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The love of God is central to God’s relationship to the world. This dissertation addresses 
the conflict of interpretation between the transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-experientialist 
models regarding divine love in the context of the God-world relationship by applying a 
canonical methodology. Chapter 1 introduces the background, purpose, problem, scope, and plan 
of study as well as the final-form canonical theological method employed in the investigation. 
Chapter 2 briefly surveys the historical theology of love, tracing the central conceptions of divine 
love and the God-world relationship by selected, highly influential thinkers. Chapter 3 presents 
and analyzes the irreconcilable interpretations of divine love in relation to the world, and the 
ontologies that ground them, in the transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-experientialist models. 
In the former model, divine love is a unilateral, unmotivated, willed benevolence, while in the 
latter model divine love is essentially relational, emotional, and primarily passive. Subsequently, 




conflict of interpretations, indicating the potential for paradigm change in the theological model 
of interpreting God's love to the world. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 shift to the investigation of a canonical and systematic model which 
addresses the issues raised by the conflict of interpretations through the identification and 
explanation of five primary aspects of God’s love in relation to the world derived from inductive 
examination of the canon: the volitional, evaluative, emotional, foreconditional, and multilaterally 
relational aspects. Chapters 4 and 5 present the data from a canonical investigation of the data 
regarding divine love in the OT and NT respectively. The material from the biblical investigation 
of divine love is utilized to construct a model of divine love that addresses the conflict of 
interpretations seen in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 6 summarizes and explains the broad outline of a 
canonical and systematic model of divine love in relation to the world, with implications for 
divine ontology and the nature of God’s relationship to the world. The dissertation concludes by 
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 What is the nature of divine love? The importance of this question is apparent by way of 
the prominence of the concept of divine love in diverse paradigms, worldviews, and theological 
systems. Many theologians consider divine love to be a central component of God’s 
nature/character, if not the very essence of God itself. Accordingly, the conflict of interpretations 
regarding the nature of divine love has large repercussions in the wider doctrine of God and 
systematic theology. However, there are significant conflicts in contemporary theology with 
regard to the nature of divine love, the very definition of which is prone to considerable semantic 
and conceptual ambiguity.
1
 While conceptions of divine love vary widely across a vast spectrum, 
the primary features of the debate over divine love may be illuminated by examination of the 
differences between two prominent and recent models of divine love in contemporary theology, 
which I have called the transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-experientialist models.
2
 
                                                     
 
1
 Many have recognized this lack of clarity. “Christian theologians have themselves been 
somewhat indifferent—inattentive, neutral—with regard to the concept of the love of God, if we are to 
judge from their often oblique, indistinct, or awkward treatments of the subject.” Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 
“Introduction: The Love of God—Its Place, Meaning, and Function in Systematic Theology,” in Nothing 
Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of God (ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 1. “Talk of the love of God, and indeed any Christian talk of God, is anything but 
self-explanatory, despite the ease with which theologians are wont to use familiar phrases.” George M. 
Newlands, Theology of the Love of God (Atlanta: John Knox, 1981), 136. 
2
 The transcendent-voluntarist model depicts a form of classic theism and the immanent-
experientialist model represents a form of panentheism. Since neither classic theism nor panentheism is a 
monolithic category (that is, there are other conceptions that fit within classic theism and panentheism), I 
have identified these models more narrowly. Of course, there are also numerous other models that would 
not fit within either of these models nor under classic theism or panentheism. However, the issues raised by 




The transcendent-voluntarist model is, in many ways, an offspring of the classical 
doctrine of God, which described God as utterly transcendent and incapable of pathos. This 
model of divine love emphasizes the distinction between God and the world, specifically, 
sovereignty and transcendence. The contemporary proponents of this model reject emotionless 
impassibility, yet find difficulty in reconciling God’s love with the sovereignty and immutability 
of God’s will.
3
 For this model, love originates in the sovereign will of God.
4
 God’s love is not 
merited or elicited by humans, but is totally gratuitous, nearly identical with grace. Accordingly, 
God’s love is unmotivated by external factors, and human love toward God does not bring him 
value.
5
 The immanent-experientialist model, on the other hand, stresses that divine love is 
relational, emotional, and supremely affected.
6
 This model of divine love emphasizes the 
immanent and essential relationship of God with the world. Proponents of this model claim that 
the problem with the classical view of divine love is a metaphysic which fails to allow for 
dynamic, relational, and reciprocal love.
 7
 In contrast, this model posits a loving relationship of 




 Donald A. Carson frames the issue well when he asks, “What does such love look like in a God 
who is omnipotent, omniscient, sovereign, and transcendent (i.e., above space and time)?” The Difficult 
Doctrine of the Love of God (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway Books, 2000), 45.  
4
 “God’s agape is comprehended in voluntary relationships that stem from his creative and 
compassionate personality. As represented in the Bible God’s love presupposes the exclusive voluntary 
initiative of the sovereign divine being whom no external power can manipulate.” Carl F. H. Henry, God, 
Revelation, and Authority (6 vols.; Waco, Tex.: Word Books, 1976), 6:349. This love is inherently rational 
and primarily volitional.  
5
 “Here the Lover does not seek to satisfy some personal lack or to remedy an inner need, for God 
has none, but bestows a benefit on the one he gratuitously loves.” Ibid., 343. The love of God is the 
motivation of His redemptive work, but it is a purely internal motivation. “We do not bring anything 
valuable to God—in fact, we acquire value only because we are the recipients of his love.” Leon Morris, 
Testaments of Love: A Study of Love in the Bible (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1981), 142. 
6
 The mutuality of such love is stressed as Charles Hartshorne states, “To love is to rejoice with 
the joys and sorrow with the sorrow of others. Thus it is to be influenced by those who are loved.” A 
Natural Theology for Our Time (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1967), 75.  
7
 “Using the word ‘love’, they emptied it of its most essential kernel, the element of sympathy, of 
the feeling of others’ feelings. It became mere beneficence, totally unmoved (to use their own word) by the 
sufferings or joys of the creatures. . . . A heartless benefit machine is less than a friend.” Charles 




“communion in freedom” which changes the participants.
8
 Thus, God’s love is in the shared 
experience of suffering (pathos) with the world. Not only is God free but the world is free: “there 




These models depict mutually exclusive conceptions of love as well as mutually 
exclusive ontologies of God. Moreover, as shall be examined below, the concept of divine love of 
both models is a logical outgrowth of their respective, competing, divine ontologies. This 
amounts to an impasse at the level of fundamental theology. In what way, then, could such an 
impasse be addressed in a productive manner, not only with regard to these models but with 
regard to the wider issue of divine love? On what basis should theologians decide whether God 
should be conceived as the Sovereign Will, as the self-surpassing surpasser of all, or as something 
in between? Many models of love tend to move from divine ontology to particular divine 
characteristics, the latter being constrained and shaped by the former. However, what if a 
canonical methodology was applied that afforded epistemological primacy to Scripture, sought 
the particular characteristics of God therein and, only then, asked: What is God like? This 
dissertation will do just that by taking the central issue of the nature of divine love and seeking a 
canonical model which then might shed light on the wider doctrine of God. 
                                                     
 
29. For this model, agape and eros “are not necessarily opposed.” Daniel Day Williams, The Spirit and the 
Forms of Love (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 9. 
8
 D. D. Williams, Spirit, 3. “But we do not love unless our personal being is transformed through 
the relation to the other.” Ibid., 117. “God and the nondivine creatures genuinely participate in the free self-
creation of one another.” Mark Lloyd Taylor, God Is Love: A Study in the Theology of Karl Rahner 
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), 345.  
9
 Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 18. “The traditional assertion that the will of God is the ultimate cause 
of every event cannot be preserved without qualification, because a will which allows no effective power to 
any other cannot be a loving will.” D. D. Williams, Spirit, 128. Moreover, “predestination, in the sense of 





The concept of the love of God occupies an important place within the doctrine of God, 
with abundant implications regarding theology proper and, consequently, wider systematic 
theology. The specific problem to be addressed in this dissertation is the significant contemporary 
theological conflict regarding the precise nature of divine love. The transcendent-voluntarist and 
immanent-experientialist models assert irreconcilable interpretations of divine love in the context 
of the God-world relationship. In the former model, divine love is a unilateral, unmotivated, 
willed benevolence, while in the latter model divine love is essentially relational, emotional, and 
primarily passive. The nature of the conflict between these two models highlights the primary 
issues regarding the nature of love throughout contemporary theology.  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this dissertation is to address the conflict of interpretation between the 
transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-experientialist models regarding the conception of divine 
love within the context of the God-world relationship. Specifically, this research seeks to analyze 
the nature of the conflict of interpretations between the two representative models, investigates 
the source and causes of that conflict, and applies a canonical method as a means to address the 
conflict of interpretations and better understand the broader issue of divine love. 
Scope and Delimitations 
A comprehensive investigation of the historical theology of divine love is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. Accordingly, after a brief survey of the historical theology of love by 
way of a few major exemplars, the issues will be addressed within models which themselves will 
be approached through highly regarded representatives of the respective positions, along with 
selected input from other proponents.
10
 Carl F. H. Henry will represent the transcendent-
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voluntarist model due to the immense influence and wide impact of his theology.
11
 Charles 
Hartshorne will represent the immanent-experientialist model, since his highly influential view of 
process ontology is laid out extensively in direct opposition to classical ontology.
12
 Exemplars of 
other, nuanced positions will also be engaged. An exhaustive analysis of these theologians will 
not be attempted. Rather, the focus of the analysis will be on their expressed concept of divine 
love with emphasis on the God-world relationship.  
Rather than approaching the entire conception of love, or even that of divine love, this 
dissertation is interested specifically in the love of God in the context of the God-world 
relationship. Metaphysical, ontological, and epistemological issues will be addressed only as they 
relate to the conception of divine love. Moreover, the large and growing field of trinitarian 
theology is not the focus of this study. Intra-trinitarian theology is addressed to the extent that it 
sheds light on the nature of God’s love in relationship to the world. Although the reality of intra-
trinitarian divine love entails vital information, the nature and operation of this love is secondary, 
in this research, to the love between God and other than God. Moreover, the loving actions of 
                                                     
 
attested. For instance, David Tracy comments that the use of models becomes imperative due to the 
complex situation of theology and thus “a widely accepted dictum in contemporary theology is the need to 
develop certain basic models or types for understanding the specific task of the contemporary theologian.” 
David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 
22. D. D. Williams employs a similar methodology, with regard to historical analysis, to this topic of divine 
love which he calls a “typological method” as “an instrument of analysis . . . to sharpen and organize 
significant aspects of the data.” Spirit, 52. Excellent examples of a similar use of models or types include 
Vincent Brümmer, The Model of Love: A Study in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge, N.Y.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993); Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1992); Justo L. 
González, The Story of Christianity: The Early Church to the Present Day (Peabody, Mass.: Prince Press, 
1999); and H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper, 1951). For a further discussion of 
the use of models, see Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962); Frederick Ferré, Language, Logic and God (New York: Harper, 
1961); and Ian T. Ramsey, Models and Mystery (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).  
11
 In his six-volume work God, Revelation, and Authority, C. F. H. Henry explicitly lays out both 
his ontology and his conception of divine love thus providing excellent material to explore the 
interrelationship of ontological suppositions and the meaning and nature of divine love. The contours of his 
thought on these issues are representative of the scholars in the transcendent-voluntarist model.  
12
 Moreover, Hartshorne adopts love as the central category of being and explicitly identifies this 
with the nature of God in numerous discussions. His thought forms much of the foundation that other 




God are not focused upon due to the lack of an objective way to delimit which actions would 
receive treatment. Indeed, one could make the case that all God’s actions are loving. That is, 
God’s actions are always good and appropriate to the state of affairs in accordance with his love. 
It should be noted here, then, that God’s love is consistently manifested in action throughout the 
canon, though such actions are not identical with love itself. In this work, actions appear as they 
relate to the specific questions of this dissertation. 
The investigation of canonical data will be limited to information that relates to the 
conception of divine love in relationship to the world. Accordingly, the texts to be examined will 
be selected in relationship to questions that directly bear on integral aspects of the transcendent-
voluntarist and immanent-experientialist models.
13
 Furthermore, a full exegesis of each text will 
not be attempted, nor will this dissertation attempt to produce an exhaustive conception of divine 
love. Rather, this study is limited to the articulation of the outline of a biblical model that may 
serve as a blueprint of divine love in the God-world relationship.
14
 
Plan of Study 
Methodological Steps 
The first methodological goal will be an analytical description of each model’s view of 
divine love in order to clearly identify the conflict of interpretation. The second methodological 
goal will seek to uncover the causes that are explicitly or implicitly involved in the construction 
of these two conceptions of divine love in the context of the God-world relationship. Closely 
related to the main conflict of these models are the issues of divine ontology. The nature of God 
and God’s relationship to the world has come under increasing debate in scholarship, which has 
                                                     
 
13
 These questions are extracted from the conflict of interpretations investigated in chapter 3. See 
the brief discussion of these questions below in this chapter.  
14
 Such a model will outline the contours of divine love in a systematic manner and will serve as a 
heuristic tool, with the recognition that it will not be exhaustive and includes the potential for distortion. In 
this way, the model itself is open to and encourages revision based on the implications of continued biblical 




pointed out the vital importance of underlying ontological suppositions.
15
 Furthermore, it is 
increasingly recognized that by nature, conceptions of divine love are directly related to these 
ontological suppositions.
16
 This suggests the possibility that conceptions of divine love may be 
by-products of the underlying epistemology and ontology, which themselves are often derived 
from presupposed philosophical systems.
17
 Both the transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-
                                                     
 
15
 Theologians are increasingly recognizing that “talk of God is dependent on a concept of the 
world, which can be established only through metaphysical reflection.” Wolfhart Pannenberg, Metaphysics 
and the Idea of God (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990), 6. The call for ontological work has long 
existed in philosophical works. For an overview see Henry Ruf, ed., Religion, Ontotheology, and 
Deconstruction (New York: Paragon House, 1989). Process theologians have been quite vocal in criticizing 
the ontological issues of classical theism. See, for instance, Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Reality 
as Social Process; Studies in Metaphysics and Religion (New York: Hafner, 1971). Distinct from this 
philosophy, Fernando Canale criticized the ontological presuppositions in theology in A Criticism of 
Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions (Berrien Springs, Mich.: 
Andrews University Press, 1987). More recently he has called specifically for attention to ontology in the 
construction of theology in “The Quest for the Biblical Ontological Ground of Christian Theology,” 
Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 16 (2005): 1–20. Open theism has also lodged a critique 
against the dependence of the doctrine of God on Greek philosophical suppositions, specifically relating to 
the nature of God. See Clark H. Pinnock et al., The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the 
Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1994), and Clark H. Pinnock, Most 
Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2001). Colin E. 
Gunton states that “it is one of the tragedies—one could almost say crimes—of Christian theological 
history that the Old Testament was effectively displaced by Greek philosophy as the theological basis of 
the doctrine of God.” Act and Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 2003), 3. Cf. Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of 
Doctrine (5 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 1:53. Gerald Bray, a classical theist, is 
aware of the ontological issues regarding the doctrine of God but claims that classical theism has not been 
corrupted by Greek thought in Gerald Lewis Bray, The Doctrine of God (Contours of Christian Theology 2; 
Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1993). Another classical theist, Norman Geisler, also recognizes a 
connection but argues for the usage of classical categories in Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1991). The debate about the impact of ontological 
presuppositions is ongoing. Cf. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, 
and Authorship (Cambridge Studies in Christian Doctrine 18; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010). 
16
 D. D. Williams states, “In Christian faith all thought about love leads to the nature of God, and 
therefore the reconception of love leads to the question of the being of God.” Spirit, 90. Others concur that 
a “new paradigm for contrasting the love of God entails nothing less than a revision of the God-world 
relationship itself, which is to say, a revision of the whole of theology.” Vanhoozer, “Introduction,” 3. 
Moreover, “an exploration of the content of the concept of love opens up wide theological questions 
relating to the being of God and the nature of human being in relation to God.” Gary D. Badcock, “The 
Concept of Love: Divine and Human,” in Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love 
of God (ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 31. 
17
 The concept of divine love holds many implications in the realm of metaphysics. Conversely, 
metaphysics is capable of dominating the concept of divine love. Of prime significance is the nature of 




experientialist models repeatedly employ ontological language in their descriptions of divine 
love. In this way, both appeal to ontological suppositions, whether explicitly or implicitly, to 
support and express their respective conceptions of divine love.
18
 Therefore, the conflict of 
interpretation regarding the conception of divine love seems to spring from a deeper, underlying 
conflict of ontological interpretations about the being of God and God’s relation to the being of 
the world.  
The present conversation about divine love is by no means limited to these two models 
(as shall be seen in chapter 3) and a survey of this issue suggests significant dissatisfaction with 
the status quo. The growing interest and research regarding ontological suppositions in theology, 
coupled with the contemporary conflicts regarding divine love specifically, signifies the emergent 
potential for a paradigm change as it relates to this issue. 
As a third methodological goal, this dissertation proposes to seek a way out of the 
conflict of interpretations on divine love by analyzing the biblical data regarding divine love. 
This will consist of a fresh study of the biblical text regarding divine love, which does not assume 
either ontology of models in question, but rather, intentionally brackets out (epoché) extra-
biblical ontological presuppositions relating to divine love.
19
 This should expose a model of 
divine love, situated within an ontology that is implied in the Bible, which may help overcome 
                                                     
 
concept of divine love and preclude another. Accordingly, certain aspects of divine love may call for a 
revision of ontological suppositions. In the unraveling of these issues, methodology plays a prime role. 
18
 In the immanent-experientialist model such language is explicitly and intentionally used to 
critique the classical ontology. The transcendent-voluntarist model may not explicitly identify the 
underlying assumptions of God’s timelessness and perfection with ontology. Nevertheless, whether used 
implicitly or explicitly, underlying conceptions regarding God’s nature are, by definition, ontological.  
19
 Epoché refers to suspension of judgment and is used philosophically to describe the intent to 
describe phenomena apart from presuppositions. Farber states on such a method “phenomenological 
reduction makes possible the final elucidation of all elements of knowledge and experience by enabling us 
to get back and to the bottom of all presuppositions” which “makes possible a truly descriptive 
philosophy.” Marvin Farber, “The Ideal of a Presuppositionless Philosophy,” in Philosophical Essays in 
Memory of Edmund Husserl (ed. Marvin Farber; New York: Greenwood, 1968), 62. For a further 




the theological conflict. This inverts the prevalent order by investigating the nature of divine love 
prior to the supposition of a pre-existing and developed ontology.
20
 In the interpretation and 
analysis of the biblical data, a final-form canonical approach will be utilized, which will employ 
tota scriptura on the concept of divine love.
21
 In this way, the canon as a whole will provide the 
content for a model of divine love which sheds light on an implicit biblical ontology and provides 
implications for the God-world relationship.  
Annotated Outline 
After this chapter, the study continues in chapter 2 with a brief historical survey of divine 
love which traces the central conceptions of divine love and the God-world relationship by a few 
selected, highly influential, thinkers. Next, in chapter 3, the exemplars of the transcendent-
voluntarist and immanent-experientialist models will be engaged to analyze their views on divine 
love in relation to the world as well as the ontologies that ground their conceptions. Subsequently, 
a sample of recent reactions to both models will demonstrate the current dissatisfaction regarding 
the conflict of interpretations, indicating the potential for paradigm change in the theological 
model of interpreting God’s love to the world. In chapters 4, 5, and 6 the study will shift to the 
investigation of a canonical and systematic model that addresses the issues raised by the conflict 
of interpretations. Chapters 4 and 5 present the data from an extensive canonical investigation of 
the data regarding divine love in the OT and NT respectively. The material from the biblical 
investigation of divine love is then utilized in the construction of a model of divine love that 
                                                     
 
20
 As Vanhoozer notes, “There has been a tendency in Western theology to discuss the divine 
attributes—the properties or qualities that make God God—in abstraction from the biblical stories about 
God’s speaking and acting in the history of Israel and Jesus Christ.” Remythologizing, 70. In his project to 
remythologize theology Vanhoozer asks: “What must God be like in order to do what the Bible depicts him 
as doing with words: creating, commanding, promising, consoling?” Ibid., 3. This work asks a similar 
question with regard to the nature of divine love. 
21
 This approach looks for a unified worldview (specifically on divine love) that may be 
discovered in the biblical data, due to a belief in the inherent unity of Scripture, due to its divine revelation 




addresses the conflict of interpretations seen in chapter 3. Chapter 6 will then reveal the broad 
outline of a canonical and systematic model of divine love in relation to the world, with 
implications for divine ontology and God’s relationship to the world. Finally, the dissertation will 
conclude with the summary, conclusions, and recommendations for further study. 
Theological Method: A Final-Form Canonical Approach 
 In order to seek a systematic model of divine love that might address the issues raised by 




 approach to systematic 
theology.
24
 This approach accepts the biblical canon as the basis of Christian doctrine and thus 
reserves epistemological primacy for the canon as divine self-revelation.
25
 
                                                     
 
22
 A final-form approach means that the canonical text is approached in the extant form(s) 
available due to the lack of access to a complete, original, final form. As such, attention is directed to the 
received corpus of canonical texts and not to non-manuscript-based reconstructions of the text(s). At the 
same time, the best findings of textual criticism in recovering the original text should not be excluded. 
23
 Here, the “canon” refers to the 66 OT and NT books that are recognized most widely throughout 
Christianity. While some may wish to include other books or traditions, the authority of the 66 books finds 
wide agreement since the 39 OT books are accepted as canonical throughout Judaism and Christianity and 
the 27 NT books are accepted across Christian denominations. I believe the 66 book canon has been 
correctly recognized (intrinsic canon) but not determined by the community (community canon) as I have 
described elsewhere. See John C. Peckham, “The Canon and Biblical Authority: A Critical Comparison of 
Two Models of Canonicity,” TJ 28, no. 2 (2007): 229–49, and “Intrinsic Canonicity and the Inadequacy of 
the Community Approach to Canon Determination,” Them 36 (2011): 203–15. Nevertheless, one need not 
subscribe to this view of the scope of the canon in order to implement the approach suggested here. 
24
 Much of what follows in the description of the theological method of this dissertation is 
dependent upon my article: John C. Peckham, “The Analogy of Scripture Revisited: A Final Form 
Canonical Approach to Systematic Theology,” MAJT 22 (2011): 41–53. 
25
 Although it is beyond the scope of this work to justify the authority of Scripture in systematic 
theology, there are plausible reasons for such a selection, not least of which is the conviction of the vast 
majority of Christians who attribute some degree of authority to Scripture. Moreover, calls for further 
collaboration of biblical theology in systematics have been growing. Here the selection of Scripture is 
admittedly a presupposition, the validity of which is open to question; nevertheless it seems at least as valid 
as any other starting point. In this regard, it is worth noting that postmodern epistemology has overcome the 
strictures of logical positivism, thus opening an alternative to evidentialism, that of faith. As Vanhoozer 
puts it: “Instead of making robust claims to absolute knowledge, even natural scientists now view their 
theories as interpretations.” Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Zondervan, 1998), 19. Cf. Fernando Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive 
Foundation of Christian Theology in a Postmodern World (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 
2001), 9. As such, all epistemology requires the selection of a starting point. This is not to say that all 
choices are equally adequate or valuable but, rather, that it is not necessary (and perhaps not possible) to 




Canonical Correspondence and Coherence 
Two criteria of adequacy pertain to this canonical approach: correspondence to the canon 
and internal coherence.
26
 Canonical coherence seeks a system that is internally consistent and 
lucid.
27
 Such an approach entails a sympathetic reading of the canon where the congruity of 
                                                     
 
meaning of the ultimate framework for intelligibility rests on human choice, why not choose divine 
revelation as available in Scripture?” Ibid., 10. Further, the objection that theism should not be selected as a 
starting point also founders in light of postmodern epistemology since, as Anthony C. Thiselton points out, 
“non-theism or positivism is no more value-free than theism.” “Canon, Community, and Theological 
Construction,” in Canon and Biblical Interpretation (ed. Craig G. Bartholomew et al.; Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Zondervan, 2006), 4. This is not necessarily the same as epistemological presuppositionalism, a 
perspective that nevertheless is of interest and could be compatible with this approach. See Cornelius Van 
Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge (Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1969), and Gordon Haddon 
Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation (2d ed.; Jefferson, Md.: Trinity Foundation, 1986). C. F. H. Henry, 
the exemplar of the transcendent-voluntarist model, explicitly adopts Scripture as the ground of theology 
saying: “The legitimacy of what we may say about God’s being, essence, nature, substance, attributes, or 
whatever else, stems solely from the living God who makes himself known and from the divinely inspired 
Scriptures.” God, Revelation, 5:49. On the other hand, Hartshorne (the exemplar of the immanent-
experientialist model) does not himself recognize the normativity of the canonical text but does recognize 
its potential (but not a priori validity) for theological reflection: “A theology which in principle accepts 
revelation as affording knowledge to those able to assimilate it may have light to throw upon truths 
otherwise likely or perhaps certain to be missed or seen less clearly.” Man‘s Vision of God and the Logic of 
Theism (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1964), 67. For him, however, nature “is the real ‘word of God’ 
concerning the general structure of the cosmos.”
 
Omnipotence, 73. 
The reservation of epistemological primacy for the canon as divine self-revelation contrasts with 
the turn toward tradition/community for confessional systematic theology. In this conception, “legitimate 
traditio, which recognizes the importance of the community as receptor and preserver, is built into the final 
form canon itself.” Peckham, “Analogy,” 45. For a brief discussion of this approach in relationship to and 
distinction from other canonical approaches such as those of Brevard Childs and James A. Sanders, see 
ibid., 43-46. Cf. Thiselton, “Canon,” and C. F. H. Henry, “Canonical Theology: An Evangelical Appraisal,” 
Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 8 (1990): 76–108. There I explain that my canonical approach 
differs from that of both Brevard S. Childs and James A. Sanders in that it does not rely on speculative 
reconstruction of the tradition history of the canonical text(s). See James A. Sanders, Canon and 
Community: A Guide to Canonical Criticism (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 67, and Brevard S. Childs, 
Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 54. Further, I reject 
Sanders’s view that the canon is fluid, agreeing with Childs that the focus of interpretation should be on the 
final canonical form as a unified and interrelated document that is recognized, not determined, by humans. 
See Sanders, Canon, 25, 31, 35, and Torah and Canon (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972), 17–20, and Childs, 
Biblical Theology in Crisis (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1970), 105, 189–91, and “Sensus Literalis of 
Scripture: An Ancient and Modern Problem,” in Beiträge Zur Alttestamentlichen Theologie: Festschrift 
Für Walther Zimmerli (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977), 80–93. 
26
 Compare Grant R. Osborne’s criteria of validity according to his critical realism, including the 
“criteria of coherence, comprehensiveness, adequacy, and consistency” and, he adds, durability. The 
Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical Interpretation (2d ed.; Downers Grove, 
Ill.: InterVarsity, 2006), 398. 
27
 Coherence is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for adequacy since, short of exhaustive 




diverse texts is sought without injury to the meaning of individual texts and pericopes. As a 
starting point, then, this approach subscribes to the canon’s own claims to internal coherence and 
thus looks for internal consistency “while conscientiously dealing with areas of perceived or 
apparent tension.”
28
 The historical rationale for approaching the canonical text, written by 
numerous different authors in different times and places, as mutually consistent and 
complementary stems from the view that canonical texts were written from within the stream of 
canon that preceded them such that their successive human authors were overtly influenced, 
having their preunderstanding shaped by existing canon and consciously intended faithfulness to 
preceding canonical writings.
29
 The theological rationale for such an approach affirms the 
                                                     
 
28
 Peckham, “Analogy,” 49. On the other hand, some have suggested that, for the sake of 
legitimate, critical study, any presupposition of the truthfulness of the text should be set aside. See John 
Barton, The Nature of Biblical Criticism (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 2007). However, why 
not first look for the coherence and consistency in the text, not assuming it uncritically, but looking for it 
rigorously? It seems that a decision to approach the text in this manner is no less arbitrary than the decision 
to expect incongruence in the text. Where apparent problems arise they should be duly noted and not 
glossed over but oftentimes even these, in light of further examination, do not rule out overall consistency 
(not simplistic identicality). In this way, the diversity and polyphony of the text does not necessarily equate 
with a cacophony of voices. Daniel J. Treier, “Scripture, Unity of,” Dictionary for Theological 
Interpretation of the Bible (ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer et al.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2005), 
733. On the other hand, James Sanders contends, “Consistency is a mark of small minds.” Canon, 46. 
However, the rush to judgment of naiveté or simplicity against those who look for unity and coherence in 
the canon might be premature and at times may even rely upon a hyper positivistic and simplistic reading—
a kind of reverse proof-texting intended to prove disunity, which is no more helpful than the out-of-context 
proof text in favor of consistency that ignores the textually conveyed and controlled intentions of the canon. 
Indeed: “Critical scholarship in this sense is often more ‘literalistic’ than are conservative scholars in that it 
often assumes that any so-called contradiction or difference between biblical writers removes the basis for a 
deeper theological unity between them.” Osborne, Hermeneutical, 350. On the contrary, where tensions 
arise there might be an “underlying unity,” despite a “different level of perception.” I. Howard Marshall, 
New Testament Theology: Many Witnesses, One Gospel (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 2004), 30. So 
Osborne, Hermeneutical, 357. As such, the canon may be approached as a unified composition while 
recognizing the diversity stemming from human authorship and various historical contexts. On the other 
hand, one who does not subscribe to the divine revelation and/or inspiration of the canon may still follow 
such an approach by (temporarily) suspending judgment about the congruity of the canon. 
29
 This does not necessarily mean that congruity exists (though I believe it does), nor does it 
exclude diversity and multivalency, but nevertheless points to the legitimacy of looking for coherence in 
the canon since earlier parts of the canon provided the context and contributed to the shaping of later parts 
of the canon. For example, when Isaiah writes and calls for correspondence to the “law and to the prophets” 
he is appealing to the in-process “canon” as the context of proper prophetic speech (Isa 8:20). Thiselton 
comments, “Intertextual resonances form part of the hermeneutic of the biblical traditions themselves.” 
“Canon,” 5. Cf. Gerhard Maier, The End of the Historical-Critical Method (St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia, 
1977), 71. The apparent congruity of the canon has been recognized elsewhere. Consider David Noel 




canonical claim that Scripture is divinely revealed and inspired and is, as such, a unified (though 
not monolithic) document; not merely the words of humans but the word of God (cf. 2 Tim 3:16; 
1 Thess 2:13).
30
 The canon itself contains numerous examples that provide the basis of something 
like a canonical approach.
31
 
                                                     
 
message” such that the “the whole work, almost exactly half of the Hebrew Bible, was the end product of 
[a] single mind or compiler (or a very small committee, like the one that produced the famous King James 
Version of the Bible).” David Noel Freedman, Jeffrey C. Geoghegan, and Michael M. Homan, The Nine 
Commandments: Uncovering a Hidden Pattern of Crime and Punishment in the Hebrew Bible (New York: 
Doubleday, 2000), 1, 164. Contra Sanders who dismisses any “discreet genius” redactor or master weaver 
hypothesis. Canon, 29-30. Consider also Hans W. Frei’s proposal of the unity of narrative, which gathers 
Scripture as part of an overarching story, a realistic narrative in contrast to referential reading, in The 
Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974). 
30
 Kermode proposes that “the books within the biblical canon form a ‘separate cognitive zone’ 
and are ‘interrelated like the parts of a single book.’” “The Canon,” in The Literary Guide to the Bible, 605-
6, quoted in Vanhoozer, Meaning, 134. Vanhoozer refers to the “Bible as a unified canonical whole,” 
which should “ultimately count as a divine communicative work” that comprises “the entire length and 
breadth of the canon.” Remythologizing, 12. Cf. Charles J. Scalise, From Scripture to Theology: A 
Canonical Journey into Hermeneutics (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1996), 64; Paul McGlasson, 
Invitation to Dogmatic Theology: A Canonical Approach (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos, 2006), 28; and 
Neil B. MacDonald, Metaphysics and the God of Israel: Systematic Theology of the Old and New 
Testaments (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2006). Maier contends that “biblical writers seek 
consciously to recede into the background. They point away from themselves to God as the author of their 
message.” Biblical Hermeneutics (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway Books, 1994), 22. See also Treier, “Scripture,” 
733. Consider also Nicholas Wolterstorff’s suggestion of a “unity behind the text,” that is, the canon 
“authorized” as a work. “The Unity Behind the “Canon,” in One Scripture or Many? Canon from Biblical, 
Theological, and Philosophical Perspectives (ed. Christine Helmer and Christof Landmesser; Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 220, 228. He has elsewhere proposed that God is Scripture’s ultimate 
authorizer. See idem, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).  
31
 The canonical writings themselves contain the notion of canon in the limited sense of “rule” or 
“standard.” The intention recognized in the Bible to be read as canon does not itself prove its canonicity but 
does provide the necessary condition for such a canonical approach. Many instances of the OT demonstrate 
the intention for the writings to have a continuing, authoritative function like unto a rule or standard. 
Perhaps the capstone statement comes from Isa 8:16, 20, “Bind up the testimony, seal the law among my 
disciples” (Here and elsewhere, unless otherwise noted all biblical quotations are from the NASB). Verse 
20 adds, “To the law and to the testimony! If they do not speak according to this word, it is because they 
have no dawn.” Moses, per divine instruction (Exod 17:14), wrote the law and gave it to the priests (Deut 
31:9) who were to assemble the people to encourage them “to be careful to observe all the words of this 
law” (Deut 31:12). Cf. Josh 1:8; 23:6; 1 Kgs 2:3; Neh 8:8–18; 9:3. Throughout the OT, the prophets 
continually called the people to “hear the word of the Lord” (Amos 3:1; Jer 2:4; Ezek 6:3; Hos 4:1). 
Furthermore, over and over NT writers appeal to OT writings as authoritative (Rom 4:3), including Jesus 
himself (Luke 10:26). In the NT, 2 Tim 1:13 exhorts to “retain the standards of sound words which you 
have heard from me” (Cf. 2 Thess 2:15; 3:14; Titus 1:9; 2 John 9–10; Jude 3). Jesus counseled to hear his 
words and do them, likening those who do to one who builds on the rock and one who does not to one who 
builds his house on the sand (Matt 7:24, 26). Moreover, Jesus, on the road to Emmaus, utilizes Moses and 




Beyond coherence, this approach seeks discernible correspondence to the canonical 
data.
32
 That is, this canonical and systematic approach seeks the maximum achievable 
correspondence to the intention in the text that is discernible, demonstrable, and defensible.
33
 As 
such, theological construction must not be isolated from exegetical considerations but based upon 
them while at the same time taking care to avoid extra-canonical presuppositions that might 
unduly affect interpretation.
34
 The intention in the text is the effect of authorial (divine and 
human) intent in writing that text but not identical to authorial intent. While the text 
inscripturates, to some degree, authorial intention, one has only the effect of that intention (the 
text) as object of investigation.
35
 It is thus the job of the interpreter to find the intent that is 
                                                     
 
5:17–18). Elsewhere Jesus teaches that the Scriptures testify of him and that one who believes Moses 
should believe him; conversely if one does not believe Moses it is clear why one does not believe him 
(John 5:39, 46–47). Paul contends that he believes “everything that is in accordance with the Law and that 
is written in the Prophets” (Acts 24:14; cf. 2 Cor 4:2). Moreover, belief is to be in accordance with the 
gospel preached by the apostles, which is not their own message but itself received from the Lord (Gal 1:8–
12). In this way, the early Christians were “continually devoting themselves to the apostles’ teaching” (Acts 
2:42; cf. Titus 3:8). In 1 Thess 2:13 it states, “we also constantly thank God that when you received the 
word of God which you heard from us, you accepted it not as the word of men, but for what it really is, the 
word of God.” In Acts 17:11 the Bereans are commended for their commitment to the Scriptures, “for they 
received the word with great eagerness, examining the Scriptures daily to see whether these things were 
so.” The importance of Scripture, its inspiration and essential function, is also unequivocally stated in 2 
Tim 3:16 (cf. 2 Pet 1:19). 
32
 The importance of correspondence to Scripture is widely recognized. For example, Wayne A. 
Grudem states, “Theology should be explicitly based on the claims of Scripture.” Systematic Theology: An 
Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1994), 15. Cf. Scalise, Scripture, 17. 
33
 There is no method that will mechanically distinguish adequate interpretations from inadequate 
ones. Thus, it is acknowledged that subjectivity as to what is adequate will remain, but the interpreter 
attempts to provide interpretation that might be discernible by, and demonstrable to, others. Such 
interpretations should continually be subjected back to the text in a hermenutical spiral.  
34
 In this regard, see the discussion of hermeneutical and phenomenological exegesis below.  
35
 However, the text itself is not identical to the complexity, comprehensiveness, and 
exhaustiveness of the author’s intention including the author’s consciousness at the time of writing. Since 
the author’s consciousness at the time of writing is not an available object of examination (indeed it is lost 
even to the human author in subsequent moments), appeal to intent that is beyond or behind the text (that is, 
not textually discernible) is speculative. So Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics 
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994), 73. This approach thus rejects the unfortunate 
dichotomy between what the text meant and what the text means. The former is unrecoverable in its 
entirety but is the cause of the text, itself the grounding of the latter. As such, the legitimate contemporary 
meaning in the text cannot be separated from the original meaning in the text insofar as that can be 




preserved and discernible in the text and thereby interpret the meaning in the text, insofar as 
possible.
36
 Accordingly, this approach adopts a hermeneutical (critical) realist perspective
37
 
“while recognizing that the interpreter brings his/her own horizon to the text such that explicating 
                                                     
 
latter’s concerns regarding the potential separation of biblical theology from systematics. Stendahl, 
“Biblical Theology, Contemporary,” IDB, 1:425, and Dulles, “Response to Krister Stendahl’s Method in 
Theology,” in The Bible in Modern Scholarship (ed. J. Philip Hyatt; New York: Abingdon, 1965), 210-216. 
Cf. Osborne, Hermeneutical, 32. See also the compelling criticism of this distinction in favor of a canonical 
biblical theology in Gerhard F. Hasel, “The Relationship between Biblical Theology and Systematic 
Theology,” TJ 5 (1984): 113–27. 
36
 While authorial intention is itself unrecoverable en toto “the text should be read with the 
recognition that the author is the unquestioned cause of the text, which was itself written for some 
purpose.” Peckham, “Analogy,” 50. Thus, as differentiated from reader response theories, a canonical 
reading “shares a concern for the objective reality of the text and for its intentional direction and ruled 
character.” Christopher Seitz, “Canonical Approach,” Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the 
Bible (ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer et al.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2005), 100. Cf. Seitz, “The 
Canonical Approach and Theological Interpretation,“ in Canon and Biblical Interpretation (ed. Craig G. 
Bartholomew et al.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2006). See also Vanhoozer’s approach to the text as 
a communicative act, based on the speech-act theory of Austin and Searle. Meaning, 26. Cf. Vincent 
Brümmer, Theology and Philosophical Inquiry: An Introduction (Philadelphia: Westminister, 1982). 
Therein Vanhoozer points out that pebbles formed by waves into words would not be considered text by 
anyone. Rather, text requires an ordering agent, the author. Thus, for him, “‘the sense of the text’ is 
logically inseparable from ‘the intention of the author.’” Meaning, 109.  
37
 “The ‘hermeneutic realist’ holds that there is something prior to interpretation, something 
‘there’ in the text, which can be known and to which the interpreter is accountable. By contrast, the 
hermeneutic nonrealist (e.g., Derrida, Fish) denies that meaning precedes interpretive activity; the truth of 
an interpretation depends on the response of the reader.” Vanhoozer, Meaning, 26. In other words, 
hermeneutical realism believes that there is meaning in the text that exists objectively (independent of the 
interpreter). Cf. Stephen Mailloux, “Rhetorical Hermeneutics,” Critical Inquiry 11 (1985): 620-641, and E. 
D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967). Cf. Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s seminal view that meaning is not located merely in authorial intent but in a “fusion” of the 
textual and interpreter’s horizons such that the reader cannot fully recover the meaning of the text 
objectively since the interpreter’s horizon always contributes to the interpretation due one’s historically 
effected consciousness (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein), in Truth and Method (trans. Joel 
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall; New York: Continuum, 2004). For a variation of the issue of the 
horizon or intention of the text see Paul Ricœur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of 
Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 30. While this canonical approach 
recognizes that one’s interpretation is always more than the objective meaning of the text due to the horizon 
of the interpreter, it insists that the interpreter’s horizon is not a valid contributor to meaning but should 
continually be subjected to the text. Here, the search is for the meaning in the text, which is an important 
nuance beyond the approach that seeks the determinate meaning of authorial intention itself. See C. F. H. 
Henry, God, Revelation, 5:403, and Walter C. Kaiser, Toward an Exegetical Theology: Biblical Exegesis 
for Preaching and Teaching (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1981), 32. Their view is largely in 
keeping with the view of Hirsch in Validity. Such attempts to reach the author’s intent have been roundly 
criticized; consider the seminal article by William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Intentional 
Fallacy,” in The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 
1954), 3–18. For an excellent discussion of the various issues involved with regard to intention and the 




the meaning in the text is an imperfect, complex, and continual process, which the interpreter 
must recognize and apply in an ongoing hermeneutical spiral.”
38
 In this approach the text as 
canon is always the source that the interpreter seeks to understand rather than replace as well as 
the objective control to which interpretation seeks to conform. Accordingly, in the absence of 
either internal coherence or canonical correspondence, the interpreter should return to the 
canonical data to identify and correct any discrepancy. 
Since this approach focuses on textual and intertextual interpretation of the canon as a 
unified, literary document in accordance with the analogy of Scripture (analogia Scripturae) less 
consideration is given to questions of introduction (isagogics) and more consideration to the 
theological interpretation of Scripture.
39
 Accordingly, the canonical approach includes exegesis as 
a crucial starting point for the gleaning of biblical data but transcends its limitations, especially in 
looking “beyond (without overlooking) the limits of individual texts and pericopes, toward the 
entire canon.”
40
 It further transcends biblical theology insofar as that discipline refers to the 
compilation and summary of an exegesis of particular books or themes. It includes such exegesis 
and compilation of biblical data but utilizes that data in the quest for the “patterns and inner logic 
of the texts in relation to the whole canonical text” without dismissing the complexity of the 
                                                     
 
38
 Peckham, “Analogy,” 51. Here and elsewhere, I use the term “spiral” in Osborne’s sense to refer 
to the process of going back and forth between various components (i.e., text and context, interpreter’s 
horizon and the text’s horizon), which mutually correct one another, avoiding vicious circle and thereby 
moving closer and closer to the intended meaning in the text. In this way, “continuous interaction between 
text and system forms a spiral upward to theological truth.” Osborne, Hermeneutical, 392. That the text is 
distinguished from its author and from its interpreter(s) should not lead to separation or autonomy, but 
differentiation; what we have is the text, nothing more, nothing less. Thus the text is to be interpreted 
without naïvely believing one’s interpretation always gets past one’s own limited horizon while 
nevertheless seeking the horizon (the thought world) of the text, not to get behind the text but to make 
sense of it. “The goal of understanding better, conceived in terms of an unreachable telos and the 
impossibility of complete understanding, bears witness to the fact that the endeavor to interpret more 
deeply is always worthwhile.” Grondin, Introduction, 71. 
39
 This in no way excludes the importance of isagogics and other, related disciplines but simply 
limits (at least at first) the focus of the canonical investigation to the text itself. See Meir Weiss, The Bible 
from Within: The Method of Total Interpretation (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1984). 
40






 As such, the product of such a canonical approach is not merely an outline of biblical 
data. Rather, the systematician asks theological questions of the canon and seeks text-based and 




Hermeneutical and Phenomenological Exegesis 
This process is further clarified by Fernando Canale’s distinction between hermeneutical 
and phenomenological exegesis.
43
 Hermeneutical exegesis refers to the philological and historical 
dimensions of the exegetical method, whereas phenomenological exegesis refers to interpretation 
that goes beyond a particular pericope in seeking the canonical horizon that impacts the meaning 
of the text(s).
44
 As such, phenomenological exegesis utilizes exegetically derived canonical data 
in order to uncover the first principles of reality that are implicit in the canon and, in so doing, 
addresses the conflict between the interpreter’s presupposed (whether conscious or unconscious) 
metaphysical framework and that which is constitutive of the internal logic of the canon by 
                                                     
 
41
 Ibid. Canonical primacy here includes high regard for the canonical details, which means that 
one should not flatten the meaning of individual texts in order to fit them within a broader system. Rather, 
both limited texts and pericopes and broad, overarching readings are utilized to inform one another. All the 
while, this approach recognizes that a method of analogy “can lead to an overemphasis on the unity of 
biblical texts,” resulting in “‘artificial conformity’ that ignores the diversity of expression and emphasis 
between divergent statements in the Bible.” Donald A. Carson and John D. Woodbridge, Scripture and 
Truth (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1983), 361. Cf. James Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology: An 
Old Testament Perspective (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999); John Barton, Reading the Old Testament: 
Method in Biblical Study (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 1996); and Walter Brueggemann, Old 
Testament Theology: An Introduction (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon, 2008). 
42
 That is, the answers to theological questions must be demonstrably derived from the canonical 
data. On the importance of questions to meaning see Gadamer’s contention regarding the dialectic of 
question and answer that makes up the “‘hermeneutic urphenomenon’: ‘no assertion is possible that cannot 
be understood as an answer to a question, and assertions can only be understood in this way.” Gadamer, 
Truth, 11. 
43
 See Canale, Revelation-Inspiration, 149. 
44
 See ibid., 148. It is essential to note that this phenomenological method differs from the 
ontological suppositions of Husserl, particularly his premise that reality is grounded in human perception. 
Here phenomenological methodology responds to the need to continually criticize and re-form (and in this 





continually subjecting the interpreter’s horizon to the canonical horizon.
45
 Accordingly, this 
approach “brackets out [epoché], as much as possible, the interpreter’s preunderstanding in favor 
of the preunderstanding required by the text in its pericope as well as the text as canon, thus 
allowing the canon to provide its own metaphysical framework.”
46
 In this way, phenomenological 
                                                     
 
45
 As such, the first principles of theology are not presupposed or derived from existing 
philosophical systems. Fernando Canale has correctly criticized the apparent priority given to philosophical 
systems “as the main provider of the ‘system’ or intellectual framework for the development of Protestant 
theology.” Revelation-Inspiration, 53. Similarly, Brevard S. Childs adds, “For systematic theologians the 
overarching categories are frequently philosophical. The same is often the case for biblical scholars even 
when cloaked under the guise of a theory of history.” Biblical, 158. Osborne similarly recognizes that “all 
decisions are filtered through a network of tradition and preunderstanding, which itself exerts tremendous 
influence on our interpretations and choices. To this extent, each decision we make is provisional, and we 
must establish a continual dialogue between tradition and biblical text in the spiral upward to truth.” 
Osborne, Hermeneutical, 396. Canale thus contends: “Inner coherence should drive Christian theology to 
conceive and formulate its presuppositional structure employing a biblical rather than philosophical or 
scientific interpretation.” Revelation-Inspiration, 149. Here, while the tools of philosophy, especially with 
regard to questions and analysis, may be utilized, the “data” and “answers” of philosophical systems are not 
afforded epistemological weight but always subjected to the canon. Compare Jay Wesley Richards’s 
contention that the Christian doctrine of God must be derived “not simply from general metaphysical 
intuitions . . . but from unique, contingent things that God has done in history and, in particular, in Jesus 
Christ.” The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Immutability, and Simplicity 
(Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 2003), 30. He adds that such a concept of God must be biblically 
normative and affirm the principle of perfection and the sovereignty-aseity of God. Ibid., 32–33. However, 
what if the “Principle of Perfection” and/or the “Sovereignty-Aseity Conviction” conflicts with a canonical 
ontology of God? On this, see the brief discussion of the way of eminence later in this chapter. As Maier 
puts it: “Every hermeneutic will be grounded in certain metaphysical convictions. . . . The question is 
‘which presuppositions are justified?’ The question is ‘which assumptions are legitimate?’” Biblical, 46. 
46
 Again, epoché refers to suspension of judgment and is used philosophically to describe the 
intent to describe phenomena without presuppositions (see the brief discussion above). As Canale states, 
“In this phase of data interpretation, exegetes and theologians cancel out all previously inherited theories 
that could prove to be hindrances to the understanding of Scripture.” Revelation-Inspiration, 149. Osborne 
adds, “The key is to ‘bracket’ out our own beliefs and to allow the other side to challenge our preferred 
positions. This will drive us to examine the biblical data anew and to allow all passages on the topic to have 
equal weight.” Hermeneutical, 373. In this vein, Vanzhoozer speaks of the interpreter “indwelling” the text, 
which means that “interpreters pour themselves out, at least temporarily, for the sake of understanding the 
other.” Meaning, 349. To be sure, despite the intent to overcome them, preunderstandings remain and that 
is why the hermeneutical spiral is ongoing and never complete, ever moving toward a more canonical 
metaphysical framework in place of the interpreter’s horizon. Thus, while looking at the text 
hermeneutically to ascertain the textual intent (both divine and human) it also looks at the ontological 
suppositions that provide the framework (environment) for the text’s communication. The understanding of 
this implicit worldview will only add to, not reduce, the hermeneutical content. As such, this approach 
contrasts with Sachkritik or content criticism, which makes the interpreter supplement the meaning of the 
author. Here, the interpreter merely seeks the answers to metaphysical questions that the text requires, 
which of course is a complex task considering there may be multiple metaphysical options that could fit a 
text, which again magnifies the usefulness of the canonical context as a whole. For an Evangelical criticism 
of Sachkritik see I. Howard Marshall, “An Evangelical Approach to ‘Theological Criticism,’” Them 13 
(1988): 79–85. Likewise, this approach takes care to avoid the imposition of a “canon within the canon” in 




exegesis complements, rather than excludes, hermeneutical exegesis by way of reciprocal 
interdependence since the former keeps the canonical horizon in view while the latter’s focus on 
individual verses and pericopes “contributes to and corrects the wider metaphysical framework” 
of the interpreter in an ongoing spiral that does not subvert the multivalency of the text(s).
47
 
Therefore, these complementary categories of exegesis address the two hermeneutical circles 
(that of the text and the interpreter as well as the canonical parts and whole) from the standpoint 
of the epistemological primacy of the final-form canon for systematic theology. 
 Overall, this final-form canonical approach uses the canon as the theological source from 
which answers are derived to theological questions toward the articulation of a coherent system 
that corresponds to the text as nearly as achievable while continually subjecting the interpreter’s 
horizon to that of the canon in a hermeneutical spiral. The extracted canonical and systematic 
model is by no means the final word but remains secondary to the canonical text, which further 
corrects the system by way of ongoing canonical investigation. “Hence, the system will never 
exhaust the canonical text but endeavors to persistently move toward thorough correspondence 
and rigorous inner coherence.”
48
 Therefore, the model of divine love, sought in this study by way 
of canonical investigation, intentionally moves away from presupposing an ontology grounded in 
                                                     
 
a canon within the canon. See Eugene Ulrich, “The Notion and Definition of “Canon,” in The Canon 
Debate (ed. Lee Martin McDonald and James A. Sanders; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2002), 29; James 
D. G. Dunn, Unity and Diversity in the New Testament: An Inquiry into the Character of Earliest 
Christianity (London: SCM, 1990), and “Has the Canon a Continuing Function?” in Canon Debate (ed. 
Lee Martin McDonald and James A. Sanders; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2002); and Barr, Concept. 
Here, whatever community constructs that may function as a canon within a canon should be continually 
corrected according to the canonical text itself. 
47
 Peckham, “Analogy,” 53. In other words, “while looking at the text hermeneutically to ascertain 
the textual intent” this canonical approach “also looks for the biblical ontological suppositions that provide 
the framework for the text’s communication” such that “phenomenological exegesis and hermeneutical 
exegesis function concurrently in an ongoing, reciprocally correcting manner.” Ibid., 52. Thus, while 
“phenomenological answers are logically prior to hermeneutical ones, they are actually recognized from 
within the ongoing, reciprocal, correcting task of interpretation.” Ibid., 52–53. Such a derived framework is 
always open to, and should be continually subjected to, further analysis on the basis of canonical 
investigation. 
48




tradition(s) in search of rigorous correspondence to the text as canon.
49
 This is accomplished by 
first ascertaining the canonical description of divine love and thereafter asking what must God be 
like in order to cohere with the canonical description.
50
 Thus, the prevalent order of presupposing 
ontology then reasoning to divine characteristics is inverted by investigating the nature of divine 
love prior to the supposition of a pre-existing and developed ontology.
51
  
Method of Investigation and Presentation of the Canonical Data 
The canonical approach described above is implemented specifically with regard to the 
scope and delimitations of this dissertation by first conducting an inductive reading of the entire 
canon and grouping the data under the canonical rubrics of OT and NT. This reading analyzed 
any texts and/or passages that might contribute to potential answers to the systematic questions 
                                                     
 
49
 Of course, this approach does not rule out from the outset the possibility that the canonical data 
could affirm an existing traditional viewpoint but merely does not assume the veracity of any particular 
existing viewpoint. Further, this approach contrasts with the contention of Thomas Jay Oord that “the Bible 
does not provide an internally consistent witness to love’s meaning. Biblical writers talk about love in 
different ways and give it differing meanings. If love is to play the leading role in biblically oriented 
Christian theology, an adequate theology of love must admit this diversity.” The Nature of Love: A 
Theology (St. Louis, Mo.: Chalice, 2010), 12. To be sure, there is a great diversity regarding the meaning 
and usage of love within the canon. However, I do not believe it is true that the canon is internally 
inconsistent in this regard. Rather, as I hope to demonstrate, there is a consistent (though not monolithic or 
simple) canonical view of divine love. In a canonical approach one is not at liberty to select one aspect of 
love and declare it the “the meaning of love dominant in the biblical witness.” Ibid., 13.  
50
 Compare Vanhoozer’s question, which he phrases in numerous ways throughout his project, 
“What must God be like if he is actually the speaking and acting agent depicted in the Bible?” 
Remythologizing, 23. Elsewhere, “What must God be in order truthfully to be represented as repenting, 
grieving, compassionate?” Ibid., 50. Cf. ibid., 3, 13. He attempts to avoid ontotheology in favor of theo-
ontology, that is, to avoid “‘bad’ metaphysics” which impose “a system of categories on God without 
attending to God’s own self-communication.” Ibid., 8. Cf. ibid., 36, 175. In his view, “the character, and 
fate, of theism depends on how one relates biblical representations (the dramatic mythos) to metaphysical 
conceptualizations (logos). Metaphysics plays a magisterial role (i.e., system-building) in ontotheology 
(i.e., perfect being analysis). By contrast, a theo-ontology that hearkens first of all to God’s self-naming in 
the biblical record (i.e., mythos) accords metaphysics the more modest, ministerial vole of conceptual 
elaboration.” Ibid., 104. In this way, Vanhoozer has made a call to “reform metaphysics along biblical 
lines,” which does not follow “the five speculative ‘ways’ of Aquinas . . . but the biblical account of the 
‘ways’ of God.” Ibid., 9, 23. 
51
 By inverting the method in this way I propose that the particulars in the economy of God’s 
revelation logically have epistemological priority. In other words, if we operate with a view of divine 
revelation then it follows that we come to know about God by what he reveals, and he reveals himself in 
particulars. Any ontology must take into account these particular revelations, rather than assuming a broad 




raised by the conflict of interpretations in chapters 2 and 3, which revolve around the question of 
whether divine love is unilateral or whether God and humans may share a reciprocal (though 
unequal) relationship of love.
52
 The data extracted from this reading were then analyzed and 
grouped in an ongoing spiral, which included both narrowing and expansion of the data when 
themes became more or less significant than originally thought. 
Within this process, a number of prominent terms that hold significant implications for 
potential answers to the systematic questions became apparent.
53
 These were investigated from 
the standpoint of a synchronic-canonical approach. Here the inherent limitations of semantic 
studies with regard to systematic investigation are recognized, especially the fact that meanings of 
words vary depending upon their context and usage. Accordingly, it is not the intention of these 
semantic surveys to reduce the terms to simple definitions, nor to assume that a nuance of 
meaning in one location can be extrapolated to all other occurrences of a given term (illegitimate 
totality transfer). Rather, such surveys seek to identify and summarize the basic meaning denoted 
by word groups as well as the polysemy and the multivalency of their semantic range and usage 
within the canon in order to provide the crucial background for engaging the wider canonical 
themes regarding divine love. 
While the OT and NT data were investigated inductively, chapters 4 and 5 present the OT 
and NT data deductively by grouping the pertinent content under five rubrics that respond to the 
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 Relative to this broad issue, five questions are identified in chapter 3 as standing at the center of 
the conflict of interpretations. First, is God the sole giver but never the receiver? In other words, is divine 
love only arbitrarily willed, pure beneficence (thematic agape), or may it include desire or enjoyment 
(thematic eros)? Second, does God only bestow and/or create value or might he also appraise, appreciate, 
and receive value? Third, does God’s love include affection and/or emotionality such that God is concerned 
for the world, sympathetically or otherwise? Fourth, does God choose to fully love only some, or does he 
choose to love all, or is he essentially related to all such that he necessarily loves all? Fifth, bound up with 
this is the question of whether divine love is unconditional or conditional, ungrounded or grounded, and so 
on. While these questions relate to the theological conflict of interpretations presented (especially in 
chapter 3) the questions themselves were also shaped and altered by the canonical investigation itself. 
53
 The terms included in this study have not been selected arbitrarily but in conjunction with the 
inductive reading of the canon and the subsequent shaping of the canonical analysis. Further, as will be 




systematic questions derived from the conflict of interpretations. As such, the order of 
presentation differs from the order of investigation and it must be understood that such rubrics are 
themselves derived from the canonical data and not presupposed. Under each of the five 
categories the data are further organized according to the various sections of the OT and NT 
canon. Such diacanonical presentation respects the canonical groupings of the text without 
entering into the speculative field regarding the authorship and dating of specific passages and 
texts.
54
 Of course, the large amount of data precludes an exhaustive presentation of its analysis. 
As such, the thematic presentation in chapters 4 and 5 consists of but a survey of the research 
conducted.  
The data that make up chapters 4 and 5 are used to address the systematic questions 
regarding the conflict of interpretations regarding the nature of divine love toward a canonical 
and systematic model of divine love. This model is outlined and briefly explained in chapter 6 
along with some implications for a wider ontology of God. In all, this dissertation does not 
attempt to produce an exhaustive conception of divine love. Rather, this study is limited to the 
articulation of the outline of a canonical and systematic model that may serve as a blueprint of 
divine love in the God-world relationship. At the same time, the model itself is open to and 
encourages revision based on the implications of continued canonical investigation. 
Methodological Issues of the Canonical Investigation 
With the broad framework of this canonical approach in mind it is necessary to address 
some methodological issues that pertain to the canonical investigation of a systematic model of 
divine love in particular: (1) accommodative language and figurative expressions, (2) the 
                                                     
 
54
 In each canonical section themes recur and serve the purpose of presenting aspects of divine 
love from within their own canonical context, but also demonstrating, in retrospect, a striking continuity 




treatment of data derived from the revelation of Christ incarnate, and (3) the agency of love and 
ambiguous genitive constructions in the NT. 
Accommodative Language and Figurative Expressions 
All canonical language about God is necessarily accommodative language since all such 
language corresponds to human language. What, then, is to be done with regard to the 
applicability of canonical language to the nature of God as he actually is? Three approaches are 
generally recognized. One might treat such language as if it applies to God univocally, 
analogically, or equivocally. Since all available language is subject to the limitations and 
imperfections of human beings, it does not seem that such language could apply strictly 
univocally to God. On the other hand, if one receives the canon as divine self-revelation (as in 
this approach) such language cannot be equivocal but must apply to God in some manner.
55
 In 
this way, it is recognized from the outset that canonical language, as human (but not merely 
human) language, is partially univocal and, in this way, analogical.
56
 Importantly, the precision of 
                                                     
 
55
 As such, the supposition of the utter ineffability of God and the consequent apophatic theology 
is rejected in favor of cataphatic, or positive, theology based on divine self-revelation, not least of which is 
that manifest in the incarnate Christ. See Insole’s warning that apophatic theology also easily falls prey to 
anthropomorphic projection. Christopher J. Insole, “Anthropomorphism and the Apophatic God,” Modern 
Theology 17 (2001): 475–83. At the same time, humility about one’s understanding of God is nevertheless 
maintained such that one recognizes the imperfection of one’s picture of God. C. F. H. Henry affirms the 
“incomprehensibility” of God but not “God’s unknowability,” meaning that we have incomplete knowledge 
of God. God, Revelation, 5:375. Nevertheless, it may be misleading (even if unintentionally so) to speak of 
God as “wholly other.” The ontological and qualitative distinction between God as Creator and creatures is 
to be maintained along with the recognition that humans were created in the image of God (imago dei) in 
accordance with the canonical data on both points. Thus, Michael Scott Horton comments: “God is 
therefore neither ‘wholly other’ nor ‘wholly identical’ to human experience.” Covenant and Eschatology: 
The Divine Drama (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 8. Murray A. Rae likewise cautions: 
“The reality of God’s personal presence with humanity must not be sacrificed to a form of deference for the 
infinity and transcendence of God that would preclude us from speaking of God at all.” 
“Anthropomorphism,” Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible (ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer et 
al.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2005), 49. 
56
 By speaking of such language as both partially univocal and analogical it is recognized that the 
language does not correspond perfectly to God (since the language is itself imperfect) but may correspond 
to God to the extent that human language is capable in light of a common reality created by God and 
experienced by creatures. That is, the canonical language used of God is analogical but, on the basis of the 
canonical assertions themselves, much closer to being univocal than to being equivocal. Compare William 




the correspondence between divine self-revelation in human language and God as he actually is 
cannot be determined prior to the eschaton due to the epistemic distance (but not detachment) 
between God and humans as well as human limitations and imperfections. In light of this, the 
canon, as divine self-revelation in human (but not merely human) language, is the prime available 
source of theology in the absence of direct divine self-revelation and, though it includes 
analogical language, is nevertheless the trustworthy source and guide of theology (cf. 2 Tim 
3:16).
57
 “For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I 
will know fully” (1 Cor 13:12). 
In light of the fact that all available language is human, and thus accommodative, it must 
be recognized that not all canonical language is intended literally, though one should take care to 
not dismiss or “demythologize” language that is intended literally, especially by way of extra-
canonical presuppositions or pressures.
58
 On the contrary, some language is figurative whether by 
                                                     
 
partial overlap between concepts of divine and human action” such that there is “some commonality 
between our thought of human and divine action and motivation.” “Divine and Human Action,” in Divine 
and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism (ed. Thomas V. Morris; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), 258, 266, 273. Cf. Horton, Covenant, 8, and Alan J. Torrance, “Analogy,” 
Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible (ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer et al.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Baker Academic, 2005), 114–37. Pinnock similarly comments: “I do not take every biblical metaphor 
literally but I do try to take them all seriously.” Mover, 62. In this regard, Vanhoozer writes: “Theological 
pride overestimates the adequacy of human language and thought; theological sloth underestimates the 
importance of responding to the provocations of God’s self-revelation.” Remythologizing, 16. The approach 
taken here hopes to avoid both of these extremes of dogmatism and skepticism. 
It is also highly interesting that C. F. H. Henry (the exemplar of the transcendent-voluntarist 
model surveyed in chapter 3) generally requires “univocal meaning” in order to “avoid agnosticism and 
skepticism” as well as “equivocation.” God, 5:87. He thus asks, “Does a relational likeness of goodness 
when predicated of God and man make sense if its ascriptions to both the divine and the human have no 
univocal overlap? When thus conceived the analogy of proportionality channels into equivocation and 
hence into agnosticism.” Ibid., 5:86. However, elsewhere he asserts that “when all due allowance is made 
for the literal and objective truth conveyed by figurative statements, divine repentance is itself an 
anthropomorphic representation.” Ibid., 5:304. This, of course, requires a break from univocal language 
about God. How, then, does he know what is “anthropomorphic” and what is “ontological teaching”? 
57
 It is folly, therefore, to try to go behind the canonical data by way of other sources or human 
reasoning since all such sources and reasoning are subject to the same limitations while also not the 
products of divine inspiration. “All the language we use of God will be inadequate . . . yet the treasure is 
entrusted—by God himself—to earthen vessels.” Rae, “Anthropomorphism,” 49. 
58
 By literal I mean that “words are used literally when they are meant to be understood in their 




way of metaphor, idiom, hyperbole, and the like.
59
 It is not always easy to identify such language 
but, to the extent that it can be identified, the interpreter should treat such language according to 
the intention in the text with attention to the genre, context, and other textual and contextual clues 
to its intended correspondence to its referent(s). 
Within this context, one of the most pressing problems pursuant to a canonical and 
systematic model of divine love is the issue of the interpretation of figurative expressions relative 
to God’s nature and/or actions. In particular, the interpretation of so-called anthropomorphisms 
and anthropopathisms is of crucial importance to a canonical approach to theology proper. An 
anthropomorphism (anthropos + morphos) is the attribution of human form (or behavior) to a 
non-human entity.
60
 Anthropopathisms (anthropos + pathos) more specifically ascribe human 
pathos, emotions, to non-human entities when they do not possess such traits. In the realm of 
theology, such monikers are often applied to particular canonical language in order to convey the 
notion that such phraseology should not be taken to accurately depict God, that is, that such 
language ascribes human characteristics to God that do not actually correspond to him.
61
 
                                                     
 
and Imagery of the Bible (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980), 133. 
59
 This is not a judgment against the truth value of the language but a recognition of the intention 
in the text, which is often figurative rather than literal. This is sometimes spoken of as interpreting the text 
not by way of naïve literalism but literarily, that is, with a view toward the maximum achievable 
correspondence to text. See Osborne, Hermeneutical. 
60
 A broader definition is sometimes used that sees an anthropomorphism as “any attribution of 
human characteristics to that which is not human.” Caird, Language, 172. 
61
 Examples of this interpretive maneuver abound, only a few of which will be mentioned here. 
John W. Cooper states, “God does not learn, have his feelings aroused, or realize that he must revise his 
plans. . . . Biblical assertions of God’s reactions are anthropopathic.” Panentheism, the Other God of the 
Philosophers: From Plato to the Present (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2006), 332. Elsewhere, 
H. A. Brongers speaks of divine jealousy as “a crude anthropopathism” from which the interpreter would 
like to spare God. “Der Eifer des Herrn Zebaoth,” VT 13 (1963): 276. Cf. to a lesser degree, G. Sauer, 
 TLOT (ed. Ernst Jenni and Claus Westermann; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1997), 1147, and ”,קנא“
Nathan M. Sarna, Exodus: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the New JPS Translation (The JPS Torah 
Commentary 2; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1991), 110. Similarly, in response to passages 
that speak of divine repentance Erickson comments: “Some of them are to be understood as 
anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms. They are simply descriptions of God’s actions and feelings in 
human terms, and from a human perspective.” Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology (2d ed.; Grand 




Any dismissal of canonical language as anthropomorphic/pathic poses great difficulty for 
a coherent theological method and is mutually exclusive to the final-form canonical approach 
posited above.
62
 Specifically, to dismiss the value of figurative language in illuminating the 
nature of God a priori, because it is “human” language, runs into a number of problems. First, it 
appears to overlook the fact that all language to which the interpreter is privy is human 
language.
63
 Indeed, as explained above, all divine self-revelation is accommodative. The fact of 
                                                     
 
“From man’s limited, earthly, finite perspective it only appears that God’s purposes have changed.” Marvin 
R. Wilson, “נחם,” Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (ed. R. Laird Harris; Chicago: Moody, 
1999), 570–1. Cf. William A. Dyrness, Themes in Old Testament Theology (Downers Grove, Ill.: 
InterVarsity, 1979), 57, and Nathan M. Sarna, Genesis: The Traditional Hebrew Text with New JPS 
Translation (The JPS Torah Commentary 1; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 47. Luther 
took a similar position with regard to divine grief in Gen 6:7 stating: “Such an emotion is attributed to God, 
not as though He were thus moved, but the holy prophets, Moses, and Noah conceived of Him in this way.” 
Martin Luther, Luther’s Works (ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehmann; 55 vols.; 
Philadelphia: Fortress, 1999), 17:358. Further he states, “One should not imagine that God has a heart or 
that He can grieve. But when the spirit of Noah, of Lamech, and of Methuselah is grieved, God Himself is 
said to be grieved. Thus we should understand this grief to refer to its effect, not to the divine essence.” 
Ibid., 2:47. See also Calvin’s view of this with regard to Hos 11 below. Recently, Phillip R. Johnson 
contended that though anthropopathisms “mean something we were meant to understand . . . we must also 
confess that there is something they do not mean. They do not mean that God is literally subject to mood 
swings or melancholy, spasms of passion or temper tantrums” for “absolute immutability is one of God’s 
transcendent characteristics.” “God without Mood Swings,” in Bound Only Once: The Failure of Open 
Rheism (ed. Douglas Wilson; Moscow, Idaho: Canon, 2001), 116. 
62
 To a large extent, the dismissal of so-called anthropomorphisms/pathisms is due to the desire to 
avoid criticisms of God being anthropomorphized, that is, theology as merely the projection of humanity. 
This issue of humans crafting God in their own image is not merely responsive to Feuerbachian criticisms 
of projection but has been an issue from early on in Christian history. Thus, Vanhoozer states, “Cultured 
Greeks like Plato and Aristotle had an aversion to anthropomorphism when myths attributed to gods things 
that were immoral and shameful, such as theft or adultery.” Remythologizing, 60. Cf. Abraham Joshua 
Heschel, The Prophets (New York: Perennial, 2001), 344–45, and Edwin M. Yamauchi, 
“Anthropomorphism in Hellenism and in Judaism,” BSac 127 (1970): 212–22, and “Anthropomorphism in 
Ancient Religions,” BSac 125 (1968): 29–44. In this regard, Hartshorne believes: “A well-meaning attempt 
to purify theology anthropomorphisms purified it of any genuine, consistent meaning at all.” Omnipotence, 
29. See also, in this regard, Edmond La Beaume Cherbonnier, “The Logic of Biblical 
“Anthropomorphism,” HTR 55, no. 3 (1962): 187–206. However, the solution to the tendency toward 
human projection in theology is not to try to remove “human” language but to purposefully do theology in 
a way that rigorously corresponds to the canon. Thus, “if we are not to fall into the arms of Feuerbach at the 
very first step . . . we must think of God as the subject.” Vanhoozer, Remythologizing, 21. Further, “unless 
we accord priority to God’s own self-presentation in theodramatic activity, Christian theology is but smoke 
and mirrors—a human projection of religious affections and special effects.” Ibid., 23. 
63
 For example, “the classic understanding is that God speaks about himself anthropomorphically 
or analogically all the way through Scripture—not just in a few places. In every noun, verb, and adjective 
God has used to present Himself, certain notions of limitation and moral inadequacy apply to the human 
world that must be deleted when we apply it to God.” “God vs. God: Two Competing Theologies Vie for 




accommodative language cannot then be used (in and of itself) to distinguish between canonical 
(or any other) language that corresponds to God and that which does not. In other words, it is 
inappropriate to sideline particular canonical language about God based on the premise that it 
corresponds imperfectly to God as accommodative language since this is true of all available 
language.
64
 Second, such dismissal of canonical language as inappropriate to God appears to 
assume that the interpreter already knows what God is like and can thus differentiate between 
language that actually corresponds to God’s being and/or actions and that which does not.
65
 This 




                                                     
 
recognition that divine revelation is accommodative but with the idea that the human should then “delete” 
some of this information from one’s conception of God as if extra-canonical human language is more 
appropriate to God. Vanhoozer comments, “While we have no alternative but to employ human language 
and categories to understand God, it remains illegitimate to make the human condition the measure of 
God’s being.” Remythologizing, 22. Yet, though one need not measure God’s being by way of human 
language, such language is necessary if humans are to speak of God at all.  
64
 Indeed, Caird states, “We have no other language besides metaphor with which to speak about 
God.” Language, 174. So John C. L. Gibson, Language and Imagery in the Old Testament (Peabody, 
Mass.: Hendrickson, 1998), 26. “The only choice open to us, therefore, is whether we derive our metaphors 
from the human realm or from the non-human, and it is important to note that the biblical writers use both 
kinds.” Caird, Language, 174. In this vein, Terence E. Fretheim comments: “Metaphors do reveal an 
essential continuity with the reality which is God; they do in fact contain information about God. At the 
same time, they disclose that which is discontinuous with the divine reality”; the danger is “either 
interpreting metaphors literally in every respect or (more commonly today) denying any essential 
relationship between the metaphor and God.” “The Repentance of God: A Key to Evaluating Old 
Testament God-Talk,” HBT 10, no. 1 (1988): 51. 
65
 Thus, Vanhoozer states, “One common Jewish and early Christian strategy for dealing with 
anthropomorphic language was to distinguish God as depicted in the Bible from God as he actually is. The 
procedure assumes, of course, that one already knows what God is like (e.g., the most perfect being).” 
Remythologizing, 60. “The church fathers had their own special device—the axiom of divine 
immutability—for deciding when to take anthropomorphisms literally and when to spiritualize them.” Ibid. 
Hartshorne criticizes that those who dismissed such language must have “thought they knew better than the 
naïve writers of scripture what concepts do and what do not literally apply to deity.” Omnipotence, 76. 
66
 Consider, for example, the tension evident in Cooper’s contentions that “biblical assertions of 
God’s reactions are anthropopathic” while, on the other hand, recognizing that “Scripture presents God as 
acting and responding in ways that are analogous to humans.” Panentheism, 322–23. This tension is 
addressed by so-called modified classical theists (such as William Lane Craig and Nicholas Wolterstorff) 
by asserting that God is temporally everlasting. In this way, Cooper states, “by allowing that God is, to 
some extent, in time, the modified version can read Scripture’s narrative of God’s mighty acts in history 
more straightforwardly and less anthropomorphically than the traditional version requires.” Ibid., 343. On 




For instance, the assertion that particular canonical language is anthropomorphic/pathic 
may be asserted on the basis of the presupposition of impassibility. Insofar as one claims to 
appeal to biblical data for one’s doctrine of God, such an interpretive procedure falls prey to 
circular reasoning if the biblical data for divine passibility are excluded on the basis of the 
premise that God is impassible. Absent a compelling canonical argument which asserts that 
emotive language should not actually apply to God as he truly is, one who subscribes to a final-
form canonical approach is not at liberty to dismiss the language of divine emotions (among other 
language of God), however unsettling it may be for the proponent of traditional divine ontology.
67
 
With this in mind, two broad principles might be posited that address these problems from a 
canonical approach. First, since all language available to the interpreter is human language, the 
dismissal of figurative language for this reason is self-defeating.
68
 Second, it is inappropriate to 
assume that the interpreter knows what God is like prior to and/or independent of the canonical 
data itself and use such assumptions to qualify and/or dismiss canonical language regarding God. 
Thus, from a canonical approach, the burden of proof is on those who rule out so-called 
anthropomorphisms/pathisms as descriptions of what God is like.
69
 In my view, such a maneuver 
                                                     
 
treat this presentation as completely anthropomorphic and explain how a wholly eternal, immutable God 
acts sequentially in history and interacts with creatures.” Ibid., 323. See also Canale’s contention for divine 
(analogical) temporarily in Criticism. 
67
 Here is not the place to discuss whether a compelling canonical argument for divine 
impassibility exists. The issue will be taken up below. Absent particular canonical data one might posit that 
a divine ontology needs only internal coherence. However, the approach of a coherence theory of truth is 
insufficient since there are many apparently internally coherent pictures and even if one thought they had 
arrived at the singular coherent picture of God, the reality of human imperfections and limitations of 
reasoning should give one reason for pause. 
68
 Further, according to a canonical approach, the favoring of abstract language over figurative 
language as it relates to one’s description of God should be demonstrated in accordance with the canonical 
data itself or discarded. 
69
 With regard to canonical language of divine emotion: “The weight of traditional theological 
wisdom is on the side of the nay-sayers: nothing that happens in the world, say classical theists like 
Aquinas, can affect God’s emotional life, much, less his knowledge and will.” Vanhoozer, 
Remythologizing, 77. On the other hand, many recent theologians argue that divine passibility, including 
relationality, is necessary to love such that God is the “deeply moved ‘first mover.’” Barry L. Callen, 




lacks a consistent and compelling rationale for determining which canonical data accurately 
depict God’s nature and which canonical data are to be dismissed as merely accommodative 
language.
70
 In sum, unless there are some canonical data to the contrary, the literary thrust of 
canonical revelation should not be cast aside as merely human accommodation.
71
  
This brings us to a third issue, which is only indirectly addressed by the two broad 
principles explained above, that is, the supposed rationale for the dismissal of anthropomorphisms 
and/or anthropathisms based on the argument that such figurative language utilizes the language 
                                                     
 
See also Richard Rice, “Biblical Support for a New Perspective,” in The Openness of God: A Biblical 
Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (ed. Clark H. Pinnock et al.; Downers Grove, Ill.: 
InterVarsity, 1994). With regard to the former position, whence is the criterion that provides the rationale 
for “non-literal interpretations of biblical passages about God changing and suffering?” Vanhoozer, 
Remythologizing, 84. Wolterstorff helpfully states that “an implication of accepting Scripture as canonical 
is that one affirm, as literally true, Scripture’s representation of God unless, on some point, one has good 
reason not to do so. Put it like this: the burden of proof, for those who accept Scripture as canonical, is on 
those who hold that Scripture’s representation of God is not literally true at some point.” Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, “Could Not God Sorrow If We Do?” in The Papers of the Henry Luce III Fellows in Theology 
(ed. Christopher I. Wilkins; Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars, 2002), 140. As Vanhoozer states, “There is more than a 
superficial resemblance between the urge to do away with anthropomorphism and the urge to 
demythologize.” Remythologizing, 60. 
70
 In all this, one must have a mechanism grounded in more than the reader’s response 
(subjectivity) if one is to attempt to approach the meaning “in” the text. Does the text contain the intention 
that God has no emotions? How could that be derived from the text itself (immediate or wider canonical 
context)? How does the reader know, from the canon, that the language is anthropopathic? 
71
 In this canonical approach, divine characteristics cannot be asserted on the basis of some 
conception of God a priori but must be derived from, and able to be demonstrated on the basis of, the 
canonical data. Further, the ways of natural theology do not suffice since all of them circumvent the 
criterion of correspondence to the canon (see the explanation of this criterion above). Moreover, the way of 
analogy is imprecise and prone to error, especially human projection (whether of human qualities or 
supposedly pious abstractions) as well as an endless conflict of theological interpretations. Likewise, the 
way of negation (via negativa) assumes that one possesses at least some correct knowledge of God already 
in order to identify what God is not like and founders for lack of objective data or criteria for appeal when 
various individuals wish to negate different characteristics of God. Similarly, the way of eminence, favored 
in analytic philosophy, can be applied with various resultant conceptions of God since “intuitions about 
perfection differ, a fact that is arguably the Achilles heel of perfect being theology.” Vanhoozer, 
Remythologizing, 96. As an example, see the discussion of Hartshorne’s utilization of the way of eminence, 
with conclusions that depart widely from those of others who argue from the infinity or perfection of God’s 
being such as the denial of God’s immutability and omnipotence, in chapter 3. Vanhoozer contends that 
“early modern philosophical theism projects human conceptions of perfection onto God as ‘highest being’ 
and makes the fatal Feuerbachian slip, thus amounting to nothing more than conceptual idolatry, a chasing 




of anatomy that is not proper to God as incorporeal.
72
 There are many significant figurative 
expressions used of God that are often classified as anthropomorphic and/or anthropopathic, only 
a few of which will be examined here toward a working approach to such figurative language. 
One of the most striking images of divine emotion appears in Hos 11:8-9 when God states, “How 
can I give you up, O Ephraim? . . . My heart [bl] is turned over [%ph] within Me, All My 
compassions [~xn] are kindled [rmk]. I will not execute My fierce anger [@a]; I will not destroy 




                                                     
 
72
 The question of the incorporeality of God in itself is beyond the scope of this dissertation. One 
might question whether the canonical data are not interpreted to say more than they do in this regard. That 
“God is Spirit” need not mean that God is excluded from taking form, human or otherwise. That God can 
and does take form is implied in the scriptural data in many instances, not least of which is the incarnation. 
If one means by the incorporeality of God that God is not essentially physical or material, by which one 
means that God is not bound to any particular, material form, such a supposition would seem to accord with 
scriptural data. However, this is not the same as saying God cannot take form. 
73
 Compare the contrast between Calvin and Finney in the interpretation of this passage. Calvin 
dismisses the language of emotion stating: “God, we know, is subject to no passions, and we know that no 
change takes place in him. What then do these expressions mean, by which he appears to be changeable? 
Doubtless he accommodates himself to our ignorances whenever he puts on a character foreign to himself.” 
First, he rejects the implication that humans have free will. Rather, “we know that what he [God] will do is 
certain, and that his decree depends not on the free-will of men. . . . God then does not deliberate as to 
himself, but with reference to men.” Further, “when he says that his heart was changed, and that his 
repentings were brought back again, the same mode of speaking after the manner of men is adopted; for we 
know that these feelings belong not to God; he cannot be touched with repentance, and his heart cannot 
undergo changes.” John Calvin, Commentaries on the Twelve Minor Prophets (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1950), 400–401. Finney, on the contrary, contends that “God really exercises all the affections 
ascribed to him in the Bible.” Particularly pertinent to this dissertation he asks: “When [God] professes to 
love his creatures, are we to understand that he does not really love them, but that he merely acts as we do 
when we love?” Indeed: “If this language does not mean what it says, what does it mean?” Further, “If God 
be not what the Bible represents him to be, then what is he, and who knows him? If these are not his real 
feelings then we are infinitely mistaken about his character. . . . If these are not the feelings of God, then we 
have no true revelation of God.” Charles Grandeson Finney, “Lecture XVIII:Affections and Emotions of 
God,” The Oberlin Evangelist 1, no. 22 (October 9, 1839): 170. Although Vanhoozer comes to a different 
conclusion, this is akin to his striking question and the method adopted in this dissertation: “What must 
God be in order truthfully to be represented as repenting, grieving, compassionate?” Remythologizing, 50. 
Vanhoozer himself refers to “the pained voice of God as he appears to wrestle with himself.” Ibid., 49. 
Wilhelm Vischer points out: “If one finds it unsuitable that God should” speak as he does in these verses 
“the same goes for all declarations of his mercy, his grace, and his love” such as Exod 34:6; Jer 31:20 and 
others. “Words and the Word: The Anthropomorphisms of the Biblical Revelation,” Int 3, no. 1 (1949): 3. 




Here, notice the anatomical language of “heart” (bl) and “nose” (@a) used in reference to 
compassion and anger. Both anatomical idioms are also used of human agency with the clear 
intent of conveying intense emotions.
74
 Further, it is obvious that the idiom does not refer to the 
physical turning (the literal meaning of %ph) of one’s heart, whether in reference to God or 
humans, but is an idiomatic description of profound emotion. Similarly, in Jer 31:20 God 
declares: “Is Ephraim My dear son? Is he a delightful child? Indeed, as often as I have spoken 
against him, I certainly still remember him; Therefore My heart [h[m] yearns [hmh] for him; I will 
surely have mercy [~xr] on him.” 
Here, notice the anatomical language of “heart,” which in the Hebrew literally refers to 
intestines, bowels, a common idiom of the seat of emotions in the ANE, as well as the term for 
“mercy” (~xr), which derives from the root that literally refers to one’s “womb” or “belly” and 
thus refers idiomatically to a profoundly compassionate love.
75
 Here again, the idiom does not 
refer to one’s bowels literally murmuring or growling (the literal meaning of hmh) but 
idiomatically refers to the emotional intensity of divine compassion. 

















 by way of idiomatic 
                                                     
 
74
 See the list below. The intensity of the emotionality conveyed here is evident by comparison to 
the similar imagery of human agents in Gen 43:30 and 1 Kgs 3:6, the only two other instances where the 
term rmk relates to emotions; only in one other instance does it appear at all, of skin becoming hot in the sun 
(Lam 5:10). Cf. Mike Butterworth, “רחם,” NIDOTTE 3:1093, and H. J. Stoebe, “רחם,” TLOT 3:1226. 
75
 With human agency see Gen 43:30. See further the discussion of the ~xr word group in chapter 
4. For an extra-canonical example of language of internal organs as the seat of emotions and/or 
dispositions, consider the Anuak use of “liver.” See Eugene A. Nida, Exploring Semantic Structures 
(Internationale Bibliothek für allgemeine Linguistik Bd. 11; Munich: Fink, 1975), 127. Compare also this 
idiomatic syntagm of “murmuring innards” in Isa 63:15. The word here translated “heart” (h[,me) literally 
refers to internal organs, inward parts, bowels, belly and is often used in the sense of womb and stomach. It 
is used in instances of intense physiological pain (Job 30:27; Ps 22:15) but more frequently to denote 
intense human emotions (Isa 16:11; Jer 4:19; Lam 1:20; 2:11). Stoebe thus correctly sees this as “expanded 
parallelism” which “approximate[s] rahamim.” “1226 ”,רחם. The collocation of h[,me and hmh or !Amh —
murmur, roar, sometimes meaning arouse appears five times (Isa 16:11; 63:15; Jer 4:19; 31:20; Cant 5:4) of 
strong emotions.  
76




phraseology that is not only used of God but humans as well.
84
 In all of these examples it is 
readily apparent that the intended meaning of the idiomatic expressions is independent of the 
literal anatomical references, both with regard to human and divine agency.
85
 Thus, when 
                                                     
 
listening, which is used with both divine (2 Kgs 19:16) and human agency (Prov 5:1). 
77
 Consider the frequent idiom of finding favor (acm + !xe + !yI[;) in one’s sight used of both divine 
and human agency (Gen 6:8; 32:5). The term !yI[; literally refers to one’s eyes but here neither refers to one’s 
eyes nor necessarily to literal sight but to favorable appraisal and/or the bestowal of grace. See the further 
discussion of this idiom in chapter 4. Consider also the idiom that is often rendered by the English idiom 
“apple” of the “eye,” which in Hebrew literally means “little man [!Avyai] of the eye [!yI[;]” and appears with 
both divine and human agency (Deut 32:10; Zech 2:8; Prov 7:2). For many other idioms by language of the 
eyes and other anatomical idioms in the OT see Jeffery D. Griffin, “An Investigation of Idiomatic 
Expressions in the Hebrew Bible with a Case Study of Anatomical Idioms” (Ph.D. diss., Mid-America 
Baptist Theological Seminary, 1999), 111; cf. Caird, Language, 175. 
78
 For example, God is said to be literally “long of nose” (~yIP:ßa; %r<a,î) which is translated “slow to 
anger” (Exod 34:6) and may be used of human agency (Prov 14:29). The idiom comes from seeing the nose 
as the locus of anger (think red). A “long nose” thus signifies one who would take longer to become angry. 
See Walter Brueggemann, “The Book of Exodus: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections,” in Genesis 
to Leviticus (vol. 1 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1994), 946. Consider also the description of 
divine anger as the “heat of my nostrils” in Exod 32:10, 12. Here and elsewhere the term @a;, literally 
“nose,” idiomatically refers to anger by metonymy as it does also with human agency (Gen 30:2; Exod 
32:10). On the other hand a human may be “quick-tempered,” that is “short of nose” (Prov 14:17). 
79
 Frequently the “mouth” (hP,) of someone idiomatically refers to their speech in the sense of 
command and/or proclamation, both of God and humans (Gen 45:21; Deut 8:3; 2 Sam 14:19). 
80
 The term that literally refers to one’s face (hn<P) may be used idiomatically of one’s presence 
(Exod 33:14), both divine and human (Exod 10:11). Consider also the concept of “hiding” one’s “face,” 
which is a sign of displeasure, used with divine (Deut 31:17-18) and human agency (Isa 53:3). See Mayer I. 
Gruber, “The Many Faces of Hebrew nāśā‘ pānîm ‘Lift Up the Face,’” ZAW 95, no. 2 (1983): 252–60. 
81
 Reference to one’s “hand” (dy“) may be used idiomatically in various ways, including action, 
receiving or giving, etc. It is also used idiomatically of both God and humans. See Gen 14:20; 49:24. 
82
 Language of “arm” ([;Arz>) may refer to one’s strength or power, also of both God and humans 
(Exod 6:6; 15:16; Job 35:9; 40:9). See the frequent language of God’s “outstretched arm” with reference to 
his mighty acts of deliverance (Exod 6:6), often along with reference to his “mighty hand” (Deut 4:34). 
83
 In Hebrew the word that literally refers to one’s “heart” [ble] is a rich term of the totality of 
human disposition. It may idiomatically describe many different mental aspects including one’s thoughts, 
will, and/or emotions and is used of both divine and human agency (Gen 6:5-6). See also Griffin, 
“Investigation,” 90. 
84
 There is an evident “proclivity” in Semitic languages “to utilize anatomical terms in the creation 
of new idioms.” Ibid., 39. Cf. E. Dhorme, L‘emploi métaphorique des noms de parties du corps en hébreu 
et en akkadien (Paris: Librairie orientaliste P. Geuthner, 1963). Caird adds, “In all languages a considerable 
proportion of the word stock of daily speech is supplied by the metaphorical use of words which literally 
connote parts of the human body.” Language, 172–73. 
85




someone finds favor in the eyes of someone else, the idiom corresponds to favor in one’s 
estimation. The anatomical referent is beside the point for both humans and God. The idiom is not 
dependent upon the physiological phenomena that might undergird the original metaphor. It is 
thus fallacious to dismiss the intended reference of such language due to anatomical language. It 
will not do to merely assert God has no body parts, therefore the language is non-literal, and 
therefore it does not correspond to God. The language is idiomatic of both divine and human 
subjects and is, as such, non-literal, but is nevertheless intended to convey true content about its 
referent(s). 
As such, one should not assume that since God has no “innards” therefore the idiomatic 
language that uses the literal terminology of “innards” does not convey any truth value that 
corresponds to God as he actually is.
86
 If one were inclined to dismiss the intended reference of 
such idiomatic language because of the use of anatomical language, consistency would require 
that the identical idioms with reference to human agency also be interpreted either as literal 
references to anatomy or as expressions that do not actually correspond to the human agents.
87
 
Obviously, neither of these options would be applied by competent interpreters when such idioms 
are used of human agency.
88
 Therefore, why should references to divine agency be divested of the 
intended meaning of well-understood idiomatic phraseology? In other words, that such language 
is idiomatic does not mean that it does not correspond to God any more than emotions applied to 
                                                     
 
corporeality/incorporeality since the idiom itself is not with reference to the literal anatomical parts therein. 
86
 Thus, with regard to action Vanhoozer recognizes: “While it is a contingent fact about human 
beings that we can only act or bring about changes in the world through some bodily movement, the latter 
is not a necessary part of the meaning of the concept.” Remythologizing, 58. Should not the same principle 
be applied to emotionality? 
87
 In other words, if language referring to God is to be dismissed as non-revelatory or severely 
flawed communication and thus dismissed, one should also logically dismiss such language with reference 
to humans. 
88
 Although Caird is not referring to the point made here, his observation fits this issue well: “Only 
captious pedantry or childish humour will find it necessary to remark that the eye of a needle cannot see or 




humans by idioms do not refer to human emotions. The question of whether God has emotions 
cannot then be answered a priori but must be engaged a posteriori to the canonical text.
89
 Absent 
a compelling, canonical rationale, such interpretive maneuvers appear to stem not from textual or 
canonical, but dogmatic and presuppositional, rationales. 
With such examples in mind, we may identify two further principles that address this 
proposed rationale for the dismissal of anatomical expressions relative to God. First, it is worth 
noting that according to the canon, humans were created in the image of God (imago dei).
90
 Thus, 
it may be more accurate to say that humans are theomorphic and, perhaps, theopathic, than to say 
that language of God that is also used of humans is anthropomorphic/pathic.
91
 Second, as clearly 
evidenced by the examples above, the fact that figurative anatomical expressions of emotion(s), 
for instance, are non-literal does not mean that they do not convey direct truth content about their 
                                                     
 
divine feelings does not pertain to the issue of divine corporeality vs. incorporeality. 
89
 Thus Graham Cole contends that “an anthropopathism such as God’s grief is to be given its face 
value. God does not merely seem to have grief in Genesis 6:6; He is grieved, contra Calvin. In other words, 
there is some counterpart to our emotional life in God. To argue otherwise is to beg the question of why we 
should not dismiss references to the divine love and compassion also as mere anthropopathisms.” Graham 
A. Cole, “The Living God: Anthropomorphic or Anthropopathic?” RTR 59, no. 1 (2000): 23. See also 
Robert B. Chisholm’s argument that while so-called anthropomorphic language is metaphorical, it conveys 
the reality that God enters into real relationship with his creatures. “Anatomy of an Anthropomorphism: 
Does God Discover Facts?,” BSac 164 (2007): 3-20. Cf. Terence E. Fretheim, The Suffering of God: An 
Old Testament Perspective (Overtures to Biblical Theology 14; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 99. 
90
 While the precise nature of the correspondence between God and human nature posited by the 
imago Dei is widely disputed and not particularly clear by way of the canonical data, the recognition of this 
point should be a control and caution against the suggestion that humans are totally unlike God. 
91
 So Vanhoozer who adds that the “human capacities to know, will, and love are themselves 
theomorphic.” Remythologizing, 64. Thus, he asks, “who is in the image or morphe of whom?” Ibid. 
Likewise, he adds, “In light of the doctrine of the imago Dei, then, perhaps the Bible’s depiction of divine 
suffering is less a matter of anthropopathic projection than it is a case of human suffering being theopathic 
(God-like).” Ibid., 77–78. Indeed, Silva adds, “our human qualities are themselves but a reflection of God’s 
person and attributes.” Moisés Silva, God, Language, and Scripture: Reading the Bible in the Light of 
General Linguistics (Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation 4; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 
1990), 22. Caneday cautions, however: “The fallacy is to forget that we are analogues of God and to regard 
ourselves as the fundamental reference point for ascriptions concerning God.” “Veiled Glory? God’s Self-
Revelation in Human Likeness—A Biblical Theology of God’s Anthropomorphic Self-Disclosure,” in 
Beyond the Bounds: Open Theism and the Undermining of Biblical Christianity (ed. John Piper, Justin 






 On the contrary, such figurative language is idiomatic and is used, as such, of both 
God and humans.
93
 As such, it is evident that the anatomical language is not intended to refer to 
literal anatomy but to dispositions and/or actions with either divine or human agency. Hence, one 
should not dismiss the well-known meaning of the idiom as it applies to God without compelling 
canonical data. Indeed, if one insists on dismissing such language as anthropomorphic and/or 
anthropopathic, consistency would also require that one rule out divine speech, which is also 
often conveyed by anatomical idiom.
94
 At what point would one draw the line with regard to 
which language actually applies to God and is useful in the construction of theology proper and 
which is not?
95
 Does such figurative language, then, truly apply to God and to what extent? The 
                                                     
 
92
 See Herbert M. Wolf, “When ‘Literal’ Is Not Accurate,” in The NIV: The Making of a 
Contemporary Translation (ed. Edwin H. Palmer and Kenneth J. Barker; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Academie 
Books, 1986), 134–36. Cf. James Barr, “Literality,” Faith and Philosophy 6 (1989): 412–28, and Eugene 
Albert Nida, Componential Analysis of Meaning: An Introduction to Semantic Structures (Approaches to 
Semiotics 57; The Hague: Mouton, 1975). See also Ricoeur’s classic consideration of the referential 
function of language by way of living metaphor, which corresponds to reality but neither univocally nor 
equivocally. The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977). 
93
 Here and elsewhere I used the term “idiomatic” to refer simply to a common use of a phrase (or 
term in Hebrew) that has figurative meaning divergent from the literal meaning of its component term(s). In 
English, idioms consist of more than one word but in Hebrew a single term may be idiomatic. See Griffin, 
“Investigation,” 22. 
94
 According to Vanhoozer, “There is a true but only partial, appropriate but only approximate 
correspondence between divine and human speaking.” Remythologizing, 58. The question is, how does one 
know what part is part of the partial correspondence? 
95
 Vanhoozer states, “Feuerbach got it partly right. Human beings are in the image of God and so, 
in one sense, all language about God may be seen to be anthropomorphic. Yet one can also appeal to the 
imago Dei in the opposite direction to argue not that we are projecting our image upon God but that God is 
projecting his image onto us. Relationality would be in this case not a human projection onto God but a 
theomorphic projection onto humanity. The difficulty, of course, is in the details: how do we know which 
forms (morphe) of human life image God and which do not?” Ibid., 161. He further states elsewhere: 
“Those who equate anthropomorphism with the system of Feuerbachian projection overlook the extent to 
which the former is a legitimate cognitive instrument. Cf. ibid., 61. D. M. Beegle adds, “It is precisely in 
the area of the personal that theism, as expressed in Christianity, must ever think in anthropomorphic terms. 
To regard God solely as Absolute Being of the Great Unknown is to refer to him or it, but to think of God 
as literally personal, one with whom we can fellowship, is to say Thou.” “Anthropomorphism,” Evangelical 
Dictionary of Theology (ed. Walter A. Elwell; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 1984), 54. Gibson 
adds that the “issue in biblical anthropomorphisms is understanding them, not approving or disapproving 
them.” Language, 26. Cf. Garrett Green, Theology, Hermeneutics, and Imagination: The Crisis of 




canonical approach maintains that, as divine self-revelation, such language conveys meaningful 
and accurate (albeit analogical) data about God as he is in himself.
96
 
The meaning of such figurative language with respect to God need not be interpreted 
arbitrarily. Rather, the wider canonical information provides insight that assists in the 
interpretation of such imagery within the context of the wider, canonical horizon of divine 
ontology. To take one example, God’s jealousy is commonly dismissed as anthropopathic in 
some theological circles. However, in light of the principles above, a canonical approach must 
take the language of divine jealousy/passion seriously. In light of the overall evidence of the 
canon, it is evident that divine jealousy differs from human jealousy not in the sense that it is 
“wholly other” but in the sense that divine jealousy portrays none of the negative characteristics 
manifest in human jealousy.
97
 While human jealousy includes envy, divine jealousy never does. 
God’s jealousy is always appropriate and in reference to his passion for that which rightfully 
belongs to him.
98
 Likewise, divine hatred and wrath is never petty or arbitrary but always 
                                                     
 
96
 K. A. Matthews correctly points out in this regard: “When we consider the metaphor of God as a 
feeling person who loves, is angry, and grieves, the aim of the figure is to point to a mitigated 
correspondence between human experience and God. This does not say that the emotions of humans and 
God are equivalent in their entirety either in intensity or in quality, for God does not grieve in the same way 
as men and women. Nor is he angry in the same fashion as sinful mortals, but to conclude that such 
language reveals nothing of God’s essential personhood makes all such language pointless. For what 
purpose is there in describing God in any terms understandable to us other than to reveal something of 
God’s mysterious nature?”
 
Genesis 1–11:26 (NAC 1A; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 1995), 
344. Hamilton adds, “It is easy, of course, to dismiss such allusions as anthropopathisms, and to feel that 
they can tell us nothing about the essential nature of God. But verses like this remind us that the God of the 
OT is not beyond the capability of feeling pain, chagrin, remorse.” Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of 
Genesis: Chapters 1–17 (NICOT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990), 274. 
97
 While one might extrapolate the apparently theologically sound principle that used of God such 
things only apply in their positive aspects, such a principle is incapable of objective usefulness since 
different interpreters will find different characteristics “good.” See the discussion of the way of eminence 
above and Hartshorne’s departure from traditional views of God on the basis of his arguments for that 
which is maximally good discussed in chapter 3. Thus, even if one adopts the truism that only good 
characteristics apply to God, it would be of no use in determining many of the thornier issues with regard to 
the correspondence of canonical language to God since some characteristics are thought to be good and 
appropriate by some and deficient and inappropriate by others. 
98
 See the word studies of the language of jealousy in the OT and NT in chapters 4 and 5 
respectively. E. Reuter rightly points out the dismissal of divine jealousy as a so-called anthropopathism 




corresponds to an accurate appraisal of the state of affairs.
99
 Throughout the canon, God’s 
emotions are depicted as perfectly corresponding to the state of affairs. As such, the wider canon 
itself provides the controls with regard to the interpretation of the language used of God, 
figurative and otherwise.
100
 Along these lines, it is notable that in Hos 11:8-9 (see above) the 
immediate text itself provides the control by stating that God is “not man” and, as such, the 
imagery here should not be applied univocally. On the other hand, such language is also not 
equivocal. It is idiomatic language which refers throughout the canon to emotionality (of humans 
as well) that, absent compelling canonical reasons to the contrary, should be applied as analogous 
(that is, partially univocal) to God as he is and as he feels.
101
  
                                                     
 
of God but is often espoused nevertheless by both Christian and Jewish theology, creating problems of 
exegesis.” “קנא,” TDOT 13:53. Cf. Jeffery H. Tigay, Deuteronomy (The JPS Torah Commentary 5; 
Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1996), 66. Vischer adds, “The LORD is a jealous God, whether 
this anthropomorphism pleases us or not. . . . In the act of creating man in his image, after his likeness he 
placed the intercourse (Gegenüber) of ‘I’ and ‘thou,’ of love, between God and man.” “Words,” 13. 
99
 On this, see chapters 4 and 5. Likewise, divine repentance differs from human repentance since 
“God is never said to have committed any sin of which God needs to repent.” Fretheim, “Repentance,” 50. 
See the discussion of divine repentance in chapter 4. 
100
 Interestingly, C. F. H. Henry states, “Scripture itself authorizes and requires a distinction 
between what we may say literally or figuratively about God.” God, Revelation, 5:197. Caird adds that “the 
biblical writers at least were alert to the possible abuses of such [figurative] language and at pains to guard 
against them.” Language, 175. He points to the passages that guard against univocal attribution by 
reminding that God is not human (1 Sam 15:29; Isa 55:8; Hos 11:9; Mal 3:6). Likewise, human judges may 
be corrupted (1 Sam 8:3) but God always judges righteously (Gen 18:25), human love may fail but God’s 
exceeds all expectations (Isa 49:15), Israel’s lovingkindness is transient (Hos 6:4) but God’s is everlasting 
(Ps 100:5). In this vein, Vanhoozer adds, “If anthropomorphism highlights God’s likeness to human beings, 
the doctrine of creation acts as an important counterbalance, safeguarding God’s transcendence.” 
Remythologizing, 65. Consider Yamauchi’s compelling argument that “upon closer inspection . . . in spite 
of the apparent similarity in expression to pagan religions the anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament 
reveal all the more remarkably a sharply contrasting concept of deity.” Yamauchi, “Ancient Religions,” 29. 
See also the discussion of the canonical approach and the analogy of Scripture above. 
101
 There is here a “dynamic tension between ‘is’ and ‘is not’” which requires careful 
consideration since “even those who appreciate the cognitive value of biblical metaphors . . . differ over the 
criteria for discerning what truly, though partially, describes God’s reality (‘is’) and what belongs to the 
merely figurative dross (‘is not’).” Vanhoozer, Remythologizing, 61. Further; “Anthropomorphic language 
confronts theologians with the task of distinguishing the ‘is’ from the ‘is not.’ For example, those who wish 
to consider descriptions of God’s bodily parts as mere projection—and hence as ripe fodder for 
demythologization—must explain why they are unwilling to apply the same approach to passages 
concerning God’s love and mercy. Conversely, those who insist on taking God’s relenting or responding at 
face value must also deal with images that emphasize God’s authority and control or that describe an act of 




In all this, ascribing emotions to God (as the canon does) need not entail that God 
experiences emotions that are univocal to human emotions. Rather, absent canonical evidence 
that suggests otherwise, such language is here treated as analogical (i.e., partially univocal).
102
 
That is, God reveals himself throughout the canon as having emotions that are analogical to 
human emotions (or vice versa) but his are wholly good, appropriate, and without fault.
103
 Thus, it 
is recognized that God cannot be fully comprehended by the finite, human mind and, therefore, 
God reveals himself in a way that accommodates the human level of understanding. At the same 
time, the limitations of human cognition and language continue to plague the contemporary 
interpreter and, therefore, it is not prudent to try to “get behind” this accommodative language. In 
other words, the canonical approach takes the position that God depicts himself as accurately as 
possible in human language via the divine self-revelation inscripturated in the canon. The 
universal accommodative nature of Scripture, therefore, should not be used to dismiss the direct 
                                                     
 
asks: “What exactly are these anthropomorphic metaphors saying if they are not to be taken literally? It is 
helpful to keep in mind that metaphors assert both ‘is’ and ‘is not,’ and thus may be indicative not of sheer 
contradiction . . . but partial description.” Ibid. While I agree with Vanhoozer’s contention here that such 
language is both like and not-like God, it is not the job of the human interpreter (since it is beyond one’s 
abilities) to specify what the not-like consists of apart from canonical information and absent direct divine 
self-revelation that reveals that which is like and not-like. 
102
 As mentioned above, since the level of correspondence between such analogical language and 
God as he is is beyond investigation absent direct divine self-revelation, such analogical data derived from 
God’s canonical self-revelation amount to the most accurate picture of God available to humans. Thus, it is 
practically spoken of as corresponding quite accurately to God with the recognition that in the eschaton we 
will see God as he truly is and surely find our view of God, at best, imprecise and incomplete and likely 
filled with errors. However, such appropriate humility with regard to theology should not deter one from 
the quest for rigorous correspondence to God’s canonical self-revelation, despite the recognition that our 
conceptions will still fall far short of perfect correspondence to God. Beyond this one cannot go within the 
framework of a canonical approach. To those who wish to speculate beyond Scripture such a canonical 
approach encourages the submission (and continuing re-submission) of all analytical and philosophical 
theology to the claims of the canon as a whole. If it does not fit, however beautiful the analysis appears, it 
should not be dogmatically accepted. It may be a model of how it “could” function but not how it “does” 
function (principle of humility). 
103
 This is not an extra-canonical presupposition but is derived from the frequent, canon-wide data 
that describe God as always, and in all things, good (omnibenevolent). Again, one cannot objectively use 
the concept of divine “perfection” to impose extra-biblical notions of perfection or infinite being since such 





statements of God about himself, but such statements must continually be understood in the light 




In dealing with the NT data regarding divine love, especially that which pertains to the 
question of the emotionality of divine love, a decision had to be made with regard to the data 
relative to the agency of Christ as incarnate. For instance, should the feelings and emotions that 
Christ experiences as incarnate be utilized as evidence with regard to the nature of divine love?  
Some might be predisposed to dismiss many of Christ’s experiences as merely human 
and not divine, much in the same way that many figurative expressions of divine passibility are 
dismissed as anthropomorphic/anthropopathic.
105
 However, questions and problems similar to 
those raised with regard to that interpretive maneuver pertain here. Specifically, what method or 
rationale would be employed in order to differentiate that which pertains to Christ’s divine and 
human natures, respectively, or both? It seems to me that a consistent and compelling method for 
such distinctions is not found within the canon and, as argued above, a canonical approach does 
not afford theological weight to extra-canonical suppositions beyond the level of commentary that 
                                                     
 
104
 This issue is of great importance to the theological conception of divine love due to the 
common presupposition that divine love is not emotive, evaluative, or motivated but a purposive, willed, 
indifferent love totally distinct from any need or desire. Biblical expressions of divine emotion “are on this 
view merely crude anthropomorphisms.” Badcock, “Concept,” 40. 
105
 This inclination has deep roots in Christian tradition in opposition to the claims such as those 
made by Celsus, a 2
nd
-century critic of Christianity, that Jesus’ lamentation and prayer in Gethsemane 
proved that he was not truly divine. Origen, The Trinity 4.2.23–26 (ANF 4:441–43). Notably, this is akin to 
the impetus for the dismissal of so-called anthropomorphisms/pathisms. C. F. H. Henry, on the basis of his 
view of divine immutability, rejects the idea of God suffering based on what he considers “its express 
incompatibility with Scripture.” God, 6:290. Cf. ibid., 5:292. In short, he contends: “The premise that 
Christ who suffered is true God and true man does not require the conclusion that God suffers.” Ibid., 
6:291. Other contemporary interpreters maintain that the emotions displayed by Jesus are purely human 
emotions (so, for example, James A. Brooks, Mark [NAC 23; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 
2001], 55) while others believe that Christ’s emotions (at least some of them) express divine emotions. See, 
for example, with regard to Christ’s anger, William L. Lane, The Gospel of Mark (NICNT; Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Eerdmans, 1974), 123. With regard to Christ’s compassion as divine compassion, see Peter Thomas 




is to be subjected back to canonical claims.
106
 Thus, it seems to be imprudent and ungrounded to 
assert a dichotomy between the human and divine natures of Christ such that one may distinguish 
which dispositions and/or actions correspond to his divine and/or human natures.
107
 
Indeed, according to the canonical data, Christ is himself the ultimate revelation of God. 
Indeed, Christ came to reveal God and proclaimed in no uncertain terms: “He who has seen Me 
has seen the Father” (John 14:9; cf. 1:14; 2 Cor 4:4; Col 2:9; Heb 1:3).
108
 With this in view, a 
canonical approach is obliged to take seriously the manifestation of divinity set forth in the 
person of Christ.
109
 But how can this be done without collapsing the divine nature into the merely 
human? In a tentative attempt to address this issue, without delving into the myriad of interpretive 
                                                     
 
106
 Moreover, it is questionable how much assistance extra-canonical suppositions would provide 
considering that the issue of the relationship of the divine and human natures of Christ have been the 
subject of enormous (both in quantity and intensity) debates throughout the history of Christian theology, 
not least of which the Christological controversies. 
107
 One should not confuse them in such a way that tends toward the obliteration of one or the 
other but one must also not separate them such that Christ’s statement in John 14:9 becomes obsolete. 
108
 For Vanhoozer “the history of anthropomorphism takes a dramatic new turn in the New 
Testament with the apostolic claim that Jesus is ‘the exact representation of God’s being’ (Heb. 1:3), a 
claim that echoes Jesus’ own” in John 14:9. Remythologizing, 64. He further states, “The Son’s humanity is 
the ultimate form of God’s self-presentation, Jesus is God’s definitive word and in his person and history 
corresponds to what it is that makes God God. The Son is not only spoken by God but speaks as God: he is 
the Word made flesh, upholding creation with his own word.” Ibid., 51. Thomas R. Schreiner adds, “To 
separate the Father from the Son in the act of self-giving would grossly distort the NT.” Romans (BECNT 
6; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1998), 260. For Leon Morris, “Christ’s action is God’s action. Christ’s love 
is God’s love” (Nygren).” The Epistle to the Romans (PNTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998), 224. 
In all this, “if our language about God is to be anything more than anthropological projection, then it must 
be christomorphic. To speak well of God one must draw not from the repertoire of our best human 
experiences, but from the recital of the economy of salvation.” Vanhoozer, Remythologizing, 162. 
However, he qualifies: “What remains to be thought, however, is how, and to what the extent, the suffering 
of Jesus, including his emotional life is equally an event in the life of God.” Ibid., 78. 
109
 As Alan J. Torrance puts it, “there can be no dichotomy between the divine and human agape 
in Christ.” “Is Love the Essence of God?” in Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the 
Love of God (ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 135. Oord adds, “We can 
safely assume that Jesus’ sorrow and joy testify to a God who feels the feelings of others and cares about 
them.” Nature, 118. Likewise, Newlands contends: “God’s feeling for us is understood through God’s 
involvement in death through the death and resurrection of Jesus.” Theology, 101. Gerald L. Borchert also 
puts it well in stating: “The actions of Jesus, therefore, were the actions of the Father because in Jesus the 
Father was in fact acting. One of the great heresies among Christians is to split Jesus from God in such a 
way that somehow God does not participate in the work (and death) of Jesus. However one interprets the 
great mystery of the incarnate work of Jesus, it must never be separated from the fact that Jesus was the 




problems and disagreements regarding the application of the communication of properties 
(communicatio idiomatum)
110
 between Christ’s divine and human natures, the canonical 
investigation of this dissertation operates on the basis of the working hypothesis that the divine 
nature of Christ is capable of experiencing that which the incarnate Christ experienced. In other 
words, while the experiences of the incarnate Christ are certainly not “normal” to divinity, God is 
not incapable of such experiences. 
Significantly, it need not be assumed that the experiences of the incarnate Christ are 
univocal to those of regular humans. To ascribe all the experiences of Jesus univocally to God 
would require the conclusion that God becomes hungry, thirsty, tired, etc. But this is not 
necessary to the working approach proposed here. It is only necessary, in this working approach, 
to posit that divinity is capable of feeling hunger, thirst, fatigue, etc.
111
 Here, the predication of 
the experiences of Christ to a doctrine of God should be interpreted in light of the wider canonical 
                                                     
 
110
 Consider, for instance, Luther’s view of the communicatio idiomatum in the discussion of his 
view of divine love in chapter 2. My use of the phrase communicatio idiomatum, however, departs in 
significant ways from Luther’s, especially when it comes to divine passibility. In my view, the canonical 
text points toward the divine nature’s capacity to experience all that the human nature experiences, as I will 
briefly explain further below. 
111
 That is, while the divine nature does not normally become “tired” in accordance with divine 
omnipotence, God might lower himself to a state in which fatigue can be felt. In one sense, God is said to 
be wearied ([g“y“) by the sins of his people (Isa 43:24; Mal 2:17). On the other hand, normally, the 
“everlasting God . . . does not become weary [@[ey“] or tired [[g“y“]” (Isa 40:28). The former appears to refer to 
God’s emotional response to the continual rebellion of his creatures while the latter is in the context of 
divine power as the one who has no equal. In this way, the wider canonical data allow for some sense of 
divine “weariness” but disqualifies another sense from God as he is in himself. In this way, it is clear 
canonically that the analogue attributed to God is not univocal. That is, God’s “weariness” in Jeremiah is 
not like human weariness, but what it does consist of, who can tell? However, Isa 40:28 does not require 
that God is incapable of assuming a form in which he can feel fatigue (at least analogically), as Jesus did, 
but appears to mean that God as he is in himself does not become fatigued. Far from depreciating God’s 
omnipotence this view actually radically affirms it since, here, God is not rendered incapable of feeling 
things such as fatigue but possesses the power to assume a form (voluntary and temporary self-limitation) 
in which such things, normally alien to God, may be experienced. That such self-limitation does not 
necessarily amount to divesting of divine power is apparent in the devil’s temptations of Christ to turn 
stones into bread, etc. Thus, such condescension is not the removal of power by self-limitation but the 
willful control of one’s own power and impulses. Accordingly, Anthony C. Thiselton comments: “If the 
sovereign, transcendent God freely chooses or decrees to allow himself to suffer, this is an enhancement, 
not a diminution, of his sovereign freedom to choose how he will act.” The Hermeneutics of Doctrine 




data, though a significant degree of mystery will nevertheless remain. Here, again, it should be 
remembered that the precision of the correspondence between the understanding of such 
revelation and God as he actually is cannot be determined prior to the eschaton due to the 
epistemic distance between God and humans and other human limitations (cf. 1 Cor 13:12). 
The provisional nature of this approach must be emphasized. Indeed, to deal with this 
issue sufficiently would require its own dissertation (indeed, probably many dissertations). 
Nevertheless, the canonical rationale for taking the tentative approach that the divine nature of 
Christ is capable of experiencing that which the incarnate Christ experienced is twofold. First, it 
will prevent canonical data regarding the incarnate Christ from being dismissed from one’s 
conception of what God is like, in accordance with the claims of Christ that he reveals the Father 
(cf. John 14:9). Second, this approach is strongly supported by the wider canonical data, 
especially in relation to the data pertinent to the canonical and systematic model of divine love. 
The most powerful evidence is the correspondence between the characteristics of divine love of 
Jesus and that exhibited by YHWH in the OT, especially the display of emotions with regard to 
both (see chapters 4 and 5). For example, the divine compassion in the OT is strikingly similar to 
that manifested by Christ in the Gospels.
112
 Similarly, the NT also suggests considerable overlap 
in this regard. In some cases the same “compassion” is predicated simultaneously of the Father 
and the Son (cf. Luke 1:58). Likewise, in numerous NT instances the love of Jesus is presented as 
being of an identical quality and nature as that of the Father (cf. Rom 8:35, 39), complementing 
the overlap between the descriptions of such love in the OT and NT.
113
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 Of the instances of Christ’s compassion in the Gospels W. Gunther and H. G. Link write: “The 
mercy and compassion shown by Jesus reveals the mercy and love of God.” “αγαπαω,” NIDNTT 2:543. So 
Helmut Köster, “σπλαγχνον, σπλαγχνιζομαι, ευσπλαγχνος, πολυσπλαγχνος, ασπλαγχνος,” TDNT 7:554, 
and N. Walter, “σπλαγχνιζομαι,” EDNT 3:265. On the emotions of Jesus see also Benjamin Breckinridge 
Warfield, The Person and Work of Christ (Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1950), 91–145. 
113
 In Rom 8:35, 39 the love of God and Christ are equated. G. Johnston comments, “God’s love is 
precisely the same as Christ’s love (Rom. 8:28–39).” “Love in the NT,” in IDB 3:171. So Ethelbert 
Stauffer, “αγαπ ω, αγ π , αγαπ   ς,” TDNT 1:49, and William Hendriksen, The Gospel According to John 




Moreover, many of the passages that speak of Christ’s love and compassion for humans 
not only correspond to the OT depictions of YHWH and the wider NT data, but the thrust of such 
passages would also seem to be impoverished if they are taken to apply only to the human nature. 
For example, Christ laments over his people: “Jerusalem, Jerusalem, who kills the prophets and 
stones those who are sent to her! How often I wanted to gather your children together, the way a 
hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were unwilling” (Matt 23:37; cf. Luke 13:34; 
19:41).
114
 What is this display intended to communicate if not the passionate love of God for his 
people? If it is taken merely as an outburst of Christ’s humanity it would not correspond to God’s 
concern for his people and may even suggest that Jesus was more compassionate than God by 
suggesting that the human nature of Jesus was compassionate but not his divine nature. On the 
contrary, merely human compassion does not seem to do justice to the canonical intent of a verse 
such as this. Indeed, notice the striking continuity between the display of God’s profound and 
compassionate love with those in Hos 11:8-9 and Jer 31:20. Considering that Jesus is himself the 
                                                     
 
specifically as ‘the love of Christ’ in v. 35 and ‘the love of God’ here [v. 39] only shows again how much 
Paul joined (without equating) God and Christ in the experience of the believer.” The Epistle to the Romans 
(NICNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1996), 547. Cf. Morris, Romans, 338, and Abraham J. 
Malherbe, The Letters to the Thessalonians (AB 32B; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 442. Schreiner adds in 
this regard: “No ultimate separation should be erected between Christ’s love and God’s love.” Romans, 
6:464. Cf. James D. G. Gunn, Romans 1–8 (WBC 38A; Dallas, Tex.: Word, 2002), 504. See also John 
5:20; 15:9 (indeed all of John 14-16); Rom 5:8; Eph 5:1-2; 2 Thess 2:16; 1 Pet 2:3. With regard to 1 Pet 2:3 
Beyreuther comments: “In Jesus Christ God’s fatherly kindness can be seen as in a mirror.” E Beyreuther, 
“χρ σ ος,” NIDNTT 2:106. 
114
 Matthews comments in this regard: “In Christ we see God so moved by grief and love that he 
chooses to take upon himself the very suffering of our sins. Do we not appeal to the incarnational role of 
Christ as our vision of the nature of his Father (cf. Matt 23:37 par.)? God is not a dispassionate accountant 
overseeing the books of human endeavor.”
 
Genesis 1–11:26, 344. In this verse the question of the 
correspondence of Christ’s will to God’s will is also raised. Here and elsewhere the will (at least the ideal 
will, see chapter 6) of Christ is clearly unfulfilled (cf. Mark 7:24). Some attribute this merely to Christ’s 
human will but not his “omnipotent will.” Gottlob Schrenk, “θελω, θελ μα, θελ σις,” TDNT 3:48. 
However, without delving into this extremely thorny issue of the nature and correspondence of the divine 
and human natures at it relates to will, this is problematic with regard to Christology and hermeneutics 
since there seems to be no objective, text-based, interpretive mechanism to determine what corresponds to 
divinity and what corresponds to humanity (as is the case with regard to other aspects above). Therefore, no 
artificial separation between the two is imposed on the data in chapter 5. See also the discussion of the 
nature of divine will (especially in chapters 4 and 5), which supports a significant level of correspondence 





ultimate revelation of God and that he manifests the same or similar emotions of love that are 
elicited of YHWH in the OT in similar circumstances, does it not stand to reason that such love 
corresponds not merely to Christ’s human nature but to his divine nature? 
In all this, the canonical data strongly suggest correspondence between the nature of 
divine love (especially with regard to the emotionality thereof) exhibited by Christ in the Gospels 
and those that pertain to the divine nature according to the wider canonical data. For these 
reasons, the manifestation of data with regard to divine love in the incarnation of Christ has not 
been separated from the other manifestations of divine love in the canon. Rather, they are here 
taken to accurately represent divine love. However, it should be recognized that the findings of 
this dissertation do not hinge on this point since, with regard to the emotionality of divine love, 
there is enough evidence of the emotionality of God’s love even without including the emotions 
manifested by Jesus as incarnate. That is, with regard to this and the other aspects of divine love, 
the canonical and systematic model of divine love posited by the non-incarnational data coheres 
with that depicted in the incarnation but is not wholly dependent upon it. The NT data of Christ’s 
incarnation and the wider canonical data of divine love are mutually supportive.  
I am under no illusion that this issue is dealt with comprehensively or settled by this brief 
excursus. Hopefully, however, this brief treatment of my working approach provides an 
understandable rationale (if not agreeable to all) for why I have treated the passages pertaining to 
Christ’s incarnation in the way that I have in chapters 5 and 6. Overall, it should be remembered 
that Christ is the true anthropomorph, not in the sense that he is attributed with characteristics that 
he did not possess but in the sense that he was truly God who became truly human without 
divesting himself of divinity.
115
 The data from the incarnation thus demand attention with regard 
to the wider doctrine of God and his love.  
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 So Vischer, “Words,” 9. As Vanhoozer writes: “The incarnation both ratifies and corrects all 
previous anthropomorphism: the New Testament does not speak of God as though he were like a human 




The Agency of Love and Ambiguous Genitives 
 Finally, a brief word should be said about the issue of the ambiguity of the agency of love 
in some instances. This generally occurs in two ways. First, related to the previous discussion of 
the communicatio idiomatum, it is not always clear whether the Father or Son is the intended 
agent of love, especially when the term “Lord” is used (cf. 1 Tim 1:12-14). Scholars generally 
agree that in most cases the term “Lord” in the NT refers to Christ, though it is not clear that this 
is always the case. As seen above, however, the canon strongly suggests that the love of the 
Father and Christ is identical. Therefore, I am not aware of any significant import with regard to 
such instances of ambiguous agency. Secondly, the NT contains a plethora of ambiguous 
genitives (genitives that might be subjective or objective), leaving the agency of love uncertain in 
some statements which may be significant for divine love. The intended agency in some of these 
instances can be decided with reasonable certainty, and these have been briefly treated in 
footnotes throughout the NT chapter (chapter 5). However, others present significant uncertainty 
and disagreement among scholars. Therefore, I thought it best to not depend upon one 
interpretation or the other with regard to these ambiguities. Further, I am not aware of any 
significant issues with regard to the canonical and systematic model of divine love derived from 
the canonical data (see chapter 6) that would hinge upon one or the other interpretation of these 
genitives. While such texts are by no means insignificant, the information that they would convey 
as subjective or objective genitives is already apparent in other, clearer passages. With this 
background, we now turn to a survey of the theological conceptions of divine love in the next two 
chapters before turning to the canonical data to address the conflict of interpretations. 
                                                     
 
“The question, then, is who is in the image or morphe of whom?” Vanhoozer, Remythologizing, 64. 
Eberhard Jüngel adds, “If ‘dogmatic’ anthropomorphism speaks of God like a man, the no less fatal 
‘symbolic’ anthropomorphism forbids speaking of God as a man. Thus it contradicts what the Christian 
faith asserts to be true: that God was among men as the man Jesus.” This “excludes in its uniqueness one 
speaking of God arbitrarily like a man, but also opposes the prohibition of speaking of God as this 
particular man.” God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified One 












A BRIEF SURVEY OF DIVINE LOVE IN HISTORICAL THEOLOGY 
Plato’s Conception of Love 
The purpose of this survey is to introduce the main themes and issues regarding divine 
love and provide a glimpse of the long history that will offer context for this study. To serve this 
purpose, major figures have been selected that demonstrate the nature of the issues involved.
1
 The 
issue of divine love in systematic theology has a long history, including a discernible connection 
to Greek philosophy. Therefore, the roots of the discussion of divine love generally begin with 
Plato.
2
 At least three main points of Plato’s doctrine are essential to this study: (1) his ontology of 
the two worlds, the supersensible and sensible, especially the veneration of timelessness, 
simplicity, immutability, self-sufficiency, and perfection; (2) the notion of the highest love as 
rational desire for the Good, the proton philon; and (3) the prominence of insufficiency and need 
                                                     
 
1
 Given the nature of this study, the historical survey is limited to a few thinkers who exemplify 
the major issues and have had a large impact on the historical theology of divine love. An exhaustive 
historical analysis of the issue of divine love would require a dissertation unto itself and is beyond the 
scope of this work. The major figures have been chosen for their prominence and influence regarding 
divine love down through the ages of Western thought. While others could have been included, these 
figures provide an introduction that suitably frames the issues of primary interest to this dissertation, an 
introduction that would not be significantly improved by an analysis of other historical figures. For more on 
the historical theology of love see Denis de Rougemont, Love in the Western World (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1974); Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (trans. P. S. Watson; London: S.P.C.K., 1953); Irving 
Singer, The Nature of Love (vol. 1 of The Nature of Love; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); 
John M. Rist, Eros and Psyche: Studies in Plato, Plotinus, and Origen (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1964); John Burnaby, Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine. The Hulsean Lectures for 
1938 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1960); Martin Cyril D’Arcy, The Mind and Heart of Love (London: 
Faber & Faber, 1954); Liz Carmichael, Friendship: Interpreting Christian Love (New York: T & T Clark, 
2004); Brümmer, Model. 
2
 “In the philosophy of love . . . I am convinced that every discussion must start with Plato.” 




as conditions of desirous love, which is limited to human love in contrast to divine love. Among 
other things, for Plato, eros is of a rational, purposive character and emotion is downplayed.
3
 
“The Platonic lover rises above . . . leaving emotionality behind: his love is not an attempt to 
express or purify sensuous feelings but rather to supplant them by sheer rationality.”
4
 This fits 
with Plato’s idealization of reason and the reflective life of the philosopher.
5
 Perhaps Plato’s most 
discussed contribution, however, is the apparent emphasis on desirous love.
6
 This conception of 
love is discussed both in the Symposium and the Lysis. At the outset it is important to mention 
that it is difficult to extract Plato’s own view from his writings with any certainty. Especially as it 
regards the Symposium and the Lysis, numerous ambiguities arise.
7
 For instance, the Lysis ends 
by stating that no definition of friendship has been ascertained; the positions set forth before are 
flawed somehow. But, it is not altogether clear what elements of Socrates’ conception remain and 
what elements have been dismissed. In both the Symposium and the Lysis, Socrates is the primary 
spokesperson, as is common in Platonic dialogues. However, at times the view of Socrates 




                                                     
 
3
 For instance the ideal is “Socrates [who] is emotionally cool, unimpassioned, involved in the life 
about him but also at a distance from it.” Ibid., 49. Accordingly, “Plato’s highest love is predominantly 
intellectual.” Ibid., 73. 
4
 Ibid. Thus, “wherever possible, Plato avoids the language of feeling.” Ibid. 
5
 The true philosopher contemplates the world of unchanging forms. See Plato, Resp.  
6
 This does not mean, however, that the motif originated with Plato. See, for instance, Nygren, 
Agape, 162. 
7
 The Symposium is a dialogue regarding love set at the house of Agathon (one of the characters) 
and thus presents a diversity of opinions. Many interpret Diotima’s perspective to be the position of Plato 
because Socrates does not overtly object to it and thus appears to accept it. 
8
 Also, it is not always clear to what extent Socrates and/or Plato accepts the views of other 
speakers and interlocutors. See Plato, Symp. 198d–e. For perspectives on Plato’s view of love, numerous 
excellent, though conflicting, interpretations are available. See, for instance, Rist, Eros; Brümmer, Model; 
David L. Norton and Mary F. Kille, Philosophies of Love (San Francisco: Chandler, 1971); Catherine 
Osborne, Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994); A. W. Price, Love and 




The Symposium and Lysis 
In the Symposium, love (eros) is presented as desire for the “everlasting possession of the 
good.”
 
This notion will be re-visited below since this, coupled with the above ontology, functions 
as the lynchpin of Platonic influence on the conception of divine love in Christian theology. 
Before this conception of love is unpacked, two important points must be kept in mind. First, in 
Plato’s two-worlds ontology the world of the forms (eidon) is the world of reality. The sensible, 
material world is merely a shadow of the real world of the forms, which is a realm of timelessness 
and immutability.
9
 Change is evidence of imperfection since anything that changes must change 
either for the better or for the worse, meaning it was either already less than perfect or would 
become so in changing.
10
 The Good is the ultimate, and as such the Good is perfect, self-
sufficient, immutable, timeless, etc.
11
 Secondly, if love includes desire, whatever else love means 
for Plato (and regardless of whether eros is selfish), then love signifies a lack (of some kind) in 
the subject of that love. Thus, desirous love is itself an evidence of imperfection and change. 
At this point, the conception of love (eros) as desire warrants examination.
12
 A 
fundamental feature of eros (in Diotima’s view related in the Symposium) is that it is directed 
                                                     
 
Object of Love in Plato,” in Platonic Studies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 3–34. 
9
 See, for instance, Plato’s allegory of the cave in Resp. 2.7.514–520a. See also the analogy of the 
divided line. Ibid., 6.509d–513e.  
10
 Self-sufficiency is axiomatic to perfection in the classical view of Plato and Aristotle, developed 
in Christianity especially in the scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas. Cf. Plato, Resp. (Benjamin Jowett, The 
Works of Plato [New York: Tudor, 1937], 79); Aristotle, Metaph., 1074b; Aquinas, Summa theologica 
1.1.9 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Summa theologica [3 vols.; Books for the Ages; Albany, 
Oreg.: Ages Software, 1997], 1:92–96). 
11
 Thus Singer states that the “Good is not like any other object. It is the principle of value and 
would retain its form whether or not anyone desired it.” Nature, 86.  
12
 However, it must be remembered that Plato is clear that not all things that are called love are 
equivalent, or love in the same sense. Plato’s Socrates states, “We have singled out a certain form of love, 
and applying thereto the name of the whole, we call it love; and there are other names that we commonly 
abuse.” Plato, Symp. 205b (Lamb, LCL). For instance, “those who resort to him in various other ways—in 
money-making, an inclination to sports, or philosophy—are not described either as loving or as lovers, all 
those who pursue him seriously in one of his several forms obtain, as loving and as lovers, the name of the 




toward that which is good; it is desire for the good and, ultimately, for happiness (eudaimonia).
13
 
Accordingly, Diotima can assert that love (eros) is desire for the “everlasting possession of the 
good.”
14
 Here, love is always directed toward something good or desirable, and as such, it entails 
that the lover lacks (deficiency) that which she desires.
15
 Hence, Diotima describes Eros not as a 
god, but as a daimon whose mother is Poverty (Penia), and whose father is Resource or Plenty 
(Poros).
16
 Eros does not possess beauty or goodness,
17
 but rather desires the beautiful and good, 
                                                     
 
correct to have it previously announced what sort we ought to praise.” Ibid. 180c–d.  
13
 “Generically, indeed, it [eros] is all that desire of good things and of being happy—Love most 
mighty and all-beguiling.” Ibid., 205c–d. Diotima and Socrates dialogue on this: “‘What is the love of the 
lover of good things?’ ‘That they may be his,’ I replied. ‘And what will he have who gets good things?’ . . . 
‘he will be happy.’ ‘Yes,’ she said, ‘the happy are happy by acquisition of good things, and we have no 
more need to ask for what end a man wishes to be happy, when such is his wish: the answer seems to be 
ultimate.’” Furthermore, this “wish or this love [eros] . . . is common to all.” Ibid., 204e–205a.  
14
 Plato, Symp. (Jowett, Apology, 197). The reasoning goes like this: since men cherish what they 
think is good Diotima asserts to Socrates that “what men love is simply and solely the good.” Plato, Symp. 
206a (Lamb, LCL). Moreover, men don’t merely love the good but also desire that the good be their eternal 
possession. In this way, Diotima and Socrates arrive at the definition (in another translation) that “love 
loves the good to be one’s own forever.’” Ibid. Eternal possession of the good thus relates to eternal 
happiness and here Brümmer sees a clear connection to Eudaemonistic ethics. “In this way Plato’s views on 
love are directly connected with his eudaemonism in which the aim of all moral action is the perfection of 
the soul which is ultimate happiness. In this way Platonic love becomes man’s greatest effort toward self-
perfection or arete.” Brümmer, Model, 111. Nygren, however, sees eros as a wholly acquisitive love: “The 
most obvious thing about Eros is that it is a desire, a longing, a striving.” Agape, 175. 
15
 “Love is a love directed to what is fair; so that Love must needs be a friend of wisdom, and, as 
such, must be between wise and ignorant.” Plato, Symp. 204b (Lamb, LCL). Thus, “all who feel desire, feel 
it for what is not provided or present; for something they have not or are not or lack; and that sort of thing 
is the object of desire and love.” Ibid., 200e. Further, Socrates argues, “‘Has he or has he not the object of 
his desire and love before he desires and loves it?’ ‘He does not have it. . . . the desiring subject must have 
desire for something it lacks, and again, no desire if it has no lack.’” Ibid., 200a–b. Thus a tall man does not 
desire to be tall, a strong man to be strong, etc. Ibid., 200b–c. Nygren criticizes that “the logical 
consequence is that love must inevitably die away when the possession of its object is secured.” Agape, 
176. 
16
 Plato, Symp. 203c–d (Lamb, LCL). Eros desires and lacks the beautiful and good but the gods 
do not. Therefore, Eros cannot be a god, as Agathon had supposed earlier in the Symposium, but must be a  
daimon, an intermediary being. Ibid., 202c–d. Therefore Eros is “between a mortal and an immortal . . . a 
great spirit [Dai,mwn me,gaj], Socrates: for the whole of the spiritual [daimo,nion] is between divine and 
mortal.” Ibid., 202e. Daimons are the intermediaries between gods and men, since “God with man does not 
mingle.” Ibid., 203a. 
17





and all desire presumes a deficiency, lack, or need in the desirous lover.
18
 Since Eros desires 
good, he must not be absolutely self-sufficient; he has need, like his mother, Poverty. Since love 
includes desire, and desire entails a lack of the thing desired, love according to Plato is always 
poor but never wholly resourceless.
19
 In this description, then, both need (or poverty) and desire 
are fundamental to eros love. Although, this presents no difficulty for human love, it presents a 
seemingly insoluble difficulty for divine love, as shall be seen.  
 Beyond this, the Symposium also presents a distinction between two kinds of desirous 
love, or two Aphrodites.
20
 Pausanius, another speaker at the gathering, presents an elder 
Aphrodite, the daughter of heaven, whom he calls Heavenly; and a younger daughter of Zeus and 
Dione, whom he calls Popular. The latter is the lesser love, a lover of the body rather than the 
soul, a crude kind of love.
21
 The former is the superior; it loves “what abides in the body” and 
“compels lover and beloved alike to feel a zealous concern for their own virtue.”
22
 While it is not 
                                                     
 
18
 Though one cannot desire what he possesses, he may desire that he possess his possessions 
eternally. If one says he desires things he already possesses he is “merely saying—I wish these things now 
present to be present also in the future.” Ibid., 200d. 
19
 “Now, as the son of Resource and Poverty, Love is in a peculiar case. First, he is ever poor, and 
far from tender or beautiful as most suppose him: rather is he hard and parched, shoeless and homeless . . . 
he ever dwells with want.” Ibid., 203c–d. Moreover, “the resources that he gets will ever be ebbing away; 
so that Love is at no time either resourceless or wealthy, and furthermore he stands midway betwixt 
wisdom and ignorance.” Ibid., 203e. 
20
 Once again, it is not clear to what extent (if at all) Plato subscribes to such a view. It is placed in 
the mouth of Pausanius rather than Socrates. Nevertheless, the conception is both influential and 
controversial and must be introduced. Nygren traces the view of higher and lower loves as the heavenly 
ladder (see discussion further below) down through the ages. He is highly critical of any such ascending 
love and his analysis often appears biased thereby; but there seems to be little doubt that ideas similar to the 
one related by Pausanius influenced some Christian thinkers. Nygren, Agape, 170. 
21
 This “is the love that we see in the meaner sort of men; who, in the first place, love women as 
well as boys; secondly, where they love, they are set on the body more than the soul.” Plato, Symp. 181b 
(Lamb, LCL). This love is shallow and fleeting, it “flutters off” as soon as the “loved begins to fade.” Ibid., 
183e.  
22
 Ibid., 185b–c. Not only Pausanius holds this but also Eryximachus who speaks regarding this 
better, heavenly love saying, “This is the sort we should preserve; this is the noble, the Heavenly Love, 
sprung from the Heavenly Muse. But the Popular Love comes from the Queen of Various Song; in 
applying him we must proceed with all caution, that no debauchery be implanted with the reaping of his 




altogether clear that Plato shares the view of Pausanius, the distinction between a heavenly love 
and a lower, earthy love fits Plato’s two-worlds ontology, as well as the conception of eros 
related by Socrates in the Symposium. For instance, Socrates speaks of ascending a ladder of 
loves, a metaphor that depends upon the notion of higher and lower loves. He does not position 
these loves in absolute dichotomy but as stepping stones to the higher, truer love.
23
 Thus, the 
ladder is an upward path to the supersensible world of forms, in contrast to a downward path 
toward materiality.
24
 This is directed toward an ultimate object of love (proton philon), which is 
self-sufficient.
25
 Furthermore, it calls to mind the notion of the idealization of reason and rational 
love. The soul that is led by reason will love the proton philon whereas those held captive by 
appetite or spirit will desire lesser objects.
26
 
Some have harshly criticized Plato’s view, holding that eros love is a wholly, self-
centered, self-gratifying desire that seeks to pull itself upwards. However, others have contended 
that Plato’s view of love should not be reduced to selfishness or even desirous love.
27
 One 
                                                     
 
23
 The ascension is set forth thus. The true lover must first “make himself a lover of all beautiful 
bodies. . . . But his next advance will be to set a higher value on the beauty of souls than on that of the 
body.” Ibid., 210b. Eventually he is to “estimate the body’s beauty as a slight affair.” Ibid., 210c. 
Therefore, “beginning from obvious beauties he must for the sake of that highest beauty be ever climbing 
aloft, as on the rungs of a ladder, from one to two, and from two to all beautiful bodies; from personal 
beauty he proceeds to beautiful observances, from observance to beautiful learning, and from learning at 
last to that particular study which is concerned with the beautiful itself and that alone; so that in the end he 
comes to know the very essence of beauty.” Ibid., 211c–d. 
24
 This is Nygren’s major criticism of what he will call the eros motif. For him, “Eros is man’s 
conversion from the sensible to the super-sensible; it is the upward tendency of the human soul; it is a real 
force, which drives the soul in the direction of the Ideal world.” Agape, 170. Nygren’s very influential 
conception of agape and eros will be discussed further below. 
25
 “In Plato’s view, there are therefore two kinds of love: eros for the proton philon which is to be 
desired for its own sake since only the possession of the proton philon constitutes eternal happiness; and 
eros for everything else (including other people).” Brümmer, Model, 113. See more on this, related to 
divine love, below.  
26
 Consider Plato’s analogy of the chariot where the charioteer represents the rational, guiding part 
of the soul, a white horse represents the rational part of the passionate nature, and a black horse represents 
the irrational passions of the soul. The charioteer attempts to direct upwards toward the heavenly from 
which the pre-existent soul had once fallen. Plato, Phaedr. 246a–254e (Fowler, LCL).  
27




primary basis for this latter assertion is the contents of the Lysis, to which we now turn. In this 
dialogue, Socrates discusses the issue of friendship love (philia) with two boys, Lysis and 
Menexenus.
28
 He mentions the fact that Lysis believes with certainty that his parents love (philei) 
him.
29
 However, he turns this conclusion on its head by arguing that no one loves someone who is 
useless, but loves one who may address a need with skill, thus Lysis’s parents do not actually 
love him.
30
 To be loved, he counsels, Lysis should become wise, otherwise no one will love 
him.
31
 Here friendship love is clearly predicated upon utility on the part of the loved and need or 
lack, which provides the context for usefulness, on the part of the lover.
32
 Socrates also raises the 
question of the mutuality of love. He seems to contend that friendship love need not be mutual 
but can be unrequited, even to the extent of the loved one hating the lover.
33
 But, then, who (if 
anyone) is the friend (philos) in friendship?
34
 Socrates appears to find logical difficulties with all 
                                                     
 
28
 Unless otherwise noted, it should be assumed that the word “love” as quoted or discussed 
regarding the Lysis is from the philia root. 
29
 “I suppose, Lysis, your father and mother are exceedingly fond [filei/] of you? Yes, to be sure, 
he replied. Then if your father and mother are fond [filei/] of you, and desire to see you happy, it is 
perfectly plain that they are anxious to secure your happiness.” Plato, Lysis 207d–e (Lamb, LCL). 
30
 “Then will anyone count us his friends [fi,loi] or have any affection [filh,sei] for us in those 
matters for which we are useless? Surely not, he said. So now, you see, your father does not love [filei/] 
you, nor does anyone love anyone else, so far as one is useless. Apparently not, he said.” Ibid., 210c. 
31
 “Then if you can become wise, my boy, everybody will be your friend [fi,loi], everyone will be 
intimate with you, since you will be useful and good; otherwise, no one at all, not your father, nor your 
mother, nor your intimate connexions, will be your friends.” Ibid., 210c–d. 
32
 This fits well with Plato’s view of the ideal society in the Republic where people love (philia) 
the city as their own family. Here each one “must contribute to the well-being of the city and in this way 
love the city and are loved for their contribution.” Brümmer, Model, 114.  
33
 He states, “When one person loves another, which of the two becomes friend of the other—the 
loving of the loved, or the loved of the loving? Or is there no difference? There is none, he replied, in my 
opinion. How is that? I said; do you mean that both become friends mutually, when there is only one loving 
the other? Yes, I think so, he replied. But I ask you, is it not possible for one loving not to be loved in 
return by him whom he loves? It is. But again, may he not be even hated while loving?” Plato, Lysis 212a–
b (Lamb, LCL). 
34
 “Now in such a case, I went on, the one loves and the other is loved? Yes. Which of the two, 
then, is a friend of the other? . . . Or again, is neither of them in such a case friend of the other, if both do 




combinations, whether the friend be the lover, the loved, or both.
35
 Perhaps, then, there is 
something wrong with the question.
36
 He thus turns to the issue of the subject and object of love 
as either alike or different.
37
 Yet, once again, Socrates finds difficulties with the available 
positions, arriving at yet another apparent impasse. For instance, those alike, insofar as they are 
alike, have no need or lack (and thus no desire) for the qualities of the other.
38
 Once again, it is 
emphasized that “if a man has no need of anything he will not cherish [avgapw,|h]  
anything. . . . And that which does not cherish [avgapw,|h] will not love.”39  
On the other hand, if the like loves that which is opposite, one must say that the lover 
must love the hater, being its opposite.
40
 But the bad cannot love; thus suppose that a third 
                                                     
 
35
 He maintains that if friendship requires mutuality, then the lover cannot be friend of a loved one 
who does not return that love. Moreover, the loved object can also not be a friend to the lover. But it seems 
that love does not always require mutuality. This ends in confusion. “What then are we to make of it, I 
asked, if neither the loving are to be friends, nor the loved, nor both the loving and loved together? For 
apart from these, are there any others left for us to cite as becoming friends to one another?” Ibid., 213c. 
36
 “Can it be, Menexenus, I asked, that all through there has been something wrong with our 
inquiry?” Ibid., 213c–d.  
37
 He quotes Homer, “Yea, ever like and like together God doth draw.” Ibid., 214a. 
38
 “Is like friend to like in so far as he is like, and is such an one useful to his fellow?” Ibid., 214d. 
He goes, “when anything whatever is like anything else, what benefit can it offer, or what harm can it do, to 
its like, which it could not offer or do to itself? Or what could be done to it that could not be done to it by 
itself? How can such things be cherished [avgaphqei,h] by each other, when they can bring no mutual 
succour? Is it at all possible? No. And how can that be a friend, which is not cherished [avgapw|/to]? By no 
means.” Ibid., 214d–215a. Moreover, “but, granting that like is not friend to like, the good may still be 
friend to the good in so far as he is good, not as he is like? Perhaps. But again, will not the good, in so far 
as he is good, be in that measure sufficient to himself? Yes. And the sufficient has no need of anything, by 
virtue of his sufficiency. Of course.” Ibid., 215a–b.  
39
 Ibid., 215b. Notice the use of the agapao word group, as in the footnote above. In parallel 
fashion, one who has no use cannot be valued either. “So how can we say that the good will be friends to 
the good at all, when neither in absence do they long for one another? How can it be contrived that such 
persons shall value each other highly? By no means, he said. And if they do not set a high value on each 
other, they cannot be friends. True.” Ibid., 215b–c.  
40
 Socrates states the possibility, “for it was between things most opposed that friendship was 
chiefly to be found, since everything desired [evpiqumei/n] its opposite, not its like.” Ibid., 215d–e. Thus, “the 
unlikest things [must be filled] with friendship: since the poor man must needs be friendly to the rich, and 
the weak to the strong, for the sake of their assistance, and also the sick man to the doctor; and every 
ignorant person had to cherish [avgapa/|n] the well-informed, and love [filei/n] him.” Ibid., 215d. Yet, this 
leads to absurdity, Socrates says, because “at once these well-accomplished logic-choppers will delightedly 




category, that which is neither good nor bad loves the good.
41
 He utilizes the analogy of a body 
that is neither good nor bad, which loves medicine. But, he adds, it seems that the body loves the 
medicine because of the presence of evil, for if there were no evil, the body would have no need 
of medicine and, hence, would not love it.
42
 Socrates remains unsatisfied and raises the question 
of motivations. To avoid an infinite regression of causes of love, he proposes the proton philon 
such that “the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship (proton philon) is not for the sake of 
any other or further dear. . . . The truly dear is that in which all these so-called friendships 
terminate.”
43
 Thus, evil is not the cause of love, but the “desires which are neither good nor bad 
will exist even when the bad things are abolished.”
44
 Thus, rather than evil, he suggests that desire 
itself is the cause of friendship love.
45
 Notably, the notion of desirous love is well represented in 
the Lysis, here and elsewhere.
46
 Moreover, desire as the possible cause of love, as in the 
Symposium, requires deficiency and lack, specifically lack of that which is natural or congenial to 
                                                     
 
41
 Thus he states, “One view then remains: if anything is friendly to anything, that which is neither 
good nor bad is friendly to either the good or what is of the same quality as itself. For I presume nothing 
could be found friendly to the bad. True.” Ibid., 216e. Earlier he had clarified, “the bad never enters into 
true friendship with either good or bad.” Ibid., 214d.  
42
 Ibid., 217a–218b. For example, “those who are already wise no longer love wisdom, whether 
they be gods or men; nor again can those be lovers of wisdom who are in such ignorance as to be bad: for 
we know that a bad and stupid man is no lover of wisdom.” Ibid., 218a. 
43
 Plato, Lysis 220a–b (Jowett, Works, 75). He suggests that perhaps there is one thing that is the 
true friend and other things are loved for the sake of that friend. An “original friend, for whose sake all the 
other things can be said to be friends?” Lysis 219c–d (Lamb, LCL). The other things “which we cited as 
friends for the sake of that one thing, may be deceiving us like so many phantoms of it, while that original 
thing may be the veritable friend.” Ibid., 219d. 
44
 Ibid., 221b.  
45
 “Can it really be then, as we were saying just now, that desire [evpiqumi,a] is the cause of 
friendship [fili,aj], and the desiring thing is a friend to that which it desires, and is so at any time of 
desiring; while our earlier statement about friends was all mere drivel, like a poem strung out for more 
length?” Ibid., 221c–d. He states, “Is it possible for a man, when he desires [evpiqumou/nta] and loves 
[evrw/nta], to have no friendly feeling [filei/n] towards that which he desires and loves? I think not.” Ibid., 
221b.  
46
 Socrates states, “There is a certain possession I have desired [’epiqhmw/n] from my  
childhood . . . for the possession of friends I have quite a passionate longing [’erwtikw/j], and would rather 






 Here again, Socrates purports to find an insoluble difficulty and thus ends his 




 Despite the plethora of logical cul-de-sacs throughout the Lysis, a number of points are 
important to understanding the issues that relate to divine love. For instance, it is significant that 
Plato utilizes the eros, philia, and even agapao word group in his discussions, and in a way that 
shows close relationships between them.
49
 For instance, need is the prerequisite for desire 
(evpiqumi,a), and without need one will not cherish (avgapw,|h), and the one who does not cherish 
(avgapw,|h) will not love (filoi/), and the one who is not cherished (avgapw|/to) cannot be a friend 
(fi,loj).50 Accordingly, desire (evpiqumi,a) seems to be the requisite of friendship love (fili,aj); it is 
not possible for a man who “desires (evpiqumou/nta) and loves (evrw/nta), to have no friendly feeling 
(filei/n) towards that which he desires and loves.”51 Nevertheless, there is reason for caution 
regarding the precise identification of Plato’s own view of these loves. For instance, Socrates is 
explicitly unable to arrive at a settled position in the Lysis. On the contrary, he presents and 
refutes many possible positions. Nevertheless, despite the lack of a clearly defined definition in 
                                                     
 
47
 He suggests, “the desiring thing desires that in which it is deficient, does it not? Yes. And the 
deficient is a friend to that in which it is deficient? I suppose so. And it becomes deficient in that of which 
it suffers a deprivation. To be sure. So it is one’s own belongings [things that are proper or congenial to 
one], it seems, that are the objects of love and friendship and desire; so it appears, Menexenus and Lysis.” 
Ibid., 221e. 
48
 Ibid., 223b. The nature of the difficulty here relates to the distinction, or lack thereof, between 
the congenial and the like. Having ruled out that the like loves the like, there must be a distinction between 
the congenial and the like to avoid equivocation here. Yet, Socrates supposes that the good is congenial to 
the good, the bad to the bad, and that which is neither good nor bad to that which is neither good nor bad 
and thus the reasoning appears to arrive at an impasse. Ibid. He thus states, “If neither the loved nor the 
loving, nor the like nor the unlike, nor the good nor the belonging, nor all the rest that we have tried in turn 
. . . if none of these is a friend, I am at a loss for anything further to say.” Ibid., 222e. 
49
 The precise nature of the interrelationship of the linguistics is beyond the scope of this work. 
Suffice it to note, however, that although the words are used distinctively, they are not set in opposition. 
50
 Ibid., 214d–215b. 
51




the Lysis, some facets of Platonic logic are clearly represented and remain influential, in 
consideration of their continued prevalence in later discussions of these issues.
52
 For instance, in 
the Lysis, as in the Symposium, the issue of deficiency and lack as a prerequisite for desirous love 
rises to the fore.
53
 Plato also presents the question regarding mutuality, or the lack thereof, in 
friendship love.  
It is possible, though it seems to me unlikely, that Plato intends to present the recurrent 
issues related to desirous love in order to question the centrality of that presumed conception(s).
54
 
Conversely, he could be endorsing the position or calling into question other facets of that or any 
number of conventional conceptions of love that were prevalent in his day. For instance, it is not 
clear if Plato wishes to show that the popular conventions (such as the initially assumed parental 
love for Lysis) regarding love are false, or that the view of love as desire is simplistic, or 
something else entirely. Or does Plato wish to state that friendship is, in fact, inexplicable? There 
appears to be no way to determine Plato’s own intent with certainty. Nevertheless, one can 
                                                     
 
52
 See the remainder of this chapter and the next. 
53
 This issue is clearly seen regarding the love of Lysis’s parents for him, where utility is raised, 
presuming deficiency. Price agrees that these emphases remain, saying, “For all its ostensible failures, the 
Lysis ends its investigation of the grounds of desire . . . with two suggestions that Plato was not later to take 
back: the object of desire is that which one lacks, and that which one lacks is that which one is deprived 
of.” Love, 12. What remains unresolved, says Price, is how mutual friendship can exist, and how the 
notions of likeness and goodness relate. Ibid. Incidentally, Price believes that Plato’s own view is 
represented in these dialogues of Socrates. 
54
 For instance, C. Osborne believes that the Lysis rules out eros as acquisitive love. To support 
her view, she contends that the Lysis includes “three examples of love [that] are shown to be impossible on 
the assumption that love is something self-seeking that expects to gain something of benefit to the lover.” 
Eros, 58. Those three are Hippothales as unrequited lover of Lysis, Lysis and Menexenus as “like” friends, 
and the love of Lysis’s parents for him. These three kinds of love are dismissed by Socrates, but she 
suggests that this shows not that these kinds of love are false, but rather that the notions about love have 
gone terribly wrong. She states, “Because we perceive that these are the most classic examples of love, and 
that if they are inexplicable something has gone seriously wrong with the analysis of love.” Ibid., 59. Thus 
“Plato could convincingly represent the common assumptions of Athenians about love as being 
incompatible with an acquisitive analysis of love.” Ibid., 60. However, it is equally possible that Plato did 
not view these types of love as true or adequate but was intending to criticize the Athenian notions. 
Although he never does reconcile his own view here it does seem to assume many facets of desirous love 
predicated on need and deficiency and this fits with Plato’s overall ontology. However, one cannot be sure 




recognize here the issues that are repeatedly raised in the discussions of love after Plato, including 
the issues of perfection and self-sufficiency as opposed to desirous love that presumes 
insufficiency, the priority of rational love for the heavenly over against vulgar love of the earthy, 
and the parties and relationship (mutuality and reciprocality) of true friendship. 
The Question of Egocentric Love in Plato 
The ongoing debate regarding the Platonic conception of love must be further addressed. 
As has been briefly mentioned, some interpret Plato’s conception of eros love to be acquisitive 
love as represented by Diotima’s account in the Symposium. For some, this conception becomes 
synonymous with thematic eros, a self-centered acquisitive love. Some contend that elements in 
this account present a thoroughgoing egocentrism where a lover only loves for some expected 
benefit that will address deficiency.
55
 This kind of love is motivated purely by self-interest in 
accordance with eudaimonistic ethics.
56
 This stands opposed to the notion of love as 
beneficence.
57
 On the other hand, it is sometimes argued that Platonic eros does not amount to 
selfishness per se, but rather that loving others is inseparably connected to one’s own benefit 
based on the interdependent nature of the world.
58
 Some, however, present Plato’s view as a 
                                                     
 
55
 For instance, the body loves medicine so that it can be improved. Plato, Lysis 215d. Even 
parental love of children is chalked up to the desire for immortality in the Symposium, as is the willingness 
for self-sacrifice of Alcestis and Achilles in mythology. Plato, Symp. 208c–d.  
56
 Nygren criticizes, “The very fact that Eros is acquisitive love is sufficient to show its egocentric 
character; for all desire, or appetite, and longing is more or less egocentric. But the clearest proof of the 
egocentric nature of Eros is its intimate connection with eudaemonia.” Agape, 180. “Of such a love it could 
scarcely be said that it
 
‘seeketh not its own.’” Ibid., 181.  
57
 “An Eros that was rich, and had everything it wanted, would be a contradiction in terms; and the 
same is true, fundamentally, of any thought of Eros as freely giving anything away.” Ibid., 176. 
58
 For Brümmer, Platonic “eros is love for the ideal humanity which all men share.” Model, 124. 
As such, it is not selfish, even though it is self-love such that “I do not love you for yourself alone, but only 
in order to achieve ultimate happiness for myself. In this sense all love is self-love.” Ibid., 115. Thus, while 
it is true that “Platonic love was in the final analysis an eudaemonistic effort toward achieving for yourself 
arete or that self-perfection which is identical with ultimate happiness.” Ibid. Nevertheless, “this does not 
mean that love is selfish. It does not seek personal advantage at the expense of other people. On the 
contrary, seeking my own good involves seeking the good of society as a whole and even of the universe as 




deficient love for universals rather than persons, while others see it as love for the potential 
(rather than actual) goodness of persons (self and others).
59
 Still others question whether Plato’s 
view must be interpreted as acquisitive at all. Might Platonic love, and thus eros, rather be 
inexplicable, as is perhaps implied by the inconclusive conclusion of the Lysis?
60
 For instance, in 
the Lysis and even in the Symposium there are brief implications of other-centered love.
61
 Perhaps 
love is multifaceted such that an attempted reduction of it to one or two elements results in 
absurdity. 
Whatever the case may be, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to enter into the 
further intricacies of interpreting Plato’s own view. Nevertheless, the briefly examined 
                                                     
 
59
 Vlastos, in “Individual,” supposes Platonic love to be directed toward the eternal forms or ideas 
and only secondarily for individuals, and then only as an instance, or exemplification, of the eternal forms 
or ideas. This he finds to be the “cardinal flaw” in Plato’s theory, lack of true personal love but rather 
limited to “love in persons . . . the ‘image’ of the Idea in them.” Vlastos, “Individual,” 31. Norton and 
Kille, on the other hand, see Platonic love not as egocentric, which is directed toward love of the actual self 
(actuality), but as a love directed toward the “indwelling ideal” (potentiality) and its growth. Philosophies, 
82. Because all of humanity is connected, this same love can also be directed toward the “ideal possibility 
within the beloved which it is his or her destiny to fulfill.” Ibid., 81. It is not concerned with the present 
imperfect condition but looks toward the perfect potentiality. 
60
 C. Osborne contends that eros is not acquisitive love or love motivated by desire or self-interest 
but is inexplicable according to the pattern of the Cupid mythology of arrows. For her, “the inexplicability 
of loving someone is central to the traditional notion of eros.” Eros, 72. She does concede that, “if the 
speech of Socrates in the Symposium is taken as an exposition of Platonic doctrine, it is easy to assume that 
Plato’s principle analysis of love is akin to what Nygren identified as Eros, a selfish desire to possess an 
inanimate good.” Ibid., 54. However, she does not take the Symposium to be a vehicle of Plato’s own view. 
Rather, she contends that “Plato himself suggests the reasons why it [the Symposium] should not be taken 
as suggesting that love is motivated by self-interest, or explained by appeal to the desirable nature of the 
object of acquisitive love.” Ibid., 56. She believes the Lysis “effectively undermines the notion of love that 
Nygren and many others have found in Diotima’s speech.” Ibid., 57. For her, it “make the uncritical, 
acquisitive, reading of the Symposium impossible.” Ibid., 58. Rist, on the other hand, does see Diotima’s 
account as including an acquisitive love that Plato would affirm, yet he also allows for some instances of 
non-egoistic love in Plato’s writings, noting that Plato was not consistent in his system and allowed for 
multiple positions that cannot be made into “a totally harmonious position.” Eros, 54. See further, ibid., 26, 
33–37, 55.  
61
 Though it is not from the mouth of Socrates, Phaedrus states, “Only such as are in love will 
consent to die for others.” Plato, Symp. 179b (Lamb, LCL). He contends that the lover avoids the shameful 
in order to be viewed more favorably by his beloved, thus making for a better citizen, and a better society. 
Thus, even here there is some emphasis on utility. Moreover, in the Lysis, love from parent to child is 
briefly mentioned as love that desires happiness for the beloved, though this parental love is itself 
questioned. Plato, Lysis 207d. In another instance, according to Diotima, the beautiful may be partaken of 




conflicting interpretations do shed light on what became major questions in the historical 
theology of love. For example, should love in its highest and purest sense be limited to altruism 
and beneficence or is there room for at least some degree of egocentrism? In other words, must 
love empty itself of valuation and desire nothing for itself? These questions become very 
prominent, and it does not seem necessary to pinpoint Plato’s own view to appreciate his 
influence in highlighting these issues. Although Plato speaks primarily of human love, and that is 
the locus of these questions for him, Christian theology will wrestle with these definitions as it 
relates to divine love. Presently, we turn to the Platonic framework, which suggests the 
impossibility of divine love. 
Divine Love 
 The words of Socrates related by Plato in both the Symposium and the Lysis imply that 
there is only one true object of love, the Good, the proton philon.
62
 For instance, Plato writes, 
“What men love is simply and solely the good.”
63
 The proton philon, the supreme object of love, 
is the ultimate Good.
64
 This relates to the aforementioned analogy of progress toward higher and 
better forms of love as “rungs on a ladder” toward the ultimate, singular, object of love.
65
 In this 
way, everything that is loved is loved for the good that it participates in or imitates, until we reach 
the proton philon, that “for whose sake all the other things” are loved.
66
 In this ascent toward 
higher love, the ultimate object of love is “the final object of all those previous toils . . . existing 
ever in singularity of form independent by itself, while all the multitude of beautiful things 
                                                     
 
62
 Plato, Lysis 219c. For Plato “all lovers are really in love with the absolute.” Singer, Nature, 21. 
63
 Plato, Symp. 206a (Lamb, LCL). 
64
 Singer, Nature, 54.  
65
 Plato, Symp. 210b–c (Lamb, LCL).  
66
 Plato, Lysis 219c (Lamb, LCL). This translation reads, “for whose sake all other things can be 




partake of it in such wise that, though all of them are coming to be and perishing, it grows neither 
greater nor less, and is affected [pa,scein] by nothing.”67 This “hierarchy of loves culminat[es] in 
the proton philon which is the only object to be loved for its own sake,” the eternal ultimate 
form.
68
 The God of Christianity would later be associated with this proton philon, the impassible 
one who desires nothing but is the true desire of all.  
The Platonic ontology makes it clear that love as desire or utility is not appropriate to 
divinity.
69
 As we have seen, love as desire suggests a lack or need in the lover that may be 
satisfied by an object of love such that the lover is “ever poor” and in need.
70
 However, the Good 
is the ultimate, and thus perfect, self-sufficient, immutable, timeless, etc.
71
 Thus, divinity as 
perfect must be completely self-sufficient and, consequently, “a god cannot love, since the gods 
lack nothing.”
72
 Moreover, there could be no relational or friendship love between God and man 
                                                     
 
67
 Plato, Symp. 211a–b (Lamb, LCL). It is “ever-existent and neither comes to be nor perishes, 
neither waxes nor wanes; next, it is not beautiful in part and in part ugly, nor is it such at such a time and 
other at another, nor in one respect beautiful and in another ugly, nor so affected by positions as to seem 
beautiful to some and ugly to others.” It is not in any instance, description, or location “but existing ever in 
singularity of form independent by itself, while all the multitude of beautiful things partake of it in such a 
wise that, although all of them are coming to be and perishing, it grows neither greater nor less, and is 
affected by nothing.” Ibid. 
68
 Brümmer, Model, 112.  
69
 At least in the sense of the absolute Good, the proton philon who is self-sufficient and “affected 
by nothing.” Plato, Symp. 211b (Lamb, LCL). Rist draws attention to a number of possible instances of 
outward-focused benevolence; Plato speaks of gods such as Zeus caring (in the sense of providing) for all 
(Phaedr. 246e), an age past of divine or semi-divine philanthropy (Leg. 713d) and a fatherly description of 
the Demiurge (Tim. 28c, 37c). He suggests that “Plato has not worked out his thought into a fully coherent 
system, but left some striking contradictions.” Rist, Eros, 33. Even if inconsistent with other elements of 
Platonic ontology, such infrequent instances still cannot remove Plato’s overwhelming emphasis on the 
timelessness, self-sufficiency, and impassibility that is central to the proton philon. 
70
 Plato, Symp. 203c–d (Lamb, LCL).  
71
 “But again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be in that measure sufficient to himself? 
Yes. And the sufficient has no need of anything, by virtue of his sufficiency. Of course.” Plato, Lysis 215a–
b (Lamb, LCL). Thus Singer states that the “Good is not like any other object. It is the principle of value 
and would retain its form whether or not anyone desired it.” Nature, 86.  
72
 Brümmer, Model, 111. Thus, Diotima states, “No gods ensue wisdom or desire to be made wise: 
such they are already; nor does anyone else that is wise ensue it.” Plato, Symp. 204a (Lamb, LCL). 




for “God with man does not mingle.”
73
 Thus divinity is never the active agent of love (lover) but 
may only be the object of love (loved).
74
  
As shall be seen, the concept of eros as desire or as love for the useful becomes 
significant in Christian theology. Thus, when Christians adapted Plato’s theory of the Good or the 
proton philon to correspond to the Christian God, the issue of divine love became problematic. 
For instance, the Good is absolutely simple, timeless, self-sufficient, immutable, and altogether 
perfect. This means, of course, that the Good is in need of nothing, indeed incapable of need. The 
proton philon is the object of all love but cannot be subject; since it already possesses the object 
of all desire, it makes no sense to consider it a subject of desire; it lacks nothing. If God is 
conceived in these terms, it follows that God cannot have any desire, and thus cannot exhibit the 
kind of love that Plato described; if there is divine love it cannot have any semblance of the 
supposedly Platonic eros love of desire; it must be something altogether different. This created a 
great difficulty to Christianity, which must hold divine love of some sort to make any sense of the 
gospel. One major attempt to overcome this difficulty will be seen in Augustine’s theory of divine 
love. But first, the view of Aristotle must be considered. 
Aristotle’s Conception of Love 
The influence of Plato on Aristotle’s conception of love is vast, yet Aristotle broke from 
his teacher in significant ways including the fact that he further emphasized rational love and 
                                                     
 
will you dare to deny that any god is beautiful and happy?’ ‘Bless me!’ I exclaimed, ‘not I.’ ‘And do you 
not call those happy who possess good and beautiful things?’ ‘Certainly I do.’ ‘But you have admitted that 
Love, from very lack of good and beautiful things, desires these very things that he lacks.’ ‘Yes, I have.’ 
‘How then can he be a god, if he is devoid of things beautiful and good?’ ‘By no means, it appears.’” Ibid., 
202c–d. 
73
 Rather, the daimons are “the means of all society and converse of men with gods and of gods 
with men, whether waking or asleep.” Ibid., 203a. Thus C. Osborne states, “It seems that Diotima’s 
universe would be in danger of falling into two parts if intermediates were denied, due to a kind of dualism 
that treats what are properly contraries as if they were contradictories.” Eros, 110.  
74
 “The relation between the two worlds is entirely one-sided; the movement is all in one direction, 




added nuance to Plato’s distinctions.
75
 Essential to understanding Aristotle’s conception of love is 
the ontology that underlies all of his thought. Aristotle’s ontology is one of substance. Substance 
is a composite of form and matter (hylomorphe).
76
 In opposition to Plato’s two-world ontology, 
universals inhere in substances and do not exist independently. The form is the essence (what it is 
made into) and the matter is what the substance is made of. There are essential qualities without 
which something would not be what it is and also accidental qualities that are not necessary to 
that particular thing. Aristotle further develops his ontology regarding the question of change by 
employing the categories of actuality (energeia) and potentiality (dunamis), the former being 
what something is and the latter being what something could become.
77
 
Despite Aristotle’s break from Plato’s two-world ontology and his development of the 
ontology of substance and change, the veneration of timelessness, simplicity, immutability, self-
sufficiency, and perfection remain constant in the foundation of Aristotle’s ontology.
78
 
Specifically, they are essential to the unmoved mover who is wholly impassible and immutable, 
immovable and unalterable, pure act with no potentiality and wholly immaterial, without parts.
79
 
                                                     
 
75
 “Even more than Plato, Aristotle associates love with reason as against emotion.” Singer, 
Nature, 91. Nygren comments, “The relation between the Aristotelian and the Platonic theory of Eros 
might be formulated briefly as follows: Aristotle presents us with an expansion of the Platonic theory, in 
which the idea of Eros acquires cosmic significance.” Agape, 183.  
76
 See Aristotle, Metaph. 7. 
77
 Actuality has priority over potentiality as its ground such that “the actually existence is 
generated from the potentially existent by something which is actually existence” but there is no infinite 
regress for “there is always a prime mover; and that which initiates motion exists already in actuality.” 
Aristotle, Metaph. 9.8.5 (Tredennick, LCL). Nygren comments, “The whole process of nature is seen by 
Aristotle as a movement, a successive ascent from matter to Form, from imperfection to perfection of 
being, from potentiality to actuality.” Agape, 184. 
78
 The “prime mover, which is immovable, is one both in formula and number.” Aristotle, Metaph. 
7.8.18 (Tredennick, LCL). “The first principle and primary reality is immovable, both essentially and 
accidentally, but it excites the primary form of motion, which is one and eternal.” Ibid., 7.8.3. See also 
ibid., 7.9.2.  
79
 For the logic regarding the notion of the prime mover see ibid., 7.8.3–4. The ultimate reality, the 
unmoved mover, is Mind (nous) and the mind is wholly unaffected and undetermined by external reality. 
Ibid., 7.9.1–2. It does not change, for the change would be for the worse, and anything of this kind would 




Once again, such a conception of the ultimate being greatly impacts the conception of divine 
love, and in Aristotle’s case, the lack thereof. First, however, his conception of love must be 
briefly examined. 
Friendship Love 
When discussing love, Aristotle prefers the term philia, which connotes a “rationalistic 
friendship love” whereas the word eros he uses to connote sexual love.
80
 Friendship love is 
rational as opposed to the fleeting love of emotion or “excess of feeling.”
81
 However, despite the 
difference in the nuance of preferred wording, a great deal of Plato’s conception of love towards a 
worthy object remains.
82
 For instance, Aristotle contends that the object of love must be useful, 
beautiful (or pleasant), and/or good.
83
 In this way he posits three kinds of friendship love (philia). 
Friendship love based on utility is concerned with an expected benefit to the lover.
84
 Love of the 
                                                     
 
substance, separate from potentiality and materiality. Aristotle describes it thus: “There is some substance 
which is eternal and immovable and separate from sensible things; and it has been shown that this 
substance can have no magnitude, but is impartible and indivisible (for it causes motion for infinite time, 
and nothing finite has infinite potentiality . . .); and moreover that it is impassive and unalterable; for all the 
other kinds of motion are posterior to spatial motion.” Ibid., 7.7.12–13. This mind is entirely self-sufficient 
and thinks only itself: “Therefore Mind thinks itself, if it is that which is best; and its thinking is a thinking 
of thinking.” Ibid., 7.9.4. 
80
 Singer, Nature, 92. Aristotle “restricts the meaning of Plato’s word eros, using it only for the 
lesser relationship of sexual love. For what he really wishes to recommend, friendship, he adopts the term 
philia.” Ibid. 
81
 Aristotle, Metaph. 8.6 (David Ross, Metaphysics [Oxford World’s Classics; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998], 201). Again, for Aristotle the best love (friendship love or philia) is rational and 
purposive as opposed to the fleeting love (philesis) of emotion. In fact, Rackham translates it as: “Liking 
[fi,lhsij] seems to be an emotion [pa,qei], friendship [fili,a] a fixed disposition, for liking can be felt even 
for inanimate things, but reciprocal liking involves deliberate choice, and this springs from a fixed 
disposition.” Aristotle, Metaph. 8.5.5 (Tredennick, LCL). The love based on feelings is fleeting, but 
rational love remains.  
82
 In fact, the majority of the difference in semantics relates to Aristotle’s usage of the category of 
eros. As has been seen, philia and its word group was used by Plato to discuss friendship in similar fashion 
to Aristotle. 
83
 “It seems that not everything is loved [filei/sqai], but only what is lovable [filhto,n], and that 
this is either what is good, or pleasant, or useful.” Ibid., 8.2.1. 
84
 “Thus friends whose affection is based on utility do not love each other in themselves, but in so 




beautiful (pleasant) is likewise concerned with personal advantage. The first two kinds of 
friendship love are thus closely connected as imperfect and inferior kinds of friendship.
85
 In 
discussing these types of friendships, Aristotle conveys his distaste for friendship based on 
emotion, temporary pleasure, or profit. Notably, he ties the friendship (philia) based on emotion 
with eros love.
86
 Likewise, he ties friendship of utility not to mutual love but mutual profit.
87
 He 
thus somewhat reticently applies the term friendship (philia) to these first two types, finally 
acknowledging that they are only friendships in an “analogical sense.”
88
 
In contrast to these first two types is the love of the good and virtuous, not merely for the 
sake of utility but for those who are morally virtuous. This third kind of love amounts to perfect 
friendship (philia), the highest kind of love.
89
 Whereas the first two kinds are fleeting, the rare, 
perfect friendship remains constant since it is based on the stability of virtue.
90
 Moreover, perfect 
                                                     
 
pleasure.” Ibid., 8.3.1.  
85
 Such friendships are imperfect not only because they are based on temporary advantage (use of 
pleasure) but because such attachments are “accidental” and thus fleeting. Ibid., 8.3.2–3. These friendships 
are easily broken off: “if no longer pleasant or useful to each other, they cease to love each other.” Ibid., 
8.3.4.  
86
 The young, he says, tend to form friendships of pleasure based on “emotion” (pa,qoj). “Hence 
they both form friendships and drop them quickly, since their affections alter with what gives them 
pleasure, and the tastes of youth change quickly. Also the youth are prone to fall in love [evrwtikoi.], as love 
[evrwotikh/j] is chiefly guided by emotion [paqo,j], and grounded on pleasure [‘hdonh.n]. . . . Hence they form 
attachments quickly and give them up quickly, often changing before the day is out.” Ibid. 8.2.5.  
87
 “A friendship based on utility dissolves as soon as its profit ceases; for the friends did not love 
[fi,loi] each other, but what they got out of each other.” Ibid., 8.4.2.  
88
 People use the word friendship for the lesser kinds thus “we must say that there are several sorts 
of friendship, that between good men, as good, being friendship in the primary and proper meaning of the 
term, while the other kinds are friendships in an analogical sense.” Ibid., 8.4.4. 
89
 “The perfect [telei,a] form of friendship [fili,a] is that between the good, and those who 
resemble each other in virtue [avreth,n ‘omoi,wn].” Ibid., 8.3.6. Thus, “perfect, complete friendship (teleia 
philia) is contingent on virtue in both partners.” Carmichael, Friendship, 17. Singer questions this as a 
basis of love, however, noting: “Reason may force us to recognize the virtuous character of a good man; 
but nothing can force us to love him.” Nature, 96.  
90
 “Hence the friendship of these lasts as long as they continue to be good; and virtue is a 
permanent quality.” Aristotle, Metaph. 8.3.6 (Tredennick, LCL). “Because virtue is a stable state, 
friendship based on it will have the perfection of permanence.” Carmichael, Friendship, 17. Singer 




friendship is not based merely on relative goods (that which is good in the view of the lover) but 
absolute goods (that which is good regardless of perspective), and the virtuous lover recognizes 
the absolute good.
91
 This type of friendship affords both utility and pleasure, though these 
benefits are not its grounds, since the good man derives both benefits from the good that he 
loves.
92
 However, this friendship remains explicitly grounded on the worth of the object; its 
superiority to the other two is based on loving what is higher, the worthy virtue, rather than the 
baser, temporary attributes.
93
 Accordingly, despite perfect friendship being superior to imperfect 
friendships, it is not thereby purely altruistic, as shall be seen below. All three types of love are 
directed toward something lovable or worthy of love (useful, beautiful, or good) and thus 
valuable to the lover.
94
  
Accordingly, the question is raised, is perfect friendship altruistic and other-centered? 
Notably, Aristotle seems to explicitly appeal to other-regarding love. Specifically, he mentions 
friendship love as “wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but 
for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about.”
95
 In another place he 
                                                     
 
other’s character, thereby according one another the love that virtue deserves.” Singer, Nature, 95. 
91
 “All affection [fili,a] is based on good or on pleasure, either absolute or relative to the person 
who feels it, and is prompted by similarity of some sort; but this friendship possesses all these attributes in 
the friends themselves, they are alike, et cetera, in that way.” Aristotle, Metaph. 8.3.7 (Tredennick, LCL). 
“Also, when men wish the good of those they love for their own sakes, their goodwill does not depend on 
emotion but on a fixed disposition.” Ibid., 8.5.5.  
92
 Thus, “it is between good men that affection [filei/n] and friendship [fili,a] exist in their fullest 
and best form.” Ibid., 8.3.7.  
93
 Aristotle explicitly frames this friendship on worthiness stating, “You cannot admit him to 
friendship or really be friends, before each has shown the other that he is worthy of friendship and has won 
his confidence.” Ibid., 8.3.8. 
94
 Singer contends that for Aristotle love “is always a response to external merit.” Nature, 97. 
Thus Singer believes that for Aristotle as for Plato “love remains the search for an objective goodness in 
the object.” Ibid. For this reason he believes that, “for all his originality, Aristotle still belongs to what is 
often called (using Plato’s terminology) the eros tradition.” Ibid., 106. 
95
 Aristotle, Rhet. 1380b-1381a (W. Rhys Roberts, Rhetoric [2 vols.; GBWW; Chicago, 
Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 1990], 2:626). Moreover, Aristotle does recognize that the benefactor in a 




states that love involves “goodwill and wishing well to each other.”
96
 Thus, Aristotle clearly 
includes well-wishing and acting for the other’s good as a part of friendship, yet the question 
remains, is regard for others the motivation of friendship love? This issue is further illuminated 
by Aristotle’s brief discussion of self-sacrifice, stating, the good man “will if necessary lay down 
his life in the behalf of friends and country.”
97
 However, for Aristotle, such self-sacrifice is rooted 
in the self-interest of gaining nobility thereby.
98
 Elsewhere, Aristotle makes it explicitly clear that 




Nevertheless, despite the appearance of benevolence (well-wishing), some have criticized 
Aristotle’s conception, saying that loving others is not really for the sake of those others but 
ultimately originated out of self-interest.
100
 Accordingly, Aristotle has been criticized for the 
                                                     
 
him if it were alive. Aristotle, Metaph. 9.7.3–4. 
96
 Aristotle, Metaph. 8.2 (Ross, Metaphysics, 194). 
97
 Aristotle, Metaph. 9.8.9 (Tredennick, LCL). 
98
 He states, “For he will surrender wealth and power and all the goods that men struggled to win, 
if he can secure nobility for himself. . . . And this is doubtless the case with those who give their lives for 
others; thus they choose great nobility for themselves.” Ibid.  
99
 Ibid., 8.5.5. Aristotle does state, “For these friends wish each alike the other’s good in respect of 
their goodness, and they are good in themselves; but it is those who wish the good of their friends for their 
friends’ sake who are friends in the fullest sense, since they love each other for themselves and not 
accidentally.” Ibid., 8.3.6. However, this does not seem to refer to altruism but rather to love based on 
recognition of virtue in the other. Thus, rather than being based on the accidents of utility or pleasure, this 
kind of love is based on the person himself, specifically his virtue. It does not seem to mean that the good 
man loves the other good man in order to benefit the other good man, although such benefit does mutually 
accrue, but rather because it is the rational and virtuous course to love the good and virtuous. This is readily 
apparent when Aristotle comments, “And in loving [filou/ntej] their friend [fi,lon] they love their own 
good, for the good man in becoming dear to another becomes that other’s good. Each party therefore both 
loves his own good and also makes an equivalent return by wishing the other’s good, and by affording him 
pleasure; for there is a saying, ‘Amity [filo,thj] is equality [ivso,thj],’ and this is most fully realized in the 
friendships of the good.” Ibid., 8.5.5.  
100
 For instance, “the criticism is not,” comments Richard Norman, “that Plato and Aristotle 
exclude altruism. It is that, because they justify it by reference to the agent’s own happiness, they reduce it 
to a kind of enlightened self-interest, and so deprive it of its moral value.” The Moral Philosophers: An 
Introduction to Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 57. For instance, consider H. A. 
Prichard’s seminal criticism of self-interest, Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest: Essays and Lectures 




semblance of overarching self-interest.
101
 Others, however, contend that Aristotle’s love is not 
selfish but, simply, consistently directs itself towards that which is worthy of love, that is, the 
good in the self or in others.
102
 Aristotle does explicitly emphasize the priority of self-love, saying 
that every man “is his own best friend and ought to love himself best.”
103
 For Aristotle, even 
parental love is an example of self-love; parents love children as offspring of their own self.
104
 
However, the right kind of self-love is rational and directed toward virtue for the self.
105
 This is in 
accord with the Eudaimonistic ethics of Aristotle that one is best served by being good and 
virtuous.
106
 Aristotle frames all action directed at happiness as the ultimate end, and happiness is 
acting in accordance with reason, which itself is virtuous action.
107
 In this limited way, love for 
                                                     
 
concern for others as “constitutive of one’s own happiness” which for him would make their account “no 
more suspect than the altruism of one who simply enjoys helping others.” Moral, 59. Nonetheless, Norman 
remains unsatisfied and detects a form of egoism here. Cf. C. Osborne, Eros, 144. 
101
 For instance, C. Osborne critiques: Aristotle’s “persistent preoccupation with what you get out 
of a relationship, and whether you or the other person are getting as much as you give, seems to fit ill with 
our notion of how friends regard each other.” Eros, 144. Nygren comments that even “the nobler form of 
love, is built in the last resort, according to Aristotle, on self-love.” Agape, 186. 
102
 “In perfect friendship the apparent object of love is the goodness which the excellent person 
instantiates.” Carmichael, Friendship, 22. 
103
 Aristotle, Metaph. 9.8 (Ross, Metaphysics, 235).  
104
 Aristotle states, “For parents love [ste,rgousi] their children as part of themselves.” Metaph. 
8.12.2 (Tredennick, LCL). 
105
 Ibid., 9.8.4–6. In fact, Aristotle contends that the wrong kind of self-love, specifically that 
which tries to assign “the larger share of money, honours, or bodily pleasures,” has given it a bad name. 
Ibid., 9.8.4. Carmichael believes that “capacity for friendship depends on right self-love, which is free of 
selfishness in that the good I will for myself is the good of virtue, and the virtuous person is free of self-
seeking passion, and acts according to intelligent reason (nous).” Friendship, 22. 
106
 “By suggesting that self-interest is best served by ministering to the higher elements of the self, 
and that this is done by doing good, which itself benefits others as well as the self, he can argue that serving 
others not only follows from looking after number one but also contributes to that task.” C. Osborne, Eros, 
151. C. Osborne contends that “Aristotle’s analysis of philia is not concerned with loving others” but “co-
operating with, or befriending, others in such a way as to operate in society as if their goals were your own 
goals, or as if the pair of you, or group of you, had joint goals.” Ibid. 
107
 “Now happiness above all else appears to be absolutely final in this sense, since we always 
choose it for its own sake and never as a means to something else.” Aristotle, Metaph. 1.7.5 (Tredennick, 
LCL). “Happiness, therefore, being found to be something final and self-sufficient, is the End at which all 
actions aim.” Ibid., 1.7.8. For Aristotle, “Happiness consists in acting in accordance with reason.” Norman, 




others is like love for one’s self.
108
 Thus, for Aristotle, self-love presents no problem since it is 
both rational and virtuous to direct love toward that which is good, thus the “good man ought to 




Mutuality and Community 
For Aristotle, mutuality is an essential feature of all three types of friendship.
110
 This 
mutuality includes equality whether it be exchange of equal pleasure, utility, or goodness.
111
 
Because friendship is a relationship of mutuality, it also requires likeness as well as nearness.
112
 
                                                     
 
happiness. Aristotle, Metaph. 1.7.14.  
108
 For Aristotle, “the extreme of friendship is likened to one’s love for oneself.” Aristotle, 
Metaph. 9.4 (Ross, Metaphysics, 228). Carmichael comments that there seem two possibilities: “self-love is 
the exemplar for all other loves, or that all love is fundamentally self-love. The exemplary meaning is 
foremost when he says that very strong friendship ‘is likened to’ one’s friendship for one’s self.” 
Friendship, 21.  
109
 Aristotle, Metaph. 9.8.7 (Tredennick, LCL). Moreover, as good “he will then both benefit 
himself by acting nobly and aid his fellows.” Ibid. Thus, here again, the action is for nobility and a by-
product is the benefit of others. 
110
 Thus “the term Friendship [fili,a] is not applied to love [filh,sei] for inanimate objects, since 
here there is no return of affection [avntifi,lhsij], and also no wish for the good of the object—for instance, 
it would be ridiculous to wish to a bottle of wine. . . . Whereas we are told that we ought to wish our friend 
well for his own sake. But persons who wish another good for his own sake, if the feeling is not 
reciprocated, are merely said to feel goodwill [euv,nouj] for him: only when mutual is such goodwill termed 
friendship.” Ibid., 8.2.3. Moreover, the goodwill must be known, for mutual goodwill unknown cannot be 
called friendship. Ibid., 8.2.4. Therefore he can state the three requisites of friendship, that “men must (1) 
feel goodwill for each other, that is, wish each other’s good, and (2) be aware of each other’s goodwill, and 
(3) the cause of their goodwill must be one of the lovable qualities mentioned above.” Ibid. 
111
 Thus, “the forms of friendship of which we have spoken are friendships of equality, for both 
parties render the same benefit and wish the same good to each other, or else exchange two different 
benefits, for instance pleasure and profit.” Ibid., 8.6.7. Aristotle does recognize that there are unequal 
friendships and includes among them that of father-son, husband-wife, ruler-ruled. Ibid., 8.7.1. However, 
he proposes that such should be balanced out by the ‘lesser’ bestowing more affection on the more 
deserving party. “The affection rendered in these various unequal friendships should also be proportionate: 
the better of the two parties, for instance, or the more useful or otherwise superior as the case may be, 
should receive more affection than he bestows; since when affection rendered is proportionate to desert, 
this produces equality in a sense between the parties, and equality is felt to be an essential element of 
friendship.” Ibid., 8.7.2.  
112
 Ibid., 8.5.5. Singer thus criticizes that Aristotle neglects “the joy or loving those who are not 
like ourselves, persons who are not extensions of our own personality, but are really different, separate, 




In this way, reciprocal friendship love is predicated upon the parties of the relationship being part 
of the community.
113
 Thus, Aristotle states, “community is the essence of friendship.”
114
 In fact, 
friendship love is what holds the community together. Moreover, the proper functioning 
community is one of justice, and each actual society will “involve friendship just in so far as it 
involves justice.”
115
 Justice includes love directly proportioned to merit, which “is what 
Aristotelian justice demands, and friendship cannot be authentic if it goes against justice.”
116
 In 




Another important characteristic of Aristotle’s conception is volition. For Aristotle, 
higher love is not a passionate impulse or merely affection, but rather a deliberate choice. Philia 
love is not directed by feelings of pathos; rather, Aristotle writes, “Mutual love involves choice 
and choice springs from a state; and men wish well to those whom they love, for their sake, not as 
a result of passion, but as a result of state.”
118
 Here again we see the importance of philia as a 
rational, willed love.
119
 The rational man chooses to love objects that are worthy of love, and the 
                                                     
 
113
 This is “an ontological precondition or ground for friendship, the sharing in some kind of 
‘communion’ (koinonia), which of itself engenders friendship between its participants.” Carmichael, 
Friendship, 17. Therefore “when persons approve of each other without seeking such other’s society, this 
seems to be goodwill rather than friendship. Nothing is more characteristic of friends than that they seek 
each other’s society.” Aristotle, Metaph 8.4.3 (Tredennick, LCL). 
114
 Ibid., 8.9.1. Alternately translated, “friendship depends on community.” The Greek reads evn 
koinwni,a| ga.r ‘h fili,a.  
115
 Aristotle, Metaph. 8.11 (Ross, Metaphysics, 112).  
116
 Singer, Nature, 95. 
117
 This does not rule out benevolence as part of the love relationship, but love still must be 
grounded upon some worth in the object (usefulness, pleasantness, or goodness) and cannot thus be wholly 
unmerited. 
118
 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.5.30–32 (Jonathan Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle: the Revised 
Oxford Translation [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1984], 1829). 
119
 He states, “A man of defective self-restraint acts from desire but not from choice; and on the 
contrary a self-restrained man acts from choice and not from desire.” Aristotle, Metaph. 3.2.4 (Tredennick, 




most rational man loves the highest good.
120
 Yet questions are also raised as to the apparent lack 
of emotion in Aristotle’s conception of higher love. Aristotle makes a distinction between the 
higher form of friendship love (philia) which is rational and purposive and the fleeting love 
(philesis) of emotion.
121
 Catherine Osborne contends that this friendship love is thus really a 
pragmatic relationship of mutual benefit in society, less love than partnership or alliance.
122
 Why 
does Aristotle not give more prominence to feeling love (philesis)? Osborne comments, “The 
occasions on which Aristotle actually discusses whether the parties are fond of each other 
(stergousi) are not many, though he occasionally takes it for granted that they would be, 
particularly in relationships due to pleasure such as love affairs.”
123
 Nevertheless, it has already 
been seen that affection is a byproduct of perfect friendship, but likewise Aristotle is clear that the 
best kind of love (philia) is predicated not on affection but on choice.
124
 The rational and 
purposive nature of friendship love (philia) is again evidenced in Aristotle’s reservation of this 
kind of love to human beings. Philesis (or other “phil” words) may be used to refer to affection or 
fondness for lesser beings, and even inanimate things, but philia is reserved for reciprocal 
relationships between rational beings that are capable of assessing and valuing the worthy object 
                                                     
 
deliberate choice.” Ibid., 3.2.6. For one thing, “Where love is governed by feeling, Aristotle remarks, one 
can never be assured of reciprocity.” Singer, Nature, 93. 
120
 The best one lives “by principle” based on reason rather than “by passion.” Aristotle, Metaph. 
9.8.6 (Tredennick, LCL).  
121
 This distinction in the semantics is clearly apparent, “Liking [fi,lhsij] seems to be an emotion 
[pa,qei], friendship [fili,a] a fixed disposition, for liking can be felt even for inanimate things, but 
reciprocal liking involves deliberate choice, and this springs from a fixed disposition.” Ibid., 8.5.5. 
122
 She proposes that philia is “co-operation” which is different from love (philesis). C. Osborne, 
Eros, 148. Here “the emphasis is not on feelings but on practical behaviour and choices.” Ibid., 149. 
Osborne comments, “How the parties feel about each other is not directly relevant to the practical and 
social implications of such partnerships.” Ibid., 151. Thus she believes perfect friendship is better not 
because it is more virtuous but because of pragmatic cooperation. 
123
 Ibid., 148.  
124
 C. Osborne contends that “love is relevant, then, but it is not the proper explanation of the co-






 Therefore, the good man loves the virtuous rationally and purposely, not based on 
fleeting emotions, pleasures, or profit, for such feelings change, but based on the purposive state 
of appreciation for virtue for virtue’s sake. 
Divine Love 
For Aristotle, no less than Plato, the notion of divine love is impossible; such would 
imply a lack of perfection, a need in the divine, which is impossible for the unmoved mover.
126
 
As has been seen, the absolute Mind is wholly self-sufficient and could attain no benefit (utility, 
pleasure, or goodness) from any object of love.
127
 Moreover, God is altogether removed from the 
creaturely realm, taking no action ad extra. Thus, there can thus be no friendship (philia) between 
humans and God and certainly no mutual relations or fellowship. Aristotle states this clearly 
saying, “When one party is removed to a great distance, as God is, the possibility of friendship 
ceases.”
128
 Thus God is an object of love but cannot be the subject of love. Aristotle’s God does 
                                                     
 
125
 “Philein and other phil-words may be used to indicate a ‘love’ or liking (philesis), even for 
inaminate things such as wine; but love for inanimate things is not called ‘philia’, for two distinct reasons: 
there is no return of love and no wishing well to the object for its own sake. We do not wish good to a 
friend ‘for his sake’ . . . and this is only possible with a human being.” Carmichael, Friendship, 15–16. 
Carmichael believes that “clearly underlying it is the intuition that only a human being can be loved ‘for 
their own sake’ because only a human person can be, not only the object of love but also a subject in their 
own right; but neither Aristotle nor any other ancient writer made this intuition explicit.” Ibid., 16.  
126
 Rather, God always enjoys his own happiness. “God is a living being, eternal, most good; and 
therefore life and a continuous eternal existence belong to God; for that is what God is.” Aristotle, Metaph. 
12.7.8 (Tredennick, LCL). 
127
 For both “Plato and Aristotle . . . the idea of mutual love between man and God would have 
been blasphemous.” Singer, Nature, 107. Aristotle “rejects the very idea that God can love the world. God 
is perfect and self-sufficient being and contains in himself all that he needs. For God to love anything 
outside himself could only reflect some inner defect or deficiency.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 
6:343. In one place, Aristotle does give a hint of divine love, but this is qualified by the hypothetical 
assertion regarding the deities of man’s conception. He writes, “It seems likely that the man who pursues 
intellectual activity . . . is also the man most beloved of the gods. For if, as is generally believed, the gods 
exercise some superintendence over human affairs, then it will be reasonable to suppose that they take 
pleasure in that part of man which is best and most akin to themselves.” Aristotle, Metaph. 10.8.13 
(Tredennick, LCL). However, it seems that this statement is not intended to say anything about the actual 
ultimate divine being but about the value of rationality. 
128
 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.7.4–5 (Barnes, 1831). Thus there is no mutual love between God and man. 
Nygren notes that there can be no friendship with God for that “presupposes an equality between Divine 




not enter into relationship because this would mean that the divine is dependent on other than 
God in some manner. But there can be no relationship between God (as so conceived) and man. 




God is the unmoved mover, but he does not create motion by moving, but by being the 
object of love. Thus, the final cause “causes motion as being an object of love [evrw,menon], 
whereas all other things cause motion because they themselves are in motion.”
130
 Notice, the love 
that humans have for God is also not friendship love, for that requires mutuality, including 
likeness, nearness, and equality, but God is absolutely superior and remote, and thus there can be 
no such thing between God and man.
131
 Not only is mutual love ruled out, there can be no love 
from God towards humans, for God thinks only of himself in absolute self-sufficiency.
132
  
Just as Plato (through neo-Platonism) provides the philosophical groundwork for 
Augustine, Aristotle has a thoroughgoing impact on the intricate systematic theology of Thomas 
Aquinas, who masterfully incorporates Aristotle’s conception of the divine and of love into the 
Christian tradition. In both cases, modifications are required, however, to allow for divine love in 
contrast to both Plato and Aristotle. Other elements of Aristotle’s conception shed light on issues 
that will recur regarding divine love. For instance, his emphasis on rational, purposive love is 
                                                     
 
129
 Aristotle, Metaph. 12.9.1–3 (Tredennick, LCL). See the discussion above. 
130
 Ibid., 12.7.4. The most moved mover “causes movement in virtue of being an object of desire” 
C. Osborne, Eros, 132. He goes on to explain, “Since there is something which moves while itself 
unmoved, existing actually, this can in no way be otherwise than it is.” Aristotle, Metaph. 12.7.7–8 
(Barnes, 1694).  
131
 Nygren comments, “We thus find in Aristotle the Eros of Plato raised to the level of a cosmic 
force.” Agape, 184. Further, although he is different from Plato otherwise, “with regard to the idea of Eros 




 Once again, God is entirely self-sufficient and thinks only of himself: “Therefore Mind thinks 
itself, if it is that which is best; and its thinking is a thinking of thinking.” Aristotle, Metaph. 12.9.4 
(Tredennick, LCL). This is because “the final good must be a thing sufficient in itself. . . . We take a self-
sufficient thing to mean a thing which merely standing by itself alone renders life desirable and lacking in 




continued by some theologians (see below) as the ideal, even for divinity. While Aristotle’s God 
does not love, later Christian theologians would propose that he does, but as wholly rational. For 
instance, is self-love inappropriate or even wicked? If it is, can God love himself or, in Christian 
theology, the trinitarian persons? Moreover, if somehow the absolute separation between God and 
humanity would be overcome, would God’s love be based on the worthiness of humans? Is love 
for God from humans necessarily based on worth? Moreover, if God and man could enter into a 
loving friendship, what degree of mutuality would such a relationship entail, if any? These and 
other questions repeatedly rise to the fore, as shall be seen. 
Augustine’s Conception of Love 
The importance of Augustine’s contribution to Christian theology can hardly be 
overstated.
133
 One of his many lasting contributions was in the area of Christian love.
134
 However, 
Augustine did not approach the issue of love in a vacuum. The similarity of his ontology to 
Platonic thought patterns (through neoplatonism) has been widely recognized.
135
 For Augustine, 
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 “It is no exaggeration to say that the essential philosophical framework of Western Christianity 
for at least the next thousand years is owed to him.” Carmichael, Friendship, 56. 
134
 Oord states, “For Augustine, love is the center of Christianity, and it is primarily due to him 
that both Catholic and Evangelical Christianity take it as axiomatic that Christianity is a religion of love.” 
“Matching Theology and Piety: An Evangelical Process Theology of Love” (Ph.D. diss., Claremont 
Graduate University, 1999), 120. 
135
 For instance, Plotinus continued the emphasis on the impassibility of the One from which the 
many emanate downwards toward the earthly but desire to return upwards toward the heavenly. See 
Plotinus, Enn. (trans. Stephen McKenna; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 191–201. Specifically, 
“In Plotinus’ theology no god could suffer, nor love.” C. Osborne, Eros, 115. Despite emanation downward 
the Divine Being is utterly self-sufficient and impassible and does not descend downward. See Plotinus, 
Enn., 361–62. God is Eros but as the ultimate object of desire, never himself desiring, thus the Divine 
Being is erasmon, the only one worthy of love. Cf. Nygren, Agape, 198–99; Singer, Nature, 117; J. C. M. 
van Winden, “What Is Love? Eros and Agape in Early Christian Thought,” in Arché: A Collection of 
Patristic Studies (ed. J. D. Boeft and D. T. Runia; Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1997). This amounts to a 
sharp dualism between God and matter, sometimes referred to as the Alexandrian world-scheme and the 
divide is bridged by a plethora of intermediary beings (daimones). For an overview of neoplatonic 
conceptions of divine love from the perspective of Plotinus, see Rist, Eros. Nygren states, “When the Eros 
motif found its way into Christianity it was not exclusively, nor even primarily, in the form given to it by 
Plato; it was primarily in the form, on the one hand, of Mystery-piety (as can be seen above all in Gnosti-




God is absolutely timeless, self-sufficient, perfect, immutable, and simple.
136
 As such, nothing 
can act upon God, for God is utterly impassible.
137
 Furthermore, God is himself the absolute 
good, having no need and no desire.
138
 Moreover, for Augustine, love is an ontological category, 
the essence of God, thus “love is God.”
139
 Augustine describes love as the bond of the Trinity 
(specifically the Holy Spirit).
140
 By extension, love is the grounding of all created beings.
141
 
However, beyond love as the ground of being itself, Augustine deals carefully with the love of 
persons: love proper and improper, given and received.  
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 For instance, Augustine speaks of God “whose being is perfect: it discerns also that the 
perfection of His being is consummate because He is immutable, and therefore neither gains nor loses.” 
Augustine, Letters of St. Augustin 118.3.15 (NPNF 1:877). Moreover, God has an “ineffably simple 
nature.” Trin. 15.19.37 (NPNF 3:424). He is the “unchangeably eternal” one. Conf. 11.31.41 (NPNF 
1:319). Further, he is the “eternal, spiritual, and unchangeable good.” Civ. 15.22 (NPNF 2:648). 
137
 Singer attributes this at least partially to the need to avoid an anthropomorphic conception of 
God. Singer, Nature, 168. In fact, nothing at all happens that is not determined by the eternal divine will. 
This is explicit when Augustine speaks of the divine “will of His which is eternal as His foreknowledge, 
certainly He has already done all things in heaven and on earth that He has willed, — not only past and 
present things, but even things still future.” Civ. 22.2 (NPNF 2:1013). He states elsewhere that, “nothing, 
therefore, happens but by the will of the Omnipotent, He either permitting it to be done, or Himself doing 
it.” Enchir. 95 (NPNF 3:523). Moreover, he states, “But however strong may be the purposes either of 
angels or of men, whether of good or bad, whether these purposes fall in with the will of God or run 
counter to it, the will of the Omnipotent is never defeated.” Ibid., 102 (NPNF 3:529). Augustine did, 
however, attempt to maintain some semblance of free will alongside predestination. See Civ. 5.9 (NPNF 
2:207–11).  
138
 For Augustine, all good is predicated on the “unchangeable good” and any good which changes 
is not good in itself. Civ. 8.3.5 (NPNF 3:218–19). He cannot increase in goodness in any way. 
139
 Lewis Ayres, “Augustine, Christology, and God As Love: An Introduction to the Homilies on 1 
John,” in Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of God (ed. Kevin J. 
Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 86.  
140
 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to deal with Augustine’s trinitarian ontology. 
However it is interesting to note that Augustine frames the Trinity according to God as lover, beloved, and 
love itself. Civ. 9.2.2 (NPNF 3:235). Thus intra-trinitarian love is described as love between the Father and 
the Son (both functioning as lover and beloved), with the Holy Spirit as the bond of love. In this way 
eternal divine love is self-love, with no need or desire for any love outside of the perfectly self-sufficient 
Trinity. See ibid., 15.19.37 (NPNF 3:423–24). 
141
 Augustine’s view “proclaimed that man’s creation, in fact the creation of everything, originates 
from an infinite source of love; and it offered the commandment to return love for love as the single but 





Only God is self-sufficient and thus has no desires, yet all others have desire, and such 
desire is neither good nor bad in itself.
142
 The quality of love is determined according to the 
object of desire.
143
 In this way, love may be positive or negative depending upon its intended 
object.
144
 Caritas is love for an appropriate object whereas cupiditas is love for an inappropriate 
object.
145
 In every case, God is the sole appropriate object of love (caritas) because he is the only 
one having goodness in himself and the sole creator of all value.
146
 Anything else, as an object of 
                                                     
 
142
 For Augustine, human “love is a kind of desire.” Moreover, “that which is loved necessarily 
affects with itself that which loves, it follows that what is eternal, loved in this way, affects the soul with 
eternity.” Augustine, Div. quaest. 83.35.2 (David L. Mosher, Eighty-three Different Questions 
[Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982], 67). “Like Plato, Augustine approached 
the concept of love from an eudaemonistic point of view: love is essentially the desire for ultimate 
happiness.” Brümmer, Model, 118. “The key difference between them, from which all other differences 
follow, was in their view on what constitutes eternal happiness. For Plato ultimate happiness consists in 
knowing the Good; for Augustine it consists in enjoying God.” Ibid. 
143
 “The right will is, therefore, well-directed love [amor], and the wrong will is ill-directed love 
[amor]. Love [amor], then, yearning to have what is loved, is desire [cupiditas]; and having and enjoying 
[frui] it, is joy; fleeing what is opposed to it, it is fear; and feeling what is opposed to it, when it has 
befallen it, it is sadness. Now these motions are evil if the love [amor] is evil; good if the love [amor] is 
good.” Augustine, Civ. 14.7 (NPNF 2:574). Interestingly, he specifically defines that “charity [caritas] 
denotes that whereby one loves those things whose worth, in comparison to the lover itself, must not be 
thought to be of lesser value.” Augustine, Div. quaest. 83.36.1 (Mosher, Questions, 67). 
144
 Augustine is often noted for his so-called caritas synthesis. However, it should be noted that he 
also uses amor and dilectio interchangeably with caritas. He states, “Some are of opinion that charity 
[caritas] or regard [dilectio] is one thing, love [amor] another. They say that dilectio is used of a good 
affection, amor of an evil love. But it is very certain that even secular literature knows no such distinction.” 
Civ. 14.7 (NPNF 2:573–74). Just previous to this Augustine shows the interchangeable use of the terms in a 
Latin translation of John 21:15–17 in an attempt to prove that Scripture also makes no distinction between 
these terms. Nygren took this view as a caritas synthesis of agape and eros. Carmichael points out, “In 
Latin translations of the Bible, agape had been rendered by two broadly interchangeable words, caritas and 
dilectio, the latter being a post-classical coinage from the verb diligere, ‘to love’ with overtones of 
choosing or regarding the beloved above others. Caritas, dilectio, and amor would all be used by 
theologians down the centuries as close or exact synonyms, with caritas alone gaining the honour of use in 
an exclusively ‘good’ sense and becoming the primary term for Christian love.” Friendship, 45.  
145
 Augustine defines caritas thusly, “I mean by charity that affection [motum] of the mind which 
aims at the enjoyment of God for His own sake, and the enjoyment of one’s self and one’s neighbor in 
subordination to God; by lust [cupiditas] I mean that affection [motum] of the mind which aims at enjoying 
one’s self and one’s neighbor, and other corporeal things, without reference to God.” Doctr. chr. 3.10.16 
(NPNF 2:1173). He states, “Love, but see to it what you love. Love to God and love to neighbor is called 
Caritas; love to the world and love of temporal things is called Cupiditas.” Augustine, Enarrat. Ps. 31.2.5, 
quoted in Nygren, Agape, 495. 
146




love (cupiditas) in itself, is inappropriate.
147
 Thus Augustine states, “God then alone is to be 
loved; and all this world, that is, all sensible things, are to be despised,—while, however, they are 
to be used as this life requires.”
148
 Thus, similar to Plato, proper human love (caritas) is directed 
upwards whereas improper love (cupiditas) is directed downwards. 
Nevertheless, though God is the only proper object of love in himself, this does not 
exclude a proper kind of love for self and for neighbor. The key is that proper love’s ultimate 
object is God, and all other lesser objects of love are loved for God’s sake, according to the order 
of love (ordo amoris).
149
 Thus, one who truly loves God loves self and neighbor, but always with 
                                                     
 
happiness, He the end of all our desires. Being attached to Him, or rather let me say, reattached,—for we 
had detached ourselves and lost hold of Him,—being, I say, re-attached to Him, we tend towards Him by 
love, that we may rest in Him. . . . For our good . . . is nothing else than to be united to God.” Augustine, 
Civ. 10.3 (NPNF 2:397). For Augustine, the only one worthy of love in himself is God because only the 
unchangeable, eternal, and perfect being is a proper object of love. Moreover, God is the source of all 
goodness which might be loved. Thus he cautions not to love the gift (other than God) more than the giver 
(God). “In the same manner, my brethren, as if a bridegroom should make a ring for his bride, and she 
having received the ring, should love it more than she loves the bridegroom who made the ring for her: 
would not her soul be found guilty of adultery in the very gift of the bridegroom, albeit she did but love 
what the bridegroom gave her? By all means let her love what the bridegroom gave: yet should she say, 
“This ring is enough for me, I do not wish to see his face now: what sort of woman would she be? Who 
would not detest such folly? who not pronounce her guilty of an adulterous mind?” Tract. ep. Jo. 2.11 
(NPNF 7:941). “Well then, God gave thee all these things: love Him that made them.” Ibid. 
147
 Augustine states, “Therefore let each one question himself as to what he loveth: and he shall 
find of which he is a citizen: and if he shall have found himself to be a citizen of Babylon, let him root out 
cupidity, implant charity: but if he shall have found himself a citizen of Jerusalem, let him endure captivity, 
hope for liberty.” Enarrat. Ps. 65.2 (NPNF 8:590). He writes in another place, “[Conceived] therefore, 
either by desire or by love: not that the creature ought not to be loved; but if that love [of the creature] is 
referred to the Creator, then it will not be desire (cupiditas), but love (charitas). For it is desire when the 
creature is loved for itself.” Trin. 9.8 (NPNF 3:244).  
148
 Augustine, Mor. eccl. 20 (NPNF 4:86). As Oord describes it, “Cupiditas seeks happiness or rest 
in that which is incapable of providing happiness and rest: created things.” “Matching,” 171. 
149
 Augustine states, “No sinner is to be loved [dilectio] as a sinner; and every man is to be loved 
[dilectio] as a man for God’s sake; but God is to be loved [dilectio] for His own sake. And if God is to be 
loved [dilectio] more than any man, each man ought to love [dilectio] God more than himself. Likewise we 
ought to love [dilectio] another man better than our own body, because all things are to be loved [dilectio] 
in reference to God, and another man can have fellowship with us in the enjoyment [frui] of God, whereas 
our body cannot; for the body only lives through the soul, and it is by the soul that we enjoy [frui] God.” 





God as the proper and ultimate object of love.
150
 God is the only object of love as enjoyment 
(frui). Others should only be the objects of love as use (uti).
151
 Therefore, proper human love of 
God is enjoyment (frui) but God is not to be loved as use (uti). Proper human love of humans is 
use (uti) but never enjoyment (frui).
152
 Love outside of these boundaries (misdirected love) is the 




Divine love, however, is quite different from human love. God is the only appropriate 
object of love because he is the Good, absolutely unchanging and fixed.
154
 In classical ontology, 
as has been seen, such a being would be incapable of love (eros or philia) towards the world. 
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 “For it is impossible for one who loves [dilectio] God not to love [dilectio] himself. For he 
alone has a proper love [dilectio] for himself who aims diligently at the attainment of the chief and true 
good; and if this is nothing else but God.” Augustine, Mor. eccl. 26.48 (NPNF 4:92). In this way “you love 
[dilectio] yourself suitably when you love [dilectio] God better than yourself.” Ibid., 26.49 (NPNF 4:92). 
On love of neighbors he adds, “Yea, verily; so that we can think of no surer step towards the love [amor] of 
God than the love [caritas] of man to man.” Ibid., 26.48 (NPNF 4:92). Further, “What, then, you aim at in 
yourself you must aim at in your neighbor, namely, that he may love [dilectio] God with a perfect affection 
[amor]. For you do not love [dilectio] him as yourself, unless you try to draw him to that good which you 
are yourself pursuing.” Ibid., 26.49 (NPNF 4:92).  
151
 Humans are not to be loved for their own sakes, for if one is loved “for his own sake, we enjoy 
him; if it is for the sake of something else, we use him.” Augustine, Doctr. chr. 1.22.20 (NPNF 2:1100). 
Moreover, “no one ought to love even himself for his own sake, but for the sake of Him who is the true 
object of enjoyment.” Ibid., 1.22.21 (NPNF 2:1100). Rather, God is the sole object of enjoyment because 
“those only are the true objects of enjoyment which we have spoken of as eternal and unchangeable. The 
rest are for use, that we may be able to arrive at the full enjoyment of the former.” Ibid., 1.22.20 (NPNF 
2:1100). Thus, the “true objects of enjoyment, then, are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, who are 
at the same time the Trinity, one Being, supreme above all, and common to all who enjoy Him.” Ibid., 1.5.5 
(NPNF 2:1090). 
152
 Carmichael notes that “Augustine soon ceased employing the language of ‘use’ and 
‘enjoyment’, but the popularity of De doctrina christiana [On Christian Doctrine] ensured its persistence 
within the philosophical deposit he bequeathed to the Middle Ages.” Friendship, 65. 
153
 See Augustine, Civ. 12.8 (NPNF 2:498–99). On the other hand virtue is “the order of love.” 
Ibid., 15.22 (NPNF 2:649). For Augustine disorder stems from misdirected love regarding the creature’s 
love for other than God. See ibid., 12.8 (NPNF 2:498–99). Moreover, “two cities have been formed by two 
loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to 
the contempt of self.” Ibid., 14.28 (NPNF 2:608).  
154
 For Augustine God alone is to be enjoyed, for Augustine states, “Among all these things, then, 
those only are the true objects of enjoyment which we have spoken of as eternal and unchangeable.” Ibid., 




However, for Augustine God does love human beings and this is an indispensable tenet of 
Christianity.
155
 Moreover, God even makes humans into friends.
156
 However, due to his adoption 
of the classical ontology (immutability, timelessness, and self-sufficiency), divine love must be 
defined (re-defined) accordingly. Specifically, divine love cannot be acquisitive or evaluative, for 
God can neither acquire anything nor increase in value. He has no need nor desire, being entirely 
impassible and self-sufficient in perfection.
157
 In what way, then, does God love the world? 
Augustine’s ontology thus prohibits a dynamic, reciprocal relationship between God and 
creature. This again utilizes the distinction between love as enjoyment (frui) and love as use (uti). 
Augustine writes,  
In what way then does He [God] love us? As objects of use or as objects of enjoyment? If He 
enjoys us, He must be in need of good from us, and no sane man will say that; for all the good 
we enjoy is either Himself, or what comes from Himself. And no one can be ignorant or in 
doubt as to the fact that the light stands in no need of the glitter of the things it has itself lit 
up. . . . He does not enjoy us then, but makes use of us. For if He neither enjoys nor uses us, I 
am at a loss to discover in what way He can love us.
158
  
Even in use love, God does not love any external goodness, but his own goodness.
159
 In this way, 
divine love is totally indifferent to its object; even use love is not at all advantageous to God.
160
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 “For had not God loved sinners, He would not have come down from heaven to earth.” 
Augustine, Tract. Ev. Jo. 94.5 (NPNF 7:542). 
156
 See ibid., 85 (NPNF 7:704–5). 
157
 Divine love cannot be evaluative because God already possesses all value and there is no value 
that was not created by God himself. “It is entirely through God’s will that value comes into being, he says, 
yet by his very nature God is necessarily good.” Singer, Nature, 168. Augustine states, “God has no need, 
not only of cattle, or any other earthly and material thing, but even of man’s righteousness, and that 
whatever right worship is paid to God profits not Him, but man. For no man would say he did a benefit to a 
fountain by drinking, or to the light by seeing.” Civ. 10.5 (NPNF 2:399). 
158
 Augustine, Doctr. chr. 1.31.34 (NPNF 2:1109). For Augustine, “to enjoy a thing is to rest with 
satisfaction in it for its own sake. To use, on the other hand, is to employ whatever means are at one’s 
disposal to obtain what one desires.” Ibid., 1.4.4 (NPNF 2:1090). Moreover, even God’s use of humans 
God “has reference to His own goodness. . . . God is said to make of us has no reference to His own 
advantage, but to ours only; and, so far as He is concerned, has reference only to His goodness.” Ibid., 1.32 
(NPNF 2:1109–10). 
159
 “But neither does He use after our fashion of using. For when we use objects, we do so with a 
view to the full enjoyment of the goodness of God. God, however, in His use of us, has reference to His 




Thus God cannot receive any enjoyment or value from human beings or the world.
161
 God loves 
the world only in the sense of use, with reference to his own goodness.  
Divine love beyond the trinitarian relationship is simply the unilateral beneficence from 
God to humans, exclusive of reciprocal or mutual love.
162
 God bestows gracious love downward, 
and humans love (desire) God as the good, the ultimate end of all desires. Not only does God 
receive no benefit from human love, human love is itself the product of divine action, a divine 
gift. God not only implanted the desire but himself determines who will love him.
163
 God is thus 
the only proper subject and object of love since only he is worthy of love and all love flows from 
him.
164
 Augustine’s view would function as the dominant view of Christian love down through 
the ages. 
                                                     
 
160
 Rather, “that use, then, which God is said to make of us has no reference to His own advantage, 
but to ours only; and, so far as He is concerned, has reference only to His goodness.” Ibid.,1.32.35 (NPNF 
2:1110). “In other words, because of God’s self-sufficient perfection, his love for us can in no way be a 
form of need-love. It is purely gift-love, or agape.” Brümmer, Model, 125. 
161
 “Finally, it is not to God’s advantage (or disadvantage) that we love our neighbour and bring 
him to love God. Like Plato, Augustine held that, since divine perfection entails that God is self-sufficient 
and lacks nothing, he can in no way be in need of my love or that of my neighbour.” Ibid., 124. 
162
 Burnaby considers this restriction of God’s love to a “one-way” relationship, one of giving 
without any receiving, is “strangely inadequate.” Amor, 307.  
163
 “When God gives Himself to us in Christ, He gives us at once the object we are to love and the 
caritas with which to love it. The object we are to love is Himself, but Caritas is also Himself, who by the 
Holy Spirit takes up His abode in our hearts. Even the fact that we love God is itself entirely a gift of God.” 
Augustine, quoted in DʼArcy, Mind, 77. Cf. Augustine, Tract. Ev. Jo. 17.6 (NPNF 7:223). For Augustine 
“no one has a desire for God—not a scintilla of it—who has not been predestined by God to have it.” James 
Wetzel, “Predestination, Pelagianism, and Foreknowledge,ˮ in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine 
(ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann; Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 53. 
Specifically, “The Grace of God makes a willing man out of an unwilling one.” Augustine, C. Jul. op. imp 
3.122 quoted in Nygren, Agape and Eros, 528 (Nygren’s translation).  
164
 Oord comments, “The relation between love of God, self-love, and love for neighbor is 
complicated in Augustine’s thought. Sometimes he speaks of self-love as the root of sin; this is cupiditas. 
Sometimes he speaks of self-love as a natural condition whereby one uti loves oneself. The most authentic 
love of self, however, is caritas whereby one seeks one’s own good in seeking God.” “Matching,” 174. 
Accordingly, some scholars have asked, on this basis, whether all love is self-seeking love for Augustine. 
This is the famous criticism of Nygren who decried the inclusion of desire (aimed at ascending toward 
God) in Christian love, calling it the caritas synthesis of the motifs of agape and eros. See Nygren, Agape, 
449–558. Singer interprets Augustine to mean that “all love, even the love of God, is self-love inasmuch as 
the lover seeks his own good.” Singer, Nature, 85. Thus Singer also contends that Augustine “perceived it 




Thomas Aquinas’s Conception of Love 
In the middle ages, Aquinas continues the basic Augustinian premise regarding divine 
love and the God-world relationship while adapting Aristotelian metaphysics and ethics to 
medieval Christianity.
165
 In keeping with classical divine ontology, God is self-sufficient and 
utterly immutable. He is the first, unmoved, mover. God’s existence is utterly necessary, and he is 
the same as his essence of nature, purely act with no potentiality.
166
 Moreover, God’s essence is 
his existence. The divine essence and existence are identical, corresponding to potentiality and 
actuality, respectively. Since God has no potentiality and is pure actuality there is nothing to 
differentiate his essence from his existence, his essence being fully actualized.
167
 As such, God is 
absolutely simple, having no parts or composite nature.
168
 It follows that God is thus absolutely 
perfect, he is the absolutely simple, fully actualized, lacking nothing, the infinite one.
169
 God 
                                                     
 
Christianity while the Christian love of God assumed the configurations of Platonistic philosophy. 
Thereafter neither would ever be the same.” Ibid., 164. Brümmer, on the other hand, sees Augustine’s view 
not as a self-motivated love. He states, “It is important to note that for Augustine our own advantage is not 
the purpose but ‘a sort of natural consequence’ of loving our neighbour.” Model, 124. He goes on, “If the 
Summum Bonum is by its very nature the bonum commune, a good which can be possessed only by being 
shared, then the desire and pursuit of it can never be the desire and pursuit of a bonum privatum.” Ibid. See 
the discussion of Nygren below. 
165
 Aquinas adopts Aristotle’s metaphysics as well as the definition of love in his ethics and 
utilizes them to present a conception of friendship, human and divine, presented below. Cf. Aquinas, 
Summa 2.2.23.5 (Ages 3:264–65). “The theology of St. Thomas is the Platonist theology of Augustine, 
shaped into a closer philosophical consistency by the use of two or three fundamental principles derived 
from Aristotle, and resting ultimately upon the Hebrew-Christian doctrine of creation, accepted and thought 
through with a more radical completeness than ever before.”
 
Burnaby, Amor, 264. Burnaby notes further, 
“St Thomas did not abandon the Platonism of Augustine, but he replaced Augustine’s degrees of existence; 
the varying participations in true being, by the analogia entis, in which man’s being is neither part nor 
equivalent of God’s, but a created likeness of it.” Ibid., 40–41. 
166
 In this way, he is pure form, but not matter at all since matter is potentiality and there is no 
potentiality in God. Aquinas, Summa 1.1.3.1–2 (Ages 1:33–35). Aquinas methodically adopts and frames 
Aristotle’s ontological conceptions. “The most important of these assumptions are the metaphysical theory 
of matter and form, potency and act, and the ethical theory that all love is based upon self-love, ‘that a 
friend is
 
another self.’” Burnaby, Amor, 265. 
167
 Aquinas, Summa 1.1.3.4 (Ages 1:38–39). 
168
 Ibid., 1.1.3.7 (Ages 1:43–44). 
169




possesses all perfections of being, and for Aquinas, “Goodness and being are really the same,” 
thus God is himself the ultimate goodness.
170
 Furthermore, goodness is “what all desire” and thus 
God is the ultimate desirable one, the true object of all desire.
171
 As the ultimate perfect one, God 
is altogether immutable. He cannot change or be affected since he is pure act with no 
potentiality.
172
 Moreover, he is eternal, for the divine being “bereft of movement . . . there is no 
before or after” and the immutable one has no beginning nor end and no succession of time.
173
 
God thus has no need of anything, possessing absolute goodness, and accordingly, desires nothing 
for himself. As first mover and ultimate cause, God’s will is sovereign and undefeated.
174
 As with 
Augustine, this divine ontology rules out a mutually impactful relationship between God and the 
world.
175
 However, it does not preclude Aquinas from positing a friendship love (amicitia) 
between God and humans, as shall be seen. First, we turn to the nature of human loves. 
The Nature of Human Loves 
Aquinas inherited many different words that relate to different aspects of love. He 
specifically mentions four primary ones (amor, dilectio, caritas, and amicitia) and differentiates 
them accordingly.
176
 For Aquinas, amicitia (friendship) is a habit, whereas amor and dilectio are 
                                                     
 
170
 Ibid., 1.1.5.1 (Ages 1:55). All other beings which are good insofar as they have being, are 
“good by way of participation.” Ibid., 1.1.6.4 (Ages 1:71).  
171
 Ibid., 1.1.5.1 (Ages 1:55). “All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, 
inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being.” Ibid., 1.1.6.1.2 (Ages 
1:67).  
172
 Ibid., 1.1.9.1 (Ages 1:92–94). According to classical ontology any change would be from 
perfection to imperfection, and is thus wholly inappropriate to divinity. 
173
 Ibid., 1.1.10.1 (Ages 1:98). Cf. ibid., 1.1.10.2 (Ages 1:100–101). 
174
 “God, who is the Prime Agent of all things, does not act as acquiring anything by His action, 
but as by His action bestowing something (aliquid largiens).” Burnaby, Amor, 263–64. 
175
 “The scholastic formulation aimed at excluding anthropomorphic conceptions of Deity. We are 
not to think of God as of a person with a certain character, a subject of whom universal attributes are 
predicable.” Ibid., 40. 
176




act or passion. Finally, caritas may express all of the above.
177
 For him, amor is the broadest 
category; dilectio and caritas are always amor but not vice versa; dilectio implies a love of 
rational, purposive choice and is thus not of passion but of will.
178
 Caritas is a “certain perfection 




For Aquinas, in human relationships love (amor) always has two aspects, the good which 
is the immediate object of desire and the person for whom the good is willed.
180
 In other words 
love is always directed towards some good (amor concupiscentiae), which is willed toward 
someone (amor amicitiae), whether oneself or another.
181
 The former, desirous love (amor 
concupiscentiae), “is something pertaining to the appetite [desire]; since good is the object of 
both” love and appetite.
182
 The latter, love of persons (amor amicitiae), is the love for the person 
                                                     
 
speaks of love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae) which makes desire an aspect of love, but does not 
define love as desire in itself. 
177
 Aquinas, Summa 2.1.26.3 (Ages 2:307–8). 
178
 Aquinas writes that dilectio “implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made 
beforehand as the very word denotes: and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in 
the will, and only in the rational nature.” Ibid., 2.1.26.3 (Ages 2:308). This emphasizes the preceding 
choice. 
179
 Ibid. This, of course, means the object of caritas is of great value. Carmichael comments, 
“Aquinas’s view arose within the context of Latin that had developed distinctions between the words for 
love such that amor is a sensitive love of the passions, a lower love; dilectio is a higher, intellectual, willed 
love; and amicitia is the mutual society of lover and beloved, who act from deliberate choice.” Friendship, 
106. 
180
 Thus, he quotes Aristotle, “to love is to wish good to someone.” Aquinas, Summa 2.1.26.4 
(Ages 2:309).  
181
 “Hence the movement of love has a twofold tendency: towards the good which a man wishes to 
someone (to himself or to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accordingly, man has 
love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to 
whom he wishes good.” Ibid. Burnaby comments, “Benevolence, wishing someone well, has a double 
object—the good which is willed, and the person, whether self or another, for whom it is willed; and 
Thomas distinguishes these two directions of benevolence by the not very happy pair of terms which he had 
inherited from his predecessors: amor concupiscentiae and amor amicitiae.” Amor, 266–67. 
182
 Aquinas, Summa. 2.1.26.1 (Ages 2:304). For Aquinas something is loved if the lover’s desire 
regards it as good and “since good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely 




that the good is willed toward.
183
 Thus, in this context, desirous love (amor concupiscentiae) and 
friendship love (amor amicitiae) are integrally connected and complementary.
184
 One who is 
loved in the sense of amor amicitiae is loved in himself as an end, whereas the object of amor 
concupiscentiae is loved for something else, as a means.
185
 Nevertheless, he cautions:  
Love [amor] is not divided into friendship [amicitia] and Concupiscence [concupiscentia], 
but into love of friendship [amor amicitiae], and love of concupiscence [amor 
concupiscentiae]. For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we 
are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.
186
  
In this way, Aquinas can elsewhere contrast perfect friendship love with desirous love for self-
interest, which he calls concupiscence.
187
 A perfect, complete friendship (amicitia) is actually 
identical to caritas love.
188
 In this context he speaks of perfect and imperfect love saying:  
                                                     
 
And this everyone desires.” Ibid., 2.1.5.8 (Ages 2:84–85). Cf. ibid., 2.2.23.4 (Ages 3:263). Nygren 
criticizes Aquinas, believing that “for Thomas, as for Augustine, all love is fundamentally acquisitive love; 
love corresponds to the acquisitive will, and this latter to the natural quest for happiness.” Agape, 642. 
Burnaby adds, “But the complacency in which my love consists is satisfaction in an object as my own good. 




 Aquinas states, “To love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing.” Summa 
1.1.20.2 (Ages 1:282).  
184
 “Friendship comprehends both friendship-love directed to the person as an end in themselves, 
and desiring-love directed to the good things we wish for them as the means for their fulfillment.” 
Carmichael, Friendship, 116. Thus, for Aquinas “friendship-love (amor amicitiae) and desiring-love (amor 
concupiscentiae) rightly directed, are complementary and integral to one another. . . . Love for the person is 
friendship-love, while the love that seeks to acquire goods for them is desiring-love.” Ibid., 115. 
185
 Aquinas, Summa 2.1.26.4 (Ages 2:309–10). Thus Burnaby comments, “Since the good desired 
is desired for the sake of the recipient, amor concupiscentiae must be regarded as secondary to amor 
amicitiae. It is the latter only which is love simpliciter, in which the object is loved ‘for itself’ and not
 
‘for 
the sake of anything else.’” Amor, 267.  
186
 Aquinas, Summa 2.1.26.4.2 (Ages 2:310).  
187
 He writes, still in Aristotelian categories, “When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, 
a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the character of friendship is preserved. 
But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or 
pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character to true friendship.” 
Ibid., 2.1.26.4.3 (Ages 2:310).  
188
 Aquinas states, “Caritas signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with 
Him.” Ibid., 2.1.65.5 (Ages 2:697). Cf. Aquinas 2.2.23.1 (Ages 3:256–58). Thus, “caritas is the same as 
amicitia.” Quoted in Carmichael, Friendship, 105. Moreover, friendship (amicitia) “embraces all 
definitions of love and manifests every possible aspect of it” and caritas is part of this perfect class. Quoted 
in ibid., 107. For Aquinas caritas and amicitia “must be identical because they show love at its greatest.” 




Love is twofold: one kind is perfect; the other kind is imperfect. Love of something is imper-
fect when someone loves a thing not that he might wish the good in itself to the ‘thing,’ but in 
order that he might wish its good to himself. This is called by some ‘concupiscence,’ as when 
we love wine, wishing to enjoy its sweetness, or when we love some person for our own 
purposes or pleasure. The other kind of love is perfect; in this the good of anything is loved in 
itself, as when loving someone, I wish that he himself have the good, even if out of that fact 
nothing falls to me. This is said to be the love of friendship, whereby anyone is loved for 
himself (secundum seipsum). This is perfect friendship.
189
 
Love that is directed toward a good as a means to one’s own enjoyment, including when 
a friend is loved ultimately for one’s own gratification, is imperfect love, in the literal sense of 
being incomplete. It is not that love directed toward oneself is evil in itself, as if love for others is 
the only virtuous love. Rather, love that loves things and persons as means to one’s own good and 
not as ends in themselves falls short of perfect love, it is incomplete.
190
 For Aquinas, the lover is 
always motivated by self-love, to some extent. In fact, aside from God who is to be the ultimate 
object of love, Aquinas contends that humans ought to love themselves more than others, and of 
course has been harshly criticized for this view.
191
 However, self-love is prior to love for others 
not due to selfishness but because all other-love is patterned after self-love. Specifically, love for 
others arises out of love for self.
192
 Nevertheless, in the process of loving, a person may come to 
                                                     
 
respect as friendship, amicitia.” Ibid., 105. 
189
 Aquinas quoted in Stephen J. Pope, The Ethics of Aquinas (Moral Traditions Series; 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 237. Pope’s translation. 
190
 Aquinas writes, “Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that whereby a 
man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person some good for his own sake; thus a man loves 
his friend. Imperfect love is that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but that he may 
obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he desires. The first love of God pertains to charity, 
which adheres to God for His own sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since he that hopes, intends 
to obtain possession of something for himself.” Summa 2.2.17.8 (Ages 3:201). 
191
 He states, “It is written, ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.’ Whence it seems to follow 
that man’s love for himself is the model of his love for another. But the model exceeds the copy. Therefore, 
out of charity, a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.” Ibid., 2.2.26.4 (Ages 3:326). Nygren 
comments, “His basic idea can be summarised in two sentences: (i) everything in Christianity can be traced 
back to love, and (2) everything in love, can be traced back to self-love.” Agape, 643. 
192
 “The love that a man has for others arises in man from the love that he has for himself, for a 
man stands in relation to a friend as he does to himself. But a person loves himself inasmuch as he wishes 
the good for himself, just as he loves another person by wishing him good. So, by the fact that one is 




desire, motivated by self-interest, to be a person who can will good to others for their own 
sake.
193
 In this way, the person who desires good from an object comes to love that object who 
provides the good, and is led to love them for their own self.
194
 In this relationship of perfect 
friendship, benefits are derived from the friendship but those derivative benefits are not 




As mentioned previously, Aquinas posits a friendship between God and humans, which 
for obvious reasons, is drastically different from friendship between humans.
196
 The very 
possibility for such a friendship between God and humans is predicated on his analogy of being 
(analogia entis).
197
 This allows Aquinas to move beyond Aristotle’s view that the distance from 
                                                     
 
Carmichael comments, “Through delight, the lover stands in relation to the beloved object as though it 
were herself or part of herself.” Friendship, 114. Thus Aquinas goes on, “Now fellowship is a reason for 
love according to a certain union in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses union, the fact that 
man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more potent reason for loving than that another should be a 
partner with him in that share. Therefore man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than his 
neighbor.” Summa 2.2.26.4.2 (Ages 3:327). Burnaby, however, is very critical of this approach. Amor, 269.  
193
 Thus, Aquinas states, “A man ought to bear bodily injury for his friend’s sake, and precisely in 
so doing he loves himself more as regards his spiritual mind, because it pertains to the perfection of virtue, 
which is a good of the mind. In spiritual matters, however, man ought not to suffer injury by sinning, in 
order to free his neighbor from sin, as stated above.” Summa 2.2.26.4.2 (Ages 3:327).  
194
 “Hence, because a person hopes for good from some other person, a way develops for him to 
love that other person in himself, from whom he hopes to attain the good. Indeed, a person is loved in 
himself when the lover wishes the good for him, even if the lover may receive nothing from him. Now, 
since by sanctifying grace there is produced in us an act of loving God for Himself, the result was that we 
obtained hope from God by means of grace.” Aquinas, quoted in S. Pope, Ethics, 238. 
195
 “However, though it is not for one’s own benefit, friendship, whereby one loves another for 
himself, has of course many resulting benefits, in the sense that one friend helps another as he helps 
himself. Hence, when one person loves another, and knows that he is loved by that other, he must get hope 
from him.” Aquinas, quoted in ibid. 
196
 However, as shall be seen, any suggestion of the mutuality of amicitia in the God-world 
relationship is qualified by the divine ontology.  
197
 “Here, then, we encounter just that feature in the Aristotelian account of Philia which seems 
most incompatible with the character of Agape in the Christian sense—the love which is so little dependent 




God to man is too great to allow for friendship.
198
 However, it must be understood that friendship 
love is not symmetrical but, rather, divine and human love are drastically different. Caritas (with 
a human subject) refers to the “movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God for His own 
sake.”
199
 Moreover, in divine-human “friendship,” God is the initiator, befriending humans first 
as their benefactor,
200
 whereas humans love God as the ultimate object of goodness.
201
 Although 
humans love God, even their love is derivative from divine love.
202
 However, Aquinas employs a 
compatibilistic approach that attributes all reality to the necessity of the divine will yet 
differentiates between absolute necessity and a “conditional necessity which does not do away 
with the liberty of choice.”
203
 This allows Aquinas to preserve the power of humans to act in love, 
                                                     
 
198
 Although Aquinas adopts much of Aristotle’s ontology, he does not agree that God is too far 
removed for friendship but rather allows for friendship from God to man as willed beneficence, as shall be 
seen below. Thus, “God is not so far removed from creatures as to render friendship impossible. Rather, he 
is intimately present to and in all things, loving all creatures in that he wills their own natural good to 
them.” Carmichael, Friendship, 107. In this way there is what Aquinas calls “the certain mutual return of 
love, together with a mutual communion,” but as shall be seen this is not a symmetrical love but includes 
different kinds of love attributed to both sides. Summa 2.1.65.5 (Ages 2:697). Moreover, “our obedience is 
‘not the cause of divine friendship, but the sign’ which demonstrates that God loves us and we him.” 
Carmichael, Friendship, 109. 
199
 Aquinas, Summa 2.2.23.2 (Ages 3:258–59).  
200
 “We were not . . . friends in the active sense (amantes) but . . . friends in the passive sense of 
those whom he loved (amanti).” Aquinas, quoted in Carmichael, Friendship, 109. 
201
 See Aquinas, Summa 2.2.27.8 (Ages 3:358–59).  
202
 Love is given only by the Holy Spirit. “Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor 
through acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the 
Father and the Son, and the participation of Whom in us is created charity.” Ibid., 2.2.23.2 (Ages 3:275). 
Thus, love “is primarily affirmed of God and only secondarily and in a derivative sense of the creature.” 
Alan J. Torrance, “Is Love the Essence of God?” in Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays 
on the Love of God (ed. K. J. Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 120. Moreover, “that 
very celestial love by which we love each other is not only from God, but also is God.” Singer, Nature, 
321. Accordingly, Aquinas comments further, “Moreover it is for this that the gift of charity is bestowed by 
God on each one, namely, that he may first of all direct his mind to God, and this pertains to a man’s love 
for himself, and that, in the second place, he may wish other things to be directed to God, and even work 
for that end according to his capacity.” Aquinas, Summa 2.2.26.13 (Ages 3:343–44). 
203
 Ibid., 1.1.23.3.3 (Ages 1:313). Aquinas interprets reality in compatibilistic terms in an attempt 
to preserve both guilt worthy of condemnation in the reprobate as well as merit in the saved. Thus he is 
adamant that “reprobation . . . is not the cause of . . . sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. . . . 
Guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace.” Ibid., 1.1.23.3.2 




and thus gain merit, in accordance with his sacramental soteriology.
204
 Not only is all love 
ultimately from God, God is also the ultimate object of love, and all others are loved “for God’s 
sake.”
205
 It is God’s worth as the supreme goodness that makes him the object of all love, since 
all desire goodness toward their own perfection and happiness.
206
 
In Aquinas’s system, divine love is quite different from human love, in accordance with 
classical divine ontology.
207
 In this system, God cannot desire anything for his own benefit. He 
lacks nothing. Moreover, God is utterly impassible; “in God there are no passions,” and thus 
divine love cannot be sensitive.
208
 God loves, but his is a passionless love; it is an “act of the will” 
                                                     
 
predestines. . . . Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons 
towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive 
way in the predestined, but actively in God.” Ibid., 1.1.23.2 (Ages 1:310–11).  
204
 Ibid., 2.2.23.2 (Ages 3:259). “Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the 
will in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an instrument, for an instrument, though it 
be a principle of action, nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again the act would 
cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas . . . the love of charity is the root of merit: and, given that 
the will is moved by the Holy Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should be the 
efficient cause of that act.” Ibid. Cf. ibid., 2.2.27 (Ages 3:356–58). Singer comments, “It is the notion of 
human merit that determines the Thomistic argument.” Nature, 322. For Aquinas “an acceptable analysis of 
caritas must not challenge its ability to provide merit for the loving individual.” Ibid., 321. “Infused 
sanctifying grace lifts us towards God, the theological virtues transfigure our powers, caritas as 
transforming virtue becomes a habit of our will, and this sharing of divine life makes it possible to 
experience caritas as friendship with God.” Carmichael, Friendship, 111.  
205
 “God is the principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of charity for God’s 
sake.” Aquinas, Summa 2.2.23.5.1 (Ages 3:265). In this way, even enemies can be loved; love extends to 
enemies whom are loved by their relation to God. Ibid., 2.2.23.1.2 (Ages 3:257–58).  
206
 “God will be to each one the entire reason of his love, for God is man’s entire good. For if we 
make the impossible supposition that God were not man’s good, He would not be man’s reason for loving. 
Hence it is that in the order of love man should love himself more than all else after God.” Ibid., 
2.2.26.13.3 (Ages 3:344). Thus Nygren comments, “The reason why we love God at all is that we need 
Him as our bonum.” Agape, 642. 
207
 In fact, divine love is so different that it is questionable whether Aquinas’s assertion of divine-
human friendship is not equivocal. Nygren comments, “It cannot be denied that the unity of Thomas’s 
doctrine of love suffered from this addition” of friendship. Ibid., 644. For a sympathetic treatment of 
Aquinas’s conception of divine love and immutability, see Michael J. Dodds, The Unchanging God of 
Love: A Study of the Teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas on Divine Immutability in View of Certain 
Contemporary Criticism of This Doctrine (Fribourg, Switzerland: Éditions universitaires, 1986). 
208
 The first objection he addresses is related to the apparent discrepancy of divine love, if love is 
considered to be a passion. “It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now 
love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God.” Aquinas, Summa 1.1.20.1.1 (Ages 1:278). Aquinas 




not an act of the “sensitive appetite.”
209
 As opposed to passion, which operates in human love, 
divine love is the procession of the will of God.
210
 Accordingly, “the love of God for Aquinas is 
God’s willing the good. God is benevolent (bene volere = ‘good willing’).”
211
 Such love is not 
caused by its object but by God alone. For Aquinas, love, or caritas, is a purposive, rational act of 
the will.
212
 Nevertheless, Aquinas continues, at least partially, love includes desire for some 
good.
213
 Even for God, love is directed toward a good object. But this is because every existent, 
insofar as it exists, is good, although it is good only because God bestowed goodness.
214
 Thus 
Aquinas can state that divine love includes desire of a very qualified type: desire for the good of 
                                                     
 
virtues are those that are concerned with “giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, magnificence” 
and these “reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will.” Ibid., 1.1.21.1 (Ages 1:289). God does not 
experience sorrow, according to Aquinas, rather “sorrow . . . over the misery of others belongs not to God.” 
Ibid., 1.1.21.3 (Ages 1:292).  
209
 “Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed to them some bodily 
change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight 
are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It is in this latter 
sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): ‘God rejoices by an operation that is 
one and simple,’ and for the same reason He loves without passion.” Ibid., 1.1.20.1.1 (Ages 1:280). Further 
Thomas speaks of the material and formal elements of the passions of sensitive appetite. But the material 
element is not proper to God in any way and the formal element only in “passions” which “imply no 
imperfection” (such as joy and love) and “without attributing passion to Him.” Ibid., 1.1.20.1.2 (Ages 
1:280). 
210
 “There are two processions in God, one by way of the intellect, which is the procession of the 
Word, and another by way of the will, which is the procession of Love.” Ibid., 1.1.37.1 (Ages 1:460).  
211
 Vanhoozer, “Introduction,” 5. 
212
 For Aquinas, “the will also should be the efficient cause of that act” of love. Summa 2.2.23.2 
(Ages 3:259).  
213
 “For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is 
anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love.” Ibid., 1.1.20.1 (Ages 1:279). 
214
 “I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are 
good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses.” Ibid., 
1.1.20.2 (Ages 1:281). C. Osborne is quite critical of Aquinas saying, “In the area of mutuality, equal social 
status, co-operation, equal benefits accruing to both parties. This is the area in which Aquinas has to do 
most violence to both sides, minimizing the demand for mutual benefit in Aristotle, and maximizing the 
requirement of virtue in the beloved object in the caritas-tradition. In the tradition that Aquinas inherits 
caritas is clearly not a co-operative virtue, but one that is directed towards another object, whereas philia 






 However, as seen above, this is by no means a passion; God is not affected in any way, 
it is purely willed good and only passion metaphorically.
216
 Since God has no lack or need of 
anything, he does not actually gain satisfaction or value, he is beneficent by nature.
217
 
Accordingly, Aquinas continues the emphasis on caritas as both the divine essence and that 
which proceeds from God.
218
  
Although Aquinas had equated caritas with amicitia, he clarifies that God does not 
actually love with friendship love (amor amicitiae) but with a desire (amor concupiscentiae) for 
the good of others, a kind of benevolence.
219
 This fits with his further specification of love: “to 
love a person is to wish that person good.”
220
 This desire is strictly for their good; God gains 
nothing by loving humans and willing their good. However, whereas human friendships are 
relational, God has no actual relations with humankind.
221
 Moreover, because God’s will is 
undefeated, divine love is not merely benevolence but also a universal beneficence for every 
                                                     
 
215
 “Strictly speaking, therefore, God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; 
but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. 
Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and of the services 
they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves.” Aquinas, Summa 1.1.20.2.3 
(Ages 1:282). 
216
 See footnotes 208 and 209 above.  
217
 “He can understand God’s own love in no other way: if God loves His creatures, He wills their 
good for their sake, although, unlike our human love which is effect not cause of the goodness in its object, 
the divine love is creative—infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.” Burnaby, Amor, 266.  
218
 “The Divine Essence Itself is charity” and further “the charity whereby formally we love our 
neighbor is a participation of Divine charity.” Aquinas, Summa 2.2.23.2 (Ages 3:260). Moreover, God’s 
love is eternal; all objects of divine love have been “in Him from eternity.” Aquinas states, “Although 
creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, 
God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by 
the images of things within us, know things existing in themselves.” Ibid., 1.1.20.2.2 (Ages 1:282). 
219
 “Strictly speaking, therefore, God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; 
but as it were with the love of desire.” Ibid., 1.1.20.2.3 (Ages 1:282). 
220
 “An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person 
for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person good.” Ibid., 1.1.20.1.3 (Ages 1:280). 
221
 Thus Aquinas comments, “Now a relation of God to creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the 






 Whereas human love is moved or affected by its object, divine love itself “infuses and 
creates goodness.”
223
 Divine love, then, is not dependent upon its object but actually creates the 
goodness of its object.
224
 God loves universally, but this does not mean that God loves all 
equally.
225
 In fact, though God loves all in some way, he does not love all in willing their eternal 
life.
226
 Some are predestined to salvation and others are reprobate.
227
 Thus divine love is not 
evaluative, or affected, but a purely creative, willed love that results in beneficence.
228
 
                                                     
 
222
 He states, “God’s will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has 
existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God 
wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest 
that God loves everything that exists.” Ibid., 1.1.20.2 (Ages 1:281–82). 
223
 God loves all, “yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of 
things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of 
its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will 
that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our 
actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.” Ibid. 
224
 “Further, God also loves himself and in this way moves himself. Therefore because God 
understands and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as 
movement and change belong to a thing existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and 
movement.” Ibid., 1.1.9.1.1 (Ages 1:93). 
225
 Rather “we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. For since God’s love 
is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said, no one thing would be better than another, if God did 
not will greater good for one than for another.” Ibid., 1.1.20.3 (Ages 1:283–84). “I answer that, It must 
needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things. For it has been 
shown, that God’s loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a 
greater good: because God’s will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are 
better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the better 
things.” Ibid., 1.1.20.4 (Ages 1:285).  
226
 “God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does 
not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good—namely, 
eternal life—He is said to hate or reprobated them.” Ibid., 1.1.23.3.1 (Ages 1:313). Moreover, God 
“extends friendship . . . to all ‘antecedently (antecedente)’ but ‘finally (consequente)’ only to the elect, 
willing for them the same good that he himself enjoys, ‘the vision of himself, and the fruition with which 
he is blessed.’” Aquinas, quoted in Carmichael, Friendship, 107. 
227
 See the discussion of compatibilism above. 
228
 A. J. Torrance comments, “In radical contradistinction to the thrust of idealism, it [God’s love] 
is a love that creates value by giving value to what it loves. It does not desire to receive, or to fulfill itself; it 




Martin Luther’s Conception of Love 
Martin Luther breaks with the traditional doctrine of love primarily as it regards human 
love. However, there is a great deal of complementarity between Luther’s view of divine love and 
the classical theologians before him.
229
 At the same time, Luther pushes the conception of divine 
love further toward altruism while relegating all human-originated loves to egocentrism.
230
 
Although Luther never seems to have fully or systematically worked out a divine ontology, 
perhaps due to his belief in divine incomprehensibility,
231
 he seems to adopt central tenets of 
Augustine and other theologians and from the primacy of the divine will all else flows, thus 
amounting to a monistic determinism.
232
 Luther’s break from traditional theology was therefore 
only partial. He maintained the axiom of God’s aseity and utter freedom, locating God’s 
independence in the divine will. Thus, Luther’s view is voluntaristic. Everything is dependent 
upon God’s eternal will, even the divine nature itself.
233
 God is accordingly absolutely self-
                                                     
 
229
 It is important to note that the magisterial reformers did not break significantly with the 
classical doctrine of God as it relates to aseity and impassibility. For instance, John Calvin took it for 
granted: “God certainly has no blood, suffers not, cannot be touched with hands.” Institutes of the Christian 
Religion 2.14.2 (Henry Beveridge, Institutes of the Christian Religion [Books for the Ages; Albany, Oreg.: 
Ages Software, 1997], 506). 
230
 Peter Abelard was likely the first to suggest that only altruistic love suffices; he pointed out that 
“if man loved God on the basis of self-love, then he did not love God properly.” Quoted in Singer, Nature, 
338. However, Luther breaks considerably, reserving altruistic love for divine love alone. 
231
 Luther contends, “If we knew his ways, he who is marvelous would not be incomprehensible.” 
Luther, Works, 38:22. This is in accordance with his method of avoiding speculation regarding the divine 
majesty, “I follow this general rule: to avoid as much as possible any questions that carry us to the throne of 
the Supreme Majesty. It is better and safer to stay at the manger of Christ the Man. For there is very great 
danger in involving oneself in the mazes of the Divine Being.” Ibid., 2:45. Thus Luther avoided 
construction of a divine ontology. 
232
 Dennis Ngien argues that “the denial of divine passibility occurred because of the influence of 
Greek metaphysics upon the church’s reading of Scripture, and that the platonic principle of divine apathy, 
in particular, held in its grip what many of the fathers believed may or may not be said of God.” Ngien, The 
Suffering of God according to Martin Luther’s Theologia crucis (vol. 181 of American University Studies: 
Series 7: Theology and Religion; New York: Lang, 1995), 3. 
233
 God wills his own nature. “God Himself determines Himself to be divinely loving and good, 
says Luther, and is not determined in any way by the attitude or condition of those upon whom goodness 




sufficient, depending upon nothing outside of himself, but purely moved by his own will.
234
 It 
follows that God is immutable and impassible according to his “immutable, eternal, and infallible 
will.”
235




This attribute of impassibility plays a central role in defining divine love, negating 
affected passion, as shall be seen. For this reason it is beneficial to carefully define Luther’s view 
of impassibility. For Luther, as the tradition before him, God cannot be affected from without. 
However, it has been proposed that Luther did, in fact, allow for some divine passibility. This is 
suggested in light of Luther’s theology of the cross, which focuses on the suffering savior Jesus, 
who is himself God.
237
 First, Luther clearly presents divine impassibility stating, “God is not 
capable of suffering.”
238
 Nevertheless, because Jesus is both God and man in one person, Luther 
                                                     
 
234
 God alone has free will and relies upon no other. Luther states, “It follows now that free choice 
is plainly a divine term, and can be properly applied to none but the Divine Majesty alone; for he alone can 
do and does (as the psalmist says [Ps. 115:3]) whatever he pleases in heaven and on earth.” Luther, Works, 
33:68. Again, “free choice is a divine term and signifies a divine power.” Ibid., 33:107. Ngien comments, 
“God’s ‘aseity’ consists in the fact that God is totally independent of others, and correspondingly 
absolutely free.” Suffering, 27.  
235
 “God foreknows nothing contingently, but that he foresees and purposes and does all things by 
his immutable, eternal, and infallible will. Here is a thunderbolt by which free choice is completely 
prostrated and shattered, so that those who want free choice asserted must either deny or explain away this 
thunderbolt, or get rid of it by some other means.” Luther, Works, 33:37. “Nothing can change, and resist 
God’s will. God cannot be affected or changed by anything that the creatures do, otherwise God would not 
be God.” Suffering, 27.  
236
 Cf. Luther, Works, 17:29. “The omnipotence of God makes it impossible for the ungodly to 
evade the motion and action of God, for he is necessarily subject to it and obeys it.” Ibid., 33:176. 
Moreover, “Since, then, God moves and actuates all in all, he necessarily moves and acts also in Satan and 
ungodly man. But he acts in them as they are and as he finds them; that is to say, since they are averse and 
evil, and caught up in the movement of this divine omnipotence, they do nothing but averse and evil 
things.” Ibid. Luther explains, “God is immutable and unchanging in His counsel from eternity. He sees 
and knows all things; but He does not reveal them to the godly except at His own fixed time.” Ibid., 2:45. 
Luther qualifies necessity as “necessity of immutability,” which retains the important fact that God acts 
freely. Ibid., 33:64.  
237
 For instance, Ngien theorizes that Luther’s theology actually requires divine passibility, in 
Suffering. For another study of Luther’s theology of the cross see Alister E. McGrath, Luther’s Theology of 
the Cross: Martin Luther’s Theological Breakthrough (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).  
238
 Luther, Works, 38:254. He also acknowledges that, “the Deity surely cannot suffer and die.” 




“ascribe[s] to the divinity, because of this personal union, all that happens to humanity, and vice 
versa” (communicatio idiomatum).
239
 In this way, it can be said that God suffers, not in Godself, 
but in Christ.
240




Thus, Luther may allow for a qualified divine passibility, only as it relates to the cross.
242
 
Whether Luther’s theology of the cross is compatible with his simultaneous view of divine 
                                                     
 
made man, he was passible” and goes on to refer to Christ as the “impassible Son of God.” Luther, quoted 
in Ngien, Suffering, 82. 
239
 Luther, Works, 37:210. 
240
 Thus Luther states, Christ “is truly God, and therefore it is correct to say: the Son of God 
suffers. Although, so to speak, the one part (namely, the divinity) does not suffer, nevertheless the person, 
who is God, suffers in the other part (namely, in the humanity). And in reality it is so.” Ibid. Cf. ibid., 
24:106. Paradoxically, Luther just before had seemed to suggest that the divine nature truly suffered saying, 
“For if I believe that only the human nature suffered for me, then Christ would be a poor Savior for me, in 
fact, he himself would need a Savior.” Ibid., 37:209. However, this assumes the communicatio idiomatum, 
specifically that “we should ascribe to the whole person whatever pertains to one part of the person, 
because both parts constitute one person.” Ibid., 37:210. Thus God suffered in Christ. Luther extends this 
further saying, “The two natures, the human and the divine, are inseparable. They are so united in one 
Person that the properties of the one nature are also attributed to the other. For instance, mortality is 
peculiar to human nature; now that the human nature is united in one Person with the divine, death, 
exclusively the attribute of the human nature, is also ascribed to the divine.” Ibid., 22:492. He goes on, 
“Since God and man are one Person, the properties characteristic of humanity alone are attributed to the 
deity; for the properties of the two natures are also united. . . . Yet these two natures are so united that there 
is only one God and Lord, that Mary suckles God with her breasts, bathes God, rocks Him, and carries 
Him; furthermore, that Pilate and Herod crucified and killed God. The two natures are so joined that the 
true deity and humanity are one. . . . The deity and the humanity joined not only their natures but also their 
properties, except for sin.” Ibid., 22:492–93. Notably, Luther himself elsewhere cautions that the divine and 
human natures are not to be confused but presented in such “a way as to identify and recognize each nature 
properly.” Ibid., 24:105–6. 
241
 Ngien comments, “The Father does not ‘suffer’, only the Son does. But of course the Son, too, 
is God. That is how Luther affirms Theopaschitism but repudiates Patripassianism as the early Church 
does.” Suffering, 1. Ngien asserts that because the suffering of Christ was eternally in the heart of God, it 
reaches the Trinity. Thus he states, “If God is in Christ then whatever God the Son suffers becomes the 
suffering of God by the union of the persons of the Trinity. . . . In this manner the Father, though He does 
not suffer dying as the Son does on the cross, suffers through divine unity with the Son.” Ibid., 27 This is 
an interesting interpretation of Luther. However, it appears that Ngien extrapolates Luther’s position 
beyond what is made explicit by Luther himself. He himself admits that Luther “did not develop a theology 
of relationships in which the suffering and dying person of the Son affect God the Father and God the Spirit 
in the inner divine life,” presumably because “Luther sees no need to dwell on the ad intra life of God.” 
Ibid. 
242
 Others agree with Ngien. For instance, Paul Althaus considers Luther to be the first major 
theologian to break with impassibility. Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: Fortress 




impassibility is an open question. This apparent tension may be overcome if God’s “passion” or 
“suffering” is understood not to result from any external cause but from the divine will resulting 
in self-willed suffering. Thus divine impassibility for Luther need not mean that God has no 
passions, but that divine passions are purely willed by himself; he has no externally caused 
passions but he may will his own passion or suffering.
243
 Thus Christ can suffer as God but even 
this suffering is not a suffering inflicted against God’s will or by free agents outside of God.
244
 In 
all this, Luther does not waver from his position that God cannot be changed or affected by 
anything outside of himself.
245
 God in Christ chooses to suffer and this is in keeping with 
Luther’s radical voluntarism, which evidences the influence of nominalism, along with his utter 
determinism, which hearkens to Augustinian predestination.  
Luther is heavily influenced by the nominalism of William of Ockham, transmitted to 
Luther by Gabriel Biel.
246
 Primarily of interest to this study, Luther adopted the premise that 
                                                     
 
(Cambridge, UK: The University Press, 1926). Nevertheless, Luther’s theology of the cross does not make 
God passible to external influence.  
243
 “God’s passion is divine action, for He wills to bring upon Himself the deepest humiliation in 
the Son and enacts His will: The suffering that God undergoes in Christ’s passion is a divine act, not out of 
a deficiency of God’s being but out of God’s ‘boundless love.’” Ngien, Suffering, 27 Compare the view of 
Richard E. Creel that God cannot be “causally influenced” by any other. Creel, Divine Impassibility: An 
Essay in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 11. As Ngien puts 
it, “It is God’s glory to give, to act, and to love freely. The immutability of God’s freedom must be 
affirmed alongside of the passibility of God’s love in order to avoid attributing to God creaturely passion.” 
Suffering, 27.  
244
 Suggestions to the contrary in biblical languages are merely due to the language of 
accommodation. Therefore, regarding the grief of the Spirit in Gen 6:7, Luther comments, “Such an 
emotion is attributed to God, not as though He were thus moved, but the holy prophets, Moses, and Noah 
conceived of Him in this way.” Luther, Works, 17:358. Further he states, “One should not imagine that God 
has a heart or that He can grieve. But when the spirit of Noah, of Lamech, and of Methuselah is grieved, 
God Himself is said to be grieved. Thus we should understand this grief to refer to its effect, not to the 
divine essence.” Ibid., 2:47. 
245
 “For the counsel of God is not changed by either the merits or demerits of anyone. For He does 
not repent of the gifts and calling which He has promised, because the Jews are now unworthy of them and 
you are worthy. He is not changed just because you are changed, and therefore they shall turn back and be 
led again to the truth of the faith.” Ibid., 25:432. 
246
 Luther acknowledged the influence of Biel upon him. However, it should be noted that Luther 
breaks from Biel’s view of merit where congruent merit can be earned. “I know what Gabriel Biel says, and 




essence is known in act, in other words, something is what it does.
247
 Moreover, God’s power is 
such that it is beyond any restriction; God does whatever he pleases and all, even the definition of 
goodness and evil itself, is subject to the divine will.
248
 This voluntaristic worldview is apparent 
throughout Luther’s system, perhaps most clearly in Luther’s predestinarian view of the bondage 
of the will. God alone is free. All others are determined by the eternal, sovereign, omnipotent will 
of God.
249
 Here Luther adamantly supports Augustine’s view of predestination and election, 
locating all reality as determined solely by the divine will.
250
 Luther differentiated between the 
God hidden (deus absconditus) and the God revealed (deus revelatus) such that the mystery of the 
divine will regarding evil and the election of some but not others to eternal life is relegated to the 
hidden God.
251
 Nevertheless, Luther himself struggles to understand how God can unilaterally 
                                                     
 
Pelagianizes together with his Scotus.” Martin Luther, Lectures on Romans (trans. W. Pauck; vol. 15 of 
The Library of Christian Classics; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1961), liii.  
247
 God is what God does such that “whoever understands His works correctly cannot fail to know 
His nature and will, His heart and mind.” Luther, Works, 21:331. Cf. William Occkham, Summa logicae 
(New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1957). 
248
 “For Occkham, God and the good are not to be trapped in universals, if the good is whatever 
God ordains. God has absolute power (potentia Dei absolute), according to which God is free to change the 
good.” Ngien, Suffering, 21. 
249
 Luther states that since God “leads us to act by his infallible and immutable counsel and power 
. . . there is no such thing as free choice.” Works, 33:191. Further, by God’s omnipotence “I do not mean 
the potentiality by which he could do many things which he does not, but the active power by which he 
potently works all in all [cf. 1 Cor 12:6], which is the sense in which Scripture calls him omnipotent. This 
omnipotence and the foreknowledge of God, I say, completely abolish the dogma of free choice.” Ibid., 
33:189.  
250
 Thus Luther comments, “In relation to God, or in matters pertaining to salvation or damnation, 
a man has no free choice.” Ibid., 33:70. Further, God “moves and works of necessity even in Satan and the 
ungodly. But He works according to what they are, and what He finds them to be: which means, since they 
are evil and perverted themselves, that when they are impelled to action by this movement of Divine 
omnipotence they do only that which is perverted and evil.” Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (trans. 
O. R. Johnston; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books, 2003), 204. For a discussion of Luther’s view of the 
bondage of the will see Peckham, “Canon.” 
251
 Ronald Goetz comments: “Luther, who in his theology of the cross affirmed the suffering of 
God even unto death, seemed to take back much of what he said in his equally foundational doctrines of 
predestination and the Deus Absconditus” thus portraying “the purposes of the hidden God” as “inscrutably 
impassible, divine sovereignty.” “The Suffering God: The Rise of a New Orthodoxy,” ChrCent 103 (1986): 
385. Ngien adds, “Goetz is right to identify the deus absconditus as ‘an inscrutable impassible, divine 




damn some eternally and save others and yet be a God of love, but he proclaims it nevertheless.
252
 
The extent of divine voluntarism drastically affects the conception of divine love, as shall be seen 
further below.  
Human Love 
Luther is primarily interested in two aspects of love, love from humans to God and love 
from God to humans. It is in the first category that he makes a definitive break from his 
background as an Augustinian monk. Specifically, Luther reacted strongly to the traditional 
concept of caritas love. This reaction was motivated primarily by Luther’s strong soteriology of 
sola gratia. Luther thought it impossible for humans to love God.
253
 Because of intrinsic 
sinfulness, humans are ontologically incapable of love.
254
 The separation between a sinless God 
and sinful human underscores the immense divine-human otherness, a difference so vast that 
there can be no true friendship between God and humans.
255
 Accordingly, Luther sees “the very 
idea that man can love God a dangerous snare of the devil.”
256
 As has been seen, Luther utterly 
                                                     
 
preached/revealed God against the not preached/hidden God.” Suffering, 27.  
252
 “Doubtless it gives the greatest possible offence to common sense or natural reason, that God, 
who is proclaimed as being full of mercy and goodness, and so on, should of His own mere will abandon, 
harden and damn men, as though He delighted in the sins and great eternal torments of such poor  
wretches. . . . And who would not stumble at it? I have stumbled at it myself more than once, down to the 
deepest pit of despair, so that I wished I had never been a man. . . . This is why so much toil and trouble has 
been devoted to clearing the goodness of God, throwing the blame on man’s will.” Luther, Bondage, 217.  
253
 “The next phrases, however—‘with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole might’—are 
difficult. No saint could fulfill them if God did not forgive. Yes, who is there who does not fail in both 
respects: in having as well as in loving one God?” Luther, Works, 9:68. Thus humans may only “love God 
by admitting your utter and total inability to love God.” Singer, Nature, 327. 
254
 Thus Singer comments, “Between God and man, however, there could be no significant 
equality.” Ibid., 202. 
255
 “Without equality there could be no friendship; and sinner that he was, man could never hope 
to equal the divine. But if friendship was impossible, how else could man raise himself into the love of 
God? To which Luther replies: he cannot.” Ibid. 
256
 Ibid., 325. He states, “No one is able to love God from his whole heart, etc., and his neighbor 
as himself.” Luther, Works, 34:309. There is a love from humans to God which itself is the gift of God. “No 
one can love Him unless He makes Himself known to him in the most lovable and intimate fashion. . . . But 




denies free will. Hence, he vehemently rejects Aquinas’s conception of love, which allows for 
merit.
257
 Merit is excluded both soteriologically (sola gratia) and metaphysically (determinism) 
and thus love cannot be an action of any subject other than God himself.
258
 
When humans do exhibit love, it is God who loves through the human.
259
 As water that 
passes through a tube, so the human may be a passive conduit of divine love.
260
 Thus, “man 
himself cannot love, but he can receive love and pass it on to his neighbor.”
261
 Nygren contends 
that such neighbor (human to human) love is greater than the Augustinian neighbor love, which is 
actually directed at God as the ultimate good. “Thus, unlike Augustine’s caritas, which can only 
use the neighbor to get to God, Luther’s agape love addresses the neighbor as neighbor. In fact, 
Luther claims that love for God is none other than love for neighbor.”
262
 Yet, here the love is 
truly directed towards others but it does not originate with humans but with God. God is the 
                                                     
 
despised, afflicted, miserable, forsaken, and those who are nothing, there a hearty love for Him is born. The 
heart overflows with gladness and goes leaping and dancing for the great pleasure it has found in God.” 
Ibid., 21:300. 
257
 “You see that nothing is held out to human trust in any work but the undeserved love of God, 
by which He is moved to approach us with His Word and promise even before we are born. It is out of the 
question that He should requite anything after we are born or begin to serve Him. . . . We should deem 
ourselves to be nothing as regards our merit, but to have, receive, and find power to do everything only by 
His mercy and love, to His glory—mercy which He first promises by His Word and then also confirms 
afterward by a work which He does through us.” Ibid., 9:85.  
258
 “But for Luther it is not man, even perfected man, who really acts: it is God.” Singer, Nature, 
340. 
259
 Luther states, “But this concupiscence is always in us, and therefore the love of God is never in 
us, unless it is begun by grace, and until the concupiscence which still remains and which keeps us from 
‘loving God with all our heart’ (Luke 10:27) is healed and by mercy not imputed to us as sin, and until it is 
completely removed and the perfect love for God is given to the believers and those who persistently 
agitate for it to the end.” Works, 25:262.  
260
 Thus, “faith and love, by which man is placed between God and his neighbour as a medium 
which receives from above and gives out again below, and is like a vessel or tube through which the stream 
of divine blessings must flow without intermission to other people.” Luther, quoted in Nygren, Agape, 735. 
The tube/Christian makes no contribution to the character or shape of this love. 
261
 Singer, Nature, 329. For Nygren, “the Christian is not an independent center of power 
alongside God.” Agape, 734. 
262




universal subject of this love as opposed to Augustine’s universal object.
263
 This still falls short of 
a human other-love; it merely makes God the subject of all love rather than its sole object. All 
true love flows from God downwards not from human upwards. Luther thus categorically rejects 
the conception of adequate love from humans to God and accordingly rejects any synthesis of 
eros and agape. 
Divine Love 
Divine love, however, remains quite in accord with the tradition of Augustine and others. 
For Luther, love is the essence of God, and this love is outflowing beneficence manifested in the 
cross of Christ.
264
 Divine wrath is overcome by God’s “omnipotent love” through Christ’s 
atonement.
265
 This love has no regard for its own good or for the worth of its objects but 
manifests itself in pure bestowal.
266
 Accordingly, divine love does not enjoy good but confers 
good.
267
 Even if human nature was capable of loving God, he would remain unaffected by such 
                                                     
 
263
 However, one may rightly question whether this is a fair understanding of Augustine, for whom 
love originates with God’s efficacious will. See, for instance, Augustine, Spir. et litt. (NPNF 5:108). 
264
 For Luther, “God is nothing else than love.” Works, 30:300. “The affirmation that God is love 
consistently appears throughout the entire corpus of Luther’s works.” Ngien, Suffering, 104. Divine love 
was itself the motive for the suffering and death of Christ on the cross for us. Luther, Works, 26:127. Cf. 
ibid., 26:92, 127. 
265
 God in Christ “conquered hell through his omnipotent love.” Luther, Works, 42:107. Wrath is 
an essential element of love; therefore Luther himself speaks of God’s love as “wrathful love” (Zornige 
Liebe). Ngien, Suffering, 27. “The work of God’s love works in a twofold way in relation to God's wrath: 
(1) In relation to us, the work of God's love itself works wrath (God's alien work) in order to move us to 
dependence upon God’s love (God’s proper work). (2) In relation to God, God’s love moves God to come 
to us, thus abolishing His distance from us, which would mean wrath for us. Two contraries are resolved: 
(1) God’s blessing and curse in His dealings with us; and (2) God’s blessing in coming to us as opposed to 
the curse of His remaining at a distance from us.” Ibid.  
266
 “God does not love because of our works; He loves because of His love.” Luther, Works, 
30:300. For Luther, it is “God’s nature to give, to bestow, to sacrifice himself and to have mercy.” Paul 
Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), 191. God’s loving descent is “a true 
‘bestowal of being,’ a sharing of the nature of the divine with the creature.” Singer, Nature, 339. God 
“gladly waste[s] . . . kindness on the ungrateful.” Luther, Works, 14:106. This divine love is “ineffable” and 
is given “to the wayward multitude, which has not merited this but, on the contrary, should reasonably 
expect to be doomed and damned.” Ibid., 22:373. 
267
 Thus, for Luther, “in relationship to men, God’s creative activity is pure giving and helping. . . . 




love according to his self-sufficiency and impassibility.
268
 The gratuitous love of God 
(characterized thematically as agape) is to be differentiated from all human types of love.
269
 As 
Luther puts it: “Rather than seeking its own good, God’s love flows forth and bestows good.
270
 
Therefore, sinners are attractive because they are loved; they are not loved because they are 
attractive.”
271
 God receives nothing from humans but gives out of his extravagant goodness.
272
 
                                                     
 
good that divine love confers but also chastening. “For God leads down to hell and brings back (cf. 1 Sam 
2:6). Now you see His back parts, and God seems to be shunning you, but sometime later you will see His 
front parts and His face. This is what it means for Him to love those whom He chastises. This love must be 
learned from experience, nor should chastisement be avoided and shunned.” Luther, Works, 6:151.  
268
 It should be noted that Luther at times speaks of divine love by employing passionate language. 
For instance, he speaks of God’s love as the “blood of love.” Luther, Works, 30:300–301. He also speaks of 
the zeal of the Lord against the enemies of God’s people. Ibid., 16:102. Forcefully he even comments, “If I 
were to paint a picture of God I would so draw him that there would be nothing else in the depth of his 
divine nature than that of fire and passion which is called love for people. Correspondingly love is such a 
thing that it is neither human nor angelic but rather divine, yes, even God himself.” Luther, quoted in 
Althaus, Theology, 115–16. In these cases, nevertheless, divine love is a willed love that remains 
unaffected by external influence. Yet he can even state poetically that “the cross was the altar on which He, 
consumed by the fire of the boundless love which burned in His heart, presented the living and holy 
sacrifice of His body and blood to the Father with fervent intercession, loud cries, and hot, anxious tears.” 
Luther, Works, 13:319. Here again, the cross is the locus of divine passion, but passion in Christ, a willed 
beneficence. 
269
 D. D. Williams, Spirit, 78. 
270
 The thought that God bestows love on the unworthy was comforting to Luther considering his 
own struggle regarding personal salvation and acceptance with God. This view of love allowed him to have 
peace saying, “If God loved me so that He gave His only Son for my salvation, why should I fear His 
anger?” Luther, Works, 22:365. 
271
 Ibid., 31:57. “I love thee, not because thou art good or bad, for I draw my love not from thy 
goodness as from an alien spring, but from mine own well-spring.” Singer, Nature, 328. For Luther, divine 
love is an overflowing spring. See Luther, quoted in Nygren, Agape, 730. Luther writes, “God’s love (amor 
Dei) does not find, but creates, its lovable object; man’s love is caused by its lovable object. . . . Sinners are 
lovely because they are loved: they are not loved because they are lovely. That is why human love shuns 
sinners and evil men. As Christ said, ‘I came not to call the righteous but sinners’ (Matt 9:13). And that is 
what love of the cross means. It is a love born of the cross, which betakes itself not to where it can find 
something good to enjoy, but where it may confer good to the wicked and the needy.” Luther, quoted in 
Nygren, Agape, 725–26. 
272
 Luther compares this to a furnace saying, “If anyone would paint and aptly portray God, then 
he must draw a picture of pure love, as if the Divine nature were nothing but a furnace and fire of such 
love, which fills heaven and earth.” Quoted in Nygren, Agape, 724. In fact, God hates some who think they 
are loved. Luther states, “‘Those other counterfeit saints, who are beyond reproach in their zeal for the 
Law, who hope to be loved, who are ready to die for their righteousness, and who suppose that with their 
strivings they are a delight to God—these are the ones whom Thou dost hate with a divine and insuperable 
hatred. Thou lovest only truth in secret. Thou dost not love those hypocrites and proud saints who go about 




Thus, divine love is indifferent to its object, bestowing goodness on whatever objects God wills 
to love.
273
 In this way, divine love is a voluntaristic, willed love. The ultimate act of divine love 
was itself willed by God from all eternity.
274
 In this way, love is a one-way relationship from God 
to humans. Daniel D. Williams states, “The Protestant Reformation understands the love of God 
as grace, as forgiveness given to man, rather than as a spirit which can be directly and 
immediately realized in man.”
275
 Thus, the idea that love includes desire, or eros, is 
fundamentally opposed to the idea of love as grace (divine bestowal). Simply put, “Divine nature 
is nothing else but pure beneficence.”
276
 Luther thus vehemently rejected the caritas of 
Augustine, finding no place for human love toward God (eros), but only divine love (agape), 
which is, effectively, grace. Despite this reaction to the definition of love (specifically as it relates 
to human nature), Luther’s view of God remains dependent upon the classical axioms of aseity 
and impassibility (among others) interpreted in accordance with divine voluntarism. The 
sovereign power and will of God is central to Luther’s view so much so that “pure love . . . must 
defer to coercive power.”
277
 
                                                     
 
live in lies and brag with a loud voice that they are loved. . . . The counterfeit saints claim God’s love 
though they are under hate.” Works, 12:355. 
273
 God “loves sinners, evil persons, fools, and weaklings in order to make them righteous, good, 
wise, and strong. Rather than seeking its own good, the love of God flows forth and bestows good.” Ibid., 
31:57. Thus God “is good by nature, and that His goodness does not stand or fall by the vice or virtue of 
another, as human goodness may stand on the virtue of one and fall by the vice of another, and even 
become worse than he is.” Ibid., 14:106. Divine love is “free and overflowing bestowal. Indifferent to the 
worthlessness of its object, it lavishly makes all things good.” Singer, Nature, 328. 
274
 “God’s self-sacrifice in His Son unveils His atoning will to reconcile humanity unto Himself. 
For Luther, God’s atoning will in Christ has already existed in the heart of God in eternity before the 
historical work of redemption on the cross. Already there is a cross in God in eternity before the wood is 
seen on Calvary (Rev 13:8).” Ngien, Suffering, 27. “Christ would not have shown this love for you if God 
in his eternal love had not wanted this, for Christ’s love for you is due to his obedience to God.” Luther, 
Works, 42:13. 
275
 D. D. Williams, Spirit, 76. 
276
 Luther, quoted in Nygren, Agape, 720. 
277




Anders Nygren’s Conception of Love 
No survey of divine love would be sufficient without considering the influence and 
impact of Anders Nygren who wrote the classic work on the distinction of agape and eros.
278
 In 
conjunction with consideration of Nygren’s view, it will also be beneficial to consider the 
reaction to his landmark framing of the issues. Consideration of this reaction will shed further 
light on the time-tested and long-lasting issues that revolve around divine love and provide 
further context for the contemporary conflict. Through Nygren’s work the categories of agape 
and eros in thinking about divine love have become incredibly influential such that nearly every 
serious work on the topic of love deals with these categories, and with Nygren’s study.
279
 He uses 
what he calls motif analysis, avoiding the semantic argument regarding agape and eros and 
focusing on a thematic dichotomy. For Nygren, eros and agape are opposites that represent 
egocentrism and theocentrism, respectively.
280
 He chastises the early church for what he 
considers to be a devastating synthesis between eros and agape by accepting the eros worldview 
and attempting to integrate it with Christianity. He hypothesizes that the eros motif stems from 
Orphism
281
 and thus consists of a desire toward ascending and agape to be the love of 
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 Nygren, Agape. 
279
 Gene H. Outka goes so far as to state, “Nygren so effectively posed issues about love that they 
have had a prominence in theology and ethics they never had before. . . . Thus, whatever the reader may 
think of it, one may justifiably regard his work as the beginning of the modern treatment of the subject.” 
Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), 1. Cf. Carmichael, 
Friendship, 36; James Barr, “Words for Love in Biblical Greek,” in The Glory of Christ in the New 
Testament (ed. L. D. Hurst and N. T. Wright; Oxford: Clarendon, 1987); Edward Collins Vacek, Love, 
Human and Divine: The Heart of Christian Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
1994). For a contemporary proponent of Nygren’s view of agape, see Colin Grant, “For the Love of God: 
Agape,” JRE 24 (1996): 3–21. 
280
 He contends that eros and agape “represent two streams that run through the whole history of 
religion, alternately clashing against one another and mingling with one another. They stand for what may 
be described as the egocentric and the theocentric attitude in religion.” Nygren, Agape, 205. “There seems 
in fact to be no possibility of discovering any idea common to them both which might serve as the starting-
point for the comparison; for at every point the opposition between them makes itself felt.” Ibid., 209. 
281
 Further, “he identifies it both with the inclination toward the sensual that is expressed in 
mystery-piety and with the drive to transcend the sensual that is expressed, in its highest form, in Plato.” 






 Nygren identifies a higher and lower eros, which he traces throughout the history 
of the motif, a vulgar eros that is love for this world and heavenly eros that strives for the higher 
world of forms.
283
 In both cases, he identifies the central element of longing and desire for that 
which one does not possess and the self-interest to which such a conception of eros love is 
disposed. However, vulgar eros has been identified as inferior long since (see Plato); for Nygren 
it is heavenly eros that presents the rival motif to Christian agape.
284
  
Nygren writes from a Lutheran perspective and fleshes out Luther’s concept of gratuitous 
love as specifically opposed to eros.
285
 He positions Luther as the bulwark defender of the true 
Christian conception of love as beneficence, which Nygren considers under the agape motif. For 
Nygren, the only true Christian love is agape, which he describes as (1) Spontaneous and 
unmotivated; (2) Indifferent to value; (3) Creative; and (4) Initiator of fellowship with God.
286
 His 
perspective is further laid out in a series of antitheses. He contends that “Eros is acquisitive desire 
and longing” while “agape is sacrificial giving.” “eros is an upward movement, man’s way to 
God” while “agape is sacrificial giving” which “comes down . . . God’s way to man.” “Eros is 
man’s effort” while “agape is God’s grace.” “Eros is determined by the quality, the beauty and 
worth, of its object, it is not spontaneous but ‘evoked’, ‘motivated,’” while “agape is sovereign in 
relation to its object, and is directed to both ‘the evil and the good’; it is spontaneous, 
                                                     
 
282
 “Agape is the center of Christianity, the Christian fundamental motif par excellence.” Nygren, 
Agape, 48. Moreover, for him, “nothing but that which bears the impress of agape has the right to be called 
Christian love.” Ibid., 92.  
283
 This distinction is clear in the writings of Plato, see above. 
284
 He contends that Christianity’s translation into Platonic terms transformed agape toward eros, 
leading toward the famous (or infamous, depending on one’s view) caritas synthesis. Nygren, Agape, 54. It 
is quite interesting, however, that Nygren sees Platonic influence as distorting agape when it appears that a 
Platonic or neo-Platonic presuppositional doctrine of God underpins the requirement of love to be purely 
self-sufficient and disinterested.  
285
 “Behind Nygren lay the Lutheran understanding of justification by faith alone, by God’s action 
and not by human striving.” Carmichael, Friendship, 36. 
286






 As such, any integration or conflation of eros and agape is 
utterly rejected by Nygren. For this reason he vehemently criticizes the so-called caritas synthesis 
of Augustine because, he believes, it includes the fundamental eros motif of ascent to God.
288
 For 
Nygren, such ascent upward toward God is in stark contrast to the view of Luther that humans are 
incapable of ascent and that God descends to man, not vice versa.
289
 
Since God, in Nygren’s view and in keeping with Luther, lacks nothing and thus desires 
nothing (perfection and self-sufficiency), the eros motif is inappropriate to any conception of 
divine love. Accordingly, divine love in Christianity (agape) is not emotive, evaluative, or 
motivated but a purposive, willed, indifferent love totally distinct from any need or desire. 
Biblical expressions of divine emotion “are on this view merely crude anthropomorphisms.”
290
 
All other types of love, eros, philia, etc., are not Christian love.
291
 Rather, friendship love is 
inappropriate due to the vast inequality between God and humans. He claims that agape was a 
theme specifically chosen by the NT writers to convey this sola gratia type of love that is 
“indifferent to human merit” and to exclude all other concepts of love.
292
 Thus, he believes that 
                                                     
 
287
 Ibid., 210. For Nygren, “Eros is need-love which is motivated by the desire for what it lacks. 
Agape is gift-love which flows spontaneously from its own abundance. Thus God’s love for us is not eros 
but pure agape.” Brümmer, Model, 128. Moreover, eros is self-love and agape is divine love toward others. 
288
 See Nygren, Agape, 449–558. Moreover, Christian love (agape) is opposed to nomos and thus 
a denial of the Jewish scale of values. Ibid., 210. As such, agape excludes justice. Ibid., 88.  
289
 “There is thus no way for man to come to God, but only a way for God to come to man: the 
way of divine forgiveness, divine love. Agape is God’s way to man.” Ibid., 80–81. Nygren’s analysis seems 
motivated by a polemic against Catholicism; he writes, “The deepest difference between Catholicism and 
Luther can be expressed by the following formula; in Catholicism: fellowship with God is on God’s own 
level, on the basis of holiness; in Luther fellowship with God is on our level, on the basis of sin. In 
Catholicism, it is a question of a fellowship with God motivated by some worth—produced, it is true, by 
the infusion of caritas—to be found in man; in Luther, fellowship with God rests exclusively on God’s 
unmotivated love, justification is the justification of the sinner, the Christian is ‘simul iustus et peccator.’” 
Nygren, Agape, 690. 
290
 Badcock, “Concept,” 40. 
291
 Nygren, Agape, 92. 
292
 Ibid., 57. In fact, he goes so far as to consider it a “new creation of Christianity.” Ibid., 48. 




the NT conception of love is different from the meaning of love in the OT.
293
 Here the only true 
agent of love is God; humans in themselves are incapable of agape love.  
Thus, a human loves God only “because God’s unmotivated love has overwhelmed him 
and taken control of him, so that he cannot do other than love God. Therein lies the profound 
significance of the idea of predestination: man has not selected God, but God has elected man.”
294
 
As for Luther, human to human agape love is likewise not originated by humans but divine love 
that flows through humans.
295
 “What we have here is a purely theocentric love, in which all 
choice on man’s part is excluded.”
296
Agape love is thus unconditional love predicated only on the 
divine will which itself is in accordance with the superabundance of the divine nature of agape; 
divine love thus could never be earned or merited.
297
 Moreover, Nygren states that agape 
“excludes completely the principle of justice from the religious relationship.”
298
  
                                                     
 
ibid., 127, 151–59. Thus, Nygren “claims that St. Paul rarely speaks of man loving God because God’s love 
was the only kind he recognized.” Singer, Nature, 296. However, Carmichael points out, “More objective 
scholarship suggests that the appearance of agape is to be attributed, not to theological motivation but to the 
natural evolution of the Greek language.” Friendship, 36. 
293
 Nygren, Agape, 62. This is in keeping with his view of discontinuity between Judaism and 
Christianity. 
294
 Ibid., 214. Badcock states, “According to Nygren, God loves but somehow does not love us.” 
“Concept,” 45. 
295
 Thus, “to the extent that man participates in the divine, and only to that extent, is it right for me 
to love him.” Nygren, Agape, 215. Nygren thus takes up Luther’s tube analogy. Ibid., 215. See above. 
Thus, “strictly speaking, agape cannot be the love of one human being for another. It can only apply to the 
love of God for human beings whereby he uses one human being as an instrument through which he 
funnels his agape to another.” Brümmer, Model, 136. “It is therefore not we but God who does all the 
loving.” Ibid. 
296
 Nygren, Agape, 213.  
297
 “God’s love is ‘groundless’ though not, of course, in the sense that there is no ground for it at 
all, or that it is arbitrary or fortuitous. On the contrary, it is just to bring out the element of necessity in it 
that we describe it as ‘groundless’ our purpose is to emphasise that there are no extrinsic grounds for it. The 
only ground for it is to be found in God himself. God’s love is altogether spontaneous.” Ibid., 73. “God 
does not love that which is already itself worthy of love, but on the contrary, that which in itself has no 
worth acquires worth just by becoming the object of God’s love.” Ibid., 78. 
298




Nygren further states that “God does not love that which is already in itself worthy of 
love, but on the contrary, that which in itself has no worth acquires worth just by becoming the 
object of God’s love. . . . The man who is loved by God has no value in himself; what gives him 
value is precisely the fact that God loves him. Agape is a value-creating principle.”
299
 The God-
world relationship of love is a one-way relationship wholly predicated on the sovereign will of 
God.
300
 God gains no value from this relationships; divine love is utterly gratuitous.
301
 Nygren’s 
view has come under a great deal of criticism, but it still remains a very influential study, and 
many of his conclusions remain prominent in biblical and systematic theology.
302
 However, 
before considering criticisms of Nygren’s view, it is important to recognize that Nygren explicitly 
states that he is not conducting a linguistic analysis or making a linguistic argument but rather a 
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 Ibid., 78. 
300
 “The fact that God loves the world derives solely from God himself, who is in himself 
unchanging, so that the love of God for the world is a function of the unchanging being and life of God.” 
Badcock, “Concept,” 40. 
301
 “God does not love in order to obtain any advantage thereby, but quite simply because it is his 
nature to love with a love that seeks, not to get, but to give.” Nygren, Agape, 201. Thus, “God’s love for us 
has its origin in God himself, i.e. in the abundance of his own agape, and not in us, i.e. in some advantage 
which he desires to receive from us. But did not Plato argue in a similar way about the Good? It too was 
self-sufficiently perfect and could have no need-love; but it too could have gift-love which imparts of its 
own abundance
 
‘to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things.’ And this form of divine 
agape became even more explicit in neo-Platonism since, according to Plotinus, God (‘the One’) created 
the world out of the superabundance of his own nature, by a process of overflow or emanation. From this it 
follows that the sole reason for God’s creativity and love is his own nature, which spontaneously overflows 
itself without suffering the least depletion.” Brümmer, Model, 129. 
302
 Nygren’s theology of divine love is criticized by D. D. Williams who sees it as inconsistent. 
Spirit, 38. “Niebuhr explicitly criticizes Nygren for making the distinction between agape and human love 
too sharp.” Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation (2 vols.; New 
York: Scribner, 1964), 2:84. Many others have pointed out that the distinction between agape and other 
words for love, specifically the philia family, is not supported by the linguistics. Badcock states, “The 
Bible itself does not actually make the rigid distinction that Nygren presupposes between Christian love, 
agape, and other forms of human love.” “Concept,” 37. Cf. Stephen G. Post, A Theory of Agape: On the 
Meaning of Christian Love (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1990), 88–89. John A. T. Robinson 
harshly criticized Nygren and finds “something of unfulfilled desire in agape.” He states, “It is, indeed, 
utterly true that Agape does not require for its stimulation appreciation of, or desire for, a beauty or 
goodness external to itself. . . . But this is no way excludes the truth that Agape desires response, and 
desires it passionately. . . . Love yearns for a loving response. In this sense there is a need in the very heart 
of God, a divine discontent which must ever burn until it be satisfied.” “Agape and Eros,” Theology 48 






 However, this leaves Nygren a great deal of room to apply definitions to 
thematic agape, which seem to stem from Luther’s definition more than the Bible and contrast 
that with the tradition that Luther explicitly condemned. In this way, the study seems to 
presuppose the conflict from a Lutheran perspective. The question is whether either of the motifs 
of eros or agape was ever widely seen in such stark terms prior to Luther. 
Nygren’s basic premise regarding the categories of need love (corresponding to eros) and 
gift love (corresponding to agape) continues to be influential in some circles.
304
 At the same time, 
Nygren’s study has come under considerable criticism. For instance, Nygren’s interpretations of 
historical theology have been questioned regarding certain figures, such as Augustine.
305
 Many 
theologians question the adequacy of a conception of divine love that rules out a meaningful 
mutual relationship between God and humans.
306
 As might be expected, this criticism of Nygren 
extends to his deterministic metaphysics.
307
 Another issue is the sharp dichotomy between eros 
and agape. While Nygren considers them to be opposing motifs, others see eros and agape as 
complementary.
308
 Moreover, the contention that the agape motif is the only true Christian 
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 Nygren, Agape, 33. However, he does note the lack of the word eros in the NT. It is admitted, 
on the other hand, that the Bible uses philia words for love positively. Ibid., 153–55. 
304
 For instance, these categories were adopted and popularized by C. S. Lewis in The Four Loves 
(New York: Harcourt Brace, 1988). “The Need-loves, so far as I have been able to see, have no 
resemblance to the Love which God is.” Ibid., 127. There can be no need loves in God, only gift love, 
charity. Even Pope Benedict XVI has weighed in, dealing with these categories at length in his first 
encyclical, Deus Caritas Est, in which he claims that “eros and agape—ascending love and descending 
love—can never be completely separated. The more the two, in their different aspects, find a proper unity 
in the one reality of love, the more the true nature of love in general is realized.” Benedict XVI, Deus 
caritas est, encyclical letter on Christian love, Vatican website, December 25, 2005, http://www.vatican 
.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html. 
305
 Burnaby, in Amor, critiqued Nygren’s view in a classic study on Augustine’s theology of love, 
specifically taking issue with Nygren’s interpretation of Augustine and the so-called “caritas synthesis.” 
306
 Burnaby, in Amor, sees the supposition of a unilateral love relationship from God to humanity 
as wholly insufficient. See chapter 3 below.  
307
 Oord is harshly critical of this worldview. “Matching,” 113. 
308
 For instance, D’Arcy also directly responds to Nygren’s critique from a contemporary Catholic 




conception of love has likewise been questioned.
309
 It is also questioned whether desire can be 
excluded from the Christian conception of love.
310
 Perhaps the strongest criticism of Nygren, 
despite his claim to not be making a semantic argument, is the apparent biblical testimony against 
Nygren’s motifs.
311
 Such criticisms recall the primary issues that have recurred in the historical 
theology of love and will be seen further in the contemporary conflict of interpretations between 
the transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-experientialist models. 
Conclusion 
As has been seen, throughout the historical conceptions of divine love, many important 
aspects of divine love remain prominent and under contention. The historical discussion of divine 
                                                     
 
when it comes specifically to divine agape, D’Arcy himself retains the unilateral nature of divine love. Paul 
Tillich differs even further from Nygren claiming that “if eros and agape cannot be united, agape toward 
God is impossible.” Systematic Theology (3 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 1:281. For 
further discussion, see chapter 3 below. 
309
 “Although he contends that agape is the only authentically Christian love, I join others in 
disagreeing with this contention.”
 
Oord, “Matching,” 114. Cf. D. D. Williams, Spirit.  
310
 Brümmer, while dealing with similar categories of gift and need love, is highly critical of the 
sharp dichotomy that Nygren proposes. For him, the separation of love from desire is unnecessary. “This 
would amount to accepting a form of quietist
 
‘pure love’ which, as we pointed out in section 4.1 above, 
renounces all desire, including the desire for God.” Brümmer, Model, 137. However, C. Osborne criticizes 
Brümmer, stating: “While otherwise sensitive to some of the inadequacies of previous work on the subject, 
still starts by adopting and developing categories of love on the lines of C.S. Lewis’s ‘need-love’ and ‘gift-
love’, which leaves us stuck in the motivational contrasts Nygren so disastrously proposed.” Eros, 6.  
311
 Geraint Vaughan Jones says, “There are enough exceptions, however, and examples of 
overlapping, to show that the hard-and-fast distinction upon which Nygren and others insist cannot be 
maintained, and the infrequency of the use of agape in the Synoptic Gospels is striking; agapao is often 
used in the sense of phileo.” “Agape and Eros: Some Notes on Dostoievsky,” ExpTim 66 (1954–55): 3. Cf. 
Roy F. Butler, The Meaning of Agapao and Phileo in the Greek New Testament (Lawrence, Kans.: 
Coronado, 1977), 70. Oord presents a sustained criticism of Nygren’s biblical interpretation, finding 
numerous examples that, he contends, contradict Nygren’s thesis. He writes, “Nygren’s thesis that agape is 
the only authentically Christian love—excluding all other loves as legitimate—collapses under a careful 
examination of Scripture. His thesis cannot stand because it is not supported by the very structure he 
assumes to be its primary foundation: the Bible.” Oord, “Matching,” 123. James Moffat points out that 
agape is used to convey meanings that fall outside of Nygren’s definition of agape. Love in the New 
Testament (New York: Harper, 1930). Further, Rist contends that Nygren has simply selected “those 
passages which might suit the theory that agape and eros are inhabitants of different worlds and then 
dragoon the other passages into harmony.” John Rist argues, however, that “they are both recognized in the 
New Testament.” “Some Interpretations of Agape and Eros,” in The Philosophy and Theology of Anders 




love displays a great deal of continuity with the Platonic and Aristotelian ontologies and theories 
of love. Specifically, the pre-eminent features of deity as simplicity, timelessness, perfection, 
self-sufficiency, immutability, and impassibility, retain priority down through the ages in the 
theologies of Augustine to Aquinas to Luther. Despite the radical upheaval between the Catholic 
and Protestant traditions in the reformation, the conception of God as a whole, and divine love 
specifically, remained relatively constant. While the meaning and nature of human love is 
diversely conceived, divine love is restricted by the possibilities afforded by the divine ontology. 
Specifically divine love must be unilateral, unmotivated, unaffected, gratuitous beneficence, 
which entails no passion but rather, purposive rationality.  
However, the classical views on divine ontology, and thus divine love, have been 
increasingly questioned. In the next chapter, the immanent-experientialist model represents the 
primary alternative to the classical models and their contemporary modification, which is 
represented by the transcendent-voluntarist model. As shall be seen, the contemporary conflict of 
interpretations between these models revisits the issues that have been introduced in the survey 
above. Specifically, the question of the mutuality of the divine-human relationship becomes 
prominent. Further questions also arise, for instance, whether love is beneficence in part or in 
whole, or whether aspects such as desire, enjoyment, and/or appraisal of value are permissible for 
conceptions of divine love. Moreover, what is the extent of divine love, and how does this 
correspond to God’s relatedness or unrelatedness to the world and its history? As shall be seen, 
these issues are integrally connected to the issues of ontology and metaphysics. With these 
considerations in mind, we now turn our attention to an influential, recent evangelical 
modification of divine love in Carl F. H. Henry. This is followed by a direct assault upon the 
classical conception that many view to be the most compelling alternative to traditional 












CONFLICTING MODELS OF DIVINE LOVE 
Introduction 
This chapter presents an analytical description of the transcendent-voluntarist model and 
the immanent-experientialist model, focused upon selected exemplars of both models. Carl F.H. 
Henry’s conception is a well-known and influential exemplar of the transcendent-voluntarist 
model, and Charles Hartshorne’s seminal process theology is representative of the immanent-
experientialist model.
1
 To provide context to understand these models of divine love one must 
look at the methodological and ontological frameworks, respectively.
2
 Because the conceptions of 
divine love flow out of the respective ontologies, they will be understood more easily after the 
introduction of the theological systems. First, the basic methodological tenets will be 
summarized, followed by the transcendent-voluntarist model’s intentional modification (at least 
in presentation) of some aspects of classic theism. The ontological framework will then be 
examined, especially the emphasis on the sovereignty of the divine will and the closely related 
axiomatic conceptions of simplicity, timelessness, omniscience, immutability, and omnipotence. 
Then, the divine relationship to the world will be addressed regarding divine transcendence and 
                                                     
 
1
 The term voluntarist is being utilized to denote that the divine will is the basic factor in the 
universe. It does not connote, however, that the will is necessarily in opposition to reason or the intellect.  
2
 The need for a treatment of ontology is increasingly important. D. D. Williams expresses this 
quite clearly saying, “Why this concern with ‘being’? . . . Our answer can be put quite simply—it is beings 
who love.” Spirit, 9. D. D. Williams also states that “the traditional Christian interpretations of love have 





immanence, freedom, and providence. This leads to the conception of election love, which is 
required by the wider ontology of the transcendent-voluntarist model.  
For the immanent-experientialist model Hartshorne’s basic methodology is presented 
first. Then, his departure from traditional theology in positing the necessity of the absolute 
relatedness of God to the world is outlined. This chapter then proceeds to explore Hartshorne’s 
ontological framework beginning with his process ontology of the world, then his divine ontology 
of dipolar theism, and concluding with his panentheistic metaphysics of the God-world 
relationship. Then, the conception of divine love, especially the important aspects of sympathy 
and value, is examined in light of the ontological framework and its implications for the God-
world relationship. The presentation of these two models is followed by an examination of the 
extent of the conflict of interpretations between the two main models. The extent of the conflict is 
presented according to numerous recent theologians who express dissatisfaction with the two 
main models. 
The Transcendent-Voluntarist Model 
Methodological Framework 
Basic Methodological Tenets 
Henry’s method is explicitly based upon propositional, biblical revelation, which reveals 
God in “objectively reliable form.”
3
 Thus, the “way of special biblical revelation declares God 
himself and his revelation to be the only objective intelligible basis for statements about his 
                                                     
 
3
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:99. Henry defines “propositional revelation” as “a divine 
communication to man of objective knowledge of the nature of God as he is, both in his eternal glory and in 
his relations to man.” Ibid., 5:98. “That God can be known, that divine revelation is rationally given and is 
to be rationally understood, is a basic presupposition of biblical theology.” Ibid., 5:381. Cf. Carl F. H. 
Henry, Toward a Recovery of Christian Belief: The Rutherford Lectures (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway Books, 
1990), 35–60, and idem, The God Who Shows Himself (Waco, Tex.: Word Books, 1966), 1–2. For an 
exposition of the evangelical view of revelation see Gordon Haddon Clark, “Revealed Religion,” in 






 Accordingly, divine attributes are “determined by a logically ordered exposition of an 
inscripturated revelation.”
5
 Every question of divine nature is thus to be subordinated to 
Scripture, yet also “within biblically revealed principles to the demands of logical consistency.”
6
 
Yet reason also plays a prime role in Henry’s theological method including the stating and 
assessing of “the claims of both the theological and secular philosophical traditions.”
7
 However, 
he opposes the traditional “way of analogy” in favor of univocal predication because of the 
former’s reliance on presupposition. Accordingly, he rejects any method that posits “a divine 
being or essence ontologically distinguishable from divine personality and knowable apart from 
God’s selfhood” since “only non-biblical motives would require us to speak of God’s existence 
                                                     
 
4
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:99. Reliable, propositional information communicated 
through divine revelation is the only “confident basis for expounding the divine attributes.” Ibid., 5:99. See 
also C. F. H. Henry, “The Interpretation of the Scriptures: Are We Doomed to Hermeneutical Nihilism?” 
RevExp 71 (1974): 197–215. Henry thus rules out any naturalistic or empirical methodology. God, 
Revelation, 5:90. Cf. Carl F. H. Henry, Notes on the Doctrine of God (Boston: Wilde, 1948), 66–68. For 
Henry’s criticism of modern theology and a call to biblical theism see Frontiers in Modern Theology 
(Chicago: Moody Press, 1966), and The Protestant Dilemma: An Analysis of the Current Impasse in 
Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1949), 43–124. Although the intricacies of Henry’s 
presuppositionalist epistemology are beyond the scope of this dissertation, some elements must be noted.  
C. F. H. Henry, Recovery, 55. His theory of knowledge stems from God as mind and the rational Logos 
behind all order and structure in the universe. C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:334–37, 381. All reality is 
dependent upon God’s ideas thus “the ultimate world of ideas is not a ‘given’ to which God is himself 
subject; it is, rather, the very mind or thought of God.” Ibid., 5:335. Accordingly, humans “think his 
[God’s] thoughts after him.” Ibid., 5:16. Henry has often been criticized for being too rationalistic. For 
instance, McNeal criticizes his emphasis on the objective which he believes leads to a less than dynamic 
picture of God. Thomas Reginald McNeal, “A Critical Analysis of the Doctrine of God in the Theology of 
Carl F. H. Henry” (Ph.D. diss., Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1986). For a more positive 
appraisal of Henry’s epistemology in conversation with other noted Evangelicals see Kelvin Neal Jones, 
“Revelation and Reason in the Theology of Carl F. H. Henry, James I. Packer, and Ronald H. Nash” (Ph.D. 
diss., Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1994).  
5
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:100. “The legitimacy of what we may say about God’s being, 
essence, nature, substance, attributes, or whatever else, stems solely from the living God who makes 
himself known and from the divinely inspired Scriptures.” Ibid., 5:49.  
6
 Ibid., 5:132–33. He thus rejects any attempt “to derive a comprehensive analysis of the attributes 
of God from an a priori metaphysics.” Ibid., 5:99. 
7
 Ibid., 5:223. He states, “The revelation of the triune God . . . can be significantly maintained only 
if divine revelation is intelligible and by expounding its content without resorting to paradox and logical 




before we discuss his nature disclosed in divine revelation.”
 8
 This leads to opposition toward 
Hartshorne’s adapted use of the way of analogy.  
Axiomatic to this methodology are the requisites of transcendence and immanence 
requiring both “God’s independence of the created universe,” and a description of “God’s relation 
to the universe in a way that makes God accessible to human experience and assures knowledge 
of him as he truly is.”
9
 Henry also presupposes that a distinction must be made regarding 
“anthropomorphic passages.”
10
 Although anthropomorphisms and other wrinkles of divine 
revelation must be distinguished, Henry generally requires “univocal meaning” to “avoid 
agnosticism and skepticism” as well as “equivocation.”
11
 He does allow, however, the way of 
negation and the way of eminence, as long as they are not “separated from divine revelation.”
12
 
The requirement of univocal predication is tied to Henry’s supposition of propositional and 
rational divine revelation, which assumes that God reveals His essence in the Bible and thus 
humans are not limited to the mere “knowledge of God-in-relation to us” but may ascertain 
thereby “metaphysical knowledge of God-as-he-is-in-himself.”
13
 In this context, Henry advocates 
                                                     
 
8
 Ibid., 5:185. The way of analogy “assigns to God in an eminent degree all perfections found in 
creaturely existence.” Ibid., 5:86. He considers the way of analogy prone to “secretly presuppose in 
advance certain facts about the very nature of God that it professes to establish only by analogical 
reasoning.” Ibid., 5:87.  
9
 Ibid., 5:101.  
10
 “The Bible requires a distinction between anthropomorphic passages that speak of God’s ‘hand,’ 
‘arm,’ ‘eyes,’ and so on, and ontological teaching that depicts personal distinctions in the nature of God. 
Those who consider the latter just as figurative as the former do so on interpretative principles that erode 
the reality of God. Scripture itself authorizes and requires a distinction between what we may say literally 
or figuratively about God.” Ibid., 5:197.  
11
 Ibid., 5:87. He thus asks, “Does a relational likeness of goodness when predicated of God and 
man make sense if its ascriptions to both the divine and the human have no univocal overlap? When thus 
conceived the analogy of proportionality channels into equivocation and hence into agnosticism.” Ibid., 
5:86.  
12
 Ibid., 5:88. Thus, “within the guidance of special revelation both methods [negation and 
eminence] may be employed simultaneously.” Ibid.  
13
 Ibid., 5:96. Specifically, he states, “If divine revelation is cognitive and propositional, then God 




caution against the proliferation of divine attributes, especially when based merely upon the 
nuances of biblical terms.
14
 This becomes especially important as it relates to the traditional 
agape-eros distinction, as shall be seen.  
Differentiation from Classic Theism  
Henry prefers the term evangelical theism as a descriptor of his doctrine of God. He 
explicitly differentiates his views from what he calls the Thomistic emphasis on “Greek 
philosophical motifs” rather than “Judeo-Christian biblical categories.”
15
 Accordingly, Henry 
seems to tweak doctrines such as immutability and impassibility, at least as a matter of 
presentation. However, he still relies on the classic tradition, seemingly assuming that the Nicene 
and ante-Nicene fathers were biblical in their theology.
16
 Thus, as shall be seen, Henry’s doctrine 
has much in common with classic theism. Some might consider it to be a modified or nuanced 
form of classical theism, and others might see it as a new evangelical theism. Whatever the label, 
                                                     
 
authentically about both his transcendent being and about his relations to man and the world.” Ibid., 5:102. 
Therefore, Henry believes God’s immanent nature is accessible due to propositional divine revelation while 
yet implying at least a semantic distinction between God’s immanent and economic natures. However, he 
does remove the inaccessibility of divine nature saying, if “God’s revelatory activity includes the divine 
disclosure of truths about God (valid information that stipulates the meaning of God’s redemptive acts and 
unveils information also concerning God’s transcendent selfhood and his divine goals) then no need arises 
for such rigid distinction between the self-revealed God and God-in-himself (since in self-revelation God 
conveys objectively valid knowledge of his eternal nature and will).” Ibid., 5:51. 
14
 Ibid., 5:139. “Scripture is not immune to the use of synonyms. Yet careless scriptural exegesis 
may dismiss certain significant vocabulary divergences as merely synonymous when in fact they are 
intended to convey special shades of meaning. In the long run what must decide the adequacy or 
inadequacy of competing representations of the number and kind of divine perfections is a faithful and 
consistent handling of the biblical text.” Ibid.  
15
 He states that Aquinas “orients the doctrine of the immutability of the God of the Bible to Greek 
philosophical motifs and develops theistic doctrine more in Greek than in Judeo-Christian biblical 
categories.” Ibid., 5:45. One specific break is the traditional substantialist ontology that Henry considers to 
be unnecessary. “This realistic, substantialist view elaborated by Roman Catholic theologians in line with 
Aristotelian metaphysics, Protestant orthodoxy then took over without questioning whether theology based 
upon special biblical revelation necessarily requires such a view.” Ibid., 5:113. 
16
 “Contrary to Nicene and ante-Nicene fathers who expounded the doctrine of God in terms of the 
Scriptures, church fathers familiar with Greek philosophy in some cases readily subscribed to the unbiblical 
notions that the purity and spirituality of the divine are best maintained by stripping God of all logically 




it is clear that Henry’s doctrine can neither be wholly differentiated from the tradition of classic 
theism nor can it be wholly identified with it.
17
 As such, it is a worthy representative of the 
progression of recent Evangelical thought.  
Ontological Framework 
In the transcendent-voluntarist model, God “is a sovereign will.”
18
 He is conceived as 
perfect, simple, timeless, immutable, impassible and totally self-sufficient.
19
 God is absolutely 
sovereign and “stands completely and intrinsically independent of the created order.”
20
 There is 
no will that threatens God’s will, and thus non-divine decisions do not determine God in any 
way.
21
 God is prior to and unequivocally other—yet not “wholly other”—than the world.
22
 God 
                                                     
 
17
 Ronald H. Nash, for instance, does not identify classical theism with Christian theism saying, “It 
is extremely important to recognize that the relationship between classical theism and Christian theism is a 
matter of some dispute.” “Process Theology and Classical Theism,” in Process Theology (ed. R. H. Nash; 
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1987), 3. He summarizes the broad tenets of classic or Thomistic theism using 
eight attributes: Pure actuality, immutability, impassibility, timelessness, simplicity, necessity, 
omniscience, omnipotence. Ibid., 8–12. He bases this breakdown on David Ray Griffin, God, Power, and 
Evil: A Process Theodicy (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976). If classic theism is limited to the above eight 
attributions it is difficult to see anything like a clean break between Henry’s Evangelical theism and classic 
theism. 
18
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:130. 
19
 Henry summarizes his ontology by referring to God as he “who stands, and stays.” Ibid., 5:10. 
God “stands” means that he “is the personal sovereign containing in himself the ground of his own 
existence.” Ibid. The “God who stays” is in reference to the “providence” of God and the “eschatological 
consummation of his dramatic plan.” Ibid. 
20
 Ibid., 5:12. God “stands free of the universe both as its voluntary creator and voluntary 
preserver.” Ibid. This means that “the universe is not necessary either to divine being or to divine 
perfection. God stands free of such dependence; he alone, moreover, stands completely and intrinsically 
independent of the created order.” Ibid. Cf. Carl F. H. Henry, “The Nature of God,” in Christian Faith and 
Modern Theology: Contemporary Evangelical Thought (ed. C. F. H. Henry and J. O. Buswell; New York: 
Channel, 1964), 91. Norman L. Geisler concurs and connects this with divine necessity. Systematic 
Theology (vol. 2 of God, Creation; Minneapolis, Minn.: Bethany House, 2002), 58–73. 
21
 God “is invulnerable to assault.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:13. Further, “the self-
disclosed God, this One who ‘stands,’ exists forever in a self-specified condition free of external 
determination; his reality, purpose and activity are not contingent on the universe. He continues steadfast, 
unimpaired and immutable.” Ibid., 5:11. Cf. Harold B. Kuhn, “God: His Names and Nature,” in 
Fundamentals of the Faith (ed. C. F. H. Henry and G. H. Clark; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1969), 
49. 
22
 Yet God is not “in all respects wholly other than man who bears his image.” C. F. H. Henry, 




wills his own life in absolute and independent freedom; he thus depends on nothing (aseity) and is 
affected by nothing (impassibility) but rather “sustains himself in voluntary self-determination.”
23
 
In other words he is “wholly free to be himself” and there is nothing external or internal to God 
that is not determined by God himself.
24
 Thus, all divine relations are external relations.
25
 God is 
necessary, perfect, and complete. He cannot grow and is “not in process, in a condition of change, 
[or] in motion toward perfection.”
26
 Divine plenitude extends even to his perfections such that 
each of “his attributes is perfect and unlimited.”
27
 Henry is careful to point out, however, that God 




                                                     
 
Ought, the transcendent Self.” Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, 5:87; Henry, “The Nature of God,” 
71. 
23
 Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, 5:214–15. Cf. ibid., 5:69. God’s “self-determination” 
means “free agency or spontaneous voluntariness. God has free will, a will that is self-moved. His thoughts 
and acts are shaped neither by external necessity nor by internal limitation except as he is self-determined 
in what he thinks and does. Only God alone, moreover, is a totally free agent.” Ibid., 5:214–15. Further 
“God perpetually wills and purposes his own being; this being depends upon nothing external to himself 
yet is not internally necessitated as if he exists forever whether he wills to do so or not. He wills eternally to 
be himself in the fulness of his independent vitality, and never ceases to be himself.” Ibid., 5:69. 
24
 Ibid., 5:69. Even the “attributes or perfections of God are virtues that he himself wills in 
sovereign freedom. They are not external constraints to which God’s nature and will must conform. . . . 
God alone establishes truth and the good; they have no existence independently of his will.” Ibid., 5:215. 
25
 Thus he states, “The Infinite can comprehend the finite without active relationships between the 
two. But the finite comprehends the Infinite only because the infinite Creator has fashioned the finite and 
relates himself to it.” Ibid., 5:223.  
26
 Ibid., 5:12. He states, “God is incapable of increase or diminution.” Ibid. 
27
 Ibid., 5:22. 
28
 Ibid., 5:9. But, “if by static is meant indifferent, the complaint can be countered by biblical 
theology; if by static is meant unchanging, then that is indeed the case. . . . The self-revealing Creator-
Redeemer God of the Bible is ontologically changeless.” Ibid., 6:291. God “is the eternally active God. . . . 
[He] is not an indifferent and static divinity like the impersonal or remote gods of many ancient 
philosophers.” Ibid., 5:12–13. Similarly, Carson stresses that God is “unchanging in his being, purposes, 
and perfections” yet this does not necessarily mean that God “cannot interact with his image-bearers in 
their time.” Difficult, 55. Geisler adds, “Neither does impassible mean immobile: God can and does act. 




Simplicity, Essence, and Attributes 
For Henry, in keeping with classic theism, God is absolutely simple, a unity.
29
 The 
absolutely simple and unified God is also triune.
30
 The trinitarian persons are not “independent 
beings” but are “hypostases alongside the living God and as subordinate deputies active in the 
creation and history of the universe.”
31
 This simplicity flows from the unitary and supremely 
rational divine will.
32
 Accordingly, all divine perfections are willed perfections and “God’s 
essence and attributes are identical.”
33
  
Timelessness and Foreknowledge 
 The perfection of God is also associated with divine timelessness. The issue of divine 
timelessness has been one of great debate, and the nature of the issue and the ongoing debate is 
well known to Henry, who attempts to avoid absurdity in his conception.
34
 Yet, though he 
                                                     
 
29
 Simplicity means “God is not compounded of parts; he is not a collection of perfections, but 
rather a living center of activity pervasively characterized by all his distinctive perfections. The divine 
attributes are neither additions to the divine essence nor qualities pieced together to make a compound.”  
C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:131. As such, God is “noncomposite, and his essence and existence are 
identical.” Ibid., 5:132. Geisler sees God’s absolute simplicity as vitally connected to God’s “pure 
actuality.” Systematic, 30. For Geisler’s articulation of the continuity with the classical Christian tradition 
see ibid., 30–57.  
30
 He states “that three eternal persons coexist within the one divine essence—[this] is the 
distinctive Christian affirmation about deity.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:197. 
31
 Ibid. These hypostases “are not simply divine representatives but personal realities whose being 
and that of the loving God are somehow integrated.” Ibid.  
32
 “The God of the Bible is a sovereign will; as such he is a living unity of perfections that 
coordinately manifests the divine essence.” Ibid., 5:130. 
33
 Ibid. Therefore, “all God’s attributes known through his self-revelation are to be identified with 
what theologians properly designate as God’s being, essence, nature or substance. . . . The divine essence is 
not to be differentiated from the divine attributes, but is constituted by them; the attributes define the 
essence more precisely.” Ibid., 5:127. Grudem comments, “Every attribute is completely true of God and is 
true of all God’s character.” Systematic, 179. As unified and yet distinct all “divine attributes in the nature 
of God” require “equal ultimacy.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:52. Therefore, “all divine attributes 
are one in God . . . differentiated only within the created situation,” and thus “mutually inclusive.” Ibid., 
5:132. Moreover, all “the divine perfections apply equally to the Father, the Son, and the Spirit.” Ibid., 
5:186.  
34
 He even states that the explicit biblical teaching is “inconclusive” on the matter. Ibid., 5:268. 




attempts to make qualifications to preserve coherence, he maintains the traditional doctrine of 
timelessness in its essential points, in accordance with his other ontological suppositions such that 
the perfection of God includes perfect, time independent (timeless) knowledge.
35
 For Henry, the 
very omniscience of God is bound up with timelessness and the two cannot be separated.
36
 Hence, 
not only is divine knowledge atemporal and a priori, it is derived solely from divine decree, never 
from non-divine objects.
37
 Thus, there is no real distinction between foreknowledge and 
foreordination.
38
 Although Henry seems to go out of his way to leave room for the significance of 
                                                     
 
The supremacy of eternity over time is not the Greek notion of timelessness which negates or annuls  
time . . . in which the whole creaturely world loses significance from an eternal perspective.” C. F. H. 
Henry, Notes, 132. For a recent defense of the traditional view of divine timelessness see Paul Helm, “Is 
God Bound by Time?” in God under Fire: Modern Scholarship Reinvents God (ed. D. S. Huffman and E. 
L. Johnson; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2002). 
35
 He states, “What creaturely minds grasp in their time sequences God knows immediately as a 
comprehensive totality; his decree to create a specific universe involves knowledge of all its eventualities 
and possibilities.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:277. Further, “divine omniscience and divine 
sovereignty imply that divine knowledge is timeless and rule out temporal succession in the activity of 
divine knowledge.” Ibid., 5:270. 
36
 “It is futile, therefore, to try to preserve God’s omniscience if his timelessness is denied. Some 
theists redefine divine eternity in terms of everlasting temporality and thus try to preserve divine 
omniscience. . . . But if God is a being to whom temporal predicates apply, then he has time-location.” Ibid. 
For him, God knows everything “in a single act” but this does not require a “temporal Now” but a “timeless 
intellectual vision whereby he eternally knows all things.” Ibid., 5:271.  
37
 God’s “knowledge of man and the world has its source in his self-knowledge, because God 
knew what he would make. God’s knowledge of what will be is grounded in his knowledge of his eternal 
purpose.” Ibid., 5:269. 
38
 Ibid., 5:277. “Given the view of God’s timeless eternity, the distinction between divine 
foreknowledge and divine foreordination falls away.” Ibid., 5:284. However, though he is adamant that 
God’s knowledge is based on his own decree, he concurrently contends that “God has knowledge of the 
universe as a created reality. He knows it now not simply as something purposed from eternity, but as a 
creaturely reality preserved and judged by him and in which he manifests his grace.” Ibid., 5:277. Although 
if read in one way this might imply that God does in fact have knowledge based on the reality of the world, 
in conjunction with the rest of Henry’s statements this does not seem to be the intended meaning. 
Therefore, to be consistent, this statement could not be taken to mean that God “now” knows what he did 
not know before but rather it means that due to God’s omniscience he is aware of the situation that is 
“present” for the world. Henry unequivocally states, “The fact of divine omniscience does not imply that 
God’s knowledge is dependent upon his creation.” Ibid. Nevertheless, Henry can say that “God does know 
human decision and human activity in its dramatic day-to-day and age-to-age occurrences. He distinguishes 
the presently actual in the space-time realm from the yet future and from the irrecoverable past.” Ibid. This 
is possible because all reality is based on divine decree. “Christian theology separates God’s intrinsic 
nature (known on the basis of his self-revelation) from his works—creation, preservation, providence, 
redemption, and so on—by delineating the decrees. These decrees relate only to realities and relationships 






 this does not negate his position that God is utterly timeless.
40
 God’s knowledge 
is thus based on his eternal decree and is not a knowledge derived from being in time or 
dependent upon contingencies; all reality is determined and known according to divine volition.
41
 
The equation of foreordination and timeless foreknowledge has implications for predestination 
and human freedom.
42
 Henry’s solution is the compatibilist view that freedom is not removed but 
humans act in accordance with their own volitions.
43
 In “compatibilism,” freedom does not entail 
                                                     
 
39
 He states, “The time sequences of human history are crucially important both in God’s sight and 
in man’s. The space-time universe owes its very existence and continuance to God, and is the cosmic 
setting for the divine incarnation in Jesus Christ, the final triumph of righteousness, and the doom of 
injustice.” Ibid., 5:277. He adds, “God is not limited to simply one track of relationships to the temporal 
order; he knows all historical factualities and contingencies through his eternal decree, and he knows them 
in personal presence in the historical order.” Ibid., 5:276. Elsewhere he states, “The triune God not only has 
eternal personal relationships within his own timeless being, but also engages in interpersonal patterns with 
creatures to whom he manifests himself in righteousness and wrath and love and mercy.” Ibid., 5:275. 
40
 He states, “The biblical view, it seems to me, implies that God is not in time; that there is no 
succession of ideas in the divine mind; that time is a divine creation concomitant with the origin of the 
universe; that God internally knows all things, including all space-time contingencies; that this knowledge 
includes knowledge of the temporal succession prevalent in the created universe. . . . But God’s nature need 
not itself be time-structured in order for him to know simultaneously all events and also to know them in 
the way that his creatures know them.” Ibid., 5:276. Here “in the way” must mean in the sense that he 
knows them truthfully, certainly not “in the way” in the sense of manner of knowing.  
41
 Although God has knowledge of succession he does not have “an a posteriori knowledge 
somehow derived through his observation of the universe, even if that knowledge is said somehow to 
transcend time.” Ibid., 5:279.  
42
 It is “the purposing will of God, and not omniscience, that governs the certainty of events.” 
Ibid., 5:284. “There can be no other ground of divine foreknowledge of nonexistent processes, events and 
creatures if they were not divinely purposed. God’s purposes are eternal, and effectuate all futurities.” Ibid., 
5:283–84. For an excellent and thorough collection of the ongoing contemporary debate on foreknowledge 
and free will see Robert Kane, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002). For open theism’s critical analysis of God’s foreknowledge in relation to his freedom see Pinnock et 
al., Openness; William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989); 
and Clark H. Pinnock, The Grace of God, the Will of Man: A Case for Arminianism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Academie Books, 1989). Open theism has been challenged in numerous responses; one prominent example 
is Norman L. Geisler, H. Wayne House, and Max Herrera, The Battle for God: Responding to the 
Challenge of Neotheism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Kregel, 2001). For an excellent and brief discussion of the 
historicity of God and foreknowledge in relation to free will see Fernando Canale, “Doctrine of God,” in 
Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology (ed. R. Dederen; Hagerstown, Md.: Review & Herald, 2000), 
105-159. For a critique of timelessness and presentation of God’s historicity and analogical temporality see 
Canale, Criticism. 
43
 He contends that “God’s foreknowledge does not involve determination that cancels voluntary 
action, but God knows what man will voluntarily choose.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:282. That 




the ability to do otherwise (libertarianism) but rather means freedom from external compulsion. 
Therefore, everything ultimately happens according to the eternal divine decree. 
Unchanging/Immutable 
In accordance with absolute perfection, God is immutable and immune to “increase or 
decrease.”
44
 However, God’s immutability is both moral and ontological.
45
 The idea of a suffering 
God is hence explicitly opposed. God is impassible. There is nothing external to God that can 
affect him or impinge upon him.
46
 Henry is adamant that “the biblical view is that the living God, 
                                                     
 
upon intellectual doubt or divine ignorance, or upon arbitrary subjective power to reverse our each and 
every decision and deed. It depends rather upon voluntary choice. If humans voluntarily choose to do what 
God foreknows to be certain, then the conditions of voluntary human agency are fulfilled.” Ibid. For a 
contemporary presentation of compatibilism see Millard J. Erickson, What Does God Know and When 
Does He Know It? (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2003). For a view for divine foreknowledge but 
against compatibilism see William Lane Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The 
Coherence of Freedom (New York: Leiden, 1991), and idem, “Hasker on Divine Knowledge,” 
Philosophical Studies 67 (1992): 52–78.  
44
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:286. “The God of the Bible is absolutely sovereign and 
omniscient. . . . Change and process do not apply to the Godhead.” Ibid., 6:67. Compare with the classical 
view of Plato and Aristotle, developed in the scholasticism of Aquinas. For classic critiques of the doctrine 
of immutability see Norman Kretzmann, “Omniscience and Immutability,” Journal of Philosophy 63 
(1966): 409–21, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, “God Everlasting,” in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion 
(ed. S. M. Cahn and D. Shatz; New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 77–98.  
45
 “Scripture stresses especially God’s moral constancy or ethical stability. It underscores God’s 
faithfulness to his holy will and to his promises.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:287. Yet, beyond this, 
God’s immutability cannot be limited to “God’s moral nature” but further he is not at all susceptible to 
“ontological change.” Ibid. Cf. ibid., 5:65.  
46
 “God conceived primarily as our ‘fellow sufferer’ is not the immutable God of the Bible. All 
talk of the final liberation of man . . . must end in a question mark if God himself is a struggling, suffering 
deity.” Ibid., 5:292. It must be understood, however, that in this model divine impassibility does not mean 
that God is uncaring or “utterly devoid of any feelings.” Millard J. Erickson, God the Father Almighty: A 
Contemporary Exploration of the Divine Attributes (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books, 1998), 161. 
Carson states, “God cannot ‘fall’ in love in the way that we do, nor is his ‘love’ suddenly elicited by 
something he had not foreseen. In that sense, we may usefully affirm God’s impassibility even while we 
affirm, with the greatest delight, God’s passionate love—indeed, so great a love that, while we were yet 
sinners, Christ died for us.” Donald A. Carson, “How Can We Reconcile the Love and the Transcendent 
Sovereignty of God?” in God under Fire: Modern Scholarship Reinvents God (ed. D. S. Huffman and E. L. 
Johnson; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2002), 308. Geisler posits that God may have emotional states 
but “His feelings are not the result of actions imposed upon Him by others.” Geisler, House, and Herrera, 
Battle, 170. Moreover, “Scripture does teach that God cannot be acted upon by anything outside of 
Himself.” Ibid., 171. “God cannot undergo passion or suffering; nothing in the created universe can make 
God feel pain or inflict misery on Him. This does not mean that God has no feelings, but simply that His 
feelings are not the results of actions imposed on Him by others. His feelings flow from His eternal and 




alone worthy of worship, is timelessly eternal and that immutability characterizes all his 
perfections. He does not change either for better or for worse for he possesses all perfections from 
eternity.”
47
 Nevertheless, Henry holds that this “unchanging and unchangeable God” is somehow 
“active in temporal processes and historical events, and in the incarnation steps personally into 
history.”
48
 Yet, at the same time, Henry is unequivocal “that ontological change is predicable only 
of the world, and not of God.”
49
 While affirming and re-affirming God’s timelessness and 
immutability, Henry seemingly strains to hold on to God’s interest in the world.
50
 It is clear that 
                                                     
 
has emotions they are purely willed, unaffected emotions.  
47
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:289. This is in close keeping with the classical conception of 
immutability. Bruce A. Ware points out (with numerous examples) that “the idea that a simple being is 
incapable of change is perhaps the most prominent notion invoked in the rational proofs for divine 
immutability.” “An Evangelical Reexamination of the Doctrine of the Immutability of God” (Ph.D. diss., 
Fuller Theological Seminary, 1984), 151.  
48
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:292. This qualification of Henry is perhaps influenced by the 
modern restructuring that Ware points out: “The doctrine of divine immutability has seen some major 
restructuring in the modern period. The primary attention that has been devoted to God as the living and 
active God has called for a restatement of the theological affirmation of God’s unchangeableness so that 
two fundamental results, one negative and the other positive, could be secured: first, the immutability 
proper to God must not be conceived so as to allow any threat to God’s free and active love, as is the case 
when immutability is seen as immobility; and second, the appropriate conception of God’s changelessness 
provides full and unwavering assurance that the God who shows himself in free and sacrificial love always 
was, is, and will be the same in and through all changes.” “Evangelical,” 239–40. Accordingly, Ware points 
out that if in “divine immutability it is meant that God is distant, unfeeling, uncaring, static, and in every 
way unchanged and unaffected by the human condition, then it is highly doubtful that this conception of 
God is useful for one’s religious experience.” Ibid., 11.  
49
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:292. Henry is aware of the biblical texts that are often used 
to call into question the immutability of God. He points out that some degree of so-called 
anthropomorphism is to be expected in the biblical text. This, however, implies a break from purely 
univocal language about God. Nevertheless, “none of these considerations implies that God changes either 
in his eternal being or his eternal purpose. When all due allowance is made for the literal and objective 
truth conveyed by figurative statements, divine repentance is itself an anthropomorphic representation.” 
Ibid., 5:304. Thus “divine ‘repentance’ can be viewed as the temporal fulfillment of a possibility eternally 
present to God and foreknown and foreordained by him.” Ibid., 5:302–3. See ibid., 5:301ff. for a further 
discussion of repentance texts.  
50
 Although “the world does not alter God ontologically . . . that is hardly to say that God is 
indifferent to the created universe. . . . Nor does God’s immutability dwarf the fact that the incarnation of 
the Logos conjoins human nature enduringly to the Son of God.” Ibid., 5:292. He also comments, “Surely 
God realizes values in and through the world; he ascribes worth to the created universe (Gen. 1:9 ff.). But 
to hold that this requires change in God, or implies that he is personally incomplete, as does process 
philosophy, is gratuitous and unjustifiable.” Ibid. But in what way can an utterly immutable God “realize 
value?” That Henry does not actually allow for value to increase in God’s experience or enjoyment is clear 




God is absolute for Henry, that is, all God’s perfections are infinite. But the question then 
becomes: How can God actually be related to the world at all? Despite this paradox, Henry 
maintains that God did come to the earth as a human, yet this did not entail a change in divinity.
51
 
Thus, God is utterly perfect and immutable and history takes place according to his divine decree 
without affecting Godself. 
Determinism: Sovereignty and Omnipotence 
Henry’s conception of sovereignty and omnipotence might best be summed up: God wills 
everything. It is not God’s nature that determines God’s will, but vice versa, and God’s will 
foreordains everything.
52
 As sovereign will, God is omnipotent and “exists in absolute plenitude 
and power.”
53
 Thus, a “fixed divine decree” of predestination is central to God’s sovereignty and 
such an all-encompassing decree includes even the evil in the world, though this does not make 
God culpable.
54
 The divine decree is not to be equated with “mechanical determinism,” which 
                                                     
 
centuries as a result of what has happened in the sequence of time; God has himself grown in experience as 
a result of his gracious love for man.” Quoted in ibid., 5:306. Henry adamantly opposes this idea 
commenting, “Advocacy of a changing God is but a confusing declaration that Change is god.” Ibid.  
51
 Rather, “the permanent inclusion even of this glorified human nature in the experience of the 
Godhead did not involve a new mode of deity, however, even though it brings into profound and intimate 
interrelationships the timeless experience of God and the context of time-structured experience in which the 
exalted Christ rules as head of the Church.” Ibid., 5:292–93.  
52
 History is determined by the will of God, he “plans and decrees the world and man. . . . He 
ordains the future.” Ibid., 5:13.  
53
 Ibid., 5:69. Divine omnipotence is simply “power over all other power and powers.” Ibid., 
5:318. Henry contends that the Bible (despite the lack of the specific term “omnipotence”) and all the 
church fathers teach divine omnipotence. Ibid., 5:308, 310. The concept of omnipotence has undergone 
considerable debate in contemporary theology. For an excellent dialogue on the issues see David Basinger 
and Randall Basinger, “Divine Omnipotence: Plantinga vs. Griffin,” Process Studies 11 (1981): 11–24, and 
Alvin Plantinga, “Reply to the Basingers on Divine Omnipotence,” Process Studies 11 (1981): 25–29. 
54
 C. F. H. Henry states, “The foreordination of an evil act is not itself evil, since God need not 
will what he wills for the reasons others may will them.” God, Revelation, 5:315. The doctrine of 
predestination is quite important to the transcendent-voluntarist model. However, it comes under severe 
criticism in different circles. For instance, Thomas Talbott severely criticizes the theory of predestination as 
“blasphemy” which must “inevitably attribute Satanic qualities to God.” “On Predestination, Reprobation, 
and the Love of God: A Polemic,” The Reformed Journal 33, no. 2 (1983): 11. He contends that there are 
several inconsistencies for a loving God to elect some to salvation and others to damnation including: (1) 




amounts to involuntary causation, but rather to “teleological law,” which includes voluntary 
causation.
55
 Moreover, there is no “ontological or logical or moral order independent of God to 
which God must conform his omnipotence.”
56
 Omnipotence means that whatever God wills he is 
able to do.
57
 The divine will cannot be thwarted nor externally limited or affected since “only the 
sovereign Lord governs all realities and possibilities.”
58
  
God’s Relationship to the World 
 In this model God’s relationship to the world requires a clear distinction between the 
merely natural and the supernatural. Henry dismisses naturalism and considers supernaturalism to 
                                                     
 
God who commands us to love our enemies fails to love his enemies.” (3) “Loving-kindness is not an 
essential property of God, nor part of his essence.” This includes an argument from logical impossibility: 
“If loving-kindness is an essential property of God, then it is logically impossible for him to act in an 
unloving way.” (4) “God is less loving, less kind, and less merciful than many human beings.” Ibid., 13. He 
also questions, if God doesn’t really love our loved ones, could we really love Him? John Piper responds 
and accepts “Talbott’s statement that the doctrine of predestination implies that there is nothing beyond 
God’s own will and nature which stops him from saving people. . . . I also accept the inference that there 
are people who are not objects of God’s electing love.” Piper, “How Does a Sovereign God Love?: A 
Reply to Thomas Talbott,” The Reformed Journal 33, no. 4 (1983): 10. Piper responds that God does show 
kindness in the sense of common grace to all, and this relates to the kind of love that humans are called to 
show in differentiation from the election love, which it is not proper for humans to exercise. Ibid., 10. 
Thomas Talbott’s view culminates in universalism (The Inescapable Love of God [Parkland, Fla.: 
Universal, 1999]) whereas Piper’s amounts to double predestination.  
55
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:50. It is the “doctrine of God’s eternal decrees” that 
“distinguishes the biblical view of predestination from mechanical determinism.” Ibid., 6:80. Henry is wary 
of all-pervasive causation and claims that “in the Bible creation is not a mechanistic causal reality; it 
involves, rather, a constant reenactment of God’s presence and power. It is important to distinguish 
voluntary from involuntary causation.” Ibid., 6:49.  
56
 Ibid., 5:319. However, “God’s will or nature implies certain limitations on his actions and 
normatively defines the very conception of omnipotence in terms of his own omnipotence. That God will 
not alter his own nature, that he cannot deny himself, that he cannot lie and cannot sin, that he cannot be 
deceived, and that, moreover, he cannot die, are affirmations which historic Christian theology has always 
properly associated with divine omnipotence and not with divine limitation or divine impotency, because 
the ‘possibility’ as stated is a logical impossibility.” Ibid. 
57
 Henry sees God’s omnipotence “in terms of his free will that is grounded in his nature yet not 
necessitated by it. God discloses in his omnipotence that he is able to perform whatever he wills.” Ibid., 
5:325. This excludes the conundrum of God creating a rock that is too heavy for him to lift since “God 
himself is the ground of all possibility. To postulate contradictions constitutes nonsense; logically 
impossible projections can hardly impose actual limits on divine sovereignty.” Ibid., 5:319.  
58




be “the only logically consistent alternative.”
59
 In contrast to secular representations, God is not at 
all dependent upon nature, but absolutely independent. He is “eternally perfect and not in process 
of development or growth,” creator “ex nihilo” and most certainly “not himself the substance of 
the universe.”
60
 Creation is based on divine volition and not subject to any constraints, 
compulsion, or external motivation whatsoever.
61
 Central to Henry’s view of transcendence is the 
“emphasis on God’s objective ontological transcendence of the universe.”
62
 However, though 
God “transcends the created universe,” he is also “pervasively immanent in it.”
63
 In fact, Henry 
may even speak of “Christianity’s insistent emphasis on divine immanence,” though he cautions 
against the extremes of transcendence and of immanence that might teach that God is in any way 




                                                     
 
59
 Ibid., 6:28. “God and God alone is supernatural, the sovereign eternal creator, the lord and judge 
of the whole space-time process.” Ibid., 6:25–26. For a criticism of scientific naturalism see C. F. H. Henry, 
“Science and God’s Revelation in Nature,” Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 3, no. 2 (1960): 25–36.  
60
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:27. Cf. ibid., 6:33. God is the “absolute transcendent  
Being . . . independent of all compulsory relations to anything and anyone outside himself; he is the 
ultimate source of all reality and of all authority.” Ibid., 6:37.  
61
 God is the creator of all and thus “ontologically other than the created universe . . . creator ex 
nihilo of the cosmic process, the ultimate cause of all that is.” Ibid., 6:37. Cf. ibid., 6:120. God freely 
created the world. It “is a wholly contingent reality, not a product of divine necessity. Divine creation is not 
motivated by some inner divine need or lack.” Ibid., 6:111.  
62
 Ibid., 6:43. God is “totally distinct in being from the world of finite things.” Ibid., 6:38. He 
alone “has aseity; alongside God nothing has an independent reality. He is the absolute creator and 
sustainer of the universe.” Ibid., 6:120. 
63
 Ibid., 6:36. He is the transcendent one and yet “the living and eternal God [who] is personally 
present and active in the universe by preserving it and by working out his sovereign purposes in and 
through it.” Ibid., 6:35. Thus, “divine transcendence and immanence are corollary conceptions. God is not a 
divine being who acts only behind, outside or between cosmic and historical processes; he is present in 
these processes and works in them. The universe does not exist without his support and concurrence. God 
both acts on the events of nature and history from without and is purposefully and meaningfully engaged 
within the universe as well. He is not indifferent to the world and to man.” Ibid., 6:48. 
64
 Ibid., 6:25. For Henry, God is not “wholly remote from nature” yet neither may he be identified 




It remains difficult, however, to conceive of divine immanence in the universe if God 
“retains his independence of space-time realities in whole or in part,” and is thus utterly 
transcendent of space and time.
65
 Henry himself recognizes the issue at hand and asks, “If God is 
eternal, transcendent being, how, it may be asked, can he act in the world? The answer given by 
biblical theism is that God acts by predestination and that he is immanent in as well as 
transcendent to his created universe.”
66 
Thus divine immanence is equated with God’s causation 
of the world according to eternal predestination. This is in accord with the impassibility of God, 
which entails that all divine relations must be such that they do not impinge upon God (external 
relations) but rather “God’s thoughts and will are the ultimate cause of the creation” past, present, 
and future.
67
 Thus, divine “action” is non-spatio-temporal, expressed “in repetitive cosmic 
processes and events, or in once-for-all acts.”
68
  
Election: The Predestinating Freedom of God 
Clearly, the sovereign will of God is vital to the transcendent-voluntarist model wherein, 
through eternal decree, God is omnicausal.
69
 The centrality of God’s sovereign will is emphasized 
further in the doctrine of election. For Henry, predestination is an essential “theme” that “the 
                                                     
 
65
 Ibid., 6:34. “As the personal and free creator and preserver of the universe he [God] is immanent 
throughout the cosmos; he fellowships with ‘his own,’ moreover, although even in the most intimate 
relationships with his creatures he retains his independence of space-time realities in whole or in part.” 
Ibid.  
66
 Ibid., 6:48. 
67
 Ibid., 6:49. 
68
 Ibid., 6:50. 
69
 “God is the supreme and sovereign rational will.” Ibid., 6:15. “Standing perpetually in 
providential relationships to man and the world, God is no less implicated in the falling of the rain than in 
the resurrection of the Redeemer.” Ibid. “If you throw a pair of dice, what numbers come up lies in the 
determination of God.” Carson, Difficult, 49. However, Henry also speaks of secondary causes. C. F. H. 
Henry, God, Revelation, 6:48–49. Yet, he also questions whether secondary causes ought to be considered 




Bible itself thrusts upon us.”
70
 Predestination flows from God’s absolute freedom and lack of any 
external necessity.
71
 Henry does not shrink from utter determinism, even comparing humans to 
inanimate objects controlled by the sovereign decree.
72
 Divine election is “pretemporal, 
superhistorical eternal election. . . . Its existence is suspended on the eternal plan of the 
unchanging God who is free to decree as he pleases and who in his ‘good pleasure’ decrees a 
space-time matrix that by his willing becomes as necessary as is God himself.”
73
 
However, he emphasizes that “divine decree is not, however, identical with the external events, 
since God’s thoughts become creative only through an act of divine will.”
74
 God’s providence is 
thus not the same as God’s decree but, rather, illustrates the living God, the one who “stands,” 
“stoops,” and “stays.”
75
 Such providence, however, operates according to God’s timeless, 




                                                     
 
70
 Ibid., 6:76. “The singular uniqueness of Judeo-Christian revelation rests upon the governing 
premise of divine election; the truth of revealed religion stands or falls on the factuality of that election.” 
Ibid., 6:83.  
71
 “At the heart of the election doctrine throbs God’s freedom. God is not bound by any necessity 
of nature to the universe. . . . He is free to create if and as he wills, free to provide or not to provide 
salvation for fallen creatures, free to covenant or not to covenant with the Hebrews or any other peoples or 
with no one at all.” Ibid., 6:76.  
72
 Henry is adamant that “everything that God does is the outworking of his sovereign decree. In 
this respect man is no different from the stars or from the sands of the sea; that humans stand at a definite 
place in history is no more an accident than that the planets move in their orbits and that the nations have 
their given bounds.” Ibid., 6:78.  
73
 Ibid.  
74
 Ibid. One especially troubling statement says, “God still wills what he willed in eternity past, 
although now he wills the effects of what he willed in the eternal decrees; and in all that he wills, he 
remains, moreover, the living God.” Ibid., 6:85. Of course, this statement is riddled with the language of 
temporality, but if God is completely independent of spatio-temporality, how could it be that he “now” 
wills? 
75
 “God who stands—who eternally exists—and who stoops—first in voluntarily creating the 
finite universe and then in voluntarily redeeming his fallen creation—is also God who stays to preserve and 
to renew and finally to consummate his purposive creation.” Ibid., 6:455.  
76
 Henry claims, “The biblical view of providence is dramatically specific; it unqualifiedly affirms 




Emphasis on unilateral divine volition gives rise to the objection that “such divine 
foreordination or election casts God in the role of an arbitrary despot indifferent to human 
choice.”
77
 Henry expresses concern over theories that “erode moral responsibility and significant 
human choice, and that obscure divine election of both Jesus Christ as the messianic substitute, 
and of sinners in Jesus Christ their Savior.”
78
 Accordingly, he attempts to leave room for the 
ethical responsibility of humans.
79
 Of course, it must be remembered that freedom, in Henry’s 
system, is compatibilistic, meaning that freedom does not require the “freedom of contrary 
choice” or the ability to do otherwise than one does.
80
 Thus all reality still stems from God’s 
eternal decree according to his “one sovereign purpose.”
81
 This includes the outcome of 
                                                     
 
the details and minutiae of life as well. . . . Nothing falls outside God’s will and concern. . . . Even 
seemingly chance events should be considered divine providences.” Ibid., 6:459. This assures God’s final 
victory in bringing the greatest good out of all things. Ibid., 6:483. He criticizes: “This is in marked contrast 
also to process theology whose God suffers along with the world. . . . Process theology can therefore offer 
no final guarantee of victory; the ultimate outcome remains in doubt.” Ibid., 6:464.  
77
 Ibid., 6:78. Henry dismisses this complaint as usually coming from “Western secular humanists 
and atheistic existentialists who consider man himself and not God personally determinative and creative in 
regards to truth, morals, and human destiny.” Ibid., 6:78–79. 
78
 Ibid., 6:82. Confusingly, he also states, “Apart from personal faith the fact of divine election 
does not of itself guarantee participation in the benefits of redemption. Scripture correlates divine 
predestination with the indispensability of personal spiritual decision and faith in the Savior.” Ibid., 6:85. 
79
 For instance, he writes, “Nor is the God of the Bible the sole volitional agent that pantheism 
projects. If divine omniscience is said to mean that God makes the only decisions and is the only volitional 
agent, then human decisions and deeds become totally irrelevant to man’s final destiny. The fact is that 
even the most predestinarian passages of Scripture (e.g., Acts 2:23) emphasize man’s accountability for his 
actions.” Ibid., 6:82. Further he maintains that “all Christians, whatever doctrine of election they hold, 
insist that God preserves man’s responsible moral agency and that divine election in no way transforms 
human beings into robots. Scripture affirms that God foreknows human actions as aspects of his plan; while 
these actions are certain as to their future occurrence, human beings are nonetheless ethically responsible 
for their personal actions.” Ibid., 6:84. 
80
 Ibid., 6:85. “To be morally responsible man needs only the capacity for choice, not the freedom 
of contrary choice. Man is accountable for the choices he makes even if his sinful nature vastly restricts that 
range of choices. Human beings voluntarily choose to do what they do. The fact that God has foreordained 
human choices and that his decree renders human actions certain does not therefore negate human choice.” 
Ibid. Here, it seems that Henry muddles the conversation by not clearly distinguishing between (1) the lack 
of alternatives due to divine decree and (2) the lack or lessening of alternatives due to the depravity of 
human nature.  
81
 Ibid., 6:84. “The divine decrees coalesce in God’s one sovereign purpose; his plan is a 




individual human salvation, for God does eternally reject some and not others.
82
 Henry’s 
emphasis on God’s absolute sovereignty leads to the question of theodicy. The extent of divine 
determinism is beyond question when he states, “God created a universe in which humans cannot 
act other than they voluntarily do.”
83
 Yet, though God predestines all history he “does no evil”; 
God is the “cause” of evil but Henry is not willing to call God the “author” of evil.
84
 In the 
eschaton, “God’s providential purpose and presence in history and experience subordinate all the 
pain and suffering of regenerate believers to a higher good” yet in the meantime, God’s purpose 
is “partially revealed yet somewhat inscrutable.”
85
 
                                                     
 
his own causality or through the agency of his creatures.” Ibid. 
82
 He states, “Barth’s denial that God hardens and rejects some persons clearly runs counter to 
what Scripture itself teaches.” Ibid., 6:102. “The scriptural good news is not an eternal salvific election of 
all mankind in Christ that no one can resist or annul; it is the fact, rather, that the holy Lord has chosen 
some who despite the wickedness of humanity can through personal faith in Christ experience forgiveness 
of sins and renewal.” Ibid., 6:104. For him, even “verses that imply God’s sincere and strong wish for 
human salvation are not necessarily inconsistent with the divine election of only some to eternal life. Those 
who contend that it would impugn divine love and justice were God to elect only some fallen creatures 
without extending the same prerogatives to all are mistaken. . . . God shows his love in electing some 
undeserving human beings to salvation and his justice in redemptively passing over others who are equally 
undeserving.” Ibid., 6:106–7. That Henry nevertheless struggles with the tension regarding predestination 
and human responsibility is evident. He states, “While God’s sovereignty is absolute it is not tyrannical; he 
does not use his power unjustly and he coerces no one into personal salvation apart from individual 
decision for Christ. . . . On the other hand human unbelief cannot and will not frustrate God’s election of 
some” even though “that election is ineffective, however, without individual repentance and faith in 
Christ.” Ibid., 6:107.  
83
 Ibid., 6:273.  
84
 “God does not sin.” Ibid., 5:283. God “does not even stimulate evil desires in man.” Ibid., 6:86. 
Cf. Carson, Difficult, 56. In fact, C. F. H. Henry contends that Isa 45:6–7 “speaks of Yahweh as creator of 
both good and evil, and in this sense, therefore, as their cause.” God, Revelation, 6:293. Moreover, “since 
the distinction between good and evil is grounded in God’s will, the sovereign God in some sense creates 
sin. But to say that God commits sin is unthinkable, for Scripture throughout depicts sin as abhorrent to 
him.” Ibid., 6:294. Henry proposes a “distinction . . . between cause and author” such that “God can be an 
ultimate cause of evil, as orthodox theism conceives him, without himself being an aspect of evil, or of evil 
being an aspect of him as its cause.” Ibid., 6:293–94. God’s “decree renders certain not only good acts but 
wicked acts as well” but “God is not a sinner” and “himself effectuates no acts as sinful.” Ibid., 6:86. 
85




God Who Stays, Lives, and Becomes 
As the one who stays, God is always there. Among God’s many actions, he “publishes his 
holy will to the human race, as the living God relates himself to the forces of the cosmos and the 
experiences of mankind, hears the prayers of his creatures, providentially governs the fortunes of 
the redeemed (Rom. 8:28) and sovereignly influences the direction of human history toward the 
sure and final triumph of righteousness.”
86
 Of course, this is all understood within the context of 
the eternal divine decree. Surprisingly, Henry leaves room for the “becoming” of God but only 
when contrasted with the static nature of Greek philosophy and the contemporary misapplication 
of process philosophy.
87
 God comes in “personal divine relationships to the created finite 
universe,” yet this coming, and all that it entails, is purely voluntary” and “in sovereign 
determination,” exemplified in Christ’s incarnation, the “divine condescension.”
88
 The 
incarnation also provides the context of “divine becoming” as “forcibly stated in the prologue of 
John’s Gospel: The Word became flesh.”
89
 Such divine becoming is strictly limited to the 
incarnation.
90
 However, the incarnation does not require alteration of the divine nature, and 
indeed could not, since the divine and human natures are mutually exclusive and “distinct 
                                                     
 
86
 Ibid., 5:81. 
87
 “To be soundly scriptural any exposition of God must deal with all three: God’s being, God’s 
coming and God’s becoming. In the Christian view divine becoming is a climactic reality that contrasts at 
once with ancient Greek notions of abstract being and becoming, and with modern process philosophy 
misconceptions of divine becoming that postulate change in the very nature of God.” Ibid., 5:56. Rather, 
being and becoming correspond to the “eternal world” and the “spatio-temporal world” respectively. Ibid., 
5:57.  
88
 Ibid., 5:53.  
89
 Ibid., 5:57.  
90
 For Henry, “this is the only doctrine of divine becoming authorized by Scripture.” Ibid., 5:58. 
However, this “becoming” is not really becoming for Henry. He appeals to the exegesis of C. K. Barrett 
who “says of egeneto in John 1:14: ‘It cannot mean “became,” since the Word continues to be the subject 
of further statements—it was the Word who “dwelt among us,” and whose glory “we beheld”; the Word 
continued to be the Word.’ Barrett thinks the sense may be that ‘the Word came on the (human) scene as 






 Thus, the divine becoming in the incarnation, whatever it may mean, most 
certainly does not mean that God changes. 
Divine Love 
Divine Paternity 
 A prominent metaphor for God’s relationship to the world is that of father. God is the 
“almighty sovereign” and “personal father” and yet “also self-giving lover.”
92
 However, for 
Henry, God is the father of his chosen rather than the father of all in an undifferentiated sense.
93
 
At the same time, God is the creator of all and in this sense one may speak of a universal love in a 
limited sense.
94
 Yet, the special fatherhood of God is based upon divine election.
95
 Although they 
                                                     
 
91
 Ibid. Henry frames his view in keeping with Chalcedon of “one person (divine), two natures 
(divine and human)” in that “the Logos did not become a human person at all.” In other words God does 
not become “a creature . . . [thus] to formulate divine becoming in this way makes it seem the absolute 
antithesis of divinity.” Ibid., 5:60. Henry thus positions his view directly against process theology. Ibid., 
5:62.  
92
 Ibid., 6:322.  
93
 Thus he states, “The notion of El as father of all, moreover, cannot be squared with the 
particular Hebrew view of Elohim as father of the chosen people Israel.” Moreover, “reluctance of Old 
Testament writers to speak of God’s fatherhood in a universal sense reflects theological commitments. . . . 
Such emphasis explains why Yahweh’s fatherhood is specially correlated with Israel.” Ibid., 6:307. He 
even states, “That God’s love reaches beyond Israel is only implicit in the Old Testament. Even the 
reference to Yahweh’s universal fatherhood (Mal. 2:10) is connected more with his creation of all mankind 
than with his love.” Ibid., 6:345. 
94
 “God being the God that he is, his love is for all he has made.” Morris, Testaments, 80. There is 
a kind of universal divine fatherhood, but differing from the special elective fatherhood. “Like Judaism 
Christianity, too, affirms a universal divine fatherhood on the basis of creation and acknowledges the 
special fatherhood of the Creator-Redeemer God in the Old Testament community of faith.” C. F. H. 
Henry, God, Revelation, 6:323. J. I. Packer speaks of this motif as the universal and particular divine love. 
Particular love reaches those whom God has sovereignly elected to love while universal love corresponds 
to God’s common grace. “The Love of God: Universal and Particular,” in Still Sovereign; Contemporary 
Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge & Grace (ed. T. R. Schreiner and B. A. Ware; Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Baker Books, 2000), 356. Thus God “loves all in some ways” and he loves “some in all ways.” 
Ibid., 283. 
95
 “For the Jews divine fatherhood was no abstract cosmological principle that reflects God’s 
relationship to the universe, but rather Yahweh’s personal relationship to the people of God’s choice.” C. F. 




are related, Henry distinguishes “divine paternity” from “divine love.”
96
 Salvation is not 
conveyed “on the basis of divine paternity alone, but especially in view of divine agapē which, as 
divine self-giving, gains in Christ a decisive significance for human destiny.”
97
 Thus, emphasis 
on God’s election fatherhood “prevents attaching to it a sentimental universalism that robs divine 
paternity of moral meaning.”
98
  
Holiness and Justice 
This relates closely to the absolute holiness, righteousness, goodness, and justice of God, 
which are very important to Henry’s conception of divine love.
99
 The goodness of God is closely 
related to his love such that “Scripture everywhere views God’s righteousness as coextensive 
with his love.”
100
 Mercy is likewise closely connected to divine love, yet not required by the 
divine nature.
101
 Divine justice, however, is to be differentiated from divine benevolence.
102
 
                                                     
 
96
 Ibid., 6:322. “The New Testament makes plain that God’s love is more than paternal 
benevolence; it is a divine gift manifest in Jesus Christ. . . . It is because of God’s agapē and man’s 
appropriation of a divinely gifted redemption, and not simply in view of divine paternity, that regenerate 
sinners can once again be called the sons of God.” Ibid., 6:322–23.  
97
 Ibid., 6:316. “Only as God’s redeeming love is additionally implied by references to his 
fatherhood can salvation be associated with the term Father.” Ibid. 
98
 Ibid., 6:321–22. Paradoxically, Henry speaks of God’s fatherhood being “frustrated.” He states, 
“How Israel’s disobedience frustrated the fatherhood of God is reflected by Yahweh’s lament” in Hos 
11:1–2. Ibid., 6:308.  
99
 See the chapter “The Holy Love of God” in C. F. H. Henry, Notes, 103–13. There he states 
regarding the impoverished view of God’s holiness, “God’s love then tends to be a concurrence in man’s 
imperfections, or a certain divine sympathy which tolerates the temporary identification of sub-divine ends 
as legitimate human goals, or a partnership in which God and man strive together for higher ideals without 
any genuine sense of man’s moral and spiritual discontinuity with the essential divine holiness.” Ibid., 111. 
For Henry, “it is the God who regards sin solemnly who is the God of holy love—and none other.” Ibid., 
110. 
100
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:350. Cf. ibid., 6:258.  
101
 Justification from divine wrath is a “voluntary act of mercy” and “does not flow from the 
justice of God as an inner necessity of God’s nature.” Ibid., 6:410. Moreover, divine love does not dissolve 
“the need of substitutionary and propitiatory atonement.” C. F. H. Henry, Himself, 80. “The witness of 
Scripture is that divine love and divine righteousness, already united in the simplicity of God, find their 
historical meeting ground the reality of justification by faith.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:356. Of 
course, in the simplicity of God, “love and righteousness (or holiness) express different aspects of the same 




Henry is concerned that divine love might eclipse the reality of divine holiness, goodness, justice, 
and judgment.
103
 He therefore insists on biblical divine wrath that “preclude[s] any promotion of 
love at the expense of righteousness.”
104
 Divine wrath, including the terror of hell, is real. Divine 
love does not remove this biblical emphasis or the fact that God must be “placated.”
105
 
Paradoxically, it seems that divine wrath may be elicited, whereas divine love cannot be. 
However, divine “love does not intercept God’s final punishment of evil; in fact, God 
vindicates his essential nature by eschatological retribution.”
106
 However, divine wrath should not 
be thought of as “an uncontrollable outburst of passion.”
107
 Divine wrath is rightly understood 
within the context of “the one sovereign God, the self-revealing God of holy love.”
108
 Thus, Jesus 
is just as much the “revelation of divine wrath” as the “revelation of divine love.”
109
 In all this, 
                                                     
 
102
 “If there is in God no divine perfection of justice distinguishable from sheer benevolence then 
there need be no justification—indeed, there can be no justification.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 
6:356.  
103
 Henry blames “exaggerated and distorted concepts of divine love” and “sentimental 
alternatives supposedly grounded in divine love” for the downplaying of divine holiness and judgment. 
Ibid., 6:328. Cf. C. F. H. Henry, Notes, 107. Morris points out that “we often confuse love with 
sentimentality. . . . There is a stern side to real love.” Testaments, 25.  
104
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:325.  
105
 Ibid., 5:303. “God is not a vague universal cosmic love but is wrathful toward fallen humanity 
and needs to be placated.” Ibid. “That God’s enmity toward sinners is not merely a passive attitude but one 
of active hostility may seem incompatible with the doctrine of God’s love. Yet it was while we were 
considered God’s enemies that Christ as the gift of divine love died for us.” Ibid., 6:358. “Christ, agapē 
incarnate . . . makes it patently obvious that no correct view of final judgment can be elaborated that 
empties hell of its terrors and depicts God’s last judgment as benevolent toward the impenitent and 
ungodly.” Ibid., 6:351–52.  
106
 Ibid., 6:353. The alternative, “self-cancelling justice is not only unbiblical, it also implies 
amoral love.” Ibid., 6:354. He states that “outside the Biblical tradition, wherever the attributes of holiness 
and love are applied to deity, the application is such that either the divine love or the divine holiness is 
seriously compromised.” C. F. H. Henry, Notes, 103. 
107
 Leon Morris, The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1955), 
184. Carson also emphasizes the controlled nature of this anger saying, “God’s wrath is not an implacable, 
blind rage. However emotional it may be, it is an entirely reasonable and willed response to offenses 
against holiness.” Difficult, 69.  
108
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:330.  
109




divine judgment is perfect and God will be shown as “holy, loving, and compassionate, and 
indeed working all things for good to believers, and by his sovereignty sheltering even the fallen 
cosmos and history from purposeless destruction.”
110
 
Love and the Divine Essence 
Although, the concept of love is very important to the transcendent-voluntarist model, 
Henry maintains that God’s essence should not be limited to love.
111
 Love is not “exhaustive of 
the totality of God’s being, [but] is nevertheless intrinsic to God’s very nature.”
112
 The main 
rationale for this decision is Henry’s apparent fear that love will dominate the discussion of God’s 
nature to the exclusion of other aspects.
113
 However, some that align with this model in most 
other ways maintain that God’s very essence is love.
114
 The difference in this model minimally 
                                                     
 
Christ’s substitutionary, propitiatory death provides deliverance from both the present wrath and the wrath 
to come.” Ibid., 6:334. For Henry, wrath is not merely an outgrowth of divine love since the terms for 
wrath certainly “do not intrinsically express divine love; only the grace of God can mitigate such actions 
against the sinner.” Ibid., 6:327. Therefore, the “wrath of God is not . . . simply the reverse side of his love, 
although that may well be the case in his relations with the objects of his election. . . . Among the people of 
God what provokes God’s wrath is insensitivity to his love while among unbelievers it is enduring hostility 
that perpetuates God’s wrath.” Ibid., 6:331. 
110
 Ibid., 6:303.  
111
 “The agapē of God is in fact the very lifeline of the Bible.” Ibid., 6:346. Nevertheless, “the 
Johannine declaration does not imply, therefore, that the divine nature at its depth is only love and nothing 
more.” Ibid., 6:341. Henry notes that John not only declares that “God is love” (1 John 4:8) but also that 
“God is light” (1 John 1:5). Ibid., 5:81–82.  
112
 Ibid., 6:348. “Love is not accidental or incidental to God; it is an essential revelation of the 
divine nature, a fundamental and eternal perfection. His love, like all other divine attributes, reflects the 
whole of his being in specific actions and relationships.” Ibid., 6:341. 
113
 He is therefore concerned about making one understanding of an attribute dominate the entire 
ontology such that “when we ascribe goodness to God properly, we at the same time ascribe justice and 
omnipotence. If we ascribe love in a way that moderates divine righteousness, or righteousness in a way 
that cancels mercy, then we depict the totality of God’s nature improperly.” Ibid., 5:135. “If God’s nature is 
self-communication which goes ‘out of Himself’ to others, then ‘creation’ becomes a necessity, the 
universe a necessary ‘emanation,’ for God’s nature can hardly be conceived out of necessary relations to 
the universe.” Ibid., 5:117.  
114
 For instance, both Carson and Morris consider love the very essence of God; however, they do 
not focus on ontological implications from this position and seem to be more interested in affirming love as 
a foundational to how God should be understood. Carson states, “Love is bound up in the very nature of 




impacts the definition and nature of love itself. Although Henry does not allow for any one 
“attribute” to be central or the sole essence, he actually makes every attribute, rightly understood, 
the essential attribute, due to the co-inherence of the divine attributes in divine simplicity.
115
 
Thus, God is love, yet not to the exclusion of other perfections of his unitary nature.
116
 Since 
God’s essence is all his attributes and all attributes are mutually inclusive, there can be no tension 
between love and “other” attributes in the divine simplicity, and love, rightly conceived, would 
still be applicable to sum up the nature of God.
117
 
Departure from the Classical  
Model of Divine Love 
This model of divine love interacts with the critique of the classical Greek idea of God, 
specifically the concept that God does not love anything outside of himself.
118
 In doing so it 
recognizes some of the shortcomings of classical theism. D. A. Carson frames the issue well 
when he asks, “What does such love look like in a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, sovereign, 
                                                     
 
love “means more than that God is loving; it means that love is of the essence of his being.” Testaments, 
136. 
115
 Thus “all God’s perfections are equally ultimate in the simplicity of his being.” C. F. H. Henry, 
God, Revelation, 5:132. He states, “We insist on the unity of the divine essence in which any and every 
divine attribute implies the others.” Ibid., 6:322. Moreover, “all God’s attributes have an absolute divine 
character; each attribute is involved in every other attribute.” Ibid., 5:135. Thus he can state, “God and 
holiness, and God and love, are mutually exhaustive synonyms; Scripture itself testifies that ‘God is love’ 
(1 John 4:16), and not simply that love is in God.” Ibid., 5:132. 
116
 In other words, just as long as the conception of divine love already took into account the 
mutual inclusivity with the attributes of justice, omnipotence, and the like, God’s essence may be thought 
of as love in this qualified sense. For instance, Henry allows that “no doubt an effective discussion of 
divine attributes requires an orderly arrangement and exposition involving logical priorities. But such 
exposition does not require certain divine perfections to be submerged to others on the premise that some 
attributes are ontologically inferior.” Ibid., 5:136. 
117
 The love of God is thus foundational to the whole doctrine of God since “God’s interpersonal 
love for himself and for his creatures is the measure of all that passes for love in the universe he makes and 
preserves; it is the shaping principle of his creative and redemptive work.” Ibid., 6:341. On the everlasting 
nature of this love see Morris, Testaments, 10. 
118




and transcendent (i.e., above space and time)?”
119
 Henry differentiates his view from Aristotle’s 
view, which makes divine love for other than God impossible, contending that “no philosopher 
has affirmed divine love to be an attribute of the Infinite except through the influence of 
Christianity.”
120
 However, the “God of the Bible . . . is the personal Creator of the universe and 
the source of redemption.”
121
 Accordingly, “whatever Christian theology means by the 
impassibility of God, it does not mean that God’s love, compassion and mercy are mere figures of 
speech.”
122
 Yet, the break is by no means total. For Henry, divine love is not elicited by anything 
external to God but is solely motivated by God’s eternal decree.
123
 
The Agape-Eros Distinction 
That there is a good deal of continuity, though not identity, between the transcendent-
voluntarist model and the tradition of love may be seen by considering the traditionally dominant 
agape-eros distinction. In addressing this issue, Henry rightly acknowledges the complexity 
                                                     
 
119
 Carson, Difficult, 45. Vanhoozer points out that “it is becoming increasingly difficult for 
classical theists to defend the intelligibility of the love of God as an apathetic and unilateral benevolence.” 
“Introduction,” 10. 
120
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:233. Cf. ibid., 6:343. “Aristotle’s spirit does not love the 
world like God the creator and preserver of the universe and redeemer of the penitent loves the world.” 
Ibid., 5:215. 
121
 Ibid., 5:340. Again, this is in explicit distinction from Aristotle’s unmoved mover. Thus it is 
“only a deity view which conceives God already as communicative personality that the notion of divine 
love possesses any genuine meaning at all; a loving God is not a divine hermit.” C. F. H. Henry, Notes, 
104. 
122
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:349. In fact, Henry is able to speak of “God as having a 
tender concern for man, and loving man as sinner as well as creature, despite his moral revolt.” Notes, 109. 
Carson discourages “attempts to strip God’s love of affective content and make it no more than willed 
commitment to the other’s good. The philology does not support this view.” Difficult, 46. He is adamant 
that an emotionless God (such as may be implied in the Westminster Confession of Faith) is “profoundly 
unbiblical and should be repudiated” though he later argues for a form of impassibility. Ibid., 48. There is a 
“fervor” to divine love as Morris states that God “does not simply tolerate the people [Judah]—he loves 
them with all the fervor of his holy nature.” Testaments, 11. 
123
 Thus, “compassionate response is not induced in God by the distress of creatures, as if they 
were able to effect a change in the nature of an otherwise uncompassionate being; rather, response is 
grounded in the living God’s essential nature, that is, in his voluntary disposition.” C. F. H. Henry, God, 




involved in the different biblical words for love.
124
 No simplistic distinctions or definitions of 
biblical words for love suffice.
125
 He thus correctly notes that “it is hardly the case, then, as some 
exegetes argue, that the Bible gives terms like agape a wholly new meaning.”
126
 Yet, on the other 
hand, he contends, along with Nygren, that there is a unique “biblical view of divine agapē,” a 
“distinctive meaning of love, [that] is found exclusively in the Judeo-Christian Scriptures.”
127
 He 
does, however, qualify this by acknowledging that “to compress the biblical view of divine love 
solely into the term agapē can raise unnecessary misunderstanding.”
128
 Nevertheless, he contends 
that “the inspired writers deliberately employ agapē—both when they speak of self-love and 
when they refer to neighbor-love.”
129 
He states, “Because of its very colorlessness as a nonbiblical 
                                                     
 
124
 Linguistically, the sharp dichotomy regarding the biblical words for love (such as philia) is 
rejected based on the bare semantic facts. Henry does recognize his dependence upon Nygren’s study 
stating, “No scholar has contributed as influentially as Anders Nygren to the contemporary contrast of 
agapē and eros (Agape and eros). At the forefront of Swedish theological research into the fundamental 
motifs of the Christian faith, Nygren emphasizes the distinctive importance of agapē for understanding 
biblical religion.” Ibid., 6:342. He states, “Some scholars have inferred, for example, that all terms for love 
except agape are inappropriate to the God of the Bible; the fact is that Jesus in the Gospel of John uses the 
verb phileō when he states that ‘the Father loves the Son’ (John 5:20), and does so as well when speaking 
of the Father’s love for the disciples (John 16:27). Jesus’ love for Lazarus (John 11:3, 36), for the apostle 
John (John 20:2), and for other believers also (Rev. 3:19) is characterized as phileō-love. Both phileō and 
agapaō are therefore used not only of Christian love for others but also of Jesus’ love for his disciples, as 
well as for the Father’s love of the incarnate Son. Moreover, the anathema that Paul pronounces at the end 
of 1 Corinthians (16:22) is directed at those who, amid the problems besetting the congregation at Corinth, 
‘love (phileō) not the Lord Jesus.’” Ibid., 6:343. His familiarity with the semantic overlap of the terms begs 
the question as to why he adopts the thematic dichotomy. 
125
 Henry emphasizes the fact that “meaning is conveyed not by single words but by logical 
constellations of words.” Ibid., 6:344.  
126
 Ibid. For instance, Henry recognizes the use of agape in the LXX for situations such as the lust 
of Amnon for Tamar his sister (2 Sam 13:15).  
127
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:343. Although Henry acknowledges many passages that 
speak of “love” he claims it is used in “God-man relationships much less frequently and much more 
cautiously than does Greek mythological literature.” Ibid., 6:344. 
128
 Ibid., 6:343. Carson as well recognizes that Nygren’s “understanding of love cannot be tied in 
any univocal way to the [agapao] word group.” Difficult, 26. 
129
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:343–44. He thus adopts the belief that the verb form of 
agape was “an indefinite word often implying no more than to ‘like’ or to ‘be content with’” and could thus 
be utilized by the Bible with an infusion of the meaning of a rational, willed love. Thus he contends that 
“The least definite term for love in this classical Greek word cluster was agapan, whose common emphasis 




term the biblical writers could impart to agapaō a highly selective intention and a distinctive 
connotation.”
130
 Furthermore he states, “And, most importantly, when God’s love-relationship to 
man is in view the New Testament uses agapē almost entirely.”
131
 Thus, despite glaring semantic 
ambiguities, this model utilizes the agape-eros distinction to ground the specific discussion of 
divine love in opposition to classical Greek conceptions. 
132
 Accordingly, a thematic (as opposed 
to semantic) distinction between agape and eros is posited. 
Thematically, Henry sees eros as “essentially one’s quest for a value that compensates for 
an inner need or defect.”
133
 In another place he states, “Eros is self-serving passion; it seeks it 
                                                     
 
“Although used for euphony as a synonym for phileō and eraō, agapaō lacked the warmth of the former 
and the intensity of the latter. . . . Of the verbs used for love in classical Greek, agapaō was therefore the 
least specific.” Cranfield, “Love,” Theological Wordbook of the Bible (ed. Alan Richardson; New York: 
Macmillan, 1950), 134. Yet, to be fair to Henry he does reject Cranfield’s contention that agape was 
chosen because it lacked the erotic connotation of eros. He does so by referring once again to the instance 
of Amnon and Tamar. C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:346. 
130
 Ibid. Morris accurately points out that the use of the word agape “was not entirely new, but it 
was not common before the New Testament.” Testaments, 124. Despite this, Morris also holds to the thesis 
that the NT writers intentionally employed this word “because they had a new idea about the essential 
meaning of love. In saying this I am not claiming that the linguistics prove this point.” Ibid., 125. It must be 
noticed, then, that this is a theological and thematic rather than exegetical and linguistic argument. Thus, he 
clarifies that “the meaning aris[es] because of the way the Christians used the concept, not the word.” Ibid. 
In fact, more than once Morris goes out of his way to emphasize that the case cannot be made from the 
linguistics. He states, “A. Nygren has often been criticized for making too sharp a distinction between 
agape and erōs. So perhaps I should repeat that I am not basing my argument on the linguistics, though I 
find them interesting and see in them a pointer. The main thrust of the argument depends on what the New 
Testament writers meant when they used the love words, not on their terminology.” Ibid., 128. Carson, 
however, proceeds with greater caution saying, “There are excellent diachronic reasons in Greek philology 
to explain the rise of the [agapao] word group, so one should not rush too quickly toward theological 
explanations.” Difficult, 27. 
131
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:343–44. Morris also recognizes that phileo and agapao can, 
at times, be used interchangeably. Nevertheless, he does not see phileo as an adequate representation of 
love. He states, “We must dismiss this term . . . if we are looking for the essential New Testament idea of 
love. . . . In short, it does not indicate Christian love.” Testaments, 119. However, as shall be seen, the 
semantic evidence does not seem to support such a dogmatic stance in favor of agape as opposed to other 
NT words for love. 
132
 For instance he states, “Christian love (agape) is the antithesis of worldly hate, but it is much 
more; it is the antithesis of worldly love (eros) in all its forms. The gods of our time are but brittle images 
of eros-love.” C. F. H. Henry, Himself, 13. “The empirical approach to the nature of God soon coalesced 
God into man and blurred agapē into eros.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:343. 
133




objects for the fulfillment of the lover’s own need or gratification.”
134
 Henry locates the problem 
in this Greek conception of love as eros saying, “Here the misunderstanding of love in terms only 
of eros leads Aristotle to reject the very possibility of God’s love for the world or for 
mankind.”
135
 Thus, Henry’s solution to the classical view of divine love is a re-definition of love. 
Accordingly, Henry utilizes a concept of love differing from the Greeks, agape, which is 
supposed to suit the timeless and perfect ontology. Hence, agape cannot entail anything that 
contradicts the concept of a simple, timeless, self-sufficient, and immutable God.
136
 
Agape Love as Election Love 
As has been seen, this model of divine love places an emphasis on the distinction 
between God and the world. God is sovereign and transcendent over the world, and love is freely 
willed by God with no necessity and no external motivation. Thus, divine love is a sovereign, 
volitional love, not the result of any “inner divine necessity” or emanation, but rather purely 
based on the totally free divine volition.
137
 Likewise, there is no external compulsion or even 
motivation for divine love. God’s love, then, is not an impersonal force but is supremely personal, 
although exclusive of sexuality.
138
 Moreover, interpersonal love is part of God’s trinitarian 
                                                     
 
134
 Ibid., 6:345. For Morris, “basically, erōs is romantic love, sexual love.” Testaments, 120. 
Although Morris points out that erōs is not inherently evil, he nevertheless concludes that “love is 
something quite different from a passionate human longing, even a longing for the good and for God.” 
Ibid., 123. 
135
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:343. He comments that the NT avoids eros “because of the 
misconception to which it is prone. The inspired writers deliberately employ agape.” Ibid., 6:344. 
136
 However, Carson adds a very important qualifier saying that “doubtless God’s love is 
immeasurably richer than ours, in ways still to be explored, but they belong to the same genus, or the 
parallelisms could not be drawn.” Difficult, 48. Thus, there is not an absolute dichotomy between divine 
and human love. 
137
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:116. Henry states, “God is sovereign from eternity and from 
eternity is personally active in self-giving holy love.” Ibid., 5:292.  
138
 Ibid., 5:297–98. Albert C. Knudson states, “Without personality love would be a mere 
abstraction.” Knudson, The Doctrine of God (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1930), 352, quoted in ibid. 
“Biblical religion is what imparted dimensions and distinctions of love and fellowship found nowhere else; 






 However, God’s love is not only intra-trinitarian but also includes other than God, 
according to sovereign election. 
It follows from the aseity of God that the sovereign, rational will of God is the sole origin 
of God’s agape love for mankind. As Carson puts it, God “does not ‘fall in love’ with us; he sets 
his affection on us.”
140
 This means that all divine love is predicated solely upon the eternal 
predestinating divine decree, independent of human action and/or response.
141
 Henry adds, 
“Divine love is here not destructive of reason but is intrinsically rational; man’s love for God, 
moreover, is not primarily emotional but volitional.”
142
 Thus, emotion is de-emphasized in favor 
of a rational will. Henry thus partially defines agape as “the incomparable love of the holy God 
                                                     
 
seems incredible and it is in fact impossible to ground them in subpersonal or impersonal relationships or 
processes.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:156–57.  
139
 There is an “eternal interchange of holy love between the persons of the self-revealed 
Godhead.” Ibid., 5:172. “God is continually engaged in intercommunion, in internal self-revelation and 
holy love. This activity is not an addition to his nature; it is God’s essential being in tripersonal activity.” 
Ibid., 5:155–56. Cf. Carson, Difficult, 39. 
140
 Ibid., 61. Though the will is clearly emphasized Carson does caution that “Christian love 
cannot be reduced to willed altruism.” Ibid., 28. Nevertheless, he adds that “all of God’s emotions, 
including his love in all its aspects, cannot be divorced from God’s knowledge, God’s power, God’s will. If 
God loves, it is because he chooses to love; if he suffers, it is because he chooses to suffer. God is 
impassible in the sense that he sustains no ‘passion,’ no emotion, that makes Him vulnerable from the 
outside, over which he has no control, or which he has not foreseen.” Ibid., 60. Yet he claims that God’s 
love is not to “be dissolved in God’s will,” but is in complete accord with God’s will and thus “unlike 
ours,” his love does “not flare up out of control.” Ibid. C. F. H. Henry states, “Judaism and Christianity 
therefore expound a distinctive love relationship between God and the universe and between mankind and 
God. In the Old Testament God’s love centers in his choice of a people utterly unworthy of his love as a 
covenant community.” God, Revelation, 6:340. For a homiletical discussion of election love from a 
Reformed perspective see John MacArthur, The God Who Loves (Nashville, Tenn.: Word, 2001). 
141
 C. F. H. Henry, Notes, 111. Accordingly, “God wills to love men and he loves according to his 
own purpose of election, not according to the actions of men.” Morris, Testaments, 160. Further, “neither 
his love nor his hate is to be explained by the way men act.” Ibid., 159. Carson also emphasizes what he 
calls “God’s particular, effective, selecting love toward his elect.” Carson, Difficult, 18. 
142
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:341. This is expressed further when Henry states that 
sometimes agape “was used to convey the thought of love that expresses not merely an emotion but rather 
an act of will; here it borders on the New Testament sense.” Ibid., 6:346. Morris states, “It might be argued 
that God loves the people because there is something in them that delights him, but . . . it seems that God 




for rebellious sinners whose only destiny would otherwise be unmitigated doom.”
143
 Here God’s 
love is not merited or won by humans, but is totally gratuitous.
144
 God does not need to bestow 
love nor does he gain from the loving relationship, for he already lacks nothing. Love is 
beneficence, “bestowed not upon a worthy object and not for the personal advantage of the Lover 
but solely for the benefit of the undeserving recipient.”
145
 Hence, the love of God is quite 
comparable to the grace of God and the divine-human relationship is not reciprocal.
146
 
This emphasis on divinely willed love also relates to the theme of election that is 
prominent in this model; thus Morris states unequivocally that “predestination and love go 
together.”
147
 Thus, the love of God is defined as purely willed by God and uncaused by its object. 
                                                     
 
143
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:343. “And, most importantly, when God’s love-relationship 
to man is in view the New Testament uses agape almost entirely.” Ibid., 6:344. Morris defines that divine 
agape “is not a love of the worthy, and it is not a love that desires to possess. On the contrary, it is a love 
given quite irrespective of merit, and it is a love that seeks to give.” Testaments, 128. Any human response 
is also the work of God and not man according to divine election. Thus, “God produces love in his elect; it 
is certainly not their own achievement.” Ibid., 182. This is, of course, exactly what Nygren proposed when 
he said that man loves God “because God’s unmotivated love has overwhelmed him and taken control of 
him, so that he cannot do other than love God,” which is the “profound significance of the idea of 
predestination: man has not selected God, but God has elected man.” Ibid., 191. Cf. Nygren, Agape, 231. 
144
 “God loves not because the objects of his love are upright and winsome, but because he is a 
loving God. . . . The constancy of his love depends on what he is rather than on what they are.” Morris, 
Testaments, 12. C. F. H. Henry adds, “The agapē of God confers on the unworthy an undeserved value or 
boon.” God, Revelation, 6:342.  
145
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:343. Geisler contends that the “Greek word agape used of 
God’s love means ‘benevolence,’ a self-less ‘sacrificial’ love.” Systematic, 367. 
146
 In fact C. F. H. Henry goes so far as to say that, “only where the love of God is discerned in 
terms of grace—in terms of a divinely provided redemption bestowed as unmerited divine favor—that the 
love of God is conceived aright; in every other religious or philosophical tradition, the divine love is 
misconstrued.” Notes, 108. “Here the Lover does not seek to satisfy some personal lack or to remedy an 
inner need, for God has none, but bestows a benefit on the one he gratuitously loves.” C. F. H. Henry, God, 
Revelation, 6:343. Morris sees such an emphasis on the gratuitousness of God’s love in the OT use of the 
ahab word group saying, “These words appear to signify love freely given, love given when there is no 
sense of obligation. When used to refer to God they imply his grace.” Testaments, 12. However, it is 
questionable whether such a case is semantically demonstrable. Nevertheless, the identification of divine 
love as self-giving or self-communication, is quite common. For instance, “love in God approaches very 
nearly the definition given by Charles Hodge of God’s quality of goodness, including ‘benevolence, love, 
mercy and grace.’” Kuhn, “God,” 53. Cf. Carson, Difficult, 41; Grudem, Systematic, 198; and Robert 
Duncan Culver, Systematic Theology: Biblical and Historical (Ross-shire, UK: Mentor, 2005), 102. 
147
 Morris, Testaments, 191. As Norman Henry Snaith remarks, “Either we must accept this idea 




Divine love is solely based on God’s sovereign decree independent of the nature of the object.
148
 
Although, in this model, all God’s love is solely a product of his free choice, the so-called “elect” 
are not the only objects of love.
149
 Moreover, God’s love does not diminish his righteousness or 
holiness, nor preclude his judgment.
150
 This concept of love builds on a concept of God as utterly 
transcendent and sovereign and is also very closely related to a soteriology of election and sheer 
gratuity in accord with the idea of volitional, unmotivated, and unaffected agape.
151
 
                                                     
 
doctrine of the love of God other than that which is biblical.” The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament 
(London: Epworth, 1944), 139. C. F. H. Henry states, “Yahweh’s sovereign love explains his choice of 
Jacob; had he wished, might have chosen Esau instead.” God, Revelation, 6:347. Henry adds, “The 
prophets, especially Hosea, Jeremiah and Isaiah, expound God’s love as the basic theme of his electing 
work.” Ibid., 6:345.  
148
 Morris thus states, “The constancy of his love depends on what he is rather than on what they 
are.” Testaments, 12. Packer adds, “The love of God is thus sovereign love, and must always be 
acknowledged as such.” “Love,” 280. 
149
 Carson, Difficult, 22. “If the love of God refers exclusively to his love for the elect, it is easy to 
drift toward a simple and absolute bifurcation.” Ibid., 22. For Geisler, God is “omnibenevolent.” 
Systematic, 367.  
150
 Thus C. F. H. Henry states, “God is love in the sovereign freedom and power of his eternal 
being, and as such has revealed himself definitively and decisively in Scripture and in Christ. While his 
election-love is free, nonetheless it is limited in application even as his effective call to the unregenerate is 
withdrawn at physical death.” God, Revelation, 6:349. In regard to God’s elected people in the OT, Morris 
points out that they will be punished and judged but “this does not mean that God has stopped loving the 
people.” Testaments, 24. This is because God’s love is not dependent upon the response of the people. He 
has sovereignly decreed to love them and nothing can thwart that election love. Interestingly, Morris does 
acknowledge the OT emphasis that “the Lord’s beloved must live as the beloved of the Lord. If they do not, 
they cut themselves off from the blessing that God’s love is always offering.” Ibid., 31. This would seem to 
have to be understood as the ability to cut oneself off from temporal blessing considering that God’s 
elective love is not dependent upon any condition. Thus he states, “We must clearly recognize that God’s 
love is unconditional. But it is also true that the God who loves his people loves certain qualities—for 
example, righteousness.” Ibid. However, God’s love is not dependent upon righteousness for Morris, God’s 
love “is not a love given to the worthy or to those God charitably assumes to be worthy; it is lavished on 
sinners.” Ibid., 131. Thus, it seems that ambiguity remains here. 
151
 The emphasis on the soteriological aspect of the God-world relationship is made clear when 
Carson states, “If the love of God is exclusively portrayed as an inviting, yearning, sinner-seeking, rather 
lovesick passion, we may strengthen the hands of Arminians, semi-Pelagians, Pelagians, and those more 
interested in God’s inner emotional life than in his justice and glory, but the cost will be massive . . . made 




The Impassibility of Divine Love 
At the heart of the transcendent-voluntarist model of love is the emphasis that God acts, 
but is not acted upon. In this way, divine love is not elicited but is uncaused.
152
 Henry states, 
“God’s agape is comprehended in voluntary relationships that stem from his creative and 
compassionate personality. As represented in the Bible God’s love presupposes the exclusive 
voluntary initiative of the sovereign divine being whom no external power can manipulate.”
153
 
Accordingly, God’s love is unmotivated (and certainly unmerited) by any external factors.
154
 
Hence, since love is based on eternal decree God’s love is constant and steadfast.
155
 Accordingly, 
divine love is non-evaluative and human love toward God cannot bring him value.
156
 God’s 
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 Thus Morris can state, “God loves not because the objects of his love are upright and winsome, 
but because he is a loving God.” Testaments, 12. Morris further points out that “two things about God’s 
love are repeatedly emphasized: it is constant, and it is exercised despite the fact that the people God loves 
are so unworthy.” Ibid., 100. 
153
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:349. Morris comments, “Men do not persuade God to be 
loving and gracious—he is loving and gracious by nature.” Testaments, 35. Packer defines four truths 
regarding agape, in contradistinction to storge, eros, and philia. Agape is (1) “a purpose of doing good to 
others.” (2) Agape is “measured by . . . what it does, and more specifically by what of its own it gives.” (3) 
Agape “does not wait to be courted, nor does it limit itself to those who at once appreciate it, but it takes the 
initiative in giving help . . . and finds its joy in bringing others benefit.” “Love,” 278. Thus, “agape means 
doing good to the needy, not to the meritorious, and to the needy however undeserving they might be.” (4) 
Agape is “precise about its object.” Ibid., 279. All of these define the sovereign, impassible, elective love of 
this model. 
154
 The love of God is the motivation of His redemptive work, but it is a purely internal 
motivation. C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:340. Thus Morris contends that “we must see it [divine 
love] as something that does not proceed from any attractiveness in those God loves.” Testaments, 135. 
God’s “love emanates from his own character; it is not dependent on the loveliness of the loved, external to 
himself.” Carson, Difficult, 63. Thus God could say, “I love you anyway, not because you are attractive, but 
because it is my nature to love.” Ibid. 
155
 C. F. H. Henry comments, “In interpersonal communion he maintains eternal fidelity in love. 
He is the steadfast God, not a vacillating sovereign.” God, Revelation, 5:13. “Because God is God he will 
never cease to love.” Testaments, 77. Morris stresses that “God’s love is firm and sure and steadfast, 
continuing no matter what happens.” Ibid., 19. 
156
 Morris states, “But we are all wrong if we think that we are conferring some great favor on God 
by coming to him. Agapē is not erōs. We do not bring anything valuable to God—in fact, we acquire value 
only because we are the recipients of his love.” Testaments, 142. Piper adds, “To be God is to be incapable 
of being a beneficiary of any person of power in the universe.” “How?” 11. Further, “‘God is love’ is this: 
it belongs to the fullness of God’s nature that he cannot be served but must overflow in service to his 
creation. The very meaning of God is a being who cannot be enriched but always remains the enricher.” 




delight is not affected by the actions of human beings, thus whatever is done does not increase or 
decrease God’s perfection or love.
157
 Anything otherwise might signify a lack or a need in God. 
Furthermore, since God is not acted upon, human love for him does not affect him.
158
 In this 
model, then, love does not include suffering. Rather divine suffering is ruled out by God’s 
absolute immutability, and all kinds of theopaschitism are explicitly ruled out.
 159
 Divine 
impassibility is maintained despite the fact of the incarnation: “The premise that Christ who 
suffered is true God and true man does not require the conclusion that God suffers.”
160
 The fact of 
the “suffering servant” leads Henry to propose a nuanced (yet strained) form of impassability in 
order to simultaneously maintain the suffering incarnate and divine self-sufficiency.  
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 “It seems that God delights in this people simply because he chooses to do so.” Morris, 
Testaments, 93. Further, although “it might be argued that God loves the people because there is something 
in them that delights him, but there is never an indication of what brings about this delight.” Ibid. 
158
 It is not clear what C. F. H. Henry means when he states that God’s “love is wounded, 
moreover, when they [Israel] are disobedient to his covenant.” God, Revelation, 6:345. This seems to imply 
the ability in God to be affected by the obedience or disobedience of His people. Most likely, however, in 
the context of Henry’s ontology it cannot mean that God is actually externally affected but rather that this 
“wound” is either metaphorical or inflicted by his own sovereign decree. Carson also briefly struggles with 
this issue when he questions how one is to reconcile a love “which is clearly a vulnerable love that feels the 
pain and pleads for repentance? John, after all, clearly connects the two.” Difficult, 59. However, he 
maintains that any vulnerability does not entail that God is “vulnerable from the outside.” Ibid., 60.  
159
 “God conceived primarily as our ‘fellow sufferer’ is not the immutable God of the Bible. All 
talk of the final liberation of man—psychological, moral, spiritual, political—must end in a question mark 
if God himself is a struggling, suffering deity.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:292. The idea of God 
suffering is rejected due to what Henry considers “its express incompatibility with Scripture.” Ibid., 6:290. 
To affirm “‘the subjectivity of God in the whole of Christ’s suffering’ and to make ‘God Himself . . . the 
subject of the suffering in substitutionary self-surrender’ . . . seriously confuses the scriptural revelation of 
Christ’s mediatorship.” Ibid., 6:291. Carson declares, “A God who is terribly vulnerable to the pain caused 
by our rebellion is scarcely a God who is in control or a God who so perfect he does not, strictly speaking, 
need us.” Difficult, 60. He states further that “at its best impassibility is trying to avoid a picture of a God 
who is changeable, given over to mood swings, dependent upon his creatures. Our passions shape our 
direction and frequently control our will. What shall we say of God?” Ibid., 49. 
160




Divine Love in History 
Divine election love manifests itself in history.
161
 God’s love is displayed in the 
unmerited favor, or grace, that is displayed toward his elect.
162
 God is the one who “stoops” in 
that he “condescends to go to the cross—to death on the cross—in holy covenantal love.”
163
 This 
stooping love is an act of his will; “God voluntarily forsakes his sovereign exclusivity.”
164
 By 
stating the loving action of God in history, Henry draws the distinction between divine love in 
action and “the inflexible mathematical regularities of a causal network of nature that are 
considered benevolent or from the mechanical relationships of an impersonal divine Absolute 
manifest as nature and man.”
165
 Hence, “God freely engages in compassionate and merciful 
acts.”
166
 In the ultimate act of love, Christ exemplifies the infinitude of God’s love.
167
 In fact, he 




                                                     
 
161
 For instance, Henry sees divine love in the creation of man in the divine image, the ejection of 
Adam and Eve from the garden to avoid eternal sinfulness, the enmity placed between humans and Satan, 
the promise of victory, the sparing of Noah and his family, and the promise to never again destroy sinful 
man, among many others. Ibid., 6:346–48.  
162
 Ibid., 6:349. Henry makes “grace” a significant term for love, in accordance with Nygren’s 
conception. Beyond this he also refers to divine lovingkindness in terms of grace. Ibid. 
163
 Ibid., 5:15. In fact, the cross is the ultimate symbol of both the holiness and the love of God.  
C. F. H. Henry, Notes, 108. 
164
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:15. This is a “stooping that manifested the outgoing 
righteousness and love of God who stands.” Ibid. 
165
 Ibid., 6:349. 
166
 Ibid.  
167
 “That it is the God of infinite righteousness and love who goes to Calvary to salvage penitent 
humans is made manifest in word and life by the incarnate Christ. If Jesus does not overtly expound divine 
infinity in propositional form, he nonetheless exhibits divine infinity, as the Scripture affirms, in his own 
life by his servanthood.” Ibid., 5:233. 
168
 Ibid., 6:356. Cf. C. F. H. Henry, Himself, 13. “In manifesting his love in Christ God unleashed 
a floodtide of agapē into the sin-devastated cosmos.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:341. Further, 
Henry comments, “In the synoptic Gospels, Messiah Jesus is at once subject and object of God’s love. 
Divine agapē is presented not only in word, but also in the Word become flesh, in the deed supreme; the 




The Relationship of Divine Love to Ontological Suppositions 
 The transcendent-voluntarist conception of divine love, then, is bound up with the 
entirety of its ontology.
169
 This starting point of a transcendent, immutable, and self-sufficient 
God places precise limits upon the nature of divine love. For such a God, love cannot be 
immanent, love cannot change God, and God can have no need or desire of love. Divine aseity 
rules out divine desire while immutability requires that God be incapable of change or 
newness.
170
 Furthermore, God as perfect could have no deficiency, thus love can add no value or 
enrichment to the divine life. Accordingly, the thematic eros love is utterly ruled out being 
impossible according to the nature of deity. On the contrary, God as sovereign, rational will 
entails a sovereign, rational, and willed love; hence election love. This corresponds to the 
thematic (but not linguistic) agape. God’s love is thus limited to gratuitous benevolence without 
regard for its object. God is not at all affected by external reality or the decisions of creatures but 
orders all history and bestows love sovereignly and independently of external causes. Since God 
as omnicausal cannot be acted upon; there is no power that could impact divinity; God’s love is 
unaffected by spatio-temporal reality. In this way, God is impassible. Although the transcendent-
voluntarist model insists that God has passions, is not indifferent to the world, and may have 
compassion and mercy, this does not mean that God can be impacted by other than God. Rather, 
all God’s “emotions” are caused purely by the eternal decree. Accordingly, God’s relationship to 
the world is an external one (the relativity required by an internal relation is impossible for a 
timeless, immutable God). God’s loving action, which is manifested in time and space, thus stems 
                                                     
 
gift of God’s love to fallen humanity.” Ibid., 6:347–48. Thus “God’s relationship to his covenant people 
reaches its climax in messianic redemption by suffering love.” Ibid., 6:345. In light of his ontology it is 
difficult to understand what Henry means here by the words “suffering love.” 
169
 Which itself is summed up by Henry thus, “The living self-revealing God is eternally self-
sufficient, the voluntary creator of the universe and sovereign monarch of all.” Ibid., 6:67. 
170
 Accordingly, Henry considers it “unpersuasive that a deity conceived as self-giving love 




only from the timeless providence of God according to the eternal decree (predestination). God is 




Consequently, divine love for other than God is superfluous to God, not only as needed 
but even as desired or valued. Once again, this fits with the absolute perfection of God, which 
entails that God is already utterly complete, thus there could be no new experience for God; all is 
eternally bound in the divine nature according to the eternal sovereign will of God. Moreover, 
since God is absolutely simple, divine love is but one aspect of describing the utterly unitary 
essence of God. Love is thus qualified by all other perfections of God, which together are actually 
merely the simplicity of the sovereign will of God. All history is determined according to God’s 
sovereignty and omnipotence. God is only the loving father of whom he chooses (election love). 
Divine love is not opposed to holiness, wrath, justice, and eschatological judgment/damnation—
all of which take place purely according to the perfect sovereign will of God. In all this, the 
transcendent-voluntarist model of love, despite its significant and intentional breaks from classic 
theism in some areas, is nevertheless beholden to many of the classical axioms (though qualified) 
regarding divine ontology including transcendence, timelessness, simplicity, aseity, perfection, 
immutability, impassibility, omniscience, and omnipotence. 
The Immanent-Experientialist Model 
Methodological Framework 
Basic Methodological Tenets 
Hartshorne’s stated goal is to free the conception of God from self-contradictions and 
present a coherent and complementary picture such that God “can be conceived without logical 
absurdity, and as having such a character that an enlightened person may worship and serve him 
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 “In classic Christian theism the Trinity of persons within the eternal Godhead serves this 




with whole heart and mind.”
172
 It must be noted from the outset that, in contrast to Henry, 
Hartshorne’s method does not include the requisite of compatibility with the Bible or any other 
revered text.
173
 Rather, his is a natural theology; nature “is the real ‘word of God’ concerning the 
general structure of the cosmos.”
174
 Though he has some regard for what he calls “religious 
doctrine” in distinction from purely metaphysical viewpoints, he assumes no infallible text but 
rather seeks the “main kernel of religious doctrine.”
175
 In so doing, Hartshorne is more than aware 
that all proofs will depend upon presuppositions.
176
 Despite this, he seeks to produce a 
meticulously rigorous logic of God, to “discover a logically complete classification of possible 
ideas about God.”
177
 Hartshorne’s method seems to be an eclectic one, utilizing aspects of 
empiricism in making experience a primary source of information
178
 while recognizing the 
                                                     
 
doctrine buttresses the argument that God requires a universe as an object of his love.” Ibid. 
172
 Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), 1. 
He suggests that “some definitions of God, at least, contain discoverable self-contradictions, and hence 
suffice to disprove the God so defined.” Vision, 77.  
173
 He states, “The validity of revelation, or of religious experience as furnishing knowledge, is not 
a necessary assumption of the argument of this book.” Ibid., xiv. Thus, although this study will later 
compare the biblical data to the models of love we must realize that Hartshorne made no attempt to follow 
such a method. Nevertheless, he allows the possibility that one working from revelation may contribute to 
the discussion saying, “A theology which in principle accepts revelation as affording knowledge to those 
able to assimilate it may have light to throw upon truths otherwise likely or perhaps certain to be missed or 
seen less clearly.” Ibid., 67. However, he frequently questions the epistemological reliability of revelation. 
See Hartshorne, Divine, 129, and idem, Omnipotence, 41.  
174
 Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 73. He adds, “In science no book settles once for all what is to be 
believed.” Ibid., 111. 
175
 He wants to find that kernel “without assuming the infallibility of scriptural texts or their 
complete consistency.” Hartshorne, Vision, 90–91. Yet, he does not “assume that religion has any kernel 
that makes sense.” Ibid., 91. 
176
 “All proofs for God depend upon conceptions which derive their meaning from God himself. 
They are merely ways of making clear that we already and once for all believe in God, though not always 
with clearness and consistency. With no belief in God no belief could be arrived at.” Hartshorne, Vision, 
274. 
177
 Ibid., x. 
178
 He states, “We have painfully learned (all but one or two groups of philosophers) that the way 
to evaluate ideas is to deduce their consequences and compare these with the relevant data of experience!” 




insufficiency of pure empiricism.
179
 Neither does he rule out “a priori analysis,” but for him this 
refers not to “analysis unrelated to experience, but analysis related to the strictly general traits of 
experience.”
180
 Thus, everything may be judged by “metaphysical necessity or empirical facts.”
181
 
Accordingly, Hartshorne employs the mutually correcting “criterion of consistency” and that of 
“adequacy to experience” and what he calls the “ethical sense.”
182
 He contends that such rigorous 
analysis will leave only one coherent conception of God.
183
 
Hartshorne posits that “God is the one individual conceivable a priori. It is in this sense 
that concepts applied to him are analogical rather than simply univocal, in comparison to their 
                                                     
 
the metaphysical set-up” does not beg the question. “To assert that it [empirical knowledge] also helps us to 
know God is actually to pre-define the applicability of the metaphysical categories to include God. Instead 
of showing conclusively that it is indeed God we are talking about, Hartshorne’s metaphysical route is 
reducible to an explanation of how we can know God, provided God is regarded as coming within 
metaphysics.” Santiago Sia, “Charles Hartshorne on Describing God,” Modern Theology 3 (1987): 199. 
179
 Hartshorne states that empiricism “in theology as it is usually conceived is there shown to be an 
insufficient procedure.” Vision, xii. Cf. Charles Hartshorne, “In Dispraise of Empiricism,” American 
Journal of Theology & Philosophy 10 (1989): 123–26. 
180
 Hartshorne, Vision, 29. 
181
 Ibid., 31. He contends that the traditional error of pitting one against the other resulted in 
atheism (pure empiricism) and classic theism (pure rationalism). The resultant classic theism disallowed 
contingency while including only necessity whereas Hartshorne’s method allows for a necessary and 
contingent divinity, as shall be seen. “If we exclude contingent knowledge from theology, we thereby deny 
contingent aspects to God; if we exclude a priori knowledge, we exclude non-contingent or necessary 
aspects.” Ibid., 61. He states, “Now the only type of theism, which is compatible with the validity (in 
theology) of both methods, empirical and metaphysical, is second-type theism; for it alone admits 
contingent features in the necessary being.” Ibid., 64. Accordingly, he assumes the adequacy of the “self-
evident formal structures of pure logic and mathematics” and the “data of experience so vivid that . . . they 
are universally admitted to occur.” Ibid., 62. For a further discussion of method see Charles Hartshorne, 
Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (London: S.C.M., 1970). 
182
 Hartshorne, Vision, 125. The priority of experience is clear when he states, “Our only reason 
for any conclusion is some form of experience, and the harmony of secular experience with religious (as 
yielding the idea of God) is surely a reason for increased confidence in both.” Ibid., 337. Though he allows 
ethical judgment to play a large role he points out that “we have an independent check on our ethical 
insight—the logic of metaphysical concepts; and we have an independent check on our metaphysical 
reasoning—our ethical sense.” Ibid., 144. 
183
 He maintains that “we must strive for formally exhaustive divisions, since to reject at the outset 
as patently absurd, or to overlook altogether, a formally possible view is to forget that all the views but one 






 With this in mind, he determines the nature of God by numerous methods, 
including the way of analogy.
185
 He also favors the way of eminence, for example: “Whatever is 
good in the creation is, in superior or eminent fashion, ‘analogically not univocally,’ the property 
of God.”
186
 The ways of analogy and of eminence are in contrast to the traditionally predominant 
way of negation, which Hartshorne considers a great historical error. He contends that “whereas 
the way of eminence, if consistently executed, treats the categories impartially, the way of 
negation plays favorites among the categories.”
187
 This consistent execution is posited to function 
by conceiving God “by analogy with our virtues . . . our other-regarding desires, and habits of 
acting upon them.”
188
 Thus, Hartshorne’s method favors “other-regarding” categories, 
anticipating what he will later define as love itself.  
The Polemic against Classic Theism 
Hartshorne categorically rejects classic theism, considering it a total failure in 
maintaining any meaningful relationship between God and the world.
189
 He thus frames his 
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 Hartshorne, Divine, 31. Among their other applications are symbolical (or material) and literal 
(or formal). See Charles Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical 
Metaphysics (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1962). 
185
 Hartshorne, Vision, 59. He cautions against the influence of anthropomorphism while 
concurrently realizing that the classic reaction, that of negating so-called “human traits,” was itself a great 
error. He states, “We should be willing to give careful attention to religious anthropomorphism, as well as 
to philosophical attempts to transcend it, without too much initial confidence that either one, in traditional 
form,
 
can be entirely accepted.” Ibid., 88–89. 
186
 Hartshorne, Divine, 77. “Thus knowledge, purpose, life, love, joy, are deficiently present in us, 
eminently and analogically present in God.” Ibid. Sia explains that for Hartshorne “God is symbolically 
ruler, literally necessary, but analogically conscious and loving.” “Hartshorne,” 195. However, elsewhere 
he contends that there is at least some sense of univocal meaning. For Hartshorne, “the formal [or literal] 
predicates of deity are not exclusively negative, and accordingly, some positive properties of deity can be 
connoted by non-symbolic designations.” Hartshorne, Logic, 134–35. For “if there is in no sense any 
univocal meaning then theology is pure sophistry.” Hartshorne, Vision, 194. 
187
 Hartshorne, Divine, 78. Cf. Charles Hartshorne, “Love and Dual Transcendence,” USQR 30 
(1975): 96.  
188
 The alternative is “conceiving him by analogy with our vices, for example, our most truly and 
deeply ‘selfish’ wish for self-sufficiency.” Hartshorne, Reality, 142. 
189




system of theology in direct contrast to classic theism, which “turns upon such terms as 
perfection, infinity, absoluteness, self-dependence, pure actuality, immutability.”
190
 Leaving no 
doubt regarding his stance, Hartshorne states, “I am convinced that ‘classical theism’ (as much 
Greek as Christian, Jewish, or Islamic) was an incorrect translation of the central religious idea 
into philosophical categories.”
191
 A major factor in this error is the assumption of negative 
theology. Hartshorne contends that while some attributes of divinity derived from religious 
experience may be preserved, these must be extracted from the “non-religious tenets” of classical 
philosophy that have dominated the last two millennia with “an insufficiently analyzed notion of 




                                                     
 
simply not love, a purpose which is no purpose, a will which is no will, a knowledge which is no 
knowledge.” Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 31. See Shubert Miles Ogden, “Must God Be Really Related to 
Creatures?” Process Studies 20 (1991): 54–56, and idem, The Reality of God and Other Essays (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1966), 46; Charles Hartshorne, “Redefining God,” American Journal of Theology & 
Philosophy 22 (2001): 107–13; and D. D. Williams, “The New Theological Situation,” ThTo 24 (1968): 
446, and idem, “How Does God Act? An Essay in Whitehead’s Metaphysics,” in Process and Divinity: The 
Hartshorne Festschrift: Philosophical Essays Presented to Charles Hartshorne (ed. E. Freeman and W. L. 
Reese; LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1964). For example, “knowledge seems to imply an internal distinction 
between subject and object—but God is said to be simple. Volition seems to imply change—but God is 
changeless. Purpose seems to imply a present lack of something—but God is perfect; and for him there is 
no contrast between present intent and future realization. Love involves sensitivity to the joys and sorrows 
of others, participation in them—but we cannot infect God with our sufferings since he is cause of 
everything and effect of nothing), and our joys can add nothing to the immutable perfection of God’s 
happiness. Though in religion one speaks of ‘serving’ God, in reality, according to technical theology, one 
can do nothing for God, and our worst sins harm God as little as the finest acts of sainthood can advance 
him.” Hartshorne, Vision, 114.  
190
 Hartshorne, Vision, 5. It should be noted, however, that Hartshorne is often criticized for his 
treatment of classical theism. For instance, although appreciative and somewhat sympathetic to Hartshorne, 
W. Norris Clarke contends that Hartshorne “systematically misunderstands—to my mind—some of the key 
metaphysical issues which St. Thomas is trying to come to grips with.” “Charles Hartshorne’s Philosophy 
of God: A Thomistic Critique,” in Charles Hartshorne’s Concept of God: Philosophical and Theological 
Responses (ed. S. Sia; Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1990), 103.  
191
 Hartshorne, Divine, vii. Of Aquinas he states, “[Though] his doctrine was shipwrecked on 
certain rocks of contradiction, has he not left us an admirable chart showing the location of the rocks!” 
Ibid., xii. For D. D. Williams, “The result is that the active, temporal, creating, suffering side of God’s 
being does not come sufficiently into view. It cannot do so because it contradicts the absolutist doctrine of 
perfection.” Spirit, 100. 
192
 Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 4. These include timelessness, foreknowledge, impassivity, creation 




Perhaps the most troubling aspect of classic theism for Hartshorne is its seeming 
incongruity with any real relatedness of God to the world, considering it to be “metaphysical 
snobbery toward relativity, dependence, or passivity.”
193
 Such widespread and influential 
shortcomings have excluded the possibility of God’s enjoyment of the world, since he must 
“contain actually all possible value” and “being perfect, he cannot change.”
194
 The outgrowth of 
such errors, according to Hartshorne was that “the purely absolute God was, by logical 
implication, conceived as a thing, not a subject or a person; as ignorant, not conscious and 
knowing, as indifferent, not interested in things and their relations.”
195
 Most important for this 
study, he contends that classic theism ruled out the possibility of the genuine love of God: “Since 
love involves dependences upon the welfare of the beloved, and in so far is a passion, God, being 




In Hartshorne’s system the God-world relationship is referred to as panentheism (literally 
“all in God”) meaning that God is essentially related to the world such that God includes the 
                                                     
 
experience.” Hartshorne, Vision, 95. It is his contention that such ideas, along with utter immutability, 
omnipotence which excludes all other power, and either absolute transcendence or absolute immanence, 
have fueled rejection of theism in general as well as obscured the foundations of “such attributes as love or 
goodness.” Ibid., 97. For Ogden, classical theism combines “the conceptions of God both of classical 
metaphysics and of Holy Scripture” and thus posits a God “without real internal relations to the contingent 
beings of which he is the ground” though also predicating “of God the personalistic perfections found in 
Scripture, all of which entail . . . real relations.” Reality, 140. 
193
 Hartshorne, Divine, 50. Hartshorne further contends that classic theism “is one-sided, meager, 
incomplete in its use of experience to arrive at the nature of God.” Vision, 125. “It simply denies certain all-
pervasive, infinitely fundamental aspects of life—change, variety, complexity, receptivity, sympathy, 
suffering, memory, anticipation—as relevant to the idea of God.” Ibid. 
194
 “From the assumption, God is a purely actual, impassive being, the absolutely independent 
cause upon which all other things depend, it follows that he contains actually all possible value, or is 
perfect. Being perfect, he cannot change; possessing all ‘perfections,’ he must know all things by an 
immutable act above time; he must have power, will, love, all the truly positive attributes in maximal 
degree.” Ibid., 96. 
195
 Hartshorne, Divine, 17. Thus, “a well-meaning attempt to purify theology anthropomorphisms 




world and yet is more than the world.
197
 In order to better understand divine love in the context of 
the God-world relationship, it is important to distinguish between the entities of the relationship 
(God and the world) and the relationship itself (panentheism).
198
 Thus, this section will first 
consider Hartshorne’s process ontology of the world (panpsychism), then his divine ontology 
(dipolar theism), followed by the metaphysics of the relationship between the two (panentheism).  
The Process Ontology of the World 
For Hartshorne, all reality consists of creative minds relating to one another as subjects 
and objects (panpsychism) within a pantemporal process of events.
199
 Becoming, or “process,” is 
the basic form of reality in direct opposition to the supposedly static ontology of classic theism.
200
 
                                                     
 
196
 Hartshorne, Vision, 115. 
197
 Hartshorne defines panentheism as “an appropriate term for the view that deity is in some real 
aspect distinguishable from and independent of any and all relative items, and yet, taken as an actual whole, 
includes all relative items.” Ibid., 89. God thus transcends the world in being more than the world but not in 
the classical sense of total otherness or distance. This God-world relationship should not be confused with 
classic theism which posits God as wholly other than the world nor with pantheism which makes God and 
the world identical. The world is not identical or equivalent to God.  
198
 As shall be seen, the nature of the God-world relationship in Hartshorne’s metaphysics is 
interdependent such that God and the world cannot exist separate from one another. Nevertheless, for the 
sake of clarity the two may be distinguished analytically.  
199
 The nature of panpsychism will be unpacked further below. 
200
 Hartshorne, Reality, 17. He affirms, “‘becoming’ is reality itself (Bergson), and being only an 
aspect of this reality.” Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (London: S.C.M., 
1970), 13. Hartshorne is heavily influenced by his teacher Alfred North Whitehead. See Whitehead’s 
seminal work Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1929). However, though Hartshorne’s dipolar view is compatible with Whitehead’s “notion of the 
primordial and consequent natures of God” there are differences between them. John P. Mahoney, “Charles 
Hartshorne’s Dipolar Conception of God” (M. A. thesis, University of Fribourg, 1974), 13. Most notably, 
“Whitehead’s conception of God is not fully worked out, even in Process and Reality.” Ibid. For a 
discussion of Hartshorne’s and Whitehead’s differences see Lewis S. Ford and William Lad Sessions, eds., 
Two Process Philosophers: Hartshorne’s Encounter with Whitehead (AAR Studies in Religion; 
Tallahassee, Fla.: American Academy of Religion, 1973), and L. S. Ford, “Hartshorne’s Interpretation of 
Whitehead,” in The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne (ed. L. E. Hahn; The Library of Living 
Philosophers; La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1991), 313–38. Hartshorne is also indebted to the contributions of 
Bergson and Morgan. See Cf. Henri Bergson, L’évolution créatrice (Bibliothèque de philosophie 
contemporaine; Paris: Alcan, 1909), and C. Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution: The Gifford Lectures 
(London: Williams & Norgate, 1923). Despite agreement within process thought it should not be 




This process ontology is directly contrary to timeless substance ontology such that all reality is 
temporal and ever-changing.
201
 Thus, rather than substances enduring through time, minds exist 
in successive occasions, or events.
202
 In this thoroughly temporalistic ontology, “reality is the 
succession of units” or “experient occasions.”
203
 Time is thus the succession of moments (units) 
and all reality is consecutive moments consisting of spatio-temporal events.
204
 The present is 
internally related to the past such that the past is included in the present and in that sense 
permanent.
205
 All actuality is thus temporal, and thus continually changing.
206
 In this way 
becoming is “cumulative”; each instant includes the past as relata and partially determines the 
present.
207
 That reality is thoroughly temporal excludes the existence of a timeless realm or 
                                                     
 
201
 Hartshorne’s “social theory, is temporalistic, the denial of any notion of a purely timeless or 
immutable existent.” Reality, 134. D. D. Williams states, “Time, freedom, and historical existence are the 
central realities of our self-understanding.” Spirit, 5. Likewise Ogden writes of “a reality which is through-
and-through temporal and social.” Reality, 64.  
202
 “Events are the final nouns.” Charles Hartshorne, “Strict and Genetic Identity: An Illustration 
of the Relation of Logic to Metaphysics,” in Structure, Method, and Meaning: Essays in Honor of Henry 
M. Sheffer (ed. P. Henle; New York: Liberal Arts, 1951), 251. This may be called event pluralism; see 
Hartshorne, Creative, 173–204. The “absolute identity of the concrete or particular is given in an event or 
occasion, not in a thing enduring through time” or substance. Hartshorne, Reality, 102. 
 
203
 Charles Hartshorne, “Personal Identity from A to Z,” Process Studies 2 (1972): 210. Such 
experient occasions are also called “unit realities.” He considers these “analogous . . . to momentary human 
experiences.” Ibid. 
204
 This theory of time finds its basis in Whitehead’s “epochalism” which Hartshorne also calls 
“temporal atomism or chronological pluralism.” Charles Hartshorne, “Panpsychism,” in A History of 
Philosophical Systems (ed. V. Ferm; New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), 450. “The mathematical 
continuum of point-instants is the system of all possible divisions of space-time; the atomic-epochal units 
are the actual divisions at a given moment.” Ibid. 
205
 Thus previous events are data for present events. This is his asymmetrical theory of time: the 
past is externally related and “thus the present may contain the past as its relatum without thereby infecting 
the past with its own presentness.” Hartshorne, Divine, 69. This is based on Whitehead’s doctrine of 
prehension. Hartshorne sums it up thus: every “occasion has intrinsic reference (somewhat as in Peirce’s 
theory of reaction) to preceding occasions, with which it has some degree of sympathetic participation, 
echoing their qualities, but with a new over-all quality of its own as it reacts to them.” Hartshorne, 
“Panpsychism,” 451. Thus, “once an event has occurred it is a permanent item in reality.” Hartshorne, 
Omnipotence, 35.  
206
 Hartshorne comments, “Prior experiences . . . are taken into and thus qualify subsequent 
experiences.” “Personal,” 210. 
207




eternal present where being is static. Accordingly, for Hartshorne, becoming is reality and being 
is an aspect of reality. 
The nature of Hartshorne’s “actual entities” or “experient occasions” will be clarified by 
considering his ontology of panpsychism, which refers to the view that all things (even at the 
subatomic level) consist of minds (souls) or “units of experiencing.”
208
 Panpsychism is a form of 
idealism that opposes materialism yet differentiates itself from simple idealism in that it supports 
the reality of the “spatio-temporal world.”
209
 Minds, of which all reality consists, function both as 
subjects and objects relating to one another in a social process.
210
 However, the fact that all 
reality consists of minds should not be taken to mean that every object of human perception is 
sentient. Rather, all perceived things are actually compounds of “smaller [sentient] 
individuals.”
211
 There are two kinds of compounds, aggregates and compound individuals. 
Aggregates are not sentient since they do not have a mind (soul), whereas compound individuals 
have an emergent mind such that the compound individual is conscious, including other 
                                                     
 
208
 In Hartshorne’s words it is “the view that all things, in all their aspects, consist exclusively of 
‘souls,’ [or minds] that is, of various kinds of subjects, or units of experiencing, with their qualifications, 
relations, and groupings or communities.” “Panpsychism,” 442.  
209
 Hartshorne even refers to this as “panpsychical realism” as well as “realistic idealism” to 
emphasize the break from traditional forms of idealism. Ibid. Nevertheless, Hartshorne’s system is not 
realism in the traditional sense. “The constituents of this world are, for panpsychists, just as real as human 
minds or as any mind.” Ibid., 442. At the same time he contends that “no one has proved or can possibly 
prove . . . that there is any ‘matter,’ apart from social terms and relations.” Hartshorne, Divine, 29. 
Moreover, “it is naive to suppose that merely because molecules, atoms, etc., are invisibly small, they 
cannot be social beings, in relation to their neighbors, or their constituents, or both.” Hartshorne, Reality, 
36. Thus, “mere matter as such is abstract or collective, and that only panpsychism can give content to it as 
concrete and singular.” Ibid., 101. 
210
 These minds are themselves extended. Therefore, “extendedness is then not a property capable 
of distinguishing ‘mere matter’ from mind, since minds, as entering into communal relations with one 
another, must exhibit extendedness. A mind, according to most panpsychists, is not simply outside the 
space-time world. It is also not at a mere point in that world, and nothing remains than that it be in an area 
of the world.” Hartshorne, “Panpsychism,” 445–46.  
211
 In “perceiving the non-human world we are always apprehending collectives.” Ibid., 450. 
However, “all individuals apparent to the senses are compounded of numerous much smaller individuals.” 
Charles Hartshorne, “The Compound Individual,” in Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead (ed. 
F. S. C. Northrop; New York: Russell & Russell, 1936), 194. Further, “psychicalism . . . does not hold that 




individuals but not thereby removing their (or its own) individuality.
212
 As shall be seen, in 
Hartshorne’s system, God is the supreme compound individual.  
Hartshorne’s panpsychism is further explained in terms of subject-object relations where 
every soul or mind functions both as subject and object, in different respects. This is understood 
within the context of four theses, which attempt a synthesis of realism and idealism.
213
 First, the 
“principle of objective independence,” which maintains that “an ‘object,’ or that of which a 
particular subject is aware, in no degree depends upon that subject.”
214
 Yet, the object is “within” 
its subject “for relation-to-O includes O.”
215
 This is the theory of internal relations, which will be 
discussed below. Second, the “principle of subjective dependence” means that “a ‘subject,’ or 
whatever is aware of anything, always depends upon the entities of which it is aware, its 
objects.”
216
 In this way, knowledge is by nature relative.
217
 The third principle is that of 
“universal objectivity,” which states, “Any entity must be (or at least be destined to become) 
object for some subject or other.”
218
 Fourth, the “principle of universal subjectivity” teaches that 
                                                     
 
212
 Here I use the term emergent to mean more than the sum of the parts, in contrast to a reductive 
view of mind. I do not, however, mean to imply that mind emerges from matter. For a further discussion of 
the compound individual see Hartshorne, “Compound.” 
213
 The first two are beholden to realism whereas the last two are related to idealism, with the 
fourth specifically referring to panpsychism. Though these four theses are at times considered 
contradictory, Hartshorne considers them to be “complementary or mutually supporting.” Hartshorne, 
Reality, 71. 
214
 Ibid., 70.  
215
 Hartshorne, Divine, 112. See the discussion of internal and external relations below. 
216
 Hartshorne, Reality, 70. Thus, “determinate subject-object relations are found in subjects, not in 
objects. Subjectivity as such is relativity, objectivity as such is nonrelativity.” Hartshorne, Divine, 110. 
“Nothing is so variously relative, dependent, as the knower.” Ibid., 8. 
217
 “Minds, as knowers, must somehow contain reference, relation, to their objects, or they are not 
knowers and (at the limit) not minds; but the entities which certain minds know and call their objects need 
not have this status in themselves.” Ibid., 105. 
218
 Hartshorne, Reality, 70. Hartshorne explains, “So it may be held that any entity must be known 
by some subject or other, even though being known by any particular subject is external to the entity.” 
Hartshorne, Divine, 108. He extends this, saying that since “any object is constitutive of the knower, then 




“any concrete entity is a subject, or set of subjects; hence, any other concrete entity of which a 
subject, S1, is aware, is another subject or subjects (S2; or S2, S3, etc.).”
219
 These four tenets 
amount to Hartshorne’s panpsychism, or psychicalism, which he otherwise refers to as the “social 
theory of reality.”
220
 Thus, all knowers are relative. As shall be seen, God is the supreme, cosmic 
mind or soul; and as supreme knower he is supremely relative. Panpsychism thus maintains the 
reality of the spatio-temporal world and that the world consists of creative minds.
221
 
In Hartshorne’s system every mind is creative, meaning that it possesses some degree of 
freedom so that even when acted upon (limited) options remain open for reaction.
222
 In other 
words, causes are the necessary condition, but never the sufficient conditions, for effects; effects 
are not merely the simple result of their causes but each “mind” has the ability to freely react to a 
cause within a limited number of possibilities; thus individuals “can only be influenced, they 
cannot be sheerly coerced.”
223
 In this way every mind is a co-creator of reality such that the whole 
world is interdependent; each mind contributes to the reality of all others.
224
 In this way, each 
                                                     
 
219
 Hartshorne, Reality, 70. A concrete entity is any particular thing in the actual world, even at the 
subatomic level. 
220
 Ibid., 71. For an early presentation of Hartshorne’s view see Charles Hartshorne, Beyond 
Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature (Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1937), 165–210. The 
importance of panpsychism to Hartshorne’s ontology cannot be overstated. He states, “I agree that the 
falsity of panpsychism implies that of much else in my philosophy.” “Could There Have Been Nothing? A 
Reply,” Process Studies 1 (1971): 25. 
221
 Hartshorne, Creative, 272. Cf. Charles Hartshorne, “Whitehead’s Novel Intuition,” in Alfred 
North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy (ed. G. L. Kline; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963). 
222
 All minds have “some degree of freedom or self-determination, even in the lowest orders of 
psyches.” Hartshorne, “Panpsychism,” 371. Thus, “all happenings are to some extent by chance.” 
Hartshorne, Reality, 106. “Novelty and freedom are fundamental to life and to all harmony.” Ibid., 51.  
223
 Hartshorne, Vision, xvi. “The notion of cause as completely determining its effects is a 
metaphorical confusion of logical consequence with temporal sequence.” Hartshorne, Divine, 39.  
224
 Thus every mind contains “a spark of freedom and creativity.” Ibid., 146. “We make each other 
what we are, in greater or lesser degree.” Ibid., 29. This interdependence is predicated on process 




mind is partially dependent and independent, partially determined and self-determined.
225
 
Accordingly, each mind plays a part (though by no means an equal part) in interdependently 
forming each moment of reality (co-creative). This is an indeterministic, non-coercive, creative 
synthesis of social relativity.
226
 
This creative synthesis is predicated upon the relationships of minds to one another—
Hartshorne’s crucial theory of internal and external relations. First, we should recognize that 
relations are identified by Hartshorne in terms of feeling: “That all is psychic means, all is 
feeling, in reaction with other feeling.”
227
 In fact, although it seems to be an imprecise 
classification, feeling even includes “all the qualitative content of sensation, often classed under 
cognition.”
228
 Minds function as both subject and objects of feeling. As subject a mind is 
internally related to its object so that its relata is actually included in, and constitutive of, the 
subject.
229
 Thus, an internal relation changes and affects the subject (feeler) of that relation and is 
inclusive of its object (that which is felt). On this basis, Hartshorne summarizes, “To include 
                                                     
 
225
 Ibid., 146. Moreover, change is pervasive throughout all concrete actuality such that “with each 
change we have a new concrete reality, not simply the identical reality with new qualities.” Hartshorne, 
Omnipotence, 104.  
226
 Here social is being used technically to describe minds (subhuman, human, and divine) relating 
to one another and should not be confused with human social relations. 
227
 Hartshorne, “Panpsychism,” 449. Further, “Feelings react with other feelings, but in this 
reaction is involved some degree of participation in the qualities of these other feelings. A feeling feels the 
feelings to which it reacts. Feelings echo to some extent the feelings around them, and this is the basis of 
the possibility of relationships among realities by which they constitute a world of things relevant to one 
another.” Ibid., 450. Thus “the unity of actuality is given as a felt unity, and its laws are laws of feeling.” 
Hartshorne, Reality, 100. Thus feelings are relations between minds, whether immediate and distinct or 
mediated and indistinct, and this is the basis of all reality. 
228
 Hartshorne, “Panpsychism,” 449. 
229
 Thus “the entity to which the relation is internal is a concrete whole of which the externally 
related entities are abstract aspects.” Hartshorne, Vision, 235. He describes this by stating that the subject 
must thus be conceived as “‘outside’ the object, as it were surrounding it but not penetrating it.” 
Hartshorne, Divine, 112. For Hartshorne, even human subjects include the objects of their knowledge, 
though in an imperfect manner. Ibid., 143–44. He states, “If it seems otherwise, this is because of the 
inadequacy of human personal relations, which is such that the terms are not conspicuously and clearly 




relations is to include their terms. Hence to know all is to include all.”
230
 On the other hand, a 
mind functioning as object is externally related such that it is unaffected by the relation. 
Hartshorne defines that an external relation is “such that the entity [mind] said to be externally 
related could have been the same had the relations not obtained.”
231
 Such subject-object relations 
are the building blocks of the creative synthesis of social relativity. It should be noted that this 
doctrine of internal and external relations does not mean that each entity is included in every 
other entity as a whole, but rather what is known in relation is constitutive of the knower (the 
subject) without affecting or changing that which is known (the object). There is thus a “mutual 
immanence of individuals”
232
 as socially related, yet this “does not depreciate individual 
distinctness” but recognizes individuality and distinction between minds, including between God 
and other minds.
233
 Thus every mind functions both as subject and object (according to 
Hartshorne’s principles of universal subjectivity and universal objectivity) and as such has 
internal and external relations. All reality is accordingly an interdependent creative synthesis of 
partially determined and self-determined minds interacting as both subjects and objects in 
process. 
The Divine Ontology of Dipolar Theism 
 Having considered Hartshorne’s ontology of the world (panpsychism), I will now direct 
attention to his divine ontology (dipolar theism). Importantly, God is not exempt from the 
                                                     
 
230
 Hartshorne, Divine, 76. This means that “if there is any wholly genuine description of A which 
entails every genuine description of B, then and only then A is relative to B; but this means that every state 
description affirming A also affirms B. If there is no wholly genuine description of A entailing every 
genuine description of B, then and only then is A nonrelative to B; but this means that at least some state 
description affirms A and denies B.” Ibid., 107. 
231
 Ibid., 95. Hartshorne adopts G. E. Moore’s definition. See “External and Internal Relations,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 20 (1919–20): 40–62. Moore argued for the validity of external 
relations, disputing F. H. Bradley’s thesis that external relations involve an infinite regress.  
232
 Hartshorne, “Panpsychism,” 443. Hartshorne comments, “Individuals generally are not simply 




metaphysical tenets of panpsychism. Rather, God himself is a mind, but not just any mind. He is 
the supreme mind, also subject to indeterministic, relativistic, spatio-temporalistic panpsychism. 
God is not identical to the world but distinct from it, though essentially related.
234
 God is partially 
dependent and independent, partially determined and self-determined; the eminently moved 
mover of all. He is the all-knowing feeler of all feelings, the supreme mind whose knowledge is 
perfectly adequate to the state of the world. Such relational characteristics will be unpacked when 
the discussion moves specifically to the God-world relationship. However, the divine nature must 
first be discussed since it is important to first understand the differentiation that Hartshorne makes 
in his usage of absolutist terminology. 
Hartshorne’s absolutist terminology  
of perfection 
 Hartshorne makes extensive use of terms such as absolute, perfection, necessary, 
eminent, et al.
235
 However, Hartshorne qualifies these terms in a manner that differentiates his 
usage from the traditional meanings associated with classic theism. Hartshorne finds much of this 
terminology to be riddled with ambiguities and thus he calls for precision.
236
 The key to 
Hartshorne’s solution to such rampant ambiguity is his re-consideration of the “idea of infinity or 
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 Ibid., 442. In other words, “‘within’ does not contradict ‘other.’” Hartshorne, Divine, 99–100. 
234
 The nature of this essential relation will be discussed when attention is turned to the God-world 
relationship (panentheism). 
235
 For instance, the very “uniqueness of God is his maximality.” Hartshorne, Vision, 231. He 
emphasizes perfection as well as the necessity of God’s existence. “God is the only unconditionally 
‘necessary’ existent. What is unconditionally necessary in God, however, is not all of God, though it is 
unique to him.” Hartshorne, Divine, 87. Yet, he also points out that “necessity is a negative or at least an 
abstract conception.” Ibid., 33. 
236
 He states, “If there is to be argument about the reality, or even the meaningful conceivability, 
of an absolute or perfect being, we ought to have before us a systematic analysis of the rationally possible 
variations or analogous forms implied by the meanings, or at least pseudo-meanings” of such terms. 
Hartshorne, Reality, 111. Although Hartshorne himself utilizes them extensively, he nevertheless points out 
“how hopelessly ambiguous phrases like ‘perfect being,’ ‘finite God,’ ‘absolute,’ and the like” are. 
Hartshorne, Vision, 10. For him, “such insufficiently examined concepts . . . sidetracked theology.” 






 He accepts the traditional view that God must be perfect, but he does not accept 
the traditional meaning of such perfection, finding it “dangerously loaded with the connotation, 
complete, therefore unincreasable, therefore without relations.”
238
 Hartshorne seeks to overcome 
this traditional notion of absolute perfection that excludes growth by noting three possibilities, 
specifically that God may be perfect in all, some, or no ways.
239
 That God is perfect in all ways 
(absolute, complete, self-sufficient, etc.) is the conception of classic theism, whereas the position 
that God is perfect in no ways is atheism. He finds the possibility of complete or absolute 
actualization, meaning that all of the infinite potentialities are actualized, to be impossible 
because not all potentialities are compossible.
240
 Hartshorne avoids these views by positing that 
God is “perfect in some ways,” meaning “perfect in one sense and capable of increase in value in 
another”; this is called surrelativism.
241
 The nomenclature of surrelativism, however, emphasizes 
                                                     
 
237
 “Perhaps this idea is ambiguous, perhaps there is a sense in which God should be conceived as 
perfect, another sense in which perfection cannot apply to God, because (it may be) this sense involves an 
absurdity or, in other words, is really nonsense.” Hartshorne, Vision, 6.  
238
 Hartshorne, Reality, 114. He goes on, “Such an idea, however legitimate, is not that of su-
periority. Non-reflexive transcendence is what has generally been called perfection, with the unproved 
assumption that to be best among possible beings is necessarily to be in the best (or only) possible state of 
this best being.” Ibid.  
239
 Hartshorne thus presupposes as “a minimal definition, God is an entity somehow superior to 
other entities.” Vision, 6.  
240
 There simply cannot “be a concrete maximum of attributes like goodness, knowledge, or 
power.” Ibid., 89. Hence, God is only potentially absolute, not actually absolute since the actualization of 
all potentialities simultaneously is impossible. Furthermore, “God alone is ‘complete’ in potency. But 
completeness in actuality (‘pure actuality’) is meaningless, and the attempt to conceive it only results in a 
concept whose object must be less than the least of actualities because it is not actual at all.” Ibid., 244. Cf. 
Hartshorne, Divine, 144.  
241
 Hartshorne, Vision, 158. Cf. Hartshorne, Reality, 156. Hartshorne contends that the primary 
mistake of tradition was overlooking the categories of “all,” “some,” or “none.” Vision, 33. Cf. Hartshorne, 
Reality, 112. Thus, there are only three options: first, God is absolutely “perfect and complete” and thus 
unable to change or “in any way increase in value” the God of classic theism. Ibid., 155. Third, is the view 
that God is “not in any respect entirely perfect” or atheism. Ibid. The second view, Hartshorne’s model, “is 
that he is perfect and complete in some respects, but not in all.” Hartshorne, Reality, 155. For Hartshorne, 
the first view must be dismissed because it leaves God incapable of relationship and the third must be 




that God may increase in value and thus surpass himself, though no others can ever surpass him. 
Thus he is the self-surpassing surpasser of all.  
In this way, Hartshorne defines God’s perfection as perfection in all ways that are 
meaningful and logically compatible (way of eminence) such that God “has everything in the 
highest degree which is capable of a highest degree.”
242
 However, not only possibility but also 
admiration comes into play such that God has “all properties that deserve admiration” in “the 
highest degree admirable.”
243
 Of course, admirability is to some extent a subjective category. 
Beyond the risk of subjectivity, the magnitude of the ambiguity surrounding these conceptions, 
despite Hartshorne’s modifications, begs the question whether one ought to begin by speaking of 
God in terms of philosophical perfection at all.
244
 He answers, “There is need for perfection, that 
we may have a cause infinitely worthy of our devotion. For though we may make reservations 
about all ordinary causes, there must be a deeper cause that we wholly accept (even though we 
cannot sharply formulate it).”
245
 Of course this assumes that perfection of this or any other type is 
valuable and thus a requisite for a conception of a God worthy of worship. As shall be seen below 
the commitment to this notion, even with Hartshorne’s modifications, entails other ontological 
conclusions. 
                                                     
 
242
 Hartshorne, Vision, 97. He determines what is capable of a highest degree by “knowing 
otherwise of the attributes” and that “they are not deficiencies.” Ibid. He states, “Only essentially negative 
predicates need or should be absolutely negated of the perfect.” Ibid., 122. Of course the question remains 
as to the precise differentiation of positive and negative predicates. 
243
 Hartshorne, Divine, 42.  
244
 To be sure, Hartshorne tweaks the definitions. However, it is not certain that he escapes from 
all of the classic presuppositions and/or connotations. 
245




The divine nature 
God is the supreme mind who functions both as the supreme subject and the supreme 
object.
246
 This is a partial description of God’s dipolar nature or dual transcendence.
247
 The 
dipolar conception of God does not mean that God has a polarized nature but, rather, the same 
God as supreme mind eminently exemplifies the admirable characteristics of both poles. These 
ontologically distinguishable yet ontically inseparable poles may be labeled according to 
numerous metaphysical contraries including: absolute-relative, abstract-concrete, potential-actual, 
necessary-contingent, and universal-particular, among others.  
In Hartshorne’s thinking, God must be supremely admirable, thus having “all properties 
that deserve admiration.”
248
 It will not do to simply attribute to God only the traditional, absolutist 
categories; this was the mistake of classical theism, which subjectively assumed the superiority of 
one pole.
249
 In direct opposition to this tendency, Hartshorne conceives God as having all 
admirable properties (as far as compossible) in an eminent manner.
250
 For Hartshorne, 
metaphysical contraries such as necessary and contingent, infinite and finite, absolute and 
relative, potential and actual, and others may be attributed to the same being (though not in the 
same sense), and there are estimable and inestimable manifestations of both poles.
251
 Here the 
modification of absolutist language, specifically the categories of all, some, or none become 
integral to understanding Hartshorne’s view of the divine nature and his application of the 
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 The meaning of God as supreme subject and supreme object will be discussed further below. 
247
 Hartshorne favored the term dual transcendence later in his career. Although he uses the terms 
synonymously, it seems he wanted to avoid some of the potentially dualistic connotations of dipolarity. 
248
 Hartshorne, Divine, 42.  
249
 Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1953), 2. 
250
 The term “compossible” here and elsewhere is used to mean possible in the light of all other 
relevant factors. 
251




metaphysical contraries to the divine nature. The application of absolute in some ways, for 
instance, leads to the conclusion that God is “unsurpassable except by itself.”
252
 This modifies 
perfection from simple illimitability or “completeness,” to “unsurpassability or maximal value in 
any respect in which ‘better’ and ‘worse’ are possible, or as the property of that which, in a given 
dimension of value, could not be better than it is.”
253
 This is what he calls “transcendent 
excellence.”
254
 Thus God is perfect in some ways (dipolar theism), but not perfect as utterly 
complete or infinitely actualized (classic theism). Accordingly, God is not accurately described in 
monopolar terms where only one aspect of the metaphysical contraries is affirmed. Rather, God 




Further application of the categories (all, some, or none) to the metaphysical contraries of 
necessity and contingency leads to the conclusion that God may be necessary in some ways and 
yet also contingent. For instance, Hartshorne posits that God is a necessary being, though only in 
respect to existence. In other words, that God exists is necessary but the particularities of his 
existence are contingent.
256
 Whereas the divine existence is necessary, there are also accidents, 
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 Hartshorne, Vision, 7. Cf. Hartshorne, Divine, 20. 
253
 Hartshorne, Vision, 124. “Consequently, if we are to conceive of the truly perfect One, the One 
who is eminently good, it can hardly be otherwise than as the supreme exemplification of these very ideas, 
as himself the supremely social and temporal reality . . . the eminently relative One, whose openness to 
change contingently on the actions of others is literally boundless.” Schubert Miles Ogden, “Toward a New 
Theism,” in A Colloquium on the Credibility of ‘God’ (New Concord, Ohio: Muskingum College, 1967), 
16.  
254
 Hartshorne, Divine, 21. Thus “‘divine relativity’ . . . includes all the divine absoluteness (or 
eternity) that logical analysis shows to be conceivable without sheer contradiction.” Ibid., ix.  
255
 Of course this raises the question of the objectivity of Hartshorne’s conception of God 
considering a given characteristic may be admirable to some but deficient to others. See Donald Wayne 
Viney, “Philosophy after Hartshorne,” Process Studies 30 (2001): 211–36. 
256
 Hartshorne states, “Deity exists necessarily, in a sense in which men, for example, do not, even 
though not all the factors in God—for example, his actual cognitions—can be necessary.” Divine, 14. 
Ogden adds, “The scriptural witness to God can be appropriately interpreted only if his nature is conceived 
neoclassically as having a contingent as well as necessary aspect.” Reality, 122–23. Cf. Ogden, “Toward,” 




and thus contingency, in God.
257
 This amounts to Hartshorne’s important distinction (not 
separation) between existence (that an entity is) and actuality (the particularities of the existing 
entity).
258
 Thus, God’s existence is necessary but his actuality is contingent.  
Accordingly, God may be absolute in some ways and yet relative, abstract in some ways 
and yet concrete, and so on. God as relative is “the integral totality of all ordinary causes and 
effects” yet as absolute he is “conceivable in abstraction from any particular, contingent 
being(s).”
259
 This divine dipolarity may be further analyzed in terms of a concrete aspect and an 
abstract aspect of God.
260
 Hartshorne builds on his previously discussed theory of relations, which 
maintains that a subject includes its object. Since the abstract may only function as object, the 
concrete (as subject) is inclusive of the abstract.
261
 In fact, the concrete aspect is all-inclusive.
262
 
                                                     
 
unique relation of God to existence (though one deduced from the normal relation plus the definition of 
perfection), let it be remembered that, by definition, God’s relation to every question is unique. He is the 
unique being, unique because maximal, the only unsurpassed and unsurpassable being (in senses A and 
R).” Vision, 309. Yet, if God is altogether unique, what sense does it make to try to describe him at all? 
257
 “In concrete or surrelative aspect, God, like all existents, has qualities that are accidental, that 
do not follow from any necessity of his essence.” Hartshorne, Divine, xiii. Moreover, “an infinity of 
accidents must belong to God.” Hartshorne, Vision, 132. 
258
 “That God exists is one with his essence and is an analytic truth. . . . But how, or in what actual 
state of experience or knowledge or will, he exists is contingent in the same sense as is our own existence” 
Hartshorne, Divine, 87. See Viney, “Philosophy.” 
259
 Hartshorne, Vision, 348. It should be noted that God requires particulars, though it matters not 
which particulars.  
260
 Hartshorne defines “the abstract” as “what can be abstracted, detached in thought and, at least 
potentially, in actuality, from various relationships or contexts, and yet in this detachment still be the 
identical entity.” Divine, 68. 
261
 “The concrete includes the abstract, and since the absolute or immutable is abstract, it can 
perfectly well constitute an aspect of a being which concretely or as a whole is relative and mutable.” 
Hartshorne, Reality, 168. Hartshorne contends that tradition reversed the relation between abstract and 
concrete. “The fact is that traditional theology makes the abstract the basis of the concrete, whereas the 
reverse relation is logically correct. The abstract is reached by abstracting from some aspects of the more 
concrete.” Vision, 113.  
262
 Therefore, “since the abstract is in the concrete, any concrete case contains the entire unlimited 
form.” Hartshorne, Divine, 144. Or put differently, “In their abstract or more or less general predicates 
things do not contain particular other things: but in their concrete being qualify each other reciprocally; and 




The supreme divine mind is both concrete (relative) and abstract (absolute), with the abstract 
aspect included in the concrete aspect. In this way God can be absolute in some ways without 
ruling out the divine relativity. God’s abstract or absolute aspect is the abstraction of his essence 
from his contingent actuality (concrete aspect).
263
 In this way God as concrete (relative) is an 
actual individual consciousness whereas God as abstract (absolute) is non-actual and included in 
the concrete.
264
 For example, God is absolute in that no other can surpass him, yet he is 
supremely relative in that he is all-inclusive and thus ever-growing according to all growth in the 
world.
265
 Thus God is always superior to every other individual (surrelative).
266
 In concrete 
                                                     
 
263
 Furthermore, in whatever respect God is “Absolute (in eminent sense),” he is the transcendent, 
perfect one, superior to all others, “the non-reflexive form . . . the abstract maximum; the self-unsurpassing 
surpasser of all others. (God as mere self-identical essence abstracted from the fullness of his accidents, the 
contingent contents of his awareness.)” Hartshorne, Reality, 116. Notice that this does not imply that God 
has an abstract nature in which he is absolute in all ways. On the contrary, the abstract (non-actual or 
potential) aspects of God are “abstractions” from the concrete (actual). On the other hand, God as concrete 
is relative. As “relative (in eminent sense; superrelative)” God is “the reflexive form . . . the concrete 
maximum; the self-surpassing surpasser of all, (God as self-contrasting life, process, or personality).” Ibid. 
“Relativity is the inclusive, concrete conception; non-relativity or non-reflexiveness (for as we have seen, 
these go together) is the reduction of this concrete conception to a partly negative and more abstract case.” 
Ibid., 115. 
264
 In this way Hartshorne technically distinguishes: (1) an absolute aspect which is abstract and 
non-actual, and (2) a relative aspect which is actual as well as “preeminently . . . mutable and passive.” 
Vision, 128. “The absolute, infinite side is abstract and concerns the divine potentiality or capacity to have 
values, while the finitude or relativity concerns the divine actuality.” Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 45. 
Moreover, the divine absolute aspect “is everything in the form of possibility, nothing whatever in the form 
of actuality. God merely as absolute is non-actual; God as person [relative] is at least actual.” “What we 
can clearly infer as to God is only his abstract essence, and the wholly abstract is no actual value.” 
Hartshorne, Divine, 92.  
265
 Hartshorne defines an absolute term as “abstract, object, cause, predecessor, constituent . . . in 
any relation in which the term is absolute.” A relative term is conversely “concrete, subject, effect, 
successor, whole.” Ibid., 70. 
266
 Surrelativism means “to be absolutely guaranteed superiority to every other individual that 
comes to exist.” Ibid., 21. This conception of supreme relativity is also called: dual transcendence, 
absolute-relative ontology, second-type theism, and most popularly process theology. In God’s concrete, 
all-inclusive, actuality, then, “God himself is a supreme relativist, his absoluteness consisting in the ideally 





actuality, God is supremely relative.
267
 This supreme relativity will be unpacked in the discussion 
of the God-world relationship further below.  
God’s Relationship to the World as Panentheism 
God as Supreme Subject and Supreme Object 
 With Hartshorne’s ontology of the world (panpsychism) and divine ontology (dipolar 
theism) in mind, attention must be turned to the relationship between God and the world 
(panentheism) so that one may better understand how God can include the world and yet be more 
than the world without equivocation. Once again, the world is in God, but is not identical or 
equivalent to God. God as the supreme mind is both internally and externally related to all other 
minds, yet distinct (non-identical) from other minds. As the supreme mind (and in accordance 
with the way of eminence) God is the supreme or universal subject. This means that God knows 
all other minds immediately (directly and non-mediated) with perfect distinctness. Since 
functioning as a subject entails an internal relation, God includes all objects as the all-knowing 
and thus all-inclusive mind.
268
 It is in this way that God is supremely relative, the “subject of all 
change,” being eminently affected according to his maximal flexibility.
269
 It must be understood 
that though God is the universal subject, related to all minds, he is not the only subject. All minds 
function as subjects and enter into relationships as part of the interdependent temporal process 
(creative synthesis). Moreover, being included in God does not remove the distinctness of the 
individual minds. They retain individual consciousness and some degree of freedom according to 
                                                     
 
267
 God is not merely relative but “super-relative, a ‘super-eminent’ type of relativity, since it 
involves, as we have seen, an element of absoluteness, of maximality.” Hartshorne, Reality, 113. For 
Ogden, God is “the eminently relative One.” Reality, 65.  
268
 Thus, “since the omniscient as such knows whatever else exists, the non-omniscient is 
contained in the omniscient as known in the knower.” Hartshorne, Divine, 88.  
269
 Maximal refers to the greatest degree of flexibility which is admirable and compossible. As 
maximally relative, God “can be all things to all things, whose all-sympathetic teleology assumes all the 




the nature of creativity as seen above. The same God is also the supreme or universal object. 
Once again, the language of universality does not mean that God is the sole object but rather that 
because of his greatness (eminence) he is an object (though not the only object) for every 
subject.
270
 Thus every mind is related to God, though lesser minds do not know God with perfect 
distinctness. Only God’s knowledge is perfectly distinct and thus absolute in adequacy.
271
 The 
knowledge of other minds is partial and not related to all. God is thus the only supreme mind and 
he functions both as the supreme subject and the supreme object and all other minds relate to him 
and to one another as lesser subjects and objects.
272
 As universal subject of the world, God is thus 
affected by every event of the world (supreme relativity). God as universal object means, 
conversely, that the world (every mind) is relative to, and thus affected by, God. Although God is 
relationally all-inclusive, he cannot be wholly identified with (pantheism), nor wholly 
differentiated from (classic theism), the world. He includes the world, yet is more than the world 
(panentheism). This relationship is further clarified in Hartshorne’s organic-social analogy. 
The Organic-Social Analogy 
Hartshorne’s organic-social analogy is itself an amalgamation of two analogies: the 
relationship between the human mind (soul) and body and a theory of social reality.
 273
 Since 
                                                     
 
270
 Hartshorne states, “Only God can be so universally important that no subject can ever wholly 
fail or ever have failed to be aware of him.” Divine, 70. Thus, God as “absolute is [also] object for all 
subjects.” Ibid. He states, “The absolute is a divine object in the divine subject and for the divine subject. It 
is an essence, not an existence.” Ibid., 87.  
271
 This is important because it means that no other mind includes God as a whole, having only 
partial and indistinct knowledge of him. Thus God is partially in other minds as their object, “in some sense 
God must be in man.” Ibid., 92. Yet only partially, for instance, human knowledge is often inadequate to its 
object and thus only inclusive of the limited relata that it knows (feels). However, it must be remembered 
that being known is an external relation and external relations do not affect the knower. Thus God is not 
affected by being the universal object but by being the universal subject. 
272
 Hence, “God is universal object as well as universal subject.” Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 110.  
273
 Interestingly, Hartshorne rejects numerous other analogies as useless, or worse. He dismisses 
any idea of God as monarch out of hand as “the most shockingly bad of all theological analogies.” Vision, 
203. He also forcefully rejects the analogy of God as father. Ibid., 175. Cf. Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 56. 




neither fully encapsulates Hartshorne’s metaphysics, he combines the two. In the mind-body 
analogy, the God-world relationship is analogous to the human mind-body relationship. He 
explains that humans have “immediate awareness of the feeling of our own cells.”
274
 In other 
words, the human mind is internally related to its body such that the mind is the “supercellular 
individual of the cellular society called a human body.”
275
 Likewise, “God is the super-creaturely 
individual of the inclusive creaturely society.”
276
 In this way the world is analogous to God’s 
body, which is “a society of individuals.”
277
 In this analogy, God’s mind is internally related to 
his body, such that he is immediately (non-mediated, direct) related to all. Accordingly, the 
cosmic body is a society of living individuals, specifically of minds (panpsychism).
278
 God is 
more than the world in a way analogous to the human consciousness, which Hartshorne considers 
to be more than the mere human body.
279
 The world is in God, but God is more than the world, he 
is the supreme individual of the world.
280
  
                                                     
 
by, her child and delighting in its growing creativity and freedom.” Ibid., 58. Yet, even this lacks the 
sufficient “radical superiority.” Vision, 202. 
274
 Ibid., 289. “The living human body is a society of cells (relatively low-grade individuals) plus 
one high-grade individual, the human personality whose body it is.” Hartshorne, Reality, 133. “Thus a 
body, to the best of our knowledge, is really a world of individuals, and a mind, if the body is one having a 
mind (or one capable of thinking and feeling), is to that body something like an indwelling God.” 
Hartshorne, Vision, 177. 
275
 Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 59. 
276
 Ibid. Yet “God has no separate sense organs or muscles, because all parts of the world body 
directly perform both functions for him. In this sense the world is God’s body.” Hartshorne, Vision, 185. 
Rather, “every physical individual in the Body becomes as a nerve or brain cell to the Soul.” Hartshorne, 
Omnipotence, 121. Thus “God’s volition is related to the world as though every object in it were to him a 
nerve-muscle, and his omniscience is related to it as though every object were a muscle-nerve.” Hartshorne, 
Vision, 185. Accordingly, “God is that mind which enjoys the fullest intimacy with all things, and therefore 
in an undiluted sense has all the world for body.” Ibid., 200. 
277
 Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 59.  
278
 Hartshorne, Vision, 155.  
279
 It must be understood that the soul is not “located” in the same manner as visual objects. Minds 
are neither “simply outside the space-time world” nor located at “a mere point in that world.” Hartshorne, 
“Panpsychism,” 445–46. 
280




However, the mind-body analogy is insufficient for Hartshorne’s system because the 
relations in the mind-body analogy are not obvious.
281
 Since God is internally related to all minds 
and thus all-inclusive, he has immediate (non-mediated, direct) relations. This is illustrated in the 
social analogy which illustrates that all reality consists of the interaction and interdependency of 
minds and as such reality is essentially and undeniably social.
282
 The “social” is defined as “the 
appeal of life for life, of experience for experience. It is ‘shared experience,’ the echo of one 
experience in another.”
283
 This shared experience, or feeling, is the fundamental characteristic of 
Hartshorne’s social analogy. He describes it alternately as “sympathetic understanding” whereby 
we know “others most intimately.”
284
 Importantly, the social analogy illustrates that reality is 
“pan-psychistic, pan-indeterministic (or pan-creationistic), pan-relativistic, and pan-temporalistic, 
in the sense that every concrete being [including God] has psychic, free or creative, relative, and 
temporal aspects.”
285
 Under this analogy “the only conceivable God is a ‘social being whose 
creatures must also be social throughout.’”
286
 However, the social analogy (in its usual form) is 
likewise an imperfect analogy since it “does not explain how one mind is able to communicate its 
                                                     
 
clarity. Again, God is not to be simply identified with the world (pantheism) but rather the world is 
included in God and God is more than world (panentheism).  
281
 “For while it is a fact that mind has immediate relations to the body it cannot be said that the 
nature of these relations is obvious.” Hartshorne, Vision, 186. 
282
 For instance “there is no such thing as the mere individual, conscious of himself as such, to 
whom membership in one or more groups may be added as a complication. We all recognize that to be a 
human individual, and to be a member of at least one or two groups of such individuals, are inseparable 
aspects of one and the same thing.” Hartshorne, Reality, 53.  
283
 Ibid., 34. 
284
 Hartshorne, Vision, 186. “Hence nothing can be social that is without experience. The 
minimum of experience, let us further agree, is feeling. Creatures are social if they feel, and feel in relation 
to each others’ feelings.” Hartshorne, Reality, 34.  
285
 Ibid., 135. 
286




feeling to another immediately.”
287
 Hartshorne thus posits the combined organic-social analogy in 
order to make the social relationship explicit while preserving the immediacy (unmediated nature) 
of the relations; hence “the mind-body relationship is immediately social.”
288
  
The Supreme Compound Individual 
To better understand the precise nature of God’s relationship to the world, one must go 
beyond the analogies to the reality of God as supreme individual of the world, his divine relativity 
and activity, and the nature of the divine-world interaction. First, the inseparability of God from 
the world must be recognized (panentheism). God is essentially related to the world and thus 
dependent upon it. In accordance with the axioms of eminence, perfection, and necessity (closely 
related to his ontological argument) Hartshorne maintains that the possibility of a world that is 
external to God’s whole being would entail the unacceptable conclusion that there is something 
greater than God (the world plus God).
289
 Thus God and the world are inseparable. Although God 
does not need any particular world, he does need some world in order to exist.
290
 This means that 
                                                     
 
287
 Hartshorne, Vision, 186–87. 
288
 Ibid., 187. In the analogy “cells possess humble forms of feeling or desire to reach the position 
that the human mind influences and is influenced by them through immediate (there is nothing to mediate 
it) sharing of feeling, with much indistinctness on both sides.” Ibid., 188. He considers this an entirely 
defensible and appropriate analogy that demonstrates “the doctrine that the world is God’s body, to whose 
members he has immediate social relations, and which are related to each other, directly or indirectly, 
exclusively by social relations.” Ibid., 192. “Is this not the principle, and the only principle with any 
analogy in our experience, by which divine love (free of the ‘indistinctness’ i.e., imperfection) could know 
and sway the world?” Ibid., 188. 
289
 “If the relation of the absolute to the world really fell wholly outside the absolute, then this 
relation would necessarily fall within some further and genuinely single entity which embraced both the 
absolute and the world and the relations between them—in other words, within an entity greater than the 
absolute.” Ibid., 238. Cf. Hartshorne, Divine, 79. For more information regarding the ontological argument 
of Hartshorne, see Hartshorne, Logic, 28–117; idem, “What Did Anselm Discover?” in The Many-Faced 
Argument (ed. J. Hick and A. C. McGill; New York: Macmillan, 1967); and idem, “Rationale of the 
Ontological Proof,” ThTo 20 (1963): 278–83. For another analysis of Hartshorne’s view see John B. Cobb 
Jr., “‘Perfection Exists’: A Critique of Charles Hartshorne,” Religion in Life 32 (1963): 294–304, and 
Eugene H. Peters, “Charles Hartshorne and the Ontological Argument,” Process Studies 14 (1984): 11–20.  
290
 M. L. Taylor, God, 354. “It is one thing to say God could exist without us, or without any 
creature or group of creatures you wish to specify; it is logically quite another to say he could exist were 




God could not have created the world ex nihilo, rather it is necessary that some world always 
existed.
291
 God is thus dependent upon a partially free and undetermined world.
292
 This 
conception of God’s essential relation to the world requires a drastic departure from utter 
determinism (traditional omnipotence) to a broad indeterminism where both God and non-divine 
entities are free and partially determined according to the nature of social relativity (the 
aforementioned creative synthesis of minds). 
As the supreme compound individual, Hartshorne calls God “the supreme case of 
personality.”
293
 God is the supreme person, an “individual conscious being.”
294
 However, in 
Hartshorne’s view of temporality as the succession of units, a “conscious being” is itself 
                                                     
 
have been nothing. Hartshorne finds this to be a logical impossibility: “To ask about the possibility of there 
being no creative process is to ask about the possibility of there being no possibility, even logical, for 
thought has no other function than to express, guide, or enrich that process.” Hartshorne, “Could?” 26.  
291
 Hartshorne sees “creation” as “supreme influence on growth” and sees this as a possible 
interpretation of Genesis. Vision, 193. The world is not eternal but is created out of a still “earlier world.” 
Ibid., 230.  
292
 We are “integral self-determined members of his present reality, rivulets poured into his ‘ocean 
of feeling.’” Hartshorne, Divine, xvii-xviii.  
293
 Ibid., 25. “What is a person if not a being qualified and constituted by social relations, relations 
to other persons? And what is God if not the supreme case of personality?” Ibid., 25. Further, he states that 
God is “truly individual and personal.” Hartshorne, Vision, 250. God is a concrete person for “the abstract 
does not act, only the concrete acts or is a person.” Hartshorne, Divine, 143. This view of divine personality 
has close affinities to Whitehead as well as Buddhism. Hartshorne, “Personal,” 209. 
294
 Hartshorne, Vision, 249. Since “individual” can simply mean a group considered as a unit, 
Hartshorne is consistent with his ontology to define personhood in this way. For him, individuals “are best 
understood as societies of events which are extended in time.” Ronald Steph Cole-Turner, “God’s 
Experience: The Trinitarian Theology of Jurgen Moltmann in Conversation with Charles Hartshorne” 
(Ph.D. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1983), 177. This alone rules out a trinitarian conception of 
God. However, some wonder how an all-sensitive, supremely relative being can yet be considered a 
person? See Albert Shalom and John C. Robertson Jr., “Hartshorne and the Problem of Personal Identity,” 
Process Studies 8 (1978): 169–179, and Randall E. Auxier, “God, Process, and Persons: Charles 
Hartshorne and Personalism,” Process Studies 27 (1998): 175–99. For an excellent discussion of 
Hartshorne’s view of God’s personhood in contrast to personalism see Hartshorne, “Personal,” and Peter A. 
Bertocci, “Hartshorne on Personal Identity: A Personalist Critique,” Process Studies 2 (1972): 216–21. One 
primary difference may be summarized, “The important personalistic thesis is that the (temporal) person, 
whenever he begins to be, is the kind of being who is never a sequence or a succession of units 
[Hartshorne’s view] but a unity who can succeed himself by virtue of his ability to relate his world to 
himself on his own terms (within limits).” Bertocci, “Hartshorne, ” 220. Cf. James Porter Moreland, “An 




actualized in a specific moment. The conscious being of the next successive moment is thus not 
identical with the conscious being of the previous moment, but rather is ever-changing in 
temporal process. This means that the “absolute identity of the concrete or particular is given in 
an event or occasion, not in a thing enduring through time, like a person or a body.”
295
 This is 
what Hartshorne calls “genetic identity” as opposed to “strict identity.”
296
 Genetic identity is “the 
abstract description of a sequence or group of occasions,” whereas strict identity requires that 
God in moment A and God in moment B be totally identical, which militates against the notion of 
an ever-changing temporality.
297
 Nevertheless, God does endure through time. He is the supreme 
conscious being, “an enduring society of actualities, [though] not a single actuality.”
298
 God thus 
has an enduring character (abstract) actualized (concrete) in successive instances.
299
 God “is 
concretely and in part new each moment, and each new divine self sympathizes with its 
predecessors and . . . anticipated successors.”
300
 God is able to sympathize with the past because 
                                                     
 
295
 Hartshorne, Reality, 102.  
296
 “The merely relative identity of the latter may be called, with Levin and Scholz, genetic 
identity, Genidentitat.” Ibid. Genetic identity is different from strict identity. Strict identity would hold that 
John Doe as a child and John Doe as an adult are identical identities; genetic identity holds a looser form of 
identity over the discontinuous instances of time. Thus he holds, “But John Smith on Monday and John 
Smith on Tuesday are two realities, numerically as well as qualitatively distinguished.” Hartshorne, 
Omnipotence, 104–5. 
297
 J. P. Mahoney, “Hartshorne, ” 39. Cf. Hartshorne, “Strict,” 244. 
298
 Charles Hartshorne, “The Dipolar Conception of Deity,” The Review of Metaphysics 21(1967): 
287. This is in contrast to Whitehead who does define God as a “single actuality” enduring through time. 
Hartshorne comments, “Here I think Whitehead was just mistaken.” Ibid., 287. Whether God is a single 
actual entity or an enduring society of actualities is a disputed point among process theists. For instance, 
Griffin considers the former to be Whitehead’s “greatest blunder.” David Ray Griffin, Reenchantment 
without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 
152. 
299
 For Hartshorne, this is analogous to the human person which is an ever-changing being, 
specifically “a different person every moment; but equally he is the same person every moment.” Vision, 
109. Here Whitehead’s concept of the self is valuable. A man is a new “actual entity” in every moment or 
“specious present.” Character, or the man as self-identical, is an abstraction from the sequence of concrete 
experiences each with its own intrinsic “subject” or “agent.” Hartshorne, Reality, 209. Hartshorne thus 
explicitly rejects an ontology grounded in substance. Rather, “events are the final nouns.” “Strict,” 251. 
This may be called event pluralism; see Hartshorne, Creative, 173–204. 
300




the determinate past is permanent in God’s perfectly adequate memory, thus there is an 
“immortality of the past.”
301
 God as the enduring society of actualities is the supreme compound 
individual of the world. God therefore includes within himself the entirety of reality. God, the 
supreme mind, is supremely relative as universal subject and is affected by all (supremely 
moved). 
However, it might be wondered how God can be the compound individual of the world 
and yet not be identical with the world. In other words, in what way is God more than the world 
(panentheism)? First, if it is true that if God is supremely relative and all-inclusive, then we are 
members of God and (to a partial extent) vice versa.
302
 As supremely relative, God is all-
inclusive. Conversely, to the extent that any non-divine subject knows God (which never amounts 
to perfect knowledge of God), the known relata is constitutive of and thus included in the non-
                                                     
 
discrete instances. For Hartshorne, “the result is that Whitehead has, not a less but a more, ‘personal’ deity 
than Augustine or Thomas, if personal means being an individual with a character expressible freely in acts 
of knowledge, choice, and love. God ‘shares with each creature its actual world’; he takes into his actuality, 
as ‘consequent’ upon process, the life of the world, somewhat as we (in infinitely less adequate fashion) 
take into ourselves experiences of our friends. He does not plot it all out in eternity, and with a single 
moveless stare register the result.” Reality, 202. However, some have argued that Whitehead’s doctrine 
would be more coherent without God. See Donald W. Sherburne, “Whitehead without God,” in Process 
Philosophy and Christian Faith (ed. D. Brown, R. James, and G. Reeves; Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1971), and idem, “The ‘Whitehead without God’ Debate: The Rejoinder,” Process Studies 1 (1971): 91–
100. For a critique of such a view, see John B. Cobb Jr., “The ‘Whitehead without God’ Debate: The 
Critique,” Process Studies 1 (1971): 91–100. 
301
 Hartshorne, Vision, 129. “To say an event is ‘past’ for God does not mean that it is absent from 
his present awareness; it means that it is not the ‘final increment’ of determinate detail contained in that 
awareness, the final increment being that which involves all the others though it is involved by none, the 
‘next to last’ being that which involves all the others but one, and is involved solely by that one, etc. To say 
a past experience is part of present experience is not a contradiction, for the date of present experience as a 
whole is the date of its final increment, not of its non-final increments, this being the meaning of date.” 
Ibid.  
302
 “Are we and God members one of another? Again the answer is, Yes, but with a difference in 
principle in this supreme case, as contrast it to ordinary ones.” Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 110. 
Interestingly, Hartshorne sees the divine mind or soul as analogous to Plato’s “world soul” in the Timaeus, 
yet this should not be taken to mean that Hartshorne adopts the two-worlds duality of Plato. See ibid., 134. 
However, it should be noted that each member of God’s body has a minute impact on God as a whole just 
as “each cell in our body is almost as nothing in comparison with ourselves as conscious individuals.” Ibid., 
55. Interestingly Hartshorne appeals to Plato’s analogy of an ideal society in The Republic for support. 




divine knower. This co-inherence is illustrated in the organic-social analogy of Hartshorne.
303
 
However this does not detract from the individuality of God or that of other minds. 
This leads us to the question of extension and the locus of consciousness. It has already 
been established that Hartshorne builds on panpsychism such that all reality consists of minds 
interrelating. In this system, extension is thus a property of interrelating minds, but nothing can 
thus be reduced to mere matter, in fact “‘matter’ is a form of manifestation of ‘mind’ . . . and is 
nothing simply on its own.”
304
 While it is true that aggregates (groups of minds that lack a 
compound individual consciousness) do not feel, the aggregate is nevertheless made up of 
individual minds that do feel.
305
 All actuality can thus only be reduced to interrelating minds. 
There is no mind-matter dualism in Hartshorne’s panpsychism. If minds, then, are not located in 
matter, where are they? For Hartshorne, minds are not located outside the spatio-temporal world, 
nor are they located in a point in the spatio-temporal world, but they occupy an area (included in 
God himself). God as the compound individual of the world, the supreme mind, is likewise not 
located outside the spatio-temporal world, or in a specific location, but overlaps the entire area of 
spatio-temporality.
306
 This is understood according to the view of God as universal subject and 
                                                     
 
303
 “The conception of God which our argument leads to is that of a social being, dominant or 
ruling over the world society, yet not merely from outside, in a tyrannical or non-social way; but rather as 
that member of the society which exerts the supreme conserving and coordinating influence.” Hartshorne, 
Reality, 40. 
304
 Hartshorne, “Personal,” 210. For Hartshorne, even “space is essentially a system of relations” 
such that “the volume even of singulars would be meaningless apart from some community of singulars.” 
“Panpsychism,” 445–46. Thus, “extendedness is then not a property capable of distinguishing ‘mere 
matter’ from mind, since minds, as entering into communal relations with one another, must exhibit 
extendedness.” Ibid.  
305
 In fact “all individuals apparent to the senses are compounded of numerous much smaller 
individuals.” Hartshorne, “Compound,” 194. 
306
 “A mind, according to most panpsychists, is not simply outside the space-time world. It is also 
not at a mere point in that world, and nothing remains than that it be in an area of the world.” Hartshorne, 
“Panpsychism,” 445–46. See also Hartshorne, “Compound.” Cf. John B. Cobb Jr., “Overcoming 
Reductionism,” in Existence and Actuality: Conversations with Charles Hartshorne (ed. J. B. Cobb and F. 
I. Gamwell; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). Hartshorne’s view is in distinction from 




universal object. The whole world is inclusive to God as universal subject, thus nothing can be 
outside him. As universal object, however, God is partially included in every mind and since 
interrelating minds are extended, the divine supreme mind overlaps the entire spatio-temporal 
area. Once again, this does not detract from the individuality of the supreme or lesser minds. God 
and the world are not identical; the world is included in God but God is more than the world 
(panentheism). Just as lesser minds always retain at least partial creativity (independence and 
self-determination) as individuals, God likewise retains a partial independence and self-
determination as the supreme compound individual. God’s consciousness is not reducible to the 
parts of the world that are included in himself as the supreme mind. Thus God and the world are 
inseparably related, yet not identical.  
Divine Knowledge as Supreme Relativity 
As the supremely relative compound individual of the world God is internally related to 
all minds and thus the immediate feeler of all feelings. As such, God’s knowledge is perfectly 
adequate to the actual state of the world. This is in contrast to the view of classic theism, which 
inexplicably reverses the relation between subject and object only when it relates to God himself 
by positing that God as subject changes the object of knowledge while God himself remains 
unaffected.
307
 Classic theism thus makes God’s knowledge omni-causal and thus “constitutive” of 
the world itself, requiring sheer determinism.
308
 Hartshorne considers this traditional view of 
wholly transcendent, unrelated knowledge to be unfounded. Rather, God is the universal subject, 
partially dependent upon the world but not equivalent to it. This provides an example of the 
manner in which the same being can be supremely absolute and supremely relative, considering 
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 Hartshorne, Divine, 8. “It is admitted by Thomists, for example, that God’s knowledge is to his 
objects as the objects of human knowledge are to the knower! . . . Here the analogy is exactly in reverse.” 
Hartshorne, Vision, 135. He explains that according to classic theism “God knows all things, but in such 
fashion (it was held) that there is zero relativity or dependence in God as knower, and maximal dependence 
in the creatures as known.” Hartshorne, Divine, 8.  
308




Hartshorne’s supposition that the relative (concrete) includes the absolute (abstract) within 
itself.
309
 This “‘panentheism,’ distinguishes God from the ‘all’ and yet makes him include all” in 
accordance with the supreme relativity.
310
 Although God is supremely relative and ever-changing, 
Hartshorne nevertheless holds that “there is in God something absolute or nonrelative, 
[specifically] his cognitive adequacy.”
311
 In other words, God’s cognitive adequacy is absolute in 
the sense that it is always perfectly adequate to the actual state of the world in any instant, and 
thus absolutely relative.  
Since God is the supremely relative universal subject, the content of divine knowledge is 
provided by the “total of actuality.”
312
 God’s knowledge, to be knowledge at all under 
Hartshorne’s definition, must depend directly upon the state of the world in a given instant.
313
 
Adequate knowledge is defined in terms of perfect and immediate (unmediated) feeling where 
“the adequate knower himself is relative, relative to what he knows.”
 314
 In fact, Hartshorne states 
that feeling is “the only adequate knowledge.”
315
 Thus, true knowledge amounts to the knower 
feeling an object’s feeling as “one’s own” or immediately.
316
 Yet, it is limited to present and past 
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 “So God, in his relative aspect, is the only unqualifiedly inclusive being, as, in his absolute 
aspect, he is the only unqualifiedly exclusive one.” Ibid., 94.  
310
 Hartshorne, Vision, 348. Nevertheless, “it can be said without equivocation that God is the 
totality of reality in that God includes all of reality within Godself.” M. L. Taylor, God, 345. 
311
 Hartshorne, Divine, 122. 
312
 “God knows as actual whatever is actual.” Ibid., 14–15. In this way, “omniscience is an infinite 
class of relationships.” Ibid., 121. 
313
 “God’s knowledge differentially implies, and thus in our defined sense is relative to, the actual 
state of all existence, i.e., its relativity is unrestricted in scope.” Ibid., 11. 
314
 Ibid., 121–22. It must be remembered that feeling for Hartshorne includes even cognition. See 
the discussion of feeling regarding panpsychism above. 
315
 Ibid., xvii. “There seems but one way to know a quality, and that is to feel it.” Hartshorne, 
Vision, 223. For a discussion of the importance of “feeling” in Hartshorne’s ontology see Keeling L. 
Bryant, “Feeling as a Metaphysical Category: Hartshorne from an Analytical View,” Process Studies 6 
(1976): 51–66. 
316
 Hartshorne comments, “If we saw the individuality and vividness of the feeling, we would have 




knowledge since the future is indeterminate, and, as such, Hartshorne contends that it is 
unknowable as not “there to be known.”
317
 Nevertheless, such perfectly adequate knowledge of 
the present and past is immediate, with “no error or ignorance” and no vagueness whatsoever, in 
contrast to the indistinctness of the knowledge of non-divine subjects.
318
 Omniscience, then, is 
direct knowledge with “a certain completeness and clarity of experience” and reality is “the 
content of such an experience.”
319
 Because God is internally related to all and thus all-inclusive, 
God changes and grows in accordance with the feelings of the world, that is, all of reality.
320
 
Nothing escapes God’s universal knowledge (feeling).
321
 This adequate knowledge (omniscience) 
is all-inclusive and immediate feeling in accordance with the divine nature of transcendental 
relativity. In this way, God is supremely relative to the world as the universal subject. Yet, how 
does God then act? This leads to the consideration of divine will and action. 
                                                     
 
is in fact possible. For instance, how could God sympathize with the feelings of temporary life and finitude 
when the divine life is eternal? Moreover, “the idea of God being able to fully appreciate ignorance seems 
categorically impossible.” “Is Divine Relativity Possible? Charles Hartshorne on God’s Sympathy with the 
World,” Process Studies 28 (1999): 99.  
317
 Hartshorne, Vision, 98. Cf. Hartshorne, Reality, 201. The “conception of a knower who sees 
past, present, and future—or all time from eternity—sees them but reserves no right to make further 
choices with respect to them, is, I submit, a mythical one which fails to describe even what we wish 
knowledge to be.” Ibid., 91. Cf. D. D. Williams, Spirit, 128. 
318
 Hartshorne, Vision, 38. “All we have to do to conceive omniscience is to banish all such 
vagueness from the idea of experience, but leave that vagueness which defines the futurity of what is 
future.” Ibid., 328. 
319
 Ibid., 330. Hartshorne refers to this as “absolute distinctness.” Ibid., 325. Once again we see the 
importance of the absolute as a category of logical reasoning. Hartshorne explicitly tells us that God’s 
knowledge is not “discursive” but his “field of distinct perception is the de facto whole itself. No thinking 
is thus needed to get to the whole from the part.” Omnipotence, 93. This implies that God does not “think” 
at all but merely perceives absolutely in each new instance the whole of actuality that is there to be known. 
320
 Hartshorne, Vision, 14. Such growth includes the “possibility of an increase in aesthetic 
satisfaction derived from his knowledge.” Ibid., 38. Thus, God “finds his own joy in sharing their lives, 
lived according to their own free decisions, not fully anticipated by any detailed plan of his own.” 
Hartshorne, Divine, xvii.  
321





Divine Power as Persuasive Power 
As has been seen, God is the supreme creative being, yet he is not the only creative being 
in the indeterministic creative synthesis where each mind plays a part as co-creator of reality. 
Although each mind is undetermined, every mind is also dependent upon other minds, including 
the divine mind. Since God is dependent (as the supremely relative universal subject), he is 
partially determined by other minds in the world.
322
 Thus, he is not omnipotent in the classical 
sense of omnicausality. Nevertheless, though God is moved by all events of the world, he retains 
freedom in reaction to events, such that he is partially self-determined. Thus, God does possess 
the power to act freely, although, like others, his options are severely limited by other minds.
323
 
Thus God’s eminent passivity does not equate to total passivity. 
God can and does act, but he acts not through coercion (unilateral determinism), but 
through persuasion.
324
 In fact, since an effect is only partially determined by its cause, there is no 
such thing as sheer coercion. In this way, God may choose his action or reaction, but his choice 
does not overrule all other choices. Thus, in direct contrast to classic theism, God’s will does not 
determine reality, but is the most powerful will among other wills.
325
 Thus, every entity always 
                                                     
 
322
 In this way, the world partially determines God since “by sympathetic union with our volitions 
God wants, not by choice, what we choose to want.” Ibid., 291. Yet God remains free to respond and “the 
radical difference between God and us implies that our influence upon him a slight, while his influence 
upon us is predominant.” Hartshorne, Divine, 141. 
323
 “God presumably wills much that we do not will, but he cannot force our will and hence must 
enjoy and suffer what we enjoy and suffer on the basis of our limited and faulty willing.” David Platt, 
“Does Whitehead’s God Possess a Moral Will?” Process Studies 5 (1975): 120.  
324
 God “is not a supreme autocrat, but a universal agent of ‘persuasion.’” Hartshorne, Divine, xvii, 
138. See John W. Lansing, “Persuasive and Coercive Power in Process Metaphysics,” Process Studies 3 
(1973): 153–57. “God must suffer all things, for he must participate in all things to know them, but he 
cannot be said to choose all things, for he has granted choices also to the creatures.” Hartshorne, Vision, 
197.  
325
 Thus, it can be said that God passively wills the desires of other creatures but since all wills are 
not compossible he actively wills in response to the decisions of other creatures. “God passively wishes 
with and for the creatures what they wish for themselves, but his activity lies in deciding how to resolve the 
conflict of interests which he has thus taken into himself.” Ibid., 292. As such, our interpersonal conflicts 
are “through the divine sympathy made God’s problem of self-harmonization.” Ibid., 293. Although this 




has the ability to respond to a cause within a limited range of options.
326
 Persuasion refers to non-
unilateral self-determination which requires other minds to react to God’s movement. Persuasion 
operates according to the notion of God as supreme object; the world is affected by knowing God 
(however indistinctly), such that when God moves himself, he thereby creates the necessary 
condition (but not the sufficient condition) for the effect of the world as social process.
327 
In other 
words, God acts upon the world by persuasion, by moving himself, such that every mind is 
required to react to his self-movement while retaining some degree of freedom among (limited) 
options.
328
 Because he is universal subject, he is the most moved mover, but the same God is also 




Since all minds possess some creative power, God cannot possess all the power in the 
world; he is not omnipotent in the sense of having “all the power that exists united into one 
individual power.”
330
 Thus as opposed to classic theism, he cannot enact his will unilaterally. 
                                                     
 
326
 Hartshorne states, “An object always influences, but cannot dictate, the awareness of itself” and 
thus “we influence God by our experiences but do not thereby deprive him of freedom in his response to 
us.” Divine, 141. 
327
 “Then, as this [divine] object changes, we are compelled to change in response.” Ibid., 139. 
Further, “God orders the universe, according to panentheism, by taking into his own life all the currents of 
feeling in existence. He is the most irresistible of influences precisely because he is himself the most open 
to influence. In the depths of their hearts all creatures (even those able to ‘rebel’ against him) defer to God 
because they sense him as the one who alone is adequately moved by what moves them.” Ibid., xvii.  
328
 In other words, due to God’s intimate connection to all minds “to alter us he has only to alter 
himself. God’s unique power over us is his partly self-determined being as our inclusive object of 
awareness.” Ibid., 139. He compares this with Plato’s “self moved mover of others.” Thus, “the total or 
concrete divine mover is self-moved, as Plato correctly said.” Ibid., 142. But this self-movement does not 
exclude that God is also the most moved. 
329
 David Basinger sees some inconsistency in the process account. He makes a distinction 
between “strong” and “weak” coercion, arguing that coercion in the weak sense happens inevitably in 
human experience and thus it would be expected that God would also exercise the weak sense of coercion. 
Thus one can grant that God does not totally determine the world and yet leave many questions of God’s 
influence in the world unanswered. Divine Power in Process Theism: A Philosophical Critique (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1988), and idem, “Human Coercion: A Fly in the Process Ointment?” 
Process Studies 15 (1986): 161–71. 
330




Rather, God has all the power that is compossible with the pan-indeterminism and pan-relativity 
of the world and in this sense he is “the greatest possible power.”
331
 God’s power is thus not 
purely absolute as in classic theism but rather “absolute in adequacy,” it is unrivaled, eminent 
power. Any individual can influence it, none can threaten it.”
332
 Accordingly, God “takes account 
of the freedom of others, and determines events only by setting appropriate limits to the self-
determining of others.”
 333
 God tolerates the maximal indeterminism that could yet be considered 
harmonious according to his maximal relativity.
334
 He thus orders the world so as to prearrange 
“the course of events so far as it would be friendly to do so.”
335
 Yet, such prearrangement is 
severely limited by the nature of social reality.
336
 
                                                     
 
piece of unconscious blasphemy, condemning God to a dead world, probably not distinguishable from no 
world at all.” Omnipotence, 18. Accordingly, “Whitehead saw an ultimate ethical contrast between brute 
force or coercion and persuasive love.” Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (Harmondsworth, 
UK: Penguin Books, 1942), 26.  
331
 Hartshorne, Vision, 30. God’s “power is absolutely maximal, the greatest possible, but even the 
greatest possible power is still one power among others, is not the only power. God can do everything that a 
God can do, everything that could be done by ‘a being with no possible superior.’” Hartshorne, Divine, 
138. Accordingly, for D. D. Williams, “the power of God, however, is not that of absolute omnipotence to 
do anything. It is the power to do everything that the loving ground of all being can do to express and to 
communicate and fulfil the society of loving beings. God’s power expresses his love, it does not violate it.” 
Spirit, 137. Thus Richard Rice states that “God’s power simply is the appeal of unsurpassable love.” Rice, 
“Process Theism and the Open View of God: The Crucial Difference,” in Searching for an Adequate God: 
A Dialogue between Process and Free Will Theists (ed. D. R. Griffin, J. B. Cobb, and C. H. Pinnock; 
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000), 186.  
332
 Hartshorne, Divine, 134. The “adequacy of cosmic power” means “power to do for the cosmos 
(the field of divine social relationships) all desirable things that could be done by one universal or cosmic 
agent.” Ibid. “Adequate cosmic power is power to set conditions which are maximally favorable to 
desirable decisions on the part of local agents.” Ibid., 135. For Hartshorne, “adequacy is the measure of 
greatness.” Ibid., 134.  
333
 Ibid., xvii, 138. “God is supremely sensitive. . . . In his rule he allots to us a privilege of 
participation in governing which goes infinitely beyond a mere ballot. It means that with every decision, 
however secret, that takes place in our minds we are casting a vote which will surely be taken account of 
and will surely produce effects in the divine decisions.” Ibid., 51.  
334
 See Charles Hartshorne, “God as Composer-Directer, Enjoyer, and, in a Sense, Player of the 
Cosmic Drama,” Process Studies 30 (2001): 242–60. Cf. Hartshorne, Vision, 265. Hartshorne is adamantly 
opposed to determinism. For him, a predestinating God is an “absolute tyrant.” Ibid., 105. Cf. Hartshorne, 
Omnipotence, 67. He asks, “Are we to worship the Heavenly Father of Jesus . . . or to worship a heavenly 
king, that is, a cosmic despot?” Ibid., 14.  
335




This leads directly to the question of theodicy, which seems to motivate Hartshorne’s 
axiomatic conception of pan-indeterminism.
337
 God cannot prevent evil in the world, but rather 
enforces “a maximal ratio of chances of good to chances of evil.”
338
 Conflict is inevitable due to 
the pan-indeterministic nature of social reality and “tragedy is thus inherent in value.”
339
 
Accordingly, God is not responsible for evil; theodicy is merely a “false problem” that stems 
from “a faulty or non-social definition of omnipotence.”
340
 God is rather the one “to whom all 
hearts are completely open because his sensitive sympathy is absolute in flexibility.”
341
 This has a 
deep impact on the concept of love as shall be seen. As the universal object God is the supreme 
agent of persuasion, himself partially determined, yet nevertheless the most important co-creator 
of the interdependent creative synthesis of social process.
342
  
                                                     
 
(as any good government will do, in its drastically more limited providence).” Hartshorne, Reality, 41.  
336
 “There is as much that God cannot make us do or be as there is that we cannot make him do or 
be, and the former ‘cannot’ expresses our deficiency, not God’s.” Hartshorne, Vision, 293. Accordingly, 
“the [simplistic] alternative, chance or providence, is invalid.” Hartshorne, Divine, 137. 
337
 See Hartshorne, Logic, 161–90, and idem, Beyond, 111–64. This is at least partially due to a 
polemic stemming from the issue of theodicy. For instance, Hartshorne contends, “The notion of an all-
arranging, chance-excluding Providence is doubly tragic; it is cruel, for it compels us to try to imagine that 
our worst tortures are deliberately contrived for our own or someone’s good by an allegedly all-loving 
being, and it is dangerous, for it suggests that we need not use our own resources to avert evil where 
possible and to help others in danger and privation.” Reality, 107. Moreover, “predestination, in the sense 
of determination by something less than personal will, would destroy the meaning of love.” D. D. Williams, 
Spirit, 116. He explicitly rules out the compatibilistic view for stating that “power to cause someone to 
perform by his own choice an act precisely defined by the cause is meaningless.” Hartshorne, Divine, 135. 
338
 Hartshorne, Reality, 107. 
339
 Ibid. Because of the different interests of different organisms “conflict and suffering cannot be 
wholly excluded.” Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 127. Thus, there “is no such mixture which would guarantee 
the elimination of evil; for if there is any freedom in a multiplicity of beings, there is potentiality of discord 
between them, a potentiality the total nonrealization of which is infinitely unlikely.” Hartshorne, Reality, 
190. For “some risk there must be if there is to be any opportunity, any existence in the social sense.” Ibid., 
41.  
340
 Ibid., 41.  
341
 Hartshorne, Vision, 265. 
342
 In this way, “God can rule the world and order it, setting optimal limits for our free action, 
presenting himself as essential object, so characterized as to weigh the possibilities of response in the 




Thus Hartshorne’s highly complex metaphysical system presents the supreme, all-
inclusive mind, which is the compound individual of the world, not identical or equivalent to the 
world, but more than the world. The divine-world relationship is understood within the context of 
the indeterministic, relativistic, spatio-temporalistic, panpsychism. All reality is accordingly an 
interdependent creative synthesis of partially determined and self-determined minds interacting as 
both subjects and objects in process. Minds are related both internally and externally where the 
subject of an internal relation includes and is thus affected by its relata and the object of an 
external relation remains unaffected. God is the supreme subject, internally related to all and thus 
supremely relative and all-inclusive, as well as the supreme object, an object (but not the sole 
object) for every subject. The supreme mind as universal subject and object corresponds to the 
dual transcendence (dipolarity) of the divine nature wherein God eminently exemplifies the 
admirable characteristics of metaphysical contraries. These poles are ontologically 
distinguishable yet ontically inseparable such that God is the absolute-relative, abstract-concrete, 
potential-actual, necessary-contingent, universal-particular, supreme compound individual. For 
example, God is absolute in that no other can surpass him, yet he is relative in that he is all-
inclusive and thus ever-growing according to all growth in the world. Just as the subject includes 
its object, God as the universal subject (concrete and relative) includes the universal object 
(abstract and absolute). He is the self-surpassing surpasser of all, the transcendental relativity. 
As has been seen, panentheism means that God is internally related to (and thus all-
inclusive of) the world, the supremely relative, concrete subject. It also means that God is 
(imperfectly) known by the world, the absolute, abstract object. Since God is internally related to 
all minds and thus all-inclusive, he has immediate (non-mediated, direct) relations, meaning that 
he feels all the feelings of the world and changes accordingly. At the same time, God is neither 
wholly independent nor dependent, neither wholly determined nor self-determined, but is the 
supreme co-creator of the creative synthesis. While God is universally affected as universal 




when God moves himself he thereby creates the necessary condition (but not the sufficient 
condition) for the effect of the world as the interdependent, creative synthesis of social process. 
God is thus the most moved but also possesses the greatest compossible power. This system 
determines the meaning of divine love. 
Divine Love 
Divine love is inseparably linked with the notion of divine feeling as sympathy. This is 
predicated on God as the all-inclusive universal subject, internally related to all other minds and, 
thus, feeler of all feelings. This universal and immediate feeling is sympathy. In this way God is 
passible, the all-sensitive.
343
 As such, this universal sympathy is “relative in the eminent sense” 
and must be understood to include all the joy and suffering of the world by immediate feeling 
according to God’s “infinite sensitivity.”
344
 Thus, God is the all-serving, he “who grieves in all 
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 Hartshorne states, “By sensation we mean that aspect of experience which is neither thought 
nor volition, neither meaning nor action, but qualitative feeling.” Vision, 199. For a systematic discussion 
of divine passibility see Jung Young Lee, God Suffers for Us: A Systematic Inquiry into a Concept of 
Divine Passibility (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974). See also Marcel Sarot, God, Passibility and 
Corporeality (vol. 6 of Studies in Philosophical Theology; Kampen, The Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1992); 
Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought (The Oxford 
Early Christian Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Paul S. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of 
God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Joseph M. Hallman, The Descent of God: Divine 
Suffering in History and Theology (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 1991), and The Coming of the Impassible 
God: Tracing a Dilemma in Christian Theology (Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias, 2007). For an Evangelical 
argument in favor of impassibility see Geisler, House, and Herrera, Battle. For an argument that God may 
be impassible and yet really love in the sense of his predetermining loving “responses” see Creel, Divine. 
Cf. George W. Shields, “Hartshorne and Creel on Impassibility,” Process Studies 21 (1992): 44–59. For a 
landmark discussion of the issue in the OT prophets see Heschel, Prophets. For an overview of the issues 
and a suggested approach based on Jeremiah see John C. Peckham, “The Passible Potter and the Contingent 
Clay: A Theological Study of Jeremiah 18:1–10,” Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 18 (2007): 
130–50.  
344
 Hartshorne, Divine, 76. This is necessary according to Hartshorne’s ontology; he states, “It 
could not be that an inclusive mind excluded the suffering of the world from itself. Nothing is more 
irrational than the notion of an all-knowing mind that does not know suffering, in the only conceivable way 
in which suffering can be known—by feeling it.” Reality, 172. Therefore, “divinity is not the privilege of 
escaping all sufferings but the exactly contrary one of sharing them all. Unlimited companionship in the 
tragedies which freedom makes more or less inevitable is the theologically most neglected of divine 







 This is essential to Hartshorne’s conception of love, “whereby what happens in one 
individual produces partially similar occurrences in another individual aware of this 
happening.”
346
 In other words, literal “sympathy” is integral to the concept of divine love, where 
God feels “the feelings of all the subjects composing the world.”
347
 God is the all-sympathizer as 
the all-inclusive universal subject.  
Value: Ethical Immutability 
and Aesthetic Perfectibility 
Before Hartshorne’s full conception of love is presented, it is important to understand the 
foundational importance of value to Hartshorne’s conception of love. He frames his discussion of 
value in the categories of ethics and aesthetics, conceived as appropriate to the different aspects 
of God as the supreme mind. For instance God is ethically immutable but aesthetically 
perfectible; this means that God never acts unethically, but he is able to grow aesthetically. God 
always acts ethically because he always takes account of all the feelings of the world.
348
 In this 
way, then, God is ethically immutable and with regard to ethics is “already as perfect as anything 
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 Hartshorne, Vision, 203. Hartshorne even calls God “the slave, nay, the scourged slave, of all, 
infinitely more passive to others, more readily ‘wounded’ even, than anyone else can ever be.” Ibid., 204. 
Yet, though he is “infinitely more passive” than others he is not absolutely passive for “the merely passive, 
that which has no active tendency of its own, is nothing.” Ibid., 89. 
346
 Ibid., 186. Thus, “love involves suffering, the freedom to be acted upon by the other.” D. D. 
Williams, Spirit, 165. Therefore, God as love “is not the being whose life is sheer joy and beauty, but the 
cosmic sufferer, who endures infinitely more evil than we can imagine.” Hartshorne, Vision, 331. 
347
 Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 28. Hartshorne describes the Whiteheadian foundation of this 
concept. For Whitehead “the basic relationship in reality is ‘prehension,’ which in the most concrete form 
(called ‘physical prehension’) is defined as ‘feeling of feeling,’ meaning the manner in which one subject 
feels the feelings of one or more other subjects. In other words, ‘sympathy’ in the most literal sense.” Ibid., 
27. 
348
 God’s character of ethical immutability (goodness) consists in the fact that “he guides his 
action [persuasion] by concern for all the interests affected by his actions [supreme relativity]” and this is 
the “maximal case of goodness.” Hartshorne, Vision, 36. “There can be no ethical appeal beyond the 
decision of the one who in his decision takes account of all actuality and possibility.” Hartshorne, Divine, 






 In other words, because of his nature as the all-sympathizer (feeler of all feelings) it 
is necessary that God always act ethically; however, the particular acts of God are not necessary 
but contingent (relative, concrete). The ethical immutability of God thus corresponds to his 
abstract aspect, but the particular actions that are always ethical correspond to the concrete, both 
aspects referring to the same supreme mind, without separation.  
Whereas Hartshorne considers it impossible (by the definition of ethics) for God to grow 
ethically, the area of aesthetics is always open to growth and thus divine happiness is not 
absolute.
350
 Thus, God actually grows aesthetically according to the level of beauty in the actual 
world. The abstraction from this is that God always has the maximal aesthetic value that 
corresponds to the world in that moment. However, in each new moment the world grows 
aesthetically and thus God is ever-growing as the concrete and supremely relative (universal 
subject) compound individual of the world. For Hartshorne, panpsychism is the maximal 
ontology of beauty, a “cosmic harmony” of minds.
351
 This is according to Hartshorne’s view that 
“the most generally recognized principle of beauty” is “the principle of organic unity, or unity in 
variety.”
352
 Panpsychism, referring to the pan-indeterministic, interdependent, creative synthesis 
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 Hartshorne, Reality, 157. The holiness of God consists in “the single aim at the one primary 
good, which is that the creatures should enjoy rich harmonies of living, and pour this richness into the one 
ultimate receptacle of all achievement, the light of God.” Hartshorne, Divine, 128. He thus rejects what he 
calls the “strange reconciliation of justice and mercy, each somehow an ultimate principle of value.” Ibid. 
Thus Hartshorne refers to God as a “slave to his goodness.” Ibid., 138. “But he can express this goodness as 
he pleases in any world arrangement that is not inferior to any possible other, so far as God determined or 
might determine it.” Ibid. 
350
 All values are not compossible instantaneously and, thus, “an absolute maximum of beauty is a 
meaningless idea.” Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 10.  
351
 Ibid., 119.  
352
 Hartshorne, Vision, 212. See John Hospers, “Hartshorne’s Aesthetics,” in The Philosophy of 
Charles Hartshorne (ed. L. E. Hahn; The Library of Living Philosophers; La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1991). 
“Since the beautiful must contain contrast, it is as necessary that there be variety, multiplicity, in God as 





of minds, maximizes beauty as an organic unity.
353
 Hartshorne’s conception of beauty leads us 
directly to the importance of value to Hartshorne’s view of divine love. 
According to Hartshorne’s aesthetics, change and growth are axiomatic and as such God 
is the ever-growing compound individual who continues to increase in value.
354
 As supremely 
relative, God experiences all value in the world in accordance with God’s perfect adequacy 
(internal relation) to the feelings of all as universally related.
355
 God as universal subject is thus 
the universal subject of value.
356
 In turn, this means he is also maximally dependent for happiness 
since, according to Hartshorne’s view of perfection, “the most perfect mind would derive most 
from the satisfactions of others.”
357
 However, God always increases, but never decreases, in 
overall value.
358
 For Hartshorne, this view of a God that ever increases in value is the only 
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 Thus, he considers the indeterminacy and unknowability of the future as “essential” to beauty; 
“in its temporal aspect harmony involves the contrast between expectation and fulfillment. . . . Unforeseen 
novelty is as essential as the realization of the foreseen.” Hartshorne, Vision, 49. 
354
 Ibid., 51. This is in direct contrast to classic theism which, according to Hartshorne, posits the 
“view that the world . . . is strictly valueless to God, an absolute nullity from the standpoint of ultimate 
truth.” Hartshorne, Vision, 40. Is God “equally incapable of improvement in happiness? How can this be if 
God loves us, and through love shares in our sorrows, and is grieved by our misfortunes and errors?” 
Hartshorne, Reality, 157. “That, be we saint or sinner, no matter what we choose to do, it is all just the 
same to God, for his glory has the identical absolute perfection in either case.” Hartshorne, Vision, 118. But 
if this is true, if “variety is said not to be a value for God, then one asks, Why a creation at all?” Ibid., 39. 
355
 Specifically God must feel all since Hartshorne fails “to see any well-authenticated principle of 
value that justifies us in assuming a divine instance which, without literal containing of all experiences, has 
the equivalent of all their values.” Hartshorne, Divine, 91. 
356
 Therefore, “the idea of God is the idea of a being that really is the seat of all value.” 
Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 124. D. D. Williams states that each person “has a value for God which is 
unique and which enhances the life of God himself through whatever of positive value this member 
contributes.” “New,” 459. D. D. Williams goes on, “Hence we are valued by God for himself as increasing 
the joy and suffering of his being.” “Situation,” 459. 
357
 Hartshorne, Vision, 23.  
358
 Hartshorne comments, “A self-contrasting being surpassing all others will contrast with itself 
only through increase, never decrease, of value.” Reality, 118. Here Hartshorne refers to self-contrasting to 
mean that God in moment A is in contrast to God in moment B as the enduring society of individuals that 
he is. In each successive moment, then, God is the value of all that is actual and since God includes the past 
in his memory (as internally related to himself) he can only increase in value, but never decrease. This 
assumes that there is always more joy than sorrow in the world. Thus Hartshorne sums up, “If there is 
always more satisfaction than dissatisfaction, then God should always have more reason to rejoice than to 




conception of God that makes the religious view of serving God meaningful; specifically humans 
serve God by increasing value for him and thus adding to his enjoyment.
359
 God is altruistic in 
desiring the good of all others, yet, at the same time, because he is all-inclusive, his good brings 
value and enjoyment to himself (though not unilaterally) since he feels all feeling as the maximal 
sympathizer.
360
 God thus enjoys ever-increasing value and grows aesthetically (aesthetic 
perfectibility) while never acting unethically (ethical immutability).  
The Love of God as Divine Sympathy 
The ethical immutability and aesthetic perfectibility of God increases the significance of 
the divine sympathy. As feeler of all other feelings, God always takes into account the feelings of 
others in his actions (ethical immutability) and appreciates all value, growing in beauty 
                                                     
 
increment of value accruing to God at each moment.” Divine, 46. 
359
 Thus the meaning of life is “to serve and glorify God, that is, literally to contribute some value 
to the divine life which it otherwise would not have. Altruism toward God would include and embrace and 
unify all altruism.” Hartshorne, Divine, 133. But, “if God can be indebted to no one, can receive value from 
no one, then to speak of serving him is to indulge in equivocation.” Ibid., 58. He further criticizes classic 
theism saying, “If God is purely altruistic in relation to men, then men must be purely race-egoistic in 
relation to him. You cannot be motivated by consideration of the value you contribute to another, if that 
other is so constituted that he can receive no value from any source. The greatest joy is in giving joy, but 
we can give none to God.” Vision, 117. Hartshorne further points out the deficiency in the alternative of 
utter immutability where nothing “could contribute anything whatever to his value or mean anything to 
him, for to him there would be no more or less but just sheer value.” Ibid., 16. He considers this alternative 
appalling “for this only means that the particular characters of the objects of his knowledge, or the results 
of his willing, are to him totally insignificant, which is psychologically monstrous and is religiously 
appalling as well. (It seems against every word concerning God in the entire Bible, for example, so far as 
any very direct interpretation is concerned.)” Ibid., 39. Furthermore, “The idea that God equally and solely 
experiences bliss in all his relations is once for all a denial of the religiously essential doctrine that God is 
displeased by human sin and human misfortune.” Ibid., 195. “Without such displeasure, the words ‘just’ 
and ‘loving’ seem mockeries.” Ibid., 195. Cf. Hartshorne, Reality, 157. He points out that impassivity or 
lack of compassion is not at all valued in human beings so why should it be admired in divinity? 
Hartshorne, Divine, 44.  
360
 This should not, Hartshorne cautions, be taken to mean that God is selfish. “God is neither 
selfish nor unselfish as we exhibit these traits. Rather, God is unsurpassably loving, and that means fully 
grasping the good of others as therefore also divine good. God’s satisfaction includes all the satisfactions of 
others, integrated on a higher level into the satisfaction which surpasses that of any conceivable other but 
perpetually exceeds itself as new others arise to enrich it.” Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 120. For him, “the 
only way to avoid a certainly false, purely self-interest theory of motivation, and at the same time do justice 
to the principle that value lies in concrete individual satisfaction, not in mere collections, is to recognize a 
superhuman mind.” Hartshorne, Reality, 65. One here senses the influence of Kant’s need for the existence 




accordingly (aesthetic perfectibility). This of course presumes the ontology of God as the 
supremely relative, self-surpassing surpasser of all. This ontology itself determines the shape and 
content of divine love, so much so that one might understand everything that Hartshorne means 
by “love” without ever seeing him invoke the word. This is because his definition of “love” 
comes to be nearly synonymous with his whole theory of social relations.
361
 God as the supreme 
mind of the creative synthesis that is social reality is the feeler of all feelings. The feeling of 
others’ feelings is sympathy and sympathy is love: “to love is to sympathize with, and through 
sympathy to share in, the changes occurring in the persons one loves.”
362
 Since God is all-
inclusive and supremely relative, he perfectly feels the feelings of all others. This is the perfect 
adequacy of divine love. Since love is bound to the entire metaphysics of Hartshorne it becomes 
an extremely elastic phrase that tends to lose uniqueness or specificity the more one comes across 
it. In this way, love actually describes the essential characteristic of what Hartshorne means by 
surrelativism, panentheism, and the like. In this way, the meaning of love, divine and otherwise, 
is required by the ontological suppositions.  
There can thus be no doubt that love is a central category of Hartshorne’s divine 
ontology.
363
 As has been seen, for Hartshorne “love must be identified as feeling” or sympathy.
364
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 Clark M. Williamson comments, “Process theology, per se, is primarily a theology of the love 
of God.” “Review of the Spirit and the Forms of Love by Daniel Day Williams,” Process Studies 3 (1973): 
120. D. D. Williams frames the meaning of love in history saying, “The guiding conception which informs 
our understanding of all love is that love is spirit taking form in history. Love is an expression of spirit. It is 
spirit seeking the enjoyment of freedom in communion with the other.” Spirit, 3. 
362
 Hartshorne, Reality, 160. This is a love “unique in its ability to adjust to others, to yield with 
infinite versatility of sympathetic desire to all that has desire, and to set limits to the fulfillment of desire 
not as to something merely alien to himself but as to what he himself would like to enjoy in and with the 
subjects of the desire. Does this not introduce the tragedy of unfulfilled desire into God? Yes, it does just 
that. . . . God suffers, that existence is tragic for God. It is tragic for anything that loves those involved in 
tragedy. And this is why men can literally love God, because he even more literally loves them ‘as he loves 
himself,’ since by direct sympathetic union they are parts of his internal life.” Hartshorne, Vision, 294. 
363
 Let there be no confusion, “God really is love, without cavil or inconsistency.” Hartshorne, 
Reality, 136. Ogden speaks of “God’s pure unbounded love.” Reality, 68. Hartshorne lauds the 
“magnificent intellectual content—far surpassing that of such systems Thomism, Spinozism, German 
idealism, positivism (old or new)—[that] is implicit in the religious faith most briefly expressed in the three 




Sympathetic love presumes Hartshorne’s theory of social reality.
365
 As social, the love of God 
requires concern for, and real dependence upon, its object such that “love is joy in the joy (actual 
or expected) of another, and sorrow in the sorrow of another.”
366
 As perfectly adequate to the 
feelings of others God is the one “to whom all hearts are open, and all feelings equally 
comprehensible.”
367
 Yet at the same time, the number of the objects of divine love means that a 
given object of divine love is not of great individual importance.
368
  
The social conception of love is itself the universal and direct sympathy such that God is 
literally the “all-surpassing form of love.”
369
 The whole being of God, the entire divine ontology, 
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 “Love is always feeling, whatever else it may be, and feeling has at least the universal 
dimension of intensity.” Hartshorne, Vision, 266. Elsewhere he states, “God is loving in the sense of 
feeling, with unique adequacy, the feelings of all others, entirely free from inferior emotions (except as 
vicariously participated in or sympathetically objectified).” Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 39. In this way, 
“love is more than goodness, wisdom, and power, it is also happiness as partly arising from sympathy with 
the joys of others.” Hartshorne, Reality, 158. D. D. Williams adds, “To love is to act. Loving involves 
feelings, emotions, cravings, valuations and sharing, and all these require a movement toward the other, 
whether it be overt physical movement or the movement of the spirit.” Spirit, 117. Thus D. D. Williams can 
define it this way: “To love is to accept another who makes his own decisions, including that of the love 
relationship itself.” Ibid., 116.  
365
 Hartshorne states, “Either value is social, and then its perfection cannot be wholly within the 
power of any one being, even God; or is not social at all, and then the saying, ‘God is love,’ is an error.” 
Vision, 14. 
366
 Ibid., 116. He pushes this identification of love as sympathy even further stating, “Love is 
taking the standpoint of the other.” Ibid., 127. However, this can be problematic because it means God 
must enjoy sadism. “While God may derive value from the pleasure of the sadist, God also experiences the 
pain of the sadist’s victim and in Whitehead’s view, God would derive greater enjoyment if the sadist and 
the victim both had their own value experiences enhanced rather than that the sadist achieve his pleasure at 
the expense of the victim.” Platt, “Does?” 117. 
367
 Hartshorne, Reality, 35. God’s “spirit embraces all the physical there is with all-surpassing, 
unstinted love.” Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 45. 
368
 Hartshorne writes, “Consider now the idea that a loving God would not establish natural laws 
that make eventually dying a certainty for animals such as we are. God loves us, this I believe. But as what 
does God love us? I answer, God loves us as what we are, a certain very distinctive species of mortal 
animal, finite spatially and in careers. We are each divinely loved as rendered individual and definite by 
this finitude.” Omnipotence, 36. 
369
 Ibid., 37. “His interest is the universal interest in interests, that is, love in the highest 
conceivable sense.” Hartshorne, Vision, 164. Such universal and direct sympathy is unique to God, being 
the all-encompassing subject. Humans “do not ‘love’ literally, but with qualifications, and metaphorically.” 
Hartshorne, Divine, 36. “God is held to love all, not just a few; always; not just at times; in all their being, 
not with neglect of this or that aspect; and his influence in the universal society will be paramount and the 




is summed up in the term “love,” which, “defined as social awareness, taken literally, is God.”
370
 
Thus, as has been seen, Hartshorne’s definition of divine love requires that God be passible, 
capable of receiving value, including the continued enrichment (aesthetic perfectibility) of the 
divine being.
371
 This essential ontological attribute is perhaps the capstone break between 
classical theism and its recent critics. He states, “To love a being yet be absolutely independent of 
and unaffected by its welfare or suffering seems nonsense.”
372
 Moreover, “it is no use to say that 
God creates the creatures out of generosity or love; for if he loves the valueless, so much the 
worse for his love, and what but the value of contrast can the creatures add to existence?”
373
  
Absolutely Adequate and Perfect Love  
With love defined as the feeling of others’ feelings, or sympathy, God’s love is perfect in 
that it surpasses human love as absolutely adequate, meaning that God feels the feelings of all 
                                                     
 
free and contingent being, “God is the supreme instance of freedom to love. He never refuses to love, but 
the specific action of his love lies within the mystery of his being which no ontological analysis can fully 
penetrate or exhaust.” Spirit, 127. For him, “one of the categorical conditions of love is that there must be a 
transforming relationship without destruction of individuality.” Ibid., 115.  
370
 Hartshorne, Divine, 36. 
371
 D. D. Williams states bluntly, “Impassibility makes love meaningless.” Spirit, 127. Hartshorne 
considers it “obvious that there must be such a distinction between the generic unchangeable factor and the 
total value enjoyed.” Hartshorne, Vision, 112. “Is it so strange to say that one who loves perfectly is yet 
made happier by the increasing welfare of those he loves? Would it not rather be very strange if God who 
loves us, gained no new joy from our achievements and growth?” Hartshorne, Reality, 155. D. D. Williams 
concurs that an individual must “risk being changed if they really love.” Spirit, 115. 
372
 Hartshorne, Reality, 40. 
373
 Hartshorne, Vision, 39. On the other hand, divine love is not earned by its objects. It should not, 
then, be thought that the objects of divine love are “worthy”; such a category does not apply since love is 
“adequate awareness of the value of others, whatever that happens to be.” Ibid., 165. Nevertheless, God 
does enjoy the value in his objects of love. This seems obvious to Hartshorne, for what kind of a friend 
says, “the good that results to you from my being and acting is nothing in my life”? Hartshorne, 
Omnipotence, 119–20. Or what kind of love would say, “I am totally unmoved and ungratified by the 
benefits my action brings to you. Whether you live or die, enjoy or suffer, is all one to me. My own 
possession of good is in every respect totally independent of any good in you. I am like the sun, bestowing 
benefits without the results giving me anything I would otherwise lack. I am absolutely unselfish, that is, I 




others as the internally related universal subject.
374
 Thus, “God is perfect in love, but never-
completed, ever growing (partly through our efforts) in the joy, the richness of his life, and this 
without end through all the infinite future.”
375
 This kind of “perfect” love is in contrast to love as 
complete or absolutely maximized such that it cannot grow, which is impossible in Hartshorne’s 
system.
376
 This break with classical ontology lends itself to Hartshorne’s qualification of the 
meaning of “absolute” according to the meaning of love.
377
 Thus he states, “It is for love to 
determine the legitimate scope of the concept of absoluteness, if the hypothesis, God is love, is 
ever to be tried out at all.”
378
 This scope is determined by drawing out the logical consequences of 
love as feeling. For Hartshorne, divine love feels and enjoys each incremental gain of the 
aesthetic value of its object, otherwise it is not really love.
379
 Since God as universal subject 
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 For Hartshorne, “perfect love” is “absolute adequacy to the object.” Vision, 165. In this way, 
love is conceived as proportional to the object itself and this “constitutes perfection in the only sense in 
which love can, without self-contradiction, be conceived as perfect.” Ibid., 159. 
375
 Hartshorne, Reality, 156. 
376
 Hartshorne states, “Love means happiness varying somehow with variations in the happiness of 
others, and hence maximally happy love would mean love all of whose objects were maximally happy, an 
impossibility if the objects are to include created, imperfect beings.” Vision, 135. Cf. Hartshorne, Reality, 
121. “If he [God] is perfect in all ways, and if perfect means complete and incapable of enhancement, then 
the greatest saint can do no more for God than the worst sinner, for neither could possibly add to, or 
subtract from, what is always wholly perfect. And such a God could not love in a real sense, for to love is 
to find joy in the joy of others and sorrow in their sorrows, and thus to gain through their gains and lose (or 
at least, miss some possible value) through their losses, and the wholly perfect could neither gain nor lose. 
Hence, it could not love in a proper sense.” Ibid., 156. Fiddes states, “To love is to be in a relationship 
where what the loved one does alters one’s own experience.” Creative, 50.  
377
 Hartshorne asks, “If the absolute ‘loves,’ it does so in an absolute manner, and the question is, 
what then remains of the meaning of the term?” Vision, 42. One might wonder, then, why Hartshorne 
continues the use of such classical terms as “perfection.” His answer: “If God is perfect in no way, then he 
would scarcely deserve our worship, religion would have certainly overpraised him, and we could not rely 
upon him.” Reality, 156. Thus, “it is precisely love which must be perfect in God—and only love and what 
is implied by it as perfect—if either love or perfection is to serve as an explanatory concept in cosmology.” 
Hartshorne, Vision, 50. 
378
 Hartshorne, Vision, 42. 
379
 “We, through our voluntary acts by virtue of which in part we are whatever, at any moment, we 
actually are, make it possible for God to love us in each new state of our existence and to gain the 
increment that a new object of love brings, not to the lovingness, but to the total resulting aesthetic value. 
And that it does depend upon us in part whether the contribution shall be made is not a paradox, but a 




means that his sympathy is perfectly adequate to all objects, divine love does not discriminate. 
There is no applicability of a divine will that chooses between objects of love, no election love of 
any kind.
380
 Rather,  
a perfectly loving, a just God must indeed never be moved one-sidedly, by the feelings of 
some only of the creatures, but always in a way appropriate to all of them at once. This is the 
meaning of ethical action, response to all on the same terms of adequate sensitivity, and of 
adequate creative furtherance so far as the various interests of others can be harmonized with 
the least sacrifice of value.
381
 
The Desire and Dependence of Divine Love 
The central role of sympathy in Hartshorne’s definition has been clearly stated. However, 
Hartshorne expands on this definition to include further aspects such as desire. In another 
definitive break from classic theism, Hartshorne categorically rejects the traditional distinction 
between agape and eros.
382
 He considers the attempt to exclude desire (eros) from the conception 
of divine love, fundamentally wrongheaded.
383
 Hartshorne purposely frames divine love in terms 
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 However, D. D. Williams recognizes the biblical theme of election and interprets it 
Christologically as the election of the world in willing communion. In the Hebrew Bible “the central 
meaning of God’s love is that he has chosen to make this one people his own, and this choice is an act of 
his love.” Spirit, 19. Yet, “the real sense of election is God’s loving communion between himself and his 
son. This is the spirit of love in God, and in his love God wills communion with all.” Ibid., 36–37. In other 
words “it is the sense of the New Testament that all are elected to salvation in Jesus Christ.” Ibid., 36. 
381
 Hartshorne, Vision, 192–93. 
382
 “It has been the contention of many theologians, most recently Nygren, that the divine love is 
entirely without ‘need’ or ‘desire’ and has nothing to gain from the good it bestows.” Hartshorne, Reality, 
139. He goes on to point however, “I have been told that I here misinterpret Nygren’s intent, but that ‘he 
lays himself open to this misinterpretation.’ After some discussion with Nygren himself, I am happy to be 
able to think we are perhaps not far apart. In any case, the following discussion concerns the issue, not any 
particular theologian.” Ibid. However, it seems that Hartshorne and Nygren were, in fact, very far apart. D. 
D. Williams is explicit that agape and eros “are not necessarily opposed.” Spirit, 9. Further, D. D. Williams 
explicitly critiques Nygren’s view of agape. “We can see why it is inadequate to describe agape of God 
only as the spontaneous, unmotivated, uncalculated self-giving of the Holy God, regardless of the value of 
its object. Agape is first and primordially the spirit of communion willing the divine relationship between 
Father and Son as the ground and of the fulfilment of all things.” Ibid., 37. 
383
 On the traditional agape-eros dichotomy Hartshorne comments, “This is supposed to guarantee 
the unselfishness of the divine love, whereas (it is thought) the selfish loves, as such, spring from 
dependence and desire. This, I maintain, is not good religion but bad metaphysics. To will the good of 
others is the entire positive side of benevolence, and it adds nothing to this to insist that one must not, in 
willing the good of others, find in this good also good for one’s self.” Reality, 139. Again, he adamantly 




of desire, saying, “Love is desire for the good of others, ideally all others, or I have yet to be told 
what it is.”
384
 In fact, he locates desire in benevolence itself which “is desire for the welfare of 
others.”
385
 Divine desire is not, however, partial or fickle but is “superrationally enlightened, an 
all-comprehending, never wearying desire for others’ good.”
386
 Nevertheless, desire entails that 
God’s happiness is at least partially dependent upon others’ happiness.
387
 In fact, according to 
Hartshorne, divine love is not merely desire; it relates to actual need.
388
 Once again this explicitly 
denies the classic ontological conception of self-sufficiency.
389
 This does not mean God would 
cease to be without sharing in any particular being. None has the power to threaten his existence, 
but rather, he is dependent upon all beings.
390
 In positing the divine need for love, Hartshorne is 
actually merely appealing back to his ontology of the internal relatedness of mutuality. In his 
                                                     
 
element of possible gain or loss to the self, and love as purely altruistic benevolence; or again between 
sensuous and spiritual love, eros and agape. But the distinction between lower and higher forms of love 
which is alone given meaning by experience—that is, which alone has meaning—is not of this character.” 
Hartshorne, Vision, 116. D. D. Williams adds, “It simply is not true that the agape of the New Testament is 
nothing but the grace of God poured out without motive upon the unworthy. It is also the spirit of rejoicing, 
of friendship, and of the new life with its foretaste of the blessedness of life with God and with the brethren 
in the full freedom of love.” Spirit, 46. 
384
 Hartshorne, Vision, 14. Of course, this is closely related to the theme of eros. D. D. Williams 
defines eros as “the love of the beautiful, the true, and the good, the aspiration for fulfillment of the soul’s 
yearning.” Spirit, 2. He distinguishes this from epithumia, which he defines as “desire, often with the 
connotation of impurity or lust.” Ibid., 2. 
385




 Ibid.  
388
 “God needs only one thing from the creatures: the intrinsic beauty of their lives, that is, their 
own true happiness, which is also his happiness in through his perfect appreciation of theirs. This 
appreciation is love, not something extra as a motive to love.” Ibid., 164. 
389
 “It is often maintained that the only really pure—or, at least, the highest—love is that which 
springs from no ‘need’ of the beloved, that which ‘overflows’ from a purely self-sufficient being who 
derives nothing from any, other. This is one of those apparently refined and superior thoughts of 
theologians which analysis shows to be really crude.” Ibid., 163. 
390
 “God ‘needs’ happiness in which to share, not because the alternative is for him to cease to be, 
for this is not a possible alternative, but because the exact beauty of his own life varies with the amount of 
beauty in lives generally. Some other lives he must have, but his perfect power consists in this, that no 




system, “the being which God is to gain from us is to be a certain particular case of mutual being, 
and . . . the only way to enjoy mutuality is to depend for it in part upon others, since such 
dependence is mutuality, is love.”
391
 Such dependence is necessary for the social theory of reality, 
the ontology of love. Here we see clearly that Hartshorne’s conception of divine love amounts to 
a recapitulation of his ontology using the terminology of love. This may be clearly seen 
throughout his works as his conception of love relates directly to, and is predicated upon, his 
ontology as a whole. 
The Motivation of Divine Love: 
Ethics and Altruism 
In regard to social relationships, Hartshorne raises the issue of egoism and altruism. He 
questions the traditional view that divine love cannot be at all egoistic but must be purely 
altruistic.
392
 The question of the motivation of love and of the possible increase of love is at the 
heart of Hartshorne’s differences with traditional views.
393
 Hartshorne challenges this conception 
saying, “Any conceivable mind will be both egoistic and altruistic, for selfhood is social or 
nothing.”
394
 He unequivocally rejects the idea that love must be purely altruistic in the sense that 
the subject has no appreciation or feeling of enjoyment in the act(s) of goodness.
395
 This, of 
                                                     
 
such, they cannot reduce God to solitariness.” Ibid., 164. 
391
 Ibid., 120. 
392
 On the contrary, “it can be shown by many lines of reasoning that the future welfare of others 
can be a motive as direct and genuine as one’s own future welfare.” Ibid., 146. 
393
 For instance, he summarizes that for classic theism God serves others only “in the overflowing 
expression of his own glory or superabundance, said theologians. But he would have been just as glorious 
had no creation existed; for God eternally is all value, world or no world. Pure altruism is all we can say, 
from the side of God.” Ibid., 115. 
394
 Ibid., 151. 
395
 Because of his social theory of reality even altruism may be identified in “experience as a 
process of participation in the good of others, so that some sort of value accrues to the self through the very 
fact that value accrues to another self. This does not mean that all motivation is merely selfish. One may 
plan the welfare of others in the distant future, and expect no benefit oneself in that future from this 




course, amounts to an explicit rejection of the distinction between so-called need love and gift 
love.
396
 Rather, “the ultimate motive is love, which has two equally fundamental aspects, self-
love and love for others.”
397
 God desires the well-being of all others and as internally related to 
all, “promoting their welfare contributes to his own.”
398
 Conversely, God is the supreme object of 
love and when one loves God, he being the all-inclusive one, that one thereby also loves others, 
and even oneself.
399
 Divine love, then, necessarily includes divine self-love, and love for God 
                                                     
 
appreciate the good of others as the good of oneself but it is “only through this expected ignorance [that of 
humans] can there be a non-coincidence between the greater good and the good for self.” Hartshorne, 
Reality, 141.  
396
 “No pragmatic or operational difference can be imagined between this love and the alleged love 
without need. What is there but word-idolatry in the traditional insistence upon the latter? And what, on any 
analogical basis, could be meant by perfect altruism or generosity but a complete finding of one’s own 
good in achieving the good of others?” Hartshorne, Reality, 140. Rather, in Hartshorne’s view, “theology 
may avoid the dangerous situation in which Nygren and many another find themselves of seeing nothing in 
common or analogous between human love—like that of father for child, or husband for wife, or Jesus for 
his human fellows—and the divine love. The sublime contrast between human and divine benevolence 
consists not in the sheer difference between need and no need but in the gap between abysmal ignorance 
and omniscience, and between partial and shifting inhibition of the interest of others by self-interest, as 
contrasted to certain and absolute coincidence of other-interest and self-interest.” Ibid., 141.  
397
 Hartshorne, Vision, 151. For D. D. Williams, “God’s agape is motivated in that love seeks out 
the other.” Spirit, 121. This is in direct opposition to the idea of wholly unmotivated love. 
398
 Hartshorne, Vision, 147. Hartshorne explains further regarding self or other motivated love. 
“Some ethical theories seek to furnish sanction for obligation by arguing that since sympathetic emotions 
are largely pleasant, it is to one’s interest to cultivate them. This implies that a man asking for a motive for 
doing good has for the time being ceased to love his fellows. But if the man has really and utterly put aside 
all concern for others, then almost all that is human must have left him. And insofar as he does still care 
about other persons, he has a motive for doing good to them—simply that he wants to do so. Must one have 
a motive for doing what one wants to do? This is to ask a motive for the motive one already has.” 
Hartshorne, Reality, 104. He relates this to the tendency of a reader to identify herself with the characters in 
a book and share in their emotions; thus altruism is identifying oneself with the other. He states, “The very 
characters in a book and their joys and sorrows can easily mean more to us than our own remote past or 
future. Of course there are some who will argue that this is because we identify ourselves with the 
characters. Exactly! That is the point; that is altruism—participating in the life of another so that his needs 
become yours.” Vision, 149. Due to his distinctive view of the ever-different individuality of persons he can 
even hold that self-love implies “a difference between the self loving and the self loved, and that difference 
makes room for everything from one’s own future state to other persons, animals, God, as the self which 
may be loved.” Ibid. It is Buddhists who really went the limit in “qualifying personal identity to allow for 
partial identity with others.” Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 107. For an argument that Hartshorne’s view 
maintains a common view with Zen Buddhism (as interpreted by Suzuki Daisetz) of the concrete in 
experience see Lawrence Willson, “Suzuki, Hartshorne, and Becoming-Now,” Japanese Journal of 
Religious Studies 2 (1975): 169–73. For instance, process, creative synthesis, sociality, and panpsychism 
are all represented in this form of Zen Buddhism. 
399




includes love for others and oneself. Nevertheless, for Hartshorne the fact that divine love 
includes self-love does not negate that it is also altruistic.
400
 Since the divine inclusion of all else 
does not negate the individuality of the other minds, divine love is not merely self-love. 
Moreover, God is not selfish but it is simply his nature as the all-inclusive sympathizer that all 
interests are his own interests. “God’s altruism toward the creatures is the exact opposite of man’s 
‘love’ for him, since it is just as free from self-interest as the latter is exclusively constituted by 
it.”
401
 God has only one motive and that is love.
402
 Once again, it is manifest that love is itself the 
essential characteristic of Hartshorne’s ontology.
403
 Since all reality consists of minds 
interrelating (thus sympathizing, or loving) Hartshorne can state, “Apart from all this [love], we 
                                                     
 
motivation” and loving God is “exactly how we are to love the neighbor.” Omnipotence, 107.
 
In this way, 
“Spinoza’s saying that we love God with the love with which he loves himself has thus a truth which he did 
not quite intend. Not that God loves exclusively himself and no other individual, but that God through 
loving all individuals for their own sakes makes them one with himself, with phases of his own life. 
Consequently, when we for our part love God this love is a factor in God’s enjoyment of himself, that is, in 
his self-love.” Hartshorne, Vision, 294.  
400
 Since God had “perfect knowledge” he has “perfect possession” of all “emotions of beauty and 
joy which God enables us to have.” These “become elements in his own all-embracing experience, 
contributory to the richness of that experience. Each such contribution makes possible for God a unique 
form of beauty which in no other way could have existed for him. Omniscience thus removes from God the 
sole reason for that form of altruism which seeks the good of another in partial disregard of whether or not 
it is good for self. Such altruism is in very truth an imperfection, a glory of the imperfect will as such.” 
Hartshorne, Reality, 140. “The fact that theologians have thought so little about the possibility of perfectly 
generous or other-regarding desire reflects, one suspects, the poverty of such desires in men. We must not 
deny desire to God because, forsooth, if it were our desire it would be niggardly and fitful in its inclusion of 
the good of others. What anthropomorphism this is; not less so because it is in part the result of an over-
strained anti-anthropomorphism.” Ibid., 142. 
401
 Hartshorne, Vision, 114. This is because, “in God there is indeed a perfect agreement of 
altruism and egoism. For whatever good God may do to any being anywhere he himself, through his 
omniscient sympathy, will inevitably enjoy. The future welfare of all beings will be entirely included in the 
future satisfactions of God. Hence God can make no sacrifices, except in the sense that he does take upon 
himself the sufferings as well as the joys of his creatures. Theologians apparently sometimes overlooked 
the fact that such an agreement between love and self-interest depends upon the complete transparency or 
omniscience of the love.” Ibid., 161. 
402
 Hartshorne, Vision, 162. 
403
 For Ogden, “dipolar theism is an analysis in the general terms of philosophy of just that love 




have no self. It is our loves that make us anything worth mentioning.”
404
 Hartshorne even goes so 
far as to proclaim that love “holds the universe together.”
405
 This is understood within the context 
of panentheism, the metaphysics of “divine inclusiveness.”
406
 The very unity and harmony of the 
world is to be found in the universal sympathy that is divine love, which is “the only theme ade-
quate to the cosmic symphony.”
407
 In this cosmic harmony of divine love, tragedy remains but 
even it is turned into beauty as far as possible within the context of the panpsychic, 
indeterministic, interdependent, creative synthesis of minds.
408
  
Divine Love and the Christ Metaphor 
Although Hartshorne does not ascribe the special status to Christ that historic Christianity 
would, he does point out that “a suffering God has for nearly twenty centuries been symbolized 
by the cross, while during nearly the same period philosophy has not known how to grasp the idea 
in technical terms.”
409
 He criticizes classical theology for ascribing divinity to Christ, yet 
paradoxically denying passibility to divinity.
410
  
                                                     
 
404
 Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 108.  
405
 Hartshorne, Reality, 180. 
406
 Hartshorne, Vision, 290. Further, “it is love that explains cosmic structure, or the two are 
aspects of the same thing. What binds many into one is social realization.” Ibid. “Cosmic being is cosmic 
experience, is cosmic sociality or love.” Ibid., 347. The being “which all qualities embody is either nothing 
further describable, or it is cosmic love. And conversely, cosmic love is either nothing conceivable or it is 
the distinctive character of ‘being’ itself.” Ibid., 267. D. D. Williams, however, cautions that God not be 
thought of in Tillich’s way of seeing God as “being itself” because that would require that God lack 
“individuality in relationship.” He prefers “Being which is the source of the community of beings.” Spirit, 
126.  
407
 Hartshorne, Vision, 216. As the universal bond, love is also the ultimate of beauty, “the beauty 
beyond all others, that with which life has a meaning, without which it does not.” Hartshorne, 
Omnipotence, 14. “The supreme example of such unity is the social harmony which is called love.” 
Hartshorne, Reality, 100. 
408
 “It is through love that tragedy is, not indeed wholly prevented, but made bearable and given 
whatever beauty it is capable of. The love that can do this is that which expects to share with others the 
sufferings from which no actuality, human or superhuman—subject as all must be to chance and 
incompatibility—can entirely escape. . . . In its highest human and superhuman forms it simply is that 
beauty.” Hartshorne, Reality, 108. 
409




The incarnation is supposed to solve the problem also. I can only say that if it is Jesus as 
literally divine who loves men, really loves them, then my point, so far as I can see, is 
granted. If not, then the problem is unsolved. Instead of simply adding Jesus to an 
unreconstructed idea of a non-loving God, should we not take him as proof that God really is 
love — just that, without equivocation?
411
  
He goes on to point out astutely, “In the debate over the divinity of Jesus, this question of 
a deity who does not escape—or wish to escape—full share in our tribulations, has generally been 
lost sight of.”
412
 Neither does the idea of intra-trinitarian love resolve the deficiency of the classic 
conception since it does not provide an answer to the question of whether or not God truly loves 
creatures.
413
 Hartshorne blames this shortcoming on classical ontology, believing that his own 
ontology allows for a consistent conception of divine love and the God-world relationship. 
                                                     
 
efforts to restrict suffering and sympathy to God as incarnate.” Hartshorne, Vision, 198. It is clear, 
however, that Hartshorne does not ascribe to Jesus the unique identification as God or as part of the trinity. 
Hartshorne, Reality, 152. Cf. ibid., 146, 150. 
410
 “His [Jesus’] suffering is the exhibition of his perfection, which is not that of impassible being 
but of love which cannot be impassible.” D. D. Williams, Spirit, 160. Cf. ibid., 166. 
411
 Hartshorne, Vision, 165. “To say that Jesus was God, then, ought to mean that God himself is 
one with us in our suffering, that divine love is not essentially benevolence—external well-wishing—but 
sympathy, taking into itself our every grief.” Hartshorne, Reality, 147. “I suggest that much more than 
divine benevolence or human kinship was symbolized in the doctrine that the man on the cross was deity. 
The devotion of Jesus to his fellows was not mere benevolence, a wishing them well, or an eagerness to do 
things for them. It was a feeling of sympathetic identity with them in their troubles and sufferings, as well 
as in their joys, so that their cause and their tragedy became his; and he paid the price of a bitter death, 
rather than weaken the intimacy of his relation to the human lot, with all its suffering and failure. Jesus is a 
symbol of the solidarity of human weal and woe through sympathy, a solidarity from which the best man 
will least of all seek to escape.” Ibid.  
412
 Hartshorne, Reality, 147. However, if God is allowed passivity and relativity then Jesus “can 
still be, a living and unique symbol of the Christian or tragic view of divine love, a symbol taken as deity 
partly because in this way attention could be diverted from certain difficulties felt to arise if it be said 
directly that God sympathizes, suffers, and changes.” Ibid., 152.  
413
 “The Trinity is supposed to meet the requirements of giving God an object of love which yet 
agrees with his absolute self-sufficiency, and also an object of love ‘worthy’ to be loved with so perfect a 
love as the divine. This is done by making the lover and the beloved identical—yet not identical.” 
Hartshorne, Vision, 164. It “leaves the essential problem of the divine love unsolved. For either God loves 
the creatures or he does not. If he does, then their interests contribute to his interests, for love means 
nothing more than this. If he does not, then the essence of the religious belief in God is sacrificed, and one 




Summary of Hartshorne’s System 
Thus God as the supreme, all-inclusive mind, the compound individual of the world, not 
identical or equivalent to the world, but more than the world, is love. Divine love is divine 
sympathy, the feeling of all others’ feelings, including the desire for the well-being of all the 
minds that make up the indeterministic, relativistic, spatio-temporalistic, panpsychism of social 
reality. As ethically immutable, God always loves all others with perfect adequacy yet also grows 
(aesthetic perfectibility) and enjoys the ever-increasing value of the world that he includes as the 
supremely relative all-inclusive compound individual of the world. Divine love as love for others 
also amounts to self-love since God himself includes the others (panentheism), but this does not 
detract from divine altruism because the divine all-inclusiveness does not remove the 
individuality of the minds that are included in God. God as universal subject is the supreme lover 
of all other minds and as universal object he is also the supreme loved one of all other minds 
(though not the sole lover or loved one). God’s divine love for the world as universal subject 
eminently affects him, partly determining his life in joy and suffering.
414
 The world’s love for 
God as the universal object deeply affects the world and partly determines the course of reality. 
God’s love is absolute in that it is absolutely relative; it always corresponds perfectly to all minds. 
As the supreme mind God is the supreme lover, the eminently relative all-sympathizer, the self-
loving lover of all. 
                                                     
 
414
 The growth or change in the content of God’s universal sympathy, or love, is predicated on the 
all-inclusive nature of God’s knowledge (feeling) as the supremely relative universal subject. Hartshorne, 
Divine, 17. Love receives new content and value because God changes every instant according to the 




The Extent of the Conflict of Interpretations 
Conflicts between the Models 
Considering that the process critique of classic theism has already been clearly presented, 
the transcendent-voluntarist critique of process theology should not be overlooked.
415
 Although 
Henry recognizes some shortcomings of classic theism and works to correct them, he is 
nevertheless utterly opposed to the tenets of process theology.
416
 Among the numerous reasons 
that Henry notes for rejecting process theology, the doctrine of revelation is of great importance. 
Whereas Henry posits divine revelation as the source of theology, process theology utilizes 
experience and reason as the fundamental sources.
417
 Henry, moreover, is further irked by the 
inconsistent use of Scripture that he considers prevalent in process theology.
418
 Another clean 
break with process theology comes over the process rejection of the transcendence of the 
                                                     
 
415
 For Henry’s further critique of process theology see Carl F. H. Henry, Remaking the Modern 
Mind (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1946), 119–71; idem, “Reality and Identity of God: A Critique of 
Process-Theology,” Christianity Today 13, no. 13 (1969); and idem, “The Stunted God of Process 
Theology,” in Process Theology (ed. R. H. Nash; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1987). For an excellent 
study contrasting elements of traditional theism and process theology see Colin E. Gunton, Becoming and 
Being: The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1978), and Ronald H. Nash, ed., Process Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1987).  
416
 The extent of C. F. H. Henry’s concern over process theology is evident in that he devotes an 
entire chapter to it in volume 6 of his God, Revelation, and Authority. Henry notes that while process 
theology attempts “to preserve literally such traditional metaphysical attributes of God as eternity, 
immutability, impassivity and immateriality, they actually redefine them within the requirements of process 
theory and preserve them only by linguistic obfuscation.” God, Revelation, 6:73. Notably, W. Norris Clarke 
admits that traditional Christian theism needs to adapt to some process concerns if it is to adequately 
address God as personal, loving, and involved in the world. The Philosophical Approach to God: A Neo-
Thomist Perspective (Winston-Salem, N.C.: Wake Forest University, 1979). 
417
 “Process philosophy further dilutes the biblical revelation by excluding propositional 
conceptual content from God’s self-revelation, and by correlating God’s salvific activity not primarily with 
historical redemptive acts but rather with man’s inner faith response to an interpersonal divine human 
encounter.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:68. 
418
 “There is every reason to press those who occasionally stress the congruity of some of their 
conclusions with the Bible to indicate on just what basis of scriptural sensitivity they venture these 
traditional affirmations about God, and by what divine authority they reject other passages that contradict 
process philosophy perspectives.” Ibid., 5:63. Nash comments, “Most process theologians appear to have a 
highly selective hermeneutic. Scripture is welcomed as authoritative when it agrees with panentheist 






 Process theism’s attempt to provide an alternative to a “static” God has rather 
provided merely a “projected reconstitution of God’s nature [that] actually deprives deity of 
major perfections and activities characteristic of the living God of the Bible, and results in a view 
of the divine that is inadequate philosophically, scripturally, and experientially.”
420
 Thus, one can 
readily see the striking contrast between process theology’s apparent lack of distinction between 
the natural and supernatural, resulting in some “inner divine necessity,” and Henry’s insistence 
that the divine nature be understood “in terms of divine voluntarism.”
421
 Whereas Henry posits 
divine determinism where “every creaturely activity incarnates God’s aims to a higher or lesser 
degree,” process allows for intersubjectivity in open process.
422
 Thus process theology makes 




Another criticism is the supposed lack of personality in process theology, a point of 
considerable debate even among process theologians.
424
 In conjunction with this, Henry proposes 
                                                     
 
419
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:59. This includes any intimation that “the universe is 
necessary to God’s being.” Ibid., 5:217. For instance, the process “theory that created reality is necessary to 
God, and is in some respects divine, departs in crucial ways from the biblical revelation of God.” Ibid., 
5:68. For Carson, any valid doctrine will result in “an understanding of God who is, on the one hand, 
sovereign and transcendent and, on the other, personal and loving. On set of attributes or characteristics 
will not be used to domesticate another set.” “How?” 312. 
420
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:68. 
421
 Ibid., 5:62. Henry claims process philosophy “sponsors a monodimensional view of reality that 
evaporates the antithesis of supernatural and natural.” Ibid., 6:18. “If God created out of inner necessity as 
say process philosophers, why as creatures should we glorify and worship him? Would not God’s creation 
of man and the world simply exemplify ontological determinism? However much process thinkers may 
relate all the evils in history to divine suffering love, these evils nonetheless become conditions that 
humans must bear because a self-satisfying deity could not avoid fashioning our universe.” Ibid., 6:289. 
422
 Ibid., 5:178. “Process theology proffers still another alternative. For the biblical doctrine of 
election it substitutes the much diluted notion of divine persuasion.” Ibid., 6:97. “Most evangelical theists 
insist, however, that to contradict or to constrict divine omnipotence, transcendence, and independence, 
undermines a meaningful concept of God.” Ibid., 6:60. 
423
 Ibid., 6:62. 
424
 “Process theology adduces no persuasive considerations for requiring that God be personal; in 
the absence of divine self-revelation, it cannot effectively refute Buddhist and other nontheistic claims that 




that process theology lacks “an articulate doctrine of divine self-revelation of a deity who loves 
the world and man and with whom personal fellowship is possible.”
425
 Thus, in the end Henry 
believes that process theology “equates God’s being with the being of the universe.”
426
 Such a 
“one-layer view of reality provides no consistent alternative to naturalism.”
427
 This “obscures the 
deity’s ever-active relation to man and the world” by “substituting a necessary divine creation of 
the universe for voluntary supernatural creation, and by excluding the once-for-all miraculous as 
a misreading of natural processes.”
428
 Moreover, the notion of a becoming God that grows is 
unacceptable to traditional Christianity.
429
 The very idea of a dipolar God is also impossible due 
to the divine simplicity.
430
 This dovetails with the process admission of temporality in the divine 
nature, which Henry summarily rejects.
431
  
                                                     
 
some process thinkers, the personal God of theism appears to be replaced by an impersonal God. This is a 
point of major disagreement among process thinkers.” Nash, “Process,” 16. Donald G. Bloesch criticizes, 
“Even those who view God in personal terms do not really think of God as an absolute individual who 
reigns over the universe as a Sovereign Lord (as in Reformed theology).” “Process Theology and Reformed 
Theology,” in Process Theology (ed. R. H. Nash; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1987), 40. 
425
 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:141. 
426
 Ibid. Yet, if “equates” means identical, this is not actually Hartshorne’s position. 
427
 Ibid., 5:142. 
428
 Ibid., 5:68. 
429
 “Process philosophy imports change and development into aspects of the very nature of God 
and consequently speaks of a growing God.” Ibid. Yet, “if God is in fact a growing God, if God does 
change in important respects, can we any longer confidently and truly say what God in truth is?” Ibid., 
6:64. Further, “if God is not sovereign and omniscient but growing, cannot his own ability to tell the truth 
also expand, and if so, have we any basis for regarding even divine revelation as unsubject to revision?” 
Ibid. 
430
 “Any ontological gradation of divine attributes can be carried through only at the expense of 
God’s simplicity and immutability.” Ibid., 5:135. Henry calls this a “schizophrenic God who embodies 
radically opposed modes of reality, a deity absolute in some aspects of his nature, but relative in others. 
Mere semantic manipulation of the metaphor of polarity will not bridge the logical difficulties, however, 
nor will it obscure the violence done to the nature of the Judeo-Christian God.” Ibid., 6:63. Moreover, “the 
notion of God as partly nonexistent and yet capable of existing fully is a speculative monstrosity; no 
philosopher could seriously have proposed such a concept unless he had imbibed modern evolutionary 
theory too long and too much.” Ibid., 6:65. 
431
 “Neo-Protestant process philosophers react against the speculative exclusion of time-




Moreover, the classic axiom of ontological immutability is removed in Hartshorne’s 
thought.
432
 Such removal of immutability might cast doubt upon the permanence of God, or 
whether he might even be destroyed himself.
433
 Thus, Henry contends, “making process or 
change or growth an ultimate perfection is one of the prime weaknesses of process 
philosophy.”
434
 In conjunction with the issue of temporality and mutability is the issue of God 
being enriched or appreciating any external value, which Hartshorne posits as essential to divine 
love, and Henry rejects as ontologically unacceptable.
435
 Moreover, Henry criticizes the lack of 
willed providence in process theology’s view of history.
436
 Henry also rejects the process critique 
that Christianity makes God unrelated to the world.
437
 Beyond this, Henry is also adamantly 
against process theology’s removal of many other Christian distinctives.
438
 Both the transcendent-
                                                     
 
making it an essential aspect of divine life.” Ibid., 5:272. 
432
 Henry criticizes Hartshorne’s attempt to “combine immutability with change” calling it “a feat 
as difficult as riding two horses moving in opposite directions.” Ibid., 5:290. He criticizes further, 
“Hartshorne has clearly substituted a conjectural deity for the biblical God who reveals himself. A doctrine 
of divine ‘immutability’ based on such tortuous exposition is more confusing than true or useful.” Ibid., 
5:291. 
433
 “If God’s ontic independence is to some extent denied, so that some aspect of his being or 
nature depends upon external causes, then these causes could just as readily destroy as constitute his 
reality.” Ibid., 6:65.  
434
 Ibid., 6:66. 
435
 Henry comments, “Involvement of God in temporal processes compromises his divine 
transcendence and portrays him as becoming progressively enriched in experience with the passing of time. 
The result of Hartshorne’s panpsychism is loss of the omniscient and immutable God of the Bible; God 
becomes so meshed with historical processes that he internally experiences the quality of evil and is 
steeped in inner conflict.” Ibid., 6:272. 
436
 Ibid., 6:457. 
437
 For Henry, God can relate to the world and “God’s absoluteness” is not “incompatible with his 
real relationship to others.” Ibid., 6:20. Henry states, “Process theologians err twice over when they league 
evangelical theism with an immovable and uncompassionate Absolute and when they depict biblical writers 
as champions of a changing God who in some respects depends upon the universe.” Ibid., 6:68. However, 
“Christian theism disallows intrinsically necessary divine relationships to man and the world, and insists on 
God’s essential independence” in opposition to process theology’s position of a “mutual relationship” 
which “obscures God’s causal efficacy in relation to the universe.” Ibid., 6:20. 
438
 For instance, process theology rejects the doctrine of the Trinitarian divine life. Moreover, he 




voluntarist and immanent-experientialist models thus explicitly reject the other’s ontology and in 
devastating fashion.  
The conflict of interpretations between the transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-
experientialist models of divine love is readily apparent. As has been seen, the transcendent-
voluntarist model of divine love retains many of the axioms of classic theism, which were 
explicitly and enthusiastically criticized and rejected by the immanent-experientialist model. No 
less enthusiastically has the transcendent-voluntarist model rejected the immanent-experientialist 
model of love.
439
 It seems that such mutual exclusiveness was inevitable due to the utterly 
conflicting ontologies and the complete dependence of both models of love on them. The 
respective conceptions of love are bound up in mutually exclusive ontologies. Hence, there could 
be no resolution of the conflict of interpretations without drastic revision of one or both 
ontologies. Accordingly, the transcendent-voluntarist model of divine love is irreconcilably 
opposed to that of the immanent-experientialist model.  
Specifically, there is an irreconcilable difference between the transcendent, sovereignly 
willed, unaffected and unenriched, election love of the transcendent-voluntarist model and the all-
sympathetic, immanent, affected and enriched, direct and adequate, desire-filled feeling love of 
                                                     
 
christology.” Ibid., 6:55. He also sees process theology as “obscuring both the incarnation of God in Jesus 
Christ and the church as the regenerate body over which the Risen Christ reigns, and strips the grace of 
God of such decisive historical acts as Jesus’ substitutionary atonement and his bodily resurrection from the 
dead.” Ibid., 5:68. Henry is especially concerned over the lack of the substitutionary atonement saying that 
in this model the sufferings of Jesus “lose their propitiatory-substitutionary character and instead supremely 
exemplify suffering in general.” Ibid., 6:289.  
439
 Mahoney, writing from a Thomist perspective, considers Aquinas’s doctrine of love to be 
superior because “in Hartshorne’s doctrine God must create some world or the other; in Aquinas creation is 
totally an act of gratuitous love. The latter is a much freer act of love than the former. And even by human 
standards the more freely given love seems to be the superior. In Hartshorne’s conception of God in loving 
he receives as much as he gives; in Aquinas the divine love is so radically different from creaturely love, 
that the divine love causes the good it loves, rather than being caused by it. Once again by human standards 
the latter ranks higher than the former, being more altruistic. On both scores the thomistic conception is 
superior, precisely because God cannot gain anything from his love of creatures, being beyond the realm of 






 Whereas in transcendent voluntarism divine love is 
impassible and divine suffering is impossible, in immanent-experientialism, divine love is 
supremely passible, all-inclusively sympathetic joy and suffering.
441
 The idea of suffering as part 
of divine love is categorically rejected by the former model but essential to the latter model. In 
the former, divine immutability rules out the possibility of God receiving enriching, or value-
increasing love, but in the latter, the divine life is increased in value and enriched by internally 
relating to and receiving each and every instance of love in the universe. In the latter, it is 
proposed that it is impossible to love an immutable being, whereas in the former a mutable being 
is unworthy of worship, much less worshipful love.
442
 Closely related is Henry’s charge that 
process theology “cannot avoid replacing agapē with eros as the nature of divine love.”
443
 
Specifically, in the transcendent-voluntarist model God acts in history “out of self-giving love” 
whereas in the immanent-experientialist model God acts “to expedite his own fulfillment.”
444
 
Finally, the immanent-experientialist model indiscriminately universalizes the divine love, in 
direct contrast to the transcendent-voluntarist model, which limits divine love to those whom God 
                                                     
 
440
 The models directly rule one another out even at their foundations. For instance, D. D. 
Williams criticizes the transcendent-voluntarist model saying, “The traditional assertion that the will of 
God is the ultimate cause of every event cannot be preserved without qualification, because a will which 
allows no effective power to any other cannot be a loving will.” Spirit, 128. 
441
 Hartshorne criticizes, “God’s love for us does not, for classical theists, mean that God 
sympathizes with us, is rejoiced or made happy by our good joy or good fortune or grieved by our sorrow 
or misery. Rather God’s love is like the sun’s way of doing good, which benefits the myriad forms of life 
on earth but receives no benefits from the good it produces.” Omnipotence, 4. 
442
 “But humans can hardly be expected to worship everything that concerns their roving intellect; 
we cannot in any event worship permanently what is but relative and changing, and such entities moreover 
are hardly worthy of even momentary worship.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 6:289.  
443
 Ibid. “It considers the universe in all its development as necessary to God as God is to the 
world.” Ibid.  
444
 Ibid., 6:289–90. “If God ‘creates’ out of inner necessity, and is motivated by eros rather than 
agapē, his relationship to space-time realities is not that of the Judeo-Christian God. The New Testament 
nowhere portrays the climax of God’s love as divine-human interdependence or as divine absorption of 
human wickedness Scripture declares it, rather, to be God’s costly redemption of sinners from the penalty 




sovereignly elects to bestow favor upon.
445
 It appears evident that both models cannot be 
maintained simultaneously, and this suggests the possibility for another paradigm of divine love 
that assumes neither ontology. 
Dissatisfaction in Recent Theology 
 A number of perspectives on divine love do not fit neatly within the transcendent-
voluntarist or immanent-experientialist model.
446
 Therefore, it is important to take note of some 
major breaks from both models regarding the concept of divine love. Questions regarding love in 
the God-world relationship continue to be raised from diverse traditions, ranging to issues of 
ontology such as immutability, impassibility, determinism, et al. The following discussion will 
mention a number of areas of dissatisfaction that have been expressed in relation to the two 
models above including the reciprocality of divine love and the question of whether divine love is 
to be thought of as pure giving (thematic agape), or as giving and receiving, including brief 
mention of some inextricable ontological issues. At the outset, it must be understood that the 
theologians referenced below may voice similar dissatisfaction regarding a particular aspect of 
divine love and yet hold vastly differing perspectives on other aspects of divine love and/or 




                                                     
 
445
 “Process theology only adds to its problems by diluting even the love of God. On the one hand, 
it excludes miraculous divine redemption in deference to evolutionary continuity and scientific uniformity; 
on the other, it professes to universalize God’s election love of the Hebrews.” Ibid., 6:289.  
446
 There are many more than two options, however they are framed. See Nash, “Process,” 21. 
447
 It is not the purpose of this section to provide a summary or overview of the theologians that 
voice the dissatisfaction but to evidence the call for improvement regarding the theological definition of 




The Relationality of Divine Love 
A major point of contention has revolved around the notion of reciprocality in the divine-
world relationship.
448
 A number of theologians have called for emphasis upon reciprocal divine 
love—in opposition to the transcendent-voluntarist model—yet not necessarily to the extent of 
the internal relatedness prevalent in the immanent-experientialist model. For instance, Vincent 
Brümmer contends that “love must by its very nature be a relationship of free mutual give and 
take, otherwise it cannot be love at all.”
449
 Elizabeth Carmichael thus promotes friendship love 
that “embraces both giving and receiving.”
450
 On the other hand, Martin D’Arcy likewise gives a 
great deal of prominence to both giving and receiving in love; however, rather than calling for 
reciprocality as it relates to God, he limits divine love to gratuitous self-giving and rules out 
divine reception of love.
451
 Other theologians struggle with the issue of the God-world 
relationship and reciprocal relations. For instance, Karl Rahner wrestles with allowing genuine 
relationality to God, maintaining that God in Godself is “strictly nonrelative or absolute” but is 
“genuinely related to the world in God’s other,” that is, Jesus.
452
 It appears that Rahner recognizes 
the need for some relationality but nevertheless relegates it to a symbolic relationship that does 
                                                     
 
448
 Brümmer points out that, in tradition, “love has generally been taken to be an attitude of one 
person toward another, rather than as a relation between persons. This way of thinking about love can 
probably be explained by the fact that western thought has suffered from a systematic blind spot for 
relations.” Model, 33. 
449
 Ibid., 161. Brümmer defines love as “intentional, evaluative, disposition,” and “reciprocal” and 
for him love always “entails a desire for reciprocation.” Ibid., 155. He goes on, “Love wants to be returned, 
requited, and in this way fulfilled in a relationship of mutual love. Of course this does not exclude the 
possibility of unrequited love. . . . In this respect love is more than mere beneficence.” Ibid. Cf. Post, 
Theory. 
450
 For Carmichael, “the love of friendship alone gives a wholly satisfactory account of love 
precisely because it embraces both giving and receiving.” Friendship, 4. 
451
 “God has shown to us, so far as is compatible with the unchanging plenitude of his nature, a 
love like to that of self-donating and self-giving.” D’Arcy, Mind, 245. 
452
 M. L. Taylor, God, 193. This seems to be Rahner’s solution to the paradox of God’s utter 
timelessness and immutability and God’s incarnation and personal action in the world. Taylor critiques 
that, “unfortunately, the concept of the real symbol does not seem to offer much clarification of how God 




not touch God in Godself. On the contrary, John Burnaby, an Anglican expert on Augustine’s 
view of love, criticizes such a “‘one-way’ relationship, a giving without receiving” as “strangely 
inadequate.”
453
 Stephen G. Post also critiques such a view, stating that one-directional love is 
“essentially negative in that it undermines the circular flow of giving and receiving in which 
agape is sustained and supported.”
454
 
Accordingly, numerous theologians posit that a mutual relationship between God and the 
world means that God gives and receives. For Thomas Oden, such reciprocality is a feature of all 
love.
455
 On this point, Jürgen Moltmann concurs, seeing divine love as a reciprocal (though 
unequal) relationship between God and the world.
456
 From yet another perspective, Wolfhart 
Pannenberg adds that love seeks response and as such “lets the other be.”
457
 For Sallie McFague, 
God gracefully loves us and “our responsive love . . . fills a need in God the lover.”
458
 For the 
proponents of open theism, love “involves sensitivity to the other. Because God loves the 
creatures, he is open to their experiences.”
459
 Thomas Jay Oord, a self-described Evangelical-
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 Burnaby, Amor, 307. 
454
 Post, Theory, 12. Cf. Stephen G. Post, Altruism & Altruistic Love: Science, Philosophy, & 
Religion in Dialogue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
455
 “God’s love for humanity, like all love, is reciprocal. God prizes the world, and values 
especially human creatures, who have the freedom and imagination to respond to God and to share with 
God consciousness and compassion.” Thomas C. Oden, The Living God (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 
1987), 121. However, he is careful to note that love may include both self-love and unrequited love, “Love 
may remain completely unreturned without ceasing to be love. Love for one’s beloved is not finally 
dependent upon its being reciprocated.” Ibid., 120.  
456
 Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God (trans. M. Kohl; San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), 203.  
457
 “The Spirit is the power of love that lets the other be.” Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic 
Theology (trans. G. W. Bromiley; 3 vols.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1991), 1:427. Further “it is an 
element of the creative love that wills the existence of creatures. It waits for the response of creatures in 
which they fulfill their destiny.” Ibid., 439. Vacek also uses a great deal of language that suggests a 
reciprocal relationship. For instance, he sees the human response to God’s love as free and unforced. Love, 
188–90. 
458
 Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: 








Divine Lover as Sole Giver 
In conceptions of love as a reciprocal relationship between God and the world, the 
aspects of giving and receiving rise to the fore, receiving a great deal of attention in recent 
discussion of divine love. God as the supreme giver is an ancient conception of God that retains a 
great deal of traction in recent theology. Many theologians see God as the giver who bestows 
value on those he loves, rather than recognizing value. This may be called “creative love.”
461
 For 
some, God creates and bestows all value unilaterally; there is no value that God did not 
sovereignly create. For others, love does not necessarily create its object but does create value in 
it by loving it.
462
 The former view rules out a reciprocal relationship between God and others, 
while the latter may allow for such mutuality.  
The traditional view, adopted by the transcendent-voluntarist model, frames God’s giving 
as the former type of bestowal love, a pure beneficence (thematic agape).
463
 Emil Brunner defines 
                                                     
 
459
 Rice, “Process,” 184. Thus Pinnock states, “Open theism is a form of relational theism, the 
approach to Scripture which views God as entering into reciprocal relations with creatures and 
experiencing genuine give-and-take.” Clark H. Pinnock, “Constrained by Love: Divine Self-Restraint 
According to Open Theism,” PRSt 34 (2007): 149. 
460
 Oord, “Matching,” 313. For Oord, mutual relationship between God and the world is an 
ontological kind of friendship love (philia). Oord has recently argued for a form of panentheism that he 
calls “Essential Kenosis Theology” such that divine love for creatures is necessary and essential to God; 
“God loves necessarily” and “cannot not love.” Nature, 129. Cf. Thomas Jay Oord, Defining Love: A 
Philosophical, Scientific, and Theological Engagement (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos, 2010). 
461
 Cole-Turner, “God’s,” 26. Singer contends this bestowed value is true of all love, saying, 
“Love creates a new value, one that is not reducible to the individual or objective value that something may 
also have. This further type of valuing I call bestowal.” Nature, 5. Cf. Brümmer, Model, 166. 
462
 For example, Brümmer comments, the “fact that I am loved by another does indeed bestow a 
value on me which I would not otherwise have had.” Ibid., 131. Singer adds, “Love does not create its 
object; it merely responds to it creatively.” Nature, 15. 
463
 In this view: “Love is sheer gratuity.” Singer, Nature, 15. For an interesting discussion of 
whether it is even conceivable that God extends benevolence to all equally see Paul Helm, “Can God Love 




this as “gracious love.”
464
 God does not receive anything, but only gives. Millard Erickson 
concurs saying, “[God’s] love for us and for his other creatures is completely disinterested.”
465
 C. 
S. Lewis famously framed this position with the dichotomy between “need love” and “gift 
love.”
466
 Divine love is only gift love but never need love. This distinction is very closely related 
to the traditional thematic distinction between agape and eros, wherein agape is a purely 
beneficent love (gift love) and eros is a desirous love (need love). In contrast to the immanent-
experientialist model, and in keeping with the transcendent-voluntarist model, this thematic 
distinction between agape and eros continues to influence recent theologians.
467
 For instance, 
Donald Bloesch explicitly states, “In Christian perspective divine love is agape, not eros.”
468
 
                                                     
 
Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 168–85. 
464
 Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God (London: Lutterworth, 1949), 187. “Love is the 
self-giving of God; love is the free and generous grace of the One who is Holy Lord.” Ibid., 185.  
465
 Erickson, Christian, 319. Rahner also retains the transcendent and gratuitous self-
communication which is antithetical to the immanent-experientialist model. For a study of Rahner’s 
conception from a process perspective, see M. L. Taylor, God. Cf. Vanhoozer, Remythologizing, 174. 
466
 For instance, C. S. Lewis says, “God, who needs nothing, loves into existence wholly 
superfluous creatures in order that He may love and perfect them.” Four, 127. H. Ray Dunning frames 
divine aseity in terms of love, stating that “God’s love is spontaneous. . . . Its cause is contained within 
itself, not in anything else. It is not called forth by external causes but breaks forth by itself.” Grace, Faith, 
and Holiness: A Wesleyan Systematic Theology (Kansas City, Mo.: Beacon Hill, 1988), 200–201. Dunning 
goes on to frame the divine attributes in the context of love; see ibid., 200–207. 
467
 This dissertation has already considered the continuing impact of Nygren’s influential work on 
this topic. Others have also continued this distinction. Brunner, for instance, stresses the traditional 
difference between agape and eros and states that, as opposed to eros, divine agape “does not seek value, 
but it creates value or gives value.” Christian, 186. He believes that this kind of love is completely foreign 
to human love. Karl Barth maintains the agape-eros distinction, at least in part, saying that agape “has its 
basis in the good being and action of God” whereas eros is based “in the corruption of man.” Church 
Dogmatics (trans. G. T. Thomson; 5 vols.; Edinburgh, UK: T. & T. Clark, 1958), 4/2:747. 
468
 Donald G. Bloesch, God, the Almighty: Power, Wisdom, Holiness, Love (Downers Grove, Ill.: 
InterVarsity, 2006), 146. Erickson comments similarly, “God’s love is an unselfish interest in us for our 
sake. It is ‘agape, not eros.’” Christian, 319. Bloesch goes on, “In evangelical religion love is neither 
unrequited longing (eros) nor submission to a moral code (nomos) but unmerited grace (agape). It is not the 
passion to possess (eros) nor the duly to attend (nomos) but the loving-kindness that bestows (agape).” 
God, 148. Further, he states, “God loves us not in order to fulfill himself (he is already fulfilled) but in 
order to redeem the sinner.” “Process,” 46. Dunning contends that agape “was not generated by the 
potentiality of its object to meet a need in God. It arose out of the fullness of the Divine Being. It is 
disinterested love, concern for the well-being of the object, in no way based on the worth of the object.” 




D’Arcy, however, rejects the dichotomy between agape and eros claiming they are “not enemies 
but friends.”
469
 However, for D’Arcy, this rejection only relates to human love since divine love 
is pure agape (beneficence) without eros. Thus, D’Arcy’s view remains within the traditional 
conception of divine love. 
Despite strong support for the transcendent-voluntarist notion of divine love as pure 
beneficence (thematic agape), other recent theologians strongly react to this limitation of divine 
love, considering it to be inadequate as a description.
470
 In fact, Moltmann goes as far as to 
identify God with eros, “the creative Spirit of God is himself Eros, for out of his creations and in 
his creations his beauty shines forth and again awakens eros in its turn.”
471
 Oord contends that all 
three love archetypes—agape, eros, and philia—apply to aspects of divine love.
472
 For him, 
elements of eros, in the sense of a desirous or value-recognizing love, are apparent in the fact that 
the trinitarian persons love one another as valuable.
473
 Brümmer also vehemently objects to love 
that is merely beneficence, noting that love “entails beneficence, but unlike beneficence it also 
seeks a relationship.”
474
 Moreover, in purely beneficent love, a giving that excludes divine 
                                                     
 
469
 D’Arcy, Mind, 304. He makes an interesting distinction between essence and existence relating 
to love. For him, the love related to essence is of the mind and refers to a self-love. The love related to 
existence is passion and other love. Ibid., 318.  
470
 C. Osborne contends that the distinction is inadequate not just for God but according to a 
review of the usage of the word in Greek philosophy. She contends that “both eros and agape can be used 
to designate love characterized by either generous or self-interested concerns.” Eros, 70. For her, eros is 
characteristic of love in the sense of the myth of Cupid which conveys “the inexplicability of loving 
someone.” Ibid., 72. She thus rejects the dichotomy between acquisitive and generous love. 
471
 Jürgen Moltmann, The Spirit of Life: A Universal Affirmation (London: SCMP, 1992), 261. 
472
 Oord, “Matching,” 336–37. This he does both philosophically and with selected biblical 
examples, although whether he systematically considers all biblical data to support the ontology underlying 
his thesis is questionable.  
473
 He states, “If eros elements are constitutive of divine love in Trinity, this places into jeopardy 
Nygren’s claim that God’s love is exclusively agape.” Ibid., 138. Moreover, Oord also emphasizes philia, 
or friendship love which is contingent upon human response. For further information regarding the three 
archetypes see ibid., 338–40. Cf. C. A. Boyd, “Perichoretic,” 15–30. 
474




receiving, God may only be “said to care for us but not about us.”
475
 Oden also objects to the 
dichotomy between agape and eros. For him, God’s love does include grace (unmerited favor), 
but it is not thus unqualified benevolence.
476
 Oden concurrently employs the thematic categories 
of agape and eros in recognition of their co-existence and, even, complementarity in divine 
love.
477
 Accordingly, he unequivocally rejects the separation of agape and eros that was 
exemplified in the work of Nygren.
478
 In keeping with this rejection, Oord proposes that the only 
adequate conception of divine love requires give and take.
479
 However, before conceptions of 
divine love as a receiving love are considered, it is important to look at this dichotomy as it 
relates to election love and universal love. 
                                                     
 
475
 Ibid., 132. He goes on, “Pure giving without receiving is not love but mere beneficence.” Ibid., 
240. 
476
 “All things are loved by God, but all things are not loved in the same way by God, since there 
are degrees of capacity, receptivity, and willingness among varied creatures to receive God’s love.” T. C. 
Oden, Living, 118. “For Arminians, God’s love is simply incompatible with unconditional election or 
irresistible grace within a nonuniversalist scheme.” Roger E. Olson, “Election/Predestination,” in The 
Westminster Handbook to Christian Theology (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster Knox, 2004), 169. Yet, for T. 
C. Oden, God’s love is constant and not dependent upon the reception of its objects. In Hosea one beholds 
the “eternal One who is in love with a beloved partner who tragically does not return that love. Yet God’s 
way of loving does not cease, as if contingent on its being received. . . . [This expresses] the intimacy, 
constancy, and faithfulness of God’s covenant love.” Living, 82.  
477
 He explains that “love is a confluence of two seemingly paradoxical impulses: the hunger for 
the desired object [eros] and the desire to do good for the beloved [agape]. One impulse takes and the other 
gives.” T. C. Oden, Living, 119. 
478
 “Although agapē and eros seem to be opposites, they may come together and flow in balanced 
simultaneity and support each other’s impulses.” Ibid. “Both involve a yearning: love as eros yearns for the 
self’s fulfillment through another; love as agapē yearns for the other’s fulfillment even at a cost to oneself.” 
Ibid., 119. Therefore, “to separate eros and agapē or to oppose them or set them absolutely off against each 
other as alternatives (cf. Nygren, Agapē and Eros) is to view love incompletely and to fail to understand 
how one dimension may strengthen the other.” Ibid. Similarly, see Post, Theory, 33. 
479
 Oord states, “If a more adequate, biblical conception of divine love is to be offered, one must 
conceive of this love as involving give and take. God must be mutable and passible if the central biblical 
notion ‘God is love’ is to make sense. The God whose love is only agape (in the sense of giving) is a God 
whose love is incomprehensible.” “Matching,” 277. Oord himself defines agape as “an intentional response 
to promote well-being when responding to that which has generated ill-being.” Thomas Jay Oord, “The 





Election Love vs. Universal Love  
 The transcendent-voluntarist model promotes election love, that is, love limited by God’s 
decision as to whom he will love (unto salvation). The immanent-experientialist model on the 
other hand supposes that divine love is universal and applicable to all, since God is essentially 
love and, as such, essentially related to all in a sympathetic, indeterministic relationship. This 
division over particular or universal love remains controversial.
480
 Some theologians continue to 
support the notion that God’s salvific love is reserved for those whom he chooses, in harmony 
with the transcendent-voluntarist model but in opposition to the immanent-experientialist 
model.
481
 Others contend that God’s love is universal. God extends love to all and this contradicts 
both the transcendent-voluntarist model and the immanent-experientialist model.
482
 Many who 
accept this second option presume that God has the freedom to love or not to love creatures, but 
chooses to love all and in such a way that humans have the freedom to respond or not respond to 
God’s love. Here “love is by definition free.”
483
 In opposition to process theology, God has 
                                                     
 
480
 The position of universal divine love does not necessarily entail universalism in the sense that 
God saves all. It would lead to universalism if the divine will were conceived as the only will determinative 
for salvation and God truly desires the salvation of all. However, the position of universalism is itself an 
implicit critique of the limited election love of the transcendent-voluntarist model, incompatible with the 
strong emphasis on divine judgment and election of some but not others to the benefit of divine love. One 
example is the neo-orthodox position that God’s love will overcome his wrath. For a critical discussion see 
C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 5:138, 358.  
481
 This position may also contend that God loves all with “common” love but not with a love unto 
salvation. So Packer, “Love.” Cf. Vanhoozer, Remythologizing, 151. 
482
 For Dunning, divine love as a “manifestation” of the divine nature “is universal rather than 
selective.” God loves “all without discrimination. None is excluded.” Grace, 196–97. Cf. T. C. Oden, 
Living, and Fritz Guy, “The Universality of God’s Love,” in The Grace of God, the Will of Man: A Case 
for Arminianism (ed. C. H. Pinnock; Minneapolis, Minn.: Bethany House, 1995), 31–49. Brümmer believes 
this notion that God unilaterally chooses whom he loves and “causes us to love him . . . seems to turn God 
into a kind of Heavenly Conquistador.” Model, 159–60. He goes on, “If we are to account for the personal 
nature of the relation between God and human persons, we shall require a less deterministic view on the 
relation between grace and freedom than that entailed by this concept of love.” Ibid., 54. Cf. Singer, 
Nature, 293. Oord comments, “How can we say that God is loving if God arbitrarily chooses not to elect 
some to receive salvation? Evangelicals in the Arminian, Wesleyan, Holiness, and other traditions have a 
history of pointing out that this doctrine sacrifices divine love.” “Matching,” 54. 
483
 Brümmer, Model, 175. This is most commonly considered the Wesleyan/Arminian approach to 




ontological independence from the world.
484
 Others support the immanent-experientialist model 
that God loves all without distinction according to the essential (love) relation of God’s nature.
485
 
 These categories thus clearly relate to the issue of God’s will and power. The 
transcendent-voluntarist model’s position that God’s will is primary, and always carried out 
according to his omnipotence, remains well supported.
486
 However, for many theologians, this 
position would mean that there is no free will for agents other than God.
487
 This is especially 
problematic for those who hold that love requires freedom.
488
 The immanent-experientialist 
                                                     
 
Theology of Love: The Dynamic of Wesleyanism (Kansas City, Mo.: Beacon Hill, 1972). The Arminian 
perspective highlights some drastic differences within contemporary Evangelicalism. “In spite of profound 
agreement about the basic meanings of election and predestination as expressions of God’s sovereignty in 
salvation, evangelical theologians fall into sharp disagreement with each other over their precise 
interpretations.” R. E. Olson, “Election,” 168. R. E. Olson notes three categories: the classical Calvinist, the 
classical Arminian, and the paradoxical approach. Ibid. Whereas the transcendent-voluntarist model would 
be most similar to the classical Calvinist view, T. C. Oden represents a classical Arminian view that has 
significant impact on the conception of divine love. Such an Arminian view reacts against the notion of 
“restricted love.” See Jerry L. Walls and Joseph Dongell, Why I Am Not a Calvinist? (Downers Grove, Ill.: 
InterVarsity, 2004), 50–55. Pinnock comments, “The future is not settled.” Moreover, God “takes risks and 
jeopardizes his own sovereignty.” “Systematic,” 125. Cf. Pinnock, Grace of God. In this sense, “the fact 
that God allows us as persons to retain the ability to turn away from him, excludes any form of 
universalism which holds that God’s love must triumph in the end and cause all to love him.” Brümmer, 
Model, 179. Cf. Pannenberg, Systematic, 1:438.  
484
 God is free from any necessity to create a world. Rice states, “The world owes its existence to 
God’s free choice, not to metaphysical necessity.” “Process,” 185. Cf. ibid., 184.  
485
 Oord, for example, utterly rejects divine determinism in favor of what he calls essential free-
will theism. This differs from the second view above, which he calls “provisional” free-will theism, in that 
God essentially loves and essentially allows free will, meaning that God lacks the power to unilaterally 
coerce. Oord, “Matching,” 308, 320. More recently Oord has referred to his view as “Essential Kenosis 
Theology.” Nature, 129. 
486
 For instance, Erickson contends that God’s omnipotence controls all of history according to his 
universal providence: “God is in control of all that occurs.” Theology, 437. Furthermore, his “will is never 
frustrated. . . . What he chooses to do, he accomplishes, for he has the ability to do it.” Ibid., 303. Divine 
actions are according to the “good pleasure of his will” and as such his “decisions and actions are not 
determined by considerations of any factors outside himself, but are simply a matter of his own free 
choice.” Ibid., 304.  
487
 This is despite the claims of compatibilism that God does not force human actions but renders 
those human actions certain. Cf. Erickson, Theology. Brümmer contends that “such views take love to be a 
highly impersonal concept and the relationship of love to be a very impersonal manipulative one.” Model, 
160.  
488
 Pinnock states, “To the invitation of love, one may respond gladly or refuse. Forced love is a 
contradiction in terms, and God does not force his love on us.” Clark H. Pinnock, Flame of Love: A 




model contends, on the other hand, that God does not exercise all the power in the world. 
Although he is the most powerful being, he lacks the power to coerce.
489
 Open theism, however, 
breaks from both models by simultaneously affirming God’s sovereign will and indeterminism, 
such that God has all power, yet chooses to grant power to agents other than himself and, in this 
way, others can love God freely.
490
 Similarly, for Oden, God’s omnipotence is conceived as not 
lacking in power to determine the world, yet, purposely leaving room for other agents.
491
 Dunning 
agrees, holding that “God does not determine one’s choices, but He influences them” and this 
allows for a free love relationship.
492
 Thus, God chooses not to exercise the full extent of his 
power, manifesting “a form of love that lets the creatures have their own existence.”
493
 Thus, 
                                                     
 
necessarily free.” Model, 177. “Furthermore, can our relationship to God still count as a personal 
relationship if on the one hand God’s agape for us is the inevitable result of his nature, and on the other 
hand our loving response is the inevitable effect of his agape?” Ibid., 134.  
489
 Oord concurs, saying, “God does not essentially possess all power.” “Matching,” 314. “God is 
sovereign because divinity exercises the greatest degree of power and the scope of this power is universal, 
but nondivine individuals also necessarily possess power.” Ibid. This is very important for Oord since the 
lack of ability to unilaterally coerce the world frees God from culpability for evil, something that he 
contends even provisional free-will theism does not. Oord contends: “If God does not care enough to 
prevent genuinely evil occurrences while having the power to do so, God is not love.” Ibid., 345. Cf. ibid., 
320. 
490
 In contrast to process theology, “God’s loving sovereignty means that God has specific plans 
for the universe and possesses the means to achieve them. God retains sufficient power to guarantee their 
fulfillment.” Rice, “Process,” 195. Pinnock comments, “God, although he could control everything, 
chooses not to do so but restrains himself for the sake of the freedom that love requires. It is essentially a 
theology of self-restraint.” “Constrained,” 149. Open theism thus criticizes process theology’s view of 
divine power for presenting a God who is too passive. See D. Basinger, Divine, and Clark H. Pinnock, 
“Between Classical and Process Theism,” in Process Theology (ed. R. H. Nash; Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Baker, 1987), 313–27. 
491
 T. C. Oden, Living, 75. Moltmann holds God’s sovereignty and indeterminism as well, taking 
notice of a dipolar conception in Judaism and Scripture (distinct from Hartshorne’s) where God is “free in 
himself and at the same time interested in his covenant relationship and affected by human history.” Jürgen 
Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology 
(trans. R. A. Wilson and J. Bowden; New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 272.  
492
 Dunning, Grace, 258. God may influence wills not by “coercion” but by “persuasion.” Ibid. 
493
 Pannenberg, Systematic, 1:438. If it is “the patience of the powerful who can intervene in what 
happens but refrains from doing so, and if this patience is shown by his own creatures, then it is a form of 
the love that lets the creatures have their own existence.” Ibid. Cf. Geddes MacGregor, He Who Lets Us Be: 




indeterministic love, opposed to the transcendent-voluntarist model, agrees with the immanent-
experientialist model that divine love “involves profound sensitivity.”
494
 But, in contrast to the 
immanent-experientialist model, this sensitive love does not mean divine love is involuntary.
495
 
On the contrary, God has chosen to love the world and to be affected by it, retaining his 
sovereignty while allowing for mutual relationship.
496
 This allows for a sensitive, feeling love 
where God is not only giver but also a receiver, able to be affected by and receive the love of his 
creatures. This position requires that God not be impassible as is supposed in traditional theism. 
Divine Lover as Receiver 
The attribute of divine impassibility has come under increasingly harsh criticism, with 
major implications for the nature of divine love.
497
 The closely related ideas of perfection, 
immutability, and total self-sufficiency are also under increasing scrutiny.
498
 Even the somewhat 
softened version of impassibility promoted by Henry is deemed inadequate because it 
                                                     
 
494
 Rice, “Process,” 185. 
495
 For instance, “open theism affirms the process insight that love involves profound sensitivity, 
but it insists that love is a voluntary commitment.” Ibid. Thus, God limits himself but this “‘kenotic’ act of 
self-restraint, which is voluntary on God’s part, does not reflect any limitation in God or any ontological 
diminishment.” Pinnock, “Constrained,” 150. 
496
 This love is “something contingent upon God’s willing to enter into such a relationship in the 
first place, to place himself under certain relational constraints, to be limited in his freedom by the 
existence of a genuinely free other.” Trevor Hart, “How Do We Define the Nature of God’s Love?” in 
Nothing Greater, Nothing Better (ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 109.  
497
 “It is no longer sufficient to speak of God as the ‘superior, absolute, impassible, unchanging 
being.’” Leo J. O’Donovan, “The Mystery of God as a History of Love: Eberhard Jüngel’s Doctrine of 
God,” TS 42 (1981): 255. Cf. Eberhard Jüngel, God As the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the 
Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1983), and idem, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God’s Being Is in Becoming (trans. H. Harris; 
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1976). Goetz adds, “The rejection of the ancient doctrine of divine 
impassibility has become theological commonplace.” “Suffering,” 385. See the discussion of impassibility 
earlier in this chapter. 
498
 Brümmer points out that “the view of divine perfection which was put forward by Plato and 
was self-evident for a vast number of theologians in the Christian tradition, including Augustine and 
Nygren . . . turns God into a quietist who avoids vulnerability and suffering by renouncing all desires. Such 
a God could be infinitely beneficent toward us, but as we have argued at length, he cannot be the God of 




nevertheless rules out God’s ability to be impacted or affected by the world, in accordance with 
the axiom of divine self-sufficiency (aseity).
499
 However, it should be noticed that the process 
ontology proposed by Hartshorne and others has also been heavily criticized.
500
 Nevertheless, 
increasing dissatisfaction on the impassibility front is readily apparent. For instance, Evangelical 
theologian Bloesch notices the insufficiency of utter divine impassibility.
501
 Moltmann reacts 
much more strongly to notions of God’s impassibility, stating that a God incapable of suffering 
“is poorer than any human . . . he is also a loveless being.”
502
 For him, there is a level of intimacy 
with the world to the point that God’s “freedom is his vulnerable love, his openness, the 
encountering kindness through which he suffers with the human beings he loves.”
503
 Numerous 
others consider God’s passibility to be integral to his love.
504
 However, in contrast to the 
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 Karl Barth’s view on this point mirrors Henry. He states that the God of the Bible “can feel and 
be affected. . . . He cannot be moved from outside by an extraneous power. But this does not mean that He 
is not capable of moving Himself.’ No, God is ‘moved and stirred’ by his own ‘free power’ to relieve our 
distress.” Church Dogmatics, 2/1:370. Hart comments on Barth’s doctrine, “He loves us, that is to say, not 
out of any lack or need in his own being, but because he wills our existence as an other over against himself 
and sharing in fellowship with himself.” “How?” 109. 
500
 See, for instance, Nash, Process. 
501
 He states, “The classical idea of perfection as all-sufficiency and completeness had indubitably 
penetrated Christian thinking and prevented the church through the ages from giving due justice to the 
biblical idea of God sharing the pain and suffering of his people.” Bloesch, “Process,” 51. Although no 
friend to process theology he even concedes that “the modern process conception of God who shares our 
suffering is probably closer to the Biblical view than the Hellenistic conception of a God who is wholly 
self-contained, who is removed from temporality and exempt from vulnerability.” Ibid., 53. 
502
 Moltmann, Crucified, 222. “God’s being is in suffering and the suffering is in God’s being 
itself, because God is love.” Ibid., 227. Thus love is antithetical to impassibility but requires being 
vulnerable to suffering and suffering in the sufferings of His objects of love. Moltmann, Trinity, 51–52. But 
God does not suffer in the sense of internal relatedness but in voluntary identification. God “opens himself 
to the suffering which is involved in love, and yet remains superior to it by virtue of his love.” Moltmann, 
Crucified, 230. Divine suffering extends even to the Father: “The Son suffers dying, the Father suffers the 
death of the Son.” Ibid., 243. This suffering is not “out of deficiency of being” but is “from the love which 
is the superabundance and overflowing of his being.” Moltmann, Trinity, 23.  
503
 Moltmann, Trinity, 56. For Guy, “divine love” is “vulnerable to disappointment.” 
“Universality,” 41. Brümmer concurs, saying, “Love is necessarily vulnerable, since each partner in a 
relationship of love is necessarily dependent on the freedom and responsibility of the other partner for 
establishing and for maintaining the relationship.” Model, 160. 
504
 In fact, C. Osborne states, “God’s love for us could very well be described as involving 




immanent-experientialist model, Brümmer contends that God feels but he feels his own feelings 
not the feelings of others.
505
  
If God is passible (capable of being affected), then it also follows that he could desire 
love and enjoy its reception, as the immanent-experientialist model holds. Traditionally, these 
aspects of divine love have been ruled out according to God’s self-sufficiency, suggesting that if 
God were to desire or enjoy anything, he must not be totally self-sufficient. However, theologians 
continue to allow more room for God’s ability regarding the appraisal and appreciation of 
value,
506
 the desire for requited love,
507
 and the divine enjoyment of creatures
508
 in a mutual 
                                                     
 
suffering/passivity. Grace, 195. Cf. Rice, “Process”; Pinnock, “Systematic”; and Jüngel, Mystery. 
505
 Brümmer, Model, 149. 
506
 God is capable of receiving value, or “an increase of his riches and his bliss.” Moltmann, 
Trinity, 121. Cf. ibid., 168. Thus, God can and does desire to receive value from creatures but this is not out 
of his “deficiency” but out of his “superabundance” and thus does not detract from divine perfection. Ibid., 
45. Singer allows for appraisal but not to the exclusion of bestowal, saying, “Love would not be love unless 
appraising were accompanied by the bestowing of value.” Nature, 10. Brümmer also sees the value that 
God appreciates as bestowed value. “My value as a person is not something intrinsic to me which somehow 
merits the love of God. On the contrary, it is bestowed on me freely in the love of God.” Model, 243. 
Badcock voices the importance of God’s care for the world. He writes, “If in fact God does care about the 
world for what it is in itself, if his love for me, in short, can be affronted by my disobedience or confirmed 
and even deepened by my obedience and faithfulness, then it becomes necessary to say that God’s love, 
like ours in the Platonic conception, is based on a kind of need.” “Concept,” 41. However, Badcock makes 
it clear that the language of “need” for God “is strictly speaking, inappropriate for God.” Ibid., 45. Cf. 
Vacek, Love, 163–71. 
507
 Singer states, “There is no love without desire, and no love is good except as it conduces to 
someone’s satisfaction.” Nature, 148. “When God loves, he desires nothing but to be loved, since he loves 
us for no other reason than to be loved, for he knows that those who love him are blessed in their very 
love.” Brümmer,Model, 236. God may also desire the future value of his creatures. C. Osborne states, 
“God’s love for the world may be a devotion not so much to the goodness and beauty that the world already 
possesses as to the realization of his vision of what it might be.” Eros, 23. Cf. Robert Farrar Capon, 
Hunting the Divine Fox: An Introduction to the Language of Theology (Minneapolis, Minn.: Seabury, 
1985), 38. 
508
 T. C. Oden states, “God loves all creatures in the twofold sense that God unapologetically 
enjoys them for their own sake and desires their answering, enjoying love in response to eternally patient, 
self-sacrificial love.” Living, 121. C. Osborne comments, “There obviously are certain things that God 
obtains from no other source; he cannot obtain the worship of human beings unless they perform it; 
similarly if he delights in burnt offerings, or contrite hearts, or fine music and art, or upright dealings and 
acts of mercy and charity, for all these he must turn to the free acts of humankind to satisfy his desire.” 
Eros, 65. Moreover, “to suggest that God did not delight in such things, or did not take any interest in such 




(though unequal), loving, relationship. While excluded in the transcendent-voluntarist model, 
these aspects are increasingly promoted among theologians of diverse backgrounds.
509
 
Importantly, however, these aspects of divine love do not necessarily require the immanent-
experientialist view of divine ontological dependence but, rather, God may freely will to allow 
others to affect him, without divine need or vital dependency.
510
 
Summary of the Dissatisfaction 
in Recent Theology 
From this survey of the dissatisfaction with both the transcendent-voluntarist and 
immanent-experientialist models, a number of important issues regarding divine love may be 
isolated in the form of questions that remain unsettled.
511
 Foremost among these questions is 
whether God and humans can enter into a reciprocal, or mutual (though unequal), relationship of 
love. The answer to this primary question is heavily influenced by the answers to a number of 
closely related ones. For instance, is God the sole giver but never the receiver? In other words, is 
divine love only pure beneficence (thematic agape) or may it include desire or enjoyment 
(thematic eros)? Does God only bestow and/or create value or might he also appraise, appreciate, 
and receive value? Does God choose to fully love only some, or does he choose to love all, or is 
he essentially related to all such that he necessarily loves all? The responses to these questions are 
themselves bound up with answers to ontological issues relating to the extent of divine power 
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 For instance, Erickson rejects the idea of God’s enjoying the world. For him, God merely 
enjoys himself; “God loves us on the basis of that likeness of himself which he has placed within us. He 
therefore in effect loves himself in us. This likeness to him, however, is not our own doing, but is present in 
us because of his unselfish, giving, nature.” Christian, 320. 
510
 Thus, God desires and receives actual enjoyment and value from creatures but this is not due to 
any “need or lack of something in himself.” T. C. Oden, Living, 121. Many posit intratrinitarian divine love 
as the evidence that God does not need love outside of himself, but chooses to desire it. However, others do 
see these aspects as needs of God. “Only by needing us can God bestow value on us and upon our love for 
him. If God does not need us, we become infinitely superfluous.” Brümmer, Model, 242. Cf. McFague, 
Models, 134. 
511
 Notably, these unsettled issues remain similar to the prominent issues throughout the historical 




(coercion/persuasion/other), the meaning of the sovereignty of divine will and determinism or 
indeterminism; the acceptance, rejection, or qualification of immutability and impassibility; and 
the nature of divine perfection and/or self-sufficiency (dependence/independence/other). The 
positions regarding these ontological issues further limit the available options regarding whether 
God is affected by the world (and if so, whether according to his eternal decree, his ontological 
sympathetic dependency, or free relationship with others) whether he cares about it or only cares 
for it, all of which determine whether or to what extent God can enter into a mutually beneficial 
(though unequal) relationship. 
From the numerous breaks from the two main models, substantial questions remain 
unresolved, giving evidence of the dissatisfaction with both the transcendent-voluntarist and 
immanent-experientialist models. Moreover, theologians have explicitly called for a more 
adequate model of divine love.
512
 It seems apparent, then, that the extent of the conflict of 
interpretations between the primary models of this study, as well as the ongoing unresolved 
questions revolving around divine love, warrants an investigation into the biblical data to 
ascertain whether progress in overcoming the perceived shortcomings of the models is attainable 
by utilizing a method for a canonical and systematic theology. 
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 “In order for formal Evangelical theology to express the love themes central to the Bible and to 
Evangelical piety more adequately, an alternative formal theology appears to be required.” Oord, 
“Matching,” 75–76. Pinnock comments, “Unless we construct a model of the divine somewhere between 













A CANONICAL SURVEY OF DIVINE 
 
LOVE IN THE OLD TESTAMENT 
Divine love is a complex and multifaceted concept throughout the OT. This chapter will 
present a canonical survey of the prominent themes that illuminate the many facets of divine love 
in the God-world relationship. Of course, due to the overwhelming amount of data, this survey is 
necessarily selective in its presentation. The investigative process consisted of a comprehensive 
reading of the entire OT that analyzed any texts and/or passages that might contribute to potential 
answers to the systematic questions raised in previous chapters, which revolve around the issue of 
whether divine love is unilateral or whether God and humans may share a reciprocal (though 
unequal) relationship of love. 
Relative to this broad issue, five questions have been identified as standing at the center 
of the conflict of interpretations, seen in chapter 3. First, is God the sole giver but never the 
receiver? In other words, is divine love only arbitrarily willed, pure beneficence (thematic agape), 
or may it include desire or enjoyment (thematic eros)? Second, does God only bestow and/or 
create value or might he also appraise, appreciate, and receive value? Third, does God’s love 
include affection and/or emotionality such that God is concerned for the world, sympathetically 
or otherwise? Fourth, does God choose to fully love only some, or does he choose to love all, or 
is he essentially related to all such that he necessarily loves all? Fifth, bound up with this is the 





 With such questions in mind, the investigation of the data was conducted by way of a 
final-form canonical approach that concentrates on interpretation of the text(s) in canonical 
context.
1
 Accordingly, the focus is upon the theological interpretation of Scripture, in accordance 
with the canonical approach to systematic theology explained in chapter 1. The inductive reading 
of the OT sought to identify all data that might provide answers to the systematic questions raised 
by the theological conflict of interpretations over the meaning of divine love.
2
 The data extracted 
from this reading were then analyzed and organized according to the three sections of the OT 
canon in an ongoing spiral that included both narrowing and expansion of the data when themes 
became more or less significant than originally thought.
3
 Within this process, a number of 
prominent terms that hold significant implications for potential answers to the systematic 
questions became apparent. These were investigated from the standpoint of a synchronic-
canonical approach. Here the inherent limitations of semantic studies with regard to systematic 
investigation are recognized, especially the fact that meanings of words vary depending upon 
their context and usage. Accordingly, it is not the intention of these semantic surveys to reduce 
the terms to simple definitions, nor to assume that a nuance of meaning in one location can be 
extrapolated to all other occurrences of a given term.
4
 Rather, such surveys seek to identify and 
summarize the basic meaning denoted by word groups as well as the polysemy and the 
                                                     
 
1
 This entails that many of the issues of historical criticism are not germane to this study, and thus 
do not receive significant treatment. This is especially true of source and tradition criticism. The final-form 
approach, rather, engages the text as a unified corpus. 
2
 See the summary of these issues in the five questions above. 
3
 While it is likely that, despite great care, some information has been overlooked, it is hoped that 
the data presented here will provide significant insight for ongoing inquiry and discussion with regard to an 
intentionally canonical model of divine love. 
4
 James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). 
Consider also the methodology followed by Gordon R. Clark, The Word Hesed in the Hebrew Bible 




multivalency of their semantic range and usage within the canon in order to provide the crucial 
background for engaging the wider canonical themes regarding divine love. 
While the OT data were investigated inductively, this chapter will survey the data 
deductively by grouping the pertinent content under five rubrics that respond to the systematic 
questions noted above: the volitional, evaluative, emotional, foreconditional, and multilaterally 
relational aspects of divine love. These rubrics correspond to five aspects of love that provide the 
outline of a canonical and systematic model of divine love, which is presented in chapter 6. The 
five aspects may be summarized thus:  
1. Divine love is volitional but not only volitional.  
2. Divine love is not indifferent or disinterested, but evaluative.  
3. God’s love is profoundly emotional though not to the exclusion of volitional and 
evaluative aspects.  
4. Divine love is foreconditional, not altogether unconditional. I have coined the term 




5. Divine love is multilaterally relational. God universally seeks a relationship of 
reciprocal love but enters into and/or maintains particular, intimate relationships only with those 
who respond appropriately.  
It must be understood that these rubrics are themselves derived from the canonical data 
and not presupposed. In this chapter, the OT data that support each thesis are grouped under the 
corresponding category.
6
 Under each of the five categories the data are further organized 
                                                     
 
5
 See chapter 6 for a more detailed explanation of the foreconditionality of divine love. 
6
 Of course, this requires that the grouping of the data is somewhat artificial and some texts are 
treated more than once. The reason for adopting this organizational structure is to afford an efficient 
presentation for the reader that highlights the importance of the data as it points toward a wider canonical 




according to the three sections of the Hebrew canon: Torah, Prophets, and Writings.
7
 Further, the 
brief semantic surveys of prominent terminology relative to the meaning of divine love are 
interspersed under their corresponding rubrics. Of course, not all terms of any significance can be 
treated in this chapter. Thus, terms have been selected for more attention according to their 
explanatory value in accord with the canonical analysis. Accordingly, the most prominent terms 
are explained at the greatest length. Likewise, the large amount of data precludes an exhaustive 
presentation of its analysis. As such, this thematic presentation is but a survey of the research 
conducted.  
The Meaning of the bha Word Group 
Before turning to the first of the five rubrics of divine love, this chapter will first present 
a brief word study of bha, the most prominent word related to divine love, which overlaps all of 
the rubrics. It appears frequently with both divine and human agency.
8
 The word group includes a 
great deal of polysemy, similar in this respect to the English term.
9
 It may be used to refer to 
                                                     
 
7
 Such diacanonical presentation respects the canonical groupings of the text without entering into 
the ongoing debates regarding the authorship and dating of specific passages and texts that continue to 
elude consensus. 
8
 The verb bha appears 215 times in 200 verses and in the noun form hbha 37 times in 34 verses. 
The verb is usually pointed as a stative in the MT, with the exception of Gen 37:3–4; Deut 4:37; 1 Kgs 
11:1. However, it often has a transitive usage; cf. Ernst Jenni, “אהב,” TLOT 1:46. Because of significant 
overlap between the nominal and verbal forms of bha, they will be discussed together. Throughout this and 
other word studies in the following two chapters, references will frequently be made to the number of times 
a term appears in the OT or NT. In many cases such word counts are only approximations that rely upon 
the counts generated by use of Logos and/or Bibleworks software. Further precision regarding such word 
counts is unnecessary since no great import hinges upon the precise numbers. Rather, the counts are 
provided to give the reader an idea of the relative frequency of terms. 
9
 The focus in the main text, in keeping with the scope of the dissertation, is upon divine bha but it 
may be helpful for the reader to recognize that interpersonal love is manifested in various types of human 
relationships including: familial, romantic, friendship, international, king/subject, servant/master, and 
neighbor/stranger. bha often appears in reference to the feeling of affection within kinship relationships, 
especially that of parent-child (cf. Gen 22:2) and husband-wife (see, among many others, Gen 29:18, 20, 
30). Of friendship love, at times with fervent emotional attachment, see (among others) 1 Sam 18:1, 3; 
20:17; 2 Sam 1:26. bha likewise depicts romantic affection, passion, and desire (see Cant 1:3–4, 7; 2:4, 5, 7; 
3:1–5, 10; 7:6; 8:4). At times it may be associated with sexual intercourse, but most often it is used with 
reference to the sentiment underlying sexual activity (cf. Gen 24:67; 29:30; Prov 5:19; 7:18; Eccl 9:9). 




everything from the most virtuous love of affection and generosity, to a “love” that is more akin 
to lust and fades quickly after its rapacious selfishness is satisfied (see the examples below).
10
 It 
often denotes affection or fondness for its object, at times of a passionate nature, often with the 
connotation of devotion with corresponding action(s). Such “affection” may entail romance, lust, 
desire, devotion, friendship, preference, acceptance, delight, the absence of hatred, et al.
11
 With 
divine agency the word group always manifests the positive and noble aspects of the word group 
and may be directed at impersonal objects such as righteousness but is most often directed at 
human beings, usually corporate but also, at times, toward individuals (2 Sam 12:24; Isa 41:8; 
Neh 13:26; 2 Chr 20:7; cf. Deut 10:18; Isa 48:14; Ps 146:8; Prov 3:12; 15:9).  
Divine bha for persons, as well as God’s love for justice and righteousness, is a ground 
of, but not identical to, divine beneficent action (Pss 11:7; 33:5; 37:28) and election (Deut 4:37; 
7:7–8). God’s “everlasting love” is itself the basis of God drawing his people with lovingkindness 
(Jer 31:3). Accordingly, God rescued Israel from Egyptian slavery “because of” [!mi] the Lord’s 
“love” for them (Deut 7:8). Isaiah points back to divine love as the central motivation of the 
deliverance of Israel, “In His love and in His mercy He redeemed them, and He lifted them and 
carried them” (Isa 63:9). Likewise, the divine call out of Egypt is predicated on God’s love for 
                                                     
 
and pleasure based on such usage in Ugaritic; cf. Gerhard Wallis, “אהב,” TDOT 1:107; E. M. Good, “Love 
in the OT,” IDB 3:165; Gottfried Quell, “Love in the OT,” TDNT 1:22. Yet, sexual activity itself is 
commonly denoted by [dy or bkv while bha most often refers less to the sexual activity itself and more to the 
romantic love relationship as a whole; cf. Wallis, TDOT 1:107; P. J. J. S. Els, “אהב,” NIDOTTE 1:291. It is 
never used with sexual connotations when God is its subject. 
10
 The particular meaning of bha is dependent upon its usage in context. While some semantic 
studies may be greatly benefitted by careful attention to etymology, the etymology of bha resists consensus 
and thus may assist only in tenuous conclusions. Two prominent associations have been proposed. The first 
is the Arabic habba, to “breathe heavily, be excited.” See David W. Thomas, “The Root אהב ‘Love’ in 
Hebrew,” ZAW 57 (1939), 57–64. Second, the Arabic ’iha b, “skin, leather” has been proposed such that “an 
affectionate feeling in the physical realm was applied to the emotional stimulation which produced it. If this 
supposition is correct, then the emotional experience is the germ cell for the development of the concept of 
‘ahabh.’” Godfrey R. Driver, “Supposed Arabisms in the Old Testament,” JBL 55 (1936): 111; cf. Hos 
11:4. 
11
 See Jenni, TLOT 1:45-54; Els, NIDOTTE 1:277-99; Arnulf Bergman, A. O. Haldar, and Gerhard 




Israel in their “youth” (Hos 11:1). God refused to listen to Balaam’s attempt to curse Israel and 
“turned curse into a blessing . . . because” of his love for them (Deut 23:5 [6]).
12
 God’s love for 
Israel is also spoken of as a ground of making Solomon king (1 Kgs 10:9; 2 Chr 2:11; cf. 2 Chr 
9:8). Elsewhere such love is the motivation for a substitution, “Since you [Israel] are precious 
[rqy] in My sight, Since you are honored [dbk] and I love you, I will give other men in your place” 
(Isa 43:4). Likewise, YHWH “loves him [Israel]” and “he will carry out his good pleasure on 
Babylon” (Isa 48:14). Thus, both divine blessing upon his beloved and judgment on her enemies 
are grounded in, yet not identical to, divine bha. 
bha is closely associated with many word groups that are also significant to the meaning 
of divine love. This word group collocates significantly with language regarding: the seat of 
emotions (vpn and bl/bbl), pleasure and/or delight (#px, hcr/!wcr, and many others), compassion 
(lmx), passion/zeal (ha'n>qi), lovingkindness (dsx), favor/grace (!nx),13 and contrasts frequently with 
hatred (anf). Many of these significant collocations appear interspersed throughout the discussion 
of the important issues below. 
There are a number of important, often-disputed, issues related to the meaning of bha.14 
Many of these touch on one primary issue: whether bha is primarily (or even exclusively) 
volitional or emotional. Considerable emphasis has been placed on the volitional aspect of bha, 
and there is a great deal of support for such a view. Indeed, the fact that human bha is often 
commanded (toward neighbors, strangers, and even toward God) assumes a volitional element 
                                                     
 
12
 Literally, God was “not willing [hb'úa'-al{)w>] to listen [[mv] to Balaam” but rather “turned the curse 
into a blessing [hk'r'B.]” (Deut 23:5 [6]). As Gordon R. Clark states, “If they are faithful to Yahweh, he will 
be faithful to them and to the covenant; he will go on loving them and expressing that love by fulfilling the 
promises he made to their ancestors.” The Word Hesed, 131. Els refers to this as God “promising his love 
as a reward for covenant faithfulness.” NIDOTTE 1:283. 
13
 See Amos 5:15; Ps 119:132; Prov 5:19; 22:11; Esth 2:17. 
14





though not necessarily to the exclusion of emotion. Likewise, divine bha has an apparent 
volitional aspect. The preference and volition of divine bha is perhaps clearest in those passages 
that relate to election.
15
 Some scholars have incorrectly suggested that bha refers to “election 
love,” often conflating bha with rxb.16 However, the evidence does not seem to allow for such 
conflation, nor for bha to be seen as purely election love. For one thing, if bha entails election, 
what is to be made of God’s bha that extends beyond the elect (Deut 10:18)? Moreover, a strong 
case will be made in this chapter that love (bha) is the basis of election, rather than the other way 
around, and as such, could not be equivalent with election (cf. Deut 4:37; 7:7–8; 10:15; cf. Isa 
41:8; Pss 47:4 [5]; 78:68; 2 Chr 20:7).
17
 Nevertheless, there is a significant volitional element 
associated with divine bha and other terms of love, as will be further seen below (cf. Hos 14:4 
[5]). 
At times, the correspondence between God’s election and preferential love suggests 
evaluation. For instance, that God “loves the gates of Zion more than all the other dwelling places 
                                                     
 
15
 bha collocates with rxb, “to choose, elect,” in five verses, all related to the divine election of 
Israel/Judah (Deut 4:37; 10:15; Isa 41:8; Pss 47:4 [5]; 78:68).  
16
 For instance, Norman H. Snaith identifies bha as “election love.” God “loved Israel—that is, He 
preferred her before all other peoples. She is His elected people.” The Distinctive Ideas of the Old 
Testament (London: Epworth Press, 1962), 95, 134. Eugene H. Merrill views these as “technical terms . . . 
virtually synonymous. . . . In other words, ‘to love’ is to choose, and ‘to choose’ is to love.” Deuteronomy 
(Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 1994), 132; cf. Charles E. B. Cranfield, “Love,” A Theological 
Word Book of the Bible (ed. Alan Richardson; New York: Macmillan, 1950), 132; Kyung Hee Park, 
“Divine Love in Hosea 11” (Ph.D. diss., The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2004), 36; Pieter A. 
Verhoef, The Books of Haggai and Malachi (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1987), 196; Larry R. 
Walker, “‘Love’ in the Old Testament: Some Lexical Observations,” in Current Issues in Biblical and 
Patristic Interpretation (ed. G. F. Hawthorne; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1975), 287–88. On the 
other hand, Alexander To Ha Luc rejects the conflation of love and choice in contexts of election. “The 
Meaning of 'hb in the Hebrew Bible” (Ph.D. diss., The University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1982). 
Jacqueline E. Lapsley adds that such conflation “effectively eliminates emotions as significant in covenant 
love, despite the biblical evidence to the contrary.” “Feeling Our Way: Love for God in Deuteronomy,” 
CBQ 65 (2003): 360. Jacob sees love, rather, as the basis of election, “desire at once violent and voluntary.” 
Edmond Jacob, Theology of the Old Testament (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), 108. 
17
 bha as the basis of election is widely recognized. See, for instance, Wallis, TDOT 1:104; 
William A. Dyrness, Themes in Old Testament Theology (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1979), 
59; Clark, The Word Hesed, 263. Even Carl F. H. Henry recognized this. God, Revelation, and Authority 
(Waco, Tex.: Word Books, 1976), 2:347. This and other features that distinguish between bha and election 




of Jacob” implies comparative evaluation (Ps 87:2). Elsewhere, God states, “Since you [Israel] 
are precious [rqy] in My sight, Since you are honored [dbk] and I love you, I will give other men 
in your place” (Isa 43:4).
18
 The fact that in such instances people are singled out as recipients of 
divine bha points to preferential love and may also suggest evaluation.19 Indeed, bha is often used 
evaluatively. Thus, God loves justice (Isa 61:8; Pss 33:5; 37:28), righteousness (Pss 11:7; 33:5), 
his sanctuary (Mal 2:11), and the gates of Zion (Ps 87:2). Likewise, God loves the righteous (Ps 
146:8) and the pursuer of justice (Prov 15:9).
20
 This evaluative aspect of bha is further apparent in 
the frequent attention given to misdirected love.
21
 It is important to note at this juncture that bha 
                                                     
 
18
 In non-religious use of the term, bha is sometimes associated with evaluative attraction based on 
beauty. Thus, Tamar was “beautiful” [hpy] and Amnon “loved” her (2 Sam 13:1). In Canticles, the woman 
is described as “beautiful [hpy] and delightful [~[n], My love” (Cant 7:6). This latter term “delightful” is 
likewise associated with the “love” between Jonathan and David (2 Sam 1:26).  
19
 Indeed, preferential bha appears frequently with human agency as well. In romantic contexts, 
Jacob “loved Rachel more than Leah” (Gen 29:30), Hannah is preferred by her husband Elkanah, who 
“loved” her and thus gave her a double portion (1 Sam 1:5), the king loved Esther “more than all the 
women” (Esth 2:17), and Rehoboam “loved Maacah . . . more than all of his other wives and concubines” 
(2 Chr 11:21). In familial contexts, Isaac “loved” Esau but Rebekah “loved” Jacob (Gen 25:28). Israel 
[Jacob] “loved Joseph more than all his sons, because he was the son of his old age” (Gen 37:3–4) and 
Benjamin is likewise preferred (44:20), both due to Jacob’s preferential love for their mother Rachel. Due 
to the reality of such preferential love, Deuteronomy puts restrictions in place to protect children in the 
instance where one wife is “loved and the other unloved [anEf']” (Deut 21:15–16). In a number of such cases, 
preferential love is not merely arbitrary or groundless but evaluative. For instance, Abraham’s love for 
Isaac as the unique son (Gen 22:2), Isaac’s love for Esau is particularly predicated on Esau’s pleasing skill 
coupled with Jacob’s taste for game (Gen 25:28), Jacob’s love for Joseph and Benjamin as Rachel’s 
children (Gen 37:3). Both Rachel and Esther are implicitly preferred based on their beauty (Gen 29:17; 
Esth 2:7, 17). Within the context of the reality of preferential love, and of a type that clearly includes 
appraisal, Leah’s notion that Jacob may finally “love” her once she bears him a child makes sense (Gen 
29:32). Many other examples of evaluative love from humans appear. See, e.g., 1 Sam 18:16; 2 Sam 1:23, 
26; Ruth 4:15. 
20
 Conversely, the people who “love the LORD” are to hate evil (Ps 97:10; cf. Pss 45:7; 119:113). 
Elsewhere, the lovers of God are starkly contrasted with God’s haters (Exod 20:5–6; Deut 5:9–10; 7:9–10).  
21
 Indeed, some objects are worthy of love while others are worthless (cf. Ps 4:2), implying that 
proper love ought to be directed not toward evil or worthless things, but to good and worthwhile objects. 
Yet, human bha is commonly misdirected. Some “love being simple-minded” and “delight [dmx] themselves 
in scoffing” while “fools hate knowledge” (Prov 1:22). The people ought not to love perjury, which God 
hates (Zech 8:17; cf. Ps 11:5). Evil is to be hated, good to be loved (Amos 5:15; Mic 3:2; 6:8; cf. Ps 45:7 
[8]). Amos negatively states that Israel so “love[s]” to offer sacrifice (Amos 4:5). Further, numerous 
inappropriate objects of love appear, including: a bribe (Isa 1:23), slumber/sleep (Isa 56:10; Prov 20:13), 
idolatry (Hos 3:1; 10:1; Jer 8:2), shame (Hos 4:18), Israel’s earnings of harlotry (Hos 9:1), “detestable” 




does not necessarily refer to positive, noble, or appropriate love in and of itself. On the contrary, 
bha may be used in dark contexts, denoting Shechem’s intense feelings of romantic attraction 
[qbd] and infatuation for Dinah that led to rape and afterward his request for marriage (Gen 34:3). 
bha is also used to describe Amnon’s temporary, lustful feelings toward his half-sister Tamar, 
which turned to intense hatred after he had raped her (2 Sam 13:1, 4, 15).
22




The evaluative nature (and often emotionality as well) of divine bha is also manifest in its 
collocation as the antonym of divine hate, whether in reference to categories such as “justice” 
and/or “robbery” (Isa 61:8; cf. Zech 8:17), or the change from divine love to hate toward human 
beings (Hos 9:15; cf. Ps 11:5).
24
 Thus, rather than being disinterested, purely elective, 
                                                     
 
(Hos 12:7 [8]), violence (Ps 11:5), words that devour (Ps 52:4 [6]), cursing (Ps 109:17), lying (Ps 119:163), 
being simple-minded (Prov 1:22), transgression and strife (Prov 17:19), hedonistic pleasure, wine, and oil 
(Prov 21:17), and money and abundance (Eccl 5:10). On the other hand, one should love good (Amos 
5:15), kindness (Mic 6:8), truth and peace (Zech 8:19), knowledge and discipline (Prov 12:1), wisdom 
(Prov 29:3) and in getting wisdom “loves his own soul” (Prov 19:8), and purity of heart (Prov 22:11). bha 
also often describes Israel’s and/or Judah’s infidelity and spiritual harlotry (Isa 57:8; Jer 2:25, 33; 5:31; 8:2; 
14:10). It is thus used in reference to Judah’s many “lovers” (Jer 22:20, 22; 30:14; Ezek 16:33, 36–37; 
23:22; Lam 1:19). Hosea also makes reference to the abundance of spiritual adultery and Israel’s “lovers” 
(Hos 2:5 [H 2:7]; 2:7 [2:9]; 2:10 [2:12]; 2:12–13 [2:14–15]; 3:1; 8:9; 10:11). Such misdirected love causes 
non-acceptance with God and remembrance of the people’s sin; cf. 2 Chr 19:2.  
22
 Notably, a number of scholars think this instance of bha merely designates “lust.” Bruce C. 
Birch, “The First and Second Books of Samuel,” in Numbers–Samuel (vol. 2 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: 
Abingdon Press, 1998), 1303; Robert D. Bergen, 1, 2 Samuel (NAC 7; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & 
Holman, 1996), 382; A. A. Anderson, 2 Samuel (WBC 11; Dallas: Word, 1989), 175. Wallis suggests that 
this occurrence highlights the emotive nature of both “love” and “hate” since “indeed, love can suddenly be 
turned into hate.” TDOT 1:102; cf. P. Kyle McCarter Jr., II Samuel: A New Translation with Introduction, 
Notes and Commentary (AB 9; New York: Doubleday, 1984), 324. 
23
 For example, love may turn to hate; cf. Wallis, TDOT 1:109. Thus, at one time Saul was said to 
have “loved [David] greatly” (1 Sam 16:21), but this love does not remain when David rises to prominence. 
Later, bha is presented in a ruse, where Saul’s servants are to make David believe “the king delights [#pex'] in 
you, and all his servants love [bha] you” (1 Sam 18:22). 
24
 bha and anf collocate as antonyms many times (in 31 verses), with God and humans as agents. 
Wallis points out that the emotive nature of the term bha “seems to be supported at least by the fact that this 
emotional feeling which flows out of one’s perceptions is contrasted with hate.” TDOT 1:102. Thus, bha 
collocates with the emotions of hate (ha'n>fi) and zeal (ha'n>qi) (Eccl 9:6). With humans as agents, Jacob’s 
preferential love of Joseph breeds his brothers’ hatred of him (Gen 37:4). bha and anf depict a husband’s 
preferential love between wives, the one “loved,” the other “hated” or “unloved” (Deut 21:15–16). As 




unconditional love, divine bha may often connote appraisal, even delight. Accordingly, bha 
frequently collocates with language of delight, including #px, which may connote delight or 
desire,
25
 and hcr/!wcr, which may connote “be pleased with, accept favorably, delight in,” etc.26 In 
a number of instances where bha collocates with various other words for joy and/or delight, love 
results in rejoicing in its object.
27
 Such examples of divine pleasure and delight also point toward 
the potential emotional connotations of bha, which will be discussed further below. 
Another recurring misconception, often related to the idea of election love, is that divine 
bha is altogether unconditional, predicated on the unilateral divine will (volition).28 However, this 
perspective is in tension with the apparent conditionality and contingency sometimes associated 
with bha (cf. Deut 7:12–13; Ps 146:8; Prov 15:9). Accordingly, what some interpreters deem 
“unconditional” may more accurately be referred to as “unmerited” or “undeserved” (Deut 7:7; 
                                                     
 
13:15; cf. Judg 14:16; 2 Sam 19:6 [7]; 2 Chr 19:2). In a number of other instances the two terms are set in 
direct contrast (Ezek 16:37; Ps 109:5; Prov 1:22; 8:36; 9:8; 10:12; 12:1; 13:24; 14:20; 15:17; 27:6; Eccl 
3:8; 9:1). Thus, evil is to be hated, good to be loved (Amos 5:15; Mic 3:2). 
25
 Notice the parallel usage of the terms when Saul’s servants are to make David believe “the king 
delights [#pex'] in him, and all his servants love” him (1 Sam 18:22). Similarly, in Ps 109:17, one “loved 
cursing” but “did not delight [#px] in blessing.” Again, to “desire [#pex']” life is to love “length of days” (Ps 
34:12 [13]); cf. 1 Kgs 10:9; Isa 48:14; 2 Chr 9:8. For parallel usage in adjacent verses, see Deut 21:14–15; 
Isa 56:4, 6. 
26
 These two also appear in parallel usage. Thus, the one who “speaks right is loved” and 
“righteous lips are the delight [!Acr'] of kings” (Prov 16:13). Divine bha is also explicitly set in parallel to the 
favor or delight [hcr] a father has for his son (Prov 3:12).  
27
 For instance, consider the collocation of bha with qvx, which likewise appears to connote 
attachment, affection, and perhaps even delight (Deut 10:15; cf. Gen 34:3, 8). A psalmist declares, “I will 
delight [[[v] in Your commandments, Which I love” (Ps 119:47; cf. Prov 1:22). bha further repeatedly 
collocates with terms of rejoicing such as fwf, xmf/hxmf, hN”rI, and/or lyg. For example, those who “love” 
God’s name should be “glad” [xmf] and sing for “joy” [!nr] and exult in him (Ps 5:11 [12]). Likewise, even 
divine delight, joy, and rejoicing appear together, looking to the future when God “will exult [fwf] over you 
with joy [hx'm.fi], He will be quiet [vrx] in His love, He will rejoice [lyg] over you with shouts of joy [hN”rI]” 
(Zeph 3:17). See also Isa 66:10; Hos 9:1; Zech 8:19; Ps 40:16 [17] = 70:5; Cant 1:4). 
28
 For Snaith, “God's love for Israel is an unconditioned sovereign love,” which is limited “only by 
the will or the nature of the lover.” The Distinctive Ideas, 13, 95; cf. ibid., 138. A number of other scholars 
view divine bha as “unconditional.” Els, NIDOTTE 1:280; Park, “Divine Love in Hosea 11,” 37–38; 
Verhoef, The Books, 196–97; Walker, “‘Love,’” in Current Issues (ed. Hawthorne), 287; Jacob, Theology, 
110; Leon Morris, Testaments of Love: A Study of Love in the Bible (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 






 Such divine love is prior to conditions, yet neither purely unilateral nor exclusive of 
conditionality. Therefore, it may be helpful to refer to it as foreconditional. Related to the 
question of conditionality and unconditionality is the significant tension between the endurance of 
divine bha in contrast to the apparent possibility of its discontinuance, even divine hatred. On the 
one hand, God himself proclaims: I have “loved you with” an “everlasting love” (Jer 31:3).
30
 On 
the other hand, at times God himself declares the change from love for his people to hatred [anf] 




The above issues are related to the question of whether divine bha is unilateral or 
bilateral. Some scholars have marginalized human love toward God.
32
 However, the reciprocal 
response of human love toward God is integral to his purposes. In human interpersonal bha, 
                                                     
 
29
 The inaccuracy enters when that which is unmerited is assumed to also be unconditional. Thus, 
Snaith comments, “Jehovah's love for Israel was unconditioned by anything in Israel that was good. It was 
wholly unmerited. It was not in the least degree because of anything in Israel that was good, or beautiful, or 
desirable. . . . Such is the story of God's unconditioned love.” Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas, 137.  
30
 Some scholars mistakenly consider the endurance of divine love to be based entirely on the 
divine will and thus unilaterally constant and unaffected; cf. Park, “Divine Love in Hosea 11,” 37; Morris, 
Testaments of Love, 12. 
31
 See the further discussion of this tension below. 
32
 Much has been written on the presence or absence of human love for God. Although it is clear 
that human bha toward God is present, especially in the Psalms, a number of scholars have marginalized 
human love toward God, sometimes suggesting that all or nearly all of the instances are merely the result of 
the influence of the so-called Deuteronomistic tradition; cf. Els, NIDOTTE 1:279, 283–84; Snaith, The 
Distinctive Ideas, 133. Claude Wiener believes love toward God is a relatively late concept, appearing in 
the prophets and coming to full fruition in Deuteronomy. Recherches sur L'Amour pour Dieu dans L'Ancien 
Testament (Paris: Letouzey Et Ane, 1957). Cf. G. Winter, “Die Liebe zu Gott im Alten Testament,” 
Journal of Old Testament Scholarship 9 (1889): 211–46. Moreover, a number of scholars, presumably for 
theological reasons, see human bha as a divine miracle. Thus, both Els and Cranfield quote Barth that God 
“has to bring about a change in the sinful heart of man to produce true love for himself. Such human love is 
really a miracle, brought about in a person by God.” Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics (trans. G. T. Thomson; 
vol. 5; Edinburgh: Clark, 1936), I/2: 410, quoted in Els, NIDOTTE 1:283; Cranfield, “Love,” A Theological 
Word Book (ed. Richardson), 133. However, reduction of religious bha to the Deuteronomist tradition begs 
the question on at least two points. First, not all of the instances are found in writings generally ascribed to 
the Deuteronomist(s). Cf. Judg 5:31; Pss 5:11 [12]; 69:36 [37]; Jer 2:2; and even sometimes Exod 20:6. See 
Els, NIDOTTE 1:283. Second, it raises the question of the speculative nature of the attribution of writings 
to the Deuteronomist tradition, which approaches the error of pan-Deuteronomism. See, for instance, Linda 




reciprocality is often presented as the ideal. In numerous texts it seems to be assumed that bha 
ought to be reciprocated, since it is lamented when love is repaid with hatred (Ps 109:4–5), or 
when Job’s loved ones have turned against him (Job 19:19). David is chastised by Joab for 
“loving those who hate you” and “hating those who love you” (2 Sam 19:6). Moreover, those 
who hate God ought not to be loved (2 Chr 19:2). Similarly, consider the exclamation, “May they 
prosper who love you [human]” (Ps 122:6). Personified Wisdom even proclaims, “I love those 
who love Me” (Prov 8:17). Thus, bha often entails relationality that includes proper regard and 
the expectation of reciprocality.  
The ideal of mutual love also appears in the divine-human relationship, evidenced in the 
abundant expressions of divine bha toward human beings on the one hand (e.g., Deut 4:37; 7:13; 
10:15; 1 Kgs 3:3; Isa 43:4; Ps 146:8), and the abundance of divine commands for his people to 
love God on the other (e.g., Deut 6:5; 10:12; 11:1, 13; 13:3 [4]; 30:6; Josh 22:5; 23:11; Ps 31:23 
[24]).
33
 Further, bha depicts not only commanded but also actual human love for God, illustrating 
the ideal of mutual and reciprocal bha.34 In this regard, bha often collocates with dsx, “steadfast 
love” or “lovingkindness,” especially in the frequent statements that God reciprocates dsx toward 
                                                     
 
Deuteronomism (JSOT Supplement; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999). 
33
 Notably, even statistical usage hints at this ideal of reciprocality of divine-human love. Els notes 
that the root is “used 27x when God loves persons, as against 24x when persons love God.” Els, NIDOTTE 
1:279. Wallis adds, “The only possible way for Israel to live is in a love, fidelity, and devotion to Yahweh 
which reciprocates [God’s] love.” TDOT 1:115; cf. Daniel J. Simundson, “The Book of Micah,” in The 
Twelve Prophets (vol. 7 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1996), 580. 
34
 Thus, “Solomon loved the LORD, walking in the statutes of his father” (1 Kgs 3:3). Likewise, 
the psalmist “love[s] the LORD, because” God hears him (Ps 116:1). Abraham is the “friend,” or more 
literally the “lover,” of God (Isa 41:8; 2 Chr 20:7). In another context God is entreated to “let those who 
love Him be like the rising of the sun in its might” (Judg 5:31). Those who “love” God’s salvation are those 
who “seek” God (Ps 40:16 [17]; cf. Ps 70:4[5]). Those who “love the LORD” should hate evil (Ps 97:10). 
God “keeps all who love Him” (Ps 145:20). In a number of instances, love for God is indirectly stated, via 
love for a hypostatization of God. For instance, covenant blessings are prescribed to those, even foreigners, 
who “love the name of the LORD” (Isa 56:6; cf. Ps 5:11 [12]; Pss 69:36 [37]); 119:132). Love is also 
variously directed at God’s house (Ps 26:8), his salvation (Pss 40:16 [17]; 70:4 [5]), his commandments (Ps 
119:47–48, 127), law (Ps 119:97, 113, 163, 165), testimonies (Ps 119:119, 167), word (Ps 119:140), 
precepts (Ps 119:159), and Jerusalem (Isa 66:10; cf. Ps 122:6). Such indirect reference may be related to 




humans who love him (Exod 20:6; Deut 5:10; 7:9; Neh 1:5; Dan 9:4).
35
 Moreover, God has 
drawn his people with dsx according to his “everlasting love” (Jer 31:3). Human dsx toward God 
is in direct parallel to human bha as God remembers “the devotion [dsx] of your youth, the love 
[bha] of your betrothals” (Jer 2:2). The dysx is to love God (Ps 31:23 [24]) and, likewise, God 
loves justice and does not forsake his dysx (Ps 37:28). Again, God preserves his dysx, those who 
love him and hate evil (Ps 97:10). Nevertheless, the history of Israel portrays and laments God’s 
repeated position as her unrequited lover (e.g., Jer 2; Ezek 16; Hos 3). 
On the other hand, Susan Ackerman has recently contended that the lexeme bha is used 
one-sidedly as the agent is “typically the hierarchically superior party in the relationship” and she 
extends this view to human and divine-human relationships.
36
 While the majority of accounts 
support this perspective, examples such as Ruth to Naomi (Ruth 4:15) and the slave’s love of his 
master (Exod 21:5; Deut 15:16) call this into serious doubt.
37
 Moreover, the love between David 
and Jonathan (1 Sam 20:17; 2 Sam 1:26) and the love of women toward men in Canticles (Cant 
1:3–4, 7; 3:1–4) and ultimately the love from humans toward God, both commanded and 
manifested (see examples above), further cast doubt on this thesis. Although love of a societal 
inferior toward a superior is less common, it is represented.
38
 
                                                     
 
sexuality. Els, NIDOTTE 1:289; cf. Jenni, TLOT 1:45–54. 
35
 Perhaps on this basis the psalmist asks for recognition of his love for God’s precepts and to be 
revived according to God’s dsx (Ps 119:159). Further, God loves righteousness and justice and his dsx fills 
the earth (Ps 33:5). God has told humans to love dsx (Mic 6:8).  
36
 Susan Ackerman, “The Personal Is Political: Covenantal and Affectionate Love ('āhēb, 'ahâbâ) 
in the Hebrew Bible,” VT 52 (2002): 447.  
37
 Ackerman unconvincingly explains the former as Ruth having become the superior by marriage 
and childbearing and the latter as merely a utilitarian expression as per J. A. Thompson, “Israel’s ‘Lovers,’” 
VT 27 (1977): 475–81. See “The Personal,” 447.  
38
 Accordingly, Pedersen speaks of the “commandment of love” as “a direct expression of the 
character of the soul and the organism of family and people . . . the substance of normal life.” Johannes 




Another major issue concerns how the bha relationship is to be viewed, specifically 
whether the divine-human relationship depicts the type of emotional and affectionate bha 
manifested in kinship relationships (such as marriage and parent-child) or if it is purely 
“covenantal” bha that is descriptive of a legal, lord-vassal treaty relationship.39 Based on Ancient 
Near Eastern parallels, William L. Moran suggested that bha, at least in Deuteronomy, belongs to 
technical treaty language.
40
 The rather striking ANE parallels use love terminology to depict 
relationships between international parties, masters-servants, kings-subjects, etc. Extrapolated 
from these parallels is the view that such “covenant” bha is to be contrasted to the kind of 
affection that often transpires in romantic or parental relationships.
41
 Dennis McCarthy built on 
Moran’s seminal work by suggesting that the divine-human, father-child analogy was itself 
technical covenant language that undergirded the usage in Deuteronomy, devoid of “any sort of 
tender love” but focused on fear, loyalty, and obedience, a love that “can be commanded.”
42
 In 
this way, McCarthy connects the father-son analogy to covenant, but in doing so he conflates the 
                                                     
 
39
 A distinction is often made between the emotional affection in intimate personal relationships 
(family, friendship) as opposed to the merely political “love” of treaty contexts; cf. Ackerman, “The 
Personal,” 440; J. A. Thompson, “Significance of the Verb Love in the David-Jonathan Narratives in 1 
Samuel,” VT 24 (1974): 334–38. 
40
 William L. Moran, “The Ancient Near Eastern Background of the Love of God in 
Deuteronomy,” CBQ 25 (1963): 77–87. The central premises of this seminal study of bha in Deuteronomy 
have been adopted and expanded over the years. See, for instance, Els, NIDOTTE 1:285–87; Walker, 
“‘Love,’” in Current Issues (ed. Hawthorne), 283–84; Ackerman, “The Personal,” 440; Dennis J. 
McCarthy, “Notes on the Love of God in Deuteronomy and the Father-Son Relationship Between Yahweh 
and Israel,” CBQ 27 (1965): 144–45; Norbert Lohfink, “Hate and Love in Osee 9, 15,” 25 (1963).  
41
 For Moran, “Love in Deuteronomy is . . . in brief, a love defined by and pledged in the 
covenant—a covenantal love.” Moran, “The Ancient,” 78. 
42
 McCarthy, “Notes,” 145. McCarthy seems to find “tender love” in the father-child analogy only 
in Hosea. He notes two other possibilities: Deut 1:31 and Isa 63:16. The former he sees as dependent on 
Hos 11 and he suggests that the latter actually speaks of God’s harsh treatment with “no note of 
tenderness.” Ibid. However, it is interesting that in another work McCarthy acknowledges that Hittite parity 
treaties were “to create an affective relationship as well as a legal bond” including “passionate rhetoric” as 
well as “an appeal for the true dedication, not forced acceptance.” Treaty and Covenant: A Study in Form 
in the Ancient Oriental Documents and in the Old Testament (AnBib 21; Rome: Pontifical Biblical 




father-son analogy with his preconception regarding the “Deuteronomistic” theology of bha, 
bereft of the affection of kinship relationships.
43
 
However, the influential conclusions of Moran and McCarthy are questionable at some 
points. To be sure, the context of bha in Deuteronomy (and likely elsewhere) is covenantal, and 
the numerous ANE parallels that evidence the language of “love” in ANE treaties are indeed 
compelling. Moreover, significant continuity between the covenant language and kinship 
metaphors (parental and marital) descriptive of bha in the divine-human relationship and 
elsewhere seems evident.
44
 However, it is not apparent that either the biblical instances of bha or 
its equivalent in ANE literature in covenant contexts are necessarily limited to legality or devoid 
of “tender love.” Nor is it evident that bha is restricted to the purely legal aspect of covenant, even 
within Deuteronomy. Numerous reasons for skepticism regarding such a claim may be briefly 
noted, the force of which will increase as this chapter progresses: 
1. Biblical texts often switch, with little or no warning, from one metaphor to another in 
describing the divine-human relationship. As such, there is significant overlap between the 
metaphors of covenant, marriage, and parent-child relationships.
45
  
                                                     
 
43
 For McCarthy, “the very ancient Israelite concept of Israel as Yahweh’s son is very close to, or 
even identical with, the Deuteronomistic conception articulated in terms of the treaty.” “Notes,” 145. As 
support for his view in Deuteronomy, McCarthy notes the parent analogy in Deut 8:5; 14:1. The first is 
what he views as stern discipline, corresponding to covenantal discipline; the second is an explicit link 
between covenant command and the language of sonship; cf. Deut 32:5, 19–20. He mentions as further 
evidence of a connection between covenant and father-child language, Isa 1:2; 30:1–2, 9 and Jer 3:19; 31:1, 
9; Mal 1:6. In another direction with the father-child analogy, J. W. McKay expands on McCarthy’s view, 
arguing for Deuteronomistic dependence upon Wisdom literature as the context, such that the “love” refers 
to the obedience proper to a teacher-student relationship. “Man’s Love for God in Deuteronomy and the 
Father/Teacher—Son/Pupil Relationship,” VT 22 (1972): 426–35. 
44
 Consider the connection between language of sonship and covenant even in secular usage (2 
Kgs 16:7). 
45
 For example, consider the mixing of covenant, marriage, and parent-child metaphors in Hosea 
(14:5; 3:1; 11:1, 4) and the parallel of breaking the covenant with harlotry (Ezek 16:33, 36, 37); cf. 




2. There is considerable support for the view that covenant language is itself grounded in 
the more basic kinship language, rather than vice versa.
46
  
3. Divine love is prior to, and in fact the basis of, covenant.
47
  
                                                     
 
46
 Although vestiges of the once prevalent reduction of covenant and covenant language to its 
legal aspects remain in some scholarship, studies such as that by Scott Hahn have demonstrated with great 
force and clarity the foundational nature of kinship to covenant rather than vice versa. Kinship by 
Covenant: A Canonical Approach to the Fulfillment of God's Saving Promises (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009). Duane Smith, while recognizing the usage of bha in covenant language, comments, 
“The root ‘hb is first and foremost a kinship term.” “Kinship and Covenant in Hosea 11:1–4,” HBT 16 
(1994): 43. “We must not suppose, however, that biblical covenants borrowed their kinship language from 
the social world of treaties. Both the language of biblical covenant and treaty language developed in a 
social environment in which kinship was the primary model for understanding all human interaction. It was 
natural, therefore, that international treaties, national (league) covenants, and individual covenants used 
kinship to describe their content.” D. Smith, “Kinship and Covenant,” 49. As Cross points out, kinship 
language was basic to the social organization of West Semitic tribal groups. Moreover, “the language of 
love (ahabah) is kinship language, the bond that holds together those in intimate relationships, the 
relationships of family and kindred,” including a basic responsibility for amity toward one another. Frank 
Moore Cross, From Epic to Canon: History and Literature in Ancient Israel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998), 5. 
Leo G. Perdue likewise questions the priority of ANE suzerainty treaties, seeing such a view as 
“forced.” Rather, he considers the “theology of covenant” to itself be an expression of “solidarity and 
community” rooted in the “household.” “The Household, Old Testament, and Contemporary 
Hermeneutics,” in Families in Ancient Israel (ed. Leo G. Perdue et al.; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
1989), 240. Ernest W. Nicholson also recognizes the kinship basis of the language of love and, further, 
rejects dependence upon treaties for such language. He also contends that it would have been distasteful 
and counterproductive to tell the Israelites that God “loves’ them in the same way as a suzerain (e.g., 
Ashurbanipal or Nebuchadrezzar) ‘loves’ his vassals and that they are to ‘love’ Yahweh as vassals ‘love’ 
their suzerains.” God and His People: Covenant and Theology in the Old Testament (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), 79. Lapsley likewise believes that love language “is imported into the political 
realm from family life, where it originated, and that its emotional connotation in that context is transferred 
to the political context in the borrowing.” “Feeling Our Way,” 355. She further points out the mistake in 
assuming that “structural and formulaic parallels necessarily express identical content.” Accordingly, the 
“aptness of the ancient Near Eastern parallels does not ipso facto mean that human love for God in 
Deuteronomy does not have an important affective dimension.” Ibid., 353–54. Even Moshe Weinfeld 
recognizes that the “whole diplomatic vocabulary of the second millennium is rooted in the familial 
sphere.” “The Covenant of Grant in the Old Testament and in the Ancient Near East,” JAOS 90 (1970): 
194. 
47
 This is true of the covenant between David and Jonathan (1 Sam 18:3) as well as the divine-
human covenant relationship. See the canonical analysis below for more discussion of the grounding of 
covenant in divine love; cf. Quell, “Love in the OT,” 27. R. Laird asserts, “Love is a covenant word 
because kings borrowed it from general use to try to render covenants effective. They tried to make the 
vassal promise to act like a brother, friend and husband. It does not follow that God’s love is merely a 
factor in a covenant; rather the covenant is the sign and expression of his love.” “חסד,” TWOT 306. 
Likewise, Peter C. Craigie recognizes the similarity between the usage of bha and ANE treaty language, yet 
insists, “The language of loving God, however, is not drawn directly from the treaty terminology; rather it 
is one of the features of the Hebrew relationship to God which made possible the use of the treaty 
terminology in the first place, and also the use of the father/son analogy.” The Book of Deuteronomy 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1976), 169–70. Likewise, Ronald E. Clements cautions against assuming 




4. The divine commands calling for human love in covenant contexts imply the demand 
of internal devotion consisting, not merely of outward obedience, but including an inner attitude 
of wholehearted fidelity (e.g., Deut 6:5). Therefore, loyalty to God and his covenant does not 
exclude affection and devotion. In fact, it might be argued that enduring loyalty ought to be 
predicated on such underlying attachment.
48
  
5. Emotionality and affection are, in fact, evident within covenantal contexts.
49
 Thus, it 
appears that bha, although often appearing within covenant relationships, may connote more than 
strictly legal “covenant love.” Indeed, bha clearly constitutes the very ground of covenant in 
many instances.
50
 God expects and desires full allegiance, devotion, and loyalty. Therefore, the 
                                                     
 
formulation.” God’s Chosen People: A Theological Interpretation of the Book of Deuteronomy (London: 
SCM Press, 1968), 83; cf. Cranfield, “Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. Richardson), 132; Duane L. 
Christensen, Deuteronomy 1–11 (WBC 6A; Dallas: Word, 1991), 143–44; Richard D. Patterson, “Parental 
Love as a Metaphor for Divine-Human Love,” JETS 46 (2003): 208. 
48
 Accordingly, Clements finds Moran’s view “strained and implausible in view of the importance 
of the issue and the widespread feature in Deuteronomy of pointing out the necessity for the nurturing of a 
right attitude toward God.” “The Book of Deuteronomy,” in Numbers–Samuel (vol. 2 of NIB; Nashville, 
Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1998), 343. It is true that similar language of wholeheartedness is also present in 
the ANE vassal treaties, such as those of Esarhaddon. See D. J. Wiseman, “The Vassal-Treaties of 
Esarhaddon,” Iraq 20 (1958): 14–22. However, such parallels may also have intent that goes beyond purely 
external behavior, in recognition of the fact that merely external loyalty can change quickly. ANE 
rulers/masters would likely also desire obedience that is predicated on inward devotion since the most 
dependable, long-lasting obedience stems from internal loyalty and devotion, not merely external, 
compulsory, or fear-based external action. As Lapsley points out, “even a modern understanding of 
‘loyalty’ is loaded with emotional content, and there is no reason to assume that ancient loyalty did not also 
involve the emotions in a significant way.” “Feeling Our Way,” 352. 
49
 Further, Weinfeld, who recognizes the correspondence between bha in Deuteronomy and ANE 
vassal treaties, admits, “In spite of the covenantal overtones, the love imagery in the description of the 
relationship between God and Israel has an affectionate connotation, especially in poetic texts such as 
Hosea and Jeremiah. Moreover, even in Deut 6:8 the affectionate connotation comes up when contrasted 
with the phrase ‘because YHWH hates us’ in 1:27.” Deuteronomy 1–11 (AB 5; New York: Doubleday, 
1991), 369. Elsewhere he notices both “affection and emotion” noting Deut 7:8, 13; 23:6 in the love 
between God and Israel. Deuteronomy 1–11, 351. Daniel I. Block also recognizes emotion and “covenant 
commitment.” Judges, Ruth (NAC 6; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 1999), 244. Cf. Luc, “The 
Meaning.” 
50
 Clark wisely counsels that “it is not wise to import” the entire ANE treaty “background into 
every use of the word tyrB in the Old Testament. Nor is it legitimate to insist that every use of the bha 
derivatives carries the full weight of political implications.” The Word Hesed, 128. On the other hand, this 
is not to dismiss the potential political connotations, but rather, to recognize that such overtones need not 
rule out an affective meaning; cf. P. R. Ackroyd, “The Verb Love—Aheb—in the David-Jonathan 




genre of treaty language is altogether appropriate to, though not exhaustive of, the content of 
divine bha. 
 Some have assumed that if love can be commanded it must be unemotional. However, the 
kind of human love that God commands appears to include an attitude, even emotion, of love that 
includes devotion displayed in obedience, service, commandment keeping, listening, and seeking 
him.
51
 Such external manifestations must correspond to an internal devotion, which is not devoid 
of emotion, in order to measure up to the love that God expects. That the nature of this expected 
love goes far beyond merely external legality is clear in the language used: humans are to love 
God with all their “heart” [bbl] and “soul” [that is, inner person, vpn],52 which is language 
associated with internal emotionality (Deut 6:5; 10:13; 11:13; 13:3; 30:6; Josh 22:5; cf. Josh 
23:11). Likewise, God himself will “circumcise” their heart . . . to love” him with all their “heart” 
and “soul” (Deut 30:6).
53
 This is likewise apparent in that the sincerity of love for God can be 
                                                     
 
affectionate relationship but also thinks “love your neighbor as yourself means be useful to your neighbor.” 
“You Shall Love Your Neighbor As Yourself: A Case of Misinterpretation,” in Die Hebraische Bibel und 
ihre zweifache Nachgeschichte: Festschrift fur Rolf Rendtorff zum 65. Geburtstag (ed. Erhard Blum, 
Christian Macholz, and Ekehard W. Stegemann; Neukirchen-Vluyn, Germany: Neukirchener Verlag, 
1990), 112–13. 
51
 Some have struggled with the concept of a love that can be commanded. Quell, “Love in the 
OT,” 25. Bernard J. Bamberger solves the issue by divesting the love toward Yahweh of emotion on the 
basis that it is commanded. “Fear and Love of God in the Old Testament,” HUCA 6 (1929): 39–53; cf. 
McKay, “Man’s Love,” 426. Marten H. Woudstra, however, contends that “this is judging the biblical love 
concept by an extraneous standard.” The Book of Joshua (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1981), 337. He 
notes, “The Hebrew word for “love,” ’āhaḇ, covers the whole range of human affection: sexual love, love 
of friendship, and love for God. It is more than a voluntary expression of the emotions. It can be 
commanded, and it expresses itself in concrete acts of obedience to law.” Jeffrey H. Tigay notes, “The idea 
of commanding a feeling is not foreign to the Torah, which assumes that people can cultivate proper 
attitudes.” Deuteronomy (JPS Torah Commentary; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1996), 76. 
Lapsley likewise contends, “The objection that feelings cannot be commanded relies on the modern notions 
not only that feelings exist within the private world of the individual, but also that they are uncontrollable. 
In order to talk about love in Deuteronomy, on the other hand, we must come up with a way to talk about 
emotion that does not perpetuate the modern propensity to privatize feelings and separate them from 
action.” “Feeling Our Way,” 365. Cf. Hos 3:1. 
52
 vpn often refers to the seat of the emotions, the inner person. The term never refers to an 
immortal soul.  
53
 “Love and behavior motivated by love are not to be separated from emotion, and yet they are 




tested. Thus the people are warned that God is “testing” [hsn] them “to find out if” they “love” 
him with all their “heart” and “soul” (Deut 13:3 [4]). This helps explain what some see as a 
contradiction between a love of obedience and affectionate, emotional love.
54
 Human love for 
God is not to be merely external but to spring from an internal disposition. In close association 
with the religious context of wholehearted love for God, bha with a human agent is often 
collocated with fear (awe) and the actions of pursuit/seeking, and/or clinging, both toward God 
and other humans.
55
 Particularly significant is the association of bha and qbd, “to cling,” which 
connotes the idea of attachment, even at times, attraction.
56
 
The strong emotional aspect that may be connoted by bha is readily apparent elsewhere, 
supporting the conclusion that the term does not merely refer to legal aspects when used in 
covenant contexts.
57
 The potential passion of bha is perhaps most explicit in its collocations with 
                                                     
 
for God is therefore far from being expressed merely in sheer legalism or external observance of the cult; 
on the contrary, it engages the whole person, with all his/her powers; it must come from one’s whole 
heart.” NIDOTTE 1:286. Accordingly, “the condemnation of externalism” and superficial worship is well-
represented” (286). Dennis T. Olson comments, “Obedience and passionate relationships characterize the 
full love of God.” Deuteronomy and the Death of Moses: A Theological Reading (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
1994), 51. Luc further comments that “genuine inner feeling must go hand in hand with outward 
observance, loyalty to God must involve both.” “The Meaning,” 139. 
54
 The “question has been raised as to how such love as this can be commanded. However, if love 
is not merely an emotional feeling for a person or a thing, but also involves a behavior that is becoming to 
love, then it is possible for Deuteronomy to elevate this behavior to the level of a commandment.” Wallis, 
TDOT 1:115. Tigay, however, sees no contradiction, “In Deuteronomy, love and loyalty toward God is 
virtually synonymous with keeping His commandments; it refers to an emotional attachment which is 
expressed in action (see, e.g., 10:12–13; 11:1, 22).” Deuteronomy, 67. 
55
 “‘Love’ designates the emotional feeling of strongly desiring something that flows out of one’s 
perceptions and as a result causes one to go after (Jer. 2:25b), seek (Prov. 8:17 [Q]), run after (Isa. 1:23), 
cleave (Deut. 11:22; 30:20; Prov. 18:24), and continue faithful to the loved person or thing.” Bruce K. 
Waltke, The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1:1–15:29 (NICOT; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 203. 
Katharine Doob Sakenfeld adds, “In such contexts the word carries the general connotation of setting one’s 
heart and mind upon the object mentioned, giving it special attention or dedicating oneself to pursuing it.” 
“Love in the OT,” ABD 4:376. 
56
 Beyond the many appearances associated with the command toward humans to love God (see 
above) qbd, “cling,” also appears in collocation with bha to describe the friend who sticks closer than a 
brother (Prov 18:24), as a description of Shechem’s “deep attraction” to Tamar (Gen 34:3) and in reference 
to Solomon’s loving and clinging to many foreign women (1 Kgs 11:2). 
57




the emotions of hate [ha'n>fi] and zeal [ha'n>qi] (Eccl 9:6). In one other instance bha is associated with 
the strong emotion of jealousy describing the potentially great intensity of love, even such that is 
“as strong as death” (Cant 8:6). Further emotionality is evident as bha collocates once with divine 
compassion (lmx): “In His love and in His mercy He redeemed them, and He lifted them and 
carried them” (Isa 63:9).
58
 bha is often used of intense feelings within the bond of an intimate 
relationship. This is evidenced in the collocation of bha with vpn (inner person) and/or bl/bbl 
(heart), functioning as the seat of profound emotions (cf. Ps 119:167). Indeed, the one who loves 
violence, God’s soul [vpn] hates (Ps 11:5). In familial contexts, bha often implies feelings of 
attachment, affection, and care (i.e., Gen 22:2). Strong feelings of attachment are also apparent in 
the bha of profound friendship between Jonathan and David and also when David remembers 
Jonathan’s love as “very pleasant” and “more wonderful than the love of women (2 Sam 1:26). 
In fact, Jonathan is said to love David, literally, as his own self/inner person (vpn) (1 Sam 
18:1, 3; 20:17). Likewise, bha also may connote passion, which may especially be implied in 
romantic contexts.
59
 In Gen 34:3, Shechem’s soul [vpn] clung to Dinah, he loved her, and spoke to 
                                                     
 
“the sense of ardent and voluntary desire contained in the root ’ahab,” which is confirmed by comparison to 
other roots such as qvx, #px, and hcr. Theology, 109. Elaine Adler adds that the verb “commonly expresses 
the ardent affection conveyed by the English ‘love.’” “The Background for the Metaphor of Covenant as 
Marriage” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1990), 70. Lapsley contends that the term 
“decidedly involves the emotions.” “Feeling Our Way,” 354. Likewise, Katharine Doob Sakenfeld, 
“Loyalty and Love: The Language of Human Interconnections in the Hebrew Bible,” in Backgrounds for 
the Bible (ed. M. P. O’Connor and D. N. Freedman; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1987), 225; Georg 
Hentschel, “‘Weil der Herr euch liebt’ (Dtn 7, 8): Die Liebe im Ersten Testament,” IKZ 23 (1994): 400–
408. Quell adds that it “hardly ever loses its passionate note.” “Love in the OT,” 23. 
58
 Notably, bha does not collocate within a single verse with either ~xr, “compassion, love” or swx, 
“compassion, pity.” However, ~xr and bha do collocate within some larger units, for instance Hos 2:25–3:1; 
14:3–4 [4–5]. bha and ~xn, “feel compassion, be sorry, comfort,” collocate three times, all related to humans 
being “comforted”: Isaac married Rebekah, loved her, and was comforted after the death of his mother 
(Gen 24:67). David “comforted” Bathsheba and lay with her and she gave birth to a son whom God loved 
(2 Sam 12:24). Finally, Jerusalem weeps bitterly, with no lovers to comfort her (Lam 1:2). 
59
 Wallis mentions its potential connotation of “passionate desire to be intimately united with a 
person.” TDOT 1:103; cf. ibid., 109; Cranfield, “Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. Richardson), 131. 
Walther Eichrodt concurs saying, bha “always retains the passionate overtones of complete engagement of 
the will accompanied by strong emotion.” Theology of the Old Testament (trans. A. Baker; Philadelphia: 




her heart [bl] (cf. Judg 16:15). Moreover, the woman in Canticles recurrently references her lover 
as “you whom my soul loves [vpn]” (Cant 1:7; 3:1, 2, 3, 4). Divine affection is likewise apparent 
in the kinship analogies of husband-wife and father-son. Thus, bha is used to depict divine love 
for his corporate people in analogy to the romantic love of a husband for his wife, wherein the 
woman is unfaithful (i.e., Hos 3:1). That this analogy connotes intensely emotive bha is not only 
implicit in the analogy itself but explicit in its further explication, where infidelity affects God in 
a way analogous to a scorned human husband (cf. Hos 9:15; 11:8–9). The analogy of the father-
son relationship likewise seems to connote affection. Thus, God himself recalls his love for Israel 
as a youth: “When Israel was a youth I loved Him, and out of Egypt I called [arq] My son” (Hos 
11:1; cf. Prov 3:12).
60
 For the reasons I described in chapter 1, such examples of the emotionality 
of divine bha (and other instances of divine emotionality) should not be dismissed as mere 
anthropopathism, in accordance with a final-form canonical approach to theology. 
In all, the bha word group may connote intense affection and emotion, including delight, 
rejoicing, favor, etc. Further, it does not depict divine love as simply unilateral, but its 
continuance is presented as an outcome of loyalty to God, and thus apparently reciprocal and 
evaluative, not disinterested or altogether unconditional (Deut 7:12–13; Ps 146:8; Prov 15:9). The 
result of divine bha (including its continuance) is often contingent upon, and appropriate to, the 
actual state of affairs. Thus, love may turn to anger and back. As such, an apparent tension exists 
between the depiction of divine bha as “everlasting” and yet subject to change, even hatred and 
the discontinuance of love. With this in mind, we turn to the first of the five rubrics regarding the 
nature of divine love. 
                                                     
 
the same time tenderness and fullness of affection.” Park, “Divine Love in Hosea 11,” 28. 
60
 Although some scholars point to ANE parallels as an explanation for this language as well, 
Lapsley points out, “No parallel presents itself for the paradox of a god who is sovereign over the cosmos, 
from whom flows an immeasurable and irrational affection for a powerless group of ragtag slaves. It is not 
unreasonable, therefore, to suggest that God's love for others might also spring from genuine feeling, and 




The Volitional Aspect of Divine Love 
This section focuses on data that ground the volitional aspect of God’s love and leads to 
the conclusion that divine love is volitional but not only volitional. That is, God’s love includes a 
free, volitional aspect that is not essential, necessary, or strictly arbitrary. Further, divine love is 
not merely volitional. That is, divine love is closely associated with, but not identical to, God’s 
will and election. Finally, the divine-human love relationship, then, is neither unilaterally 
deterministic nor essential or ontologically necessary but mutually (though not symmetrically) 
volitional and contingent. Accordingly, the reader is encouraged to keep the following questions 
in mind while reading this section. What is the relationship of love, the divine will, and election? 
Is divine love the result of God’s unilaterally arbitrary will? Is divine love to be equated with 
election? These questions are themselves predicated on thorny questions at the center of the free-
will debate, particularly the complex issue of whether God’s will is unilaterally efficacious or do 
humans possess significant freedom, that is, freedom to do otherwise than they do.  
Throughout the OT the concept of love is firmly embedded in relationship. The form of 
relationship is most often, but not always, that of covenant, which itself is closely associated with 
the concept of election.
61
 As such, covenant is an especially important revelation of the divine-
human relationship as a whole, and of love in particular. Throughout the canon, covenant 
functions as a central environment for the divine-human relationship, overlapping significantly 
with the theme of divine love. While covenant itself is not the object of this study, the basis of 
covenant (i.e., love) is.62 Moreover, many other oft-referenced facets of love, including election 
                                                     
 
61
 There are diverse forms of covenant throughout the OT and the ANE, the complexity of which 
is, at times, staggering. This dissertation operates with the basic definition of Gary N. Knoppers that a 
covenant is not merely a unilateral or one-sided oath but refers to a “formal agreement involving two or 
more parties” and consequently, “affects those parties” and are “inevitably bilateral.” “Ancient Near 
Eastern Royal Grants and the Davidic Covenant: A Parallel?” JAOS 116 (1996): 696. Such a basic 
definition is adopted on the basis of consideration of the OT covenants, which consistently depict 
mutuality, though not equality or symmetry, in the divine-human relationship, as shall be seen. 
62





and beneficence, are often integrally rooted in covenant. Therefore, this study will approach 
covenant from the standpoint of issues regarding divine election and beneficence. This section of 
the study begins with a survey of the meaning of the primary term of election in the OT, rxb, and 
the major term for divine grace, !nx. Then, this section will present a survey of election and 
covenant in the OT that provides necessary background information in order to appreciate the 
survey of the volitional aspect of divine love in the OT that will conclude this section. 
A Brief Survey of rxb 
rxb is the primary term for election in the OT.63 The most common meaning refers to 
choice or selection,
64
 often with the connotation of evaluation and examination (cf. Isa 48:10).
65
 
In some instances, the term refers to a decision or will of someone, without explicit reference to 
                                                     
 
63
 The word group occurs in verbal (mostly qal but a few niphal) forms over 160 times. It also 
appears in noun forms rx'b.mi or rAxb.mi as well as the adjectival ryxiB'. On the etymology of the term see John N. 
Oswalt, “בחר,” TWOT 100; Emile Nicole, “בחר,” NIDOTTE 1:638. 
64
 Oswalt comments that the “root idea is evidently ‘to take a keen look at’ (KB), thus accounting 
for the connotation of ‘testing or examining’” in Isa 48:10; cf. Prov 10:20. “בחר,” TWOT 100. Thus, the 
“idea seems to be that which has been examined and found to be best or most serviceable.” Ibid., 101. 
Nicole asserts, “there is no intrinsic difference between secular and theological uses of the word. In both 
cases the vb. denotes the selection of something or someone from a number of other possibilities.” 
NIDOTTE 1:638. However, the term is most often used in religious contexts. 
65
 H. Seebass points out the objective nature of rxb, that is, “the principles determining the choice 
can be scrutinized, and this seems to be characteristic of rxb.” This is the “rational element, i.e., the scrutiny 
of the criteria.” “בחר,” TDOT 2:75–76. Accordingly, he views divine rxb as intelligible, verifiable, rational, 
and understandable in accordance with specific purpose; a reasoned and purposeful choice based on 
rational standards. Ibid., 79, 82–83. “The choice that one makes can be related strictly to an obj.: one 
chooses the fittest, the most appropriate, the best, and the most beautiful. Because the basic meaning may 
be ‘to regard precisely’ and the verb can also mean ‘to test,’ this value orientation is surely a primary 
element. The subj. itself is involved, in fact, because it evaluates, but this evaluation arises from a rational 
consideration.” H. Wildberger, “בחר,” TLOT 1:212. Accordingly, Wildberger suggests that “similarity in 
form and meaning suggests the likelihood that a relationship exists between the roots bḥr and bḥn . . . ‘to 
select, choose,’” and “to test, put to the test,” respectively. TLOT 1:210. Yet, there also may be the “subj.-
conditioned, volitional meaning [which] should be distinguished from this obj.-oriented, cognitive 
meaning: one chooses what one would dearly like to have, what pleases one, what one loves. A strict 
distinction between the two aspects is impossible. But the second aspect manifests itself very clearly in the 
translators’ rendering of the word in such passages with ‘to elect’ and not simply with ‘to choose, select,’ 
occasionally even with ‘to choose for oneself,’ expressing the subj.’s engagement, as well as with ‘to wish 
for.’” Wildberger, TLOT 1:212. In many instances, “the ‘choice’ transpires in these cases on the basis of a 






 However, rxb is often depicted as on the basis of some evaluation, that is, with 
reference to some characteristic or quality.
67
 Indeed, a number of forms of the word group refer to 
that which is “choice” or “elect” in an evaluative sense, including superlatives in reference to that 
which is “choicest” or “best.”
68




rxb refers to God’s choice or decision especially frequently. The word group is the term 
par excellence for divine election. The adjective ryxib is always used of those chosen of God (in 13 
verses).
70
 rxb is used in reference to the vocational (as opposed to salvific) elections of Jerusalem, 
the temple, the priesthood, kings/leaders, and the people as a whole.
71
 Most often the group is 
                                                     
 
66
 Thus, servants are ready to do whatever the king chooses (2 Sam 15:15). See also 2 Sam 19:38; 
1 Kgs 18:23, 25; Isa 7:15–16; Job 9:14; 15:5; 29:25; 34:33; 36:21. 
67
 Thus, the sons of God saw that the daughters of men were fair and took whom they chose (Gen 
6:2). Similarly, Lot “saw” the valley that it was a good land (Gen 13:10) then he “chose” for himself all the 
valley of the Jordan (Gen 13:11). Many other examples include 1 Sam 17:40; 20:30; Isa 40:20; Job 34:4; 
Prov 3:31. It also frequently refers to the choice of soldiers, an obviously evaluative choice. See Exod 17:9; 
18:25; Josh 8:3; 1 Sam 13:2; 2 Sam 10:9; 17:1; 1 Chr 19:10. 
68
 Thus, in the niphal rx'b.nI refers to something that is of superlative quality or value, e.g., the 
“choicest” gold or silver (Prov 8:10, 19; 10:20; 16:16). Similarly, the qal passive participle rWxB' often refers 
to that which is choice or select in an evaluative sense and the nouns rx'b.mi or rAxb.mi appear as superlatives, 
referring to that which is choicest or best. rWxB' appears in 18 verses (Exod 14:7; Judg 20:15–16; 20:34; 1 
Sam 24:2 [3]; 26:2; 2 Sam 6:1; 10:9; 1 Kgs 12:21; Jer 49:19; 50:44; Ps 89:19 [20]; Cant 5:15; 1 Chr 19:10; 
2 Chr 11:1; 13:3, 17; 25:5. It is still debated whether the noun rWxB', young men, is to be associated with this 
lexeme. See Oswalt, “בחר,” TWOT 100–101; Nicole, NIDOTTE 1:638. With regard to the nouns rx'b.mi or 
rAxb.mi, the former appears in 11 verses, the latter in 2 verses. See Gen 23:6; Exod 15:4; 2 Kgs 3:19; 19:23; 
Isa 22:7; 37:24; Jer 22:7; 48:15; Ezek 23:7; 24:4; 31:16; Dan 11:15. 
69
 For instance, “a good name is to be more desired [rxb] than great wealth (Prov 22:1). In another 
occurrence it is in parallel to desire, “the oaks which you have desired [dm;x'] . . . the gardens which you have 
chosen” (Isa 1:29). Those who have rebelled against God are said to have “chosen their own ways, and 
their soul delights in their abominations” (Isa 66:3); cf. Job 7:15. 
70
 See 2 Sam 21:6; Isa 42:1; 43:20; 45:4; 65:9, 15, 22; Pss 89:4; 105:6, 43; 106:5, 23; 1 Chr 16:13. 
71
 rxb refers to the election of the priesthood (Num 16:5, 7; Deut 18:5; 21:5; 1 Sam 2:28; 1 Chr 
15:2; 2 Chr 29:11). Also, reference is frequently made to the “place which the LORD your God will 
choose” where his name will dwell (Deut 12:5, 11, 14, 18, 21, 26; 14:23–25; 15:20; 16:2, 6–7, 11, 15–16; 
17:8, 10; 18:6; 23:16 [17]; 26:2;3 1:11; Josh 9:27 ). Later, the reference is to God’s choice of Jerusalem (1 
Kgs 8:16, 44, 48; 11:32, 36; 14:21; 2 Kgs 21:7; 23:27; Zech 1:17; 2:12; 3:2; 2 Chr 6:5–6, 34, 38; 12:13; 
33:7; Neh 1:9; cf. Ps 132:13) and to the temple in Jerusalem (2 Chr 7:12, 16). It also refers to the election 
of individuals to positions of leadership (Hag 2:23; Pss 105:26; 106:23; Neh 9:7; cf. Isa 42:1; 49:7), 




used of God’s election of Israel/Judah, chosen out of love [bha] and in affection [qvx] (Deut 4:37; 
7:6–7; 10:15) to be a “holy people,” God’s “own possession” (Deut 14:2; cf. Ps 135:4).
72
 As shall 
be argued further below, divine election is often associated, but not to be conflated, with divine 
love (cf. Isa 41:8; Ps 47:4 [5]; cf. 78:68). Moreover, as shall be examined hereafter, divine 
election is often depicted as conditional and contingent (cf. 2 Kgs 23:27; Isa 14:1; 41:9; Jer 
33:24; Ezek 20:5; Zech 1:17; 2:12, [16]; Ps 78:67–68).
73
 Significantly, in a number of instances 
rxb refers to divine desires that are, in some cases, unfulfilled.74 There is considerable overlap in 
some instances with God’s desire and delight as signified by hwa, dmx, #px and hcr, each of which 
may refer to evaluative and/or emotional desire or delight.
75
 Further, the concept of significant 
human freedom is implied in a number of places by use of rxb.76 In all, then, this term points to 
                                                     
 
cf. 1 Sam 16:8–10; 2 Sam 6:21; Pss 78:70; 89:3 [4], 19 [20]; 2 Chr 6:5–6; Solomon – 1; Chr 28:5–6, 10; 
29:1; cf. 1 Kgs 11:13, 34); cf. the deceptive use in 2 Sam 16:18. Divine election of kings is also a well-
represented theme in the ANE; cf. Wildberger, TLOT 1:213–14. At times, the term is with reference to 
other specific elections of people (Jer 49:19; 50:44; Ps 65:6). Oswalt points out, “In all of these cases 
serviceability rather than simple arbitrariness is at the heart of the choosing. . . . The scriptural doctrine of 
divine capacity for choice demonstrates that purpose and personality, not blind mechanism, are at the heart 
of the universe. Since God carefully chooses certain ones for a specific task, he can also reject them if they 
deviate from that purpose (I Sam 2:27ff.).” “בחר,” TWOT 100. 
72
 The term is used in various ways in reference to this special election of God’s people. For 
instance, they are the people whom God has “chosen” (1 Kgs 3:8), “the people whom He has chosen for 
His own inheritance” (Ps 33:12), “Sons of Jacob, His chosen [ryxiB'] ones” (Ps 105:6; 1 Chr 16:13; cf. Isa 
43:10, 20; 44:1–2; 45:4; 65:9, 15, 22; 105:43; 106:5). 
73
 Notably, sam is often used as the antonym of rxb, to choose, as it appears in Isa 7:15–16; 41:9; 
Jer 33:24; Ps 78:67; Job 34:33. 
74
 For instance, to do righteousness and justice is desired [rxb] by the LORD more than sacrifice” 
(Prov 21:3; cf. Isa 58:5–6). Similarly, in Ps 132:13 God’s choice of Zion is in parallel with the statement, 
“he has desired [hw"a'] it for His habitation” (Ps 132:13). Moreover, divine desires may be unfulfilled; God 
will “choose” punishments for the people because he “called, but no one answers”; he “spoke, but they did 
not listen. And they did evil in [his] sight and chose that in which [he] did not delight” (Isa 66:4). 
75
 #px and hcr will be addressed at the outset of the evaluative section. hwa and dmx are briefly 
surveyed in footnotes as they appear in the canonical analysis in this section. 
76
 Thus, the exhortation, “choose life in order that you may live, you and your descendants” (Deut 
30:19), “choose for yourselves today whom you will serve” (Josh 24:15). Similarly, the people are said to 
have “chosen for [themselves] the LORD, to serve Him” (Josh 24:22).
 
Likewise, humans have the power to 
choose other gods (Judg 5:8; 10:14; cf. Isa 41:24). In some cases, humans choose for God (Isa 56:4; Pss 
119:30; 173) and in others humans choose against him (cf. Isa 6:12; 66:3; Jer 8:3; Prov 1:29); cf. 2 Sam 




the strong divine volition but also points toward divine evaluation and the exercise of human 
volition.  
A Brief Survey of !nx 
!nx is not strictly a term of divine volition but has volitional as well as evaluative 
elements.
77
 The !nx word group is most often translated as favor, or grace.78 In its most basic 
sense, this group refers to a positive, favorable disposition and/or action from one to another.
79
 It 
is closely associated with entreaty since it often consists of a free, beneficial disposition and/or 
action in a situation where the (potential) object of favor is in, or will soon be in, a situation of 
distress or need.
80
 Although in a number of cases the supplicant is unworthy of receiving favor, 
                                                     
 
do too. The OT operates on the assumption that they can also choose their God or gods [cf. Josh 24:22].” 
Wildberger, TLOT 1:224–25. 
77
 Because it appears so prominently in the OT canon and overlaps with the five rubrics, but does 
not fit fully within any of them, it seems best to introduce the term here. 
78
 In the ANE the cognates (Akkadian, Ugaritic, Arabic) have a range of meaning similar to that 
represented by the usage in the Hebrew Bible. Terence E. Fretheim, “חנן,” NIDOTTE 2:203. The Arabic 
ḥanna to “yearn or long for” or “to feel sympathy, compassion” may form the background of the adjectival 
!wnx, which is often coupled with compassion, ~xr. David N. Freedman and Jack R. Lundbom, “חנן,” TDOT 
5:23. Freedman and Lundbom suggest that by association with ~xr, !wnx may also “carry the idea of 
motherly (or fatherly) compassion.” TDOT 5:25; cf. Exod 22:26 [27]. Dafydd R. Ap-Thomas has suggested 
a connection to a root [ḥnh] “to bend, incline” thus seeing the sense of condescension. “Some Aspects of 
the Root HNN in the Old Testament,” JSS 2 (1957): 128–48. Stoebe thinks it is possible, but Yamauchi 
finds the suggestion unconvincing. H. J. Stoebe, “חנן,” TLOT 1:440; Edwin Yamauchi, “חנן,” TWOT 302.  
79
 The group appears in the noun !x (in 68 verses), various verbal forms (in 72 verses), and the 
adjectival !wnx (in 12 verses). Other noun forms include hn"ynIx meaning “favor,” appearing only once (Jer 
16:13) and two terms that consistently present supplication, usually from humans toward God, but 
sometimes human to human: hN"xiT. (in 25 verses) and !Wnx]T; (in 18 verses). The verb !nx appears most often in 
the qal (in 50 verses), followed by the hitpael (in 17 verses), and rarely in the piel (1x) and the poel and 
hophal (2x). Some have seen a niphal form in Jer 22:23 but the term is more likely a “miswritten form of” 
xna, “to sigh.” See Stoebe, TLOT 1:440. In the hitpael, it refers to supplication, the (potential) recipient of 
which is always human, while the (potential) benefactor may be human or divine. In the qal, it may refer to 
the disposition and/or action of being gracious or bestowing favor. In human contexts, being “gracious” is 
clearly described as a desirable virtue (i.e., Pss 37:21, 26; 112:5). With God as agent, the qal is most often 
used in entreaty, when God is asked to “be gracious,” usually relative to the request of specific action(s) 
(cf. Isa 33:2 among many others). It likewise appears frequently as the description of God’s beneficent 
disposition and/or actions, whether requested or received. See Gen 33:5, 11; 33:19; 2 Sam 12:22; 2 Kgs 
13:23; Isa 27:11; 30:18–19; Amos 5:15; Pss 59:5 [6]; 102:13 [14]; cf. Mal 1:9; Ps 109:12. 
80
 Yamauchi considers it to entail not only a favorable response but a “heartfelt response by 




the root !nx itself does not necessarily connote anything about the worthiness or unworthiness of 
the supplicant. In many instances, the supplicant greatly desires or needs that which is asked for 
and the one who may or may not grant favor is in a position to grant it (cf. Gen 6:8; Isa 27:11; 
Amos 5:15; Ps 119:132).
81
 In such circumstances, !nx may be ordinary favor or that which extends 
beyond expectations. Importantly, God is never the patient of !nx except when the term refers to 
supplication, in other words, he is never depicted as the beneficiary of !x or !nx.82  
In human usage, !x sometimes refers to qualities, i.e., “gracefulness” (cf. Prov 3:22; 
5:19).
83
 The term is thus, at times, suggestive of traits that are desirable or favorable.
84
 However, 
the term most often appears within the context of entreaty, frequently in the expression “find 
                                                     
 
81
 For instance, many commentators see the use of “favor” for Noah as an instance where the term 
denotes approval; see below. In 2 Sam 15:25–26, finding favor with God is put in parallel with the potential 
of God having “delight” [#px] in someone (2 Sam 15:26); cf. Judg 6:17; 2 Sam 15:25.  
82
 Moreover, although !nx has been thought to be only from superiors to inferiors (so Clark, The 
Word Hesed, 215; Nelson Glueck, Hesed in the Bible [Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1967], 
128; W. F. Lofthouse, “Hen and Hesed in the Old Testament,” ZAW 51[1933]: 30), this is not always the 
case when it comes to societal status (cf. Gen 30:27; 47:29). So Freedman and Lundbom, TDOT 5:27; 
Yamauchi, TWOT 303; William L. Reed, “Some Implications of Hen for Old Testament,” JBL 73 (1954): 
36–41. However, !nx does always flow from a situational position where the potential benefactor is in a 
position to grant something needed or greatly desired to the supplicant, which is almost always the societal 
superior. As Fretheim points out, even “find favor,” the common syntagm of entreaty, “may or may not 
specify deference toward the one addressed.” NIDOTTE 2:204. 
83
 For various connotations in this general vein see Nah 3:4; Zech 4:7; Ps 45:2; Prov 3:22; 4:9; 
5:19; 11:16; 17:8; 22:1, 11; 28:23; 31:30; Eccl 9:11; 10:12. Other uses of !x include Deut 7:2, where Israel 
is commanded to “show no favor” to the former occupants of the land (Deut 7:2) and Deut 28:50 where a 
nation is foretold who will “show no favor to the young” (Deut 28:50). Thus, in some instances “one may 
gain favor or honor from others by words or deeds (Prov 13:15; 28:23), yet not inevitably so (Eccl 9:11).” 
Fretheim, NIDOTTE 2:204. 
84
 Freedman and Lundbom state, “The noun is first a term of beauty. It denotes an aesthetically 
pleasing presentation or aspect of someone or something, and is properly the quality someone or something 
possesses. The response to this projection of beauty is also hen, ‘favor.’” TDOT 5:22. They also point out 
that verb may also “be used in an aesthetic sense, ‘possess grace.’” Ibid.; cf. Prov 26:25; 22:11. Fretheim 
concurs, seeing “an aesthetic sense for that which possesses an aspect that is gracious, graceful, or elegant,” 
which “contributes to the beauty of the world and will usually receive a favorable response.” NIDOTTE 
2:204. Thus, a “derived sense is used in Hebrew primarily for the pleasing impression made upon one 
individual by another.” Freedman and Lundbom, TDOT 5:22. Stoebe adds that in some contexts, !x 
“assumes the meaning ‘attractiveness, loveliness’ as a visually perceptible personal or objective 
characteristic that can also involve the notions of success and fortune.” See Prov 1:9; 3:22; 4:9; 11:16. 
TLOT 1:442–43. However, it is not valid to thus read evaluation into every use of the term, though one 




favor” in one’s sight (acm + !xe + !yI[;).85 This syntagm is used in situations where one is seeking 
and/or receiving desired or needed favor from another, usually without reference to merit, but not 
ruling out the possibility that the recipient is, at least relatively, worthy.
86
 The latter seems to be 
the case with regard to Noah, who “found favor” in God’s sight prior to the flood and, the 
narrative makes sure to inform the reader, he was “a righteous man, blameless in his time” who 
“walked with God” (Gen 6:8–9).
87
 However, even when the object of !x appears to be worthy, !x 
                                                     
 
85
 The idiom apparently refers to looking at one’s eyes to determine whether one was favorably 
disposed or not. Fretheim, NIDOTTE 2:203. Since “favor is shown on the face,” ancient peoples looked at 
the eyes while contemporary humans look at the smile. Freedman and Lundbom, TDOT 5:24. Moreover, 
the term for face [hn<P'] itself is a common term used to express the presence or absence of divine favor, 
whether it is hidden/turned away, or turned toward someone. 
86
 I say “relatively” because in an absolute sense no imperfect human is worthy of divine favor. 
Reed, nevertheless, correctly sees evaluation in a number of instances of this syntagm. “Some 
Implications,” 39. The term is used with humans or God as the potential benefactor. In human usage the 
pattern is of one seeking and/or receiving desired or needed favor from another, thus Laban from Jacob 
(Gen 30:27), Jacob from Esau (Gen 32:5; 33:8, 10, 15), Shechem from Jacob and his sons (Gen 34:11), 
Joseph from Potiphar (Gen 39:4), Joseph from the chief jailer (Gen 39:21), those affected by famine from 
Joseph (Gen 47:25), Jacob from Joseph (47:29), Joseph from Pharaoh (Gen 50:4), the Gadites and 
Reubenites from Moses and Eleazar (Num 32:5), the lack for a wife from her husband (Deut 24:1), Hanna 
from Eli (1 Sam 1:18), David from Saul (1 Sam 16:22; 20:29), David from Jonathan (1 Sam 20:3), David 
from Nabal (1 Sam 25:8), David from Achish (1 Sam 27:5), Joab from David (2 Sam 14:22), Ziba from the 
king (2 Sam 16:4), Hadad the Edomite from Pharaoh (1 Kgs 11:14), Ruth from Boaz (Ruth 2:2, 10, 13), 
Esther from all who saw her (Esth 2:15), and Esther from the king (Esth 5:8; 7:3; 8:5). In Esther a variant 
of the syntagm appears three times, afn + !xe + !yI[; also referring to Esther’s receiving favor in the sight of 
the king (Esth 2:15, 17; 5:2). Notably, many usages in Esther appear to imply that her beauty was the 
source of her favor, suggestive of the potential evaluative connotations of !x noted earlier (cf. Ruth 2:10, 
13). Further, Freedman and Lundbom contend that David “had established a deep relationship with both 
men [Saul and Jonathan], so much so that hen implies deep affection.” TDOT 5:28. 
In theological usage, with God as the potential benefactor: Noah “found favor” in God’s sight 
(Gen 6:8). Abraham entreats one of three strangers (in an apparent theophany): “Lord, if now I have found 
favor in your sight” do not pass by (Gen 18:3). Lot, speaking to the “man” who saved him from destruction 
in Sodom, says, “Your servant has found favor in your sight” (Gen 19:19). Moses found favor in God’s 
sight (Exod 33:12) and based his significant entreaty upon it (Exod 33:13, 16–17; 34:9). In times of further 
distress, Moses laments to God why he has “not found favor” in God’s sight (Num 11:11, 15), entreating 
further divine response. In numerous other instances the syntagm denotes the request, hope for, or reception 
of favor in God’s sight: to Gideon (Judg 6:17), to David (2 Sam 15:25). Jeremiah 31:2 refers to the 
Israelites having “found grace in the wilderness.” Favor in the sight of another may also be extended by 
God (and only by him), from the chief jailer to Joseph (Gen 39:21) and from the Egyptians to the Israelites 
(Exod 3:21; 12:36).  
87
 Most translations have “finding favor” but some have “winning favor” (e.g., NEB). 
Interestingly, in Gen 6:8 JPS has “found favor” but in Exod 32, JPS consistently translates “gained my 
favor.” Nahum M. Sarna, Exodus: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the New JPS Translation (JPS Torah 
Commentary; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1991), 213. Freedman and Lundbom suggest that 




is never an obligation of the one bestowing it.
88
 As such, !x may be given to a worthy or unworthy 
recipient, both at the discretion of the bestower. At the same time, nothing in the usage of !x 
suggests that it must be an altogether arbitrary bestowal by the benefactor, and instances such as 
Gen 6:8 imply evaluation and appreciation of the recipient.
89
 
Aside from the expression “found favor,” the term appears in other contexts of entreaty 
with God as agent, sometimes in benedictory formulas (Gen 43:29; Num 6:25). Interestingly, !x is 
also sometimes spoken of as that which is given on the basis of specific conditions. For instance, 
the psalmist proclaims that God “will give grace and glory; no good thing does He withhold from 
those who walk uprightly” (Ps 84:11). Similarly, those who do not forget Qohelet’s teaching and 
keep his commandments (Prov 3:1) are those that “will find favor and good repute in the sight of 
God and man (Prov 3:4; cf. 3:5).
90
 In another instance, God “gives grace to the afflicted” yet 
scoffs at the scoffers,” assuming some form of divine appraisal (Prov 3:34; cf. 3:33). On the other 
                                                     
 
the potentially evaluative connotation of !x and !nx, he appears to reject evaluation with divine agency. He 
asserts that “no reason for the grace” toward Noah is stated, a view he holds by seeing vv. 8 and 9 as 
stemming from independent sources, specifically v. 8 (J), v. 9 (P). TLOT 1:444. However, K. A. Matthews 
comments that “the reason Noah “found favor” is related in the following tōlĕdōt section to his ‘righteous’ 
conduct” and points to Ezek 14:14, 20. “This infers that Noah’s conduct is related in some way to God’s 
bestowal of gracious favor” though he nevertheless believes that “‘favor’ remains as God’s sole discretion.” 
Genesis 1–11:26 (NAC 1A; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 1995), 346. Reed believes Noah “had 
given some indication of being worthy of that attitude” of divine goodwill. “Some Implications,” 39; cf. 
Sarna, Exodus, 213; Douglas K. Stuart, Exodus (NAC 2; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2006), 
703–4. Thus, it appears that !nx may be given subjectively or with a mind toward the objective value or 
action of the recipient. 
88
 See Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas, 127–28; Lofthouse, “Hen and Hesed,” 29–35. 
89
 Stoebe comments, “The demonstration of ḥēn includes an evaluation of the other so that both, 
subj. and obj., are considered and both participate, even if in different roles, in the event.” TLOT 1:441; cf. 
Gen 39:4; Deut 24:1; 1 Sam 16:21–22; 18:1; 25:8. 
90
 Waltke comments, “The term for ‘grace,’ here denotes the positive disposition of heaven and 
earth toward the son because of his attractiveness . . . extended voluntarily and unilaterally to preserve a 
valued relationship.” The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1:1–15:29, 243. Cf. Michael V. Fox, Proverbs 1–9 
(AB 18A; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 169. Accordingly, Fretheim notes, “Such favor may be granted in 
view of positive human response (loyal, Prov 3:3–4; righteous, Gen 6:8–9; repentant, Isa 30:19), but God 
may withhold such favor (pity) in view of a sinful human response (Jer 16:13) or because of God’s larger 
purposes (Josh 11:20).” Further, God is entreated specifically not to be gracious (!nx) to the “treacherous” 
(Ps 59:5 [6]). On the other hand, it also may be granted to “those who are not repentant” (Neh 9:17, 31). 




hand, God proclaims he will “grant” no “favor” (hn"ynIx]) to the people because of their great evil 
(Jer 16:13).  
The adjective !wnx almost always has God as agent, and is descriptive of the attribute of 
“graciousness,” appearing thirteen times, eleven of which collocate with ~wxr as descriptive of 
God’s compassionate and gracious nature, rooted in the amazing self-revelation of divine 
character at Sinai.
91
 In the one exception, the meaning is similar: God will hear because he is 
gracious (Exod 22:27 [26]). So, divine grace appears to be primarily predicated upon God’s 
character. At the same time, in a number of instances divine !nx or !x seems to be responsive to 
people’s appropriate disposition and/or action toward God. In all, the word group may be directed 
toward qualities that elicit a favorable response, but most often it is used with regard to 
supplication for gracious action, which is freely, but not necessarily wholly arbitrarily, bestowed 
upon a worthy or unworthy recipient, one who has responded appropriately toward God (Ps 
84:11; Prov 3:1) or not (Neh 9:17, 31), at God’s discretion.
92
  
Election and Covenant in the Torah 
Genesis provides the origin of all God-human relations when God immanently creates 
Adam and Eve, thus framing the primary divine-human relation, that of Creator to his creation, a 
relationship that is marred thereafter by the Fall. However, the divine-human relationship 
continues, extending in the form of explicit covenants that God initiated with his people, which 
include divine election and blessing as prime features that pervade the entirety of the Hebrew 
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 Exod 34:6; 2 Chr 30:9; Neh 9:17, 31; Pss 86:15; 103:8; 111:4; 145:8; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2; cf. 
Pss 112:4; 116:5. In Ps 112:4 the agent is unclear, whether divine or human, though the latter is more likely 
(see the discussion of ~xr). In 116:5 !wnx collocates with the participle form ~xer:m. and the characteristic of 
righteousness [qyDIc;].  
92
 As Freedman and Lundbom point out, “favor can be sought on either the ground of 
righteousness or the ground of unrighteousness coupled with repentance for sin.” Thus, the psalmist can 
come with a “consciousness of sin” (Pss 25:16, 18; 45:4 [5]; 51:1 [3]) or “as a righteous person” (Pss 26; 
140). TDOT 5:32. However, there is a consistent theme that repentance provides occasion for grace (Isa 
30:19; Jer 31:9; Joel 2:13; 2 Chr 30:9; cf., conversely, Isa. 27:11). God is even presented as waiting to be 




canon. The main word for this significant theme of election (rxb) does not appear with God as 
agent until Num 16:5. However, the theme of election, in the most basic sense of divine choice, 
appears much earlier in the Torah. The first significant thematic instance of election is the 
selection of Noah to build the ark.
93
 The language regarding the cause of this election is 
ambiguous, however, simply stating that Noah “found favor” in God’s eyes (Gen 6:8) and was a 
“righteous man, blameless in his time” (Gen 6:9).
94
 No reason for Noah’s election is explicitly 
given but Noah’s selection is not depicted as altogether arbitrary but as grounded, at least 
partially, in Noah’s character.
95
 After Noah follows God’s instructions and is delivered in the ark 
(Gen 6:13–14, 18, 22), God establishes the covenant with the seemingly unconditional promise to 
never again destroy the earth by flood (Gen 9:11–17). 
The call of Abraham represents the second significant thematic election, the initiation of 
the promise and covenant that founds Israel and undergirds the God-Israel relationship (Gen 
12:1–3; 15:18; 17:1–14; 18:19). Once again, no explicit reason for the choice of Abraham is 
presented. There is, however, an apparent tension between the absence of explicit conditionality 
of the divine promises and other statements that may imply conditionality, such as the 
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 Some have seen election in the narrative of Cain and Abel. For instance, Gerhard von Rad, 
Genesis: A Commentary (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972), 104. But others are skeptical of such a view. 
Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1–15 (WBC 1; Dallas: Word, 1987), 104. The later discourse between God 
and Cain suggests that the unspecified fault was known to Cain (Gen 4:7); cf. Mathews, Genesis 1–11:26, 
270; Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 117. See also Saul Levin, who suggests that God simply liked the smell of 
the meat better. “The More Savory Offering: A Key to the Problem of Gen 4:3–5,” JBL 81 (1979): 85.  
94
 Numerous commentators have noted that Noah is explicitly approved in God’s sight (Gen 6:8–
9), in contrast to the evil God had observed pervading the earth (Gen 6:5); cf. Sarna, Exodus, 213; 
Mathews, Genesis 1–11:26, 345–46; Stuart, Exodus, 703–4.  
95
 Fretheim, however, suggests that the divine action is independent of Noah’s character. “The 
Book of Genesis,” in Genesis to Leviticus (vol. 1 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon, 1994), 1:390. 
Likewise, von Rad, Genesis, 118. However, this begs the question, was it just a coincidence that God chose 
the one who is described as “righteous” and “blameless” and who would be faithful, the very one who 
“walked with God” (Gen 6:9)? Wenham sees Noah’s righteousness as ensuring the continuance of divine 
blessing, including “preservation in the flood” and the consequent covenant, though not necessarily 




expectations of human response (Gen 17:1, 9–11, 14).
96
 Moreover, Abraham, is not only called, 
but he is also tested (Gen 22:16–18) and blessings are depicted as consequences of Abraham’s 
appropriate response (Gen 26:4–5; cf. 18:19).
97
 Importantly, the election of Abraham is not 
presented as exclusive but intended as a blessing to all nations (Gen 12:3; 22:18; 26:4).
98
 
The election of Israel as a nation is predicated on the Abrahamic covenant, and this 
corporate election is described thematically in Exodus-Numbers.
99
 Prior to Deuteronomy the 
institution of the covenant with the nation of Israel is explained by reference to the Abrahamic 
covenant (Exod 2:24; 3:6, 15–16; 6:4, 8; 32:13; 33:1; Lev 26:42, 45; Num 32:11) and the election 
is more explicitly outlined in relation to God’s love in Deuteronomy itself (see the volitional 
aspect of divine love in the Torah below).  
The famous divine statement, “I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will 
show compassion on whom I will show compassion” (Exod 33:19), has sometimes been taken to 
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 Abram is instructed to “walk before” God and “be blameless” prior to a divine declaration of the 
covenant promises (Gen 17:1) and again commanded after the promises: “Now as for you, you shall keep 
My covenant, you and your descendants after you throughout their generations” and be circumcised with 
the uncircumcised to be cut off (Gen 17:10–11, 14). 
97
 Following the Akedah narrative, God swears, “Because you have done this thing . . . indeed I 
will greatly bless you. . . . In your seed all the nations of the earth shall be blessed, because you have 
obeyed My voice” (Gen 22:16–18). Again, the promise of blessing is recounted and said to be “because 
Abraham obeyed Me” (Gen 26:5). Moreover, previously God had declared, “I have known” Abraham “so 
that he may command” his descendants to keep God’s way “so that the LORD may bring upon Abraham 
what He has spoken about him” (Gen 18:19). 
Wenham recognizes this conditionality, “the fulfillment of the promise [is] contingent on 
Abraham’s obedience,” and asserts the “pattern of promise-obedience-fulfillment of promise is ubiquitous 
in Scripture” thus rejecting Gunkel and Westermann’s assertion that the original form of the promise was 
unconditional. Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 50. Sarna goes further, believing that Abraham must 
“unequivocally prove his worthiness to be God’s elect.” Genesis: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the 
New JPS Translation (JPS Torah Commentary; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 393. 
Victor P. Hamilton believes the covenant is primarily “unilateral” yet admits that “the voice of 
conditionality and mutuality is occasionally heard.” The Book of Genesis: Chapters 18–50 (NICOT; Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995), 19. 
98
 The Abrahamic covenant extends even to the slave who becomes circumcised as a condition of 
entrance into the covenant (Gen 17:14). 
99
 It is not presented in detail as rxb until Deuteronomy though Moses and Aaron are chosen [rxb] 




mean that God chooses to bestow grace and compassion on some but withholds it from others.
100
 
However, this phrase seems to be an echo of the first call of Moses where the divine name is 
made known (Exod 3:14).
101
 As such, this idem per idem construction, parallel to the original 
revelation of the divine name, adds to the divine self-description, moving from “I am who I am” 
to something like “I will proclaim before you the name LORD, and the grace that I grant and the 
compassion that I show” (JPS). This explanation of divine character serves to emphasize the 
divine right to bestow mercy on even those who are egregiously undeserving, but does not refer 
to arbitrary election of those who will receive mercy to the exclusion of others.
102
 In other words, 
the divine freedom and authority to bestow grace and compassion on Israel, even after such 
odious rebellion with the golden calf, is highlighted, leading into the fuller expression of the 
divine character in Exod 34:6–7. 
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 For instance, see Leonard J. Coppes, “רחם,” TWOT 842; J. A. Motyer, The Message of Exodus: 
The Days of Our Pilgrimage (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 309.  
101
 Stuart states, “The characteristics of Yahweh, namely his grace and mercy, are placed here in 
grammatical apposition to the name of Yahweh.” Exodus, 708; cf. G. W. Ashby, Go Out and Meet God: A 
Commentary on the Book of Exodus (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997), 134. 
102
 Many scholars concur that this idem per idem construction signifies an emphasis on God’s 
attributes of grace and compassion rather than discrimination between objects of God’s mercy; cf. 
Freedman and Lundbom, TDOT 5:30; Sarna, Exodus, 214; Stuart, Exodus, 708; J. Gerald Janzen, Exodus 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 248; David Noel Freedman, “The Name of the God of 
Moses,” JBL 79 (1960): 154; Walter Brueggemann, “The Book of Exodus: Introduction, Commentary, and 
Reflections,” Genesis to Leviticus (vol. 1 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1994), 940; Brevard S. 
Childs, The Book of Exodus: A Critical, Theological Commentary (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), 
76, 596; William H. C. Propp, Exodus 1–18 (AB 2; New York: Doubleday, 1999), 225; Terence E. 
Fretheim, Exodus (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1991), 305. Lundbom asserted that the idem per idem 
construction was used to end a discussion. “God’s Use of the Idem per Idem to Terminate Debate,” HTR 71 
(1978): 193–201. However, G. S. Oden comes to different conclusions by a survey of all the known 
examples, which suggest the construction may express the totality/intensity of the action of the verb. In this 
context, the adverbial locating phrase (rv<åa]) stresses the extent of the verbal action. The termination of 
argument is only a secondary function of this construction. Perhaps most notably, he concludes that the 
traditional interpretation that the construction refers to God’s freedom of choice is without substance. 




Election and Covenant in the Prophets 
Conceptually, the prophets build upon the corporate covenants in the Torah, and add to 
them the Davidic covenant and the new covenant. In the prophets, the term election often denotes 
vocational election.
103
 The election of kings is the most prominent type of election throughout the 
prophets, beginning with the strange case of Saul. His election begins with the people’s desire for 
a king, regarding which God warns them that they will cry out because of the king whom they 
have “chosen” (1 Sam 8:18; 10:19), yet they continue to demand a king. Thus, the kingship itself 
was “chosen” by the people against God’s wishes and despite his warnings (1 Sam 12:12–13, 17). 
Nevertheless, God is willing to bless the kingship if the people would “fear,” “serve,” and “listen 
to” him but, if they do wickedly they and their king would “be swept away” (1 Sam 12:14–16, 20, 
24–25). According to the wishes of the people for a king, Saul, the one “whom the LORD has 
chosen” (1 Sam 10:24), is “anointed” of the LORD (1 Sam 10:1; cf. 9:16–17), Yet, Saul, God’s 
elect, is eventually rejected by God. Although no explicit reason was given as to why God chose 
Saul to be king rather than someone else, the reasons for Saul’s rejection are apparent. They 
include his offering of sacrifice without Samuel at Gilgal (1 Sam 13:8–13) and his disobedience 
in not utterly destroying the Amalekite king and the plunder of war (1 Sam 15:3, 9–11). On such 
bases, God declares, “I regret that I have made Saul king” (1 Sam 15:11; cf. 15:35)
104
 and Samuel 
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 This includes chosen priests (1 Sam 2:28), the election of Zerubbabel (Hag 2:23), and the 
election of kings (discussed below). Jerusalem is also elect by God (1 Kgs 8:44, 48; 11:13, 32, 36; 14:21; 
21:7; cf. Josh 9:27; 1 Kgs 8:16) though eventually God calls her “this city which I have not chosen” (2 Kgs 
23:27). Such election appears to extend even to the election of the Messiah, whom God has chosen and 
delights in (Isa 42:1) but the nation abhors (Isa 49:7). Of course, the referent of these elections is disputed, 
as are numerous potentially Messianic passages throughout Isaiah. Many believe the referent is Cyrus in Isa 
42:1 due in part to parallels with the Cylinder of Cyrus including Cyrus being called by name, chosen, and 
Marduk being pleased with him. Joseph Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 40–55: A New Translation with Introduction 
and Commentary (AB 19A; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 211. However, if the referent is indeed the 
Messiah, such election is clearly not merely subjective, but the election as well as the associated delight 
quite clearly would be evaluative. 
104
 Perhaps the translation “regret” is a bit misleading. The term may better be translated, “I am 
sorry.” As H. Van Dyke Parunak points out, ~xn connotes the sorrow of emotional pain but never the sense 
of “regret” per se. “A Semantic Survey of NHM,” Bib 56 (1975): 519. This is the same term used of God’s 




declares to Saul, “Because you have rejected the word of the LORD, He has also rejected you 
from being king” and in this regard he will not “change His mind” (1 Sam 15:23, cf. 15:26).
105
 It 
is thus apparent that Saul’s election to the kingship was not unconditional.
106
 Significantly, the 
dynasty that is thereafter promised to David was conditionally available to Saul. At Gilgal, 
Samuel had proclaimed that God “would have established” Saul’s “kingdom over Israel forever” 
but because of his sin, his kingdom would “not endure” (1 Sam 13:13–14). 
Within this context, David is chosen to succeed Saul. The first hint of David’s election 
comes directly upon the heels of the first proclamation of Saul’s rejection as dynastic king, 
wherein Samuel proclaims, “The LORD has sought out for Himself a man after His own heart” 
and “has appointed him as ruler over His people.” Yet, importantly, the selection of another is 
itself “because” Saul had not kept God’s commands (1 Sam 13:14) and thus God has given the 
kingdom to another “who is better” than Saul (1 Sam 15:26–28). Although scholars have been 
divided as to whether the phrase “a man after His own heart” is a statement of subjective election 
or objective evaluation (or some combination), the latter statements suggest evaluation.
107
 The 
narrative of David’s selection is itself telling regarding the nature of this election. First, God 
declares that he has “seen” (har) a king for himself (1 Sam 16:1). Shortly after, Samuel beholds 
                                                     
 
further discussion see the word study of ~xn earlier. Bergen comments further, “God is aware of and 
responsive to choices made by people, reacting favorably only when people choose the option of obedience 
to the divine will.” 1, 2 Samuel, 170. 
105
 The same term, ~xn, is used for God’s sorrow (1 Sam 15:11, 35) as well as the declaration that 
he will not “change his mind” like a human (1 Sam 15:29). The statement in v. 29 conveys God’s resolve to 
remove Saul and replace him with David, which is beyond revocation, but does not assert that God never 
“relents,” as such. See the brief word study of ~xn later in this chapter. 
106
 That is, “election does not have such permanence that it cannot be called into question by the 
improper behavior of the elect.” H. Wildberger, “מאס,” TLOT 2:654. 
107
 Some see this phrase referring to God’s choice, suggesting the translation “a man of his own 
choosing.” McCarter Jr., II Samuel, 229. Elsewhere, the phrase ^b<+b'l.ki, literally “according to my heart,” 
refers to that which is according to one’s desire (1 Sam 14:7; Ps 20:4 [5]). But this begs the question, 
whether such “desire” is wholly arbitrary or at least partially grounded in objective evaluation, as implied 
elsewhere (1 Kgs 3:6). Consider also the apparently objective, morally evaluative, usage in Jer 3:15 of the 




Eliab and thinks he must be God’s anointed, but God responds that while “man looks at the 
outward appearance,” God “looks at the heart” (1 Sam 16:7), a significant hint of evaluation that 
reminds one of the somewhat cryptic earlier description, “man after my own heart” (1 Sam 
13:14). God successively declares, with regard to brother after brother of David, not “chosen” (1 
Sam 16:8–10) until David is brought and God states, “Arise, anoint him, for this is he” (1 Sam 
16:12). David later states, God “chose me above” Saul “and above all his house” (2 Sam 6:21; cf. 
1 Kgs 8:16). Although God does not specify why David himself is chosen, Saul was clearly 
rejected because he rejected God, David is “better” than Saul, and God looked upon the heart of 
David in selecting him. The implication is that David’s election is not arbitrary.
108
  
With this election comes the promise of a dynasty. God declares to David that he will 
“make a house” for him (2 Sam 7:11) and will “establish the throne of his kingdom forever” (2 
Sam 7:13). God will be “a father to him and he will be a son to” God who will discipline his sons 
if they depart from faithfulness. Yet, divine “lovingkindness shall not depart from him, as [God] 
took it away from Saul. . . . [David’s] house and [his] kingdom shall endure before [God] forever; 
[David’s] throne shall be established forever” (2 Sam 7:14–16; cf. 2 Kgs 21:7; Jer 33:17–21).
109
 
This David later refers to as “an everlasting covenant” (2 Sam 23:5). As such, these promises to 
David appear to be unconditional, in stark contrast to the case of Saul. But this begs the question, 
why is such a promise made to David, and by extension, Solomon?
110
 Interestingly, Solomon 
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 In support of this view, Carol L. Meyers and Eric M. Meyers reference an “element of scrutiny 
in the root rxb [which] is appropriate to the idea that, for so important an office, Yahweh looks carefully at 
qualifications before making his appointment.” Haggai, Zechariah 1–8 (AB 25B; New York: Doubleday, 
1987), 70. See also such evaluative connotations in the word study of rxb. 
109
 Roddy Braun contends that “no possibility is entertained that this covenant will be abrogated, 
or will need to be abrogated (v 13); no less than five times the writer repeats that it will be forever.” 1 
Chronicles (WBC 14; Dallas: Word, 1986), 200.  
110
 Both Birth and Fretheim suggest that God’s election of David is different in kind from Saul’s 
such that while Saul’s election was conditional, David’s is unconditional. Birch, “First and Second 
Samuel,” in Numbers–Samuel, 2:1091, 1257–58. Yet, Birch states, “The promise to David does not remove 
the ‘if’ of moral demand that we associate with God’s covenant given to Israel at Sinai. Even kings may be 




seems to attribute this “great lovingkindness” shown to David, including Solomon’s own 
kingship over God’s “chosen” people, at least partially to David’s obedience and “uprightness of 
heart” (1 Kgs 3:6, 8). Likewise, later, it is declared that Solomon’s kingship is “for David’s sake,” 
and “because David did what was right in the sight of the LORD, and had not turned aside from 
anything that [God] commanded him all the days of his life, except in the case of Uriah the 
Hittite” (1 Kgs 15:4–5). 
Further, the promise elsewhere seems explicitly conditional. David himself instructs 
Solomon to obey God in accordance with the “Law of Moses . . . so that the LORD may carry out 
His promise which He spoke concerning me, saying, ‘If your sons are careful of their way, to 
walk before Me in truth with all their heart and with all their soul, you shall not lack a man on the 
throne of Israel’” (1 Kgs 2:3–4; cf. 1 Kgs 8:25). Again, Solomon is instructed by God himself, “if 
you will walk before Me as your father David walked . . . then I will establish the throne of your 
kingdom over Israel forever, just as I promised to your father David” (1 Kgs 9:4–5). Yet, “if you 
or your sons indeed turn away from following Me . . . then I will cut off Israel from the land 
which I have given them” (1 Kgs 9:6–7; cf. 9:9).
111
 Accordingly, the earthly dynasty is not 
everlasting. In actuality, Solomon strays from obedience, and God is angered (1 Kgs 11:9–10) 
and proclaims, “Because you have done this . . . I will surely tear the kingdom from you, and will 
                                                     
 
Samuel , 2:1258. But then, whence is unconditionality? Fretheim suggests that God learned from the 
experience of Saul and implemented a better way. “Divine Foreknowledge, Divine Constancy, and the 
Rejection of Saul’s Kingship,” CBQ 47 (1985): 599–601. Yet, even if one allows Fretheim’s view that God 
lacks foreknowledge (which I do not), it seems difficult to believe God would not anticipate enthroning a 
potentially rebellious king. Why not just make an unconditional commitment the first time? Why not just 
decide to maintain the commitment to Saul despite his rebellion while he was still on the throne, even? 
Fretheim further suggests that the proclamation that God will not “change his mind” in 1 Sam 15:29 refers 
to the surety and permanence of David’s election; cf. also Ps 132:11. However, the apparent conditionality 
of the Davidic covenant elsewhere raises significant questions for such an approach. 
111
 Many scholars have recognized the conditionality embedded even in the promises of the 
Davidic dynasty. Bergen, 1, 2 Samuel, 150–51; Ralph W. Klein, 1 Samuel (WBC 10; Dallas: Word, 1983), 
127; Katharine Doob Sakenfeld, The Meaning of Hesed in the Hebrew Bible: A New Inquiry (Missoula, 
Mont.: Scholars Press, 1978), 141–42; John A. Davies, A Royal Priesthood: Literary and Intertextual 




give it to your servant” (1 Kgs 11:11; cf. 11:33). Yet, the punishment is tempered on account of 
David and Jerusalem such that God “will not do it in your days for the sake of your father David” 
but the kingdom will be torn from Solomon’s son though his son will be given one tribe “for the 
sake of My servant David and for the sake of Jerusalem which I have chosen” (1 Kgs 11:12–13).  
Jeroboam is selected in a similarly contingent manner, being given a conditional promise 
of an “enduring house” if he is obedient to God as was David (cf. 1 Kgs 11:38).
112
 Yet, he is 
disobedient and thus the kingdom is taken from his house (1 Kgs 14:8). Thus began a long line of 
mostly rebellious kings in both the north and the south of the divided kingdom. Although 
punishment was tempered and delayed “for the sake of David His servant, since He had promised 
him to give a lamp to him through his son always” (2 Kgs 8:19), both Israel and Judah ultimately 
faced destruction (cf. 2 Kgs 23:27). 
It seems, then, that while election may be undeserved and foreconditional, its attendant 
privileges are neither unconditional nor unending. There have been numerous scholarly 
explanations for the apparent tension between the apparently unconditional promise(s) and, 
elsewhere, conditionality involved in the attendant blessings of the promise(s). Some interpreters 
hold that there were at least two streams of history that interpreted the events in contradiction to 
one another: one viewing the promises as unconditional and eternal, the other viewing them as 
conditional, or at least tempering them as such.
113
 Another possibility is that, considering the 
evident conditionality and the removal of the earthly kingship, the promise was never intended to 
be viewed as unconditional. A third possibility is that the election, covenant, and attendant 
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 Jeroboam succeeds Solomon as ruler over 11 tribes but one tribe will remain with Solomon’s 
son, “for the sake of My servant David and for the sake of Jerusalem, the city which I have chosen from all 
the tribes of Israel (1 Kgs 11:32), and again “for the sake of My servant David whom I chose, who 
observed My commandments and My statutes” (1 Kgs 11:34), “that My servant David may have a lamp 
always before Me in Jerusalem, the city where I have chosen for Myself to put My name” (1 Kgs 11:36).  
113
 The prevalent view is that the Deuteronomic historian emphasized conditionality upon 
faithfulness while another strand, likely the priestly, emphasized the unconditional “perpetual covenant” 
hearkening back to Abraham. Weinfeld, “The Covenant,” 195; Sakenfeld, The Meaning of Hesed, 149, 




promises were unconditional in some respects, but conditional in others. This study favors the 
third option, which is bolstered by reference to parallels in ANE literature.
114
 This potential 
solution will be addressed in a bit more detail later, along with further mention of the potential 
interpretive value of comparison to ANE covenant genres, especially that of grant. 
The apparent tension between elements of conditionality and unconditionality continues 
throughout the latter prophets, and into the writings. Much of Israel’s identity is as God’s 
“chosen” people (Isa 43:10, 20; 44:1–2; 45:4; 48:10; 65:9, 15, 22).
115
 God has “chosen” and not 
“rejected” Israel (Isa 41:8–9; cf. Jer 33:24; Zech 3:2). However, the people are not always faithful 
to God, despite his repeated pleadings for them. Indeed, in numerous instances, God’s desires are 
unfulfilled. For example, God “longs [hkx] to be gracious” to his people” (Isa 30:18) but his 
compassion is interrupted by human apostasy.
116
 Further, God does not desire or have “pleasure” 
(#px) in the death of the wicked but desires repentance (Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11). However, many 
reject him.
117
 Therefore, God’s will is not unilaterally efficacious; some factor(s) bring about 
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 This is the view of many scholars. See McCarter Jr., II Samuel, 207–8; Weinfeld, “The 
Covenant”; Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1–11, 370. Consider also John H. Walton’s helpful presentation of 
covenant jeopardy, which maintains that God does not revoke his covenant promises but “there is a 
necessity for the human party to obey God.” Covenant: God’s Purpose, God’s Plan (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Zondervan, 1994), 113. Walton suggests that failure by the human party to meet covenant responsibilities 
might amount to “benefit jeopardy” or “abortive jeopardy,” among others. In the former, the human party’s 
failure to meet covenant responsibilities puts them in danger of losing the benefits of the covenant (cf. Lev 
26:14–30; Deut 28:15–68; 1 Kgs 9:6–9). In the latter, failure “on the part of the human party prior to or 
soon after ratification [of the covenant] could jeopardize their involvement in that phase of the covenant.” 
For example, if “Abraham had not left his home and family to go to the land God showed him, the 
covenant would not have been made with him.” Covenant, 97. In this way, he contends that human 
rebellion against God can “render the covenant ineffectual.” However, “this does not mean that the 
covenant is null and void, but that it is rendered ineffectual in terms of its intended purpose.” Walton, 
Covenant, 97. 
115
 It should be remembered that often the identification of the “chosen” is disputed. The passages 
here appear to be in reference to Israel. 
116
 This is important for it means that God makes his action dependent upon contingencies. The 
language of intense waiting implies once again the divine emotion of wanting to be gracious but not being 
able to tolerate the state of affairs (in regard to justice, not sheer capability). 
117
 Although God has no pleasure in anyone’s death, “Yahweh will not impose his grace on a 
rebellious people. They must accept responsibility for both the course of their lives and their destiny. 




states of affairs contrary to God’s will, which causes him grief (cf. Lam 3:32–33). Accordingly, 
that election is not constant with regard to Israel is apparent in the forecast that a time will come 
when God “will have compassion on Jacob and again choose Israel” (Isa 14:1). Likewise, in 
Zechariah it is foretold that God will “again choose Jerusalem” (Zech 1:17; 2:12).
118
 Further, 
humans are said to have “broke[n] the everlasting covenant” (Isa 24:5; cf. Jer 6:30).
119
 
Conditionality is further evident in that people are exhorted to listen to and come to God and he 
“will make an everlasting covenant with” them, “according to the faithful mercies shown to 
David” (Isa 55:3).
120
 Apparently, even this “everlasting covenant” requires a responsive 
relationship. Again, God declares that he loves justice and thus declares his intention to faithfully 
recompense Israel with an everlasting covenant and with blessing denoting a link between love, 
justice, and blessing (Isa 61:8–9). Indeed, God looks forward to a day when the “whole house of 
Israel” will serve him, he will “accept [hcr] them” and their gifts as a “soothing aroma” and bring 
                                                     
 
Book of Ezekiel: Chapters 1–24 (NICOT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997), 589. Thus, “God desired 
to deliver, but he would bring judgment if necessary.” Lamar Eugene Cooper Sr., Ezekiel (NAC 17; 
Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1994), 193. 
118
 Ben C. Ollenburger suggests, “These texts stress the permanence of God’s choice, and thus of 
Jerusalem/Zion.” “The Book of Zechariah,” in The Twelve Prophets (vol. 7 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: 
Abingdon Press, 1996), 754. Similarly, see Gary Smith, Isaiah 1–39 (NAC 15A; Nashville, Tenn.: 
Broadman & Holman, 2007), 306. Oswalt suggests, “This election does not speak so much of Israel’s status 
before God as it does of the individual Israelite’s experience of him. God’s choice of Israel to be the 
bearers of the covenant was fixed in God’s promise to Abraham. But any specific group or generation of 
that people had to receive the choosing for themselves.” Yet, whatever may come, “God will once again 
choose.” The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 1–39 (NICOT; Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, 1986), 312. Yet, the very 
fact that Israel must be chosen again points to an aspect of impermanence. Watts suggests, “‘Again’ is 
needed in the context where such election has been set aside to allow judgment to do its work.” John D. W. 
Watts, Isaiah 1–33 (WBC 24; Waco, Tex.: Word Books, 1985), 202. Such lapses of election are 
consistently attributed not to divine arbitrariness, but to the failure and rebellion of God’s covenant people. 
Indeed, here “election is not deterministic and that the correlation of divine election and human submission 
to obligation is taken very seriously.” Wildberger, TLOT 1:221–22. 
119
 However, Wildberger points out that “Lev 26:44 expressly emphasizes the notion that this 
judgment may be understood as abandonment to destruction. The dissolution of the covenant is not at 
issue.” TLOT 2:659. See also Jer 31:37. 
120
 There is some ambiguity as to whether the phrase dwId” ydEs.x; is a subjective or objective genitive. 
That is, are the “mercies” those shown by David toward God, or by God toward David? See the discussion 




them to the land of Israel (Ezek 20:39–42).
121
 Thus, ultimately, God forecasts a new covenant, not 
like the one the people broke (Jer 31:31–32) but one in which God will put his law within them 
and write it on their heart (Jer 31:33) and its endurance will be sure (Jer 31:35–37; cf. Jer 32:38–
41; Ezek 16:59–63; 37:21–28). The key to this future, idyllic relationship is the concept of a new 
heart provided by God, such that the relationship will be wholehearted and internal (cf. Ezek 
11:19; 18:31; 36:26). 
Accordingly, it seems that Israel is not automatically privy to the Davidic promises. 
God’s word will accomplish his “desire” (#px) (Isa 55:11), his anger accomplishes his purpose 
(Jer 23:20), he is the father (Isa 64:8) and the potter (Isa 64:8; Jer 18:1–10).
122
 Yet, God expects 
appropriate response, that is, requited love. The elect king is to, in effect, fulfill that which was 
already prescribed in the Mosaic covenant, which itself exists only because of God’s love for 
Israel’s forefathers (Deut 4:37; 7:7–8; 10:15), and his lovingkindness and compassion bestowed 
upon them, especially after rebellion (Exod 33:19; 34:6–7).
123
 Similarly, in Amos, the special 
status of the people before God brings special responsibility. Thus, God declares, “You only have 
I chosen [[dy] among all the families of the earth; Therefore I will punish you for all your 
iniquities” (Amos 3:2).
124
 God took the initiative, and his love is the basis for the relationship, but 
                                                     
 
121
 God himself recounts the up and down history of his special relationship with Israel, from the 
day he “chose Israel and swore” to them in Egypt (Ezek 20:5) they rebelled with idolatry despite God’s 
instructions and, thus, he “resolved to pour out” his “wrath on them” (Ezek 20:8). Yet, for his name he 
delivered them repeatedly but they likewise rebelled repeatedly, making God furious, an emotion that he 
tempered, and did not destroy them (Ezek 20:9–24). In the promised land, their rebellion continued, even in 
child sacrifice (Ezek 20:31) yet God resolved that he would bring them back through discipline, even into 
the “bond of the covenant,” purge the rebels and bring them out of sojourn but not to Israel (Ezek 20:38).  
122
 God is consistently represented as passible, but he is not passive. Notably, the “potter” analogy, 
while clearly displaying God’s power as the shaper of his creation, also evidences clear conditionality; cf. 
John C. Peckham, “The Passible Potter and the Contingent Clay: A Theological Study of Jeremiah 18:1–
10,” Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 18 (2007): 130–50. 
123
 Thus, the Davidic covenant is a sub-covenant of the Sinaitic covenant and, therefore, also 
includes conditionality. See Roy Gane, “Covenant of Love: Syllabus for GSEM 538 Covenant-Law-
Sabbath” (Berrien Springs, Mich.: Andrews University, 1997), 32–35. 
124
 The verb here, [dy, connotes an intimate relationship, thus alluding to the special status of Israel 




he expects all the more an appropriate response from his people. Within this context, the idea of a 
remnant becomes highly significant; some of God’s “chosen” are spared and heirs to the 
inheritance (Isa 65:8–9), and there is a “blessing” in them, God’s people who “seek” him (Isa 
65:10).
125
 However, there are others who were “called” but neither listened to nor answered God 
and forsook him, chose what displeased him, and thus face destruction (Isa 65:11–12). This posits 
the distinction between a “believing [faithful] remnant” who are heirs to the promises and the 
unbelieving who ultimately face destruction.
126
 In all this, though God’s promises never fail, 
election is depicted as conditional and not unilateral, irresistible, or constant. 
Election and Covenant in the Writings 
The Writings build upon a very similar framework to that of the prophets with regard to 
election. As in the prophets, the term rxb often refers to vocational election, especially the 
election of Israel (Pss 33:12; 47:4 [5]; 78:67–68; 132:13; 135:4).
127
 Notably, Israel is chosen as 
God’s “inheritance” (Ps 33:12) and “His own possession [hL'gUs]” (Ps 135:4). As such, God’s 
                                                     
 
“although v 2 states the case in absolute terms, these should be taken as relative rather than exclusive: I 
have given you more attention than any other people; therefore I expect more from you than from them. I 
will punish you more than them.” Francis I. Andersen and David N. Freedman, Amos: A New Translation 
with Introduction and Commentary (AB 24A; New York: Doubleday, 1989), 382. This may have served as 
a corrective against those who thought election relieved them of responsibility. Donald E. Gowan, “The 
Book of Amos,” in The Twelve Prophets (vol. 7 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1996), 369–70. 
On the contrary, “Israel was about to learn that their special relationship carried with it special 
responsibility and accountability.” Billy K. Smith and Frank S. Page, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah (NAC 19B; 
Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 1995), 71. 
125
 John D. W. Watts believes that “the whole is preserved from deserved destruction for the sake 
of the few faithful servants and the potential life and blessing inherent in them.” Isaiah 34–66 (WBC 25; 
Waco, Tex.: Word Books, 1987), 344. Cf. idem, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66 (NICOT; Eerdmans: 
Grand Rapids, 1998), 644–45.  
126
 Though some scholars think that the idea of a “believing” remnant is late, Oswalt points out 
that “all the prophets, at least from Elijah and Elisha onward, divided the nation into those who obeyed God 
and those who did not.” The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66, 645; cf. Deut 28–29; Isa 3:10; Jer 24.  
127
 Election in the Writings also includes that of priests (1 Chr 15:2; 2 Chr 29:11) and kings, 
Jerusalem (Ps 78:68; 2 Chr 6:5, 34, 38; 12:13; 33:7; Neh 1:9), and the temple itself (2 Chr 7:12, 16; 33:7). 
Reference is also made to the election of Abraham (Neh 9:7; cf. Ps 105:9–12 = 1 Chr 16:16–19) and of 
Moses and Aaron (Ps 105:26). The Abrahamic covenant, the product of this election, is itself presented as 





people are cherished by him, a special treasure (hL'gUs), implying evaluation (cf. Prov 21:3).128 
Elsewhere, the psalmist speaks of God’s “desire” (dmx) for the mountain of his dwelling (Ps 68:16 
[17]).
129
 Likewise, God has “chosen” (rxb) and “desired” (hwa) Zion (Ps 132:13); it is to be his 
“resting place forever” for he has “desired [hwa] it” (Ps 132:13–14; cf. 2 Chr 7:16).130 The term for 
desire here is a strongly emotional term, sometimes connoting an intense craving.
131
 Moreover, 
                                                     
 
128
 Notice the evaluative term hL'gUs, which denotes something highly valued, treasured, and/or 
cherished. See the discussion of the term in the Torah section earlier. It is also interesting that the word rxb 
(niphal participle) with God as agent is used in the sense of “desire” in Prov 21:3. See the discussion 
regarding divine delight below. 
129
 dmx connotes desire, longing, liking, finding pleasure, and/or craving, but usually of an 
explicitly objective nature, with an object that is desirable, pleasant, etc. It “denotes the desire as founded 
upon the perception of beauty, and therefore excited from without.” W. Schultz, quoted in Carl F. Keil and 
Franz Delitzsch, Commentary on the Old Testament (10 vols.; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2002), 1:402. 
David Talley comments that “depending on the context, dmx can stress a different meaning, either the 
desirability of an object or the desire to obtain.” “חמד,” NIDOTTE 2:167. Childs states, “The emphasis of 
dmx falls on an emotion which often leads to a commensurate action.” The Book of Exodus, 427. It may be 
used for a positive desire or the coveting of that which belongs to someone else (cf. Exod 20:17). Notably, 
it collocates in parallel with bha in one instance, referring to those who “love [bha] being simple-minded” 
and scoffers who “delight [dmx] themselves in scoffing” (Prov 1:22). The term is used with divine agency in 
four instances, the verb once (Ps 68:16 [17]) and the adjectival dWmx' thrice, all in reference to Daniel as one 
who is “greatly beloved” or “highly esteemed” (Dan 9:23; 10:11, 19). The implicit agent is God. The 
adjectival form appears in 9 verses altogether. Elsewhere, it refers to that which is precious, highly 
valuable, pleasant, etc. (cf. Gen 27:15; Ezra 8:27; Dan 10:3; 11:38, 43; 2 Chr 20:25). The noun hD'm.x 
appears in 16 verses referring to a desirable object. In some instances, there may be implicit divine 
evaluation such as when God refers to “My pleasant [hD'm.x] field” (Jer 12:10; cf. Jer 3:19). Interestingly, the 
term collocates once in parallel with choice [rxb], of human agency (Isa 1:29). 
130
 According to Waltke, “Desire (ta
a
wat) is a synonym of ḥāmad (“covet”; see 1:22) and denotes 
the aspirations rooted deep in a person’s existence.” The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1:1–15:29, 474. Both 
terms are profoundly emotive. G. Mayer, “אוה,” TDOT 1:135. Leslie C. Allen speaks of this as God’s 
“enthusiastic fervor.” Psalms 101–150 (WBC 21; Dallas: Word, 2002), 274. 
131
 hwa appears with divine agency in three passages, two in the verbal form (Ps 132:12–13; Job 
32:13) and once in the noun form (Hos 10:10). Its basic meaning is “desire,” which may be associated with 
longing and/or craving. See William C. Williams, “אוה,” NIDOTTE 1:304–306. The piel, which appears 
here in Ps 132:13–14, is in every other case collocated with the soul as the seat of desire. The verb hwa 
appears in 27 verses altogether, in the piel (11 verses) and in the hitpael (16 verses). The hitpael often 
connotes a greedy craving or coveting while the piel often refers to intense desire, whether positive or 
negative. The collocation of hwa + vp,n< appears in Deut 12:20; 14:26; 1 Sam 2:16; 2 Sam 3:21; 1 Kgs 11:37; 
Job 23:13; Prov 21:10; Isa 26:9; Mic 7:1. 
Job also uses it to refer to the divine will saying, “What [God’s] soul [vp,n<] desires, that He does” 
(Job 23:13). This, interestingly, associates the divine will with a syntagm that usually connotes intense 
longing. In its noun form, hwa appears in the phrase, “When it is My desire, I will chastise them” (Hos 
10:10), which may also be translated “in my desire, I will chastise them” (Hos 10:10). This marks the only 
occurrence where the noun does not collocate with vp,n. Notably, some have questioned whether this is an 




divine election is not unconditional or unilaterally effective as God is provoked by Israel’s evil 
(Ps 78:58–59) and “rejected [sam] the tent of Joseph, and did not choose [rxb] the tribe of 




Further, the Davidic election is once again a prevalent theme in the Writings, perhaps 
most clearly depicted when David recounts that God “chose” him to be king “for He has chosen 
Judah” and “He took pleasure [hcr] in me to make me king over all Israel (1 Chr 28:4; cf. 2 Chr 
6:5–7). Further, Solomon’s election is also prominent; God himself declares, “I have chosen him 
to be a son to Me, and I will be a father to him” (1 Chr 28:6; cf. 1 Chr 17:13; 28:5). Again, as in 
the Prophets, the promises attending this election within the Davidic covenant are frequently 
spoken of as everlasting. For instance, God proclaims that he will “establish” Solomon’s “throne 
forever,” be a father to him, and not take away his dsx as from Saul (1 Chr 17:12–14). In 
numerous other instances the covenant is spoken of as everlasting.
133
 Indeed, it is declared, “If his 
sons forsake” the commandments then God will punish them but “will not break off [his] 
lovingkindness from him. . . . My covenant I will not violate, nor will I alter the utterance of my 
                                                     
 
Andersen and David N. Freedman, Hosea: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 24; 
New York: Doubleday, 1980), 565–66. JPS translates the phrase, “When I chose them.” The noun occurs in 
7 verses with the connotation of desire, longing. The collocation of hwa + vp,n< appears in Deut 12:15, 20–21; 
18:6; 1 Sam 23:20; Jer 2:24. A different noun of this lexeme, hw"a]T, represents desire in the form of a craving 
for someone of something; it is never used with divine agency. 
132
 This appears to be in reference to the removal of the ark from Shiloh to Jerusalem, which is 
itself a precursor to further judgment against Israel, yet also, by extension, highlights appraisal of 
respective nations. 
133
 Thus, God declares, “I have made a covenant with My chosen; I have sworn to David My 
servant, I will establish your seed forever” (Ps 89:3–4 [4–5]; cf. 89:19–21 [20–22]). Notice the qal passive 
participle used here with reference to David’s election, which often connotes the evaluative sense of being 
choice, of good quality, like choice soldiers, chariots, cedars, etc.
 
Further, “My lovingkindness I will keep 
for him forever, and my covenant shall be confirmed to him. So I will establish his descendants forever” 




lips. Once I have sworn to My holiness; I will not lie to David. His descendants shall endure 
forever and his throne . . . shall be established forever”” (Ps 89:31–37 [32–38]).
134
  
Yet, despite all of this, the Psalmist laments the apparent reality that God has “cast off 
and rejected” and even “spurned the covenant of your servant” and “profaned his crown in the 
dust (Ps 89:38–39 [39–40]) and asks, “Where are Your former lovingkindnesses, O Lord, which 
You swore to David in Your faithfulness?” (Ps 89:49 [50]).
135
 Accordingly, the attendant 
privileges of this election are repeatedly declared to be conditional. For example, God himself 
declares to Solomon, “If you walk before Me as your father David walked” keeping the 
commandments “then I will establish your throne as I covenanted with your father David . . . but 
if you turn away and forsake” the commandments and serve other gods “then I will uproot you” 
(2 Chr 7:17–20). Likewise, David exhorts Solomon to serve God wholeheartedly for “if you seek 
Him, He will let you find Him; but if you forsake Him, He will reject you forever” (1 Chr 28:9). 
Many other statements likewise declare such conditionality.
136
 Further, the Davidic promises 
                                                     
 
134
 As J. Clinton McCann Jr. puts it, here the “metaphor suggests that the Davidic dynasty is an 
enduring structure of God’s cosmic rule.” “The Book of Psalms,” in 1 & 2 Maccabees, Job, Psalms (vol. 4 
of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1996), 1036. The language here and in 2 Sam 7, upon which 
this passage is based, has often been associated with the language of a “royal grant”-type covenant. So 
Marvin Tate, Psalms 51–100 (WBC 20; Dallas: Word, 2002), 427. See the discussion further below.  
135
 Knoppers believes that “however much 2 Sam 7 and Ps 89 heighten the deity’s obligation to 
David and his seed, they also contain a bilateral element. In both texts, David’s descendants are not freed 
from their responsibility to obey Yhwh (2 Sam 7:14; Ps 89:31–33).” Gary N. Knoppers, 1 Chronicles 10–
29 (AB 12A; New York: Doubleday, 2004), 672. Cf. idem, “Ancient Near Eastern.” Notably, God’s 
faithfulness (hn"Wma/) and lovingkindness (dsx) are emphasized throughout the Psalm (both appearing seven 
times) and it forms the crux of the Psalmist’s final question, is God no longer faithful? As Tate puts it, “The 
perplexity and hurt are not resolved in this psalm; the matter is left open. The speaker cannot solve the 
problem.” Psalms 51–100, 429. 
136
 Thus, David states to Solomon, “Then you will prosper, if you are careful to observe” God’s 
commandments (1 Chr 22:13). God declares of Solomon, “I will establish his kingdom forever if he 
resolutely performs my commandments and My ordinances (1 Chr 28:7). Likewise, Solomon recounts 
God’s declaration to David: “You shall not lack a man to sit on the throne of Israel, if only your sons take 
heed to their way, to walk in My laws as you [David] have walked before Me” (2 Chr 6:16; cf. 6:42). Cf. Ps 
89:32 [33]; 1 Chr 28:10; 2 Chr 15:2. Elsewhere, the conditionality is also explicit: “Of the fruit of your 
body I will set upon your throne. If your sons will keep My covenant and My testimony which I will teach 
them, their sons also shall sit upon your throne forever” for “the LORD has chosen Zion; He has desired it 
for His habitation” calling it his “resting place forever; Here I will dwell, for I have desired it” (Ps 132:11–




remain integral to the divine acceptance or rejection of succeeding kings.
137
 Eventually, despite 
the Davidic covenant, destruction comes, even upon Jerusalem (2 Chr 36:19).
138
 In all there is 
repeated contingency despite the supposed unconditionality of the divine promises.
139
 The 
depiction of election and covenant in the OT thus suggests significant conditionality in the divine-
human relationship. 
The Volitional Aspect of Divine Love in the Torah 
The volitional aspect of love is evident in Exod 33:19 where God has the right to freely 
bestow mercy and compassion on the undeserving but is not compelled to do so.
140
 The volitional 
aspect of divine love is further apparent in the relationship between love and choice, which is 
clarified in three primary passages in Deuteronomy, all of which depict divine love as the cause 
of the divine choice of Israel (Deut 4:37; 7:7–8; 10:15). First, “because” God loved (bha) Israel’s 
forefathers he chose (rxb) their descendants (Deut 4:37). Second, “Not because you were more 
numerous than all other peoples did Yahweh delight [qvx] in you, therefore he chose [rxb] you 
when you were the least of all peoples, because of the love [hb'h]a;] of Yahweh for you, and he kept 
the oath which he swore to your fathers” (Deut 7:7–8).
141
 Third, “Yet in your fathers Yahweh 
                                                     
 
are meant not merely for kings but, through them, belong to the people as a whole.  
137
 God was with Jehoshaphat “because he followed the example of his father David’s earlier days 
and did not seek the Baals” (2 Chr 17:3). Similarly, Hezekiah and Josiah “did right in the sight of the 
LORD” like their “father David” (2 Chr 29:2; 34:2; cf. 11:17). On the other hand Ahaz “did not do right in 
the sight of the LORD as David his father” (2 Chr 28:1).  
138
 This is despite the fact that even in the midst of evil, God “was not willing to destroy the house 
of David because of the covenant which He had made with David, and since He had promised to give a 
lamp to him and his sons forever” (2 Chr 21:7).  
139
 Thompson comments, the “basic condition [of the Davidic dynasty] was that David’s 
descendants should walk in God’s law.” J. A. Thompson, 1, 2 Chronicles (NAC 9; Nashville, Tenn.: 
Broadman & Holman, 1994), 229. 
140
 See the discussion of this verse above where it is demonstrated that the text does not refer to 
the arbitrary bestowal of compassion on some and not others. 
141
 My translation. I have departed from the NASB translation, both here and in Deut 10:15 below, 




delighted [qvx] to love [bha] them. Therefore he chose [rxb] their seed after them, even you, from 
all the peoples as it is this day” (Deut 10:15).
142
 These texts do not address the cause of divine 
love itself but, importantly, distinguish between love and choice, the former consistently being 
identified as the source of the latter.
143
 As such, divine love and choice cannot be synonymous.
144
 
Israel is the recipient of divine choice and affection (qvx) because of God’s love for their fathers, 
first, but also because of his love for them.
145
 Since divine love is the basis of election, it is 
likewise the basis of covenant. Further, in Deut 7:7 and 10:15, significant import hinges upon the 
meaning of the rare term qvx, an emotive term, which may denote clinging, attachment, longing, 
attraction, being drawn to, desire, and/or delight in something or someone.
146
 qvx implies that the 
                                                     
 
by the LXX “proei,lato” for qvx, meaning to “choose, decide, prefer, or commit oneself to”) is misleading 
when the meaning of qvx is considered intertextually. Lapsley refers to this as an “evidently emotional 
attachment.” “Feeling Our Way,” 361. Further, “Somehow, God's love for Israel is born out of a feeling, 
and that feeling has moral weight and relates in a significant way to the actions God takes on Israel's behalf 
(Deut 7:8).” Lapsley, “Feeling Our Way,” 368. 
142
 My translation. In both cases, I have translated vav with rxb as a vav of consequence “therefore 
he chose” in accordance with the usage in Deut 4:37 where the parallel statement is predicated on 
“because” [tx;T;] and the vav with rxb is thus a vav of consequence. Lapsley translates, “Yhwh became 
attached to Israel's ancestors in love and chose their seed after them.” Lapsley, “Feeling Our Way,” 361. 
143
 Shafer sees this as reference to “a cosmic deity who loved the fathers, made covenant with 
them, and acknowledged their reciprocal faithfulness to his covenant by choosing their seed.” Byron E. 
Shafer, “The Root bhr and Pre-Exilic Concepts of Chosenness in the Hebrew Bible,” ZAW 89 (1977): 39. 
Tigay suggests that “Israel’s ancestors earned God’s love” through “fidelity” as “explained in Genesis.” 
Deuteronomy, 57. 
144
 Some scholars have seemed to conflate love and choice. So Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas, 134. 
Merrill is likewise representative of such a perspective. He suggests that in “covenant contexts these verbs 
are synonymous.” Thus, in his view, “love and hate are not emotive terms but technical language to speak 
of divine election for salvation and service.” Deuteronomy, 180–81. But, contra Merrill, since election is 
consistently described as a consequence of God’s prior love here, it cannot therefore be synonymous. 
145
 Cf. Pss 78:68; 47:4 [5]. That God’s choice is explicitly predicated on his love, as its basis, is 
recognized by numerous scholars, despite the traditional conflation of love and choice; cf. Els, NIDOTTE 
1:285; Dyrness, Themes, 59, Clark, The Word Hesed, 131, 136; Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy, 179–
80; Christensen, Deuteronomy 1–11, 159, 204; Gerald L. Keown, Pamela J. Scalise, and Thomas G. 
Smothers, Jeremiah 26–52 (WBC 27; Dallas, TX: Word, 1995), 108. Jacob comments that “the origin of 
election is found in love, that is to say in the spontaneous movement which carries one being toward 
another being with the desire to possess it and to find some satisfaction in that possession.” Theology, 108. 
Even Egyptian parallels depict divine activity toward Pharaoh “as a result of my love for you.” See Jan 
Bergman, “אהב,” TDOT 1:100. 
146




kind of love that God has for his people is not detached, but includes tender feeling, affection, and 
emotion.
147
Yet, divine love here describes more than God’s emotive affection for Israel. Here, 
divine love is also committal, signified by the action of choice, explicitly appealing to a prior 
commitment, the promise to the patriarchs. In this way, the volitional aspect of divine love is 
complementary to evaluation and emotion. 
                                                     
 
and plays a prominent role in passages that speak of Israel’s election in divine love. The non-personal 
usages of qvx refer to bands in the construction of the sanctuary (Exod 27:17; 38:17, 28), thus suggesting 
derivation from a root meaning of bind, adhere, unite, or stick together; cf. Good, “Love in the OT,” IDB 
3:165; Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1–11, 360; Gerhard Wallis, “חשק,” TDOT 5:261. The usage in interpersonal 
contexts also implies such a connection. For instance, in Gen 34:8 (Shechem for Dinah) it means “longing” 
or even “passionate desire.” See Els, NIDOTTE 1:280. Deut 21:11 utilizes the same term of a man’s desire 
for a beautiful woman among the captives whom he would like to marry. It is used of other desires as well 
(1 Kgs 9:1, 19; 2 Chr 8:6; Isa 38:17). The same term is used to describe the one who has “loved” [qvx] God 
and “therefore” God will deliver him (Ps 91:14). In this way, from a survey of OT usages it is clear that the 
term does not connote “choice” in the sense of arbitrary election. Rather, the normal meaning would seem 
to entail passionate love, delight, and/or desire. 
However, some scholars nevertheless suggest an elective connotation. Wallis recognizes the 
connotation of “inward devotion to or pleasure in a project” in human usage (1 Kgs 9:19). TDOT 5:262. 
However, he believes the theological usage is correctly associated with decision and “does not suggest a 
sudden surge of emotion; it presupposes not just an unconditional erotic attraction but also a reasoned and 
unconditional decision . . . a conscious attitude of devotion.” Ibid., 262. Merrill, not surprisingly, sees qvx, 
rxb, and bha as “essentially synonymous as their usage elsewhere clearly shows.” Deuteronomy, 203. 
However, in my view, both err in projecting the meaning of choice onto the two other verbs, which by their 
function are not synonymous but merely interrelated. Coppes sees it as purely on the basis of divine 
volition but also “deep, inward attachment.” “חשק,” TWOT 332. 
On the other hand, many scholars have suggested meaning more in line with the etymology and 
usage of the term throughout the OT. BDB simply suggests the meaning “to love, be attached to.” “חשק,” 
BDB, 365. Similarly, HALOT suggests, “be attached to” or “to love” and that there may be a relationship to 
the Arabic ‘asiqa, ‘love passionately.’” “חשק,” HALOT, 362. Robert Alter translates qvx as “desire” in both 
Deut 7:7 and 10:15. The Five Books of Moses: A Translation with Commentary (New York: Norton, 2005), 
917, 933. HCSB translates “devoted” in both instances. JPS is inconsistent, translating “set his heart” in 
Deut 7:7, but “was drawn in His love” in Deut 10:15. Similarly, Craigie suggests in Deut 10, God “was 
drawn to your fathers to love them.” The Book of Deuteronomy, 204. The NKJV is likewise inconsistent, 
translating “set His love” and “delighted” (Deut 7:7; 10:15). Els and Snaith likewise see qvx as meaning 
“delight.” Els, NIDOTTE 1:280; Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas, 135. Talley sees this as “God’s desire” by 
choice and including emotion. “חשק,” NIDOTTE 2:318. Duane Christensen interprets that God has “fallen 
in love” with them. Deuteronomy 21:10–34:12 (WBC 6B; Dallas: Word, 2002), 204. Eichrodt sees this as 
“free affection” and points out “the emphasis on the emotional element” in this term. Theology, 256; cf. 
Tigay, Deuteronomy, 56. Weinfeld even suggests “‘lusted after you’ or ‘hung on you.’” Deuteronomy 1–
11, 360. Lapsley contends that the verb “denotes affectionate love, desire, yearning, or longing—
sometimes with a sexual connotation (Gen 34:8; Deut 21:11) but always with an affective dimension.” 
“Feeling Our Way,” 360. 
147
 In Els’s analysis, bha in these verses signifies, among other things, “an emotive event, 




Further, divine love is here unmerited and foreconditional, that is, prior to, but not 
exclusive of, conditions. Israel is not chosen because of its merit but precisely because of God’s 
prior love (Deut 7:7–8; cf. 9:4–5).
148
 God does not need to love Israel, he is the sovereign of the 
universe (Deut 10:14); to him belongs all that is, yet he loved and chose Israel, “even” her “above 
all peoples” (Deut 10:15). This divine choice is necessarily in contrast to the “nations” that will 
be driven out of the land, since the specific divine blessing of inheritance is preferential and 
mutually exclusive to the blessing of those who already occupy the “promised” land (Deut 4:38). 
Accordingly, Israel is holy, “chosen” for God’s own “possession out of all the peoples” on earth 
(Deut 7:6). As such, divine love is depicted as differential. However, God’s action is not 
altogether arbitrary since the former occupants are dispossessed of the promised land because of 
their wickedness (Deut 9:4–5; cf. Gen 15:16). Moreover, divine love does not exclude non-
Israelites since God “does not show partiality nor take a bribe” and God loves even the alien 
(Deut 10:17–18).
149
 As such, divine love may be differential, but is not altogether exclusive. 
Although the status of God’s elect is unmerited it is nevertheless conditional and must be 
maintained by appropriate human response to God (Deut 7:9, 11–13; 10:16). This implication 
also appears in that Israel is a “holy people to the LORD,” which is in parallel to the fact that they 
are “chosen . . . to be a people for His own possession” (Deut 7:6; 14:2). The syntagm “holy” and 
“to the LORD” connotes not only that the people were set apart by choice, but also that they now 
have a responsibility to maintain holiness. This responsibility is also indicated by reference to the 
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 Cf. Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas, 135, 137; Eichrodt, Theology, 256. See also Deut 32:10; Hos 
11:1, 3; Jer 3:4; Ezek 6:6, 8; 7:4–6; Jer 31:9, 20. 
149
 Lapsley makes a compelling case that further points to the emotive nature of divine love. She 
comments that “an emotional dimension to this divine love for the stranger flows logically from the 
concern for the inner life that is present in the preceding verses.” “Feeling Our Way,” 361. She further 
points out that the love that humans are to show for the alien is likewise emotional since they are to 
remember what it felt like to be a stranger and this “act of emotional imagination will stir feelings of 
compassion. Out of this affective response will arise love for the stranger, which then takes form in 




conditionality associated with this phrase elsewhere in Deuteronomy (14:21; 26:18–19; 28:9).
150
 
Moreover, the word “possession” (hLgs), often translated “treasured possession,” has significant 
connotations of pleasure/delight, predicated on the condition of human fidelity, and is elsewhere 
closely associated with holiness to the LORD (Exod 19:5–6; Deut 7:6; 14:2; 26:18; cf. Mal 3:16–
18).
151
 Thus, even within the context of election, human responsibility and corresponding divine 
evaluation are highlighted. As such, God’s choice itself imposes conditions. This will become 
especially clear as the canonical analysis proceeds. 
The Volitional Aspect of Divine Love in the Prophets 
The primary term for election (rxb) only collocates with bha once in the Prophets, 
referring to “Israel, My servant, Jacob whom I have chosen, descendant of Abraham my friend 
[ybih]ao]” (Isa 41:8). Here, as in the Torah, the election of Israel is predicated on prior love 
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 For instance, “the LORD will establish you as a holy people to Himself, as He swore to you, if 
you keep the commandments” (Deut 28:9). Moreover, Christensen points out that as elect they “must 
maintain a ‘priestly’ level of holiness.” Deuteronomy 21:10–34:12, 291. Similarly, see Craigie, The Book 
of Deuteronomy, 179; Clements, “The Book of Deuteronomy,” in Numbers–Samuel, 2:350; Tigay, 
Deuteronomy, 87; Wildberger, TLOT 1:214, 216. 
151
 hLgs appears in 8 verses in the OT. Two are in reference to treasure of gold and silver (Eccl 2:8; 
1 Chr 29:3), one is a direct allusion to Deut 7:6; 14:2 describing God’s choice of Israel as his hLgs, absent 
reference to holiness (Ps 135:4). In each of Exod 19:5–6; Deut 7:6; 14:2; 26:18–19, hLgs is related to 
holiness and explicit conditions or instructions. For example, “if you will indeed obey My voice and keep 
My covenant, then you shall be My hLgs” (Exod 19:5) a “holy nation” (Exod 19:6). Mal 3:16–18, absent the 
term holy [vdq], nevertheless implies active holiness for “those who fear” God and “esteem His name,” 
which are those of whom God speaks when he declares, “They will be Mine . . . on the day that I prepare 
my hLgs” (Mal 3:16–17) and God “will again distinguish between the righteous and the wicked” (Mal 3:18). 
As such, hLgs is clearly a term that expects obedience and its privileges are predicated on maintenance of 
relational holiness to God. As such, it appears to be an evaluative term. Israel’s special status as hLgs is only 
possible because of God’s election in the first place, but God’s initiative must be appropriately responded 
to in order to continue. 
Greenberg associates this term with the Akkadian, sikiltu, denoting valuable, private property but 
coming to refer in theological usage to “objects diligently and patiently acquired” and in this way a “dear 
personal possession.” “Hebrew segulla: Akkadian sikiltu,” JAOS 71 (1951): 174. “A royal seal of Abban of 
Alakh designates its owner as the sikiltum of the god, his ‘servant’ and ‘beloved.’ A letter from the Hittite 
sovereign to the king of Ugarit characterizes his vassal as his ‘servant’ and sglt, ‘treasured possession.’” 
Sarna, Exodus, 104. Thus, the term “expresses God’s special covenantal relationship with Israel and His 
love for His people” and the contexts in which it appears “uniquely emphasize the inextricable association 
between being God’s hLgs and the pursuit of holiness.” Ibid. Thus, God “owns everything, but Israel is his 






 In Isa 41:8, there are many possible referents of the phrase, the 
“LORD loves him,” within the context of a declaration that God will deliver Judah from 
Babylonian captivity. The text may refer to Cyrus, to Israel in a collective singular, the author or 
speaker of the text, or even to the Messiah himself.
153
 In light of various plausible interpretations 
it seems unwise to try to draw far-reaching conclusions from this text.  
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 Clark likewise makes this connection of love leading to choice in Deut 7:7–8; 10:15; Isa 41:8 
and Pss 47:5; 78:68. The Word Hesed, 130. J. A. Motyer agrees, saying, “election arises from divine love, 
but it issues in responsive love.” Isaiah: An Introduction and Commentary (Downers Grove, Ill.: 
InterVarsity Press, 1999), 312; cf. Isa 41:8–9. As Oswalt puts it, “My friend . . . suggests that election is not 
an austere, judicial act but is rooted and grounded in love, both the love of God for the chosen and the love 
of the chosen for God.” The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66, 90. Els believes that Abraham “the friend of 
Yahweh, on account of his intimate relationship with God, is seen as the model of piety.” NIDOTTE 1:286. 
Some have seen in this a reference to ANE covenant language. See Thompson, “Israel’s ‘Lovers’”; 
Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1–11, 371. See also the discussion of the relationship of love to covenant language 
in the bha word study earlier.  
153
 Some who believe it refers to Cyrus as the agent of deliverance, whom God has chosen (Isa 
44:28; cf. 45:1; 46:11), and here “loves,” believe this is an instance of the term “love” signifying election.
 
Oswalt sees the referent as Cyrus, seeing “love” as “an expression of the election of Cyrus for the task at 
hand.” Though he acknowledges, “It may also, though not necessarily, express a special affection for the 
man who would accomplish God’s purpose for him.” The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66, 277; cf. Wallis, 
TDOT 1:113. Importantly, even if the referent is Cyrus it does not require a conflation of bha with rxb. It 
may, in fact, be pointing to a divine affection for the person he uses to accomplish his purposes. Others 
who see this as Cyrus associate it with suzerain-vassal language, for which there is very specific support in 
relation to an ANE text regarding Cyrus as the “friend” of Marduk. Motyer connects this to the “Cyrus 
Cylinder account that Marduk, angered by the Babylonian kings, ‘scoured all the lands for a friend. . . . He 
called Cyrus . . . went at his side like a friend and comrade.’” Isaiah, 380. In this vein, Blenkinsopp sees 
Cyrus and the referent and interprets “love” in a political rather than emotive sense, like the love of an 
overlord for his vassal. Isaiah 40–55, 294; cf. James Muilenburg, “Isaiah 40–66,” in Ecclesiastes, Song of 
Songs, Isaiah, Jeremiah (ed. George A. Buttrick; vol. 5 of IB, ed. George A. Buttrick; Nashville, Tenn.: 
Abingdon Press, 1956), 560.
 
If Israel is the beloved, God’s affection for his people would reasonably 
provide the basis for God’s action against unmerciful Babylon (Isa 47:6). If the referent is the author or 
speaker of the verse, the phrase the “LORD loves him” belongs with the immediately previous phrase “who 
among them has declared these things.” Christopher Seitz believes that “the Lord loves him,” strictly 
speaking, is not an answer to the question, “Who among them has declared this?” If the question is not 
rhetorical only, an alternative reading would be, “The Lord loves the one who declared this.” Here, then, 
the declarer would be from Israel, perhaps the author of the discourse. “The Book of Isaiah 40–66,” in 
Isaiah–Ezekiel (vol. 6 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 2001), 419.
 
Finally, if it refers to the 
Messiah it would refer cryptically to the Messiah’s ultimate work of the restoration of God’s people. I 
believe the most likely referent is Israel, in part because God’s love for Israel is frequently the motivation 
of divine deliverance elsewhere in Isaiah (Isa 43:4; 63:9; cf. 41:8) as well as throughout the prophets. The 
nearest textual antecedent is Israel in 48:12. However, the language in vs. 14, if the object of “love,” is 
Israel would require Israel to be both in the second person, “you,” earlier and in the third person as this 
object. This is possible considering the call for people to assemble. The text may shift between speakers, or 
have one speaker refer to the assembly by use of a collective singular. The LXX reads avgapw/n se, “loves 
you,” which would make the referent Israel. Some amend the verb bha from 3ms to a participle. See 





Perhaps the most frequently cited passage regarding the use of bha in close association 
with election appears in Mal 1. God declares at the outset of Malachi, “I have loved you,” 
connoting not only past love but also his ongoing love for his people, that is, “I have loved and 
continue to love you” (Mal 1:2). But, unappreciative, the people ask, “How have you loved us?” 
In other words, where is the evidence of God’s stated love? The implied accusation is that God 
has not fulfilled his covenant promises. God answers that he “loved Jacob” (Mal 1:2) but “hated 
Esau,” though they were brothers (Mal 1:3). That this refers to Israel and Edom, the descendants 
of Jacob and Esau respectively, seems clear in the foreground of the passage (cf. 1:3–5).
154
 A 
couple of major interpretive issues present themselves with regard to this passage. First, many 
scholars have considered the idea of God’s hatred of Edom to be too harsh and that, rather, the 
language of “hate” merely refers either to God’s loving Edom less than Israel,
155
 or simply not 
loving Edom.
156
 The latter perspective has downplayed, or even denied altogether, the 
emotionality of one or both of the terms, anf and bha.157 Second, there has been some tendency to 
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 The usage of “Esau” and “Jacob” to refer to Edom and Israel respectively throughout Obadiah 
(especially 10) seems to parallel the usage here. Scholars, however, disagree on whether the reference also 
refers to the individuals Jacob and Esau, a question that arises primarily due to Paul’s usage of this passage 
in Rom 9:13. A number of scholars find reference to both the individuals and nations. Verhoef, The Books, 
202; E. Ray Clendenen, Haggai, Malachi (NAC; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2004), 256; 
Andrew E. Hill, Malachi (AB 25D; New York: Doubleday, 1998), 164. In my view, the primary emphasis 
is on the nations of Israel and Edom, yet the reference to the progenitors of both nations also draws 
attention to the historical reversal of birthrights, pointing toward election.  
155
 See, for instance, Theodore F. K. Laetsch, Bible Commentary: The Minor Prophets (Saint 
Louis: Concordia, 1956), 512–13. On the other hand, Keil and Delitzsch state, “To hate, is the opposite of 
love.” Commentary, 10:637. 
156
 If loved means chosen, hate means not loved or not chosen, rejected. Verhoef, The Books, 200–
201; Clendenen, Haggai, Malachi, 251; Hill, Malachi, 166. David L. Petersen on the other hand rejects this 
explicitly saying nothing in this passage is akin to Deut 21:15, “In Malachi, hate is hate. . . . The rhetoric 
requires that Yahweh hate Edom virulently in order to demonstrate his unmitigated love toward Israel.” 
Zechariah 9–14 and Malachi: A Commentary (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), 170.  
157




conflate bha with “election” as if the two were synonymous.158 This often dovetails with the 
supposition that God’s love is altogether unconditional.
159
 
First, let us consider the issue of whether the term “loved” should be interpreted as 
chosen in this passage. There can be little doubt that this passage is associated with, and indeed 
appeals to, election. However, if “I love you” simply means “I have chosen you,” what does it 
add to the first affirmation that preceded the question?
160
 The people’s question itself presumes 
election as the supposed legitimation for their complaint, implying something like, “you ought to 
have loved us, but you haven’t.” God does not seem to be ignoring the question and merely re-
stating his election of Israel. Rather, God seems to be appealing to his election of Israel to make 
the point that he has, in fact, manifested love toward Jacob’s descendants. But this claim is not 
evidenced by reference to the mere fact that he elected them in the past, but rather by reference to 
                                                     
 
158
 For instance, both Snaith and A. E. Hill view bha as synonymous with choice. Snaith, The 
Distinctive Ideas, 133; A. E. Hill, Malachi, 147, 165. Clendenen equates it with election and God’s 
ongoing fidelity. Clendenen, Haggai, Malachi, 247. Similarly, Verhoef, The Books, 196. Els sees both a 
“definite act of election in sovereign grace” but “not apart from a secondary semantic component of a 
feeling of affection.” NIDOTTE 1:282. The determinist view of this “love” and “hate” has been to equate 
this with God’s inscrutable, eternal decree of predestination to salvation (Jacob) or to damnation (Esau). 
However, some who equate election and love do not see this as election unto salvation. For instance, 
Verhoef, The Books, 198. Clendenen views Israel’s election as unto salvation, but not necessarily to the 
exclusion of the salvation of individual Edomites. Haggai, Malachi, 253. Others see the election as one of 
“position” and “historical task.” Gottlob Schrenk, “εκλεγομαι in the New Testament,” TDNT 4:179. John 
M. P. Smith rejects the interpretation that this represents “the doctrine of predestination” altogether. A 
Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Malachi (ICC 25; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1912), 21. 
Likewise, Keil and Delitzsch, Commentary, 10:637.  
159
 “The love of God for Israel is sovereign and unconditional.” Verhoef, The Books, 196; cf. ibid., 
197. “Like Yahweh’s love, Yahweh’s ‘hate’ is absolute and unconditional.” A. E. Hill, Malachi, 167. 
“God’s ‘love’ was in no way conditioned by the moral qualities of its object, but emanated from his 
sovereign will and mercy. This ‘love’ is undefinable in terms of more or less.”
 
Verhoef, The Books, 200–
201. Thus Clendenen can proclaim “God’s choosing Jacob and his descendants meant that he established a 
permanent relationship with Israel as a whole. . . . Regardless of how often they strayed from him, he 
would be faithful to them by his grace until his work in them was complete.” Haggai, Malachi, 253. 
However, to say God’s love is unconditional begs the question regarding the foreground of Malachi. See 
below on Mal 1:8–10. It also demands an explanation for the destruction of Samaria in 722 B.C. or 
Jerusalem in 586 B.C. While God always faithfully fulfills his promises, God’s people may forfeit the 
reception of God’s love and eventually cut off relationship with him (see the further explanation of this in 
chapter 6). However, God continues to work with a faithful remnant according to his plan. 
160
 To put it another way, if one simply translates bha here as equivalent to rxb, the passage would 




the evidence that he has loved them throughout their history and even now. This is highlighted by 
comparison of Jacob and Esau’s descendants. Both are progeny of Abraham and Isaac, yet Israel 
has been specifically privileged in God’s love toward them.  
Significantly, neither Jacob nor Esau deserves to receive divine love, rather they both 
deserve destruction. Yet, God has manifested his ongoing love in having been compassionate and 
patient with Israel, despite their rebellion and continual slander of his name (cf. Mal 3:6; 2:11). 
Such unmerited favor and preservation is a consequence of God’s fidelity to the covenant, itself 
begun by election. Here, the unmerited election itself is not the love of God, but divine love is 
demonstrated in that God has mercifully and compassionately restored Judah and remains in 
covenant relationship despite her many shortcomings. As such, the contrast of God’s treatment of 
Israel and Edom demonstrates not only that he has loved Israel but is to point toward how he has 
done so historically.
161
 Thus, election and love are to be differentiated in this passage, the former 
highlighting the fact that Israel has neither deserved nor merited God’s love.
162
 
Furthermore, it is important to briefly address the issue of conditionality that is apparent 
with regard to God’s treatment of both nations. First, it is important to recognize that Edom is not 
subjectively rejected by God, nor are its people treated unfairly. Rather, the Edomites are 
responsible for their fate, having rejected and forfeited available divine blessing and thus 
deserving destruction.
163
 On the other hand, while God’s love toward Israel is certainly 
                                                     
 
brother?’ declares the LORD. ‘Yet I have chosen Jacob.’”  
161
 Although the precise manner of Edom’s downfall is not historically clear, Edom became a 
desolation while Israel was restored. Some believe Edom fell to Babylon around the time of the fall of 
Jerusalem, others think it was during the Persian-Egyptian wars, and still others relate it to the Nabateans 
ca. 5
th
 century BC. For a discussion of these issues see Verhoef, The Books, 203–4.  
162
 Consider also the discussion of Deut 4:36–37; 7:12–13; 10:15 above, and the parallel in Isa 
41:8. 
163
 Judgment against Edom is often described as “because” of their evil actions; cf. Ezek 25:12–
13; 35:15; 36:5; Joel 3:19; Amos 1:9, 11; Obad 10–14; Lam 4:22. Elizabeth Achtemeier comments that 
God responds to the questioning of his love by pointing to the fact that “Edom has not gone unpunished for 




undeserved, it is not depicted as altogether unconditional. God expects his love to be reciprocated 
by his people, and the remainder of Malachi testifies to God’s desire for, and expectation of, a 
responsive relationship with Israel.
164
 
The second primary interpretive issue of this passage is whether divine love and hate here 
denote affectionate emotion, or are merely technical terms for election/acceptance and rejection. 
It is not altogether clear whether the terms love and hate refer to divine emotions.
165
 However, the 
foreground of the passage implies that they do connote emotion when God is said to be 
“indignant [~[z] forever” toward Edom (Mal 1:4).166 Supporting this is the fact that divine anf is 
                                                     
 
Thus, God “does not reject arbitrarily.” Rex Mason, The Books of Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi (New 
York: Cambridge UP, 1977), 141. Rather, “Edom brought divine judgment upon themselves.” A. E. Hill, 
Malachi, 167. Clendenen takes the compatibilist view that Edom’s “destiny” is explained “both by the 
divine word and by their own wickedness.” Haggai, Malachi, 257. Harris adds, “It does not necessarily 
follow that Esau was hated before he was born. This statement is quoted from Mal 1:3 which was written 
long after Esau had lived his predominantly secular life.” Further, “the condemnation of the lost is . . . upon 
the basis of their own sin.” R. Laird Harris, editor’s note in Gerard Van Groningen, “שנא,” TWOT 880. Keil 
and Delitzsch contend that though “no explanation is given here of the reasons which determined the 
actions of God . . . with God anything arbitrary is inconceivable.” Commentary, 10:637. It is also important 
to recognize that God did not always “hate” Edom, but has shown concern for them elsewhere (cf. Deut 
2:5). 
164
 A. E. Hill suggests that here, as in Deuteronomy, ‘ahb points to the “duty to reciprocate God’s 
love.” Malachi, 147; cf. ibid., 165; cf. Mal 2:11. J. M. P. Smith points out, “Yahweh loves” Israel but “her 
own sinful conduct prevents her from enjoying the full fruitage of that love.” A Critical, 19. 
165
 The qal perfect 1ms, yTib.h;a', appears to be a qal quasi-fientive, which is a verb that “exhibit[s] 
both stative and fientive characteristics” and “denote[s] a mental or psychological state and take[s] an 
object.” Bruce K. Waltke and Michael Patrick O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax 
(Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 365, 491. Cf. A. E. Hill, Malachi, 147; Laetsch, Bible 
Commentary, 510. A. E. Hill thus appears to be correct in viewing it as a “durative stative perfective,” 
which indicates “an ongoing emotional response,” which he believes is further implied by the people’s 
question. Malachi, 147–48; cf. Waltke and O’Connor, An Introduction, 365, 491. Verhoef likewise sees 
this as “based upon God’s continuous love during the whole of Israel’s history.” The Books, 195. Eileen M. 
Schuler, on the other hand, sees it as a simple statement about God’s present love. “The Book of Malachi,” 
in The Twelve Prophets (vol. 7 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1996), 854.  
166
 God elsewhere displays negative emotions toward Edom. See Ezek 25:14; 36:5; cf. Isa 63:1–6. 
Moreover, as A. E. Hill points out, Edom was guilty of doing the things that God hates (Deut 16:22; Pss 5:6 
[5]; 11:5; 129:5; etc.). Malachi, 152. Some scholars suggest the absence of feeling or personal animosity in 
this passage. Clendenen considers love and hate “to be figurative, pointing to God’s sovereign election in 
choosing by his grace to form a relationship with some of his creatures and to leave others to pursue their 
rebellious desires to their own destruction.” Haggai, Malachi, 372; cf. Schuler, “The Book of Malachi,” in 
The Twelve Prophets, 7:856. Snaith recognizes that the language used in the passage in fact presents a 
hatred that is “active, even virulent, to the highest degree” but ascribes it to the human author rather than 




often clearly emotive throughout the OT (cf. Isa 1:14; Jer 12:8; 44:4; Hos 9:15; Amos 5:21; 6:8; 
Pss 5:5–6 [6–7]; 11:5) and is never depicted as arbitrary.
167
 With regard to divine love, in the 
foreground of Malachi, Israel continues to depart from God in iniquity, not entreating his favor 
(!x; Mal 1:9), therefore, God is “not pleased” (#p,x)  with them and will not “accept” (hcr) or have 
pleasure in them (Mal 1:10; cf. 1:13).
168
 Such evaluative and emotive terminology suggests that 
bha earlier in this chapter does, in fact, connote divine affection.169 This would be further 
supported by parallel expressions of intensely emotive and affectionate bha elsewhere, especially 
those in the latter prophets, which will be considered further below. 
The Volitional Aspect of Divine Love in the Writings 
In the Writings, Israel’s election is likewise grounded in love and depicted as explicitly 
conditional. Thus, God chooses (rxb) the inheritance for Jacob “whom He loves” (Ps 47:4 [5]).170 
                                                     
 
thinks that on the one hand God’s hatred lacks “personal animosity.” Malachi, 167. Yet, paradoxically, he 
notes that “emotion and hostility color this text.” Ibid., 152. Ralph L. Smith notes, “an overtone of 
bitterness here directed at Edom.” Micah-Malachi (WBC 32; Word: Dallas, 1984), 305. 
167
 That divine hatred is often of an emotive nature is further evidenced by other terms of negative 
evaluation and/or rejection that collocate with divine anf, including b[t/hb[AT (Deut 12:31; Isa 1:13–14; Jer 
44:4; Amos 5:10; 6:8; Ps 5:5–6 [6–7]; Prov 6:16) and sam (Amos 5:21). See the word study of anf later in 
this chapter. 
168
 The terms #p,xe and hcr together serve to convey the absence of God’s delight in their object. 
That these terms are evaluative here is clear in v. 8, in the rhetorical question that assumes a negative 
response, Would your governor “be pleased [hcr] with you?” See also the respective word studies of these 
terms in the evaluative section. The idiomatic language of entreaty in v. 9, literally “soften the face” [hlx + 
~ynIP'], suggests God might be persuaded to be favorable toward Israel, which seems to place divine pleasure 
beyond that of the unilateral divine will. For the idiom elsewhere see Zech 7:2; Dan 9:13. However, though 
God is responsive to humans, he desired and delights in true, heartfelt worship and obedience, but theirs is 
a token offering, and of an inferior nature, at that (Mal 1:8; cf. Isa 29:13). Moreover, divine evaluation is 
likewise apparent in the foreground of Malachi. For instance, a book of remembrance is made of those who 
“fear the LORD.” In the future, God says, “They will be Mine . . . on the day that I prepare My own 
possession [hL'gUs.]” and there will be a distinction between the righteous and the wicked (Mal 3:16–18). 
Further, conditionality is explicit throughout the book; the people must turn to God in order to receive 
divine blessing (Mal 4:6). 
169
 A. E. Hill sees “an ongoing emotional response” in bha. Malachi, 147. Moreover, Els notes 
what he calls “a secondary semantic component of a feeling of affection.” NIDOTTE 1:282.  
170
 That is, out of God’s love for Israel, he provided their land, their inheritance, and glory for 




Likewise, the bestowal of land “forever” is spoken of as predicated on “Abraham [God’s] friend” 
(bha; 2 Chr 20:7).171 Similarly, God “chose the tribe of Judah, Mount Zion which He loved” (Ps 
78:68). In such instances, love is in a similar relationship to election as that which was seen in the 
Torah (Deut 4:37; 7:7–8) and in the Prophets (Isa 41:8), namely election on the basis of, or as a 
manifestation of, divine love. 
Importantly, the context of Ps 78:68 evidences that at least some types of divine election 
are both evaluative and not unilaterally effective. God is said to have been provoked and made 
jealous [anq] by Israel’s evil (Ps 78:58). Thus, he was “filled with wrath” and “greatly abhorred 
[sam + daom.] Israel” (Ps 78:59) and, accordingly, “rejected [sam] the tent of Joseph, and did not 
choose [rxb] the tribe of Ephraim” (Ps 78:67), but he “chose the tribe of Judah, Mount Zion 
which He loved” (Ps 78:68). Notably, God’s rejection of Israel stems from their idol worship. 
God is presented as being moved to intense, negative emotions and removes the ark, and thus his 
presence, from their midst. On the other hand, Judah is elected as the locus of worship, meaning 
that God’s presence will be among them, for God loves them. As such, this divine choice of 
election is presented as both evaluative and neither wholly arbitrary nor ineradicable. Such a 
relationship between election and elements of divine love also appears with regard to the Davidic 
dynasty. Solomon’s king-making is specifically seen as based upon God’s love for his people (2 
Chr 2:11 [10]; 2 Chr 9:8). Similarly, Solomon is made king according to God’s lovingkindness to 
David (2 Chr 1:8).
172
 In all this, divine election is neither strictly arbitrary nor unilaterally 
constant and may be associated with emotion and desire. 
                                                     
 
reference is to the people of Israel as Ps 135:4 and elsewhere. On the other hand, if it were to refer to Jacob, 
even as a dual reference, it would parallel the line of thought in 2 Chr 20:7. 
171
 It is not entirely clear whether it is the land or the friendship with Abraham that is forever; the 
former seems more likely due to the prevalence of ~l'A[ as a reference to the divine promises. 
172
 L. C. Allen believes that here “Solomon's obedience is in view as a condition for the dynastic 
continuity. In fact, the motif of royal obedience accompanies the references to the divine promises in 1 Kgs 




The Evaluative Aspect of Divine Love 
This section focuses on data that ground the conclusion that divine love is not indifferent 
or disinterested, but evaluative. The term “evaluative” refers in this context to the appraisal, 
appreciation, and/or reception of value from external agents. First, divine love is explicitly 
depicted as evaluative throughout the canon. Second, divine love includes appropriate self-
interest that is not exclusive to other-interest. Third, humans may bring value to God through the 
prevenient and ongoing action of God, especially the mediation of Christ. Thus, God can and 
does receive love and may enjoy, delight in, and garner pleasure from his creatures. His own 
delight is voluntarily bound up with bringing genuine pleasure, joy, and delight to those very 
objects of his love. Accordingly, the reader is encouraged to keep the following questions in mind 
while reading this section. Can God be the beneficiary of human action? What about self-interest? 
Is self-sacrifice and/or self-abnegation the ideal of love? Is divine love indifferent and/or 
disinterested? Does God’s love include delight and/or enjoyment of his creatures, including their 
loving response toward him? This section of the study begins with a survey of the meaning of 
prominent terms relative to God’s evaluative love. 
The Semantics of Divine Delight 
A Brief Survey of #px 
The word #px173 has the basic meaning of desire or delight, often of an emotive nature, 
which may be manifested in the wish for something or someone.
174
 It is thus often used of 
                                                     
 
NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1999), 473. 
173
 The noun appears in 37 verses, while the verb appears in 70 verses, always in the qal, and the 
lexeme appears as a verbal adjective in 12 verses. The etymology of the term is “obscure, since all its 
occurrences are relatively late” and limited. G. Johannes Botterweck, “חפצ,” TDOT 13:92. 
174
 For Leon J. Wood, “The basic meaning is to feel great favor towards something” with 
considerable “emotional involvement.” With both divine and human agency it means “to experience 
emotional delight.” “חפצ,” TLOT 1:310. Talley calls it the “direction of one’s heart or passion” and 
“conveys a passionate emotion for an object.” “חפצ,” NIDOTTE 2:232. For David Toshio Tsumura, it is 




evaluative delight in a person or object.
175
 With personal objects it may connote affection and joy 
in another.
176
 An unfulfilled wish may be seen as a desire, a fulfilled wish may bring delight. In 
other words, when something would be a source of delight, but is absent, the sense is desire, 
want, or wish. In this way, the term sometimes takes on the connotation of that which one wishes, 
especially the will of a sovereign.
177
 However, it is not merely a subjective expression of the will, 
but relates to the unfulfilled or fulfilled wishes of its agent, which are grounded in objective 
reality.
178




 #px often refers to divine desire and delight.180 With regard to the former, it may refer to 
various things that God wants to take place, often with a strong sense of that which he will 
                                                     
 
Eerdmans, 2006), 402. In one instance (Job 40:17) there is a second root, which means “to let hang.” Also, 
in some instances in Ecclesiastes the term takes on the meaning “‘business or facts’ of life.” W. E. Staples, 
“The Meaning of Hepes in Ecclesiastes,” JNES 24 (1965): 112; cf. Eccl 3:1, 17; 5:8 [7]. 
175
 Thus, it may refer to that which elicits delight (Isa 54:12; Prov 3:15; 8:11; Eccl 12:10) or things 
that ought not be delighted in (Pss 40:14 [15]; 68:30 [31]; 70:2 [3]; 109:17; Prov 18:2). Of such delight or 
pleasure see 2 Sam 24:3; Isa 13:17; Prov 31:13. It may also refer to joy or rejoicing (Ps 35:27). See the 
examples with divine agency below. 
176
 See Botterweck, TDOT 13:94. Thus, it may be used of the presence or absence of delight in 
romantic relationships (Gen 34:19; Deut 21:14; Esth 2:14; cf. Deut 25:7–8) or in non-romantic 
interpersonal relationships such as Jonathan’s great affection for David (1 Sam 19:1; cf. 18:22; 2 Sam 
20:11; Esth 6:6–7, 9, 11). 
177
 Of the will or desire of a sovereign see 1 Sam 18:25; 2 Sam 23:5; 1 Kgs 5:8–10; 9:1, 11; 10:13; 
Eccl 8:3; 2 Chr 9:12). It may also refer to general desires, such as for life (Ps 34:12), a haven (Ps 107:30), 
for family (Job 21:21), and the desires of the poor (Job 31:16). In many instances, the term appears to 
merely denote one’s will or wish (1 Kgs 13:33; Jer 42:22; Eccl 3:1, 17; 8:6). It can thus be used in a request 
(1 Kgs 21:6; Ruth 3:13; cf. Cant 2:7; 3:5; 8:4).  
178
 “The confusion lies in English, where ‘purpose’ and ‘pleasure’ are not closely related” as they 
are in #px. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66, 581. 
179
 The wicked “loved cursing” but “did not delight [#px] in blessing” (Ps 109:17). Further, Saul’s 
servants are to make David believe “the king delights [#pex'] in him, and all his servants love” him (1 Sam 
18:22). bha is also used in parallel to “desire [#pex']” for life as one who “loves length of days” (Ps 34:12 
[13]). Divine delight is likewise associated with bha toward Israel. The Queen of Sheba states, “God . . . 
delighted [#px] in you [Solomon]” making you king “because” God “loved Israel” (1 Kgs 10:9; 2 Chr 9:8). 
Talley suggests that bha is possibly a “synonym for #px.” NIDOTTE 2:232. Botterweck likewise suggests 
bha, qbd, and qvx as being used synonymously. Botterweck, TDOT 13:95. 
180






 If one asserts that the divine will is always unilaterally enacted, then a divine 
desire, in the sense of “want,” would be nonsensical. Yet, many instances of this term refer to 
divine desires that remain unfulfilled. For instance, God proclaims, “I have no pleasure in the 
death of the wicked” but “rather . . . that he should turn . . . and live” (Ezek 18:23; cf. 18:32; 
33:11; cf. also, Isa 66:4; 65:12). Likewise, God “desire[s] truth in the innermost being” from 




 The evaluative, and often emotive, sense of this terminology is further apparent in its 
frequent portrayals of divine delight.
183
 For instance, God “delights” in dsx, justice, and 
                                                     
 
the things of God. See Isa 58:2, 13; Mal 3:1; Pss 1:2; 16:3; 40:8 [9]; 73:25; 111:2; 112:1; 119:35; Neh 1:11; 
2 Chr 28:9. It may also refer to the lack of delight in the things of God (Jer 6:10; Job 21:14; cf. Job 9:3; 
13:3; Eccl 12:1). 
181
 For instance, Isaiah states, “The LORD was pleased for His righteousness’ sake To make the 
law great and glorious” (Isa 42:21). Further, God declares of Cyrus, “He is My shepherd! And he will 
perform all My desire” (Isa 44:28; cf. 48:14). Again, God declares, “My purpose [hc'[e] will be established, 
And I will accomplish all My good pleasure” (Isa 46:10). In an apparent Messianic reference, “the LORD 
was pleased to crush Him . . . and the good pleasure of the LORD will prosper in His hand” (Isa 53:10). 
Moreover, God’s word does not return “without accomplishing what [he] desire[s]” (Isa 55:11; cf. Hos 
10:10). In all, God “does whatever he pleases” (Ps 115:3; cf. Jonah 1:14; 135:6). Consider the study of Avi 
Hurvitz, who looks at all the occurrences of the syntagm lKo + #p,xe + hf[, of God (Isa 46:10; Jonah 1:14; Pss 
115:3; 135:6) and, once, of a human sovereign (Eccl 8:3), and finds that they refer to the unlimited power 
of the sovereign within the realm of jurisprudence. “The History of a Legal Formula: kōl 'ašer-hāpēs ʻāśāh 
(Psalms cxv 3, cxxv 6),” VT 32 (1982): 257–67. He also points out the more prevalent idiom, do what is 
good in your sight (hf[ + bwj + !y[; cf. 2 Sam 10:12). The term may also refer to God’s desire to execute, or 
not execute, judgment. Thus, Manoah states that God did not desire to kill them (Judg 13:23). Eli’s sons 
“would not listen to the voice of their father [Eli], for the LORD desired to put them to death” (1 Sam 2:25; 
cf. Job 33:32). In Proverbs it is used of divine sovereignty where it is stated, a “king’s heart is like channels 
of water in the hand of the LORD; He turns it wherever He wishes” (Prov 21:1). Importantly, however, the 
rest of the chapter evidences that whatever this verse refers to, it does not appear to refer to utter 
determinism. For instance, the next verses speak of every man’s way being right in his own eyes and God’s 
desire (rxb) of righteousness rather than sacrifice (Prov 21:2–3). As such, God’s fervent desire, coupled 
with his sovereignty/omnipotence, means that he will bring about that which he sets his heart on. But, these 
do not refer to determinism as is seen elsewhere. 
182
 Both usages of #px are complementary, not contradictory, if the underlying meaning of “desire” 
is kept in mind as something willed, which, when not effectuated, amounts to something wanted. Thus, 
both aspects of meaning may be in play when God as potter remakes the vessel into what “it pleased the 
potter to make” (Jer 18:4). 
183
 Wood points to the evaluative sense in stating with regard to this term, “The object solicits 
favor by its own intrinsic qualities. The subject is easily attracted to it because it is desirable.” TLOT 1:310; 




righteousness (Jer 9:24; cf. Mic 7:18) and takes no pleasure in wickedness (Ps 5:4 [5]).
184
 Further, 
God “does not delight in the strength of the horse; He does not take pleasure [hcr] in the legs of a 
man,” but he “favors [hcr] those who fear Him, those who wait for His lovingkindness [dsx]” (Ps 
147:11; cf. Isa 56:4; Ps 37:23).
185
 Moreover, #px repeatedly manifests God’s delight in human 
fidelity as opposed to purely external ritual and sacrifice.
186
 God’s delight in human beings is 
often the grounding of his beneficent action.
187
 For instance, David declares, “He rescued me, 
because He delighted in me” (2 Sam 22:20 = Ps 18:19 [20]; cf. 22:8 [9]).
188
 On the other hand, 
with regard to those who choose their own ways and delight in abominations, God will “choose 
their punishments” because they “chose that in which I did not delight” (Isa 66:4; cf. 65:12). God 
even looks forward to his future delight in his restored people (see Isa 62:4; Mal 3:12). Thus, #px 
has the ability to depict the amazing sovereignty of God and yet his affection for and attachment 
to human beings whom he values and who may bring him great delight and enjoyment.  
                                                     
 
184
 In a negative evaluative sense, God refers to Coniah and Moab as an “undesirable vessel” (Jer 
22:28; 48:38; cf. Mal 2:17). Israel is “like a vessel in which no one delights” (Hos 8:8). God says explicitly 
to his people, “I am not pleased with you” and thus will not accept their offering (Mal 1:10). Moreover, he 
“takes no delight in fools” (Eccl 5:4 [3]); cf. Job 22:3. 
185
 Talley thus suggests that “God’s delight, or the lack thereof, revolves around human obedience 
(cf. Ps 37:22, 28, 34, 38).” NIDOTTE 2:232. Similarly, R. Dennis Cole, Numbers (NAC 3B; Nashville, 
Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 227. 
186
 Importantly, the sense is not that God does not desire the very sacrifices he has prescribed, but 
that the value of the sacrifices lies ultimately in the internal disposition of the offerer. This common 
sentiment is expressed in various ways. See 1 Sam 15:22; Isa 1:11; Hos 6:6; Pss 40:6 [7]; 51:16–17, 19 
[18–19, 21]; cf. Isa 58:3. 
187
 Thus, Talley states, “If the passion of God’s heart is for someone, then the subsequent action is 
blessing (cf. Num 14:8; 2 Sam 22:20; Ps 18:19 [20]; 41:11 [12]), but if God’s heart is against someone, 
then the subsequent action is punishment (cf. Mal 2:17–3:7).” Talley, NIDOTTE 2:232. 
188
 Joshua states, “If the LORD is pleased with us, then He will bring us into this land and give it 
to us” (Num 14:8). Similarly, the psalmist says, “By this I know that You are pleased with me, Because my 
enemy does not shout in triumph over me” (Ps 41:11 [12]). The Queen of Sheba declares that God 
“delighted in” Solomon to make him king “because the LORD loved Israel forever” (1 Kgs 10:9; 2 Chr 
9:8). On the other hand, David notes the possibility that God will “have no delight” in him but merely 
states, “Let Him do to me as seems good to Him” (2 Sam 15:26). God wants the best for his people; he 




A Brief Survey of hcr 
The meaning of hcr189 is often similar to that of #px with which it frequently collocates.190 
hcr refers to strong delight in something or someone, often including the connotation of 
acceptance.
191
 It sometimes refers to one’s desire or will, in a few cases describing the divine 
will.
192
 The term most often has God as agent. Notably, hcr collocates in parallel with love in 
description of God’s affection for his people, “whom the LORD loves he reproves, even as a 
father corrects the son in whom he delights” (Prov 3:12; cf. 16:13; Jer 14:10). The aspect of 
acceptance flows from the prevalent usage of hcr in sacrificial contexts to describe an offering 
                                                     
 
189
 It appears in verbal [hcr – in 54 verses] and nominal [!Acr' – in 56 verses] forms, which will be 
treated together for the purposes of this survey. 
190
 G. Gerleman explains that “the two roots are used synonymously to a great extent (Psa 147:10 
par.). But they have each undergone unique developments in varied directions.” “חפצ,” TLOT 1:466. 
191
 Barstad comments, “The basic meaning of the verb is best defined as ‘be pleased with, find 
good or pleasant, love, like, wish for,’ etc.” H. M. Barstad, “רצה,” TDOT 13:619. Gerleman adds that 
lexical evidence shows that “the verb was used almost exclusively as an expression of a positive 
assessment: ‘to find something good, be pleased with something’” and “the abstract form !Acr' most often 
indicates the subjective sentiment of pleasure.” G. Gerleman, “רצה,” TLOT 3:1259–60. However, many 
occurrences appear to be, at least partially, rooted in objective qualities and/or actions and others are 
ambiguous in this regard. He adds, “The root finds greatest usage in theological language: to indicate 
divine pleasure.” Gerleman, TLOT 3:1260. Likewise, Norman Walker comments, “The root meaning of !Acr' 
is two-sided, namely will and pleasure, whether oneself or another.” “Renderings of rāṣôn,” JBL 81 (1962): 
184; cf. Terence E. Fretheim, “רצה,” NIDOTTE 3:1186; William White, “רצה,” TWOT 860. Thus, the term 
may be used in human relationships of one received “favorably” (Gen 33:10) or of evaluative favor that 
might result from action (1 Sam 29:4; Prov 14:35; 16:13; Esth 10:3; 2 Chr 10:7; cf. Prov 23:26) or simply 
that which is acceptable (Prov 10:32; cf. 11:27) or of “good will” (Prov 14:9). On the other hand, some are 
pleased with that which should not be accepted as pleasing. There are those who “approve” of the words of 
the foolish (Ps 49:13 [14]), are “pleased” with a thief (Ps 50:18), delight in falsehood (Ps 62:4 [5]). In other 
instances, the term seems to denote bestowed favor. For example, the king’s “favor is like a cloud with the 
spring rain” (Prov 16:15), like “dew on the grass” (Prov 19:12; cf. Job 20:10). In some texts, the term has 
been thought to belong to a separate lexeme, hcr II, meaning to buy or pay or possibly even atone, though 
others think it is merely an expansion of meaning that can usually be explained by the nuance “accept.” 
Lexicographers remain split on the issue. Richard E. Averbeck, for instance, contends there “may be some 
reason to believe that two original words are represented.” “רצה,” NIDOTTE 3:1187. The separation is 
partially dependent upon ANE cognates, but there based on singular occurrences and thus indeterminate. 
Ibid., 1186. Possible occurrences include Lev 26:34, 41, 43; Isa 40:2; Job 20:10; 2 Chr 36:21. Barstad, 
however, rejects the categorization and suggests the translation “accept” in many such cases, related to the 
so-called “credit terminology.” TDOT 13:624–25. Likewise, Gerleman suggests that some such 
occurrences mean “accept” with the neutral or negative meaning to let something come to one. TLOT 
3:1259–60. 
192
 Of divine agency see Pss 103:21; 143:10; Ezra 10:11. Of human agency in this respect see Gen 




that is pleasing, and thus acceptable to Yahweh through which its offering may be reckoned 
pleasing.
193
 Indeed, God looks toward a future when all Israel will serve him and “there [he] will 
accept them” (Ezek 20:40), “as a soothing aroma” God “will accept” them (Ezek 20:41). In one 
instance, divine election collocates with God’s hcr in such a way that leaves the impression of 
evaluative pleasure of a passionate nature: God states, “Behold, My Servant, whom I uphold, My 
chosen one in whom my soul [inner person] delights” (Isa 42:1; cf. 1 Chr 28:4).
194
 This use 
extends to other ways in which one might please, or be acceptable to, God.
195
 Like #px, the term 
hcr (when negated) is frequently used to describe God’s displeasure in sacrifices that are merely 
offered by external ritual, absent the corresponding internal devotion and fidelity that is actually 
the object of God’s desire and pleasure.
196
 Thus, even in such cultic contexts, it is clear that God 
has profound desires and he is affected by the people’s disposition toward him; God’s delight is 
                                                     
 
is, they could do “whatever they liked.” Barstad, TDOT 13:628. 
193
 The acceptability of offerings is conditional upon many aspects of the offering and its proper 
performance (see Lev 1:3–4; 7:18; 22:19–21, 25, 27). The term thus connotes that a sacrifice is “well-
pleasing.” See Rendtorff, Die Gesezte. Indeed, “the effect of a sacrificial offering depends on whether it 
pleases God.”
 
Gerleman, TLOT 3:1260–61. See also Barstad, TDOT 13:621–22. The intended result of such 
offerings is clearly stated; it is “so that [the offerer] may be accepted” by God (Lev 19:5; 22:29; 23:11; cf. 
Exod 28:37 [38]). 
194
 Notice, the use of the term “soul,” referring to the inner person [vp,n<], as the seat of delight, 
connoting profound emotion. Barstad comments of 1 Chr 28:4, “David was chosen to be king because 
Yahweh took delight in him (rsh).” TDOT 13:620. 
195
 Thus, hcr often occurs with reference to the request, expectation, and/or actuality of being 
accepted favorably by God (Deut 33:11; Isa 60:7; Pss 19:14 [15]; 40:13 [14]; 119:108; Job 33:26; Eccl 9:8; 
cf. Ps 77:7 [8]). It can similarly refer to an “acceptable” or “favorable” time (Isa 49:8; 58:5; 61:2; Ps 69:13 
[14]).  
196
 See Mic 6:7–8; Ps 51:16 [18]; Prov 15:8. Indeed, the people’s offerings are ineffectual insofar 
as they are merely attempts to assuage God without true repentance (Hos 8:13). Thus, human offerings may 
be rejected by God (see Jer 6:20; Amos 5:22, 24, 26; Mal 1:8, 10, 13; 2:13). But God looks forward to a 
day when human hearts will truly be set toward him and he will delight in their offerings (Isa 56:7). Some 
have posited a critique by the prophets of the priestly system of “crediting of offerings.” Cf. Barstad, TDOT 
13:622. However, others have, rightfully in my opinion, pointed out that the criticism is not of the cult per 
se, but of merely external offerings without internal devotion. See, for example, Tsumura, The First Book 




evaluative, grounded in the disposition of his people.
197
 The divine-human relationship that is 
symbolized in cultic ceremony is not automatic, but points to a deeper reciprocal relationship that 
God desires with his people, and delights in when such is present.  
Moreover, the hcr word group is not restricted to sacrificial contexts but is “a central 
theological term expressing fundamental relationships between God and human beings.”
198
 
Elsewhere, divine evaluation of humans is evident such as when God examines or “tries” [!xb] the 
heart and “delight[s] in uprightness” (1 Chr 29:17). Further, God “does not delight [#px]” in a 
horse’s strength and “does not take pleasure [hcr]” in man’s legs (Ps 147:10). Rather, God 
“favors [hcr]” those who fear Him, those who wait for His lovingkindness” (Ps 147:11).199 On the 
other hand, because the people have “loved to wander . . . therefore the LORD does not accept 
them” (Jer 14:10), when they call, God is “not going to accept them” (Jer 14:12). Similarly, both 
positive and negative divine evaluation are evident by explicit contrasts between that which is 
pleasing to God or not.
200
 Finally, hcr also may be used to describe the manner of God’s actions, 
as the grounding of his beneficence.
201
 It is thus starkly contrasted with divine anger and thus 
appears to depict the opposite, more enduring emotion akin to love.
202
 
                                                     
 
197 hcr also often appears in religious contexts of human delight toward the things of God. For 
instance, David proclaims that in his “delight in the house” of God he has provided his treasure for the 
temple (1 Chr 29:3). God’s servants “find pleasure” in Zion (Ps 102:13 [15]). The psalmist proclaims to 
God, “I delight to do Your will” (Ps 40:8 [9]; cf. 2 Chr 15:15).  
198
 Barstad, TDOT 13:621. 
199
 See also Hag 1:8; Pss 5:12 [13]; 145:16, 19; 149:4; Prov 3:12; 8:35; 16:7; cf. Job 34:9. As 
Fretheim notes, “The striking language of God’s delighting . . . demonstrates that feelings are not foreign to 
his experience of the world.” Fretheim, NIDOTTE 3:1186. 
200
 For instance, “A false balance is an abomination to the LORD, but a just weight is His delight” 
(Prov 11:1; cf. 15:8). Likewise, the “perverse in heart are an abomination to the LORD, but the blameless 
in their walk are His delight” (Prov 11:20). Likewise, see Prov 12:2, 22. 
201
 For example, God “favored” his people in giving them the Promised Land (Ps 44:3 [4]) and 
later “showed favor” to his land in restoring Jacob (Ps 85:1 [2]). See also Pss 30:7 [8]; 51:18 [20]; 89:17 
[18]; 106:4; Prov 18:22; cf. Isa 40:2. See also its usage in benedictory formulas (Deut 33:16, 23–24; 2 Sam 
24:13). 
202




The Evaluative Aspect of Divine Love in the Torah 
Divine evaluative pleasure, delight, and even enjoyment appears in numerous instances in 
the Torah, often in cultic contexts. For instance, in the aftermath of the flood God “smelled [xwr] 
the soothing aroma” of Noah’s offering and then proclaims that he will never again destroy all 
living things with a flood (Gen 8:21).
203
 The phrase “soothing aroma” (x:xoyNI; x:yrEä) may be literally 
rendered quieting or soothing odor and is often used, mostly in the Torah, to denote sacrifices 
acceptable to God.
204
 The implication appears to be that God was pleased by the offering and/or 
offerer and thus the promise.
205
 hcr also appears primarily in cultic contexts in the Torah, with the 
                                                     
 
on you” (Isa 60:10). Similarly, the psalmist declares, “His anger is but for a moment, His favor is for a 
lifetime” (Ps 30:5 [6]). According to Craigie, then, “favor is the divine response to goodness, but also to 
repentance and contrition.” Psalms 1–50 (WBC 19; Dallas: Word, 2002), 254. Compare also the frequent 
contrast of the term with “abomination,” hb[AT, as appears above. Michael V. Fox states that hb[AT is the 
opposite of !Acr', “‘favor,’ that is, what one favors or finds pleasing.” Proverbs 10–31 (AB 18B; New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 530. See also the brief survey of terms for divine displeasure. 
203
 Interestingly, Genesis is the only case where God is said to “smell” the offering, though 
elsewhere he requested to do this (1 Sam 26:19). Moreover, God could refuse to smell (Lev 26:31). 
Hamilton suggests that references to “God’s olfactory sense” are “to be understood as 
anthropomorphisms.” Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1–17 (NICOT; Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990), 308. Likewise, von Rad, Genesis, 122. It is notable that this narrative does not 
include a divine craving to eat the sacrifice(s) as in ANE parallels. (Cf. Gilgamesh, ANET, 95, where 
“hungry gods . . . crowded like flies around the sacrifices”); cf. Sarna, Genesis, 59.  
204
 See Exod 29:18, 25; 29:41; Lev 1:9, 13, 17; 2:2, 9, 12; 3:5, 16; 4:31; 6:15, 21; 8:21, 28; 17:6; 
23:13, 18; Num 15:3, 7, 10, 13–14, 24; 18:17; 28:2, 6, 8, 13, 24, 27; 29:2, 6, 8, 13, 36; cf. Ezek 6:13; 16:19; 
20:28; 20:41. There is an interesting play on words between the name Noah and an offering that is soothing 
(x;AxynI), perhaps highlighting that Noah as offerer is a ground of divine pleasure/acceptance. Sarna, however, 
suggests the phrase is used “in a specific technical sense, divested of its literal meaning. It simply connotes 
God’s acceptance of the sacrifice.” Sarna, Genesis, 59. Although its repetition does suggest technical 
meaning, it is not altogether clear that this requires divesting it of its explicit sense.  
205
 There is disagreement whether the offering is propitiary or a thank offering, Wenham believes 
both are appropriate. Genesis 1–15, 189–90. See also Mathews, Genesis 1–11:26, 393. He further goes on 
to note common objections to the idea that “this offering changed God’s attitude to mankind”; (1) “an 
aversion to allowing any significant role to ritual,” and (2) the fact that God had already proclaimed his 
gracious attitude toward Noah previously (8:1). He, however, sees continuity of “very clear interest in 
cultic and priestly concerns that runs through Gen 1–8” and believes that God’s disposition toward Noah 
was not the object of change, but his attitude toward humankind in general “turned around.” Wenham, 
Genesis 1–15, 189–90. Wenham, however, does believe that the ultimate reason for the acceptance still 
resides in “God’s antecedent purpose, whereby he appointed the sacrificial system as a means of atonement 
for reconciliation between God and man.” Ibid., 190. Other commentators also recognize that God is here 
presented as affected by the offering. Matthews believes that “Noah’s worship soothed the broken ‘heart’ 
of God, which had been injured by man’s wickedness” and God thus “shows his pleasure” and “as a result 




nuance of favorable acceptance of sacrifice. Such acceptance is based upon numerous conditions, 
including but not limited to the quality of the sacrifice, proper age, proper ritual, etc. (Lev 1:3–4; 
22:19, 21, 27; cf. 23:11). Offerings may be rejected by God if they do not meet the prescribed 
criteria (Lev 7:18; 19:7; 22:20, 23, 25).
206
 However, the crux of the issue is only indirectly the 
acceptance of offerings, since it is through the cultic system that the people are to be accepted. 
Thus, the importance of various ritual elements is described “that you may be accepted” (Exod 
28:37 [38]; Lev 19:5; 22:29). The implication is that God once again takes delight in his people as 
a consequence of the proper human response. This assumes divine responsiveness to human 
beings and appraisal of their actions.  
 Evaluative pleasure also appears when Joshua, while pleading with Israel to trust the 
Lord to deliver the Promised Land, states, “If the LORD is pleased [#px] with us, then He will 
bring us into this land and give it to us” (Num 14:8). Here, although the land had already been 
promised, Joshua sees reception of it as contingent upon divine delight. Israel’s fidelity toward 
God brings him pleasure, specifically; the Lord “delighted” (fwf) or “rejoiced” to prosper Israel 
(Deut 28:63). Yet, on the other hand, disobedience brings it about that the LORD will delight 
[fwf] to destroy Israel (Deut 28:63).207 God also looks forward to a future restoration, predicated 
                                                     
 
11:26, 392–93. Fretheim suggests that the sacrifice pleased God out of Noah’s devotion. “The Book of 
Genesis,” in Genesis to Leviticus, 1:393. John Skinner states, “That the pleasing odour is not the motive but 
merely the occasion of his gracious purpose (Knobel) may be sound theology, but it hardly expresses the 
idea of the passage.” A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956), 
158. 
206
 hcr also appears in benedictions, in the request of favor [!Acr'] upon the sons of Jacob and their 
progeny (Deut 33:16, 23). 
207
 Divine delight is elsewhere presented by the term fwf, with the connotation of evaluation and 
enjoyment. However, Tigay sees the term in a volitional sense, “was determined to . . . will be determined 
to.” Deuteronomy, 272; cf. Yochanan Muffs, Love & Joy: Law, Language, and Religion in Ancient Israel 
(New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1992). However, fwf consistently refers to exultation 
and joy and does not appear to connote “determined” anywhere in the text. Importantly, every other usage 
where God is the agent the term seems to refer to rejoicing (Isa 62:5; 65:19; Jer 32:41; Zeph 3:17). Thus, it 
may be that here the term connotes divine delight in the people even in times of trouble and acts 
appropriately to their actions for their ultimate good. Thus, Christensen translates, “And it shall be just as 




on appropriate human response, when he will “again rejoice [fwf] over you for good, just as He 
rejoiced [fwf] over your fathers” (Deut 30:9–10). Here, not only divine evaluation but also 
emotionality is apparent in God’s delight in his people, which is responsive to their disposition 
and/or action(s). 
The Evaluative Aspect of Divine Love in the Prophets 
In the prophets, God’s love is also often presented as evaluative. For instance, God states 
that he “loves justice” but “hates robbery,” and recompenses the just accordingly (Isa 61:8). 
Likewise, God describes himself as the “LORD who exercises lovingkindness [dsx], justice and 
righteousness . . . for I delight [cpx] in these things” (Jer 9:24; cf. Isa 16:5; Mic 7:18). 
Accordingly, God “delight[s] in “loyalty [dsxî] rather than sacrifice, and in the knowledge of God 
rather than burnt offerings (Hos 6:6; cf. 4:1; 1 Sam 15:22; Mic 6:7–8). As Andersen points out, 
“Hesed is a matter of ultimate concern for Yahweh. The use of this emotional word, rather than 
one that emphasizes formal authority or power, matches the expressions of disappointment and 
anguish at the people’s inconstancy (v 4).”
208
 Conversely, God is displeased by merely external 
obedience and hates wickedness. For instance God declares that he has no “pleasure” (#px) in the 
blood of sacrifices (Isa 1:11), his soul “hates” (anf) the festivals and feasts, which have become a 
wearisome burden to him (Isa 1:14).
209
 Again, God “hates” and “rejects” their festivals and does 
                                                     
 
you.” Deuteronomy 21:10–34:12, 696. See the further discussion of this term and others in the discussion 
of Zeph 3:17 later in this chapter. 
208
 Andersen and Freedman, Hosea, 430. “By using ḥesed for what Israel does for God, Hosea is 
able to emphasize that observance of the decalogue is not just something that God commands, but is more 
importantly what God desires or asks from Israel. Even though God is powerful and Israel dependent, 
ḥesed is nevertheless an attitude and action that Israel is somehow free to offer or to withhold. Divine 
judgment might ‘coerce’ such behavior, but judgment by its nature cannot produce the free and willing 
behavior and commitment that is essential to ḥesed. Thus in speaking of Israel’s ḥesed to God, Hosea is 
able to convey both the freedom of Israel within the covenant relationship and also the deep and urgent 
desire of God for Israel’s free response.” Sakenfeld, “Love in the OT,” 4:380. See the word study of dsx 
later in this chapter.  
209
 Motyer points out, My soul hates is equivalent to ‘I hate with all my heart.’” Isaiah, 47. On 




not “delight in” (or “smell,” xwr) their assemblies (Amos 5:21), thus he will not “accept” or 
“delight” (hcr) in them (Amos 5:22).210 Likewise, God “does not take pleasure” in Judah’s guides 
because they have wickedly misled the people (Isa 9:17). He is “not pleased” (#px) with Israel 
despite their entreaty of favor and hope for grace and will not “accept” (hcr) their offering (Mal 
1:9; cf. 1:13).
211




That God’s pleasure and displeasure is not arbitrary but evaluative is especially evident 
when God refers to those who may receive blessing if only they “choose what pleases [#px]” him 
(Isa 56:4), in contrast to those who do not receive blessing because they “chose that in which 
[God] did not delight [#p,xe]” (Isa 65:12). 213 As such, the choices of human beings may bring 
pleasure, or deny delight, to God himself (cf. Hag 1:8). God’s pleasure or delight is spoken of as a 
grounding of beneficence. Thus, David states, “He rescued me, because He delighted in me” (2 
                                                     
 
210
 Literally, God will not “smell” their solemn assemblies. This is in contrast with his acceptance 
of the “pleasing aroma” of sacrifices. See the discussion of Gen 6:8. Likewise, God takes “no delight” in 
the people [hcr] (Hos 8:13; cf. Jer 14:10), and is not “pleased” [bre['] with their sacrifices (Hos 9:4). Here, 
the people’s offerings are ineffectual insofar as they are merely attempts to assuage God without true 
repentance. God’s evaluation thus looks at the inward motivation and devotion to God, since “the Lord 
himself does not need the sacrifices like gods and goddesses in other religions.” Thus, “sacrifice without 
obedience as well as the fat of rams without attentiveness” is worthless to him. Tsumura, The First Book of 
Samuel, 402; cf. Douglas K. Stuart, Hosea-Jonah (WBC 31; Dallas: Word, 1987), 110. God desires true 
faithfulness, and will someday again take pleasure [br[] in their offerings (Mal 3:4), but not while the heart 
of his people is far from him. This term br[ refers to that which is “pleasant” or “pleasing,” a term that 
points to objective approval or disapproval. Clendenen points out, “It is a synonym of rṣh and of ḥpṣ in Mal 
1:8, 10, 13; and 2:17.” Haggai, Malachi, 390–91. 
211
 Contrast this with God’s willingness to accept [hcr] the offerings and sacrifices of faithful 
foreigners (Isa 56:7). The acceptance or rejection is thus not arbitrary, but grounded in God’s evaluation of 
the offerer. 
212
 Thus, “the LORD saw [har], and it was displeasing [[[r] in His sight that there was no justice 
[jP'v.mi]” (Isa 59:15). God “does not accept” the people and “remember[s] their iniquity” because they have 
“loved [‘Wbh]a'(] to wander” (Jer 14:10). Not only does this shed light on the purity of the divine character but 
it also denotes the evaluative nature of divine delight, similar to the exhortation to “hate evil, love good” 
(Amos 5:15).  
213
 Quite clearly, then, “That which distinguishes persons acceptable to God from those who are 
unacceptable is their commitment to God’s will and to God’s ways (cf. 1:19).” Watts, Isaiah 34–66, 249. 




Sam 22:20 = Ps 18:19 [20]).
214
 In all this, God has no “pleasure” (#px) in the death of the wicked, 
desiring repentance instead (Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11).
215
 Thus, God’s evaluative pleasure extends 
to the plan of salvation, even the sacrifice of his “chosen one in whom [his] soul [inner person] 
delights [hcr]” (Isa 42:1; cf. v. 21).
216
 Yet, God “was pleased [#px] to crush” the servant, a willing 




Accordingly, God’s love is such that he often manifests emotions of delight and/or joy 
over his people. God refers to Israel/Judah as “His delightful [~y[ivu[]v;] plant” (Isa 5:7), his 
“pleasant [hD'm.x,] field” (Jer 12:10), and within the context of robust emotive language speaks of 
“Ephraim My dear [ryQiy:] son” as “a delightful [~y[ivu[]v;] child” (Jer 31:20).218 His people are 
                                                     
 
214
 McCarter Jr. comments that this denotes affection and preference. II Samuel, 468. The 
following verses denote the context of this “preference,” which is clearly evaluative approval rather than 
arbitrary selection among equivalent potential objects of favor (cf. 2 Sam 22:21–27). Divine evaluation is 
also prominent in David’s statement regarding the uncertainty of his kingship while fleeing, specifically 
whether God will find favor in him, and thus return him to the city, or not delight in him (2 Sam 15:25–26). 
Notice the parallel between God’s delight and finding favor in his eyes. Similarly, Sheba ascribes 
Solomon’s kingship to God’s love for Israel and his delight in Solomon (1 Kgs 10:9). Likewise, divine 
“favor” or “delight” [!Acr'] is the root of compassion, in direct contrast to wrath [@c,q,], a source of 
punishment (Isa 60:10). All this is in accord with God’s right as the creator of all and by his great power to 
bestow blessings on “the one who is pleasing in My sight” [yn”)y[eB. rv:ïy”] (Jer 27:5). Although it is possible to 
read this to mean that God arbitrarily and altogether subjectively bestows blessings on whom he will, the 
covenant context of Jeremiah would seem to rule out such an interpretation. Rather, this seems to assert 
God’s sovereignty and ability to bless those who please him, or to those who might bring about that which 
ultimately pleases him. 
215
 Greenberg calls this “an impassioned declaration of his desire that the wicked repent and live.” 
Ezekiel 21–37 (AB 22A; New York: Doubleday, 1997), 675. 
216
 Here again, the “soul,” often the seat of emotions, is the seat of divine delight. As Watts puts it, 
“What is done with the ‘soul’ comes from the heart.” Watts, Isaiah 34–66, 119. 
217
 Here, God’s pleasure seems to be indirect. It does not refer to some sadistic enjoyment of the 
servant’s suffering but to the ultimate desires of God, which may be brought about by the sufferings. See 
the discussion of this in chapter 6. 
218
 There can be little question that such language is deeply emotive due to the mention of the 
yearning of God’s heart and compassion in the foreground (Jer 31:20). This does, however, raise the 
question with regard to what God finds delightful in Israel at this time. Nevertheless, the term here for 
delight (~y[ivu[]v), in noun form, is used in only nine verses and is often clearly in reference to objective 
delight, that is, delight for an object that warrants it, for instance God’s testimonies (Ps 119:24), law (Ps 
119:77, 92, 174), commandments (Ps 119:143), etc. Moreover, wisdom had her “delight in the sons of 




“precious” (rqy) in his sight, “honored” (dbk), and “loved” (bha) (Isa 43:4).219 Moreover, God 
refers to his people as “the apple of his eye” (Zech 2:8).
220
 God looks forward to the end of 
Israel’s forsakenness when she shall be called “My delight is in her” for “the LORD delights 
[#px] in you” (Isa 62:4). Furthermore, the people will be a source of God’s delight, even “as the 
bridegroom rejoices [fAf'] over the bride, So your God will rejoice [fAf'] over you” (Isa 62:5). 
Thus, the day will come when God himself “will rejoice [fAf'] over them to do them good and will 
faithfully plant them . . . with all [his] heart and with all [his] soul” (Jer 32:41).
221
 Similarly, God 
looks forward to a future wherein weeping and crying will be removed and “I will also rejoice 
[lyg] in Jerusalem and be glad [fwf] in My people” (Isa 65:19).222 In the future, God’s people will 
serve him and he will “accept [hcr] them” as “a soothing aroma” (Ezek 20:40–41; cf. Gen 6:8). 
                                                     
 
plant” (Isa 5:7). Lundbom comments, “The noun saasuim . . . is another intensive form meaning the object 
of play or delight. . . . In Isa 66:12 the Polpal form of the verb means ‘rocked back and forth on the lap.’” 
Jeremiah 21–36: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 21B; New York: Doubleday, 
2004), 446. Moreover, of the parallel term, Lundbom informs, “Hebrew yaqqir means ‘dear, very precious’ 
(cf. yaqar in 15:19 and yeqar in 20:5).” Jeremiah 21–36, 445.  
219
 Cf. Exod 19:5. Notably, God acts on the basis of this love for his people to “give other men in 
your place and other peoples in exchange for your life” (Isa 43:4). In other words, God’s valuation of the 
people is a grounding of substitution. Oswalt thinks this is not because of “intrinsic worth in the one being 
ransomed, but because of who God is and what he sees in them.” The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66, 134. 
O. Palmer Robertson likewise believes, “Them he loves because he loves them (Deut. 7:6–8). Not in them 
or for anything in them is to be found the reason for his love. In the nature of God himself may be 
discovered the only explanation of this love.” The Books of Nahum, Habbakkuk, and Zephaniah (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990), 341. However, is it not likewise possible that God finds worth in his 
beings, value with which he himself imbibed them, looking past their shortcomings in love? According to 
Motyer, these terms “speak of the value the Lord sees in his people (precious: cf. Eph 1:18), the dignity 
(honoured) he has conferred in calling them his, and the love (Dt. 7:7–8) which undergirds all.” Isaiah, 
332. 
220
 Cf. Deut 32:10; Ps. 17:8, literally, “little man of his eye.” It is elsewhere clear that God does 
appreciate beauty, even the beauty that he himself creates, “I made it beautiful with the multitude of its 
branches, And all the trees of Eden, which were in the garden of God, were jealous of it” (Ezek 31:9).  
221
 Once again, note the intensity added by the phrase “with all my heart and with all my soul,” 
denoting the object of God’s cognitive and emotive personality. Notably, “only here in the OT is the 
expression ‘with all my heart and with all my soul’ used in reference to God.” Lundbom, Jeremiah 21–36, 
521. 
222
 Watts comments, “Undoubtedly God’s tears had flowed for both the city and his people many 
times during the previous four centuries. Finally this can be reversed.” Isaiah 34–66, 354. Moreover, God 
“will rejoice because his compassionate heart will no longer be wrenched and torn by those things that 




Zephaniah presents perhaps the height of this apparently eschatological divine delight. In “that 
day” of deliverance, God the mighty warrior “in your midst . . . will exult [fWf] over you with joy 
[hx'm.fi], He will be quiet in His love,223 He will rejoice [lyg] over you with shouts of joy [hN"rI]” 
(Zeph 3:16–17).
224
 Notice the rich and intense divine joy, which nearly exhausts the available 
terminology and might best be described as exuberance, even perhaps “ecstasy.”
225
 Clearly, God 
may be pleased or displeased in correspondence with the specific actions/reactions of his people. 
As such, divine pleasure, or the lack thereof, is clearly represented as evaluative, corresponding to 
the presence or absence of the desired state of affairs. For this reason, the height of his joy is 
                                                     
 
223
 Numerous suggestions have been made regarding the meaning of “keeps silent in his love.” 
The LXX and Pesshitta read, “he will renew you in his love.” However, the most natural reading is “silent 
in his love.” Keil and Delitzsch helpfully suggest, “Silence in His love is an expression used to denote love 
deeply felt, which is absorbed in its object with thoughtfulness and admiration.” Commentary, 10:461. 
Similarly, Robertson points out that vrx is usually intransitive, thus denoting the “inward condition of the 
subject,” thus this describes God as contemplating his people in love. The Books, 340. Theodore H. Gaster 
also rejects the LXX reading, suggesting an intended contrast between “keeping silent and bursting into 
song” rendering the latter as a concessive clause, “Though now He be keeping silent about His love, He 
will then joy over thee in a burst of song.” “Two Textual Emendations,” ExpTim 78 (1966–67): 267. 
224
 A brief look at these terms may further highlight divine delight. fwf consistently means exult or 
rejoice and appears in various instances with human agency. Sometimes it appears alone, connoting 
exultation, joy (Isa 62:4 [5]; 64:5 [4]; 66:14; Ezek 21:10; Pss 19:6 [5]; 119:14, 162; Job 39:21; Lam 1:21). 
It is often closely associated with other terms for rejoice, as it is here, such as x;mef' (Pss 40:16 [17]; 70:4 [5]; 
Lam 4:21), both x;mef' and #l;[' (Ps 68:3 [4], both x;mef' and lyg (Isa 66:10; Job 3:22), and lyg (Isa 35:1; 65:18; Ps 
35:9). In divine usage, the term clearly denotes divine joy, even rejoicing (Isa 62:4 [5]; 66:19; Jer 32:41; cf. 
Jer 49:25; Isa 60:15; Jer 49:25; Lam 2:15). xmf is a very frequent term of joy, gladness, and/or delight. It 
refers not to lasting joy, but to a spontaneous emotion of rejoicing, even exuberance. E. Ruprecht, “שמח,” 
TLOT 3:1273. “The root ś-m-ḥ denotes being glad or joyful with the whole disposition as indicated by its 
association with the heart (cf. Exod 4:14; Pss 19:8 [H 9]; 104:15; 105:3), the soul (Ps 86:4); and with the 
lighting up of the eyes (Prov 15:30).” Bruce K. Waltke, “שמח,” TWOT 879. It mostly refers to human joy 
but does appear a few times with divine agency in both verbal xmf and nominal forms (Isa 9:17 [16]; Zeph 
3:17; Ps 104:31). !nr, another prominent term of joy, often of shouting or singing, appears with God as 
subject only here in Zeph 3:17. Finally, lyg refers to gladness, rejoicing. Wood comments that this root 
connotes great “emotional involvement.” TLOT 1:310. It appears with divine agency not only in Zeph 3:17 
but also Isa 65:19. 
225
 Robertson, The Books, 340. Robertson calls this “a rapturous description of the love of God for 
his people. . . . Delight, joy, rejoicing, and singing on God’s part underscore the mutuality of emotional 
experience felt by God and the redeemed.” Ibid., 339. Indeed, in Zeph 3, “Zion is exhorted to sing (rānnî); 
[God] rejoices with singing (rinnāh). Jerusalem shall rejoice (śimṭî); [God] delights over Jerusalem with 







reserved for the day of ultimate restoration when reality will be in perfect accord with the divine 
will. 
The Evaluative Aspect of Divine Love in the Writings 
Although Eliphaz, Job’s so-called friend, gives voice to the common misconception that 
God does not actually enjoy or appreciate human beings (Job 22:2–3), the evaluative aspect of 
divine love is likewise presented in the Writings.
226
 For example, God “loves [bha] the righteous” 
(Ps 146:8).
227
 He himself is righteous and “loves righteousness,” the upright “will behold His 
face” (Ps 11:7; cf. Pss 33:5; 37:28; 99:4, 8).
228
 God’s delight is itself sometimes directly 
connected to love proper. Thus, God “reproves” those he loves (bha) like a father to his son in 
whom he “delights” (hcr) (Prov 3:12). Likewise, just as the upright person’s prayer is God’s 
                                                     
 
226
 Eliphaz rhetorically asks whether a “vigorous man” is “useful” [!ks] to God (Job 22:2) or 
whether God has any pleasure [#p,xe] in human righteousness, or “profit” [[c;B,] in perfection (Job 22:3; cf. 
35:7). Eliphaz therein assumes that God can neither use, nor pleasure, nor profit from the actions of human 
beings. “The point of the verse is that God is not advantaged by good deeds. He is distant and detached . . . 
transcendent” and “indifferent toward all people.” Robert L. Alden, Job (NAC 11; Nashville, Tenn.: 
Broadman & Holman, 1993), 230. Apparently, Eliphaz “wishes to refute Job’s implication from his 
disputation that since there are wicked people who enjoy prosperity all their lives there may be righteous 
people who endure calamity in spite of their righteousness (ch. 21). Eliphaz counters this position with the 
premise that a person cannot benefit God. . . . This means then that misfortune can have its cause only in 
human sin, never in God’s sovereign purpose acting toward an individual irrespective of his righteousness 
or wickedness. In other words it is unfathomable to Eliphaz that God would permit a righteous person to 
endure a season of misery even though he has been faithful in obeying God.” John E. Hartley, The Book of 
Job (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1988), 325; cf. Marvin H. Pope, Job (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 
1965), 150. There is “in Eliphaz’s position a dual stripping of biblical faith: God is depersonalized by a 
mechanical view of justice, and moral deeds possess only utilitarian value for mankind.” Hartley, The Book 
of Job, 325. Of course, Eliphaz and Job’s other friends are shown to be incorrect (they have not spoken of 
God “what is right”) and thus strongly rebuked by God at the end of the book (Job 42:7–8). Such 
statements are therefore not representative of the true nature of God. See the discussion of the temporary 
and partial suspension of the consequences of evaluative judgment in chapter 6, which sheds light on these 
issues. 
227
 The “righteous” are within a passage that emphasizes God’s beneficence toward the needy, the 
blind, the orphan, etc. “While it may seem that ‘the righteous’ (v. 8c) do not belong in this series, we must 
remember that it is precisely ‘the righteous’ in the psalter who are constantly besieged, assaulted, and 
oppressed (see Ps 34:19).” McCann Jr., “The Book of Psalms,” in 1 & 2 Maccabees, 4:1264. 
228
 Craigie comments, “Because God is righteous, he loves righteous deeds (v 7), implying either 
that he loves to do righteous deeds, or loves those that do righteous deeds; in context, the latter is more 
likely, so that there is here a confident expression of the love of a righteous God for a righteous person.” 
Psalms 1–50, 134. Thus, “God’s judgment follows his evaluation of people.” Duane A. Garrett, Proverbs, 




delight (!Acr'), he loves (bha) the pursuer of righteousness (Prov 15:8–9). These passages, as well 
as others, clearly associate divine love with objectively evaluative, divine delight.
229
 Further, as in 
the prophets, divine delight (#px) also may be the cause of rescue (Ps 18:19 [20]), which David 




Thus, God “takes pleasure (hc'r') in His people” (Ps 149:4; cf. 77:8–9). On the other hand, 
God does not take “pleasure” (#pex') in evil but “hates” (anf) those who do evil, destroys those who 
speak falsehood, and “abhors [b[t] the man of bloodshed and deceit” (Ps 5:4–6 [5–7]; cf. 106:40). 
God’s “soul” (vp,n<) hates (anf) the one who “loves” (bha) violence (Ps 11:5).231 Whereas God does 
not “delight [#px] in the strength of the horse” nor “take pleasure [hcr] in the legs of a man,” he 
“favors” (hcr), or takes pleasure in, those “who fear Him” and “wait for His lovingkindness” (Ps 
147:10–11).
232
 Similarly, whereas “the perverse in heart are an abomination [hb'[eAT] to the LORD, 
the blameless in their walk are His delight [!Acr']” (Prov 11:20). As in the prophets, divine 
                                                     
 
229
 Thus, Daniel is God’s beloved, or one of “high esteem” (dWmx') (Dan 10:11). Choon-Leong Seow 
renders this, “Greatly beloved,” “literally, ‘a man of lovableness.’” Ecclesiastes (AB 18C; New York: 
Doubleday, 1997), 243. John E. Goldingay points out, “Like words such as bha ‘love,’ dmx suggests both a 
feeling and an attitude that expresses itself in being drawn toward the object of love and committing oneself 
to it (Isa 53:2; Pss 19:11 [10]; 68:17 [16]). . . . Daniel is one to whom God is committed. As we have seen, 
he has prayed as persona grata to Yahweh.” Daniel (WBC 30; Dallas: Word, 1989), 256. Good adds, this 
“denotes something highly desirable and precious.” “Love in the OT,” IDB 3:165. Likewise Stephen R. 
Miller, Daniel (NAC 18; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 1994), 251; cf. Gen 27:15; Ezra 8:27.
 
Further, God “delighted [#pex'] in” Solomon and set him on the throne out of love for Israel (2 Chr 9:8).  
230
 Mitchell Dahood translates, “He [God] brought me out of the broad domain, liberated me 
because he loved me. Yahweh rewarded me because I was just, because my hands were innocent he repaid 
me.” Psalms 1-50 (AB; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), 102. The foreground likewise speaks of the 
keeping of God’s commandments and God’s reciprocal relations, “with the kind [dysix'] You show yourself 
kind [dsx]; with the blameless You show yourself blameless; With the pure You show Yourself pure, And 
with the crooked You show Yourself astute” (Ps 18:25–26 [26–27]). Thus, “there was a reciprocal 
dimension to the relationship with God, by which the faithful, the blameless, and the pure could expect 
God’s faithful response, while the twisted could expect tortuous returns.” Craigie, Psalms 1–50, 175. 
Notably, it is not that his behavior guaranteed a turbulent-free life, for the king had been assailed by 
enemies, but the assertion is that God heard him when he cried because he had been faithful. 
231
 See the discussion of the emotive nature of these statements in the section on the emotionality 




appraisal is again evident with regard to God’s delight in, or desire for, heartfelt, sincere devotion 
to him, which is contrasted with merely external sacrifices by various phrases.
233
 Such instances 
speak to the wholeheartedness expected by God from his people; external sacrifices of themselves 
are not pleasing to God but an internal spirit of devotion to God is his delight. In many other 
instances, God’s evaluative delight appears throughout the Writings.
234
 Such examples are clearly 
evaluative, distinguishing between moral qualities in the identification of the object of divine 
delight. God’s pleasure and delight are thus evaluatively responsive to actual objects yet distinct 
from the scale of evaluation that human beings may employ.
235
 Accordingly, divine love, as well 
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 JPS translates, “the LORD values those who fear Him” (Ps 147:10). 
233
 Thus, God does not “delight [#pex'] in sacrifice” nor is he “pleased [hc'r'] with burnt offering” but 
the “sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and a contrite heart,” which he “will not despise” (Ps 
51:16–17 [18–19]; cf. Ps 40:6 [7]; 69:31; Prov 15:8–9). In one such instance, rxb, the usual term for 
election, signifies such evaluative desire. Specifically the doing of “righteousness and justice is desired 
[rxb] by the LORD more than sacrifice” (Prov 21:3). Here, rxb (in niphal participle) clearly connotes more 
than indifferent election but seems to connote the divine evaluation and even appreciation of good conduct; 
cf. Prov 22:21. This evaluative sense of rxb is not surprising when it is remembered that the word group 
often refers to that which is “choice” or the “choicest” in the sense of being the most desirable or precious. 
See the word study earlier in this chapter. As Roland E. Murphy comments, “The contrast is not between 
the relative values of sacrifice and prayer, but between the reaction of God and the contradictory actions of 
human beings. It is the sacrificer, not the sacrifice, that is the issue.” Proverbs (WBC 22; Dallas: Word, 
1998), 112. Thus, “the criterion for God’s favor is not simply the scrupulous performance of ritual but the 
ardent pursuit of serving others along with it.” Waltke, The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1:1–15:29, 621.
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 Thus, as upright and faithful himself, God “loves [bha] righteousness and justice” (Ps 33:5). 
Again, he “loves justice” and does not “forsake His godly ones” (dysix') whereas others are cut off (Ps 
37:28). Further, a just weight (Prov 11:1), the blameless (Prov 11:20), those who deal faithfully (Prov 
12:22) and the prayer of the upright (Prov 15:8) are each characterized as God’s “delight” (!Acr'). These are 
in contrast to a false weight (Prov 11:1), lying lips (12:22), and the sacrifice of the wicked (15:8), which are 
all viewed by God as an “abomination” (hb'[eAT). God does not take “pleasure [#pex'] in wickedness” (Ps 5:4), 
“takes no delight [#p,xe] in fools” (Eccl 5:4 [3]) and may be otherwise “displeased” (wyn”+y[eB. [r:äw>) (Prov 24:18). 
Further, the man whose way is “pleasing” (!Acr') to God is blessed (Prov 16:7; cf. 12:22). As Waltke 
paraphrases Prov 12:22, on the other hand, “liars so repulse his nature that he casts them aside.” The Book 
of Proverbs: Chapters 1:1–15:29, 539. Further, the one who finds wisdom “finds life and obtains the favor 
[!Acr'] of the LORD” (Prov 8:35; cf. 12:2). Likewise, God “surrounds” the righteous man with “favor” [!Acr'] 
(Ps 5:12; cf. Prov 3:3). Wisdom personified is God’s daily, intense “delight” (~y[ivu[]v;) (Prov 8:30). The 
Hebrew term ~y[ivu[]v signifies “intense delight.” See the discussion above. Some translations (e.g., NIV) 
ascribe the delight to “wisdom” not to God. So Waltke, The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1:1–15:29, 420–
21. However, the noun ~y[ivu[]v in the construction would seem to imply that wisdom is the object and God 
the subject of the delight, as the LXX interprets. Cf. Jer 31:20. This is the position of Fox who comments, 
“God gets amusement from his creatures.” Fox, Proverbs 1–9, 287. 
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 Morris cautions, “It is going too far to suggest that these passages teach that the righteous are 




as its antonym hatred, is not altogether indifferent, but may be grounded in objective appraisal. It 
is thus neither undifferentiated nor altogether constant. 
The Evaluative and Emotional Aspect of Divine Hatred 
 At the juncture of the evaluative and emotional aspects of divine love is the contrast of 
God’s hate. The most prominent term of negative divine evaluation is anf, the antonym of bha, 
which is most often used in religious contexts.
236
 The root most often refers to the emotional 
feelings of disdain or hatred for something or someone.
237
 However, the intensity of the negative 
feelings and/or evaluation can vary greatly from the most intense loathing or abhorrence of 
something, or someone, to a mild aversion.
238
 
As with bha, anf often refers to the emotions between a man and a woman in a romantic 
and/or erotic relationship. For instance, Leah is said to be “hated” by her husband Jacob (Gen 
29:31, 33; cf. Deut 21:15–17; 22:13; 24:3).
239
 Many consider this usage, and others like it, to 
                                                     
 
could be taken to present a false dichotomy because divine delight could be evaluative but still not amount 
to winning or meriting God’s love. 
236
 The word group appears in verbal (139 verses), nominal (16 verses), and adjectival forms (1x). 
In ANE cognates the term appears often in northwest Semitic languages with significant parallels meaning 
“to hate.” See A. H. Konkel, “ נאש ,” NIDOTTE 3:1257; Ernst Jenni, “שנא,” TLOT 3:1277; cf. the Aramaic 
cognate in Dan 4:16. The term is used some 31 times in direct contrast to bha as its antonym. 
237
 It “expresses an emotional attitude toward persons and things which are opposed, detested, 
despised and with which one wishes to have no contact or relationship. It is therefore the opposite of love.” 
Groningen, TWOT 880. Lipinski adds that the verb “refers to an emotional condition of aversion that OT 
anthropology locates ‘in the heart’ [bb'le] . . . or in the” vp,n<. E. Lipinski, “שנא,” TDOT 14:64; cf. Lev 19:17; 2 
Sam 5:8; Ps 11:5. 
238
 “The gamut of feelings of dislike are included in the scope of anf; it may express the most 
intense hatred of the enemies of God (Ps 139:21–22), or that of a violent enemy (25:19), but it may simply 
express that which is to be avoided, such as serving as a guarantor for a debt (Prov 11:15), the feelings of 
aversion for a poor man (19:7), or the aggravation of a neighbor who visits too often (25:17).” Konkel, 
NIDOTTE 3:1257. Jenni concurs, “The semantic scope . . . reaches from the strongly affective ‘to hate’ . . . 
to a somewhat diluted “to feel aversion for, not want, avoid.” TLOT 3:1278. 
239
 Similarly, in the situation where a man has two wives “one loved and the other hated” the law 
protects the children of the “hated” wife from losing any birthrights (Deut 21:15–17). In both of these 
passages, as well as Prov 30:23, anf is a qal passive participle. anf also refers to a man who, after 
consummating the marriage, “hates” his wife and charges her with having not been a virgin (Deut 22:13, 




merely depict a mild contrast with bha and thus render the term “unloved” or “unpreferred.”240 
However, there is simply not enough information to determine the intensity of the anf in the 
situations above.
241
 Elsewhere, an intensely emotional contrast is apparent, as in the dark 
narrative of Amnon and Tamar. After Amnon rapes his half-sister, it is said that “hated her with a 
very great hatred; for the hatred with which he hated her was greater than the love with which he 
had loved her” (2 Sam 13:15).
242
 Likewise, anf appears within sibling relationships, referring to 
quite intense, and evaluative, animosity. For example, Joseph is hated by his brothers because 
they see that their father “loved him more than all his brothers” and they come to hate him “even 
more” after he tells them his dream (Gen 37:4–5, 8). Absalom hated Amnon for raping his sister 
Tamar (2 Sam 13:22). In both of the above cases the reason for the animosity is clearly given. 
Likewise, in a non-kinship relationship the cause of hatred is explicit; Ahab hates Micaiah 
because he never prophesies good for him (1 Kgs 22:8; 2 Chr 18:7).
243
 Thus, hatred is often 
explicitly predicated on some objective reality.
244
 
                                                     
 
technical language for divorce. Lipinski comments that while it is a technical term used “in connection with 
divorce” the use of the term in Hebrew “leaves no doubt that this verb expresses an emotional condition 
implying the wish for separation or removal from the ‘hated’ person.” TDOT 14:169. 
240
 For instance, Konkel comments, “The use of loved and hated to describe the attitude toward a 
preferred wife as opposed to the one who was tolerated or even rejected (Gen 29:31, 33) lends to hate the 
sense of being unloved or not chosen, or even abandoned and rejected.” NIDOTTE 3:1257. Jenni 
comments, “In reference to the relationship between man and woman, śn’ usually implies a contrast to the 
expected or prior relationship of love: ‘to hate’ (Ezek 23:29) signifies, then, ‘to love no longer, develop 
dislike for,’ etc. (Deut 22:13, 16; 24:3; Judg 14:16; 15:2; 2 Sam 13:15).” TLOT 3:1278. See the brief 
discussion of this in the word study of bha. 
241
 With regard to Leah, commentators have long proposed that anf is here merely a reference to 
the absence of love. However, it is not unreasonable to think that Jacob may have felt some animosity, 
whether overtly or suppressed, toward Leah considering the fact that he never intended to marry her and 
worked an extra seven years for her sister, Rachel, due to Laban’s deception with which Leah apparently 
went along. It is plausible that, as such, Jacob did have some degree of disdain for Leah. 
242
 Further emotional contrast is apparent when Delilah complains to Samson, “you only hate me, 
and you do not love me” when he will not give her truthful information regarding the source of his strength 
(Judg 14:16; cf. Judg 15:2).  
243
 In a couple of instances, prior hatred is referenced. Isaac asks Abimelech why he came to him, 
“since you hate me and have sent me away from you” (Gen 26:27). Jephthah says similarly to the elders, 




 Evaluation and/or emotion is often apparent by reference to the context. Thus, it is clear 
that anf connotes evaluation when God praises, “You have loved righteousness and hated 
wickedness” and therefore God has anointed him above others (Ps 45:7 [8]). Similarly, those who 
“love the LORD” are exhorted to “hate evil” (Ps 97:10; cf. Amos 5:15; Prov 8:13; 27:6; Eccl 3:8; 
9:1).
245
 There are many other examples of the term anf being used in a clearly evaluative 
manner.
246
 Thus, it appears that an evaluative element is consistently present such that even when 
the reason for hatred is not explicitly given there appears to be something operative that goes 
beyond merely arbitrary decision. The emotionality of the term is likewise evident in many 
occurrences. For instance, God will bring judgment on Edom according to their anger (@a;) and 
envy (ha'n>qi), which they showed because of their hatred of Israel and Judah (Ezek 35:11; cf. 35:6). 




 With divine agency, the word group is consistently used in an explicitly evaluative 
manner and often with a clear indication of emotionality. For example, God loves justice but 
                                                     
 
are in trouble?” (Judg 11:7). Consider also the presence or absence of prior hatred as the determinative 
factor between murder and manslaughter (Num 35:20; Deut 4:42; 19:4, 6, 11; Josh 20:5). 
244
 anf also often appears with specific counsel, including the command to not “hate your brother 
in your heart” (Lev 19:17; cf. Zech 8:17) and to help the animal of the one who hates you (Exod 23:4–5). 
The term is also often used with regard to proverbial advice. See Prov 10:12, 18; 11:15; 15:17; 25:17; 
26:24, 26, 28. 
245
 Similarly evaluative is Jehu’s chastising of King Jehoshaphat for helping the wicked, and thus 
loving “those who hate the LORD,” thus provoking God’s wrath (2 Chr 19:2). David is chastised by Joab 
for “loving those who hate you, and by hating those who love you” when he is mourning for Absalom (2 
Sam 19:6). 
246
 This is true even if evaluation is not always accurate or warranted or worse, perverted, such as 
Amnon’s hatred for Tamar after defiling her. See Exod 18:21; Amos 5:10, 15; Mic 3:2; Pss 26:5; 31:6 [7]; 
36:2 [3]; 50:17; 101:3; 109:5; 119:104, 128; 119:113, 163; 120:6; Prov 1:22, 29; 5:12; 8:13, 36; 12:1; 13:5, 
24; 14:17, 20; 15:27; 19:7; 29:10, 24; Job 34:17; Eccl 2:17–18. 
247
 Emotion is also evident when anf is collocated with “soul” or “inner person” [vp,n], which is 
often used as the seat of emotions (2 Sam 5:8). Further, the presence or absence of animosity or hatred can 
make the difference with regard to whether there is murderous intent. If one kills another out “of hatred, or 
threw something at him lying in wait” the penalty is death (Num 35:20; cf. Deut 4:42; 19:4, 6, 11; Josh 




hates robbery (Isa 61:8). He himself declares, “I hate [literally, My soul (vp,n<) hates] your new 
moon festivals and your appointed feasts, they have become a burden to Me, I am weary of 
bearing them” (Isa 1:14).
248
  
God is even said to hate human beings with the connotation of both evaluation and 
emotion.
249
 For instance, God says, “My inheritance has become to Me like a lion in the forest; 
she has roared against Me; Therefore I have come to hate her” (Jer 12:8).
250
 Again, God “came to 
hate” his people at Gilgal and will drive them out of his house because of their wickedness and 
“will love them no more” (Hos 9:15). Likewise, God hates “all who do iniquity” (Ps 5:5 [6]; cf. 
Mal 1:2–3).
251
 That this is evaluative and emotional is evident in the verses before and after. The 
next verse declares, in parallel, he “abhors” (b[t) the man of bloodshed and deceit” (Ps 5:6 [7]) 
                                                     
 
248
 Further, God “hates” the idolatrous pillar (Deut 16:22), the “abominable [hb'[eAT] acts that the 
other nations have committed (Deut 12:31; cf. Prov 6:16), evil and perjury (Zech 8:17), and divorce (Mal 
2:16). Notably, emotive content is apparent in that Prov 6:16 depicts that which is an abomination to God’s 
soul. Indeed, God hates such abominable acts so much that he has continually sent his prophets to declare 
on his behalf, “‘Oh, do not do this abominable thing that I hate” (Jer 44:4). Similarly, God says, “I hate, I 
despise [sa;m'] your religious feasts” (Amos 5:21). By the use of strongly emotive terminology, God has 
“sworn by Himself [vp,n<]” and declared “I loathe [bat] the arrogance of Jacob, and detest [anf] his citadels” 
(Amos 6:8). 
249
 On the other hand, humans may also hate God or his people. The participle of anf frequently 
refers to a hater or haters of an individual or group, often of those who hate God’s people. anf also appears 
frequently in the participle to refer to those who hate God, often with the further statement that God will 
repay them for their hatred (cf. Exod 20:5 = Deut 5:9). See also Num 10:35; Deut 7:10; 32:41; Pss 21:8 [9]; 
68:1 [2]; 81:15 [16]; 83:2 [3]; 139:21; 2 Chr 19:2. The term is similarly used to refer to those whom God’s 
people “hate,” the very same who will oppress her (Ezek 16:37; 23:28–29; cf. Isa 60:15; Ps 139:21–22). 
250
 This is in contrast to their position as the “beloved” of his “soul” (Jer 12:7). Here, “the Lord 
declares that he ‘hates’ his people, the very people who had earlier been described as his ‘beloved.’ Once 
again we catch a glimpse of the pathos of God (cf. 9:1–10).” Peter C. Craigie, Page H. Kelley, and Joel F. 
Drinkard Jr., Jeremiah 1–25 (WBC 26; Dallas, TX: Word, 1991), 184. Earlier, the Israelites had falsely 
accused God of hating them and thus bringing them into the wilderness to suffer (Deut 1:27; cf. 9:28).  
251
 At times, God’s declaration “I have loved Jacob” but “I have hated Esau” (Mal 1:2–3) has been 
interpreted as a simple contrast between the election of Jacob and Esau, conflating the terms “love” and 
“hate” with choose and not choose, respectively. However, in every other case, God’s hatred toward human 
beings is prompted by evil and God’s response is appropriate to the actual state of affairs. Accordingly, in 
light of the fact that all other instances of divine hatred are not arbitrary but evaluative (and most are 
explicitly emotive) as well as a number of intertextual hints in Malachi (and the wider canon) that suggest 
divine animosity toward Edom, this passage should also be seen as an instance of evaluative and emotional 
divine hatred. For a further explanation of this position, see the discussion of this passage in the canonical 




where the previous verse stated, “You are not a God who takes pleasure [#pex'] in wickedness” (Ps 
5:4 [5]). Similarly, God examines, or “tests” (!xb), the righteous and the wicked, and the one who 
loves violence His soul [anf] hates” (Ps 11:5).252 The evaluation is evident by reference to 
examination, and intense emotionality is clear by the use of the divine soul, the seat of emotions, 
as the agency of hatred. Notably, in the above instances, reasons for divine hatred are explicitly 
given, so the divine hatred is anything but arbitrary.
253
 
That divine hatred is often (and likely always) of an emotional nature is further evidenced 
by other terms of negative evaluation and/or rejection that collocate with divine anf including 
b[t/hb[AT (Deut 12:31; Isa 1:13–14; Jer 44:4; Amos 5:10; 6:8; Ps 5:5–6 [6–7]; Prov 6:16) and sam 
(Amos 5:21). A brief look at the usage of these terms with divine agency may further clarify 
negative evaluation. 
The word group b[t appears frequently, referring to loathing, detesting, or abhorring 
something or someone. The noun hb[AT frequently refers to abominations, or those 
objects/occurrences that are detestable to God and provoke his anger.
254
 For instance, with 
idolatrous “abominations” Israel “provoked” God to anger (Deut 32:16). Israel frequently 
partakes in such abominations and is not ashamed of them (Jer 6:15; cf. 7:10; 8:12) despite God’s 
consistent pleadings (Jer 44:4). As such, they made God’s inheritance an abomination (Jer 2:7; cf. 
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 The language of “soul” (vp,n<) clearly denotes emotionality as elsewhere. Such hatred is here 
based on examination. “The verb !xb, translated ‘scrutinize,’ implies ‘testing, proving, assaying.’ And the 
testing of metals was done by fire.” Peter C. Craigie, Psalms 1–50, 133. Dahood, however, sees the human 
as the subject of hatred. He translates, “Yahweh is the Just One who will indeed assay the wicked; So that 
he who loves injustice hates his own life.” Psalms 1–50, 68. Such a translation is possible (cf. Prov 29:24), 
but the parallel with Ps 5 strongly suggests a divine subject. Likewise, cf. Isa 1:14; Amos 6:8; Prov 6:16. 
253
 Van Groningen likewise comments, “God’s hatred for idols and feasts is also directed against 
people, e.g., Esau (Mal 1:3, Gen 27; Pss 5:5 [H 6]; 11:5). In each case the character and/or activities of the 
hated ones are expressed; thus God is opposed to, separates himself from, and brings the consequences of 
his hatred upon people not as mere people, but as sinful people.” TWOT 880.
 
254
 “Pagan worship practices, deceit and insubordination within the covenant nation, and 
superficial worship of Yahweh constitute three major realms of abhorrent activities.” Michael A. Grisanti, 
 NIDOTTE 4:314. A few examples are given in the main text of a much longer list of things that are ”,תעב“




Isa 1:13). As with hatred, an abomination, or that which prompts divine loathing, is evaluatively 
evil or negative. Frequently, Proverbs contrasts that which is an abomination (hb[AT) to God with 
that which is his delight (!Acr'), clearly connoting both positive and negative divine evaluation.255 
God’s abhorrence extends to human beings, like his hatred. Thus, the one who does abominations 
or “detestable things” (hb'[eAT) is “detestable [hb'[eAT] to the LORD” (Deut 18:12; cf. 25:16). 
Likewise, God “abhors the man of bloodshed and deceit” (Ps 5:6 [7]). Further “the devious are an 
abomination to the LORD; But he is intimate [dAs] with the upright” (Prov 3:32). Because of their 
evil “the anger of the LORD was kindled against His people and He abhorred His inheritance” 
(Ps 106:40). Thus, divine abhorrence is directly tied to evaluation; divine abhorrence toward 
human beings is grounded in their evil, not in an arbitrary divine decision. The abominations of 
God’s people try God, so that he is “no longer able to endure it” and thus destruction is brought 




  The verb sam often refers to the action of rejection, which is associated with God’s hatred 
and at times the disposition from which they spring.
257
 God had promised a limitation to his 
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 Thus, “a false weight is an abomination to the LORD, but a just weight is His delight [!Acr']” 
(Prov 11:1). Similarly, the “perverse in heart are an abomination to the LORD, but the blameless in their 
walk are His delight [!Acr']” (Prov 11:20). Likewise, “Lying lips are an abomination to the LORD, But those 
who deal faithfully are His delight [!Acr']” (Prov 12:22). Again, “The sacrifice of the wicked is an 
abomination to the LORD, But the prayer of the upright is His delight [!Acr']” (Prov 15:8). In the same vein, 
“The way of the wicked is an abomination to the LORD, But He loves [bha] one who pursues 
righteousness” (Prov 15:9). Similar evaluation is present in ANE parallels. For instance, “this verse has a 
parallel in Amenemope, chap. 10, ‘Do not speak falsely to a man, the God abhors it.’” Murphy, Proverbs, 
92.  
256
 Cf. Ezek 5:9, 11; 6:11; 7:3–4, 8–9, 20; 11:21; 12:16; 16:58; 18:12–13; 18:24; 33:29; 43:8. 
Regarding their continual abominations also see Mal 2:11; Ezek 6:9; 8:6, 9, 13, 15, 17; 9:4; 11:18; 14:6; 
16:2, 22, 25, 36, 43, 47, 50–52; 20:4; 22:2, 11; 23:36; 33:26; 36:31; 44:6–7, 13. 
257
 “The rather rich spectrum of usages indicates that one can assume the basic meaning ‘to want 
nothing to do with.’ . . . The verbal notion has a marked emotionally charged, irrational aspect; one rejects 
something because one neither no longer can nor wishes to identify inwardly with it.” Wildberger, TLOT 
2:356. “Reasons for this distaste need not be stated and often are not. Yet the LXX’s relatively frequent 
translation of m’s with exoudeneō should be noted: one abhors something because one has come to the 




animosity, to not reject them so as to destroy them (Lev 26:44). Yet, as they rejected his covenant 
“the LORD rejected all the descendants of Israel” (2 Kgs 17:20). God also says, “I will remove 
Judah also from My sight, as I have removed Israel. And I will cast off Jerusalem, this city which 
I have chosen” (2 Kgs 23:27; cf. Amos 5:21).
258
 As such, it sometimes seems to the people like 
they have, in fact, been utterly rejected. Thus, God reassures, “You are My servant, I have chosen 
you and not rejected you” (Isa 41:9). Yet, in distress the people of God can be compared to a 
“wife of one’s youth when she is rejected” (Isa 54:6). 
Israel provoked God such that he was “filled with wrath and greatly abhorred Israel (Ps 
78:59). Thus, he “rejected the tent of Joseph, and did not choose the tribe of Ephraim” (Ps 78:67). 
Thus, the question to God, “Have you completely rejected Judah? Or have you loathed [l[g] 
Zion?” (Jer 14:19; cf. Jer 2:37; 6:30; 7:29).
259
 In Lamentations, one wonders if God has “utterly 
rejected” (WnT's.a;m. saom') them and is “exceedingly angry with” them (Lam 5:22). Later, the psalmist 
laments, “You have cast off and rejected, You have been full of wrath against Your anointed” (Ps 
89:38 [39]). Yet, ultimately, God proclaims that he will not “cast off [sam] all the offspring of 
Israel” (Jer 31:37; cf. 33:24, 26). However, all this is not arbitrary, but it is directly related to 
                                                     
 
and in the niphal (5 verses). The noun sAam' appears only once, meaning “refuse” or trash (Lam 3:45).  
258
 This term is often used as the antonym of rxb, to choose, as it appears here (Isa 7:15–16; 41:9; 
Jer 33:24; Ps 78:67; Job 34:33. Eugene H. Merrill, “מאס,” NIDOTTE 2:834. 
259
 Further, consider the verb l[g, “to abhor, reject,” which does not appear often (10 x) and does 
not collocate with anf. However, it does collocate with sam in a number of instances (Lev 26:15, 43–44; Jer 
14:19) and likewise portrays divine animosity toward human beings. Levine suggests, “The primary image 
seems to be that of physical spoilage, or filth.” Baruch A. Levine, Leviticus (JPS Torah Commentary; 
Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 184. Milgrom adds, it “conveys the notion of ‘nausea, 
loathing.’” Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27 (AB 3B; New York: Doubleday, 2001), 2301. Thus, God 
proclaims that if they are faithful he will dwell among them and his “soul” (vp,n<) will not despise them (Lev 
26:11). Notice vp,n<, the seat of emotions. But if their soul abhors his ordinances (Lev 26:15; cf. 26:43) and 
they spurn God, then God’s “soul shall abhor” them (Lev 26:30). Yet, the divine abhorrence will only go so 
far. For “in spite of this, when they are in the land of their enemies, I will not reject [sam] them, nor will I so 
abhor them as to destroy them, breaking My covenant with them; for I am the LORD their God” (Lev 
26:44). Thus, in times of distress it is asked of God, “Have You completely rejected Judah? Or have You 
loathed Zion?” (Jer 14:19). Other instances of the term include Ezek 16:5, 45; 2 Sam 1:21; Job 21:10. 
Consider also God’s spurning (#an) of his people, likewise in response to their evil (Deut 32:19; Jer 14:21; 




Israel’s choice. Just as Saul was rejected as king because he rejected God’s word (1 Sam 15:23; 
cf. 15:26; 16:1; Hos 4:6; 9:17),
260
 the people have “rejected” the LORD (Num 11:20; 1 Sam 8:7; 
10:19), his commandments (Lev 26:15, 43), the land (Num 14:31), his statues and his covenants 
(2 Kgs 17:15; cf. 17:20; Ezek 5:6; 20:13, 16, 24), the law of the LORD (Isa 5:24; cf. Jer 6:19; 
Amos 2:4), and the word of the LORD (Jer 8:9). 
This brief survey demonstrates that God’s hatred, abhorrence, and rejection of human 
beings are consistently grounded in evaluation of them that prompts negative divine emotions, 
often of an intense nature. Such negative evaluation is the apparent opposite of divine love and 
delight seen earlier. Thus, divine displeasure is quite prominent, further grounding the fact that 
God’s emotions are frequently depicted as affected and evaluative. With this in mind, we turn to 
the emotional aspect of divine love. 
The Emotional Aspect of Divine Love 
This section focuses on data that support the conception that God’s love is profoundly 
emotional though not to the exclusion of volitional and evaluative aspects. In this dissertation, an 
emotion is loosely defined as any feeling(s) that may be affected by external stimulation. At the 
same time, emotions are not necessarily determined by external stimulus to the exclusion of other 
mental factors including volition, evaluation, etc. First, love may be, at once, emotional and 
responsive to command. Second, God’s love is consistently depicted as intensely affective and 
emotive. Accordingly, the reader is encouraged to keep the following questions in mind while 
reading this section. Is divine love emotionally responsive to human disposition and/or action? If 
so, what kind of emotions are exhibited and on what occasions? Is God concerned about/affected 
by the world? Do the lives of creatures make a difference to God’s own life? Are emotions 
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 Importantly, “Yahweh’s rejection is not capricious. . . . It is a reaction to the failure of the 
king.” Wildberger, TLOT 2:654. Kaiser comments that such statements refer “only to individual 
participation and not to the abiding promise which remains open to all who will believe.” Walter C. Kaiser 




mutually exclusive to volition, that is, can emotional love be commanded? This section of the 
study begins with a survey of the meaning of prominent terms relative to God’s emotional love 
and then proceeds with the canonical survey of divine emotions. 
The Semantics of Compassion and Passion in the NT  
A Brief Survey of ~xr 
The word group ~xr generally refers to compassion.261 The basic meaning of ~x,r,  the 
noun from this root, is “womb.” Both the verb (probably denominative from the noun) and 
abstract plural form of the noun denote compassion and tender-feelings, apparently based on the 
idea of ~x,r,  “womb,” and, accordingly, referring to a “womb-like mother love.”262 As such, the 
word group can refer to the “seat of emotions” or the profound emotions of compassion and/or 
affection of one for another.
263
 ~xr includes mercy but is more than mercy; it is an emotional love, 
a compassionate affection that often is manifested in merciful, non-obligatory action that goes 
beyond reasonable expectations. Quell thus calls it “the strongest word for love that biblical 
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 The lexeme appears in the nominal ~ymxr (37 verses), verbal ~xr (43 verses), and two forms of 
adjectival ~wxr (13 verses) and once as ynIm'x]r; (Lam 4:10). This count does not include the occurrences of the 
singular noun that means “womb.” Moreover, it also does not include the usage in the “names” in Hos 1:6, 
8. The word also appears in Aramaic once (Dan 2:18). There is not a significant difference between the 
connotation of the nominal and the verbal form, thus the two shall be treated together. 
262
 See Phyllis Trible, God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality (OBT 2; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1978), 31–59. ~ymxr is likely an intensive plural. It is “probably in reference to the accompanying 
physiological phenomena of strong emotion.” H. J. Stoebe, “רחם,” TLOT 3:1226; cf. “רחם,” HALOT 1217–
18. This connection is widely recognized, see, for instance, Waltke, The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1:1–
15:29, 527; Coppes, “רחם,” TWOT 841; G. Smith, Isaiah 1–39, 306; Watts, Isaiah 1–33, 202; Tate, Psalms 
51–100, 14; Goldingay, Daniel, 243–44; Stoebe, TLOT 3:1225; Mike Butterworth, “רחם,” NIDOTTE 
3:1093. This connection of “womb” to the emotion of love and/or compassion is also testified in the 
cognate languages. Ibid.. Simian-Yofre asserts ~xr is “common to all Semitic languages.” H. Simian-Yofre, 
 ,TDOT 13:438. The cognates further signify various connotations of love, compassion, devotion ”,רחם“
loyalty, attachment. For an overview see ibid., 438–39.  
263
 Tate, Psalms 51–100, 14; cf. Coppes, “רחם,” TWOT 842–843; Wilhelm Gesenius, “רחם,” 
Gesenius' Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon to the Old Testament Scriptures (Oak Harbor, Wash.: Logos, 
2003), 766. Thus, Janzen comments that it “refers to the feeling a mother has for the children whom she 
carries and feels in her womb, then carries in her arms and nurses at her breast, and afterward continues in 






 ~xr is closely associated with some word groups that are also significant to the 
meaning of divine love. This word group collocates especially significantly with lovingkindness 
(dsx),265 grace (!nx),266 and other terms for compassion (~xn, lmx and swx).267 It further complements 
divine justice (jPvm),268 may be grounded in divine pleasure and act alongside divine passion,269 
tempers and overcomes wrath,
270
 and is contrasted with being cruel (yrIz"k.a;).271 
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 G. Quell, “Jesaja 14, 1–23,” in Festschrift Friedrich Baumgärtel (ed. L. Rost; Erlangen: 
Universitätsbund, 1959), 140, quoted in Watts, Isaiah 1–33, 202. Gowan contends that it “needs to be given 
a stronger emotional quality than the word ‘mercy’ usually has.” Theology in Exodus: Biblical Theology in 
the Form of a Commentary (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1994), 236. The intense emotion 
connoted by ~xr is variously described. It is a “feelings word” and “denotes strong emotion,” the “strong 
feelings of love and concern” that result in “action.” Goldingay, Daniel, 243–44. It “is a heart-love: 
compassion . . . emotional, passionate, personal.” Motyer, Isaiah, 386. Stoebe interprets ~ymxr as “an 
emotion oriented toward a specific action.” TLOT 3:1226–27; cf. H. J. Stoebe, “Die Bedeutung des Wortes 
hāsād im Alten Testament,” VT 2 (1952): 246. 
265
 The discussion of the overlap with the dsx word group will take place in the word study of dsx 
later in this chapter. 
266
 See the discussion further below. 
267
 In three instances, it is used with swx, each referring to the lack of compassion and pity in the 
context of war, one from the Medes to the Persians (Isa 13:18). In two of those instances, lmx, swx, and ~xr 
all appear together, expressing the lack of compassion from God toward Jerusalem (Jer 13:14), and 
Nebuchadnezzar toward Judah (Jer 21:7). It also collocates with the ~xn lexeme, twice in allusions to Exod 
34:6–7, with the mention of God’s “relenting” (Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2). In another instance, God “comforted” 
his people and “will have compassion” on the afflicted (Isa 49:13). See the discussions of each of these 
three terms in footnotes in the canonical section. 
268
 Indeed, God exhorts human beings to “dispense true justice and practice kindness and 
compassion” (Zech 7:9). Thus, “the LORD longs to be gracious to you, and therefore He waits on high to 
have compassion on you. For the LORD is a God of justice” (Isa 30:18). Similarly, God proclaims he will 
betroth his people to him in “righteousness and justice, in lovingkindness and in compassion” (Hos 2:19 
[21]). 
269
 In one instance, ~xr associates with divine pleasure [!wcr] as the grounding of divine 
compassion, as opposed to wrath as the grounding of judgment (Isa 60:10). In another instance, the absence 
of God’s compassion is lamented and the absence of his zeal (ha'n>qi) and the stirrings of his heart are 
questioned (Isa 63:15). On the other hand, God proclaims that he will “restore” and “have mercy” on Israel 
and “be jealous” for his holy name (Ezek 39:25). 
270
 See the discussion below. 
271





God is by far the most common agent of ~xr, it is one of the essential elements of God’s 
self-revelation of his character, manifested in action. The first appearance of ~xr with God as 
agent takes place in the midst of dire need for forgiveness after Israel’s rebellion with the golden 
calf where God’s freedom to bestow compassion on the undeserving is put in action (Exod 33:19) 
and God reveals his character as “the LORD, the LORD God, compassionate [~wxr] and gracious, 
slow to anger, and abounding in lovingkindness and truth” (Exod 34:6).
272
 This adjective ~wxr 
appears thirteen times altogether, and in every instance, with the likely exception of Ps 112:4, 
God is the agent.
273
 The close association of God’s compassion and graciousness is evident in that 
eleven of the thirteen instances are paired with words from the root !nx.274 Further, God’s ~xr is 
great and abundant, denoted numerous times by the syntagm dsx with br.275 Over and over again 
throughout the OT the amazing compassion of God is recounted as unfailing and a basis of his 
merciful, redemptive action.
276
 These ideas will be taken up further in the canonical analysis 
below. Here, a few characteristics of this word group should be noted before moving on.  
                                                     
 
272
 See the discussion of this verse in the canonical analysis below. 
273
 Ps 112:4 appears to associate the attributes “gracious and compassion and righteous” with the 
“upright” human agent, which would be the only time where ~wxr is used of a human. For this reason many 
have interpreted the text to refer to divine agency. If it does refer to God, it would seem to parallel Ps 
116:5, which uses !nx, ~xr, and qdc of God, although not in this order. On the other hand, if it is of human 
agency the four descriptors may form a chiasm: rv'y”, !wnx, ~wxr, qyDIc;. Both interpretations are possible but the 
latter interpretation is more likely absent the presupposition that humans cannot manifest true ~xr and 
considering that the entire chapter is about humankind. 
274
 See Exod 34:6; 2 Chr 30:9; Neh 9:17, 31; Pss 86:15; 103:8; 111:4; 145:8; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2; 
cf. Ps 112:4. Sometimes this syntagm is an unmistakable, extensive allusion to Exod 34:6, together with 
“slow to anger” and abounding/great in dsx (Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2; Pss 86:15; 103:8; 145:8; Neh 9:17). At 
other times the pair form a simpler refrain (Pss 111:4; 112:4; Neh 9:31; 2 Chr 30:9). Some instances of 
either the longer or shorter form reverse the order of the pair in Exod 34:6, reading “gracious and 
compassionate” (Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2; Pss 111:4; 112:4; 145:8; Neh 9:17, 31; 2 Chr 30:9). Finally, one 
instance of !wnx appears with a participle of ~xr (~xer:m.), God is the “gracious” and “righteous” and 
“compassionate one” (Ps 116:5); cf. Isa 49:15. The adjective appears without !wnx only twice (Deut 4:31; Ps 
78:38). 
275
 See 2 Sam 24:14; Isa 63:7; Pss 51:1; 69:16; 119:156; Dan 9:18; Neh 9:19, 27, 31; 1 Chr 21:13), 
and once “exceedingly great” (br + dam) (1 Chr 21:13). This is similar to the many usages of br + dsx.  
276




First, divine ~xr is responsive and profoundly emotional. Over and over again the term 
exhibits intense feelings of affection and/or compassion for the plight of human beings.
277
 It often 
appears not merely as a willed affection, but actually affected and/or aroused, an emotion that is 
responsive to the actual state of affairs. At times, the striking magnitude of God’s tender 
compassion is compared to that of a father and/or mother for their children (Isa 49:15; Jer 31:20; 
Ps 103:13; cf. Isa 63:15). Second, and closely related, the emotion comes to fruition in a 
corresponding action that goes out toward one who is in distress or needs help.
278
 With divine 
agency, God’s compassion often results in beneficence, forgiveness, and the removal of anger (cf. 
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 With human agency the term also refers to strong emotional feelings of love and compassion 
between family members including: Joseph for his brother (Gen 43:30), a mother for her endangered infant 
(1 Kgs 3:26), and a father for his children (Ps 103:13). In the first two, ~xr is collocated with rmk to form a 
phrase that connotes profound and intense emotion. When Joseph saw Benjamin, he “was deeply stirred . . . 
and sought out a place to weep . . . and wept” (Gen 43:30). JPS translates, “he was overcome with feeling 
toward his brother and was on the verge of tears.” This emotion is so strong it is apparently “beyond his 
ability to control.” Clark, The Word Hesed, 148. This same collocation refers to the mother “deeply stirred” 
over her infant in the baby custody case before Solomon (1 Kgs 3:26); cf. Ps 103:13; Zech 7:9. 
278
 With divine agency see, for example, Jer 42:12; Neh 9:27. Many have thus suggested that ~xr 
is compassion from a superior to an inferior. Waltke, The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1:1–15:29, 527; 
Stoebe, TLOT 3:1227. Coppes suggests this is usually the case. “רחם,” TWOT 841. While this is true for the 
majority of cases, the psalmist declares, “I love You, O LORD” (Ps 18:1 [2]), the only occurrence where 
~xr is in the qal and the only instance of God as the object of ~xr. This one case of divine ~xr toward God 
would rule out the universality of such a trend, if it is taken as a valid instance. Many have considered this 
to be a textual corruption or scribal gloss, especially since this phrase does not appear in the parallel in 2 
Sam 22:2. However, textual data favor its validity and the proposed emendations are not very compelling; 
cf. Simian-Yofre, TDOT 13:444. Simian-Yofre points out that “Ps. 116, which appears to presuppose Ps. 18 
. . . uses ’hb instead of rhm” and thus sees Ps 18 as an Aramaism. Ibid.; cf. Stoebe, TLOT 3:1227. Coppes 
sees it as a valid expression of the Psalmist’s love for God. “ םרח ,” TWOT 841; cf. Good, “Love in the OT,” 
IDB 3:165. In the absence of compelling data to the contrary, this study considers the text to be a valid 
representation of human love (~xr) toward God. For our purposes, then, it seems best to recognize that ~xr 
most often (but not always) connotes beneficence from one in a position to bestow mercy on one in need. 
Girdlestone, accordingly, states that ~xr expresses “a deep and tender feeling of compassion, such as is 
aroused by the sight of weakness or suffering in those that are dear to us or need our help.” Robert Baker 
Girdlestone, Synonyms of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1948), 108; cf. Cranfield, 
“Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. Richardson), 131; Clark, The Word Hesed, 148; Butterworth, “רחם,” 
NIDOTTE 3:1093; Simian-Yofre, TDOT 13:451. The negated word group with human agency may also 
refer to the absence of compassion, especially in the context of war (Isa 13:18; 47:6; Jer 21:7; Amos 1:11). 
Although Michael A. Fishbane suggests the interpretation of “friends, allies” for ~ymxr here, it does not fit 
the broader meaning of the term. “Treaty Background of Amos 1:11 and Related Matters,” JBL 89 (1970): 
313–18; idem, “Additional Remarks on Rhmyh (Amos 1:11),” 91 (1972): 391–92. Simian-Yofre points out, 
“Etymological evidence stands in the way of accepting Fishbane’s proposal to translate rahamim as 
‘friends, allies.’” TDOT 13:448. Robert B. Coote agrees with Fishbane on the legal meaning, but not with 
regard to his suggested etymology. “Amos 1:11: RHMYW,” JBL 90 (1971): 206–8. Within such a context, 






 Accordingly, divine ~xr is repeatedly contrasted with God’s wrath.280 Third, 
God’s ~xr extends far beyond the covenant and any responsibility and/or expectations, moral or 
otherwise, due to his willingness to bestow compassion on the undeserving out of his profound 
love. Divine ~xr is freely given and unmerited.281 Fourth, divine ~xr is, nevertheless, not 
unilaterally constant. Rather, it is conditional upon various factors.
282
 Such contingency of divine 
compassion, including that it may be withdrawn, is well attested.
283
 Fifth, God’s compassion is 
both particular and universal. On the one hand, God’s compassion extends universally. He “is 
good to all, and His mercies are over all His works” (Ps 145:9).
284
 However, as shall be seen 
                                                     
 
279
 See also 1 Kgs 8:50; Isa 55:7; Jer 30:18; 42:12; Ezek 39:25; Hos 1:6; 2:23; 14:3; Mic 7:19; 
Zech 1:16; 10:6; Dan 9:9. The results of divine compassion further include the bestowal of goodness (Isa 
63:7), renewal of election (Isa 14:1; cf. Zech 1:16–17), betrothal to him (Hos 2:19 [21]), and all kinds of 
blessing, such as the relieving of hunger and thirst (Isa 49:10). God may even extend ~xr through human 
agents (Gen 43:14; 1 Kgs 8:50; Jer 42:12; Ps 106:46; Neh 1:11; Dan 1:9). 
280
 Deut 13:17 [18]; 29:28; 30:2–3; Isa 54:7–8; 60:10; Jer 12:15; Zech 1:12; Pss 77:9; 78:38. 
Divine compassion is thus, as it were, the antidote to divine wrath, the former far outlasting the latter (cf. 
Isa 54:10; Jer 33:26). As has been seen, the lasting nature of this compassion surpasses even that of a 
mother for her young child (Isa 49:15; cf. 49:13).  
281
 Thus, Simian-Yofre comments, “When the people suffer affliction, rhm can denote the 
unmerited revelation of Yahweh’s benevolence.” TDOT 13:442. Often, there is no semblance of an external 
basis upon which God ought to bestow compassion. Nevertheless, humans continually call upon God to 
respond in compassion with the expectation that he will hear and respond (1 Kgs 8:50; Hab 3:2; Pss 25:6; 
51:1; 69:16; 79:8; 119:77; Dan 2:18 [Aramaic]; 9:18). However, it is important to recognize that this call is 
not based in any obligation of God, nor external warrant but, rather, humans appeal because they recall 
God’s past compassion, and ultimately, his character (cf. Exod 33:19; 34:6–7). See also 2 Sam 24:14; 1 Chr 
21:13; Pss 40:11; 102:13; Lam 3:32. 
282
 Why is God’s compassion bestowed some times and not others? Numerous grounds of divine 
compassion are apparent, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, including divine freedom, zeal for 
his name, the responsiveness of the people, etc.; cf. 2 Kgs 13:23; Jer 42:12; Ezek 39:25. The contingency of 
divine compassion and factors involved will be discussed further below. 
283
 See Deut 13:17–18 [18–19]; 30:2–3; 2 Kgs 13:23; Isa 55:7; Jer 42:12–16; Ps 103:13; Prov 
28:13; 2 Chr 30:9. The withdrawal of divine compassion is evident in the frequent references where 
compassion has been withdrawn or withheld (Isa 9:17 [16]; 27:11; 63:15; Jer 13:14; 16:5; Hos 1:6–7; 2:4; 
Zech 1:12; Ps 77:9 [10]). However, it must be understood that the withdrawal of divine ~xr is never 
depicted as an arbitrary whim of God, but always stems from the persistent and egregious shortcomings of 
the people. God wants to be merciful and manifest his love (cf. Isa 30:18; Lam 3:32–33). See the canonical 
analysis for discussions of these and other verses regarding divine compassion. 
284
 Thus, God’s compassion is not restricted to his covenant people or elect. Elsewhere, it is also 
clear that ~xr extends beyond Israel/Judah, since the neighboring nations may receive divine ~xr in Jer 




below, this need not entail that divine ~xr is universal or constant in every respect. Some people 
are privy to divine compassion while others may forfeit it. Nevertheless, God desires to 
continually bestow compassion on human beings; it is an integral facet of God’s love. 
A Brief Survey of anq 
The word group anq denotes the very strong emotions of ardor and intense passion, 
related to a basic sense of zeal, passion, or jealousy, for that which belongs to one, or envy for 
that which belongs to someone else.
285
 As such, it is closely associated with God’s love for his 
people.
286
 However, the term is never used to denote divine envy, but always for that rightful 
passion that God has for the exclusive relationship his people are to have to him, analogous to 
that which spouses ought to have in a marriage relationship.
287
 In English usage, however, the 
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 Many have suggested a connection to the Arabic qana’a meaning intensely red, thinking that 
this lexeme derives from that redness of face associated with intense emotion. Sarna, Exodus, 110; “קנא,” 
BDB, 888; Jacob Milgrom, Numbers (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1990), 216; Thomas B. 
Dozeman, “The Book of Numbers: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections,” in Numbers–Samuel (vol. 
2 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1998), 201. However, the etymology is uncertain and other 
scholars have suggested the link is tenuous at best. G. Sauer, “קנא,” TLOT 3:1145; E. Reuter, “קנא,” TDOT 
13:48. Although etymology is uncertain, “the meanings of cognates in other Sem. languages roughly 
correspond to the semantic range of the Heb. root.” H. G. L Peels, “קנא,” NIDOTTE 3:937. In human usage 
the emotionality of this term is readily apparent, often responsive to the infidelity of a loved one. See Num 
5:14–15, 18, 25, 29–30; Prov 6:34; 27:4; Cant 8:6; Eccl 9:6.  
286
 Numerous scholars recognize a close association between passion and divine love. Cf. Pierre 
Buis, Le Deutéronome (Paris: Beauchesne, 1969), 59. In fact, Coppes even suggests that hanq represents 
God’s “arduous love.” Leonard J. Coppes, “קנא,” TWOT 802. Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy, 138; 
Christensen, Deuteronomy 1–11, 87; Tigay, Deuteronomy, 65; Block, The Book of Ezekiel: Chapters 1–24, 
211; Andersen and Freedman, Hosea, 187; Baruch A. Levine, Numbers 21–36 (AB 4A; New York: 
Doubleday, 2000), 289. Weinfeld comments, “The basic meaning of qn,’ which is ‘jealousy,’ applies also 
to passionate love. Love causes jealousy, and jealousy brings anger that burns like fire (Deut 4:22; 23:21–
22).” Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1–11, 296. Because “the covenant relationship was one of love,” when Israel 
forgot their “first love,” the divine response was appropriately jealousy. Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy, 
138. Craigie even refers to jealousy as “the reverse of the coin of love.” Ibid. Reuter thinks bha “functions 
both as an antonym and a prerequisite (meeting of extremes) of qn.’” Reuter, TDOT 13:49. Likewise, anq 
may be manifest in “passionate love” or “vitriolic hatred.” Ibid., 57. 
287
 Longman notes that two kinds of relationships qualify for appropriate jealousy, the husband-
wife and divine-human relationships. “God’s jealousy is an energy that tries to rescue the relationship. 
Similarly, a man and a woman can have only one spouse. If there is a threat to that relationship, then 
jealousy is a proper emotion. All this is because so much hangs on the integrity of relationship. It is so 
basic, so deep, that it stirs up strong emotions and passions.” Tremper Longman III, Song of Songs (Grand 




term jealousy has primarily taken on the negative connotation of envy, whereas in Hebrew the 
basic lexeme anq may refer to a positive emotion that results in action protective of a rightful 
possession or relation, or it may relate to a negative, inappropriate, destructive emotion akin to 
envy or covetousness.
288
 The combination of anq + preposition B suggests the latter negative 
emotion of envy (e.g., “envy” in Prov 3:31), never used of God,
289
 whereas the construction of anq 
+ l suggests the former, an appropriate passion or righteous ardor with action on behalf of its 
object, of both humans (e.g., “zealous” in 1 Kgs 19:10) or of God (e.g., Zech 8:2).
290
 As such, the 
negative connotations of “jealousy” are often absent from the term anq and such negative emotion 
is never connoted by the term with God as agent.
291
 
anq describes a crucial divine characteristic: God’s passionate love for his people, which 
is displayed in fiery jealousy when his people are unfaithful to him.
292
 This stands in contrast to 
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 The group is manifested in the substantive hanq (43 x), the verbal (34 x), mostly in piel (30 x), 
but in a few instances hiphil (4 x), and two adjectival forms aN”q; (6 x) and aANq; (2 x). The majority of 
occurrences of the root in the substantive are related to divine passion (24 x) and the adjectival forms are 
only descriptive of God.  
289
 See Gen 26:14; 30:1; 37:11; Isa 11:13; Ezek 31:9; 35:11; Eccl 4:4. Numerous cautions to not 
be “envious” of evil in various forms appear (Pss 37:1; 73:3; Prov 1:31; 14:30; 23:17; 24:1, 19; Job 5:2). 
290
 Of God, see also Ezek 39:25; Joel 2:18; Zech 1:14; 8:2. See Reuter, TDOT 13:49; Peels, 
NIDOTTE 4:938. Of humans, see 2 Sam 21:2; 1 Kgs 19:10, 14; 2 Kgs 10:16; Pss 69:9; 119:39; cf. Num 
11:29. In such contexts, “jealousy is best understood as the actualization of passion confronted by a threat.” 
Reuter, TDOT 13:50. 
291
 For this reason, Peels believes that “the translation ‘jealous’ is, therefore, [often] inadequate.” 
NIDOTTE 4:939. Cf. Mordechai Cogan, 1 Kings: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary 
(AB 10; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 386. See also H. A. Brongers, who thinks a more general meaning 
of being angry better suits the term. “Der eifer des Herrn Zebaoth,” VT 13 (1963): 280. However, while 
recognizing that the common negative connotation of jealousy may be reason to substitute a word like 
passion, Longman points out that “it is important to understand that the Bible affirms a proper type of 
jealousy, a desire for someone else that tolerates no rivals.” Longman III, Song of Songs, 211. 
292
 Thus God is repeatedly presented as a “jealous God” anq la (Exod 20:5; 34:14; Deut 4:24; 5:9; 
6:15) or awnq la (Josh 24:19; Nah 1:2), always in the context of the exclusive worship required by God. 
Sarna translates this as “an impassioned God.” Exodus, 110. This denotes God’s “intolerance of rivalry or 
unfaithfulness.” Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1–11, 208. Eichrodt considers this to be the “basic element in the 
whole OT idea of God.” Eichrodt, Theology, 210. As such, it “concerns the central characteristic of OT 
belief: Yahweh’s demand that he alone be worshiped, enshrined in the great commandment.” Reuter, 
TDOT 13:53. Thus, Nahum speaks of God as a God “jealous and avenging” toward his enemies (Nah 1:2; 




depictions of other gods in the ANE who may be envious of one another but no deity manifests 
“zeal in relation to his worshiper.”
293
 In contrast, God is never jealous of other gods or idols or 
any kind of being, but is passionate for his name and his people. Accordingly, it is used of God’s 
passion for Israel as her husband in the marriage analogy (cf. Ezek 16:38, 42; 23:25).
294
 As such, 
anq is an intensely emotive term that assumes divine passibility and may be manifested 
negatively, against the unfaithful,
295
 or positively, on behalf of his people and against her 
oppressors.
296
 Due to theological presuppositions, anq has sometimes been interpreted as a mere 
anthropopathism.
297
 However, such a position requires appeal to extra-biblical suppositions and 
                                                     
 
“arouse His zeal” (Isa 42:13).  
293
 Sauer, TLOT 3:1146. 
294
 Although the term is used of God only with explicit reference to the marriage analogy in 
Ezekiel, many scholars have sensed the connotation throughout the wider usage of the term. Weinfeld, 
Deuteronomy 1–11, 296; Tigay, Deuteronomy, 65; Sarna, Exodus, 110; Fretheim, Exodus, 227; Propp, 
Exodus 19–40, 615; Coppes, “קנא,” TWOT 802. Reuter points out that though the language is different, 
since Hosea does not use the lexeme anq, “in substance . . . the similarity to Hosea is unmistakable.” Reuter, 
TDOT 13:54. In such usage, the term represents “the fire of divine passion, Yahweh’s enthusiasm for his 
covenant relationship with Israel . . . arising out of the profundity of his covenant love.” Block, The Book of 
Ezekiel: Chapters 1–24, 211. See Exod 20:5; Deut 5:9; Num 25:8, 11; Deut 29:20 [19]. 
295
 Throughout Israel’s history they made him “jealous with strange gods” and “provoked” [s[k] 
him (Deut 32:16, 21; 4:24–25; Ps 78:58). It is noteworthy that in all four instances of anq in the hiphil God 
is the patient (Deut 32:16, 21; Ezek 8:3; Ps 78:58). Elsewhere, Israel’s infidelity occasions divine jealousy 
(1 Kgs 14:22; Ezek 5:13; 8:3, 5; 16:38, 42; 23:25; Pss 78:58; 79:5). Thus, he is explicitly caused to be 
jealous by idolatry. Divine jealousy is associated with numerous other terms for divine anger as well, 
denoting the result of his passion directed at unfaithfulness of evil. 
296
 Isaiah specifically describes God’s “zeal for the people,” which prompts divine judgment (fire) 
on her enemies (Isa 26:11; cf. 42:13). See also 2 Kgs 19:31; Isa 9:7; 37:32; 63:15; Ezek 35:6; 36:5; 38:19; 
39:25; Joel 2:18; Nah 1:2; Zech 1:14; 8:2–3. In such contexts, “God is understood as watching 
jealously/zealously over his people” in his love. Reuter, TDOT 13:57; cf. Peels, NIDOTTE 4:939. 
Brueggemann puts it this way, “Negatively, this jealous God is one of deep moral seriousness who takes 
affront at violations of commands, so that the cost of the affront endures over the generations (34:7b). 
Positively, this jealous God is one who practices massive fidelity [dsx] to those who are willing to live in 
covenant (34:6–7a).” Brueggemann, “The Book of Exodus,” in Genesis to Leviticus, 1: 842. Stuart adds, 
“We would especially remind the reader that God’s jealousy, including the demand that he be exclusively 
worshiped, does not arise from petty motives but from beneficent ones. The problem with idols is not that 
they make God feel bad but that they cannot save, thus keeping from salvation those he wants to see gain 
eternal life. His hatred of idols reflects his love for us, not any insecurity with regard to himself.” Exodus, 
724.  
297
 For instance, Brongers refers to divine jealousy as “a crude anthropopathism” from which the 




does not do justice to the textual data.
298
 In all, this term denotes God’s intense, impassioned 
interest in his people, particularly the special and sacred relationship between them.
299
 
Concern, Compassion, and Passion in the Torah 
God speaks the world into existence (Gen 1) yet intimately forms man from the ground, 
breathes life into him (Gen 2:7–8), and even “walks” in the garden seeking fellowship with 
humans (Gen 3:8).
300
 However, the Fall presents a serious rupture in the divine-human 
relationship, significantly altering the level of intimacy going forward. Nevertheless, God remains 
intensely interested in, and concerned for, the world despite the rebellion of his creatures.
301
 In 
the aftermath of the Fall, God finds a way to continue his presence among his people through the 
sanctuary.
302
 Thus, God is concerned about his people and does not abandon them. He regards, 
                                                     
 
TLOT 3:1147.  
298
 Reuter rightly points out, “this concern only serves the Stoic notion of divine impassibility, 
which is inconsistent with the biblical understanding of God but is often espoused nevertheless by both 
Christian and Jewish theology, creating problems of exegesis.” TDOT 13:53; cf. Tigay, Deuteronomy, 66. 
See especially the discussion of anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms in chapter 1. 
299
 This “term emphasizes that God cannot be indifferent to His creatures and that He is deeply 
involved in human affairs.” Sarna, Exodus, 110. Thus, “God’s “jealousy” clearly has the best interest of his 
creation in view. Just as a screeching mother mockingbird terrorizes any feline that comes near her nest, so 
the Lord zealously hovers over his own to avert any rival to his sovereignty and centrality.” Robertson, The 
Books, 60.  
300
 Although source criticism assumes discontinuity between the two creation accounts, this 
sympathetic canonical reading considers the viewpoints as complementary unless such a view is necessarily 
incoherent. The intimacy of the second depiction of the creation of humankind is quite striking. Derek 
Kidner comments, “Breathed is warmly personal, with the face-to-face intimacy of a kiss and the 
significance that this was giving as well as making; and self-giving at that.” Genesis (Downers Grove, Ill.: 
InterVarsity Press, 1967), 60. Further, “walks” (%Leh;t.mi) is a hitpael, which “suggests iterative and habitual 
aspects.” Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1–17, 192. In other words, the text implies that God 
often walked in the garden. Consider a similar usage of the term to signify God’s presence in the sanctuary 
(Lev 26:12; Deut 23:15 [14]; 2 Sam 7:6–7). 
301
 Fretheim comments, “These chapters imply that the divine sovereignty in creation is 
understood, not in terms of absolute divine control, but as a sovereignty that gives power to the created for 
the sake of a relationship of integrity. Such a view involves risk, since it entails the possibility that the 
creatures will misuse the power they have been given, which does occur.” Fretheim, “The Book of 
Genesis,” in Genesis to Leviticus, 1:356. 
302
 Thus God is also said to “walk among” his people and be their God, a reference to his presence 




sees, and takes appropriate action.
303
 God hears and responds accordingly. God remembers and 
moves.
304
 He delights, and, at times, grieves, over his people. Altogether, a striking picture is 
presented of a God who is deeply interested in human affairs, who notices the goings on of 
history, who is consistently concerned about and invested in the world, and such concern spurs 
him to appropriate action. Accordingly, God is recurrently presented as affected by, and 
responsive to, his people. Yet, due to the immense holiness of God on the one hand and the 
sinfulness of the people on the other, a palpable tension is woven throughout the OT that provides 
numerous pictures of heightened divine emotion, even grief, anger, and jealousy, yet divine 
concern, compassion, and lovingkindness reign supreme.  
                                                     
 
26:12; cf. Deut 23:15 [14]; cf. 2 Sam 7:6–7; 1 Chr 17:6). 
303
 For instance, God looks (h['v') upon Abel and his offering with approval, in contrast to the 
disapproval and disregard (h['_v' al{) for Cain and his offering (Gen 4:5); cf. Gen 4:10, 13–15. 
304
 For instance, in the midst of the flood, God “remembers” (rk;z) Noah (Gen 8:1; cf. 9:15–16), 
which leads to the recession of the waters. Importantly, divine remembrance does not depict “calling to 
mind” so much as a focus on the object of memory. See Mathews, Genesis 1–11:26, 382; Sarna, Genesis, 
56; Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1–17, 299. As the focus changes from universal to more local 
concerns in the patriarchal narratives, God continues to display intimate personal concern for his people. 
He spares Lot from destruction on the basis of remembrance of Abraham (Gen 19:29). In the Akedah 
narrative, he is Yahweh-yireh, “the Lord sees” (Gen 22:14; cf. 22:8). He does not forsake (bz:[') his 
lovingkindness toward Abraham but guides Abraham’s servant in the search for a wife for Isaac (Gen 
24:27). He promises not to abandon Jacob (Gen 28:15). Further, God manifests personal concern for Hagar, 
giving “heed” ([mv) to her distress (Gen 16:11; cf. 21:17) and for Leah, Jacob’s “unloved” and barren wife, 
both seeing and hearing her plight (Gen 29:31–33; 30:17; cf. 30:22) blessing both with a child; an explicit 
connection between favorable divine action and divine concern is thus apparent (cf. Gen 21:17; 30:22). 
Similarly, God “saw” Jacob’s affliction by Laban, and provided for him (Gen 31:42). God “heard” ([mv), 
“remembered” (rkz), “saw” (har) and “took notice” ([dy) of Israel in Egyptian bondage and delivered them 
(Exod 2:23–25; cf. 3:7–8, 16; 4:31; 6:4–5) for he was “indeed concerned about” them (Exod 3:16; cf. Gen 
21:1). In Exod 2:23–24, direct responsiveness is evident even in the number of verbs. Israel cries out by use 
of four verbs and God’s taking notice of their cry is also expressed by four verbs. Sarna, Exodus, 13. 
Likewise, a number of scholars recognize that God’s action is a response at least partially caused by 
entreaty. Stuart, Exodus, 103; Brueggemann, “The Book of Exodus,” in Genesis to Leviticus, 1:706; cf. 1 
Sam 9:16. On the other hand, God also hears Israel’s grumblings and complaints (Exod 16:8; Num 11:1; 
12:2; Deut 1:34) and responds in kind. God lovingly and patiently leads and guides his people like a 
shepherd (Exod 15:13). Such expressions collectively refer to God’s attention. The sense is not that he 
previously could not see or hear, had forgotten, or was unconcerned, but that now God is about to respond 
to his people with power. Stuart claims, “The different wordings [including paqad] are all variations of an 
idiom that is essentially a synecdoche—a part for the whole—in which because of God’s nature, his own 
overt mention of his being aware automatically implies additionally his determination to act.” Exodus, 123. 




For instance, at the observance of the extreme wickedness on the earth before the flood, 
God is deeply “grieved [bc[] in his heart” and “sorry” (~xn) that he made humans (Gen 6:6–7).305 
In this context, the reference is clearly to God’s deep emotion of sorrow and grief. God is pained 
by the wickedness on the earth and responds with judgment: the flood (Gen 6–9).
306
 The 
appearance of profound divine sorrow is striking in that it depicts God in terms of passibility 
nearly from the outset of the Genesis account. The term ~xn is also used to describe God’s 
“compassion” toward his people (Deut 32:36) and appears in the description of Moses’ pleading 
with God to turn (bwv) from his anger and even change (~xn) his intention toward his people, 
eventually resulting in a re-institution of the broken covenant relationship (Exod 32:12) and God 
does, in fact, relent (Exod 34:14).
307
 However, God is certainly not altogether passive; there are 
                                                     
 
305
 God is not just “grieved” but “grieved to his heart,” emphasizing the intensity of the divine 
emotion. Thus, Matthews speaks of “God’s fervent passion” and his “wounded ‘heart’ filled with pain,” 
which “conveys the emotional response of God” and even “emotional anguish.” Genesis 1–11:26, 341–42; 
cf. von Rad, Genesis, 118. “In other words, he felt the bitter rage of someone whose closest friend had been 
terribly wronged. This is the anger of someone who loves deeply.” Wenham, Genesis 1–15, 146. Sarna, 
however, for apparently non-textual reasons, sees this as an anthropopathism. Genesis, 47. The lexeme bc[ 
appears only a few times in the Torah, all in Genesis (3:16; 5:29; 34:7; 45:5). Beyond the usage of divine 
grief here in Genesis, God is also said to be “grieved” by rebellion (Isa 63:10; Ps 78:40). The meaning of 
bc[ with human subjects may denote physical pain, such as that in childbirth (Gen 3:16; 1 Chr 4:9) or in toil 
(Gen 5:29; Isa 14:3; cf. 58:3; Ps 127:2; Prov 5:10; 14:23; Eccl 10:9), or by extension denotes emotional 
suffering, such as the grief of Dinah’s brothers after she was raped (Gen 34:7) or the potential grief of 
Joseph’s brothers over selling him into slavery (Gen 45:5), and various other kinds of emotional grief (1 
Sam 20:3, 34; 2 Sam 19:2 [3]; 1 Kgs 1:6; Isa 54:6; Prov 10:22; Neh 8:10; 1 Chr 4:10–11). It is also used in 
reference to the “distortion” of God’s words (Ps 56:5) or to a “harsh” word (Prov 15:1), a grievous way (Ps 
139:24). This is not to be confused with bc[ meaning make or shape, the nominal form of which refers 
often to idols. 
306
 God’s action is prompted by his observance (har) of the extent of evil (Gen 6:5, 12) in contrast 
to God’s sight (har) of his creation, which was good (Gen 1:31), and Noah whom God saw (har) as 
righteous (Gen 7:1). Sarna suggests that “the LORD saw” has “juridical overtones, implying both 
investigation of the facts and readiness for action.” Genesis, 47. Thus, later God “saw” Israel’s idolatry and 
spurned them (Deut 32:19). This may be why the Israelites invoke God to “look upon” how Moses has 
made them odious to Pharaoh (Exod 5:21). 
307
 ~xn, the most prominent term related to compassion other than ~xr, may take on various 
meanings, depending upon its context and form, which include: to comfort or have compassion, be 
comforted, or comfort oneself, to mourn or be sorry, and to relent/change one’s mind. However, the 
common theme throughout its usage is that ~xn often appears in a situation that prompts intense grief or 
regret and connotes the emotion and/or active response to that situation. Thus, the feeling of sorrow or 
regret is associated with the action of repenting, that is, changing action accordingly. Thus, Stoebe groups 




some decisions of God that he will not change, thus the declaration, “God is not a man, that he 
should lie, nor a son of man, that he should repent [hitpael]” (Num 23:19; cf. 1 Sam 15:29).
308
  
                                                     
 
2:734. He goes on to note that in the niphal the term “is never sorrowful resignation but always has 
concrete consequences.” Ibid., 738. In other words, it is not just felt but acted upon. ~xn may be used with 
both human and divine agency. In various human usages, the term often takes the meaning: to comfort 
someone else or to mourn (piel), be comforted by someone (niphal), or comfort/appease oneself (hitpael) or 
the lack of such comfort. The related term ~wxnt refers to consolation (Isa 66:11; Jer 16:7; Ps 94:19; Job 
15:11; 21:2). When the verb appears in the niphal, it may also refer to changing one’s mind, repenting 
(Exod 31:17; Jer 8:6; 31:19; Job 42:6), or being “sorry” (Judg 21:6, 15). All these usages are grounded in a 
situation that prompts, or should prompt, intense grief or regret.  
With divine agency ~xn often refers to comfort and/or compassion. In nominal forms, the root 
likewise may refer to “comfort” given by God (Isa 57:17–18; cf. Zech 1:13) or to the presence or absence 
of divine compassion, which is clearly emotive (Hos 11:8; 13:14). In the piel, the verb refers to divine 
comfort toward the people (or the lack thereof), which may result in compassion and the turning away of 
anger (Isa 12:1; 49:13; cf. 51:3, 12, 19; 52:9; 61:2; 66:13; Jer 31:13; Zech 1:17; Pss 23:4; 71:21; 86:17; 
119:76, 82). In the pual, it refers to those comforted or not comforted (Isa 54:11; 66:13). In hitpael various 
meanings are presented in a small number of occurrences. First, it is declared that God “will have 
compassion on his servants” (Deut 32:36; Ps 135:14). In another instance it refers to God being “appeased” 
(Ezek 5:13). In still another, God is contrasted with humans, specifically that he is not “man, that he should 
repent” (Num 23:19). The term may also refer to profound divine emotions akin to compassion (cf. Hos 
11:8). With God as subject the verb most often appears in the niphal, which may denote divine sorrow 
and/or grief (Gen 6:6–7; 1 Sam 15:11, 35), being “moved to pity” or “feeling sympathy for” (Judg 2:18; cf. 
Ps 90:13), and/or relenting, or changing course in action (Exod 32:12, 14; 2 Sam 24:16; Isa 57:6; Jer 26:19; 
Joel 2:13–14; Jonah 3:9–10; 4:2; Amos 7:3, 6; Ps 106:45; 1 Chr 21:15; cf. Isa 1:24). Jeremiah 18:1–10 is 
perhaps the capstone passage that lays out God’s willingness to relent in accordance with human 
repentance. If humans change course, God’s responsive action will change accordingly (cf. Jer 26:3, 13; 
42:10). In fact, in one instance, God has relented so often that he is “tired of relenting” (Jer 15:6).  
308
 Similarly, 1 Sam 15:29 states, God “will not lie or change His mind; for He is not a man that 
He should change His mind.” These verses have sometimes been taken to mean that God can’t actually 
relent or change his mind. However, both of these occurrences use ~xn to contrast with one who would not 
keep his word, thus implying that here the declaration is to emphasize the surety and irrevocability of 
God’s decision in that specific instance. Moreover, with regard to the usage in 1 Sam 15:29, within the 
same chapter it is said twice, both before and after the above statement and in the same form (niphal), that 
God was “sorry” (~xn) he had made Saul king (1 Sam 15:11, 35). This is an apparent contradiction unless 
one understands that contextually the meaning in 1 Sam 15:29 appears to relate to the finality of God’s 
rejection of Saul, not the nature of God. An explicit usage of such finality of divine decision appears in a 
divine declaration in Jeremiah, “I have spoken, I have purposed, and I will not change My mind” (Jer 4:28). 
That this is not a blanket policy appears clear in that later God himself declares at length that he will indeed 
relent in accordance with human repentance (Jer 18:1–10 et al.). In this way, the term is used in a number 
of instances in the niphal to show that God’s decision is final, whether positively (Ps 110:4) or when God 
carries out judgment without relenting (1 Sam 15:29; Jer 4:28; 20:16; Zech 8:14) and in one such instance 
the lack of ~xn is collocated with the lack of relenting ([rp) and pity (swx; Ezek 24:14). In such usages the 
term refers to the finality of the divine decision, not to the ontological possibility of divine relenting. 
Butterworth notes, “God does not capriciously change his intentions or ways of acting. It is the change in 
Saul’s behavior that leads to this expression of regret.” “נחם,” NIDOTTE 3:82. Some scholars, however, 
relieve the tension by simply positing that the term is “anthropopathic” and thus “from man’s limited, 
earthly, finite perspective it only appears that God’s purposes have changed.” Marvin R. Wilson, “נחם,” 
TWOT 571. For a response, see Peckham, “The Passible Potter,” 130–50. Although some scholars have 
suggested that God is absolutely immutable, numerous scholars recognize that the Bible depicts God as 




Divine passibility and emotionality are further apparent in that God is often provoked to 
anger (s[k), that is, “vexed” by Israel’s evil, often in the form of idolatry, due in part to his great 
love and passion (hanq) for his people (Deut 32:16, 21; cf. Exod 32:11; Ezek 16:42; Ps 78:58).309 
Though the OT unashamedly depicts divine anger, God’s wrath is never arbitrary but is always a 
result of human action that provokes God because he loves his people so deeply. In the aftermath 
of Israel’s apostasy with the golden calf, God’s anger runs high with “burning anger” (Exod 
32:11) but God is successfully entreated by Moses to turn from his anger, eventually resulting in 
a re-institution of the broken covenant relationship (Exod 32:12–14; 33:12–34:10; cf. Gen 18:22–
32; Lev 26:41–42, 45; Num 14:13–19; Deut 3:23; 9:25–28).
310
 Out of this exchange in which God 
                                                     
 
suggest that “to repent concerning [threatened/real] calamity” is “fundamental to the divine nature.” Block, 
Judges, Ruth, 131. Van Dyke Parunak points to the underlying conception of comfort, consolation or 
compassion and asserts that the root entails both “change” and sorrow” “in the sense of emotional pain,” 
even at times sympathy, but no “suggestion of regret.” Parunak, “A Semantic Survey,” 513, 532. See also 
Stuart, Exodus, 672; Brueggemann, “The Book of Exodus,” in Genesis to Leviticus, 1:932; Peckham, “The 
Passible Potter”; Terence E. Fretheim, The Suffering of God: An Old Testament Perspective (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1984); David N. Freedman, Divine Commitment and Human Obligation: Selected Writings 
of David Noel Freedman (2 vols.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997), 1:409–46; Terence E. Fretheim, 
“The Repentance of God: A Key to Evaluating Old Testament God-Talk,” Horizons in Biblical Theology 
10 (1988): 47–70. God can and does relent, but in some situations he will not relent. As such, God can and 
does change direction, and can be affected by human affairs, but he is nevertheless sovereign. Paying 
attention to the form and context of ~xn is essential to understanding its meaning in the Old Testament. 
309
 Craigie sees not only anger but also sorrow in the context of Deut 32. “The behavior of the 
Israelites vexed God; he had a fatherly concern for them as his sons and daughters, so that to see them 
rejecting his love caused him not only anger, but also pain . . . for a loving Father finds it hard to look on 
while his children invite disaster by their sinful behavior.” The Book of Deuteronomy, 383. Such apostasy 
brings real pain and vexation (s[k) to God, a recurring theme throughout the OT (cf. Deut 4:25; 9:18; 
31:29; 32:16, 19, 21; Judg 2:12; 1 Kgs 14:9, 15; 15:30; 16:2, 7, 13, 26, 33; 21:22; 22:54; 2 Kgs 17:11, 17; 2 
Kgs 21:6, 15; 22:17; 23:19, 26; Isa 65:3; Jer 7:18–19; 8:19; 11:17; 25:6–7; 32:29–30, 32; 44:3, 8; Ezek 
8:17; 16:26; 20:28; Hos 12:14 [15]; Pss 78:58; 85:4 [5]; 106:29; 2 Chr 28:25; 33:6; 34:25; cf. Deut 32:27). 
In one such instance, due to such provocation, God is said to “spurn” the people, which means to treat them 
with contempt (Deut 32:19). Yet, God looks forward to a time when he will be vexed “no more” (Ezek 
16:42). It also refers to various kinds of provocation and vexation in human usage (1 Sam 1:6–7, 16; Pss 
6:7 [8]; 10:14; 31:10 [9]; 112:10; Prov 12:16; 17:25; 21:19; 27:3; Eccl 1:18; 2:23; 5:17; 7:3, 9; 11:10; 32:9; 
Neh 4:1 [3:33]; 4:5 [3:37]; 2 Chr 16:10). Craigie points out, “the anger of God is an awesome and terrible 
thing exactly because it follows from a rejection of the equally pervasive love of God.” The Book of 
Deuteronomy, 384. 
310
 Moses persistently entreats God, reminding God of his declaration that he had “found favor” in 
God’s sight and pleading that God would act on that basis (Exod 33:12–13, 16; cf. 34:9) to which God 
agrees (Exod 33:17), resulting ultimately in forgiveness, the renewal of covenant, and a wonderful self-
revelation of God’s character (Exod 33:19; 34:6–7). The importance of this cannot be overestimated. 




enters into personal give-and-take dialogue with Moses, he responds to Moses’ request to see his 
glory (Exod 33:18) by proclaiming that he will make all of his goodness pass by and “will 
proclaim before you the name LORD, and the grace that I grant and the compassion that I show” 
(Exod 33:19, JPS). This emphatic phrase that binds divine compassion and graciousness with 
God’s very name is further elaborated in what has become perhaps the locus classicus of all OT 
texts on God’s character, Exod 34:6–7.
311
 “The LORD, the LORD God, compassionate and 
gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in lovingkindness and truth” (Exod 34:6). As in Exod 
33:19, the proclamation of divine character is explicitly associated with his name, which is, 
among other things, compassionate and gracious. They are presented as core characteristics of 
God associated with, and perhaps descriptive of, his enduring, longsuffering patience signified by 
the idiomatic expression that God is “long of nose” (~yIP:ßa; %r<a,î). Since anger was metaphorically 
seen in the nose (think red) the length signifies the length of time it would take for one to become 
angry.
312
 In other words, God has great capacity to overcome his anger at sin and bestow grace 
and compassion.  
Yet, God is not compelled to be gracious. On the contrary, God has every right to destroy 
the people for their apostasy. Yet, his compassion reaches beyond the blessings and curses of 
covenant, providing a means for continuance of what would otherwise be a shattered relationship. 
                                                     
 
9:8; Num 14.11f; Ezek. 20.13ff.).” Childs, The Book of Exodus, 567. However, as Stuart comments, “God 
never desired to destroy his people in the first place, so he was willing to relent in response to Moses’ 
appeal (v. 14). Nevertheless, the threat was genuine rather than theoretical, and the response of God reveals 
his willingness to respond to prayer. Indeed, this is one of many passages in Scripture that demonstrate 
God’s responsiveness to the prayer of a righteous person prayed not for selfish reasons but out of a desire to 
see God’s will accomplished.” Stuart, Exodus, 672. Elsewhere, God repeatedly hears entreaty and responds 
(Deut 5:28; 9:19; 10:10; 26:7). God’s anger also may be “turned away” by swift action to deal with evil 
(Deut 13:17–18; Num 25:11) and/or priestly intercession (Num 16:41–50). 
311
 One need only consider the amount of allusions to this text throughout the OT to recognize its 
pervasive influence. For instance, consider Num 14:18; Neh 9:17; 31–32; Pss 86:15; 103:8, 17; 145:8; Jer 
32; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2; Nah 1:3. Moreover, this “is the only place [in the OT] where God actually 
described Himself, listing His own glorious attributes.” J. Carl Laney, “God’s Self-revelation in Exodus 
34:6–8,” Bibliotheca sacra 158 (2001): 36.  
312




This divine forbearance, grounded in his character of compassion and graciousness, among other 
attributes, is thus essential to the divine-human relationship; without divine compassion there 
could be no God-human relationship. Thus, throughout the Torah, compassion continues to 
function as the grounding of entreaty and the basis of deliverance (cf. Gen 19:16).
313
 Likewise, 
the divine graciousness (!wnx), as a characteristic of God, depicts his willingness to hear and 
respond to entreaty, closely associated with his compassion as in 34:6, but also independently 
portrays that he will hear the one who cries out, for he is “gracious” (Exod 22:27 [26]). As such, 
divine compassion is depicted as the most profound, rich, and intense mother-love, providing 
forgiveness and comfort (cf. Isa 49:15). Nevertheless, alongside divine compassion, there is a 
balance between divine mercy and justice, stated without equivocation in Exod 34:7, which will 
be addressed further in its relation to lovingkindness below. 
As seen above, divine compassion is a ground of entreaty and is itself often conditional. 
Thus, the people are instructed to turn to God in times of distress (Deut 4:30) for he is “a 
compassionate God” (~Wxr: lae) and he will not fail or forget his covenant (Deut 4:31). God may 
thus work through discipline to bring his people to a state of repentance that may, in turn, affect 
his disposition toward them.
314
 Such “discipline” is explicitly noted just a few verses later in Deut 
4:36, and elsewhere connected with fatherly discipline (cf. Deut 8:5). Nevertheless, continued 
rebellion will result in the execution of divine judgment but, when Israel acts faithfully 
(following, fearing, keeping, listening, serving, clinging), God will turn from “burning anger” to 
show “mercy” (~ymxr) and “have compassion” (~xr) (Deut 13:17–18 [18–19]). Similarly, if God’s 
people will make a heartfelt return to God in wholehearted obedience, then God will “restore,” 
                                                     
 
description of God’s anger as the “heat of my nostrils” in Exod 32:10, 12.  
313
 In Gen 19:16 Lot’s deliverance is predicated on the “the compassion [hl'm.x,] of the LORD.” 
314
 God’s wrath itself appears here as a corrective to Israel, prompting them to repentance for their 
ultimate good. As Tigay puts it, Deut 4:30 “suggests a cause-and-effect relationship between distress and 




and “have compassion” (~xr) on, Israel (Deut 30:2–3).315 Notably, God’s compassionate response 
includes circumcision of their hearts to love (bha) him in return (Deut 30:6).316 Thus, even after 
apostasy, compassion is available to Israel, but true repentance is required. It is in this line of 
thought that God lays out clear covenant options before his people: life and prosperity or death 
and adversity, they must choose (Deut 30:15–20).
317
 In this way, the divine-human relationship is 
at least partially dependent upon the disposition and actions of the covenant people, according to 
whether or not they choose to receive his grace. 
In the divine character, compassion is complemented by passion, God is both anq la 
(Deut 4:24) and ~wxr la (Deut 4:31).318 God’s passionate love for his people is manifested in 
righteous jealousy when his people are unfaithful to him.
319
 Thus, God declares of himself, “I, the 
LORD your God, am a jealous [anq] God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the children, on 
the third and fourth generations of those who hate Me” (Exod 20:5; Deut 5:9).
320
 Thus, Israel is 
                                                     
 
Lord and obey Him.” Deuteronomy, 54. 
315
 JPS translates, “God will restore your fortunes and take you back in love.” Cf. ibid., 400. 
Craigie points out, the people had to turn to God and “only then could they expect to know once again his 
compassion (v. 3).” The Book of Deuteronomy, 363. 
316
 Wallis comments that here “Yahweh’s love for his people and Israel’s love for her God are 
interwoven. But Yahweh is always the one who takes the first step in love, and Israel must actively respond 
to this love. . . . A failure to love and obey Yahweh brings a curse on Israel.” Wallis, TDOT 1:116.  
317
 The very promise ([bv) is contingent on the people responding to God in love (Deut 30:20).  
318
 “The God who is impassionate (qanna’) because of the sin of the people (v 24) turns into a 
compassionate God (’el rahum) after Israelite repentance (v 31).” Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1–11, 207.  
319
 The association between divine love and passion is well-recognized. Weinfeld comments, “The 
basic meaning of qn’, which is ‘jealousy’, applies also to passionate love. Love causes jealousy, and 
jealousy brings anger that burns like fire (Deut 4:22; 23:21–22).” Ibid., 296. Craigie comments, “The 
language is stern, but it is closely related to the theme of the love of God in Deuteronomy.” The Book of 
Deuteronomy, 138; cf. Christensen, Deuteronomy 1–11, 87; Buis, Le Deutéronome, 59. See the word study 
on anq previously. 
320
 Based on the association between love and “jealousy,” Weinfeld suggests the “possibility that 
the term ’el qanna’ refers not only to the clause of punishment, but also the clause of divine grace” in Deut 
5:9–10. Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1–11, 296. The literary structure supports this view since “anq la appears 
as an overall characterization, followed by a negative idea introduced by a participle which is followed by a 




not to worship any other God for his “name is Jealous, [he] is a jealous God” (Exod 34:14; cf. 
Deut 4:24; 6:14–15).
321
 Significantly, if jealousy is a part of God’s very name, then his character 
must be relational, since his jealousy is only occasioned by the divine-human relationship.
322
 
Israel repeatedly made God “jealous with strange gods” and “provoked” him (Deut 32:16, 21). As 
such, God is deeply affected by Israel’s spiritual adultery. Such divine passion is very strong and 
the consequences of infidelity are serious.
323
 Yet, as mentioned above, divine passion is never 




In all this, throughout the Torah, God’s compassionate and passionate concern is evident. 
Thus, it is fitting that near the end of the Torah, God is said to “encircle,” to “care for” and 
“guard” Israel “as the pupil of His eye” (Deut 32:10; cf. 2:7; 11:2). Divine concern is here 
depicted “like an eagle that stirs up its nest, that hovers over its young, He spreads His wings and 
caught them, and carried them” (Deut 32:11). God cares for his people. His compassion goes 
beyond covenant to the depth of mercy that is the character of God. In fact, divine compassion is 
expected to finally triumph in vindication of God’s people; God will “have compassion [~xn] on 
His servants” when all their strength is gone (Deut 32:36; cf. 31:6, 8, 16–17).  
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 For Exod 34:14, Stuart suggests another translation, “You must worship no other god, because 
Yahweh is jealous for his name. He is a jealous God.” Stuart, Exodus, 724. 
322
 Reuter points out that “if jealousy is a critical element of the name of Yahweh” then “our 
attention must turn at once to the relationship between Yahweh and his worshipers.” TDOT 13:54. 
323
 In a striking instance, Phinehas puts an end to egregious sin in the camp by execution of the 
participants (Num 25:8), which turns away divine wrath. In reference to this, God explains that Phinehas 
“was jealous with My jealousy among them, so that I did not destroy the sons of Israel in My jealousy” 
(Num 25:11). Likewise, the intensity of divine jealousy is clear in that God’s anger and jealousy will burn 
against the man who defiantly turns to serve other gods, and God will not forgive him (Deut 29:20 [19]). 
Dozeman thus suggests that “Yahweh is not indifferent” but demands “exclusive allegiance.” “The Book of 
Numbers,” in Numbers–Samuel, 2:201. 
324
 In other words, this is a “justified jealousy of Israel’s God.” John I. Durham, Exodus (WBC 3; 
Dallas: Word Books, 1987), 286. “The basis for this jealousy of Yahweh is the expectation of undiluted 
loyalty” from “those who, having promised to have no God but him, have gone back on that promise” 




 Compassion and Passion in the Prophets 
 God is likewise deeply concerned for human beings throughout the prophets. He is thus 
responsive to them, positively or negatively, appropriate to their disposition and/or action toward 
him. He sees, hears, answers, and remembers.
325
 Such concern is especially manifest in God’s 
responsive compassion and passion. 
Divine Compassion 
 In the prophets, God’s compassion is especially prominent, often associated with divine 
grace. The God of compassion is likewise the great comforter as well as a loving, interested 
shepherd.
326
 Yet, the intimate image of the shepherd cradling his little lambs is surpassed when 
God’s comfort and compassion (Isa 49:13) are compared to that of a woman nursing her child. 
Despite Israel’s feeling of forsakenness and being forgotten (Isa 49:14), God declares he will no 
more forget them than a “woman [could] forget her nursing child” or lack “compassion [~xr] on 
the son of her womb” (Isa 49:15). God’s compassion is thus depicted with the most vivid imagery 
of personal affection known to humanity.  
Though God is often provoked to wrath by his people, he is affected even more by their 
suffering (Judg 2:18; 10:16; Isa 63:15; Hos 11:8). God is even depicted as sympathetically feeling 
Israel’s suffering. He is “afflicted in [all] their affliction” yet provides deliverance in love and 
mercy (hl'm.x,) (Isa 63:9).327 In this way, divine compassion seems to restrict the extent of divine 
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 See Judg 2:18; 1 Kgs 8:49–53; Isa 30:19; 49:14–15, Jer 2:2; Ezek 16:8; cf. Jonah 1:6. 
326
 God is he who “will tend his flock. In His arm he will gather the lambs and carry them in His 
bosom; He will gently lead the nursing ewes” (Isa 40:11; cf. Isa 49:10). Of God as comforter see Isa 12:1; 
40:1; 49:13; cf. 51:3, 19; 52:9; 57:18; Jer 31:13; Zech 1:17. 
327
 This translation follows the Qere, wl, “to him.” However, the Ketiv is al, which is also in LXX, 
Syriac, Targum, and Vulgate. Interestingly, according to Watts, 1QIsa
a
 has awl. Isaiah 34–66, 326. 
Although this is ambiguous, it does give an important textual possibility for the Qere. If one follows the 
Ketiv, numerous translation possibilities arise, which affect the whole clause. For instance, LXX reads ouv 
pre,sbuj ouvde. a;ggeloj avllV auvto.j ku,rioj e;swsen auvtou.j, “not an envoy or angel but the Lord Himself 
saved them,” reading ryc not rc'ª and translating pre,sbuj. However, this seems to be a synthetic attempt to 




anger and wrath such that God’s anger may be “turned away” and effectively replaced by comfort 
(Isa 12:1). However, while divine compassion may suspend or reduce deserved punishment, it 
does not overrule justice.
328
 Joel, alluding to the classic self-revelation of Exod 34:6, encourages 
the people to return to God in heartfelt repentance “for He is gracious and compassionate” (Joel 
2:13). True repentance will prompt the divine response of passion (anq) and compassion (lmx) 
(Joel 2:18) resulting in deliverance and blessing (Joel 2:19). Here, divine compassion and grace 
are by no means automatic, but rather, contingent upon human response. Likewise, the people are 
exhorted to “hate evil, love good and establish justice” and then God “may be gracious to the 
remnant” (Amos 5:14–15). In this way, divine favor and/or compassion often serve as grounds of 
deliverance and the reduction or removal of divine wrath and punishment. Thus, “the LORD was 
gracious [!nx] to [the people] and had compassion [~xr] on them and turned to them because of 
His covenant with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob” (2 Kgs 13:23; cf. Isa 49:10; 63:7). Importantly, 
divine compassion is not restricted to the covenant people. Rather, even the foreign lands may 
receive compassion in the wake of judgment (Jer 12:15–17).
329
 Likewise, Jonah 4:2 depicts God’s 
                                                     
 
their affliction he did not afflict,” which follows the Ketiv but does not disrupt the parallel verb of 
affliction. Ibid. However, elsewhere in Isaiah it is clear that God did “afflict” them. God’s judgment had 
fallen on the people. He is even said to have “become their enemy” (Isa 63:10; cf. Deut 31:17; 2 Chr 15:6; 
Neh 9:27, 37). It seems best to utilize the Qere in accordance with most translations and see this as a 
depiction of divine sympathy. So Joseph Blenkinsopp translates, “In all their afflictions he too was 
afflicted, and the angel of his presence saved them. In his love and his pity, he himself redeemed them; he 
lifted them up and carried them for all the days of old.” Isaiah 56–66: A New Translation with Introduction 
and Commentary (AB 19B; New York: Anchor Bible/Doubleday, 2003), 252; cf. Judg 2:18, where Stoebe 
suggests the most accurate reading is to “feel sympathy for.” TLOT 2:738. 
328
 For example, asked to choose the agent of punishment in the aftermath of his census, David 
chooses to “fall into the hand of the LORD for His mercies are great” as opposed to that of man (2 Sam 
24:14; cf. 12:22). David’s confidence in divine compassion is not displaced but neither is punishment 
annulled. Rather, after significant, but far from total, angelic destruction the angel prepares to destroy 
Jerusalem, but “the LORD relented [~xn] from the calamity” declaring “It is enough” (2 Sam 24:16; cf. 2 
Sam 24:25). Thus, “so real was the Lord’s mercy that he was unwilling to pursue the killing further and 
‘was grieved because of the calamity.’” Bergen, 1, 2 Samuel, 479. 
329
 God promises to “have compassion on” the peoples and “bring them back” each to their land 
and then “if they will really” learn the ways of his people they will be built up, but the alternative is 
destruction (Jer 12:15–17). “The text betrays a powerful universalistic impulse. The Lord invites and 
welcomes all the ‘neighbors’ into the community of faith that is constituted by Israel. The invitation is 




compassion toward the people of Nineveh and God responds to their heartfelt repentance (cf. 
4:10–11).
330
 Over and over again in the prophets, God is thus presented as moved, deeply 
affected, and responsive to sincere entreaty and supplication. For instance, God is “moved to pity 
[~xn] by” his people’s “groaning” (Judg 2:18),331 “could bear the misery of Israel no longer” (Judg 
10:13),
332
 and is “moved by prayer” (rtEô['YEw:) for the land (2 Sam 21:14).333 He is eager to relent 
                                                     
 
Abingdon Press, 2001), 680. “This is an extraordinary statement, nothing less than a conditional, Sinai-type 
covenant offered to the Gentiles. Yahweh’s compassion is not conditional upon them learning his peoples’ 
ways, but conditions will come afterward. Verse 17 tells us what will happen if these conditions are not 
met.” Jack R. Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 21A; 
New York: Doubleday, 1999), 663; cf. J. A. Thompson, The Book of Jeremiah (NICOT; Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Eerdmans, 1980), 362. Thus, here compassion appears prior to conditions but along with conditions 
for its continuance, providing a probationary opportunity for the nations to turn toward God. F. B. Huey Jr. 
adds, “The verses teach the freedom of choice with which God has endowed the human race. We are free to 
accept his lordship and be blessed or to reject him and experience punishment.” Jeremiah, Lamentations 
(NAC 16; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 1993), 141–43. 
330
 God even has compassion (swx) for the animals (Jonah 4:10–11). S. H. Blank comments, 
“Man’s troubles are matched and dwarfed by God’s own hurt.” “‘Doest Thou Well to Be Angry?’ A Study 
in Self-Pity,” HUCA 26 (1955): 36. In that instance, Nineveh was afforded probation through the reluctant 
preaching of Jonah. At times, God’s relenting is according to his lovingkindness (Ps 106:45; cf. Dan 1:9). 
In still other accounts, divine compassion is set in parallel to the action of sparing (sWx) (Ps 72:13). As 
McCann Jr. puts it, “Motivated by compassion, impelled by grace, God sets things right.” “The Book of 
Psalms,” in 1 & 2 Maccabees, 4:1148. 
331
 When God’s people cry out, he hears, and is “moved to pity [~xn] by their groaning” resulting 
in deliverance (Judg 2:18). Here, the term for “groaning” (hq'a'n>) appears with a causative mem, indicating 
the causal relation between God’s hearing of Israel’s pain and his feelings of compassion for them. Cf. 
Block, Judges, Ruth, 130. Here, the usage “signifies sorrow at the hurt or pain of another and a desire to 
come to the victim’s aid.” Dennis T. Olson, “The Book of Judges,” in Numbers–Samuel (vol. 2 of NIB; 
Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1998), 756; cf. Robert G. Boling, Judges: Introduction, Translation, and 
Commentary (AB 6A; New York: Doubleday, 1969), 75. Many scholars note that the text here, as in Exod 
2, makes no explicit mention of repentance. God appears to be moved out of his compassion for his people. 
Cf. Block, Judges, Ruth, 130.  
332
 Within the context of judgment, even after God had declared “I will no longer deliver you” 
(Judg 10:13), when the people turn to God and away from their foreign gods, “He could bear the misery of 
Israel no longer,” connoting deep affection and passibility (Judg 10:16). This is a statement of deep 
affection. Literally, “his soul was shortened at the trouble of Israel” (Judg 10:16). In the only other three 
instances where the syntagm vp,n< + rcq appears it refers to humans who have grown weary or become 
impatient (Num 21:4; Judg 16:16; Zech 11:8). A similar phrase appears elsewhere in a question form, “Is 
the Spirit [x:Wr] of the LORD impatient [rcq]?” (Mic 2:7); cf. Robert D. Haak, “A Study and New 
Interpretation of QSR NPS,” JBL 101 (1982): 161–67. Traditionally, this has been interpreted to mean that 
God responds favorably because of the genuineness of Israel’s repentance. However, Block thinks that God 
“has grown tired” of Israel’s “call for help” and “may be dismissing the Israelite actions as further evidence 
of their iniquitous condition. The words themselves are ambiguous, but there is rejection in Yahweh’s 
voice” due to the intolerability of Israel’s “present efforts . . . and the attempts to wrest deliverance from 








Accordingly, notwithstanding the immensity of God’s tender regard for humans, divine 
compassion toward rebellious humans is not extended forever.
335
 It may be forfeited and removed 
by God. For example, God declares numerous times in succession, “My eye will have no pity 
[swx] on you, nor will I spare [lmx] you,”336 as the consequence of Israel’s evil conduct (Ezek 7:4; 
                                                     
 
change his plans, but merely because of Israel’s great suffering, while knowing that their repentance is 
“temporary and shallow.” “The Book of Judges,” in Numbers–Samuel, 2:824–25. The text denotes both 
repentance and action, which elsewhere seems to denote genuine repentance (Judg 10:15–16). It is, 
however, impossible to judge with certainty the motivations of Israel. Even if Block’s interpretation is 
correct, God is likewise moved emotionally by the situation, albeit in the opposite direction. 
333
 Later in Israelite history, God is said to be “moved by prayer” (rtEô['YEw:) for the land (2 Sam 21:14; 
cf. 2 Sam 24:25; 1 Kgs 8:50–53). Notably, God does not reject his people despite numerous affronts, but 
remains concerned for the well-being of his people. God “sees” affliction and responds in deliverance (2 
Kgs 14:26) and manifests patience and unwillingness to destroy Judah despite the abundance of iniquity 
committed in Israel (2 Kgs 8:19).  
334
 Thus, God repeatedly presents himself as an object of entreaty. God is open, and often 
responsive to, supplication (1 Kgs 8:33, 47, 59; 9:3), even human wrestling with him (Hos 12:4 [5]). 
Jeremiah 18:1–10 is perhaps the capstone passage that lays out such divine willingness to relent in 
accordance with human repentance. If humans change course, God’s responsive action will change 
accordingly. However, such relenting is not endless (Jer 15:6; 1 Sam 15:29). God may become “tired of 
relenting” (Jer 15:6). “In mercy Yahweh will relent (niḥam) for so long, but finally he will grow weary of 
relenting.” Thompson, The Book of Jeremiah, 389–90. The term, with God as subject, most often appears 
in the niphal, denoting at times relenting, or changing course in action (2 Sam 24:16; Isa 57:6; Jer 26:19; 
Joel 2:13–14; Jonah 3:9–10; 4:2; Amos 7:3, 6) or regretting (1 Sam 15:11, 35); at still others God is 
“moved to pity” (Judg 2:18). For a further discussion of divine relenting see the word study of ~xn. 
335
 For instance, at times the apparent absence of divine compassion is lamented by the covenant 
people (Zech 1:12). Further, Isaiah speaks of a time when God will “have compassion [~xr]” and “again 
choose Israel” (Isa 14:1; cf. Mic 7:20). Someday, God will “return” to Jerusalem with “compassion” (Zech 
1:16), he will “comfort Zion and again choose Jerusalem” (Zech 1:17; cf. 2:12 [16]).  
336
 The terms lmx and swx collocate frequently, both referring to pity and/or compassion and closely 
associated with ~xr and, at times, ~xn. They often appear together with reference to the lack of compassion 
and pity in the context of war whether from humans (Isa 13:18; Jer 21:7) or from God (Jer 13:14; Ezek 
24:14). The phrase (or similar) “My eye will have no pity (!yI[; + swx) and I will not spare [lmx]” appears 
frequently in Ezekiel (Ezek 5:11; cf. Ezek 7:4, 9; 8:18; 9:10; cf. 9:5; 16:5; Deut 13:8 [9]). Apart from one 
another, both lexemes often continue this meaning related to pitying or sparing. swx often occurs in the 
idiomatic expression, the eye will (not) pity (!yI[; + swx) and refers to a lack of concern or compassion for its 
object, with both human (Gen 45:20; Deut 7:16; 13:8 [9]; 19:13, 21; 25:11 [12]; cf. 1 Sam 24:10 [11]) and 
divine subjects (Ezek 24:14). In one instance with God as subject, the idiom is positive, when God declares, 
“My eye spared them” (Ezek 20:17). swx may appear with a positive meaning elsewhere as well, thus the 
king “will have compassion [swx] on” the poor (Ps 72:13). The term is also used in entreaty; God is called 




cf. 7:9; 8:18; 9:10).
337
 Thus, the interruption of divine compassion is not isolated, but recurs in 
response to the people’s disposition and/or actions toward God in rejecting his overtures.
338
 
Without fail, the lack or removal of divine compassion is the divine response to human infidelity 
(cf. Jer 2:32).
339
 Even God’s compassion and mercy have a limit; divine compassion is neither 
constant nor immutable, but conditional within a real, historically significant relationship.  
                                                     
 
Jonah’s compassion extends to a mere plant, God’s compassion (swx) extends to the people, and even 
animals, of Nineveh (Jonah 4:11).  
The lmx word group likewise continues the concept of compassion and/or sparing when it is used 
elsewhere. It may refer to human compassion, such as that felt by Pharaoh’s daughter upon seeing the baby 
Moses on the river (Exod 2:6; cf. 1 Sam 23:21; 2 Sam 12:4, 6; Zech 11:5). However, as above, the verb 
frequently refers to the action of sparing (1 Sam 15:9, 15; 2 Sam 21:7) or not sparing (1 Sam 15:3; Isa 9:19 
[18]; 30:14; Jer 50:14; 51:3; Hab 1:17; Prov 6:34) something or someone from destruction in battle. At 
times, it appears in laments over the apparent lack of divine compassion and/or sparing (Job 16:13; Lam 
2:2, 17, 21; 3:43) or in God’s own declaration that compassion is or will be absent (Jer 15:5; Zech 11:6). 
On the other hand, it also describes the presence of divine compassion. God sent prophets because of his 
compassion on the people, but the people scoffed at them and, consequently, Babylon had no compassion 
on them (2 Chr 36:15–17). Yet, Joel speaks of a day when God “will be zealous [anq] for His land and will 
have pity on His people” (Joel 2:18; cf. Mal 3:17). In all this, God has “concern” for his own holy name 
(Ezek 36:21). Likewise, positive, is the noun hl'm.x, which appears in only two instances, describing the 
“compassion [hl'm.x] of the LORD [that] was upon” Lot when the men took he, his wife and two daughters 
out of Sodom (Gen 19:16) and in close relation to divine love in the recollection of the Sinai narrative, “in 
His love [hb'h]a;] and in His pity [hl'm.x] [God] redeemed [lag] them” (Isa 63:9). As such, both swx and lmx can 
be used in reference to the presence or (when negated) the absence of compassion, most often referring to 
the specific action of sparing or not sparing something or someone. 
337
 The people have pushed God too far. Katheryn Pfisterer Darr comments regarding Ezek 8:18, 
“By their actions, God insists, ‘they are putting the branch to my nose!’ (MT, ‘their nose,’ a deliberate 
scribal emendation). The meaning of this action is obscure; scholars have identified it as a gesture of 
entreaty, an obscene gesture, or a euphemistic reference to ‘breaking wind.’ Whatever the phrase’s literal 
referent, its present use is probably metaphorical: Just as a painful blow provokes outrage, so also Judah’s 
deeds unleash divine wrath,” “The Book of Jeremiah,” in Isaiah–Ezekiel (vol. 6 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: 
Abingdon Press, 2001), 1176. Their “impurity has become so great that only a thorough purge of land and 
people can eradicate it.” Ibid., 1166. Thus, “as people have behaved, so they shall be treated; one’s fate is 
merely the outworking of one’s action. Yahweh will personally guarantee that this occurs. He will not 
permit any hint of pity to interfere with his determined action.” Block, The Book of Ezekiel: Chapters 1–24, 
250. Elsewhere God also refuses to respond to entreaty (Jer 11:11; Mic 3:4; Zech 7:13). 
338
 Thus, God “will not have compassion” nor “be gracious” to his people who lack discernment 
(Isa 27:11; cf. Mal 1:9). Likewise, God is adamant that, at times, he will not “relent” ([rp) nor have “pity” 
(swx) nor “be sorry” (~xn) but will judge “according to your ways and according to your deeds” (Ezek 24:14; 
cf. Zech 11:5). God has tried to restore this people. Verse 13 literally reads I purged you, “i.e., I applied 
cleansers to you to no avail. This may be a metaphor for the graduated futile chastisements inflicted on the 
people in the manner described in Lev 26.” Greenberg, Ezekiel 21–37, 503. 
339
 God has not been unfaithful to them but they have continually rebelled and “have forgotten” 
him “days without number” (Jer 2:32). The imagery is that of a bride who would not forget her attire, yet 




The removal of divine compassion is poignantly displayed in the husband-bride metaphor 
of Hosea. The spiritual adultery of Israel is depicted and its results upon the divine-human 
relationship appear even in the names of Hosea’s children. One is named “Lo-ruhamah,” which 
God interprets to signify, “I will no longer have compassion [~x;r'] on the house of Israel, that I 
would forgive them” (Hos 1:6; cf. 2:4 [5]; 2:23 [25]) though compassion appears to remain, at 
least temporarily, for Judah (Hos 1:7).
340
 Divine compassion is removed on the explicit basis of 
“harlotry” (Hos 2:4 [6]) that brings considerable grief and anguish to God himself (Hos 11:8, see 
                                                     
 
340
 The Hebrew of vv. 6–7 is notoriously difficult. The phrase could be rendered, “I will no longer 
love [have compassion on] the house of Israel, but I will surely forgive them” (Hos 1:6). But this appears to 
make little sense as a whole. Some have viewed the text as corrupt and requiring emendation to fix the 
difficulty. Others have interpreted, “I will no longer show Israel love by forgiving them.” Cf. William 
Rainey Harper, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Amos and Hosea (New York: Scribner, 1905), 
214. Others interpret afn, usually translated “forgive,” in its more basic sense of “lift” or “carry” to mean 
that Israel will be carried away, or God’s compassion will be taken away. The former are represented by 
Thomas E. McComiskey, The Minor Prophets: An Exegetical and Expository Commentary (3 vols.; Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1992), 1:21; James L. Mays, Hosea, a Commentary (OTL; Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1969), 22. The latter is represented by Hans W. Wolff, Hosea: A Commentary on the 
Book of the Prophet Hosea (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), 8. Another option, 
championed by Andersen and Freedman, is that the whole of what follows the negative expression “I will 
no longer” (@ysiAa al) is governed by it, thus the following elements of the passage might mean, “never 
again will (1) I have pity on the house of Israel, (2) I make the slightest move to forgive them, (3) I have 
pity on the house of Judah, and (4) I, Yahweh their God, rescue them.” They point to Jer 3:2; 22:10; Num 
23:19; Mic 7:1; Isa 38:18 as analogous instances of such rare grammar. Hosea, 189. Fensham, however, 
rejects this view, stating that “in verse 7 the stress on [hd”Why> tyBe] by placing it before the verb shows that a 
contrast is expressed.” F. Charles Fensham, “The Marriage Metaphor in Hosea for the Covenant 
Relationship between the Lord and His People,” JNSL 12 (1984): 76. Garrett thinks that the text should be 
left to stand as a paradox, seeing a similar dual statement in 1:9–10. Hosea, Joel (NAC 19A; Nashville, 
Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 1997), 61–62. He observes, “Of course Hosea loved Lo-Ruhamah! Could 
God abandon his love for Israel? On one level the answer is yes—he could give them over to the most 
terrible suffering—but on a deeper level it is impossible: “How can I give you up, Ephraim? How can I 
hand you over, Israel? . . . My heart is changed within me; all my compassion is aroused” (Hos 11:8). This 
inconsistency is the language of the vexation of a broken heart—and it also reflects the mystery of a God 
whose ways are above our ways.” Ibid., 62. Yet, this would raise questions for Hos 9:15, which has its own 
tension with Hos 11. See the discussion of both further below. There is no compelling reason to depart 
from the traditional rendering, which would see in these verses the rejection of Israel, likely fulfilled in the 
destruction of Samaria in 722 B.C., but the postponement of Judah’s punishment. In fact, the kind of 
tension seen in these verses is apparent throughout the book. Perhaps it is meant to be cryptic, less a 
foretelling of what will occur and more a declaration of God’s profound grief at the rupture of his special 
relationship with Israel and Judah. However, the Hebrew is understood and applied to the two nations; the 
theological point regarding the removal, or at least suspension, of God’s compassion/love is striking and 
sets up a tension that continues throughout the book of Hosea. As Simian-Yofre sees it, “Yahweh [is] torn 






 The case is similar throughout the entire latter prophets; the temporary lack of divine 
compassion (Cf. Isa 27:11) is not attributed to God’s unilateral decision but is the direct result of 
the unwillingness of God’s people. They were afforded every opportunity for repentance and trust 
but they “were not willing” (Isa 30:15) even though God “longs to be gracious” (hkx) and “waits 
on high to have compassion on” them (Isa 30:18).
342
 The compassion of God is here represented 
as an internal commitment such that Israel’s rebellion affects the inner life of God, so even God 
must wait for them to be ready to receive his compassion. In the meantime, God’s desire is 
unfulfilled, he longs to be compassionate and seeks them out, but they are obstructing the 
relationship.
343
 Still, he will respond and be gracious at the sound of their cry, when he hears, he 
will answer (Isa 30:19).
344
 As such, divine compassion is manifestly contingent upon the state of 
relationship. Although compassion cannot be earned, it must be received; God’s call seeks to 
evoke response (cf. Jer 42:10–16). In the future, God will reclaim his people, betroth them to 
                                                     
 
341
 Although it is possible to see the lack of compassion on her children as an extended penalty of 
their “mother’s” adultery, it is more likely that the reference is to her children who are also taking part in 
adultery in like manner as their “mother.” This would fit the historical reference to Israel and Judah. Thus, 
Stuart translates, “I can have no compassion on her children, Because they are prostituting children.” 
Hosea-Jonah, 42.  
342
 Joseph Blenkinsopp translates, “but you did not want it.” Isaiah 1–39: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary (AB 19; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 417. “The Holy One had extended 
his arms to them with a gentle word of strength (28:12), but they refused.” Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: 
Chapters 1–39, 554; cf. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 1–39, 556–57. Thus, God waits because they 
were unwilling (Isa 30:15); cf. Isa 5:2, 4, 7. “In spite of the circumstances that prevent God from saving his 
people immediately, those who wait for God will be blessed (30:18b).” G. Smith, Isaiah 1–39, 519. 
343
 The extent to which God goes in seeking reconciliation is displayed in God’s own language. He 
continually and persistently called to his people, signified by the idiomatical language of “rising up early 
and speaking.” But the people “did not hear,” God called but they “did not answer” (Jer 7:13; cf. 7:25; 
11:7; 25:3–4; 26:5; 29:19; 32:33; 35:14–15; 44:4). Elsewhere, despite being forgotten and mistreated, God 
searches (vrd) and seeks (rqb) for (or inspects) His people, even “as a shepherd cares [hr'Q'B;] for his herd . . . 
so I will care for My sheep” (Ezek 34:11–12). Some have considered this text to be corrupt. However, in its 
final form, Darr points out the potential evaluative connotation of this seeking. “The piel verb from the root 
baqar can mean ‘to seek’ but also ‘to inquire’ in the sense of inspecting something.” “The Book of 
Jeremiah,” in Isaiah–Ezekiel, 6:1466; cf. Lev 13:36; Lev 27:33. Likewise, Greenberg, Ezekiel 21–37, 700; 
Block, The Book of Ezekiel: Chapters 1–24, 289. 
344
 The construction ^n>x.y” !Anx' inf. abs + qal imperfect emphasizes the certainty that God will be 




himself in righteousness, justice, lovingkindness, and compassion (Hos 2:19 [21]) and will “have 
compassion” on them, so that those who were not his people will be his people and he will be 
their God (Hos 2:23 [25]).
345
 Likewise, God will “strengthen,” “save,” and “bring back” Judah 
“because” he has “had compassion [~x;r'] on them and they will be as though [God] had not 
rejected [xnz] them” (Zech 10:6; cf. Jer 33:25; cf. Zeph 2:3, 7).  
Thus, over and over the familiar pattern appears. Even though the “stirrings” of the divine 
“heart,” “compassion,” and “zeal” are temporarily “restrained” (Isa 63:15; cf. 63:10), there is 
hope for the future when God will again comfort his people even “as one whom his mother 
comforts” (Isa 66:13).
346
 Likewise in Jeremiah, though divine compassion may be evoked, it may 
also be revoked. In response to human rebellion, God “withdraws” his “peace,” and his 
“lovingkindness and compassion,” resulting in discipline (Jer 16:5; 30:14).
347
 Yet, in the wake of 
justly deserved divine punishment, God will “have compassion [~xr] on his dwelling places” (Jer 
30:18).
348
 On the basis of God’s enduring love (Jer 31:3), he will “turn their mourning into joy 
                                                     
 
345
 “The woman’s repentance and return to her husband then become the first and vital act in the 
process of rehabilitation. Hosea, however, contends that the initiative always remains with the husband 
(Yahweh), though it is only effective when there is a response (v 17b).” Andersen and Freedman, Hosea, 
264. Thus, the “broken covenant could be mended because Yahweh’s love was stronger than his wrath.” 
Ibid., 219; cf. Stuart, Hosea-Jonah, 54. This tension between the apparent removal and, conversely, 
continuance of love will be taken up further below. 
346
 Further demonstration of the depth of divine compassion and passion appears by way of an 
idiom that literally rendered means the murmur, roar of turmoil of your internal organs. Oswalt phrases it as 
“the rumbling of your innards.” The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66, 612. It here connotes the kind of 
distress that is often accompanied in humans by intestinal aching. This profound divine affection, 
sympathy, and interest in his people results ultimately in God’s purpose of restoration. “The outcome 
(restoration) is rooted in the deep feeling of God, the parental compassion that is moved to care and 
tenderness in the presence of the pain of the child (cf. 31:20).” Miller, “The Book of Jeremiah,” in Isaiah–
Ezekiel, 6:808.  
347
 In fact, God himself says he “wounded” Israel “with the punishment of a cruel one” (yrIêz”k.a; 
rs:åWm), depicted as “incurable,” but this is because of the great iniquity of the people (Jer 30:14–15; cf. 15, 
which clearly shows the reason for their punishment). Such punishment is just, signified here by the term 
rs'Wm, elsewhere “discipline,” which the people consistently refused to accept (Jer 2:30; 5:3; 7:28; 17:23; 
32:33). The “cruelty” could refer to the punishment itself or perhaps the mediatorial agent of punishment, 
Babylon (cf. Jer 6:23; 50:42).  
348
 In this context, the compassion is elicited by the taunts of the nations that no one cares for 




and will comfort [~xn] them” (Jer 31:13). He will “certainly remember” his “dear son . . . a 
delightful child,” his “heart [that is, innards, h[,me] yearns [hmh] for him” and God will “surely have 
mercy on him” (Jer 31:20; cf. 33:25–26).
349
 Thus, God introduces a heartfelt call to repentance 
(Jer 31:21–22). The depth of divine emotion expressed here is astounding. God deeply longs to 
love and continue loving his wayward people, and this expression leads into the famous 
proclamation of the new covenant (cf. Jer 31:31–34).  
Likewise, while Israel deserves severe punishment for her adulterous ways, God appears 
to be conflicted, “How can I give you up, O Ephraim? How can I surrender you, O Israel? How 
can I make you like Admah? How can I treat you like Zeboiim? My heart is turned over within 
Me, All My compassions [~ymixunI] are kindled [rmk]” (Hos 11:8–9).350 Consequently, the fullness of 
                                                     
 
representation of divine character. For instance, God will restore the people and “have mercy” (~xr) on 
them but in the context of jealousy for his “holy name” (Ezek 39:25; cf. Ezek 20:21–22; 39:27). Thus, 
Block comments that “Ezekiel recognizes two motivational factors underlying Yahweh’s restorative 
actions, the first relating to the need of his people, and the second to concern for his name.” The Book of 
Ezekiel: Chapters 1–24, 486. “Yahweh’s actions toward his people, both punitive and salvific, are played 
out before the worldwide audience.” Ibid., 487. He further notes that “Israel’s election was particularly to 
be a witness to the nations of the uniqueness of Yahweh.” Ibid.  
349
 This idiomatic syntagm of yearning innards appeared also in Isa 63:15. Thompson comments, 
“The very vivid anthropomorphism depicts God’s stomach being churned up with longing for his son.” The 
Book of Jeremiah, 575. The word “heart”—h[,me internal organs, inward parts, bowels, belly—is often used 
in the sense of womb and stomach. It is used in instances of intense physiological pain (Job 30:27; Ps 
22:15) but more frequently to denote intense human emotions (Isa 16:11; Jer 4:19; Lam 1:20; 2:11). Stoebe 
thus correctly sees this as “expanded parallelism” that “approximate[s] rahamim.” Stoebe, TLOT 3:1226. 
The collocation of h[,me and hmh or !Amh'—murmur, roar, sometimes meaning arouse—appears five times (Isa 
16:11; 63:15; Jer 4:19; 31:20; Cant 5:4). Elsewhere it describes the inner feelings of emotional lament for 
Moab (Isa 16:11). In Cant 5:4 it depicts the erotic feelings of an aroused woman. hmh with ble describes the 
“pounding” of Jeremiah’s heart, in parallel to the anguish (lWx) of his innards (h[,me) (Jer 4:19). 
350
 The two human instances (Gen 43:40; 1 Kgs 3:6) and this divine one are the only three 
instances where rmk relates to emotions. Only in one other instance does it appear at all, of skin becoming 
hot in the sun (Lam 5:10); cf. Stoebe, TLOT 3:1226; Butterworth, “רחם,” NIDOTTE 3:1093. Further, “The 
word nihumim occurs only here, in Isa 57:18, and in Zech 1:13. The emotion is one of compassion and pity; 
it describes the desire to bring consolation. As such it is close in meaning to rahamim.” Andersen and 
Freedman, Hosea, 589. Garrett comments, “Abruptly, Yahweh enters what can only be described as 
distraught self-questioning. Like a father who is at wit’s end over what to do with a wayward child, 
Yahweh is here at a loss as he tries to resolve his compassion for Israel and the punishment demanded by 
their sin. One may of course regard this as metaphor, as language that somehow puts divine love into terms 
that a human can understand, even though God himself does not really experience self-doubt and anxiety 
over issues of justice and mercy.” He goes on, “While accepting the fact that God transcends our metaphors 




God’s anger is not executed (Hos 11:9). Although destruction will come, there will be a future 
when anger will be removed and divine love toward his people will be restored (Hos 14:4 [5]).
351
 
Such acute idioms of divine emotion thus appear recurrently throughout the prophets, evidencing 
God’s deeply affective nature. Far from being aloof, God is profoundly impacted by the evil and 




Such intense emotionality is likewise depicted when God describes his momentary 
forsaking of his people as an “outburst of anger” in stark contrast to his “great compassion,” 
which is displayed with “everlasting lovingkindness” (Isa 54:7–8).
353
 Although God may act in a 
torrent of anger, divine compassion is greater and exponentially more lasting than any “negative” 
emotions. Moreover, in spite of the obvious contingency of divine compassion, the wellspring of 
divine sympathy and God’s unwavering benevolence endures beyond all expectations. God’s 
                                                     
 
jettisoned, texts such as this should be allowed to speak to us in the power of their raw emotion. It is 
precisely in texts such as this that the love of God becomes a vivid reality and not a barren abstraction.” 
Hosea, Joel, 227; cf. John L. McKenzie, “Divine Passion in Osee,” CBQ 17 (1955): 287–99. I agree with 
Garrett that the texts must be allowed to speak and, on that basis, question whether the doctrine of divine 
impassibility is able to cohere with the texts as such. See the further discussion of this in chapter 6. 
351
 “It is significant that the attribute of God to which the OT returns again and again is his 
compassion: his tenderness and his ability to be touched by the pain and grief of his people. His 
transcendence and almighty power are never forgotten, but it is his compassion to which they return with 
wonder again and again.” Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66, 299; cf. Paul R. House, 1, 2 Kings 
(NAC 8; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 1995), 309.  
352
 Consider also the poignant metaphor of God depicted as the attentive owner and caretaker of 
his much-cherished vineyard (Israel). The vineyard owner’s painstakingly presents tender care to his 
vineyard, providing everything for it, but it nevertheless produces only worthless grapes though it should 
have produced good grapes (Isa 5:2). Therefore God cries out, “judge between Me and My vineyard. What 
more was there to do for My vineyard that I have not done in it? Why, when I expected it to produce good 
grapes did it produce worthless ones?” (Isa 5:3–4). Despite God’s all-encompassing labor and consistent 
beneficence, his people have turned away from him. There is nothing left for God to do except carry out 
judgment and destruction in response to the absence of justice and righteousness in his vineyard (Isa 5:5–
7). 
353
 “It is deep/‘great’ compassion, love which overflows, love in its passionate reality.” Motyer, 
Isaiah, 448. “Thus God is passionately concerned about us and the thought that we should corrupt and 
destroy ourselves stirs him to the depths. How much better a father who knows what his child is doing to 
himself or herself and is angry about it than the one who neither knows nor cares what is happening.” 




good will toward his people is more lasting than the hills and the mountains. God declares, “My 
lovingkindness will not be removed from you. And My covenant of peace will not be shaken, 
Says the LORD who has compassion on you” (Isa 54:10).
354
 Accordingly, God implores the 
“wicked [to] forsake his way . . . return to the LORD, and He will have compassion on Him” and 
“abundantly pardon” (Isa 55:7; cf. Zeph 3:17).
355
 He wants to remain near, to be found by them, 
but the opportunity will not be available forever. Thus, although divine initiative is primary and 
his benevolence endures, the fruition of divine compassion and pardon is predicated on human 
response. There is thus a tension between the permanence of willed divine compassion and the 
potential transience of efficacious, received divine compassion. God persistently wills, and longs 
for, a harmonious reconciliation with his wayward people, and his compassion and grace make 
such reconciliation possible, but he does not unilaterally effectuate relationship. 
Divine Passion 
Without equivocation, then, the latter prophets present God as personally concerned 
about his covenant people. However, such concern may turn into righteous indignation when God 
is “grieved” (bc[) by rebellion (Isa 63:10). As in the Torah, God is repeatedly provoked (s[K) by 
Israel’s apostasy with idols, bringing him pain and vexation and spurring him to anger. In one 
instance among many, God refers to Israel as “a people who continually provoke Me to My face” 
(Isa 65:3).
356
 Whereas, God “cared” ([dy) for Israel in the wilderness, Israel became proud and 
                                                     
 
354
 Yet, even this comes on the heels of a rupture of the relationship. Thus JPS translates, “my 
loyalty shall never move from you . . . said the LORD, who takes you back in love.” Cf. Jer 33:25. God 
further promises an “everlasting covenant” that is “according to the dsx of David” (dwId” ydEs.x;), specifically 
unto those who “incline” their “ear,” “come,” and “listen that [they] might live” (Isa 55:3). It is not 
altogether clear whether the phrase dwId” ydEs.x; refers to the dsx shown to David or the dsx David showed 
toward God. Either way, the point is that such a relationship may yet be restored to God’s people, if they 
will respond to him. 
355
 Further, they are to “seek the Lord while he may be found; Call upon Him while He is near” 
(Isa 55:6). 
356
 See Judg 2:12; 1 Kgs 14:9, 15; 15:30; 16:2, 7, 13, 26, 33; 21:22; 22:54; 2 Kgs 17:11, 17; 21:6, 




forgot God, resulting in divine wrath, which itself is compared to that of a “lion,” a “leopard,” a 
“bear robbed of her cubs,” a “lioness,” or “wild beast” (Hos 13:5–8).
357
 Thus the Israelites have 
brought their own destruction (Hos 13:9). Divine anger (@a;) may be evoked by, and persist 
against, the godless and the evildoer and, accordingly, God will “not take pleasure [xmf] in their 
young men” nor “have pity [~xr] on their orphans or their widows” (Isa 9:17 [16]).358 Similarly, 
God often becomes indignant at evil, usually toward his covenant people, but his indignation also 
falls upon the other nations, especially in response to their cruel oppression of his people.
359
  
God’s profoundly emotional concern and compassion correspond to his intense, 
passionate love for his people. This is especially manifest in God’s desire for exclusive 
relationship with them.
360
 Accordingly, when his people stray into spiritual adultery it is 
manifested in jealousy, anger, and zeal. On the other hand, it can also denote the divine passion 
for his people in a positive sense, manifested against her oppressors. God is a holy and jealous 
God [aANq;-lae], and therefore he takes sin seriously and his offers of forgiveness are not endless 
                                                     
 
20:28; Hos 12:14 [15]). 
357
 Some consider [dy in covenant contexts to be a technical term for the recognition of treaty 
parameters. Herbert B. Huffmon, “The Treaty Background of Hebrew Yada‘,” BASOR 181 (1966): 37. 
However, as with bha, it is a mistake to reduce the meaning of the term to mere legality on the basis of 
ANE parallels, especially when it is likely that such treaty language itself borrows from the more basic 
kinship language. Nicholson contends that where [dy is used with divine agency it means “something like 
‘know someone for one’s own,’ ‘choose and make someone one’s own.’” God and His People, 80; cf. 
Eberhard Baumann, “ידע und seine Derivate,” ZAW 28 (1908): 22–41. Sakenfeld suggests that treaty 
language is not mutually exclusive to the other, more intimate, connotations of [dy. The Meaning of Hesed, 
171. 
358
 Importantly, even the orphans and widows are represented as evildoers. Blenkinsopp translates, 
“so the Sovereign Lord had no mercy on their youths, no compassion on their orphans and widows, for they 
are all ungodly and wicked.” Isaiah 1–39, 216.  
359
 For indignation toward Israel see Isa 10:25; 13:5; 26:20; Ezek 22:24, 31; Zech 1:12. For 
indignation toward the nations, see Isa 10:5; 30:27; 66:14; Jer 10:10; 50:25; Ezek 21:36; Nah 1:6; Hab 
3:12; Zeph 3:8; Mal 1:4. 
360
 God “loves them so much that he wants their undivided love in return. He will not share them 
with any other god.” Trent C. Butler, Joshua (WBC 7; Dallas: Word, 1984), 275. God’s jealousy cannot 






 Accordingly, Judah’s infidelity with false gods provokes God to severe jealousy 
(1 Kgs 14:22; cf. 14:15) for he deserves and requires the exclusive loyalty of his people. Such 
infidelity is frequently presented as adultery; Judah is the wife who runs after many “lovers” 
(Ezek 16:33, 36–37; 23:9, 25; cf. Ezek 23:5–7, 22).
362
 Here, divine jealousy amounts to 
unrequited love; God is like a scorned husband passionate for his wayward beloved. However, the 
divine jealousy (ha'n>qi) and anger (s[;K') may be “pacified” in the carrying out of discipline. In this, 
God himself will “calm” or satisfy (xwn) his “fury” (hm'xe) (Ezek 16:42) and thereafter may again 
“care” for his people (Ezek 36:9).
363
 Yet, in all this, divine discipline is a manifestation of his 
love-seeking relationship. 
Accordingly, God’s negative emotions, themselves an outgrowth of his profound concern 
for his creatures, may be quite intense; God describes his temporary forsaking of Israel as “an 
outburst of anger” and “in My wrath I struck you,” though this is contrasted with his everlasting 
                                                     
 
361
 This statement is in the context of Joshua warning the people that, despite their claims to the 
contrary, they will not be able to serve Yahweh faithfully, for “He will not put up with your disloyalty and 
your sinning.” Robert G. Boling, Joshua (AB 6; New York: Doubleday, 1982), 528. The ability or inability 
of Israel to serve God is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, it should be noted that many are 
perplexed by this statement and see it as a “deep paradox” considering the constant exhortations to serve 
God. See David M. Howard Jr, Joshua (NAC 5; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 1998), 437. Butler 
calls it “perhaps the most shocking statement in the OT.” Butler, Joshua, 274. However, this was not an 
absolute statement, but in the context of infidelity, “if his people persisted in rebellion in spite of such 
loving and sustained overtures, he would not tolerate this forever.” Howard Jr, Joshua, 438. 
362
 Their harlotry is so perverted that whereas most harlots receive gifts, they give gifts to entice 
their lovers (Ezek 16:33).  
363
 “There had to be a spending of the jealous fury of v 38, a final resolution of the problem that 
provoked Yahweh to pain-filled anger in v 26. This glancing back over the earlier material shows that 
theodicy is the issue at stake in this oracle. Only the final destruction of Jerusalem could wipe clean the 
slate of accumulated debt owed to its divine patron.” Leslie C. Allen, Ezekiel 1–19 (WBC 28; Dallas, TX: 
Word, 1994), 243. “His primary aim is to put a stop to all of Jerusalem’s harlotrous ways (v. 41b), but the 
effects will be cathartic upon his disposition as well. . . . But this will not transpire until the city has 
suffered the full consequences of her deeds.” Block, The Book of Ezekiel: Chapters 1–24, 503. “The gods 
of the neighbors would simply wait for the worshiper to come back. Yahweh goes out to discipline the 
errant lover until she returns.” Butler, Joshua, 275. God is far from indifferent. He is manifesting the 
righteous indignation that is appropriate to his place and the relationship he has entered into with Israel. 
“Anything less than this kind of justifiable protectiveness would indicate a careless attitude toward 




lovingkindness and favor (!Acr') manifested in compassion (Isa 54:8–9; cf. Isa 47:6).364 Likewise, 
the overall conditionality of the covenant relationship is in full view when the continuance of 
divine blessing is jeopardized “because of” Israel’s continued provocation of divine anger with 
their “Asherim” (1 Kgs 14:15–16). God may be offended to the point that his “heart [yviÞp.n:] would 
not be with this people,” even if Moses and Samuel were among them, for he is “tired of 
relenting” (Jer 15:1, 6).
365
 However, despite the intensity of divine anger at times, Jer 23:20 
implies that God controls his emotions: His anger is not “turned back” until the divine purposes 
are carried out. Likewise, in God’s purpose his anger will be “spent,” his wrath “satisfied,” and 
God “appeased” (~x;n"), this God has spoken in his passionate “zeal” (ha'n>qi) (Ezek 5:13).366 Again, 
divine anger, though intense, does not continue forever unabated, but he himself will calm his 
fury and be vexed “no more” (Ezek 16:42).  
Divine jealousy may also be an immense positive for God’s people. It may be prompted 
by the “insults of the nations” against his people, provoking him to act in “jealousy”—even “fiery 
jealousy” (ytiîa'n>qi vae’B.)—and in “wrath” (Ezek 36:6; cf. Zeph 1:18; 3:8). Likewise, God describes 
his great and exceeding jealousy for “Jerusalem and Zion” (Zech 1:14), which amounts to him 
being “very angry” with the oppressive nations (Zech 1:13, 15; cf. 8:2).
367
 Likewise, God is 
“exceedingly jealous” for Zion, “with great wrath” he is “jealous for her” (Zech 8:2). Jealousy for 
his beloved and, thus, anger towards her oppressors, results in the divine declaration of a future 
                                                     
 
364
 God is thus clearly “both affected and determined by human actions, if only in response. This 
God is by no means immutable.” Gene M. Tucker, “The Book of Isaiah 1–39,” in Isaiah–Ezekiel (vol. 6 of 
NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 2001), 161. Rather, “God is passionately concerned about the lives 
of human beings and whether justice takes place among them.” Bruce Baloian, “Anger,” NIDOTTE 4:381.  
365
 The use of “my heart,” or rather my soul (yviÞp.n), once again presents God as an emotional being. 
366
 Such wrath is neither “arbitrary” nor “impulsive” but is part of God’s “historical self-
manifestation.” Block, The Book of Ezekiel: Chapters 1–24, 211. See the discussion of anq earlier.  
367
 While he was “only a little angry” the oppressors “furthered the disaster,” pushing him to 
severe zeal (Zech 1:14). While he is motivated by his passion, “Yahweh is motivated by pure compassion. 
Thus the two grounds for God’s work of salvation are his covenant bond with the people and his merciful 




return to Jerusalem with “compassion,” which will result in the blessing of overflowing 
prosperity when God will “again comfort Zion and again choose Jerusalem” (Zech 1:16–17; cf. 
2:12 [16]). 
Elsewhere, Joel locates divine jealousy as an emotion contingent upon the repentance of 
the people, while also pre-emptive of the insults of the other nations (Joel 2:17): “Then will the 
LORD be jealous [anq] for his land, and pity [lmx] his people” (Joel 2:18).368 Zephaniah likewise 
speaks of the Lord’s great “wrath” and “the fire of his jealousy” (Atêa'n>qi ‘vaeb.W) on the day of 
retribution (Zeph 1:18). Yet, divine wrath is in favor of all those who “wait” for him on that 
coming day of “indignation, “burning anger,” “fire,” and “zeal” (Zeph 3:8).
369
 Thus, although 
God is “slow to anger and great in power” he punishes the guilty (Nah 1:3). Toward his enemies, 
God is “a jealous [aANq;] and avenging God” a “wrathful” one who “takes vengeance” (Nah 1:2).370 
                                                     
 
368
 The actual repentance of the people is not reported, though it seems that they did, in fact, 
repent. James L. Crenshaw thus points out, “One could argue that YHWH’s compassionate character as 
announced in 2:13b pertains regardless of human response” yet “the context of the second chapter in Joel 
argues against this emphasis on ignoring human conduct.” Joel: A New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary (AB 24C; New York: Doubleday, 1995), 148. “When either [the land or people] suffered, it 
aroused strong and deep emotions in his heart. He had now rushed to show his passionate concern, his keen 
ardor which would not allow his rights to be infringed. This zealous or jealous love is a passion that in the 
OT can show itself in judgment upon Israel, but here it is protective, and is to cause Yahweh to drive away 
the trespassers from his property.”
 
Leslie C. Allen, The Books of Joel, Obadiah, Jonah, and Micah 
(NICOT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1976), 87; cf. Ezek 39:25; Zech 1:14; 8:2.  
369
 Kenneth L. Barker states that God’s caring jealousy is “the stimulating force behind the 
decisive turn in redemptive history: the ‘small remnant’ and the coming of the Messiah are the result of 
God’s burning love for Israel.” Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah (NAC 20; Nashville, Tenn.: 
Broadman & Holman, 1999), 169–70.  
370
 Coggins suggests this reading would have the shock value of “‘a deliberate dramatic device’ in 
which ‘the two great Canaanite deities, El and Baal” are “used as alternative designations of Yahweh.” 
Thus, “jealous El, avenging Yahweh, angry Baal.” R. J. Coggins and S. P. Re'emi, Israel among the 
Nations: A Commentary on the Books of Nahum and Obadiah (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1985), 21. 
Some have taken the phrase, “keeps [rjn] wrath,” as an indication of divine self-control. Robertson, The 
Books, 62. Others, however, believe it simply refers to God’s ability to become angry. Duane L. 
Christensen, Nahum (Anchor Yale Bible 24F; New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), 179. 
Thus, “zeal describes Yahweh’s affective nature. He feels strongly and reacts vigorously to the behavior of 
his people. So God’s compassionate beneficence as well as his wrath is contained in the notion of 
Yahweh’s devotion or ‘zeal’ for Israel; the tone and measure of Yahweh’s passionate reaction depends on 




Yet, he is “good” and “knows those who take refuge in him” (Nah 1:7).”
371
 As such, jealousy 
itself seems to be a manifestation of the intense emotionality of divine love. It is manifested 
negatively when God is jealous toward Israel due to her infidelity, but positively when God is 
jealous for Israel due to outside forces. In both cases, God is the passionate lover.
372
  
Compassion and Passion in the Writings 
 God’s concern is once again on display throughout the Writings where God is depicted as 
hearing ([mv) and “inclining” his ear to the humble (Ps 10:17; cf. 40:2).373 God cares (dqp) about 
and remembers (rkz) his people. He sees (har) and he hears ([mv) human cries (Ps 106:44; cf. Ps 
139:3) and remembers (rkz) “His covenant,” even relenting (~xn) according to his great 
lovingkindness (Ps 106:45).
374
 He is concerned for, and responds to, those who respond to him, 
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 “This ‘knowing’ of the Lord must be understood in the full biblical sense of ‘loving’ with the 
most intense care.” Robertson, The Books, 70. Likewise, Barker, Micah, 178. 
372
 “The Bible thus speaks unashamedly of Yahweh’s passion, presenting him as an intense and 
passionate Being, fervently interested in the world of humans.” Baloian, NIDOTTE 4:380. 
373
 The idiom “inclining” his ear is ^n<z>a' byviq.T;. As such, “God has heard; God will act.” Craigie, 
Psalms 1–50, 126. At the dedication of the temple, God himself declares he has “heard” ([mv) Solomon and 
that if his people, in times of distress, will “humble themselves and pray and seek [his] face and turn from 
their wicked ways,” then God will “hear [[mv] from heaven.” His “eyes will be open and [his] ears 
attentive” to prayers from the temple (2 Chr 7:12–15). Thus, God is “entreated” (hl'x'), “moved by his 
entreaty” (llp + rt;[), and he hears, and responds to, “supplication” (hN"xiT.) (2 Chr 33:12–13; cf. 30:20; Ezra 
8:23). Notably, this is the supplication of the worst king of Judah. This illustrates the heights and depths of 
the grace and compassion of God. Manasseh certainly did not deserve grace but he received it, yet for him 
even that grace was conditional. God “responded” to his entreaty. “Even a religious renegade like 
Manasseh could be restored to blessing.” L. C. Allen, “First and Second Chronicles,” in Kings–Judith, 
3:636. 
Daniel notes the failure of the people to have “sought” God’s favor (Dan 9:13). Thus, he himself 
pleads for God to “listen” ([mv) to his supplications, “O my God, incline Your ear and hear [[mv]! Open 
Your eyes and see [har] our desolations” (Dan 9:17–18; cf. Ps 116:1; Neh 1:11). He goes on, “O Lord, 
hear! O Lord, forgive! O Lord, listen and take action!” (Dan 9:19). “The picture is of a person bending the 
ear in order to hear more clearly. God was being asked to listen intently to the prophet’s prayer (and 
possibly also to the insulting words being spoken about Yahweh by the heathen). The Lord was then 
implored to ‘open’ (‘open please!’) his eyes and observe the plight of the Jewish people and the condition 
of Jerusalem.” Miller, Daniel, 249. Yet, even when supplication is made, it is not “on account of any 
merits” of the asker, “but on account of [God’s] great compassion” (Dan 9:18). God responds to such 
heartfelt entreaty (Dan 9:23; cf. Ezra 8:23; Neh 9:17, 19, 27). 
374
 Elsewhere, in the midst of terrible divine judgment, God himself is concerned, he “saw [har] 




not forsaking (bz[) those who “seek” (vrd) and trust in him (Ps 9:10). This abundance of divine 
concern and emotion consistently evidences the passibility and relationality of God. Such 
awareness and responsiveness to the actual state of affairs are most prominently depicted in terms 
of divine compassion and passion. 
Divine Compassion 
God is consistently represented as the compassionate (~xr) one (Pss 40:11 [12]; 103:8; 
119:76–77; Lam 3:22), one who comforts (~xn) humans, denoting God’s devoted and 
compassionate attention to his people (Pss 23:4; 71:21; 86:17; 119:76; 135:14; cf. 77:2 [3]; 
119:82). The intimacy of such divine compassion is illustrated when it is compared with a 
father’s compassion for his children, specifically directed toward “those who fear him” (Ps 
103:13; cf. 17, 18).
375
 Further, both compassion and graciousness are central characteristics of 
God who is repeatedly described as “gracious and compassionate” (Ps 111:4; cf. 77:7 [8]; 102:13 
[14]; 103:8; 111:4; 145:8; Neh 9:31; 2 Chr 30:9) and these two characteristics are further linked 
with divine righteousness (Ps 116:5; cf. 112:4).
376
 The bestowal of such divine compassion (~xn) 
is dependent upon (albeit not unilaterally) the divine will (Ps 135:14) and, at times, an apparent 
ground of God’s grace (Ps 51:1), deliverance (Ps 69:16), and/or redemption (Ps 103:4). As 
compassionate, God is responsive and is thus implored to remember his compassion and his 
lovingkindness, which “have been from of old” (Ps 25:6; cf. vs. 7). While, God’s “mercies [~ymix]r;] 
are over all his works,” thus implying an aspect of universal compassion (Ps 145:9), God is “near 
                                                     
 
implies that God is affected by the sight of the affliction and relents in sorrow (cf. Gen 6:6). See also the 
word study of ~xn. The term appears elsewhere in the Writings with regard to divine relenting (Pss 90:13; 
106:45) or not relenting (Ps 110:4). See also the word study of ~xn.  
375
 Specifically, “children” is in parallel with “those who fear him,” implying that God’s children 
are none other than those who fear him. 
376
 Such depictions of the divine character are dependent upon the locus classicus of divine self-
revelation in Exod 34:6–7. Psalm 112:4 is a potential example of this divine attribute, but more likely it is 
in reference to a human agent though scholars are divided on this point (see the discussion regarding this in 




to all who call upon Him . . . in truth” (Ps 145:18). Accordingly, over and over such divine 
compassion is sought (Ps 51:1; Dan 2:18; Neh 1:11), as well as grace (Pss 51:1; 56:1; 119:32; Job 
8:5; Dan 9:13, 17–18), evidencing the widespread understanding that God may be affected, hear, 
and respond to entreaty.
377
 As such, neither divine grace nor compassion is depicted as altogether 
unilateral.  
Indeed, while divine grace and compassion may be unmerited they are not indifferent to 
human response. God is entreated to “turn” and be “gracious . . . after your manner with those 
who love your name” (Ps 119:32). God “scoffs at the scoffers” but “gives grace to the afflicted” 
(Prov 3:34).
378
 Confession and the forsaking of transgressions will “find compassion” (Prov 
28:13). God is “gracious and compassionate” and will “not turn his face away from you if you 
return to Him” (2 Chr 30:9).
379
 However, when God sent his “messengers” the prophets to call the 
people back to him “because He had compassion on His people and on His dwelling place,” they 
were “continually mocked” and “scoffed at . . . until the wrath of the LORD arose against His 
people, until there was no remedy” (36:15–16) and destruction came, and God “had no 
compassion” on any of them (2 Chr 36:17). The tension, here and elsewhere, between the 
“gracious and compassionate” God and the lack of efficacious compassion on historical 
occasions, is not due to a conflicted divine nature, character, or will, but is consistently tied to the 
actual state of affairs, specifically the resolve of Israel to repent or remain in apostasy. 
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 Thus, human supplication makes a difference, though it is only viable because of God’s “great 
compassion” (~ymix]r;) (Dan 9:18; cf. 9:9; Pss 78:38; 79:8 [9]). God’s compassion is so immense that David 
would rather receive chastisement directly from him rather than any human, for God’s “mercies [~ymix]r;] are 
very great” (1 Chr 21:13). 
378
 This implies a condition of grace, i.e., not scoffing. Thus, here divine grace is not altogether 
arbitrary. Fox translates, “As for the scornful—them he scorns, but upon the humble he bestows favor.” 
Proverbs 1–9, 162; cf. Ps 18:25–26 [26–27] = 2 Sam 22:26–27. According to Murphy, “The sense is that 
he [God] ‘outscoffs’ the scoffers.” Proverbs, 23.  
379
 Here, as elsewhere, God’s compassionate and gracious nature seems to provide the occasion for 




The expectation that God will be compassionate is so strong that its apparent absence is 
lamented (Ps 77:7 [8]). Yet, even in times of the apparent absence of God’s mercy there is hope 
predicated upon God’s amazing character. Thus, Ps 102 speaks of a future when God will arise 
and have compassion (~xr), because it is “time to be gracious [!nx]” and “the appointed time has 
come” (Ps 102:13 [14]).
380
 Although explanation is not given as to the nature of the “appointed 
time,” God is clearly not compelled to bestow compassion, but does so according to his designs 
while also being affected by the actual state of affairs. Accordingly, God’s compassion, as his 
lovingkindness, never fails, his faithfulness is great (Lam 3:22). He does not desire to execute 
judgment, indeed, he unwillingly causes grief (Lam 3:32–33) but he will nevertheless “have 
compassion according to his abundant lovingkindness” (Lam 3:32).  
Perhaps the abundance of divine compassion is most clearly represented in Nehemiah’s 
reflection upon Israel’s history, specifically the pattern of apostasy > loss of blessing > return > 
restoration of blessing > apostasy, and yet, divine compassion. While God is a God of 
forgiveness, grace, compassion, patience, and lovingkindness, the people stubbornly refused to 
listen to or remember God’s deeds, nevertheless God, in his “great compassion,” did not 
“forsake” them but continued to guide them (Neh 9:17, 19). However, due to their continued 
rebellion they were given to their oppressors. Yet, when they “cried” to God he “heard from 
heaven” and compassionately delivered them (Neh 9:27). Nevertheless, “as soon as they had rest, 
they did evil again” and thus God “abandoned them to the hand of their enemies” (Neh 9:28). But 
the people “cried again” and God again “heard from heaven” and “many times . . . rescued them 
according to [his] compassion” (Neh 9:28) and in God’s great compassion did not destroy or 
forsake them, for he is “a gracious and compassionate God” (Neh 9:31), the “great,” “mighty,” 
and “awesome,” “who keeps covenant and lovingkindness” (Neh 9:32; cf. Neh 1:5). Again, 
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 “The psalmist ventures to remind God of the ruined state of Jerusalem, in order to arouse 
compassion. He appeals to Yahweh’s faithfulness, to the covenant relationship that still binds Yahweh to 




appeal is made on the basis of God’s gracious and compassionate character, with the recognition 
that “You are just in all that has come upon us; For You have dealt faithfully, but we have acted 
wickedly” (Neh 9:33; cf. 13:22).
381
 In all this, though the primary reason for grace and 
compassion is found in God’s character and willingness to bestow grace and compassion, the 
reception of this grace and compassion is dependent upon the human reception, specifically 
hearing, obeying, turning, and thus manifesting their love for God. 
Divine Passion 
Divine concern is also manifested in indignation due to God’s people continually 
provoking him to vexation and the execution of judgment. Psalm 78 presents a compelling 
summary of this continual provocation in the history of Israel. Despite God’s care for them, his 
people forgot his deeds and rebelled against his commandments (Ps 78:10–11). He brought them 
out of Egyptian bondage miraculously but they continued to rebel, even testing God with their 
complaints and infuriating him even unto fiery wrath (Ps 78:15–21, 31). However, despite 
judgment they kept on sinning (Ps 78:32). When times became severe they “remembered,” 
“returned,” and sought God “diligently” (Ps 78:34–35). However, before long, they returned to 
covenant breaking and deceit (Ps 78:36–37). Yet God, “being compassionate, forgave” and “did 
not destroy them. . . . Often He restrained His anger and did not arouse all His wrath” (Ps 78:38). 
Notably, God has control over his anger, which is counteracted by his compassion. Despite such 
divine mercy, the people repeatedly rebelled, “grieved” (bc;['), “tempted, “and “pained” God (Ps 
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 “God would have been ‘just’ in putting an end to these rebellious people. Yet he kept on 
loving, guiding, and delivering them (Exod 32:10; 33:5).” Mervin Breneman, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther 
(NAC 10; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 1993), 241. H. G. M. Williamson suggests that this 
depicts a “God who, powerful as creator, had bound himself to them [the people] in a covenant promise 
that he had moved in deliverance to uphold and realize. . . . While they therefore offered no excuse on their 
own behalf, they appealed to the contradiction between their present circumstances and what they 
perceived as God’s immutable purposes toward them. The future might still be open, but in its own way the 
conclusion of the prayer breathes an atmosphere of strong faith and hope in spite of all the present, 






 Even after God established them in the Promised Land “they provoked [s[k] him” 
and “aroused His jealousy [anq]” with idolatry (Ps 78:58) such that God was angry and “greatly 
abhorred Israel” (Ps 78:59). This prompted God to remove his presence from Israel (Ps 78:60) 
and, finally, select Judah as the place of his presence (Ps 78:67–68).
383
 However, despite all of 
this, God goes on to shepherd Judah “according to the integrity of his heart” (Ps 78:72). 
The themes present in Ps 78 appear throughout the Writings, and indeed throughout the 
entire OT. The emotional response of divine anger is complemented by a broad range of 
emotions, including divine grief, pain, vexation, displeasure, jealousy, and even hatred, 
abhorrence, and loathing. Elsewhere, in response to infidelity, God often becomes angry in his 
wrath (2 Chr 19:2). At times, God is so deeply aggravated that he even hides his face (Ps 30:7), a 
strong sign of disapproval and removal of divine presence and beneficence (cf. Ps 77:8–9). Notice 
the intense divine feeling in his statement: “For forty years I loathed [jwq] that generation, And 
said they are a people who err in their heart, And they do not know My ways” (Ps 95:10). That 
generation “tested” and “tried” God (Ps 95:9) and he resolved (literally “swore” in his “anger”) 
that they would not enter into his rest (Ps 95:11). This is profound, raw emotion. Over and over 
again, Israel provoked (s[k) God with their idolatrous infidelity (Pss 78:58; 106:29; 2 Chr 28:25; 
33:6; 34:24–25; cf. 85:4). Israel’s infidelity thus prompts him to passionate, righteous jealousy 
(anq) (Pss 78:58; 79:5; cf. Cant 8:6).384 Even so, God’s anger may be turned away by entreaty 
                                                     
 
382
 bc[ and hwt are both in the hiphil, an explicit statement of humans causing God grief and pain. 
383
 This specifically depicts the removal of the ark from Shiloh. Notably, Ps 78:65 uses two 
analogies that describe God as rousing from sleep like a drunken warrior as he acts to place the ark in 
Jerusalem. The analogous, metaphorical, nature of this imagery is clearly depicted by the preposition K in 
both cases; cf. Isa 40:28; Ps 121:4. 
384
 The divine passion (anq), whether in verbal or nominal, is infrequently represented in the 
Writings (Pss 78:58; 79:5). Interestingly, the emotion of jealousy is associated with love and the “flame of 
Yahweh” in Cant 8:6 (cf. Deut 32:21–22). Although some commentators have seen the use of “Yah” as a 
superlative, primarily because the divine name is avoided elsewhere (so Longman III, Song of Songs, 213), 
it is more likely that it is indeed intended as a reference to the divine name. See the extended discussion in 
Richard M. Davidson, Flame of Yahweh: Sexuality in the Old Testament (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson 




and/or supplication (2 Chr 12:12; 30:8).
385
 Even in his anger, God remains receptive to the sincere 
cries of his people who humble themselves (2 Chr 2:6). Moreover, God does not desire to act in 
wrath, but even in times of judgment God “does not afflict willingly” (Lam 3:33).
386
 Ultimately, 





In all this, God is presented as being profoundly interested in, and moved by human 
affairs. On the one hand evil provokes him to anger, but on the other, his passion and compassion 
may be elicited by repentance and entreaty, leading to the removal of wrath, forgiveness, and 
deliverance. As such, throughout the canon, God is presented as emotional, affected by human 
actions, experiencing feelings of sorrow, grief, and passionate love, moved to anger by evil and 
yet compassionately responding, even relenting, according to human entreaty. God is thus 
presented as sympathetic, deeply affected by the sorrows of his people, willing to hear, answer, 
                                                     
 
comments, “Human passion is compared to ‘a mighty/raging flame’ or ‘a flame of fire from Yahweh/God.’ 
Human love can be as intense as divine love, but divine jealousy can be as intense as human jealousy.” 
Renita J. Weems, “The Song of Songs,” in Proverbs–Sirach (vol. 5 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon 
Press, 1997), 430. Davidson compellingly argues that the reference here presents the very best of romantic, 
human love as ultimately flowing from that reciprocal divine love God manifests toward his people, “a 
spark off the Holy Flame.” Davidson, Flame of Yahweh, 630. See also Larry L. Lyke, I Will Espouse You 
Forever: The Song of Songs and the Theology of Love in the Hebrew Bible (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon 
Press, 2007). 
385
 Prior to this, notice the reciprocality involved in that God declares to Judah, “You have 
forsaken Me, so I also have forsaken you to Shishak” (2 Chr 12:5); cf. 1 Chr 28:9; 2 Chr 15:2; 24:20. Here, 
“it was by humbling himself before the LORD that Rehoboam escaped (12:7), but he also adds the note that 
there was ‘some good’ in Judah. The good is left undefined—it may have been the very acts of contrition 
themselves, the many faithful in the kingdom, the residual benefit of God’s promises to David, or simply 
the favor shown to his people Israel.” Raymond B. Dillard, 2 Chronicles (WBC 15; Dallas: Word, 1987), 
100–101. 
386
 Notably, this suggests that God’s will is not omnicausal, the sole determiner of history, while at 
the same time recognizing God’s direct and powerful agency in history. 
387
 Thus, “weeping may last for the night, but a shout of joy comes in the morning” (Ps 30:5). Both 
“favor” and “anger” are here clearly emotional. Craigie states, “Anger is the divine response to human sin; 




and comfort. His compassion is passionate, profoundly deep and intense, the magnitude of which 
is astounding. Although divine compassion is not constantly applied, its lasting nature stands in 
stark contrast to the fleetingness of divine anger. Nevertheless, even divine compassion has a 
limit; it is not inexhaustible. Divine compassion is thus, to some extent, contingent upon the 
actual situation and disposition of the people. In this way the efficacy and manifestation of divine 
compassion fluctuates, not because God is capricious, but in direct relationship to the vacillation 
of his wayward people. Divine compassion is assiduous but not immutable, highly emotive but 
not beyond divine control. At the same time, there is a real give and take that is presented as 
affecting God himself, and it is within this divine passibility that the contingency of covenant 
election is situated. God has real emotions that respond to human action(s). He thus remains 
compassionate, willing to turn in favor toward those who sincerely turn to him. In all this, even in 
divine wrath, it is unmistakable that God is personally invested and interested in his creatures. 
Kinship Metaphors 
The relational responsiveness that provides the context for divine-human relationships 
including election, covenant, and blessing, as well as aspects of conditionality and 
unconditionality, is conveyed quite powerfully in kinship metaphors. These stand at the junction 
of the emotional aspect of divine love and the foreconditional and reciprocal aspects of God’s 
love, depicting the strong affection as well as the reciprocity expected of the divine-human 
relationship that God seeks with his creatures. 
Kinship Metaphors in the Torah 
 The parent-child analogy appears in numerous instances that build upon the covenant but 
describe a relationship that surpasses mere legal responsibility in the imagery of familial, kinship 
love.
388
 For instance, God considers Israel “My people” (Exod 3:7), even “My son, My firstborn” 
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(Exod 4:22). He is deeply concerned about them and goes to great lengths to deliver them from 
bondage (Exod 4:23).
389
 In reflection upon God’s action in Israel’s past history, they are 
reminded that God “carried” them “just as a man carries his son” (Deut 1:31). Further, God 
disciplines Israel even as a “man disciplines his son” (Deut 8:5), a loving discipline that is 
ultimately for their “good” (Deut 8:16; cf. Deut 4:36–37; Prov 3:11–12; 13:24).
390
 Certain 
behavior is expected of God’s children because they “are the sons of the LORD” (Deut 14:1), “a 
holy people” whom the LORD has “chosen” as his “own possession” (hL'gUs.) (Deut 14:2). Israel’s 
election, or adoption, itself expects the responsibility of those adopted.
 
This parental analogy reaches its pinnacle in the Torah within the extended poetic 
imagery of Deut 32. Israel has “acted corruptly toward” God and the people are “not His children, 
because of their defect” (Deut 32:5). God is their “Father who has bought” them, made, and 
established them (Deut 32:6). He is said to have “found” Israel “in a desert land,” a “howling 
waste of wilderness” and “encircled him, He cared for him, He guarded him as the pupil of His 
eye” (Deut 32:10).
391
 This divine concern is then depicted as “like an eagle that stirs up its nest, 
That hovers over its young, He spreads His wings and caught them, and carried them” (Deut 
                                                     
 
Deuteronomy. See, for instance, the seminal article of McCarthy, “Notes”; cf. 2 Kgs 16:7. While the two 
are certainly complementary and overlapping, however, the particular nuances of each descriptor of the 
divine-human relationship ought to be retained as well. Kinship language underlies language of covenant 
throughout the ANE, so covenant language is based on kinship, not vice versa. See the discussion in the bha 
word study above.  
389
 Although LXX has “my people” instead of “my son,” the MT is almost surely correct. Israel’s 
status as “firstborn” implies that God has others, pointing toward universal fatherhood. Stuart points to 
God’s “concern for the son’s suffering,” an “empathetic attention.” Stuart, Exodus, 151. According to 
Driver, Israel is here “brought into the closest and dearest relation to God.” S. R. Driver, Exodus 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1911), 31. Note that Israel is called God’s firstborn even prior to the 
institution of the Mosaic covenant (Exod 4:22). Further, this comparison is heightened by the tenth plague 
against Egypt’s firstborn, which God characterizes in response to their bondage of his “firstborn” (Exod 
4:23). 
390
 “The comparison to a father’s discipline indicates that the discipline, whether punitive or not, is 
administered with love.” Tigay, Deuteronomy, 93. Likewise, Christensen, Deuteronomy 1–11, 186. 
391
 The idiom “little man in his eye” denotes the reflection of the object of sight in one’s pupil. 
“Since protecting the eye is a reflexive action, the pupil is an effective simile for the object of protective 




32:11; cf. Exod 19:4).
392
 However, they forgot the God “who begot” them, who gave them “birth” 
(Deut 32:18) and went after false gods and he “spurned them because of the provocation of His 
sons and daughters” (Deut 32:19). He hides his face from them because they are “sons in whom 
there is no faithfulness” (Deut 32:20). In their rebellion they made him jealous and “provoked” 
him to “anger” (Deut 32:21; cf. 32:16), resulting in the execution of divine judgment. But, in the 
future, God “will have compassion on His servants” (Deut 32:36), indeed, he “loves” them (Deut 
33:3).  
In some passages the language of divine fatherhood and election implies adoption (Deut 
14:1–2; 32:6, 10; cf. Exod 4:22). However, the parent-child metaphor freely alternates between 
language of adoption and language of begetting/birth. Throughout such usage, the parent-child 
metaphor corresponds to the covenant relationship, but signifies that the divine-human 
relationship goes beyond the legal, perhaps utilitarian, relationship between the typical suzerain 
and vassal.
393
 Rather, divine fatherhood operates within profound personal relationship that is 
presented as affectionate, loving, devotedly interested, and intimately concerned, feeling sorrow, 
passion, and intense anger at Israel’s evil, but also compassion and the desire to bring them back. 
Thus, this parental love acts not only in tender caretaking, but when necessary, in discipline, itself 
corresponding to that real love that goes beyond surface sentimentality to the desire of ultimate 
well-being for its object.  
                                                     
 
392
 This is quite a striking analogy: “Apparently the eagle taught its young to fly by throwing one 
out of the nest, and then swooping down and allowing the young bird to alight on its mother’s wings. The 
poetry illustrates vividly God’s dealings with his people, casting them from security to the fierce 
wilderness, but remaining beneath them to give them strength for the fearful experience, and gradually 
teaching them to ‘fly’ on their own.” Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy, 381.  
393
 As Brueggemann puts it, “Yahweh’s resolve is not just that of a political sovereign (though it is 
that), but is also the passion of a parent who will see about the honor and well-being of the beloved heir and 




Kinship Metaphors in the Prophets
394
 
 In the prophets, the divine-human relationship is often depicted by the use of the parental 
and marriage metaphors.
395
 Both metaphors overlap with the covenant(s) and with one another 
and, in doing so, manifest the emotive background of the divine-human relationship, which 
includes God’s profound and lasting affection for his people as well as his desire for reciprocal 
love.
396
 The central themes that utilize both kinship metaphors are God’s enduring and faithful 
affection and their continual infidelity. Both are used (sometimes overlapping) to depict God’s 
tender affection on the one hand and Israel’s unfaithfulness on the other. For instance, divine 
fatherhood can extend to the individual, the covenant people, and all humans universally. Thus, 
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 Although a broad pattern emerges, in some instances the imagery has a complex relationship to 
Israel’s history such that the precise human referents of the metaphor are not always entirely clear. This 
brief survey will highlight the broad themes that often frame instances of love in the divine-human 
relationship, giving little attention to the details and intricacies regarding historical referents, in order to 
better serve the purposes of this study. 
395
 This brief survey is not intended to be exhaustive but serves the purpose of orienting one to the 
overarching metaphors that often overlap with love and describe the context of the divine-human 
relationship. For further information regarding these metaphors in the Bible, see Adler, “The Background”; 
David Tasker, “The Fatherhood of God: An Exegetical Study from the Hebrew Scriptures” (Ph.D. diss., 
Andrews University, 2001); Patterson, “Parental Love.” Interestingly, whereas the parental imagery is 
common in language depicting the relationship between ANE gods and humans (especially with regard to 
kingship), the language of marriage for the deity-human relationship is unique to the Bible. No ANE deity 
is “called the ‘husband’ of its nation.” Likewise, “nowhere else in the Ancient Near East is a pact or 
covenant found between a god and his/her worshipping community” that entails exclusive fidelity. Adler, 
“The Background,” 1–2, 5.  
396
 Cf. Adler, “The Background,” 72. There is a clear association between such metaphors and the 
covenant, by nature of the history of the parties. However, while covenant and the metaphors are closely 
related, they should not be conflated. The metaphors convey information about the divine-human 
relationship that should not be reduced by assuming it is only referencing the legal aspects of the 
relationship. For further information on the conflation of covenant with other metaphors, especially the 
father-son relationship, see the discussion earlier in the word study of bha. With this in mind, the intense 
emotionality of these metaphors should be recognized rather than explained away. Such emotionality 
within these metaphors is widely recognized; cf. Tigay, Deuteronomy, 56; Fretheim, Exodus, 77; 
Sakenfeld, The Meaning of Hesed, 176; Craigie, Kelley, and Drinkard Jr., Jeremiah 1–25, 64; Miller, “The 
Book of Jeremiah,” in Isaiah–Ezekiel, 6:608–9; Lundbom, Jeremiah 1–20, 303. “‘A wife of youth’ 
suggests all the passionate devotion of a young married couple with the bright hopes of their early married 
life.” Motyer, Isaiah, 447. Similarly, see Adler, “The Background,” 70; cf. Eichrodt, Theology, 251–52. As 
Garrett points out, “The marriage between Yahweh and Israel is the covenant, but this particular analogy 
for covenant implies more than either of the other two standard analogies, a contract and a treaty” since “a 
marriage . . . is an act of love.” Hosea, Joel, 93; cf. D. Smith, “Kinship and Covenant,” 45. As such, 




God utilizes the father-son imagery in describing the promise of his enduring faithfulness to 
Solomon, saying, “I will be a father to him and he will be a son to Me,” which will include 
establishing his throne forever, disciplining him when necessary, but never removing his dsx (2 
Sam 7:13–15).
397
 In another sense, divine fatherhood is universal. He is the creator of all (Mal 
2:10). As father, God is presented as the one who discovered Israel as a foundling in the 
wilderness, took her even in her amniotic fluid, washed her, and adopted her (Ezek 16:3–6).
398
 
Similarly, God proclaims, “When Israel was a youth I loved him, And out of Egypt I called My 
son” (Hos 11:1).
399
 He taught Ephraim to walk, gathered him in his arms, healed him and will 
continue to guide them (Hos 11:3–4).
400
 God spoke of his people as “sons who will not deal 
                                                     
 
397
 This language has significant parallels in ANE literature. Weinfeld has connected this with 
language of adoption coupled with the granting of kingship. Weinfeld, “The Covenant of Grant in the Old 
Testament and in the Ancient Near East,” 90–93; cf. Knoppers, 1 Chronicles 10–29, 670. However, Cross 
helpfully emphasizes, “It should be stressed that adoptive sonship places obligations of kinship on the 
father, as is generally recognized, and also on the son, which is often forgotten. Kinship obligations are 
necessarily mutual. In the language of kinship-in-law, the so-called Davidic Covenant, the same is true.  
. . . There are no ‘unilateral’ covenants in a kinship-based society.” Cross, From Epic, 14.  
398
 When God found her, she was still in her amniotic fluid, with uncut navel cord, unwashed, and 
unwrapped, abandoned and abhorred. The adoption is evident in the phrase, “Live!” (Ezek 16:6). The child 
had been abandoned, since the biological parents had relinquished all rights and left her for dead. See Meir 
Malul, “Adoption of Foundlings in the Bible and Mesopotamian Documents: A Study of Some Legal 
Metaphors in Ezekiel 16:1–7,” JSOT 46 (1990): 97–126.  
399
 This is apparently language of adoption and may recall Deut 4, 7, and 10 where love precedes 
divine election. Here God loves Israel, then calls them his child; cf. Exod 4:22. Notice the JPS translation, 
“I fell in love with Israel when he was still a child; and I have called him My son Ever since Egypt” (Hos 
11:1). This love itself is far more than the election that springs from it, but, when compared intertextually 
throughout Hosea, points to a profound affection within a give-and-take relationship (cf. Hos 3:1; 9:15; 
11:8–9; 14:4 [5]). Yee points out this give and take in that “in the other retrospects, God’s election is 
juxtaposed with Israel’s desertion to the gods of Canaan (9:10; 10:1–2). The more God ‘called’ Israel, the 
more he abandoned God to worship the baals (11:2). The son thus disowns himself from his parent, just as 
the wife/Israel rejects her husband (2:2a).” Gale A. Yee, “The Book of Hosea,” in The Twelve Prophets 
(vol. 7 of NIB, Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1996), 277. 
400
 These verses shift without warning to the metaphor of Israel as a beast of burden, in continuity 
with Hos 4:16; 10:11. Andersen and Freedman, however, believe that “taught to walk” and “took them in 
My arms” are incorrect interpretations since “a na’ar is not an infant that must be taught to walk.” Hosea, 
579. Adopting the more traditional view, Stuart points to the “image of the tender, patient parent training a 
child to walk, he proclaims his own innocence. There is both irony and pathos in these words. He had held 
little Ephraim’s hands as Ephraim took his first hesitant steps, and cared for him when he was sick. . . . Yet 
Ephraim did not even acknowledge this compassionate attention.” Stuart, Hosea-Jonah, 178; cf. Garrett, 
Hosea, Joel, 223. The Hebrew of v. 4 presents significant interpretive problems (which many attribute to 




falsely” (Isa 63:8) and he thus, among other things, redeemed them in love and mercy (Isa 63:9; 
cf. 63:16; 64:8). The depth of God’s affection is apparent in that his compassion surpasses that of 
a mother for her infant (Isa 49:15). When Israel grew up, God entered into a marriage covenant 
with her so that she became his (Ezek 16:8).
401
 He cared for her, lavishing her with gifts of fine 
clothing, adornments, and fine food (Ezek 16:9–13). God later looks back on this time with both 
fondness, recalling Israel’s former, youthful devotion (dsx) and the love (tb;Þh]a) of her betrothals, 
and yet sorrow at what she has become (Jer 2:2).
402
 
                                                     
 
suggest the translation, “I was a guide for Ephraim. I took from his arms the bonds of men. They did not 
acknowledge that I had healed them, That I had drawn them with cords of love on their jaws, That I treated 
them like those who remove the yoke. I heeded (his plea) and made (him) prevail” (Hos 11:3–4). Andersen 
and Freedman, Hosea, 574. Yee suggests that “the MT seems to conflate two images for Israel here: Israel 
as son and Israel as heifer.” Yee, “The Book of Hosea,” in The Twelve Prophets, 7:277. So also Stuart, 
Hosea-Jonah, 179; Garrett, Hosea, Joel, 224. The reference to lifting the yoke from their jaws in 11:4 
would seem to relate to the similar image in 10:11 where Ephraim is referred to as a “trained heifer” who is 
harnessed by God. If this is correct, Yee suggests the rendering “cords of human kindness” and “bands of 
love” as references to “the reins that control the animal.” She points to a similar conflation in Jer 31:28–20. 
Yee, “The Book of Hosea,” in The Twelve Prophets, 7:277. It is difficult to point to a specific translation 
and interpretation with certainty, but the significance seems to be captured well by Huey, who reads this as 
a comparison of “the Lord’s patience with Israel to a workman gently and compassionately correcting and 
leading an animal to food (11:4).” Huey Jr., Jeremiah, Lamentations, 270. Yet, the people’s refusal was a 
continual and purposive rebellion as God describes it: They were “bent on turning from Me” (Hos 11:7). 
Andersen and Freedman, Hosea, 574. Notice the potential parallel to Jer 31:3 by the collocation of hb'h]a + 
$vm. Ibid., 581. 
401
 Literally, he spread his skirt (wings) over her, a custom signifying betrothal. See P. A. Kruger, 
“The Hem of the Garment in Marriage: The Meaning of the Symbolic Gesture in Ruth 3:9 and Ezek 16:8,” 
JNSL 12 (1984): 86; Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 1–20 (AB 22; New York: Doubleday, 1983), 277. This 
shift from adopted daughter to wife is perhaps shocking to contemporary readers, but this is yet another 
example of the unexpected shifts from one metaphor to another. Here and elsewhere, the metaphors are 
intermixed in order to convey the content regarding the relationship most powerfully. For similar overlaps 
see Jer 3 and Hos 1–2. Further, God “swore” ([bv—the language of covenant promise) to her and “entered 
into a covenant” so that she became his. This has parallels in the Elephantine marriage vow, “She is my 
wife and I am her husband.” See R. Yaron, Introduction to the Law of the Aramaic Papyri (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1961), 46. Cf. Mal 2:14; Prov 2:17. The Elephantine marriage vow is, of course, strongly 
reminiscent of the divine language of covenant-making, “I will take you for My people, and I will be your 
God” (Exod 6:7; cf. Lev 26:12; Jer 7:23; 11:4 24:7; 30:22; 32:38; Ezek 11:20; 37:23; Zech 8:8; 13:9). 
402
 The use of hb'h]a; may be doing double-duty as a reference to the covenant relationship but also 
pointing to the language of affection and tender emotion drawn from interpersonal relationships. Neither 
connotation excludes the other. Some have spoken of this as a “nomadic” or “desert ideal,” a reference to 
the initial period of marital devotion of Israel toward God. Fox thinks this is mistaken with regard to Jer 
2:2, which he sees as specifying God’s unmerited love and devotion. Michael V. Fox, “Jeremiah 2:2 and 
the ‘Desert Ideal,’” CBQ 35 (1973): 441–50; cf. Robert P. Carroll, Jeremiah: A Commentary (OTL; 
Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986). Some see this as a direct contradiction of the history. Ibid., 120. 




Yet, God is repeatedly presented as a disrespected and unloved father or a scorned, 
cuckolded husband, the victim of unrequited love. The people’s disloyalty is expressed by their 
depiction, on the one hand, as rebellious, faithless children (Isa 1:2, 4; 30:9; Hos 11:2) who 
dishonor their father (Mal 1:6) and only seem to call to him as “my father” when they are in need 
(Jer 3:4; cf. Isa 63:16) and, on the other hand, as an extremely promiscuous and adulterous wife, 
continually going after her “many lovers” (Jer 3:1; cf. Isa 57:6–8; Jer 2:24–25; Ezek 16:15, 25–
26), abandoning God (Jer 3:20), and forgetting him “days without number” (Jer 2:32), who even 
pays her “clients” rather than receiving payment from them (Ezek 16:33–34).
403
 Their rebellion 
brings divine discipline (Isa 63:10; Ezek 16:42–43) and the rupture of the special relationship 
between God and his people. They have no rightful claim to the continuance of the special 
relationship as “wife” (Jer 3:1)
404
 or as God’s children (Hos 1:6, 9; 2:4; cf. Jer 4:22).
405
 Thus, God 
                                                     
 
scholars view the language as not merely wishful, but also factual. Israel was briefly devoted, though 
inconsistent. Craigie, Kelley, and Drinkard Jr., Jeremiah 1–25, 24, 52; Thompson, The Book of Jeremiah, 
162–63; Huey Jr., Jeremiah, Lamentations, 62; Michael DeRoche, “Jeremiah 2:2–3 and Israel's Love for 
God during the Wilderness Wanderings,” 45 (1983): 364–76. Importantly, Ezek 16:8–14 likewise depicts 
the wilderness era as a time of “close fellowship with God” despite also noting the extent of Israel’s later 
corruption (Ezek 20:5–26). Thompson, The Book of Jeremiah, 163. 
403
 The imagery of adultery is quite frequent throughout nearly all of Hosea as well (cf. Hos 4:12, 
15, 18; 5:3–4, 7; 6:10; 8:9; 9:1, 10). She is even said to have “played the harlot” with “every passer-by who 
might be willing” (Ezek 16:15; cf. 16:25–26) as well as having committed child sacrifice and other 
atrocities (Ezek 16:20–22). Their depravity is even compared to a donkey in heat, a powerful metaphor of 
their adulterous ways (Jer 2:24–25).  
404
 Jeremiah 3:1 raises the prospect that no reconciliation may be possible by reference to the law 
in Deut 24:1–4 that prohibits a man from remarrying a woman who has since been re-married to another 
and divorced. Miller thinks God’s affection is so great that he “is willing to violate God’s own law . . . if 
the people will return.” “The Book of Jeremiah,” in Isaiah–Ezekiel, 6:603. However, as Thompson points 
out, Israel had not married one lover but “was a prostitute to several lovers.” The Book of Jeremiah, 191. 
Yaron, further, stresses that “too exacting a standard must not be applied to a text which is not legal.” R. 
Yaron, “Restoration of Marriage,” JJS 17 (1966): 3. Likewise, Craigie wisely cautions not to press the 
marital law imagery, since the prophet “freely adapts it to his immediate purpose.” Craigie, Kelley, and 
Drinkard Jr., Jeremiah 1–25, 51.  
405
 Hosea is thus commanded to name his children Lo-Ruhamah (no compassion) and Lo-Ammi 
(not my people) to symbolize God’s fractured relationship with such children of harlotry (Hos 1:6, 9; cf. 
2:4) though later God hopefully reverses these names to Ruhamah and Ammi (Hos 2:1 [3]). Here, the 
imagery of unfaithful children and adulterous wife come together in the complex analogy of Hosea, where 
an adulterous wife and her two children appear to represent Israel and Judah, perhaps with Israel depicted 
as the mother and one of the children. Andersen and Freedman suggest the land as mother, Jezreel as all 




sent them away and gave Israel a “writ of divorce” (Jer 3:8; cf. Isa 50:1; Hos 2:2).
406
 God’s 
passion regarding his “wife” is nevertheless evident. She is his “beloved” who by vile deeds has 
forfeited her place in his house (Jer 11:15). Therefore he has “forsaken” his house and 
“abandoned” his inheritance, given the “beloved of [his] soul” into the hand of her enemies and 
has even “come to hate her” (Jer 12:8–9).
407
  
Nevertheless, despite their unfaithfulness and apostasy, God in his graciousness and love 
maintains a seemingly heartfelt call for their repentance and return (Jer 3:12–14, 22), upon which 
the restoration depends (Jer 4:1; cf. 31:21–22; Hos 2:2 [4]; 10:12; 14:1–3 [2–4]).
408
 Thus, God 
will allure his adulterous wife, bring her into the wilderness and speak kindly to her (Hos 2:14; cf. 
                                                     
 
However, the exact referents are not entirely certain. 
406
 This is specifically in reference to the northern kingdom, Israel, and was to hopefully deter 
Judah from her adultery, but it did not do so (Jer 3:8). Notably, adultery should have incurred the death 
penalty (cf. Deut 22:22) but God compassionately issued only a writ of divorce, which corresponds to 
something less than adultery (cf. Deut 24:1). There has been some disagreement over whether God ever 
actually divorced Israel, especially considering the cryptic phrase in Isa 50:1 where God, defending himself 
against the charge that he abandoned his people, asks, “Where is the certificate of divorce by which I have 
sent your mother away? Behold, you were sold for your iniquities, and for your transgressions your mother 
was sent away” (Isa 50:1). Some have taken this to mean that God never gave them such a writ of divorce 
and that the people’s inability to produce one will drive that point home. Thompson, The Book of Jeremiah, 
191. This is in accord with the view that God and his “wife” were merely separated but not divorced in Hos 
1–2. Andersen and Freedman, Hosea, 220–24. On the other hand, some see this as God calling for the writ 
of divorce to point out the charges that were brought against them, that God did not abandon them but the 
other way around. Both options could fit the meaning of Isa 50:1 in isolation but, of the two, only the latter 
accords with Jer 3:8. Cf. Thompson, The Book of Jeremiah, 196. 
407
 The language “beloved of my soul” is intensely emotive suggesting that the hatred, as parallel 
antonym, is as well. Miller points out, “the pathos of the whole section is caught up in that one sentence, 
with its identification of the one whom the Lord has given over to her enemies as ‘the beloved of my 
heart.’” “The Book of Jeremiah,” in Isaiah–Ezekiel, 6:679. Lundbom likewise notes the import of the 
expression, manifesting God’s “deep love for his people.” Jeremiah 1–20, 654.  
408
 “By her faithlessness Israel [had] forfeited a father-child relationship and an inheritance.” Huey 
Jr., Jeremiah, Lamentations, 77–78. Yet, “God had a special desire to give them the best, a delightful land, 
the most beautiful patrimony in all the world. But if that were to be the case, Israel would need to call 
Yahweh My Father in utter sincerity and not turn back.” Thompson, The Book of Jeremiah, 207. “The 
woman’s repentance and return to her husband then become the first and vital act in the process of 
rehabilitation. Hosea, however, contends that the initiative always remains with the husband (Yahweh), 
though it is only effective when there is a response (v 17b).” Andersen and Freedman, Hosea, 264. 
Lundbom notes that in 4:2 the language is from the Abrahamic covenant, pointing out that “the Abrahamic 
covenant is being subjected to conditions,” specifically that Israel’s “role in mediating grace to the nations  






 If they will but return, God will adopt (or re-adopt) them, promising to set them 
among his sons, give them a pleasant land and the most beautiful inheritance; they will call him 
father (Jer 3:19) and he will heal their faithlessness (Jer 3:22).
410
 Likewise, in response to their 
repentance and recognition that in God “the orphan finds mercy,” God declares, “I will heal their 
apostasy, I will love them freely, for my anger has turned away from them” (Hos 14:3–4 [4–
5]).
411
 Once again, out of his surpassing affection and “everlasting love” (Jer 31:3) for Israel, 
even his firstborn Ephraim (Jer 31:9), God exclaims, “Is Ephraim My dear son? Is he a delightful 
child? Indeed, as often as I have spoken against him, I certainly still remember him; Therefore 
My heart yearns for him; I will surely have mercy on him” (Jer 31:20). Therefore, though they 
broke (rr'P') their covenant with him, their husband, he will make a new covenant with them which 
shall endure (Jer 31:31–36; cf. Ezek 16:60–62) and “betroth” his people to himself “forever,” in 
“righteousness, justice, lovingkindness, compassion, and faithfulness (Hos 2:19–20 [21–22]).
412
 
In that future, her shame will be forgotten, “For your husband is your Maker, whose name is the 
LORD of hosts; and your Redeemer is the Holy One of Israel, who is called the God of all the 
earth” (Isa 54:4–5). God has called her “like a wife forsaken and grieved in spirit, even like a wife 
of one’s youth when she is rejected” (Isa 54:6), for he “forsook” her for a “brief moment” but will 
gather her with “great compassion” (Isa 54:7); he hid his face in a momentary “outburst of anger” 
                                                     
 
409
 The continuance of his love for her, despite her infidelity, is modeled in the command to 
Hosea, “Go again, love a woman who is loved by her husband, yet an adulteress, even as the LORD loves 
the sons of Israel” (Hos 3:1). As Craigie, Kelley, and Drinkard Jr. put it, “Beyond all the requirements of 
the covenant regulations, God continued to love those who had long since ceased to love him and earnestly 
desired their return to him.” Jeremiah 1–25, 57. 
410
 Notice the adoption language of fatherhood and inheritance. Further, “the reflective nature of 
these verses illuminates the warmth and love that lie permanently in the heart of God. He is disappointed at 
failure but still loves and still desires repentance (3:22). It is important to retain memory of this deep 
compassion when we read the prophet’s declarations of judgment (4:5ff.); in judgment, the compassion is 
still present, hoping beyond the judgment for a restoration of the relationship of love.” Ibid., 64. 
411
 There can be little doubt that the people recognize themselves as the “orphan.” 
412
 He will be called “Ishi” (my husband) and no longer “Baali” (my master) (Hos 2:16 [18]) and 




but will have compassion with “everlasting lovingkindness” (Isa 54:8). Thus, she will no longer 
be called “forsaken” nor her land “desolate” but she will be called “My delight is in her” and her 
land “married” for God delights in her and will marry (or re-marry) her land (Isa 62:4). Likewise, 
God will claim them as his own cherished “possession” (hL'gUs.) and “spare” (lmx) or have 
compassion on them even as a man has compassion on the “son who serves him” (Mal 3:17).
413
 
Kinship Metaphors in the Writings 
The intimacy of the divine-human relationship is once again described in the Writings in 
terms of kinship. In this section of the canon, however, the overwhelming prevalence is the 
parental metaphor, whereas the marriage metaphor is rare and somewhat cryptic. With regard to 
the latter, there are two primary instances where the marriage metaphor may be discerned. One is 
within a wedding song describing the marriage of a king and a princess, which typologically 
points to the divine-human relationship (Ps 45:9–14).
414
 Similarly, Song of Songs may 
typologically point to the love between God and his people, specifically by reference to the flame 
of Yahweh (Cant 8:6).
415
 If such instances are indeed types of the divine-human relationship, they 
                                                     
 
compassion) and declare Lo-Ammi (not my people) to be Ammi (my people) (Hos 2:23 [25]). 
413
 Notice the evaluative term hL'gUs and see the discussion of the term in the Torah section earlier. 
Also, notice the term lm;x',  which often has the affective connotation of compassion. 
414
 The immediate referent is a historical king and his bride. However, the NT identifies this as a 
Messianic psalm (compare Ps 45:6–7 with Heb 1:8–9). As such, the typology seems to point toward the 
metaphors of Christ and his bride that are prevalent in the NT. For a discussion of the primary and 
secondary meanings in this Psalm see Keil and Delitzsch, Commentary, 5:333–34, Craigie, Psalms 1–50, 
340. 
415
 The entire book traditionally has been interpreted as an allegory of the love between God and 
his people. However, strictly speaking, the book is not allegorical, but surely refers to immediate historical 
persons. Moreover, an allegorical view tends to reduce the meaning of the book to the realm of the 
spiritual, overlooking its importance as an ode to God’s gift of human sexuality. The typological, rather 
than allegorical, link to the divine-human relationship is evidenced by the reference to the “flame of Yah,” 
which the lover uses to describe the passionate love of her relationship. As Longman states, “The love 
between a man and a woman is used to describe the love between God and his people. One thinks of the 
tenacious love of God for a recalcitrant Israel in Hosea 8:8–9.” Longman III, Song of Songs, 213. For an 




manifest a profound, passionate love of God for his people, in continuity with that which has 
already been seen in the earlier sections of the OT.  
The parental metaphor is more explicit in the Writings, used in numerous instances with 
regard to the Davidic dynasty, specifically David and Solomon. God proclaims to David 
regarding Solomon, “I will be his father and he shall by My son” along with the promise of 
unceasing lovingkindness (1 Chr 17:13; cf. 22:10; 28:6).
416
 The Psalms similarly recall this time 
regarding David, “He will cry to Me, ‘You are my Father, My God . . . I also shall make him My 
firstborn” (Ps 89:26–27 [27–28]). Moreover, God’s decree is recounted, “You are My Son, Today 
I have begotten You” (Ps 2:7).
417
 The metaphor also extends beyond individuals to the 
community of God’s people, evidencing his interest and concern for their well-being. God is “a 
father of the fatherless and a judge for the widows” (Ps 68:5 [6]; cf. 10:14). Fatherly divine love 
extends to compassion as well as discipline. Thus, “just as a father has compassion on his 
children, so the LORD has compassion on those who fear Him” (Ps 103:13).
418
 Yet, “whom the 
LORD loves [bha] He reproves, even as a father corrects the son in whom he delights [hcr]” (Prov 
3:12; cf. Ps 89:30–32 [31–33]).
419
 Thus, even divine discipline is grounded in the intimate and 
compassionate, fatherly love of God. It is his deep affection that prompts God to care enough 
about his people to discipline them.
420
 In all, kinship descriptors of the divine-human relationship 
                                                     
 
416
 This language has significant parallels in ANE literature. Weinfeld has connected this with 
language of adoption coupled with the granting of kingship. “The Covenant,” 190–93; cf. Knoppers, 1 
Chronicles 10–29, 670.  
417
 The NT identifies this as Messianic (Acts 13:33; Heb 1:5; 5:5). 
418
 L. C. Allen suggests the reading, “As tender as a father’s affection for his children, has been 
Yahweh’s affection for those who revere him.” Psalms 101–150, 25. Notably, the children in the analogy 
appear to be “those who fear him,” thus contingency is built into the kinship relationship in this instance.  
419
 Notice the connection between love and delight, presenting the strongly emotional fondness 
and affection God has for his people. 
420
 Correction, only necessary in a non-ideal world, implies cognizance and concern for the actual 
situation of the son. This is in accord with the proverb, “Discipline” is withheld by the father who “hates” 




appear in continuity with those in the Prophets, although they are less frequent. They manifest 
that profound affinity that God has for his people, and desires from them in return.  
Conclusion 
Throughout the OT, kinship imagery depicts God’s affection for his people, like the 
enduring and deep compassion of parents for their children and the passion of a husband for his 
exclusive marital relationship. It is interesting to note that marriage and adoption are both 
voluntary, rather than merely natural, relationships. This implies that the divine-human 
relationship is voluntary rather than necessary. At the same time, deep and intense affection is 
evident both in such metaphors and elsewhere throughout the OT, which suggests relationship 
that is not only volitional but also profoundly emotional. Similarly, the ongoing maintenance of 
the relationship is conditional. The divine-human relationship is thus depicted as both more than 
voluntary (involving pathos and compassion) but also not less than voluntary. God is the devoted 
parent and faithfully loving husband, yet dishonored and scorned, his overtures rejected in a 
repetitive cycle of unrequited love. God is thus the wounded lover and the pained, rejected father. 
Yet, he is nevertheless the sovereign God who continuously acts to call his people back, whether 
by wooing them or disciplining them toward repentance, and he forecasts a day of final and 
ultimate restoration and delight that he will bring about for those who respond to him. This 
provides the striking context of divine love, set within a reciprocal, give-and-take relationship 
with his people, as shall be seen below.  
                                                     
 
his people to experience blessing, but they must respond to him in loyalty. Therefore, he disciplines them. 
“Although the reproof may be harsh, it is actually a sign of the LORD’s love, not of his wrath, for it 
concerns those whom the LORD loves.” Waltke, The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1:1–15:29, 249. Garrett 
further points out that discipline goes beyond punishment: “While the idea of punishment is certainly 
present (cf. Job 5:17–18 and 2 Sam 7:14), ‘discipline’ primarily involves teaching or training rather than 
punishment for wrongdoing. It is analogous to military training, in which, although the threat of 
punishment is present, even stern discipline is not necessarily retribution for offenses. Hardship and 
correction are involved, however, which are always hard to accept.” Proverbs, 81. However, this does not 




The Foreconditional Aspect of Divine Love 
This section focuses on data that support the conclusion that divine love is 
foreconditional, not altogether unconditional. By the term “foreconditional” I mean that God’s 
love is offered prior to any conditions but not exclusive of conditions. Accordingly, that God’s 
love is foreconditional affirms that:  
1. Divine love is prior to any human initiative or response—it holds sole primacy 
regarding the divine-human love relationship.  
2. God chooses to bestow his love prior to and independent of human merit.  
3. God’s love expects and ultimately requires, an appropriate human response, even if 
that response is merely the intention of responding to God in love.  
First, divine love is prior to all other love and conditions though it is not thereby 
altogether unconditional. Second, divine love is unmerited but not altogether unconditional. 
Third, divine love, as evaluative, is also conditional and may be forfeited. Therefore, it is not 
strictly unmotivated, spontaneous, disinterested, indifferent, or unconditional. Fourth, divine love 
is unconditional with respect to God’s volition, but conditional with respect to divine evaluation. 
Accordingly, the reader is encouraged to keep the following questions in mind while reading this 
section. Is divine love altogether unconditional, spontaneous, or ungrounded? Is divine love mere 
beneficence? Is divine love altogether unmerited? Can divine love be forfeited, lost, or 
discontinued and, if so, how and why? This section of the study begins with a survey of the 
meaning of the important, complex, and multifaceted term dsx. This is followed by a brief survey 
of the conditional aspect of divine beneficence in the OT before a canonical survey of the 




The Meaning of dsx 
dsx is one of the most significant descriptors of God’s character in the entire 
Scriptures.
421
 dsx is a purely relational term, describing interpersonal attitudes and/or actions as 
well as divine-human attitudes and/or actions, the majority referring to the divine-human 
relationship.
422
 It is often translated as lovingkindness, steadfast love, loyalty, goodness, 
faithfulness, mercy et al. It may connote love, compassion, mercy, and forgiveness, yet also 
faithfulness, loyalty, and strength. Perhaps Gowan puts it best when he writes that dsx “cannot be 
adequately translated by anything short of a paragraph.”
423
 As with bha, dsx has a wide range of 
meaning. It is often a basis of many kinds of beneficent action.
424
 The purpose of this brief 
semantic overview is not to search for a narrow or monolithic definition of the term, but rather to 
view its range of meaning in order to better grasp its relationship to the topic of this study.
425
  
                                                     
 
421
 It occurs 251 times in 245 verses. The etymology is uncertain and unhelpful in determining the 
meaning; cf. Hans-Jürgen Zobel, “חסד,” TDOT 5:45; H. J. Stoebe, “חסד,” TLOT 1:449. dsx occurs primarily 
in the noun form (248 times in 243 verses) with the verbal form appearing only in two verses, which are 
identical (2 Sam 22:26 = Ps 18:25 [26]). The vast majority of instances are singular. The plural appears 
only 16 times in 15 verses. Over half of all occurrences of dsx appear in the Psalms. Three of the 245 
occurrences are of a variant meaning of “shame” or “insult” (Prov 25:10; 14:34; Lev 20:17). Beyond the 
245 uses of dsx, the adjectival dysx appears in 32 verses, mostly in the Psalms (25 verses). 
422
 Zobel counts 63 out of 245 as dsx within the divine-human relationship. Zobel, TDOT 5:45. 
423
 Gowan, Theology in Exodus, 236. Walker cautions against “too sharp a distinction between 
God’s love (’hb) and his faithfulness (hsd) . . . hsd may clearly refer to either ‘love’ (kindness, mercy, 
favor) or ‘faithfulness.’” “‘Love,’” in Current Issues (ed. Hawthorne), 279. Hesed is further associated 
with, among other things, truth, faithfulness, compassion, righteousness, justice/judgment, goodness, 
redemption/deliverance, etc. 
424
 There are numerous cries for salvation, rescue, and/or deliverance on the basis, or “because of,” 
God’s dsx (Ps 6:4 [5]). dsx may thus be the basis of remembrance (Ps 25:6–7), deliverance (Pss 69:13 [14]; 
86:5; 144:2), help (Ps 94:18), salvation (Pss 31:16; 109:26; cf. 119:41), redemption (Ps 44:26), preservation 
(Ps 61:7), satisfaction (Ps 90:14), comfort (Ps 119:76), revival (Ps 119:88, 159), even the cutting off of 
enemies (Ps 143:12), and a host of other benefits (Pss 69:16; 119:124, 149; 143:8). God’s dsx and truth 
“continually preserve,” he does not “withhold” his “compassion” (Ps 40:11). He saves and “sends forth His 
lovingkindness and truth” (Ps 57:3). “He has remembered His lovingkindness and His faithfulness to the 
house of Israel; All the ends of the earth have seen the salvation of our God” (Ps 98:3). God may even 
extend dsx through other human beings (see Gen 39:21; Ezra 7:28; 9:9; Dan 1:9). In the plural, dsx is a term 
for God’s beneficent action itself (lovingkindnesses—Pss 66:20; 85:7 [8]; 86:13; 90:14; 94:18; 107:1, 8, 
15, 21, 31, 43; 2 Chr 1:8).  
425




dsx appears most often with God as agent and is strictly relational, connoting a positive 
disposition and/or action(s) toward another.
426
 Within such relationality, divine dsx is responsive 
and expects appropriate response. Specifically God’s dsx is often in response to a pre-existing 
relationship and/or various actions of human beings including fidelity and supplication. As such, 
the divine-human dsx assumes a reciprocal, though unequal, relationship. However, divine dsx is 
consistently presented as voluntary and free.
427
 Perhaps the greatest example of this, among 
others, appears in the narrative of the golden calf, when divine dsx, among other divine 
characteristics, is bestowed upon a people who have just forfeited all covenant rights in an 
egregious manner (cf. Exod 32–34). 
Out of that wider Exodus narrative come two seminal statements that go to the very root 
of the OT understanding of God and dsx. The first appears within the Decalogue. Although God 
will visit iniquity to the third and fourth generations, divine dsx will be shown to the thousandth 
generation of those who love God and keep his commandments (Exod 20:6 = Deut 5:10; cf. Exod 
34:7; Deut 7:9; Jer 32:18). The second seminal statement is perhaps the locus classicus of divine 
character (Exod 34:6–7). In the golden calf narrative, and indeed recurrently throughout Israel’s 
                                                     
 
widely different conclusions regarding the meaning of the word. Secondary studies will be engaged as they 
relate to the issues that come up in surveying the usage of dsx. 
426
 Likewise, with human agents, the root dsx sums up all that is virtuous in behavior. In intimate 
relationships of family and/or friendship that means treating loved ones as such. In political relationships 
that is being faithful to responsibilities and reciprocating past favors. In religious relationship that is 
fulfilling all of the covenant desires of God: hearing, doing, obeying, worshipping exclusively, etc., but 
doing all this out of devotion, that is, from the heart. 
427
 For instance, Lot declares that he has “found favor in your sight” and “you have magnified 
your lovingkindness, which you have shown me” (Gen 19:19). Abraham’s servant requests that God show 
“lovingkindness” to Abraham in granting success in the search for Isaac’s bride (Gen 24:12; cf. 24:14) and 
then praises God “who has not forsaken His lovingkindness and truth” implying that God was free to do 
otherwise (Gen 24:27). Jacob, as a precursor to his request of deliverance from Esau, declares that he is 
“unworthy of all the lovingkindness and of all the faithfulness” (Gen 32:10). Later, divine lovingkindness is 
said to have been removed from Saul, but God promises that such will not depart from David’s son (2 Sam 
7:15). Solomon praises God for having dealt in great dsx toward David by fulfilling his promise (2 Chr 1:8–





history, God goes far beyond covenant responsibilities, or even moral expectations, by continuing 
in dsx toward a stiff-necked, rebellious, unworthy people who had forfeited all covenantal 
privileges. In the aftermath of Israel’s great apostasy (Exod 32), God describes himself as 
“abounding in lovingkindness and truth” as well as “compassionate and gracious, slow to anger 
(Exod 34:6), the one “who keeps lovingkindness for thousands” the forgiver of all kinds of sin, 
yet also the punisher of the guilty (Exod 34:7). Thus, “as it stands in Exodus, the passage is a 
beautifully balanced statement with regard to the two most basic aspects of the character of 
God—His love and His justice. It is significant that love holds the primary place.”
428
 dsx is thus a 
foundational characteristic of God, one that is manifested in action but flows from who God is, 
demonstrating the steadfastness of God’s commitment to his people, which extends beyond what 
is deserved in divine mercy and forgiveness.
429
 
This seminal statement of divine character and dsx manifests associations that appear 
many times elsewhere, including goodness, compassion, graciousness, truth, and forgiveness yet 
never injustice (Exod 33:19; 34:6–7). These characteristics also often appear alongside dsx in 
contexts where someone requires mercy, which often result in forgiveness. Although forgiveness 
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 Robert C. Dentan, “The Literary Affinitites of Exodus XXXIV 6f,” VT 13 (1963): 36. 
429
 This seminal passage is recurrently alluded to, often in the context of further entreaty. After one 
such allusion, entreaty for pardon is predicated “according to the greatness of Your lovingkindness” (Num 
14:18–19). Similar allusions occur throughout the OT, often the basis of similar appeals (Joel 2:13; Jonah 
4:2; Neh 9:17; 31–32; cf. Ps 86:15; cf. Pss 103:8; 145:8). The importance of dsx to the divine character is 
also seen in its frequent occurrence as the basis of praise. Appropriately, divine dsx is also a basis of 
effusive praise and thanksgiving (Exod 15:13; Pss 31:7, 21; 92:2; 107:1, 8, 15, 21, 31; 136:1–26; 138:2; cf. 
Jer 33:11; Ezra 3:11; 1 Chr 16:34, 41; 2 Chr 20:21). God is to be “blessed” (Ps 66:20), his dsx is to be 
praised and proclaimed (Pss 59:16–17; 63:3; 89:1; 101:1), not hidden (Ps 40:10), walked in (Ps 26:3), and 
thought of (Ps 48:9). Moreover, dsx is not just characteristic of God, it is his “delight,” which he expects of 
humans (Hos 6:6), and delights in exercising, along with justice and righteousness (Jer 9:24). He is unique 
as the pardoner, the one who passes over rebellion, who does “not retain His anger forever, because He 
delights [#pex'] in unchanging love [dsx]” (Mic 7:18; cf. v. 20). Similarly in the Psalms, dsx takes on even 
greater prevalence as a descriptor of the divine character, in fact, as a summative term that, amidst other 
rich language and imagery, intends to encapsulate God’s relationship to his people. He is the God of dsx (Ps 
59:10 [11]). God is the one “who redeems . . . who crowns you with lovingkindness and compassion” (Ps 
103:4). With him there is dsx and abundant redemption (Ps 130:7). It is characteristic of divine virtues and 
governance, thus, “righteousness and justice are the foundation of Your throne; Lovingkindness and truth 




is not significantly associated with dsx in human interpersonal usage, it becomes quite important 
to the ongoing divine-human relationship within which dsx takes place. dsx is often a basis (often 
alongside goodness, compassion, and/or grace) of the removal of divine wrath (Isa 54:8; Mic 
7:18; Lam 3:31–32) as well as the expectation, request, and/or reception of forgiveness and/or 
deliverance (i.e., Num 14:19; Pss 25:7; 51:3). This willingness to overcome sin and the disruption 
of the relationship manifests the steadfastness of God’s commitment, which is the only way that 
the God-human relationship can continue. In this way, the ultimate (but not exclusive) ground of 
divine dsx is God’s free, loving character. As such, dsx is closely associated and collocates 
significantly with all the divine virtues including his love (bha),430 compassion (~xr),431 and 
goodness (bwj),432 which are manifested in his voluntary association with humanity.433  
                                                     
 
430
 Divine bha itself is an explicit ground of dsx. God declares his “everlasting love” and 
“therefore” has drawn the people with dsx (Jer 31:3). According to Bowen, God shows dsx because he 
loves. Boone M. Bowen, “A Study of Chesed” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1938), quoted in Clark, The 
Word Hesed, 18. The close connection is also apparent in Jer 2:2, where God remembers human dsx and 
love toward him. On the other hand, God is often said to respond with dsx toward humans who love him 
(Exod 20:6; Deut 5:10; 7:9; Neh 1:5; Dan 9:4; cf. Pss 119:159; 37:28; 97:10).  
431
 In one instance, compassion is on the basis of dsx (Isa 54:8), but most often they are side by 
side as grounds of positive divine action and are not clearly distinguished. As such, in many of the 
collocations a beneficial action is either promised, expected, requested, and/or received on the basis of 
divine dsx and compassion (Isa 63:7; Hos 2:19 [21]; Pss 25:6; 40:11; 51:1; Pss 69:16 [17]; 103:4; Lam 
3:22, 32). Likewise, the two terms collocate in the locus classicus of the divine character. God is 
compassionate as well as abounding in lovingkindness (Exod 34:6; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2; Pss 86:15; 103:8; 
145:8; Neh 9:17), attributes that provide the foundation of divine forgiveness. The endurance of both is 
emphasized (Isa 54:10; Lam 3:22). They are both “from of old” (Ps 25:6), bestowed on “those who fear” 
God (Ps 103:11, 13). Both may be withdrawn or withheld (Jer 16:5; cf. Ps 40:11) or appear to be absent 
(Mic 7:19–20; Ps 77:8–9 [9–10]). Both are thus grounds of the continuance of the divine-human 
relationship, in which divine forgiveness and deliverance are so often needed. God’s dsx as steadfast loyal 
love, and ~xr as God’s compassionate, tender feelings for his people, together ground God’s beneficent 
actions, especially those that extend into the realm of need. 
432
 There is a great degree of overlap between the terms, but their semantic ranges are distinct. 
Goodness is an aspect of dsx, but dsx is more than goodness. For one thing, dsx entails particular 
interpersonal relations while bwj may be used more abstractly. As such, dsx is always good, but goodness is 
not always dsx. Zobel comments, “What is meant by hesed can almost be paraphrased by the expression 
‘do good.’” TDOT 5:47. For further consideration of the overlap see Stoebe, “Die Bedeutung,” 244–54. He 
suggests the original meaning of dsx was “goodheartedness, kindness” and that bAj gradually replaced dsx 
in late writings. In divine usage, the collocation is most often used to praise the character of God in the 
refrain, he “is good” and “His lovingkindness is everlasting” (Jer 33:11; Pss 100:5; 106:1; 107:1; 118:1, 29; 
136:1; 1 Chr 6:34; 2 Chr 5:13; 7:3; cf. Ezra 3:11). Similarly, God is praised for the “great goodness toward 




God’s commitment, reliability, steadfastness, and fidelity to the objects of his dsx is 
further emphasized in the frequent collocations of dsx with tma, !ma, or hnwma, all of which connote 
aspects of truth and faithfulness.
434
 In circumstances that require forgiveness dsx also overlaps 
somewhat with grace, although the quality of loyalty and steadfastness distinguishes the terms, 
being essential to dsx but not to !nx/!x.435 It must be recognized in all this that divine dsx surpasses 
                                                     
 
Thus, both terms together describe and extol God’s virtuous character (cf. Pss 86:5; 25:7; 69:16 [17]; 
109:21). See also Mic 6:8; 2 Chr 6:41; Prov 14:22; Judg 8:35; 2 Sam 2:6; Esth 2:9.  
433
 Due to such associations many scholars see an emotional aspect as a connotation of dsx. 
“Hesedh, then, implies relationship and indicates a deep, lasting affection.” Morris, Testaments of Love, 68. 
Clark spoke of it as “an emotion that leads to activity beneficial to the recipient.” Clark, The Word Hesed, 
267. Zobel sees dsx as “involv[ing] an emotional element,” even early, which becomes clear in its 
association with ~xr. TDOT 5:53. Snaith sees emotionality based on his view that dsx has etymological 
roots in the Arabic term meaning “eager, ardent desire.” The Distinctive Ideas, 106. Propp believes that 
“hesed is an emotional state motivating action.” Exodus 1–18, 532.  
434
 Often the terms dsx and tma, “truth,” appear together in the syntagm tm,a/w< ds,x both with human 
and divine agency. At times, this syntagm signifies the steadfast faithfulness in human relationships (Gen 
24:29; 47:29; Josh 2:14), or is descriptive of virtue (Ps 25:10; Prov 3:3) and/or the consequences of virtue 
(Prov 14:22; 16:6; 20:28; cf. 2 Sam 15:20). However, it appears most often with divine agency, signifying 
the steadfastness and faithfulness of divine dsx (Gen 24:27; Exod 34:6; Pss 40:10–11 [11–12]; 57:4; 61:7 
[8]); 85:10 [11]; 86:15; 89:14 [15]; 138:2). In other instances, the two terms demonstrate the close 
connection between them as descriptors of the basis, or description, of virtuous action requested, received, 
and/or expected of God (Gen 32:10 [11]; 2 Sam 2:6; Mic 7:20; Pss 69:13 [14]; 115:1; 117:2). dsx is not 
synonymous with tma, since the latter alone can be used in non-personal contexts, but the syntagm 
magnifies the commitment, reliability, trustworthiness, faithfulness, and fidelity aspects of God’s dsx; cf. 
Clark, The Word Hesed, 236; Sakenfeld, The Meaning of Hesed, 34. Many scholars have seen the syntagm 
as a hendiadys with tma serving to accentuate or emphasize the divine commitment. Clark, The Word 
Hesed, 255; Glueck, Hesed in the Bible, 102; Zobel, TDOT 5:48; Umberto Cassuto, A Commentary on the 
Book of Exodus (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1967), 440; E. A. Speiser, Genesis (AB 1; Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1964), 180. As Sarna puts it, “The combination of terms expresses God’s absolute and eternal 
dependability in dispensing His benefactions.” Exodus, 216. A number of scholars, however, see these as 
two separate attributes of God. Waltke, The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1:1–15:29, 242; Laney, “God’s 
Self-revelation,” 46; Alfred Jepsen, “אמן,” TDOT 1:314. As Clark puts it, “The genuineness, permanence, 
and reliability is not so much an attribute of hesed as of the parties who are involved in the hesed. . . . The 
relationship between them is an unwavering, enduring, reliable commitment to each other in which hesed is 
the appropriate action.” The Word Hesed, 254–55. See also Ps 57:10 [11]; cf. 108:4 [5]. dsx also collocates 
closely with two other terms that have meanings related to tma (truth): !ma and hnwma. !ma describes God’s 
character of faithfulness (Deut 7:9; cf. Ps 89:1 [2]. Likewise, God’s continued dsx and hnwma are variously 
described and praised (Pss 92: [3]; 98:3). See also Pss 36:5 [6]; 89:2 [3]; 100:5; 89:24 [25]; 33 [34]; 49 
[50]). In all this it is clear that the qualities of truth and faithfulness are inherent in dsx, though dsx is more 
than these qualities.  
435
 In divine usage, the two terms appear in parallel and signify beneficence. See Gen 19:19; 
39:21. The close association between the terms also allows for either to serve as the apparent basis for the 
other (see Gen 47:29; Ps 51:1 [3]). Both terms most often appear in the many instances of the locus 




responsibilities and/or expectations since forgiveness and grace are never deserved and God’s 
fidelity extends far beyond that which is required, or could be reasonably anticipated. This 
surpassing and superabounding aspect often connoted by dsx alone is magnified in the syntagms 
“abundance of dsx” (br + dsx) of “greatness of dsx.”436 However, this does not mean that justice is 
ever shirked. Divine forgiveness does not include ignoring or overlooking sin. Importantly, divine 
dsx is associated with justice in many significant ways especially in collocations with the lexemes 
qdc and jpvm.437 God forgives but does not thereby forsake justice; God is the one “who exercises 
lovingkindness, justice and righteousness on earth” (Jer 9:23 [24]; cf. Pss 33:5; 89:14 [15]). As 
                                                     
 
4:2; Pss 86:15; 103:8; 145:8; Neh 9:17). Thus, dsx overlaps with grace in being a favorable disposition 
and/or resulting in favorable, often gracious action. But the terms are not synonymous. Stoebe, TLOT 
1:653. They collocate together in contexts where mercy, forgiveness, or some kind of special favor is 
needed by the patient. Thus, their significant overlap is not surprising considering the history of Israel’s 
frequent need for grace. In such contexts, dsx has the ability to overlap with !x/!nx, yet surpasses !x/!nx in its 
other connotations of steadfastness, loyalty, appropriate response, etc. dsx goes beyond all responsibilities 
and in this respect overlaps !x, but entails more than the surpassing of responsibilities. dsx is more than 
beneficence; it presumes loyalty and, often, faithfulness to a past relationship or mutual activity while !x is 
that element of favor in general, often unmerited. Thus, dsx often contains !x in its expression, but the two 
terms are not to be conflated.  
Two main differences have been popular among scholars: the difference between the terms with 
regard to responsibility/obligation and the difference regarding relative status. Lofthouse thought !x was 
only appropriate “just where there was no tie or claim,” whereas dsx requires “some recognised tie.” 
Lofthouse, “Hen and Hesed,” 33. Likewise, for Snaith, dsx is bilateral, but !x is unilateral, and the bestowal 
of !x is out of pure generosity, never responsibility. The Distinctive Ideas, 128. However, one should take 
care to recognize that something may be undeserved yet, at the same time, not given entirely arbitrarily. 
Lofthouse also viewed !x as only from superior to inferior. Lofthouse, “Hen and Hesed,” 30; cf. Glueck, 
Hesed in the Bible, 128. Clark agreed with the superior-inferior relation for !x but thought it irrelevant for 
dsx. The Word Hesed, 215. However, Reed correctly notes that !x does not require a superior-inferior 
relationship, but more importantly emphasizes the capacity of the giver of !x for goodwill. Further, he 
considers !x to be quite complementary to dsx, perhaps even as a basis of dsx. Reed, “Some Implications,” 
36–41.  
436
 For the former see Exod 34:6; Num 14:18; Isa 63:7; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2; Pss 5:7 [8]; 69:13 
[14]; 86:5, 15; 103:8; 106:7, 45; Lam 3:22; Neh 9:17; 13:22. For the latter see Gen 19:19; Num 14:19; 1 
Kgs 3:6; Pss 57:10 [11]; 86:13; 108:4 [5]; 145:8; 2 Chr 1:8. 
437
 The three terms are collocated together in numerous instances. For example, God “loves 
righteousness [qdc] and justice [jPvm]; The earth is full of the lovingkindness of the Lord” (Ps 33:5). See 
also Ps 89:14 [15]; Isa 16:5; Jer 9:23 [24]; Hos 2:19 [21]. In other instances, dsx is closely tied to qdc. For 
example, “lovingkindness and truth have met together; righteousness [qdc] and peace have kissed each 
other (Ps 85:10 [11]). See also 1 Kgs 3:6; Hos 10:12; Pss 40:10 [11]; 36:10 [11]; 103:17; Prov 21:21. 
Similarly, the close bond is seen with jPvm. See Hos 12:6 [7]; Mic 6:8; Zech 7:9; Pss 101:1; 119:149. This 
term is also related to the dysx. God loves justice (jPvm) and does not forsake his dysx (Ps 37:28; cf. 149:9), 




such, dsx overlaps with both mercy and forgiveness, on the one hand, and justice on the other, 
tying them together (Ps 85:10).
438
 
 At this point it will be helpful to address a number of issues related to the interpretation 
of dsx including whether dsx is strictly “covenant love,” always takes place in mutual obligatory 
relationships, flows only from superior to inferior, or may be reciprocal, everlasting, or 
conditional. Some of these may be illuminated by an example or two; others may await potential 
resolution by way of the larger canonical analysis. Within the following issues, the broader 
question of the nature of the relationship within which dsx takes place rises to the fore. The 
divine-human relationship that provides the environment of dsx is often, though not always (cf. 
Job 10:12), a covenant relationship. Thus, dsx is manifest in relation to the Abrahamic (Gen 
19:19; 24:12, 14, 27; 32:10; Exod 15:13; cf. Mic 7:18, 20), Mosaic (Exod 20:5–6; 34:6–7; Deut 
5:10; 7:9, 12), and Davidic covenants (2 Sam 7:15; 22:15; 1 Kgs 3:6; 8:23; 2 Chr 1:8; 6:14, 42), 
and is also in close reference to the proclamation of the new covenant (Jer 31:3).
439
 Accordingly, 
there are a number of close collocations of dsx and tyrb.440 However, while there is certainly a 
great deal of affinity between dsx and covenant, they are not synonymous.  
                                                     
 
438
 Hesed is also sometimes associated with strength such as in the parallel, “In Your 
lovingkindness You have led the people whom You have redeemed; In Your strength [z[o] you have guided 
them” (Exod 15:13); cf. Ps 144:2. Some have viewed one of dsx’s basic meanings as strength when used 
with divine agency. Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas, 94–95; cf. W. E. Vine, “Loving-Kindness,” Vine's 
Complete Expository Dictionary of Old and New Testament Words, 143; cf. especially Lester J. Kupyer, 
“The Meaning of חסדו Isa 40:6,” VT 13 (1963): 491–92. But Sakenfeld suggests that “‘strength’ is not an 
additional, independent meaning of the word but rather a particular emphasis within the larger framework 
of meaning evoked by the term.” The Meaning of Hesed, 223.  
439
 This is by no means an exhaustive list. 
440
 In some instances God is described as the keeper of covenant and dsx (Deut 7:9, 12; 1 Kgs 
8:23; Neh 1:5; 9:32; 2 Chr 6:14; Dan 9:4). A number of these instances point to some degree of mutuality, 
specifically that God keeps covenant and dsx with those who love him (Deut 7:9 et al.). The ~ydysx are 
likewise described as “those who have made a covenant with Me by sacrifice” (Ps 50:5). Such mutuality 
also appears when dsx is said to be to those who keep the covenant (Ps 25:10). To David, God proclaims he 
will keep his dsx and confirm his covenant (Ps 89:28 [29]; cf. Isa 55:3). In parallel, God proclaims that his 
dsx will not be removed, nor his covenant of peace shaken (Isa 54:10). Speaking of God’s deliverance in 
the past, God remembered the covenant and relented according to his great dsx (Ps 106:45). The two terms 




For this and other reasons, dsx has often been described as “covenant love,” or at least as 
the “norm of conduct” in a relationship of “mutual rights and duties.”
441
 However, it is important 
to recognize covenant is not always in the background of dsx. In fact, dsx is not restricted to a 
formalized relationship of any kind, and, even within a covenant context, may operate outside as 
well as above and beyond the restrictions of tyrb.442 Moreover, dsx is often manifested in 
situations that go far beyond any reasonable expectations (covenant, moral, or otherwise).
443
 
Divine dsx also extends beyond the covenant people in numerous examples.444  
As such, dsx is a concept alongside that of covenant, but not subservient to covenant. 
While covenant responsibility is often present, the actual ground of divine dsx goes beyond 
covenant responsibility. Indeed, covenant itself originated in the free decision of God. dsx 
                                                     
 
covenant between them (1 Sam 20:8). Here it seems that covenant is an additional source of responsibility 
beyond dsx. 
441
 Glueck, Hesed in the Bible, 68. “God's hesed can only be understood as Yahweh’s covenantal 
relationship toward his followers.” Ibid., 102. For him, the terms are not synonymous but require one 
another, though in some parallel usages they may have the same meaning. Ibid., 47. Hesed is the “very 
essence of a berith,” yet, at the same time, dsx is the “result” of the covenant. Ibid., 55, 68, 102. As such, 
they are “mutually contingent upon one another.” Ibid., 47. However, for Glueck dsx could take place 
beyond formal covenants, but only within relationship with mutual commitments of obligations. Norman 
Snaith went beyond Glueck’s view to assert that dsx is “covenant love” specifically “eagerness, 
steadfastness . . . mercy, loving-kindness” but “all within the covenant.” Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas, 94–
95, 98; cf. Good, “Love in the OT,” IDB 3:167; Lofthouse, “Hen and Hesed,” 29–35.  
442
 Numerous scholars recognize that dsx is not restricted to covenant. Clark, The Word Hesed, 
192; Morris, Testaments of Love, 69; Harris, “חסד,” TWOT 306–7; Sakenfeld, “Love in the OT,” 4:379; 
Fox, Proverbs 1–9, 145; Goldingay, Daniel, 241–42; Zobel, TDOT 5:53, 61; Stoebe, TLOT 1:455, 460; 
Thomas M. Raitt, “Why Does God Forgive?” HBT 13 (1991): 54; Dentan, “The Literary Affinitites,” 43; 
Alfred Jepsen, “Gnade und Barmherzigkeit,” KD 7 (1961): 265. Cross points to the more basic category of 
kinship, suggesting that not only bha, but also dsx “originally was a term designating the loyal and loving 
behavior appropriate to kinship relationship.” From Epic, 5. 
443
 For reasons that will be seen later in the study, I also do not believe God is internally obligated, 
but the usage of dsx is not sufficient to determine this position. 
444
 Naomi calls for God to show dsx to Ruth and Orpah, non-Israelites (Ruth 1:8; cf. 2 Sam 15:20). 
Perhaps even clearer is Jonah’s lament that God is a God of dsx, among other attributes, which led to the 
suspension of judgment against Nineveh (Jonah 4:2). Such universality of divine dsx is likewise implied in 
that the entire “earth is full of the lovingkindness of the LORD” (Ps 33:5; cf. Pss 36:7 [8]; 117:1–2; 119:64; 
145:8–9); cf. Sakenfeld, “Love in the OT,” 4:379; idem, The Meaning of Hesed, 127; Gerald A. Larue, 
“Recent Studies in Hesed,” in Hesed in the Bible (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1967), 4. On 




belongs to the God-human relational context of which covenant is the most prominent descriptor. 
As such, dsx exemplifies the best, the ideal, of that relationship as well as other divine-human 
relationships, while covenant itself is grounded in the character of God and his decision to enter 
into special relationship with human beings.
445
  
The supposition of dsx as a covenantal term is closely related to the debated position that 
dsx always takes place only within a “mutually obligatory relationship.”446 While Glueck believed 
that dsx always “connotes mutual obligation” between parties, others have emphasized the ideas 
of voluntary kindness, mercy, and/or grace, as opposed to obligation.
447
 In this latter perspective 
dsx as duty gives way to dsx as the free actions of a benefactor.448 Sakenfeld rightly points out 
that the request or situational expectation of dsx is always one that the potential grantor could 
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 Further support for this view will become clearer as the study progresses. 
446
 Glueck, Hesed in the Bible, 55; cf. ibid., 38–40, 50, 54. Yet Glueck does allow that in later 
usages [Esther, Ruth] dsx loses “characteristics of obligation” and “becomes more like grace and mercy” 
yet, nevertheless, he later summarizes, “Subjectively understood, hesed, especially that shown to the poor, 
may appear as mercy or grace. Objectively, however, hesed remains the obligatory relationship of men 
toward one another, and implicitly as well as explicitly toward God.” Ibid., 52, 64; cf. Snaith, The 
Distinctive Ideas; Park, “Divine Love in Hosea 11,” 28. Bowen contended that dsx is descriptive of the 
universal obligations of human interpersonal conduct. Boone M. Bowen, quoted in Clark, The Word Hesed, 
18. 
447
 Jepsen rejected any kind of obligation related to dsx. “Gnade und Barmherzigkeit,” 261–71. Cf. 
Stoebe, TLOT 1:454; U. Masing, “Der Begriff Hesed im alttestamentlichen Sprachgebrauch,” in 
Charisteria Iohanni Kopp: Papers of the Estonian Theological Society in Exile (Stockholm: Holmiae, 
1954), quoted in Larue, “Recent Studies in Hesed,” 22. Harris comments that “Glueck certainly seems to 
find obligation where there is none. . . . Where no obvious relationship of mutual obligation is apparent in 
the text, Glueck ingeniously discovers one.” “חסד,” TWOT 305. Fox suggests, “Hesed is kindness (whether 
an act or an attitude) that is not mandatory. . . . It is always the right thing to do, never a mere gift and 
certainly never an unfair partiality. Hesed is charity, in the sense of gracious benevolence, correctly 
translated eleos ‘mercy’ in the LXX.” Proverbs 1–9, 144. 
448
 Stoebe explicitly rejects obligations, seeing dsx as a “kindness . . . not a duty.” Stoebe, TLOT 
1:454. In his view, dsx is “the spontaneous demonstration of a sincerely friendly attitude.” Ibid., 1:455; Cf. 
Stoebe, “Die Bedeutung,” 244–54. Stoebe refers to 1 Kgs 20:31 as a prime example, when the servants 
entreat Benhadad to humble himself before the “merciful kings” of Israel who will perhaps spare him; cf. 1 
Sam 15:6; 2 Sam 2:5; 10:2; cf. Gowan, Theology in Exodus, 236. Andersen also recognizes that dsx is 
“outside the domain of duty and obligation” yet a “promise to do hesed can bring it within the domain of 
commitment.” “Yahweh, the Kind and Sensitive God,” in God Who Is Rich in Mercy: Essays Presented to 






 In other words, there is no enforceable obligation for dsx to be granted. That the benefits 
of divine dsx are not automatic, but require voluntary divine response, is apparent in the 
numerous requests, some for dsx (Gen 24:12, 14; Ruth 1:8; 2 Sam 2:6), some on the basis of dsx 
(Gen 19:19; 24:27; Num 14:19; 2 Chr 1:10; 2 Chr 6:42; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2; Dan 9:4; Neh 1:5; 
9:17, 31–32; 13:22; cf. Ps 42:8).
450
 While the prevalent covenantal context creates a divine 
responsibility that calls for dsx, God, by nature, is not externally obligated to bestow dsx. At its 
core, then, dsx includes voluntary positive disposition and/or action toward another.451 
However, although there is no enforceable obligation, there is often the expectation, or 
even moral responsibility, that dsx should and/or will be granted.452 Indeed, in many instances of 
dsx a covenant responsibility provides the context, though this responsibility is to be 
distinguished from an enforceable obligation. At this juncture, a point of clarification will avoid 
confusion with regard to use of the term “obligation.” The word “obligation” may be used in 
various senses, but for our purpose we can distinguish between “hard” and “soft” obligations.
453
 
                                                     
 
449
 Sakenfeld, The Meaning of Hesed in the Hebrew Bible: A New Inquiry, 176, 234. This is true of 
both human and divine usage. Sakenfeld points out her own dependence upon an unpublished paper by 
Sidney Hills, “The Hesed of Man in the Old Testament,” presented to the Biblical Colloquium, 1957. She 
does, however, depart from Hills in significant ways. “Love in the OT,” 4:379; Stoebe, TLOT 1:460. 
450
 The volitional nature of dsx may also be demonstrated in that God “commands His 
lovingkindness” (Ps 42:8). Sakenfeld comments, “The sovereign freedom of God and his strong 
commitment to his chosen people were held together in a single word,” that of dsx. The Meaning of Hesed, 
238–39; cf. “Loving-Kindness,” 142. dsx does appear in collocation with “oath” in numerous instances, but 
often the oath is called upon to ensure that dsx will take place, which seems to assume the absence of 
existing, legal obligation (Gen 21:23; Josh 2:12). Thus, in instances of divine agency, the oath appears to be 
an additional ground of entreaty that God “ought to” provide deliverance (cf. Deut 7:12; Ps 89:49; Mic 
7:20).  
451
 Sakenfeld stresses the “inability for an act of hesed to be required or compelled” as a 
distinctive feature of dsx. The Meaning of Hesed, 45.  
452
 Ibid., 234. Larue points out that “passages, such as Ps. 25:6, 7; 106:1, 7, 45; 107:1, 8, 15, 21, 
31; 138:8, suggest that Yahweh ought to show hesed as a moral imperative to a distressed people or else 
fall short of moral responsibilities.” “Recent Studies in Hesed,” 4. 
453
 Sakenfeld unfortunately uses the word “obligation” ambiguously, at times allowing it and in 
other instances rejecting it. Cf. The Meaning of Hesed, 3, 6. She seems to be assuming the type of 




The former is the sort of obligation that is enforceable and, as such, is binding with regard to 
external factors, while the latter refers to responsibilities that may include expectations, perhaps 
“good faith,” and even moral value, but are not enforceable and thus always maintain volitional 
freedom.
454
 With this distinction in mind, soft obligations may relate to dsx, while it appears that 
hard obligations do not. Thus, dsx is the volitional, non-coerced disposition/action toward one 
another that often meets and/or exceeds responsibilities.  
Although mutual “hard” obligations do not pertain to dsx, the question of mutuality of dsx 
in general is also a point of dispute, and merits clarification. As has been seen, dsx presumes 
some kind of relational responsiveness, whether within a pre-existing relationship, or an informal 
one begun by positive action. Moreover, a number of instances have demonstrated not only 
relationality but, more specifically, the expectation and/or presence of an appropriate (reciprocal) 
response (cf. 1 Sam 20:8, 14). However, some scholars deny the reciprocal nature of dsx.455 
Indeed, some scholars have contended that humans never direct dsx toward God.456 
However, a number of instances seem to display human dsx toward God.457 For example, God 
                                                     
 
454
 An example of implied responsibility, but not necessarily ontological or legal obligation, is the 
Israelites’ failure to show dsx to Gideon’s descendants in Judg 8:35.  
455
 Of course, all those who assert mutually obligatory relationships presume reciprocality. So 
Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas, 128; Glueck, Hesed in the Bible, 55–57. Others recognize mutuality more 
generally. Stoebe, TLOT 1:454; D. A. Baer and R. P. Gordon, “חסד,” NIDOTTE 2:213, 216. Zobel 
recognizes mutuality in human relationships, but not divine-human ones, contending it is one of “the ethical 
norms of human intercourse to return hesed that has been received.” TDOT 5:48. Clark, likewise denying 
human dsx toward God, nevertheless views human interpersonal dsx as “a mutual, bilateral commitment.” 
The Word Hesed, 261; ibid., 20. But still others have asserted that dsx does not assume mutual dsx, but 
rather dsx is unilateral, though it is rooted in responsibility and may be a response to prior action, even prior 
dsx. Sakenfeld, “Love in the OT,” 4:377; idem, The Meaning of Hesed, 7, 53–54. Hills also viewed dsx as 
situationally unilateral assistance. “Hesed of man,” in Sakenfeld, The Meaning of Hesed, 50; cf. Ugo 
Masing, quoted in ibid., 6–7. According to Fox, dsx is “always a one-sided boon.” “Jeremiah 2:2,” 443; cf. 
Fox, Proverbs 1–9, 145. 
456
 A number of scholars interpret all of the uncertain occurrences as directed toward other human 
beings. Clark, The Word Hesed, 259, 267; Zobel, TDOT 5:61–62; Jepsen, “Gnade und Barmherzigkeit,” 
268–69. A potential rationale for the rejection of human dsx toward God is the theological supposition that 
humans cannot benefit God. Thus Zobel “excludes from the outset any possibility that human beings, 
following the secular principle of mutuality, could repay Yahweh in turn the divine kindness they have 




himself declares his remembrance of “the devotion [dsx] of your [Judah] youth, the love [hb'h]a;] of 
your betrothals, your following after Me in the wilderness” (Jer 2:2).
458
 In another example, 
Nehemiah entreats God to “remember” him for his deeds and “not blot out my loyal deeds [dsx] 
which I have performed for the house of my God and its services” (Neh 13:14; cf. 2 Chr 32:32; 
35:26).
459
 Another pair of instances exemplifies a contrast between the endurance of divine dsx 
and the transience of human dsx and, in so doing, also implies human to divine dsx. God declares, 
“What shall I do with you, O Ephraim? What shall I do with you, O Judah? For your loyalty [dsx] 
                                                     
 
457
 Numerous scholars recognize that there are examples of human dsx toward God, including 
Good, “Love in the OT,” IDB 3:168; Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas, 128; Glueck, Hesed in the Bible, 56–63; 
Stoebe, “Die Bedeutung,” 244–54; Stoebe, TLOT 1:458–59; Vine, Vine's Complete Expository Dictionary 
of Old and New Testament Words, 142; Baer and Gordon, NIDOTTE 2:213. However, in order to 
differentiate human dsx toward God from human dsx, some suggest viewing the former as piety. Snaith, 
The Distinctive Ideas, 94, 128; Glueck, Hesed in the Bible, 58. Sakenfeld qualifies that Israel’s 
responsibility is “to him, not for him. Since God is understood as all-powerful and self-sufficient, Israel's 
dsx obviously cannot be an action of the powerful for the weak, an action of deliverance or rescue or 
protection.” The Meaning of Hesed, 173–74. Andersen views human dsx toward God only in the indirect 
sense, that is, by doing it to other human beings. “Yahweh, the Kind and Sensitive God,” 81. It seems that 
the relative scarcity of human to divine dsx is not because it is outside the bounds of the meaning of the 
term, but that relative usage is much less because the situations where God may be the beneficiary are so 
rare in the Hebrew Bible. 
458
 Some have attempted to dismiss this as an inaccurate statement, claiming that this is just a 
metaphor displaying God’s wishful remembrance but that Israel never displayed such dsx. Carroll, 
Jeremiah, 120. Fox interprets God as the subject of both bha and dsx, akin to unmerited grace. For him dsx 
is always a “one-sided boon or favor.” “Jeremiah 2:2,” 443; cf. Clark, The Word Hesed, 198; Jepsen, 
“Gnade und Barmherzigkeit,” 268. With this view in mind, Zobel thus concludes, “Even though . . . this 
interpretation of Jer. 2:2 is nothing more than a suggestion worth considering, his fundamental conclusion 
stands: in view of the frequency with which our term occurs in the OT, a single passage cannot bear the 
burden of proof. Human beings can receive the kindness of Yahweh, but they cannot do him acts of 
kindness.” TDOT 5:62. DeRoche, on the other hand, makes a compelling case that this is an instance of 
human dsx toward God by, among other things, a structure that alternates between human agency and 
divine agency in Jer 2–3. “Jeremiah 2:2–3,” 369. Numerous other scholars also see this as a legitimate 
example of human dsx toward God, including Good, “Love in the OT,” IDB 3:168; Snaith, The Distinctive 
Ideas, 105; Glueck, Hesed in the Bible, 60; Sakenfeld, The Meaning of Hesed, 173; Craigie, Kelley, and 
Drinkard Jr., Jeremiah 1–25, 24; Miller, “The Book of Jeremiah,” in Isaiah–Ezekiel, 6:597; Thompson, The 
Book of Jeremiah, 162; Stoebe, TLOT 1:460. See the further discussion in canonical analysis. 
459
 Here, the reference to God’s house suggests an indirect reference to God himself. Another 
potential example of human dsx toward God is the mention of two kings whose positive actions are referred 
to as “deeds of devotion” (2 Chr 32:32; 35:26). Since the Chronicler is mostly concerned with matters of 





is like a morning cloud And like the dew which goes away early” (Hos 6:4; cf. Isa 40:6).
460
 In a 
number of other potential cases of human dsx toward God the object of dsx is unclear.461 
                                                     
 
460
 That this is apparently toward God seems evident in that two verses later the context is God’s 
delight for dsx more than sacrifice (Hos 6:6). In a likely related text, NASB translates dsx as “loveliness” 
poetically, that all its “loveliness is like the flower of the field” (Isa 40:6). So also NKJV. JPS translates dsx 
here as “goodness.” 
461
 A number of instances consist of the command of humans to manifest dsx with the object of 
such dsx uncertain. For instance, Hosea counsels, “return” to God and “observe kindness and justice” (Hos 
12:6 [12:7]; cf. Mic 6:8; Hos 10:12; Zech 7:9; Prov 3:3–4). Moreover, that God expects human dsx is 
apparent in that he laments the people’s lack of dsx (Hos 4:1; cf. 6:6). In these examples, it is uncertain 
whether the object of human dsx is merely other humans, or directly/indirectly God as well. It seems likely, 
however, that in many such instances both relations with God and fellow human beings are in view, since 
God is consistently interested in both vertical and horizontal relationships (cf. Prov 19:17). On the other 
hand, humans who have engaged in idolatry are characterized as those who “forsake their dsx” (Jonah 2:8). 
Since idolatry is a sin against God himself, this text implies that humans ought to maintain their dsx toward 
him in true worship. Sakenfeld thinks that human dsx toward God is the issue of every instance of the term 
in Hosea (2:19 [21]; 4:1; 6:4, 6; 10:12; 12:7). “Love in the OT,” 4:380. She believes that, in Hosea, dsx 
connotes all of the vertical and horizontal dimensions of justice, “that is, ḥesed represents the entire 
decalogue in a single word.” Ibid., 380; cf. Glueck, Hesed in the Bible, 57; Stoebe, TLOT 1:459. A number 
of cases call upon God to bless humans for their dsx (Ruth 3:10) or for divine vengeance when expected dsx 
is absent (2 Chr 24:22). As Sakenfeld puts it, “The alternative of ḥesed toward God or only among people 
is falsely posed because, for the OT, both belong together.” Stoebe, TLOT 1:459. 
The uncertainty is also apparent with regard to two ambiguous syntagms. First, in the two 
instances of the syntagm dwId” ydEs.x;, it is unclear whether it is a subjective or objective genitive. In the first, 
the people are called to come to God and he will “make an everlasting covenant with you” (Isa 55:3). 
Whether this means the covenant will be made according to the dsx God showed toward David, or because 
of the dsx David showed is not certain. Likewise unclear is the petition of God to remember dwId” ydEs.x (2 Chr 
6:42). Is the petitioner asking God to remember his dsx toward David, or bless on the basis of David’s dsx? 
In each case, both options are possible since the promise of divine dsx toward David and his house is well-
represented on the one hand (i.e., Ps 89:50), but also there is the implication that David’s progenitors are 
blessed on account of David’s faithfulness (cf. 1 Kgs 11:12–13, 32–34; 2 Kgs 8:19; Ps 132:10). For the 
position that God is agent see Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 40–55, 367; Seitz, “The Book of Isaiah 40–66,” in 
Isaiah–Ezekiel, 6:482; Zobel, TDOT 5:58; Baer and Gordon, “חסד,” NIDOTTE 2:217; H. G. M. 
Williamson, “‘The Sure Mercies of David’: Subjective or Objective Genitive?” JSS 23 (1978): 31–49. On 
the other hand, Dillard thinks David is the agent of dsx in the usage in 2 Chronicles as a “periphrastic 
allusion” to Ps 132 where “the faithful actions of David are in view.” Dillard, 2 Chronicles, 51–52; cf. Isa 
63:7; Pss 89:2; 107:43; Lam 3:22. It is also unclear what is meant by the syntagm hw"hy> ds,x, or ~yhil{a/ ds,x, (1 
Sam 20:14; 2 Sam 9:3). It could be that David shows God’s dsx toward other human beings or it may refer 
to merely human dsx, perhaps as a superlative (in the sense of relationship to God, not in the sense of 
denying the “religious significance” of the divine name). See David Winton Thomas, “A Consideration of 
Some Unusual Ways of Expressing the Superlative in Hebrew,” VT 3 (1953): 215. Finally, the agent in 
Prov 16:6 is also unclear: “By lovingkindness and truth iniquity is atoned for, And by the fear of the LORD 
one keeps away from evil” (Prov 16:6). Here, “lovingkindness and truth” seems to be in parallel to “fear of 
the LORD” and as such, would appear to describe the disposition and/or action(s) that God expects/desires. 
On the other hand, it is possible that it is the divine “lovingkindness and truth” in view here, especially 




Moreover, the adjectival dysx also appears to be a manifestation of human dsx in 
relationship to God.
462
 For instance, “with the kind” (dysix') God shows himself “kind” (dsx) (2 
Sam 22:26 = Ps 18:25 [26]). The parallel statements suggest reciprocality, divine dsx bestowed on 
the human dysx.463 Although it is not altogether clear whether dysx refers to those upon whom God 
bestows dsx, or those who manifest dsx,464 the latter appears to be the case in numerous instances 
that highlight the character of the dysx (Mic 7:2; 2 Sam 22:26 = Ps 18:25 [26]).465 dysx sometimes 
seems to refer to Israel as a whole (Pss 148:14; 149:1) but in other instances it seems to connote a 
more restricted group of “the faithful within Israel” (Pss 31:23 [24]; 37:28).
466
 That dysx is not 
restricted to those who receive but never bestow dsx is evidenced in that God himself is twice 
referred to as dysx (Jer 3:12; Ps 145:17).  
One reason for rejection of reciprocal dsx by some scholars is the assertion that dsx flows 
only from a superior agent to inferior patient, which of course denies the possibility of bilateral 
dsx.467 Although the majority of instances appear to flow from a superior to inferior (with regard 
                                                     
 
462
 Similarly, righteous humans are “men of dsx” (Isa 57:1; cf. Prov 11:17).  
463
 This would be consistent with similar theological positions elsewhere (cf. Exod 20:6 = 5:10; 
7:9; Neh 1:5; Dan 9:4). 
464
 It appears to refer to qualitative evaluation in some instances (Deut 33:8; 1 Sam 2:9; 2 Sam 
22:26 = Ps 18:25 [26]; Mic 7:2; Pss 4:3 [4]; 12:1 [2]; 37:28; 43:1; 86:2; 97:10; Prov 2:8). In some 
occurrences, it is not clear whether evaluation is involved (Pss 16:10; 32:6; 116:15). At other times it may 
be a term for the priests (2 Chr 6:41; Ps 132:9, 16) or perhaps to the entire camp (Pss 30:4 [5]; 31:23 [24]; 
50:5; 52:9 [11]; 79:2; 85:8 [9]; 89:19 [20]; 145:10; 148:14; 149:1, 5, 9). 
465
 For instance, the dysx are described as “upright” (rv'y—Mic 7:2) and blameless (~ymiT'—2 Sam 
22:26 = Ps 18:25 [26]). Baer sees dysx as “denoting the one whose life is lived in accordance with the 
principles of dsx.” Baer and Gordon, “חסד,” NIDOTTE 2:213; cf. Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas, 110; 
Glueck, Hesed in the Bible, 68. Sakenfeld notes ambiguity between the people as a whole and the upright, 
but recognizes many evaluative usages. Sakenfeld, The Meaning of Hesed, 179; cf. Stoebe, TLOT 1:462–
63. But Harris cautions, “Whether God’s people in the OT were called ḥāsîd because they were 
characterized by ḥesed (as seems likely) or were so called because they were objects of God’s ḥesed may 
not be certain.” “חסד,” TWOT 307. 
466
 Baer and Gordon, “חסד,” NIDOTTE 2:213. 
467
 Fox asserts, “hesed is always conferred by a superior upon an inferior (in status or power).” 
Proverbs 1–9, 144; cf. Ugo Masing, quoted in Sakenfeld, The Meaning of Hesed, 6–7. It has been pointed 




to status), there are many examples in human interpersonal usage of either the request, or the 
showing, of dsx from a societal inferior to a societal superior (Gen 20:13; 2 Sam 2:5; 3:8; 16:17; 
2 Chr 24:22).
468
 Thus, a more nuanced view has been proposed, that in human interpersonal usage 
dsx only takes place from a circumstantially, or situationally, superior to inferior. In other words, 
the person receiving the dsx must be in a situation of need or significant distress in relation to the 
superior, without regard to societal status.
469
 This view has some merit since within human 
relationships, dsx consistently refers to beneficent actions, thus appearing within the context of a 
benefactor-beneficiary relationship.
470
 Most often (if not always) within human relationships, the 
beneficiary is the situationally inferior party with regard to the beneficence at hand. This is not 
surprising since in order for one to request or receive dsx they must be in a position to benefit 
from it, if it is to have any value worth mentioning. As such, the relative status of the parties with 
regard to dsx may be accidental, and perhaps it is more precise to recognize that dsx takes place 
from a benefactor to a beneficiary, but does not in every case require need, though most cases 
may presume need or significant distress. As such, dsx is something important to the beneficiary, 
but not always needed (e.g., Gen 24:12, 49; 2 Sam 9:1). Further, in some instances the benefactor 
                                                     
 
a conception of dsx as only from superior to inferior since “hesed, when used of God, will, by definition, 
involve relationships of superior and inferior.” Baer and Gordon, “חסד,” NIDOTTE 2:212.  
468
 Sarah to Abraham (Gen 20:13), the spies to Rahab (Josh 2:12–14), Jabesh-Gileadites to King 
Saul (2 Sam 2:5), Hushai (potentially) to David (2 Sam 16:17), Abner to Ishbosheth (2 Sam 3:8), Jehoida 
the priest toward King Joash (2 Chr 24:22). This also seems to be the case when Abimelech asks Abraham 
to show him dsx going forward (Gen 21:23). But Sakenfeld suggests that Abraham is the stronger party 
with God’s support. The Meaning of Hesed, 72. Another example is the dsx between David and Jonathan (1 
Sam 20:8, 14–15). Those who assert the restriction of dsx from superior to inferior contend that David was 
the inferior when he is requesting dsx but Jonathan looks forward to a time when David will be king and 
thus will, in the future, be the superior. Cf. Josh 2:12–14; Judg 1:24; 8:35; Job 6:14. Consider also the 
occurrences of human dsx toward God, discussed further above. 
469
 Sakenfeld, “Love in the OT,” 4:378. She gives credit for this to her expansion of the 
interpretation of Hills. The Meaning of Hesed, 12; cf. ibid., 7, 234; Clark, The Word Hesed, 267. However, 
Sakenfeld sees this reversed in the instances of human to divine dsx. She ascribes this reversal to what she 
views as Hosea’s intention to shock his hearers. The Meaning of Hesed, 175. 
470
 Importantly, however, a beneficial action may or may not be altruistic. So, also, Sakenfeld, The 




and the beneficiary may be bilateral such that both parties may be able to do dsx toward the other, 
in different ways (e.g., Josh 2:12). 
 Another possible reason for this denial of reciprocal dsx is ambiguity regarding the 
meaning of “reciprocal.” It is possible for “reciprocal” to refer to an action that expects, or 
receives, an equal reaction, that is, dsx for dsx. If the term “reciprocal” is restricted to this quid 
quo pro type of mutuality, it would be inaccurate to ascribe to dsx universally since such one-to-
one correspondence of dsx is only rarely seen in the text.471 On the other hand, if “reciprocal” 
refers to the broader idea of a relationship wherein an action of dsx is often responsive to a 
previous relationship and/or action and/or expects a positive response, if applicable, in the future, 
then it is appropriate. Sakenfeld seems to react negatively to the first usage, whereas many 
scholars seem to intend the latter when they use the term “reciprocal,” which may be called 
appropriate responsiveness.
472
 In this dissertation, I use the term reciprocal with reference to the 
latter, a relationship that expects or receives appropriate response. A relationship of dsx seems to 
expect that dsx would flow from either agent to the other, if the appropriate circumstance(s) 
obtained (Josh 2:12–14; 1 Sam 20:8, 14–15; 1 Sam 15:16; 2 Chr 24:22).
473
 In all this, 
reciprocality does not necessarily mean equality or symmetry, either of the agents or of the 
respective actions.  
                                                     
 
471
 See Gen 21:23; Josh 2:12–14; cf. Ps 109:12, 16; Ruth 2:20. 
472
 Sakenfeld rejects the idea that dsx is “mutual exchange” but rather (in human relationships) it is 
the unilateral act of a situationally superior toward inferior. The Meaning of Hesed, 50. But she recognizes 
dsx may be “dependent on something prior.” Ibid., 50. Further, she allows that once her thesis regarding 
situational superior-inferior relationships is in view, “reciprocity need not be utterly rejected, for it occurs 
when there is a reversal of circumstances” as in the case of Rahab. Ibid., 7. Thus, in her view, “While hesed 
is not exchanged quid pro quo, it is rooted in responsibility, and the reference to a prior action concretizes 
that responsibility.” Ibid., The Meaning of Hesed, 91. 
473





With these qualifications in mind, dsx may be spoken of as reciprocal in that it assumes a 
bilateral relationship. At times, dsx is responded to with dsx,474 at other times dsx is responsive to 
a previous positive action or a pre-existing relationship;
475
 in still other instances, dsx seems to 
initiate a relationship but expects appropriate future response, including dsx if a situation arises 
that warrants it.
476
 Thus, dsx operates within a context of relational, voluntary, reciprocal 
responsibility. This not only explains the human interpersonal usage of dsx but also fits with both 
human dsx toward God and divine dsx toward humans.  
Another major interpretive issue is the tension between the endurance, on the one hand, 
and contingency, on the other, of divine dsx. The OT consistently affirms the amazing endurance 
and persistence of divine dsx, even to the thousandth generation (Exod 20:6; 34:6–7; Deut 10:5 et 
al.). God himself proclaims his “everlasting lovingkindness” with which he promises, “I will have 
compassion on you,” and contrasts this with the momentary hiding of his face “in an outburst of 
anger” (Isa 54:8). Similarly, divine lovingkindness flows from “everlasting love” (Jer 31:3) and 
itself is “everlasting” (Jer 33:11). Indeed, divine dsx is “from everlasting to everlasting on those 
                                                     
 
474
 Thus, in some instances an initiating action of dsx is reciprocated by dsx (Gen 21:23; Josh 
2:12–14; cf. Ps 109:12, 16; Ruth 2:20). 
475
 Human dsx takes place in a number of pre-existing relationships including marriage (Gen 
20:13), familial/kinship (Gen 24:49; 47:29), friendship (1 Sam 20:8, 14–15; 2 Sam 9:1, 3, 7; Job 6:14), or a 
political relationship (2 Sam 3:8; 2 Sam 16:17). In other instances, dsx is requested, received, or 
unexpectedly absent on the basis of, and appropriate to, some previous action (Gen 40:14; Judg 1:24; 1 Kgs 
2:7; Judg 8:35; 2 Sam 10:2; 1 Chr 19:2; cf. Prov 14:22). In such instances dsx is descriptive of reciprocal 
(though not necessarily equal) relations. That is, dsx is often a response to a prior beneficial action that 
created the expectation (but not necessarily a duty) of response by the one who is, at that time, the 
beneficiary. Although in many (if not all) of these instances existing relationships may also be 
discoverable, the emphasis appears to be on prior action. In some sense, every human interaction is based 
on relationship to some degree, even if that relationship is merely belonging to common humanity. 
476
 In another rare variation, the initial action alone is described as dsx, with an appropriate 
response or the expectation thereof (1 Sam 15:6; 2 Chr 24:22; cf. Ruth 3:10). Thus, dsx may take place 
within a pre-existing relationship or on the basis of a previous action that precipitates a response of dsx, or 
rarely, dsx may be depicted as initiating a relationship. In one rare divergence of usage, dsx seems to be an 
outcome of the king’s pleasure and/or desire for Esther (Esth 2:9, 17). Sakenfeld believes this late usage is 
explained by the meanings of !x and dsx having “fallen together” by the time of this writing. The Meaning 




who fear him” (Ps 103:17). In many other instances the steadfastness of God’s dsx is proclaimed, 
even to the extent that it is spoken of as everlasting, and thus, seemingly impossible to forfeit.
477
  
Yet, removal of divine dsx also occurs. God declares he has “withdrawn . . . peace [~Alv'] . 
. . lovingkindness and compassion [~ymix]r;]” (Jer 16:5). In numerous contexts, it appears to be 
assumed that God could remove dsx.478 For instance, God is praised as the one “who has not 
forsaken His lovingkindness and truth,” implying that he could do so (Gen 24:27; Pss 98:3; 
106:45). Similarly, God is often entreated to continue his dsx: “Do not turn away the face of Your 
anointed; remember Your lovingkindness to Your servant David” (2 Chr 6:42; Ps 36:10 [11]; cf. 
138:8). At other times, dsx appears to be absent, leading to the people’s lament, “Has his 
lovingkindness ceased forever?” (Ps 77:8), “Will your lovingkindness be declared in the grave, 
your faithfulness in Abaddon?” (Ps 88:11), “Where are your former lovingkindnesses, O Lord, 
which You swore to David in Your faithfulness?” (Ps 89:49). The contingency of divine dsx is 
likewise implied throughout Hosea. For example, God pleads a case against Israel because of 
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 Thus, Snaith comments, “the chesed of God . . . is everlasting, determined, unshakable.” The 
Distinctive Ideas, 102. Similarly, Zobel suggests dsx is “characterized by permanence and reliability.” 
TDOT 5:57. In comparison to mountains and hills, which may be shaken, divine dsx “will not be removed” 
(Isa 54:10). In Hosea this lasting lovingkindness is associated with betrothal when God speaks of his 
people, “I will betroth you to Me forever . . . in righteousness and justice, in lovingkindness and 
compassion” (Hos 2:19 [H 2:21]). Again, his “lovingkindnesses never cease, For His compassions never 
fail” (Lam 3:22). His dsx “is great” and his “truth” is “everlasting” (Ps 117:2). Indeed, “as high as the 
heavens are above the earth, so great is His lovingkindness” (Ps 103:11; cf. Pss 36:5 [6]; 57:10; 108:4). 
Divine dsx is “precious” (Ps 36:7), it “endures all day long” (Ps 52:1), it is “better than life” (Ps 63:3) and 
is even depicted as pursuing David for his lifetime (Ps 23:6). Interestingly, a large number of the statements 
regarding the persistence of divine dsx are in reference to the Davidic covenant (dynasty). 2 Sam 7:15 
declares, God’s “lovingkindness shall not depart from” David as he removed it from Saul (cf. 2 Sam 22:51; 
1 Chr 17:13). Divine dsx to David “will be built up forever” (Ps 89:2 [3]). “My lovingkindness I will keep 
for him forever, And My covenant shall be confirmed to him” (Ps 89:28 [29]; cf. 18:50 [51]), “I will not 
break off My lovingkindness from him, Nor deal falsely in My faithfulness” (Ps 89:33 [34]). Similarly, 
God declares regarding Solomon, “I will be his father and he shall be My son; and I will not take My 
lovingkindness away from him, as I took it from him who was before you” (1 Chr 17:13). Finally, in a 
common refrain of praise, God’s dsx is proclaimed as everlasting (Pss 100:5; 106:1; 107:1; 118:1–4, 29; 
136:1–26; 138:8; cf. Jer 33:11; Ezra 3:11; 1 Chr 16:34, 41; 2 Chr 5:13; 7:3, 6; 20:21), his faithfulness to all 
generations (Ps 100:5). As such, divine dsx is steadfast and extremely long-lasting. 
478
 Baer and Gordon acknowledge, “Numerous texts witness to at least the hypothetical possibility 




their lack of faithfulness, kindness, and knowledge (Hos 4:1). God laments Israel’s lack of loyalty 
(Hos 6:4) and they are punished because he “delight[s] [#px] in loyalty rather than sacrifice” (Hos 
6:6). Thus, in numerous instances, there is a clear tension between the permanence of divine dsx 
and its contingency, even removal. The possible forfeiture of dsx dovetails with the significant 
conditionality of divine dsx apparent in numerous instances. Although dsx is ultimately grounded 
in the divine character, the reception of dsx sometimes indicates the fidelity of the recipient of 
dsx, implying conditionality and the expectation of responsiveness.479 For example, the divine 
lovingkindness will be shown (hf[) to the thousandth generation of those who love God and keep 
his commandments (Exod 20:6; Deut 5:10). The conditional human reception of dsx is likewise 
explicit in numerous other instances.
480
 While divine dsx is ultimately grounded in God’s love, 
                                                     
 
479
 In some instances, “God’s ḥesed is conditional, dependent upon the good repair of the covenant 
relationship that it is up to Israel to maintain.” Sakenfeld, “Love in the OT,” 4:379. Sakenfeld goes so far as 
to suggest that dsx “may even be ‘deserved’ at the same time that it is freely given,” as in the case of 
Joseph. The Meaning of Hesed, 102; cf. ibid., 97. Glueck, similarly, believes it is given to the “worthy.” 
Hesed in the Bible, 99. As Sakenfeld notes, “The person’s right relationship to God is not stated as a basis 
for the hesed” yet she notes that in some circumstances it is clear “that the individual is acting in obedience 
to God or is doing the morally upright [thing] against difficult odds and hence is ‘deserving’ of divine 
assistance.” Ibid., 236; cf. idem, “Love in the OT,” 4:379; Glueck, Hesed in the Bible, 81, 89. 
480
 In Deut 7:9, God is the “faithful God, who keeps His covenant and His lovingkindness to a 
thousandth generation with those who love Him and keep His commandments.” Likewise, Deut 7:12, 
“because you listen to these judgments and keep and do them” God “will keep with you His covenant and 
His lovingkindness which He swore” (Deut 7:12). Here, dsx is explicitly (though not necessarily 
exclusively) predicated on appropriate human behavior. Accordingly, Solomon declares that God has 
“shown great lovingkindness” to David “according as he walked before [God] in truth and righteousness 
and uprightness of heart” and God has “reserved for him this great lovingkindness” (1 Kgs 3:6). God is 
likewise the one “keeping covenant and showing lovingkindness” to his “servants who walk before [him] 
with all their heart” (1 Kgs 8:23 = 2 Chr 6:14). 
Conditionality is further apparent when God exhorts his people to come to him and listen “and I 
will make an everlasting covenant with you, according to the faithful mercies shown to David” (Isa 55:3). 
Psalms also depicts divine dsx as an appropriate response to human action. Thus, “with the kind You show 
Yourself kind; with the blameless You show Yourself blameless” (2 Sam 22:26 = Ps 18:25 [26]). Likewise, 
some entreaties assume such mutuality, asking God to “continue Your lovingkindness to those who know 
You, and Your righteousness to the upright in heart” (Ps 36:10 [11]; cf. Ps 40:10–11 [11–12]). Again, 
“lovingkindness is Yours, O Lord, For You recompense a man according to his work” (Ps 62:12). 
Similarly, “he who trusts in the LORD, lovingkindness shall surround him” (Ps 32:10; cf. 17:7). His dsx is 
“great” and “from everlasting to everlasting” for “those who fear Him” (Ps 103:11, 17). “Abundant 
lovingkindness” is available to all who call upon him” (Ps 86:15). The “LORD favors those who fear Him, 
those who wait for His lovingkindness” (Ps 147:11). “All the paths of the LORD are lovingkindness and 
truth To those who keep His covenant and His testimonies” (Ps 25:10). Moreover, God’s “eye . . . is on 




compassion, and goodness as a part of his character and an outgrowth of his free decision to 
bestow dsx on human beings, the bestowal of dsx is not altogether unilateral. There is relational 
responsibility, conditionality, and a divine expectation of appropriate response at work. However, 
while God always meets and/or exceeds his responsibility, humans consistently fall short of 
theirs. Yet, divine dsx often overcomes even human shortcomings, another manifestation of the 
freedom of dsx, which manifests itself beyond the bounds of covenant and/or obligation. At the 
same time, divine dsx is clearly (partially) contingent upon human response. 
The conditionality and potential forfeiture of dsx thus posits a crucial tension between 
“everlasting dsx” and the potential of removal and/or forfeiture thereof.481 This tension is not 
unlike that already seen with regard to divine bha. Moreover, such questions are not unique to dsx 
but pertain to numerous themes related to divine love. Perhaps the key is apparent in Ps 103:17, 
which states: Divine dsx is “from everlasting to everlasting on those who fear him.” Here, 
everlasting dsx is directed specifically toward those who respond appropriately to God. Thus, as 
shall be further explained in the canonical analysis, divine dsx, like other aspects of divine love, is 
not unconditional but foreconditional. That is, God freely bestows dsx prior to conditions, will 
                                                     
 
Nehemiah recognize the unworthiness of humans to receive God’s mercy but base their supplication on 
“the great and awesome God, who keeps His covenant and lovingkindness for those who love Him and 
keep His commandments” (Dan 9:4; Neh 1:5). Nehemiah later entreats remembrance because of his efforts 
to purify Israel, asking, “have compassion on me according to the greatness of Your lovingkindness” (Neh 
13:22; cf. Pss 26:3; 119:159; 143:8). In such occurrences, the reception of dsx is tied to fidelity to God. 
Finally, in a couple of instances, requests for divine dsx are based on prior acts of human to human dsx. See 
Ruth 1:8; 2 Sam 2:6. In both instances, divine dsx is hoped for/expected on the basis of human to human 
dsx, implying that dsx to Naomi/Saul is indirectly dsx to God. Sakenfeld suggests that such requests are 
technical language that presume the discontinuance of a relationship such that only God could do dsx in the 
future. The Meaning of Hesed, 107–8. Yet, though that may be the occasion of the blessing, the request is 
nevertheless predicated on previous action. 
481
 Baer and Gordon recognize the tension but offer no solution. “It may finally be impossible to 
square such agonized questioning with the frequent confident assertions that ds,x, is eternal. Perhaps this 
very tension reminds us of the relational core at the center of this concept. God’s steadfast love, the biblical 
theologian might conclude, is not a mechanical tool to be used in a crisis, nor a philosophical absolute to be 
taken for granted. Rather, it is a quality of relationship that is to be sought again, appropriated, and 




never remove dsx arbitrarily, but expects appropriate response upon which the continuing 
relationship within which dsx takes place is conditional. 
In all, dsx is relational conduct and/or attitude in accord with the highest virtues (love, 
loyalty, goodness, kindness) and beneficial to another, which meets and exceeds all expectations 
(often manifested in mercy and forgiveness), in which the agent is ontologically free to act 
otherwise, and is responsive to and/or creates or maintains the expectation (but not hard 
obligation) of appropriate response from the recipient. Since it describes the attitude of the agent 
who characteristically acts in such a way, a dsx disposition often becomes the basis of entreaty for 
dsx action. From the perspective of the (potential) beneficiary, dsx is a disposition and/or action 
that will fulfill a need or important desire. dsx may take place in human non-religious 
relationships, from humans toward God, but most often from God toward humans. 
Divine dsx is grounded in the divine character of love, compassion, goodness, 
faithfulness, and justice. It is free and voluntary, but not altogether spontaneous, often taking 
place within the commitment of the covenant relationship, but not restricted thereby. It is a basic 
grounding characteristic of God that makes the covenant meaningful and reliable. It is unmerited 
but not altogether unconditional.
482
 It includes action that may be one-sided and unilateral, but 
assumes a relation that will be reciprocated (even if dsx action in particular is not, or cannot, be). 
It is from benefactor to beneficiary, not merely quid pro quo, but assumes appropriate 
responsiveness and expects reciprocation when/if the context arises. In many instances (i.e., with 
regard to tyrb) God has committed himself to certain responsibilities (soft obligations) to which 
his faithfulness is unparalleled. However, this is to be distinguished from “hard obligations” since 
(1) there is no external obligation upon God due to the simple fact that there is no one capable of 
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 Divine dsx thus may flow beyond the covenant, beyond responsibility, even beyond moral duty 




enforcement, and (2) the very language used of God with regard to tyrb presumes the lack of 
ontological obligation.  
As such, divine dsx may be responsive to virtue and/or entreaty, yet may be withdrawn or 
withheld according to the state of affairs. As such, divine commitments are voluntary 
responsibilities and thus moral expectation and the divine name (character) are involved, but God 
remains volitionally free. Divine dsx is extremely steadfast, reliable, and enduring, yet likewise 
expects appropriate response from humanity and is often depicted as contingent, yet goes well 
beyond what would be considered normal grounds for forfeiture. Accordingly, it often takes on 
the connotation of mercy and forgiveness and results in the removal of wrath and the bestowal of 
blessings, especially deliverance. Thus, divine dsx often surpasses the bounds of expectation and 
exceeds all moral responsibility. As such, divine dsx is an aspect of his character of goodness, but 
is not mere clemency or beneficence but, rather, consists in always doing that which is best, 
righteous, and just, always and without fail. 
The Conditional Aspect of Divine Beneficence 
 As has been seen, some have defined divine love in terms of beneficence. For this reason 
it is important to briefly examine the nature of divine blessing and its place in the divine-human 
relationship. Divine goodness is a central characteristic of God himself (Exod 33:19), which is 
consistently manifested in actions of beneficence.
483
 However, though blessing appears most 
often within covenant, blessing is not limited to the immediate recipients of the covenant, but is 
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 Divine blessing ($rb) toward human beings is an especially prominent feature that runs from 
the creation narrative to the end of the Hebrew Bible, often related to covenant and promise (Gen 12:2; 
17:16–19; 18:12; Exod 19:4–6; Lev 26; Deut 1:11; 2:7). Divine blessing appears to flow from divine 
lovingkindness, and does so in such a way that God is not obligated to manifest lovingkindness, but 
expected to do so based on his character (cf. Gen 24:12, 14, 27; Ps 69:13, 16). Further, election is another 
basis of divine blessing. Thus the one who is blessed (rv,añ,) is the one whom God chooses (rxb) and 
“bring[s] near” (brq) (Ps 65:4 [5]). Notably, however, just previously it is stated, “to You all men come” 
(Ps 65:2 [3]). Tate comments, “The request in v 5 seems to support the interpretation that the worshiping 
community is intended here; all those who are acceptable in the worship of Yahweh, and potentially every 




intended to extend beyond Abraham or Abraham’s progeny as a universal blessing mediated 
through Abraham and his descendants (Gen 12:2–3; 17:4–6; 26:4).
484
 Moreover, divine blessing 
is not depicted as purely unilateral beneficence. On the contrary, although it flows from God’s 
character and freedom and is, as such, unmerited and seemingly prior to any conditions 
(foreconditional), it nevertheless often betrays underlying contingency, especially in accordance 
with covenant conditionality. 
To be sure, at times blessing is mentioned without causal explanation and may be 
extended unilaterally. However, in many instances, divine beneficence is depicted as conditional 
upon appropriate human response. Such human responsibility tied to the contingency of divine 
blessing is apparent in the Abrahamic covenant in numerous instances. Thus, God states that he 
“will greatly bless” Abraham “because” he did not withhold his son from God (Gen 22:16; cf. 
18:19; 26:4–5).
485
 The responsiveness of the divine-human relationship is perhaps most starkly 




 Notice also the examples of mediated blessing to others through Abraham’s progeny, for 
example, blessing to Laban through Jacob (Gen 30:27, 30); to Potiphar and his house through Joseph (Gen 
39:5). Moreover, other nations are mentioned as people to whom God has granted land. He refuses to give 
Israel “as little as a footstep” of Edom’s land (Deut 2:5), similarly Moab (2:9) and Ammon (2:19). As 
Tigay puts it, this “indicates the universal dominion of God and His involvement in the history of all 
nations.” Deuteronomy, 24. Likewise, Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy, 108; cf. Deut 32:8; Amos 9:7. 
Further, foreigners may also be privy to the covenant blessings if they align themselves with the LORD, 
keep God’s Sabbath, choose what pleases God, love the name of the LORD, and keep the covenant (Isa 
56:4, 6–7). Thus, foreigners become part of the “chosen” by choosing to please God. Such conditions are 
similar to those expected of God’s people already within the covenant (Isa 58:13–14). This is in accordance 
with other hints throughout the prophets of God’s concern for all peoples. “This is what God longs for in 
his people, and if anyone will do this, their parentage or their body has nothing to do with their 
acceptability.” Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66, 458. Watts views this as meaning, 
“Commitment and acceptance of responsibility are more important than the birthright. Cf. the story of Esau 
and Jacob in Gen 25:29–34. . . . Israel/Jacob also despised his birthright. Now others, more worthy, are 
invited to enter into it.” Watts, Isaiah 34–66, 249. Thus, “all who do justice and righteousness and hold fast 
to the divine covenant are God’s servants.” Seitz, “The Book of Isaiah 40–66,” in Isaiah–Ezekiel, 6:485. 
485
 Sarna suggests that at first in the Abrahamic narrative, “blessings are pure acts of divine grace” 
but later “these are presented as rewards for Abraham’s devotion to God.” Genesis, 154; cf. Brueggemann, 
“The Book of Exodus,” in Genesis to Leviticus, 1:835. Hamilton concurs, but believes that the order gives 
priority to “promise” and “grace.” Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 18–50, 116. Fretheim 
explicitly recognizes that the promise of God was “thereby made conditional” in the sense that “God could 
not have used a disloyal Abraham for the purposes God intends.” “The Book of Genesis,” in Genesis to 




manifested by the strange “wrestling” of Jacob with the divine “man” culminating in the 
reception of blessing (Gen 32:25–28).
486
 The conditionality of the divine-human relationship also 
appears throughout Exodus (Exod 1:20), especially with regard to the Mosaic covenant (Exod 
19:5; 23:25; 32:29).
487
 Such covenant conditionality, tied to blessings and curses, is also 
prominent in Leviticus (Lev 26:3–17, 40–44).
488
 Likewise, it is clear elsewhere that the 
continuance of divine blessing is dependent upon the maintenance of the covenant relationship 
(Deut 4:40; 5:16; 18; 10:12–13; 11:13–15, 22–23, 26–28; 15:4–6; 19:13; 28:1–2, 58, 62; Josh 
22:2, 5; 23:11–13).
489
 Thus, God expects reciprocal response from his people, which will result in 
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 This is a powerful narrative example of the connection between human action and divine 
response with regard to divine beneficence. It is clear in the narrative that nothing Jacob could do would 
force God to bless him, for the “man” is able to injure Jacob by a mere touch (Gen 32:25), yet the divine 
“man” nevertheless wrestles with Jacob. That the “man” is, in fact, divine is explicit in Gen 32:28 (cf. Hos 
12:4–5).  
487
 God is good (bjy) to the Hebrew midwives who “fear God” and spare the Israelite infants (Exod 
1:20). Those who obey and keep God’s commands are promised covenant blessings (Exod 19:5), but only 
“if” they choose to serve God (Exod 23:25). In Exod 19:5, “the birth of ‘Israel’ as Yawheh’s people” is 
contingent upon “affirmative response.” Durham, Exodus, 262. In the aftermath of the golden calf apostasy, 
divine blessing is explicitly contingent upon the people’s repentance and dedication to the Lord (Exod 
32:29). 
488
 Divine blessings are contingent upon human response, specifically walking in, keeping, and 
doing the divine prescriptions (Lev 26:3–4, 6). Simply put, “Obedience to God’s will brings reward; 
disobedience brings dire punishment.” Levine, Leviticus, 182; cf. Walter C. Kaiser Jr., “The Book of 
Leviticus,” in Genesis to Leviticus (vol. 1 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon, 1994), 1179. Specifically, 
God will respond and turn toward the people and confirm the covenant and dwell among the people, walk 
among them, and be their God and not reject them (Lev 26:9–12); the opposite will take place if they reject 
God (Lev 26:17). In effect, it seems that “without obedience to the commandments there can be no 
blessing.” Clements, “The Book of Deuteronomy,” in Numbers–Samuel, 2:351. 
489
 The conditionality may be summarized thus, “the blessing, if you listen to the commandments 
of the LORD your God, which I am commanding you today; and the curse, if you do not listen to the 
commandments of the LORD your God” (Deut 11:27–28). Even the reception of the land is explicitly 
conditional (Deut 11:22–23). Further, the command to love God wholeheartedly, which includes 
obedience, appears over and over again in Deuteronomy and elsewhere. For example, see Deut 6:5; Josh 
22:5. In all this, God deeply desires to bless the people, but his doing so is contingent upon not only their 
external obedience, but also upon their internal disposition (cf. Deut 4:40; 5:29; 6:24; 12:28). Robert B. 
Coote summarizes thusly, “Obey the law and take the land; continue to obey the law or lose the land.” “The 
Book of Joshua,” in Numbers–Samuel (vol. 2 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1998), 710. 
Woudstra thus notes, “There is a point when God abandons sinners to their wicked desires.” The Book of 
Joshua, 337–38. Thus, “it matters whether God’s own people remain unified and work together toward the 
purposes of God. God has chosen in some way to be contingent on active human participation in the 
ongoing drama of God’s saving ways with God’s people and the world.” D. T. Olson, “The Book of 






 For example, God is gracious and compassionate, giving food to “those who fear 
him” for he “remember[s] his covenant forever” (Ps 111:4–5).
491
 Likewise, the one who retains 
“kindness and truth” will “find favor” (acm + !xe) and “good repute” or success/kind approval (lk,f,) 
with “God and man” (Prov 3:3–4; 12:2; cf. Ezra 8:22).
492
 Conversely, the absence of divine 
blessing is often directly responsive to the people’s disposition and/or actions.
493
 Importantly, 
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 God himself who hears ([mv) the cries of Israel (Exod 2:24; 6:5) expects them to hear/obey 
([mv) his commands (Exod 15:26; 19:5). Likewise, God remembers (rkz) his covenant with Abraham (Exod 
2:24) and institutes ritual to bring about remembrance (rkz) of himself (Exod 20:24). Similar reciprocality is 
present in the language of Leviticus where the people are commanded to walk in God’s commands (Lev 
26:3) and God will walk among them (Lev 26:12). God will not “abhor” them (Lev 26:11) if they do not 
“abhor” his commands (Lev 26:15) and vice versa (Lev 26:30, 43–44). Ultimately, God loves them (Deut 
7:7) and wants to be loved in return (Deut 6:5) Thus, God is responsive to the disposition of his people, all 
the while modeling the type of disposition they ought to manifest toward him. Thus, the human response to 
God requires more than external actions. It requires a change in heart (Lev 26:42; cf. Deut 10:16). 
Reciprocality is also evident in a benedictory proclamation; Jabesh-gilead is to be “blessed of the LORD 
because” of the dsx they showed in burying Saul (2 Sam 2:5–6).  
491
 In this passage, four factors of divine blessing are present: the divine character, the covenant, 
divine action (remembering the covenant), and human response (God-fearing). Priority is here given to the 
divine character of grace and compassion and his positive action, but contingency is clearly displayed in 
regard to whether or not potential objects of blessing “fear” God. Further, God “blesses” the “righteous 
man” and “surrounds him with favor” (Ps 5:12; cf. 37:28). The “good” one obtains divine “favor” (!Acr') but 
the wicked will be condemned (Prov 12:2). Similarly, “when a man’s ways are pleasing [hc'r'] to the LORD, 
He makes even his enemies to be at peace with him” (Prov 16:7). Likewise, the one who is attentive to the 
“word” and trusts God “will find good” and is “blessed” (Prov 16:20) just as God is “good” to those who 
“wait for him” and “seek Him” (Lam 3:25; cf. Ruth 3:20). Reciprocality is likewise implied in the 
statement, “Delight [gn[] yourself in the LORD; And He will give you the desires of your heart” (Ps 37:4). 
Those who “love” the name of God exult in him, take refuge in him (5:11 [12]) and are the righteous that 
God blesses (5:12 [13]). Likewise, various blessings are associated with proper human disposition, 
including: loving righteousness and hating wickedness (Ps 45:7), loving God’s name (Ps 69:36), walking in 
God’s way (Pss 119:1; 128:1), and fearing God (Pss 128:1; 103:11, 13, 18; Eccl 8:12). Likewise, God 
states that he will deliver someone, “because He has loved [qvx] Me,” that is, “known My name” (Ps 
91:14). 
492
 In this context, both acm + !xe and lk,f, appear to be evaluative. “The root meaning of sekel (var. 
sekel) is ‘vision,’ ‘perception.’ It almost always refers to (1) perception from the standpoint of the 
perceiver. The possessor of sekel sees a situation clearly and is consequently discerning and circumspect. 
Sometimes sekel refers to (2) perception from the standpoint of the object, i.e., the way others see a 
person” (Fox, Proverbs 1–9, 147); cf. 1 Sam 25:3; Esth 2:7; Gen 29:17; 39:6; Ps 111:10; Prov 3:4; cf. 
HALOT 1328. See also the word study of !nx on acm + !xe. Further, although Fox is adamant that the dsx here 
“can only be God’s kindness toward the pupil” and thus cannot be human dsx (Fox, Proverbs 1–9, 144), the 
more likely (and common) reading is that people are being encouraged to act loyally and faithfully. So 
Waltke, The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1:1–15:29, 241; Murphy, Proverbs, 121; cf. Prov 20:28. See the 
discussion in the word study of dsx above. 
493
 For instance, the opposite of divine blessing is manifested in reaction to Judah’s unfaithfulness 




even the lack of blessing and the execution of divine judgment is directed toward disciplining 
Israel with the hope that they will turn back so that the relationship can be restored (Deut 8:5).
494
  
Significantly, the contingency of divine blessing is set alongside the contingency of 
divine love, specifically “because you listen to these judgments and keep and do them. . . . God 
will keep with you His covenant and His lovingkindness which He swore to your forefathers. He 
will love you and bless you and multiply you” (Deut 7:12–13; cf. 2 Sam 22:20–25).
495
 Likewise, 
humans are thus to turn from idolatry and return to God, in order to receive the full measure of 
divine beneficence and mercy. If they will but return, God will “love them freely” (Hos 14:1–4 
[2–5]; cf. Joel 2:12–14). On the other hand, Israel’s continued disloyalty removes the divine 
blessing such that God has “withdrawn” his “peace” from the people, even his “lovingkindness 
and compassion” (Jer 16:5; cf. Jer 14:10). 
Conditionality must not be confused with merit. Divine blessing is not deserved based on 
Israel’s “righteousness” (Deut 9:4). On the contrary, Israel has “provoked” God to “wrath” over 
and over (Deut 9:7). Nevertheless human action may contribute to divine pleasure (cf. Num 
14:8), or, on the other hand, it may obstruct divine love, and may even eventually prompt God to 
                                                     
 
Similarly, “the LORD is with you when you are with Him. And if you seek Him, He will let you find Him; 
but if you forsake Him, He will forsake you” (2 Chr 15:2). When the people seek God “with their whole 
heart” and “earnestly,” God “let them find Him” (2 Chr 15:4, 15) and “gave them rest on every side” (2 Chr 
15:15; cf. Jer 29:13–14). Thus, the continuation or disruption of the covenant blessings is clearly predicated 
on the human response. The relationship, then, is not presented as one unilaterally predicated on the divine 
will.  
494
 Cf. M. F. Rooker, Leviticus (NAC 3A; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 318. 
“By reason of Israel’s continued provocation of God, its troubles will also become more aggravated, not as 
a retaliatory device on God’s part, but as a further stimulus to capture their attention. . . . The same love of 
God that sent the word of the prophets will not send a message of love in the tragedies of life, hoping that 
the nation will be forced by desperation to cry out to God for forgiveness and love once again.” Kaiser Jr., 
“The Book of Leviticus,” in Genesis to Leviticus, 1:1180. 
495
 Notably, divine blessing is also connected to divine delight when David proclaims that he has 
been rescued “because” God “delighted in” (#px) him (2 Sam 22:20). David goes on to describe his 
“reward” and “recompense” as a consequence of his own fidelity to God (2 Sam 22:21–25; cf. 1 Kgs 3:6), 
culminating in the refrain, “with the kind You show yourself kind, with the blameless You show Yourself 




dispossess a people. In this way, divine blessing is gracious but requires ongoing reciprocation.
496
 
Thus, Judges differentiates between the “lovers” (bha) and “haters” (bya) of God; the former will 
be blessed, the latter cursed (Judg 5:31). Nevertheless, while human reciprocation may be a 
proximal cause of the maintenance of divine blessing, its origin, and the primary ground of its 
continuance, is explicitly located in divine love (Deut 4:36–38; 7:8; 23:5). 
Furthermore, the divine disposition toward the people, although it may be affected, is not 
wholly dependent upon the human response but, rather, God resolves to be ready to respond even 
when his people have forfeited all privileges (Lev 26:40–44).
497
 Indeed, whereas divine 
beneficence may be interrupted, it appears that divine benevolence remains. God seems to 
continually seek and forecast a state of affairs when he can abundantly bless the people.
498
 God 
desires to bless the people and has the power to do so since “nothing is too hard for him” (Jer 
32:17, 27) yet God gives to each “according to his ways” and the “fruits of his deeds” (Jer 
32:19).
499
 The people suffer not because of God’s will but because they continually provoke God 
                                                     
 
496
 Thus, “that the Israelites are undeserving is not incompatible with his [Moses] frequent 
admonition that obedience to the commandments is a precondition for the conquest (see, e.g., 4:1; 6:18–
19). That condition applies to their behavior from now on (see 10:16): future obedience is indispensable for 
the conquest, but it will not be the reason why God chose to give the land to Israel.” Tigay, Deuteronomy, 
97. Likewise, see Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy, 193–94, 211, Christensen, Deuteronomy 1–11, 184.  
497
 God will hear and remember the covenant if the people confess and respond to him (Lev 26:40, 
42) and in all this God will refuse to reject (sam) and abhor (l[g) his people or break (rrp) the covenant even 
when they reject and abhor (l[g) him (Lev 26:44). This is only explained by the proclamation, “I am the 
Lord their God” (Lev 26:44). This “underscores the significance of YHWH’s fidelity to his covenant.  
. . . Israel will continue as his people, and the covenantal promises will remain in force. This statement 
belies the claim that divine mercy is absent in priestly theology.” Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 2337. Levine 
suggests, “No matter how disloyal the Israelites have been, the Lord remains their God and will restore 
them.” Leviticus, 192. 
498
 Thus, God’s stirring declaration, “Oh that they had such a heart in them, that they would fear 
Me and keep all My commandments always, that it may be well with them and with their sons forever!” 
(Deut 5:29; cf. Deut 4:40; 6:24; 12:28). 
499
 Thus, if they persist in evil, God will “set [his] eyes against them for evil and not for good” 
(Amos 9:4; cf. Lev 26:17; Deut 31:17–18). “To ‘fix one’s gaze on’ (l[ ~yny[ ~f) is usually a sign of favor 
(Gen 44:21; Jer 24:6). Here, however, its purpose is for harm (h[rl).” Stuart, Hosea-Jonah, 392. Thus, it is 
evaluative and responsive. Perhaps this conditionality is nowhere more apparent than in Jer 18:7–10 where 
the divine intention is represented as directly contingent upon human response, and God will “relent” 




to anger through spiritual adultery and wickedness, yet God looks forward to a day of restoration 
that he will enact and thus “rejoice” over his people “to do them good” (Jer 32:30–42) with the 
bestowal of such goodness and peace that it will cause the nations to tremble (33:6–9; cf. Zech 
10:6; Zeph 2:7).
500
 In spite of human shortcomings, God’s enduring commitment to covenant 
remains, while nevertheless partially contingent upon human response.  
The pervasive conditionality in the OT therefore suggests that divine blessing is not 
purely arbitrary beneficence but is often responsive to the divine-human relationship. Thus one 
finds a conditional/unconditional motif that weaves itself through the complexities of the divine-
human relationship, complexities that betray a fundamental place for a relational give and take 
between God and humans. In all this, while divine blessing need not be motivated or initiated by 
human action or obedience, to some extent ongoing divine blessing is presented as dependent 
upon human response to God’s initiative and providence. God desires to pour out his blessings, 
but the actual reception of God’s covenant blessing is often presented as contingent upon human 
fidelity. In other words, it is consistently God’s will to continue the blessing relationship, to be 
with his people, to not forsake them, but he leaves the decision in their hands. Since the reasons 
for the absence (or lessening) of divine blessing are not to be found in God’s goodness or 
character, nor in God’s election, there must be other factors at work, especially including the 
disobedience and apostasy of the people. At no point has God merely failed to follow through on 
his end of the covenant; the failure to receive promised divine blessings is presented as due to 
human transgression of appropriate response to God. 
However, it is important to note that although the covenant relationship posits a specific 
modus operandi regarding blessings and curses, not all blessings fit neatly within such a 
framework. First of all, divine blessings are not restricted to the elect but, rather, God is “good to 
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 Nevertheless, despite the anticipation of a future full blessing in Zechariah, the contingency of 




all” (Ps 145:9). Yet, he specifically “keeps” those “who love Him while the wicked are destroyed 
(Ps 145:20; cf. 70:4 [5]). Here there is a clear differentiation between universal and particular 
blessing, as has been seen elsewhere in the OT.
501
 Presumably, there are aspects in which God 
blesses all people yet other aspects that operate in response to human disposition and/or actions.  
Second, questions regarding the correspondence between human actions and divine 
blessing arise. To be sure, human response is an essential (necessary, but not sufficient) 
component of covenant blessing. The covenant relationship cannot continue forever without 
positive human response in accord with the expectations of God. Yet, the priority of the divine 
initiative is evident. However, humans often do not receive their just deserts, as is also clearly 
represented in the OT, especially in Job and Qohelet (cf. Eccl 3:16–17; 8:12, 14; 9:2). Thus, there 
is not always a one-to-one correlation between behavior and the reception of blessings or curses. 
Accordingly, positing a thoroughgoing “theology of (immediate) retribution” would create a 
significant tension.
502
 However, the complexity in the operation of the divine-human relationship, 
as presented in the OT, resists positing a simplistic, one-to-one relationship between the 
occurrences of an individual’s earthly life and their faithfulness to God. Moreover, the Bible 
operates with a tension between the present and the future. As such, often retribution, whether 
positive or negative, operates as deferred rather than immediate. It becomes apparent as the canon 
progresses that ultimate justice awaits the eschaton (Rev 20). These dual tensions of the 
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 As L. C. Allen comments, “First, the whole creation is dependent on Yahweh’s providential 
work. . . . Second, Yahweh’s loving care is demonstrated especially to that group of people privileged to 
invoke this name in worship, the community of Israel.” Psalms 101–150, 373.  
502
 Even texts that may be read as positing a view of immediate retribution in isolation are clarified 
by wider contextual interpretation. For instance, Ps 18:25–26 [26–27]) posits, “With the kind You show 
Yourself kind; With the blameless You show Yourself blameless; With the pure You show Yourself pure, 
And with the crooked You show Yourself astute.” However, the context of this verse demonstrates that the 
king’s enemy has assailed him (Ps 18:17–18 [18–19]). Thus, God hears his cry in accordance with his 
faithfulness, but such faithfulness has not preserved him from all misfortune. As Craigie puts it, “He had 
lived a life of moral integrity, he had walked in God’s ways. . . . The assault of enemies had not been a 
consequence of his behavior; it did not reflect divine judgment. So he had been able to call for divine 




presence/absence of retribution and the present/future become perhaps more prominent in the NT, 
as shall be seen. Aside from this tension, the contingency that is evident throughout the OT, with 
regard to the reception of divine blessings, assumes that God takes account of the fulfillment or 
non-fulfillment of covenant conditions. If God does, in fact, take into account human actions that 
affect (yet not determine) the bestowal of blessing, then divine beneficence is not wholly 
unilateral and, of necessity, God’s nature is capable of seeking and appreciating reciprocal 
response. With this in mind, attention now turns particularly to the foreconditionality of divine 
love in the OT. 
The Foreconditionality of Love in the Torah 
The priority of divine love is explicit in the unmerited election of Israel (cf. Deut 4:37; 
7:7–8; 10:15). Israel was the object of God’s love prior to, but not exclusive of, conditions (cf. 
Deut 9:4–5). The priority of God’s love is further apparent from the first appearance of dsx in 
Genesis when Lot describes his deliverance from Sodom by the phrase “you have magnified your 
lovingkindness” (Gen 19:19). Abraham’s servant praises God for “His lovingkindness and truth” 
in guiding him to a bride for Isaac (Gen 24:12, 27; cf. Gen 32:10 [11]). Notably, the servant’s 
praise implies that God could have withheld his lovingkindness, which is thus depicted as free 
and voluntary. 
Divine love is also amazingly enduring as appears so poignantly as in the narrative of 
Exod 32–34 where God freely grants mercy and compassion to an undeserving people who have 
forfeited the privileges of their special relationship with God. In so doing, God manifests his own 
nature as “abounding in lovingkindness and truth” in close association to his being 
“compassionate and gracious” and longsuffering (Exod 34:6–7; cf. 33:19).
503
 God’s willingness 
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 Here, the syntagm tm,a/w< ds,x, appears, which emphasizes the commitment, reliability, 
faithfulness, steadfastness, and fidelity of the divine dsx. It appears elsewhere in the Torah in Gen 24:27; cf. 




to overcome sin and the disruption of the relationship manifests the steadfastness of his 
commitment, which is the only way the divine-human relationship can be continued.  
However, although divine love is amazingly enduring, it is not strictly unconditional. 
Rather, divine love is foreconditional. That is, God’s love is bestowed prior to, but not exclusive 
of, conditions. As has been seen earlier, divine dsx is conditionally predicated on the human 
response of love for God. God will visit iniquity to the third and fourth generation of those who 
hate him, but divine dsx will be shown to the thousandth generation of those who love (bha) him 
and keep his commandments (Exod 20:5–6 = Deut 5:10; cf. Exod 34:7; Deut 7:9; Jer 32:18). dsx 
is thus unmerited, though not thereby altogether unconditional as shall be seen further below. 
 Deuteronomy 7:7–13 further illustrates the foreconditionality of divine love in one of the 
fullest expositions of how love is to operate within the divine-human relationship. First, divine 
love is prior to human response and unmerited. “Not because you were more numerous than all 
other peoples did Yahweh delight [qvx] in you, therefore he chose [rxb] you when you were the 
least of all peoples, because of the love [hb'h]a;] of Yahweh for you, and he kept the oath which he 
swore to your fathers,” delivered and redeemed them (Deut 7:7–8).
504
 Divine love is thus prior to 
conditions (foreconditional) and, at the same time, unmerited. However, it is not unconditional. 
God is “the faithful God, who keeps His covenant and His lovingkindness [dsx] to a thousandth 
generation with those who love Him and keep His commandments” (Deut 7:9) yet “repays those 
who hate Him to their faces” (Deut 7:10). Therefore, Israel is to “listen” to, “keep,” and “do” all 
of God’s commands (Deut 7:11). “Then it shall come about, “because [bq,[e] you listen to these 
judgments and keep and do them,” God “will keep with you His covenant and His lovingkindness 
which He swore to your fathers” and “He will love you and bless you and multiply you” in 
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 My translation. Notably, Jacob points to the picture in Hos 9:10 of God finding Israel like 
grapes in the wilderness, suggesting that “Israel must therefore have had some trait to arouse Yahweh’s 
interest, but this passage, unique of its kind, might also mean that the impossible had become true, and so 




numerous ways (Deut 7:12–13, emphasis mine).
505
 Thus, although the origination of divine love 
is foreconditional and unmerited, the continuance of his love (as dsx and bha) and the attendant, 
promised, covenant blessings are all likewise contingent and conditional upon the human 
response, often love that is to be manifested in devoted loyalty and obedience. 
The Foreconditionality of Love in the Prophets 
 The priority of divine love is also apparent in the Prophets. For example, while Solomon 
was an infant “the LORD loved him” (2 Sam 12:24). Such love is obviously prior to any 
conditions that Solomon could have possibly fulfilled, though it is associated with the Davidic 
covenant.
506
 Just as divine bha was bestowed foreconditionally (prior to any conditions) upon 
Solomon, the endurance of divine dsx is predicted by God in a prophecy shared with David. 
Specifically, God promises to treat Solomon as a father would his son, including necessary 
correction and discipline (xky), yet never to take away his lovingkindness, which itself results in 
continued blessing (2 Sam 7:13–15; cf. 2 Sam 22:51).
507
 Solomon himself predicates this on 
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 The vav consecutive at the start of Deut 7:13 implies that v. 13 is likewise a result of Israel’s 
appropriate response. Thus, listening, keeping, and doing the divine judgments (Deut 7:12) are the 
condition that God will “love you [bha] and bless you [bha] and multiply [hbr] you” according to the divine 
promise (Deut 7:13). Quell notes that this verse indeed “links the love of God with blessing as a reward 
which Yahweh will give for covenant faithfulness. Hence the thought of love unintentionally acquires a 
note of Do ut des.” “Love in the OT,” 33. However, he incorrectly believes this connection to law robs love 
of “its best part, its freedom.” Notably, even that which God had promised (swore) is presented as 
explicitly conditional upon the ongoing relationship. However, as Craigie points out, “This did not mean 
that obedience merited divine blessing, but rather that obedience maintained the proper covenant 
relationship with God; and his people could experience the blessing of God only when the covenant 
relationship, which involved reciprocal responsibilities, was properly maintained.” The Book of 
Deuteronomy, 180. Divine love is thus relationally beneficent. Divine blessing originates in the promise 
(Deut 1:11; 2:7) and thus, ultimately, in love. On the other hand, destruction will come “because” (bq,[) of 
disobedience (Deut 8:20). Cf. Deut 13:3–4; 19:9. 
506
 This divine love entails not only a positive divine disposition toward Solomon, but also grace 
toward David manifested in a visible marker of the continuance of divine love in the aftermath of his sins 
with Bathsheba and against Uriah. 
507
 Here, then, God promises to really care for Solomon, not indifferently, but including the 








 The surpassing endurance of God’s love is abundantly evident in his continual love to an 
undeserving and ungrateful people who even have the audacity to question his love (cf. Mal 1:2–
5).
509
 In some instances, divine love is spoken of as “everlasting.” God is said to show his 
lovingkindness to David “forever” (2 Sam 22:51; cf. 2 Sam 7:13–15). The everlasting nature of 
divine dsx even becomes part of a frequent refrain, “the LORD is good, For His lovingkindness is 
everlasting” (Jer 33:11).
510
 Further, God declares his intention to “betroth” the people to him 
“forever” in righteousness, justice, lovingkindness, and compassion (Hos 2:19 [21]).  
In this regard, consider the fluctuation between the potential rupture of the divine-human 
relationship and its continuance that appears in Isa 54. Israel is compared to a “wife forsaken and 
grieved in spirit” and “rejected” (Isa 54:6).
511
 God even admits, “For a brief moment I forsook 
you, But with great compassion I will gather you” (Isa 54:7).
512
 Moreover, in contrast to his 
“outburst of anger,” which amounted to the hiding of his face “for a moment,” God, the redeemer, 
will “with everlasting lovingkindness . . . have compassion” on his people (Isa 54:8). Moreover, 
God’s “lovingkindness will not be removed” and his “covenant of peace will not be shaken, Says 
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 As such, Solomon appears to be the benefactor of something akin to a covenant of grant that 
God made with David. God shows “great dsx” in reciprocation of David’s faithfulness. Cf. 1 Kgs 15:4–5. 
See the discussion further above.  
509
 Elsewhere, the Israelites rebelled and “grieved His Holy Spirit” (Isa 63:10) and God’s “zeal,” 
“mighty deeds” and the “stirrings” of his heart and compassion appear to be “restrained” (Isa 63:15). Yet, 
God’s anger is not “forever [‘d[;l'], because He delights #peîx' in” steadfast love (ds,x) (Mic 7:18). Thus, he will 
again have compassion, forgive, and give truth to Jacob and dsx to Abraham (Mic 7:20). 
510
 This phrase is quite frequent in the Psalms (cf. Pss 100:5; 106:1; 107:1; 118:1–4, 29; 136:1–
26). 
511
 For the similar analogy, see Jer 2:1; Hos 3:1, see the previous discussion of the familial 
analogies. 
512




the LORD who has compassion” (Isa 54:10; cf. Isa 55:3).
513
 While divine anger, manifested in 
rejection, is a momentary torrent, divine love is manifested in great compassion and endures 
beyond mere covenant stipulations, making a way for reconciliation. Nevertheless, it is not 
altogether constant.  
Perhaps the foremost passage regarding the enduring nature of divine love is found in Jer 
31. Within the context of the need for Judah to turn to God, specifically that he will be found if 
they seek with all their heart (Jer 29:13), and in the aftermath of God’s punishment and exile of 
them for their harlotries (Jer 30), God declares the depth of this love. Even after all that has 
transpired between the covenant partners, he will be their God and they shall be his people (Jer 
31:1), they have found “favor,” and the covenant will be restored to a remnant (Jer 31:2). It is 
within this context that God himself declares, “I have loved you with an everlasting love; 
Therefore I have drawn you with lovingkindness” (Jer 31:3).
514
 First, this is a glorious affirmation 
of the longsuffering and overarching nature of divine love, itself the basis of God’s continued 
drawing in lovingkindness. This new covenant points to a further work of God that provides the 
possibility of an ongoing, intimate, covenant relationship between God and his people. Although 
God will punish iniquity, the results of which reach even to future generations, God’s 
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 Oswalt suggests that God’s “ḥesed, that gracious, giving loyalty that, if given half a chance, 
will beggar itself for the beloved. It is not a spineless sentimentality that is blind to our human condition. 
Rather, it calls us into the mutual commitment of covenant. But it is that ‘love [that] never fails’ of which 
Paul knew (1 Cor. 13:8, NIV).” The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66, 423.  
514
 The opening phrase, yli ha'r>nI hw"hy> qAxr”me, could refer to a revelation from “long ago” in reference 
to Sinai, but may also be taken to mean “from afar.” The latter would be in accord with Jeremiah’s use of 
qAxr, elsewhere in the sense of distance (Jer 12:2; 23:23; 25:26; 30:10; 46:27; 48:24; 51:50). Yet, the sense 
of “long ago” is also represented in other prophets. The precise relationship between ds,x and “I have drawn 
you” is not certain since there is no preposition between the terms. Yet, it is clear that ds,x results in the 
“drawing.” Such continuance of divine love will result in a return of blessings to Israel (Jer 31:13) and 
ultimately in a new covenant. 
The phrase ~l'A[ tb;h]a;, usually translated “everlasting love” might also be translated “love of old” 
or ancient love. However, such an interpretation would appear to be strained. Moreover, the syntagm of dsx 
+ ~l'A[ seems to be thematically related to this syntagm and the meaning “of old” applied to ~l'A[ in many 
such contexts does not fit (i.e., Isa 54:8; cf. 2 Sam 22:51). If such a connotation were present, one would 
expect ~l'A[me, so Ps 25:6. Rather, divine ds,x is elsewhere consistently depicted as “everlasting,” 




lovingkindness is transmitted to the thousandth generation (Jer 32:18; cf. Exod 20:6 = Deut 
5:10).
515
 Within this context, a future is envisioned in which God will restore, forgive, and be so 
good to his people that the other nations will tremble (Jer 33:9; cf. Jer 31:31–34; 32:38). In this 
context, praise will resound for God’s goodness and “everlasting lovingkindness” (Jer 33:11).
516
  
On the other hand, there are numerous instances throughout the prophets that display the 
conditionality of love, including its potential forfeiture. A most striking and illuminating example 
is found in Hosea when God’s people become so evil that God “came to hate [anEf'] them” and 
declared, “I will love them no more” (Hos 9:15).
517
 Notice the contingency of divine love. It is 
clearly foreconditional since God “found” them in the wilderness (Hos 9:10) and loved them prior 
to any human response. However, it is clearly not unconditional since this love is interrupted, 
even discontinued. Divine hate is here associated with the discontinuance of love, but not 
indifference. As such, divine love is neither unilateral nor impartially constant. However, God’s 
final word has not been spoken in Hos 9 but he posits a further, conditional opportunity. If they 
will but return, God will “heal their apostasy” and “love them freely” (hb'_d"n> ~beÞh]ao), his anger will 
be “turned away,” and blessings will result (Hos 14:1–4 [2–5]).
518
 The very opportunity of 
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 This is clearly an allusion to Exod 20:5–6; 3:7; Deut 5:9–10, which Lundbom calls “the divine 
retribution formula.” Jeremiah 21–36, 512; cf. Jer 31:30. Literally, God “shows lovingkindness to 
thousands, but repays the iniquity of fathers into the bosom of their children after them.” The following 
verse emphasizes that God is just in his dispersal of rewards (Jer 32:19); cf. Deut 24:16; Ezek 18:20. 
516
 Such a refrain appears often throughout the Psalms. 
517
 Further, God declares that they became as detestable as that which they love (Hos 9:10), likely 
descriptive of their engagement in cultic and sexual evils (cf. Num 25), even eating sacrifices to the dead 
(Ps 106:28); cf. Andersen and Freedman, Hosea, 537. Andersen and Freedman translate, “Because of all 
their evil in Gilgal indeed there I came to hate them. Because of the wickedness of their deeds, I will expel 
them from my house. I will never love them again.” Ibid., 536. 
518
 Eichrodt thinks that Hosea’s depiction, which he elsewhere considered the deepest and most 
advanced, nevertheless is “utterly impossible to rationalize it into a dogmatic statement about the nature of 
God” where the “most appalling outbursts of anger and the expressions of favour toward the new Israel—I 
will love them no more' (9.15) and ‘I will love them freely’ (14.4)—are allowed to stand side by side with 
no attempt at reconciliation, signifying that on the basis of the prophetic faith at any rate there is no method 
of reconciling them. The only answer is to flee from the wrathful to the loving God.” Eichrodt, Theology, 
253. Thus, he believes that “it can only be understood as the product of faith,' breaking through the opus 




returning to God is predicated on divine compassion, yet the reception of divine blessing is 
nevertheless conditional; if only they will repent, God will “love them freely” (Hos 14:1, 4; cf. 
Joel 2:12–14). Thus, significant tension appears between the stated endurance, and yet apparent 
absence at times, of divine love and lovingkindness. How does the repetitive conditionality of the 
divine-human relationship accord with “everlasting love”?
519
 The tension is especially apparent in 
contrast to God’s statement in Hos 9:15 that he came to hate Israel and “will love them no more” 
(Hos 9:15). If such statements are taken seriously, it appears that divine love is everlasting in 
some respect(s), yet may nevertheless be discontinued.
520
 Importantly, the object of this 
everlasting love appears to be a “remnant” (Jer 31:7–9) within the parental analogy, suggesting 
limited application of such everlasting love. In other words, divine love itself may be everlasting, 
but its objects may not be constant. Thus, the love relationship will ultimately continue only for 
those who are a part of the new covenant. 
In this regard, consider the striking presentation of the simultaneous continuance of 
God’s love for his people and yet restriction from actively loving them that appears in Jer 11, 
further highlighting these issues. Because of their continual apostasy, even breaking (rrp) the 
covenant (Jer 11:10), God will “not listen [[:meªvo] when they call” (Jer 11:14). Even though they are 
his “beloved” (dydIy") they lack the right to his house because of their “vile deeds” (Jer 11:15; cf. 
8:5).
521
 In one sense, the people continue to be viewed as God’s “beloved” yet the love 
                                                     
 
However, this tension is not a contradiction in light of the concept of foreconditionality. 
519
 Keown, Scalise, and Smothers suggest that “the unique description of the divine love as ~l'A[, 
“everlasting,” moves beyond the conditional promise in Deut 7:9, no longer counting generations or sins. It 
is the LORD’s constant commitment to Israel that bridges the generations and makes restoration possible.” 
Jeremiah 26–52, 108. However, contra Keown, Scalise, and Smothers, it does not seem Jeremiah moves 
beyond conditionality at all, especially in consideration of the wider themes of Jeremiah (cf. Jer 18:7–10), 
not to mention further tension between these themes throughout the prophets. 
520
 Consider the continuity between this conception of divine love and Walton’s view of covenant 
jeopardy. Covenant, 94–107. 
521
 Whereas God is steadfast in love, “Jerusalem is distinguished by its steadfastness to rebellion 




relationship is ineffective and broken. Thus, it appears that divine benevolence, which stems from 
his foreconditional love for Israel, is maintained, while his beneficence is interrupted by their 
apostasy. In other words, the love God desires to manifest remains thwarted by the rebellious 
actions of the object of that love. In this way, the foreconditional divine love is subject to 
conditions in the actual history of the relationship.  
Divine love is not, in this passage, impartially constant or undifferentiated. On the 
contrary, it is extremely passionate. God may, at least temporarily, forsake (bz[) his inheritance by 
giving the “beloved” (tWddIy>) of his “soul” (vp,n<) to her enemies (Jer 12:7), noting that he has 
actually “come to hate [anf] her” (Jer 12:8).522 There can be no mistaking the profound passion of 
God for his people, as the beloved of his very soul, yet even this intense affection does not 
prevent such passion from turning to hatred. It appears, then, that the apostasy can go so far that 
the people can cut themselves off from divine love such that even if Moses and Samuel were 
present, God declares, “My heart [yviÞp.n:] would not be with this people” (Jer 15:1).523 Israel’s 
continued disloyalty removes the divine blessing such that God has “withdrawn” his “peace” 
                                                     
 
to them” (Jer 11:23). The lack of a remnant is apparently in reference to the conspirators, not the nation as a 
whole (Ezra 2:23). 
522
 The form tWddIy> is a hapax legomenon but with the identical meaning of dydIy” “beloved” (cf. Jer 
11:15). This phrase “beloved of my soul” is a statement of profound emotion. Notice vp,n<, the seat of 
emotions. Thus, Miller states, “I have given the beloved of my heart into the hands of her enemies.” The 
pathos of the whole section is caught up in that one sentence, with its identification of the one whom the 
Lord has given over to her enemies as “the beloved of my heart.” “The Book of Jeremiah,” in Isaiah–
Ezekiel, 6:679. Such expression “is a strong one . . . showing a deep love for his people.” Lundbom, 
Jeremiah 1–20, 654. Thus, divine hatred here appears likewise to be intensely passionate. Notably, God 
appears to both love and hate Judah at the same time in this passage. Although the emotionality of divine 
hatred is often downplayed in some theological circles, the emotionality here is recognized by many 
scholars. For instance see Craigie, Kelley, and Drinkard Jr., Jeremiah 1–25, 184; Miller, “The Book of 
Jeremiah,” in Isaiah–Ezekiel, 6:679.  
523
 “The situation is so terrible—lying, apostasy, adultery, malfeasance of office, oppression of the 
poor—that not even the most successful intercessors could succeed. The Lord’s heart has hardened in the 
face of continuing, unrelenting wickedness. The people’s refusal to ‘turn,’ repent, and their refusal to 
receive correction is so persistent (e.g., 2:30; 3:10; 5:3; 8:5–6; 15:7) that ‘turning’ is no longer possible.” 
Miller, “The Book of Jeremiah,” in Isaiah–Ezekiel, 6:692. “There is a limit to God’s mercy and patience.” 
Huey Jr., Jeremiah, Lamentations, 157. “As has been seen previously, in all this, it is not God’s decision to 
remove himself, but they have ‘done this to’ themselves.” Craigie, Kelley, and Drinkard Jr., Jeremiah 1–




from the people, even his “lovingkindness and compassion” (Jer 16:5; cf. Jer 14:10). As such, 
despite the enduring quality of divine lovingkindness, it is not unilaterally permanent. God’s love, 
lovingkindness, and compassion may be withdrawn, contingent upon the actions of the people. In 
this way, it appears that the reception of divine love by its intended objects can be thwarted while 
God waits for a “remnant” upon whom he can pour out his blessings. As such, God’s love is, in 
and of itself, everlasting and granted prior to conditions, but its continued reception is conditional 
upon appropriate human response. This is the foreconditionality of divine love. 
The Foreconditionality of Love in the Writings 
The priority of divine love is likewise apparent in the Writings. God is, freely and 
without prompting, “merciful and gracious, slow to anger and abundant in lovingkindness and 
truth” (Ps 86:15; cf. 103:8; 106:44-45; 145:8; Neh 9:17). Such love is astonishing in its 
endurance. God’s lovingkindness is frequently spoken of as everlasting, often in the hymn 
formula, “give thanks to the LORD, for He is good; For His lovingkindness is everlasting” (Pss 
106:1; 107:1; 118:1–4, 29; 136:1–2, 4–5; Ezra 3:11; 1 Chr 16:34, 41; 2 Chr 5:13; 7:3, 6; 
20:21).
524
 Elsewhere the same theme is confirmed: God is good, his lovingkindness is everlasting, 
and his faithfulness is to all generations (Ps 100:5; cf. 89:1–2 [1–3]; 117:2; 138:8).
525
 His 
“lovingkindness . . . endures all day long” (Ps 52:1 [3]).
526
 This enduring bond is linked to the 
                                                     
 
524
 Notably, in Ezra, the paradigmatic refrain comes in the wake of the laying of the second 
temple’s foundation, itself a historical witness to the numerous sufferings of the exile. Thus, it seems to be 
understood that even though calamity comes upon God’s people, it is not because God’s lovingkindness 
has changed. 
525
 McCann reads this as having universal implications, “Psalm 100 wants us to know that God is 
shepherd both of God’s people and of the whole cosmos (see Pss 23:1; 74:1; 80:1; 95:7; Ezek 34:11–16).” 
“The Book of Psalms,” in 1 & 2 Maccabees, 4:1079. Tate translates Ps 89:2 [3], “For I have declared that 
your loyal-love is built to last forever, (and) that you have fixed your faithfulness in the heavens.” Psalms 
51–100, 406. McCann Jr. adds, “God’s steadfast love lies behind and accounts for the origin of the world.  
. . . The verb makes clear that God’s character, the essence of which is steadfast love, is made known by 
God’s creating, redeeming, and sustaining activity.” “The Book of Psalms,” in 1 & 2 Maccabees, 4:1224. 
526
 The term here translated “lovingkindness” is rendered in some translations by the unrelated 




intimacy of the father–son relationship that God enters into with Solomon. God proclaims that he 
will be a father to Solomon and not take away his dsx from him (1 Chr 7:13; cf. Ps 103:13; cf. 
103:17). Thus a personal, moral, and affectionate relationship is established, one that God 
apparently has the power to end but declares that he will not. Within the context of the Davidic 
promises, God declares, in accord with his superlative character of faithfulness, righteousness, 
justice, lovingkindness and truth, that he will keep his lovingkindness forever (Ps 89:28 [29]; cf. 2 
[3], 30–32 [31–33]; 18:50 [51]). Even within the context of sorrow and affliction, it is affirmed 
that God’s lovingkindness itself never ceases, just as his compassions do not fail; “great is [his] 
faithfulness” (Lam 3:22–23; cf. Ps 33:5). However, such enduring love and lovingkindness are 
not unilaterally constant. 
Rather, the context of Lamentations itself draws attention to the tension between God’s 
“everlasting” dsx and the suffering and sorrows that befall his people. Such is apparent as well 
when, at times, the lack of expected lovingkindness is lamented, through questions such as: Will 
God “reject forever” and “never be favorable [hc'r'] again?” Has God’s “lovingkindness ceased 
forever,” his “promise come to an end forever? Has God forgotten to be gracious” or “in anger 
withdrawn his compassion?” (Ps 77:7–9 [8–10]). Similarly, Ps 88 questions God, “Will Your 
lovingkindness be declared in the grave, Your faithfulness in Abaddon?” Further, “You have 
removed lover and friend far from me; My acquaintances are in darkness” (Ps 88:11, 18). Such 




                                                     
 
NRSV). However, the syntagm lae ds,x, seems to make the more prevalent reading as God’s enduring dsx 
more plausible; cf. Tate, Psalms 51–100, 32. 
527
 As Tate comments, “The apparent absence of God in the present leads to meditation about the 
past, when divine love and protection were evident. This makes the present look even worse as the speaker 
remembers the favor, lovingkindness, graciousness, and compassion of the former days. Even God’s eternal 
promises seem to have come to an end. In sorrow and abandonment the speaker ponders on the disturbing 




Further, divine love is often spoken of as contingent and conditional, as was the case in 
the Torah and the Prophets, here most often with reference to divine dsx. While God himself is 
the ultimate ground of the bestowal of love and lovingkindness, divine love is not indifferent to 
the actual response of human beings. For instance, God “keeps” the covenant and lovingkindness 
to those who “walk before [him] with all their heart” (2 Chr 6:14; cf. Deut 7:9). Likewise, God 
“keeps His covenant and lovingkindness for those who love Him and keep His commandments” 
(Dan 9:4; cf. Neh 1:5; 13:22). Similarly, it is prayed that God continue lovingkindness to those 
who “know” God and his righteousness to those who are “upright in heart” (Ps 36:10; cf. Ruth 
1:8).
528
 On the other hand, it is prayed that no lovingkindness be extended to the evil one, 
“because he did not remember to show lovingkindness” (Ps 109:12, 16). Further, expected 
reciprocality is quite explicit in the statement, “with the kind [dysix'] You show Yourself kind 
[dsx]” (Ps 18:25 [26] = 2 Sam 22:26). Accordingly, “all the paths of the LORD are 
lovingkindness and truth to those who keep his covenant and his testimonies” (Ps 25:10; cf. 25:6, 
14).
529
 Further, divine “lovingkindness” is seen as the basis upon which God “recompense[s] a 
man according to his work,” it is here unequivocally conditional (Ps 62:12; cf. 31:23 [24]).
530
 
Likewise, it is the one with lovingkindness and truth who finds “favor and good repute in the 
sight of God and man” (Prov 3:4). Similarly, just as the upright’s prayer is God’s delight (!Acr'), he 
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 In Ruth 1:8, Naomi asks God to “deal kindly” with Ruth and Orpah as they “have dealt with the 
dead and with me.” Robert L. Hubbard Jr. comments, “Here emerges a key theological assumption of the 
book: the intimate link between human action and divine action. In this case, human kindness has earned 
the possibility (even likelihood) of a God-given reward. It has even modeled the shape that reward should 
take. This assumes, of course, that God is so intimately involved in the main characters that he knows their 
actions. It also assumes that he cares about them—indeed, that he wants to treat them kindly.” The Book of 
Ruth (NICOT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1988), 104–5.  
529
 However, that this does not require perfect obedience is clear from Ps 25:11. As Craigie puts it, 
“All covenants have two parties, and the lovingkindness of God, the senior partner in the covenant (v 10a), 
was related to the psalmist’s obedience to the covenant stipulations (v 10b).” Yet, “if God’s response 
depended upon sinlessness with regard to the covenant stipulations, then there could be no response. And 
so the psalmist prays again for forgiveness, aware that his ‘iniquity . . . is great.’” Psalms 1–50, 220.  
530
 Tate translates, “Yours is indeed a loyal-love, O Lord, for you reward each person according to 




loves [bha] the pursuer of righteousness (Prov 15:8–9). Lovingkindness “surrounds” the one who 
“trusts in the Lord” (Ps 32:10).
531
 He “favors” (hcr) those “who fear him,” that is, “those who 
wait for His lovingkindness” (Ps 147:11; cf. Lam 3:25). Again, that God is interested in human 
response is likewise clear in the statement, “the eye of the LORD is on those who fear Him, on 
those who hope for His lovingkindness” (Ps 33:18). God is thus willing to forgive “all who call 
upon” him, in his goodness and abundant lovingkindness (Ps 86:5; cf. 33:22). Similarly, “as high 
as the heavens are above the earth, so great is His lovingkindness toward those who fear Him” (Ps 
103:11). The conditionality on the basis of appropriate response here is obvious.  
In all this, there is a striking contingency in God’s lovingkindness. Perhaps the tension 
between such contingency and statements of God’s everlasting dsx approaches resolution in the 
statement, “The lovingkindness of the LORD is from everlasting to everlasting on those who fear 
Him, and His righteousness to children’s children, to those who keep His covenant and remember 
his precepts to do them” (Ps 103:17–18).
532
 Here the everlasting promise of dsx is contained but 
particularized for those who respond appropriately to God.  
At this juncture, it may be instructive to revisit the potential solutions to the tension 
between unconditionality and conditionality throughout the OT. The tension has been apparent 
with regard to love, lovingkindness, compassion, and the covenants, and it is not unreasonable to 
assume that the tension regarding such elements of the divine-human relationship are interrelated 
                                                     
 
531
 “In other words, the ‘godly one’ (חסיד, v 6) will experience the divine lovingkindness (חסד, v 
10).” Craigie, Psalms 1–50, 268.  
532
 “This love is not to be willfully abused. Its recipients must respond with respectful awe, he says 
in a triple refrain at vv 11, 13, 17. . . . The activity of God, involving ‘loyal love’ and ‘vindication’ (vv 4b, 
6), must find an echo of obedient activity in their lives. . . . ‘Loyal love,’ essentially engenders a 
corresponding relationship of obligation.” L. C. Allen, Psalms 101–150, 32–33. McCann Jr. suggests, 
“There seems to be a contradiction: How is it ‘mercy’ if finally it is deserved? And what need is there for 
forgiveness? This contradiction, or better perhaps, tension, represents the inevitable dilemma for God, who 
both wills and demands justice and righteousness and yet who loves and is committed to relationship with 
sinful people.” “The Book of Psalms,” in 1 & 2 Maccabees, 4:1092. While McCann is right to note some 




and share a common thread. A prevalent position in biblical scholarship has been the belief that 
there are at least two, contradictory, streams of thought presented in the OT with regard to this 
issue, one positing the unconditionality and everlasting nature of God’s promises, the other 
presenting the divine promises as conditional and potentially transient.
533
 On the other hand, a 
canonical reading of the OT comes to a quite different and, I believe, compelling conclusion: that 
the covenant, and its attendant promises and blessings, including divine love, are unconditional in 
some respects, yet conditional in others. At the risk of oversimplification, this view basically 
interprets the data to point to the unconditionality of God’s promises in general, but conditionality 
with regard to who will or will not be the recipients of such promises (as seems to be the clear 
reading of Ps 103:17–18 above).
534
 God’s love dovetails with this unconditionality and 
conditionality by way of its foreconditional nature. That is, God bestows love freely to his 
creatures foreconditionally, but the continued reception of that love, and attendant personal love 
relationship with God, is conditional upon appropriate human response to God’s initiating love.
535
  
Such a view is bolstered by, though not necessarily dependent on, interesting parallels 
between the biblical covenants and the grant type of covenant in the ANE.
536
 While the 
                                                     
 
533
 The prevalent view is that the Deuteronomic historian emphasized conditionality upon 
faithfulness while another strand, likely the priestly, emphasized the unconditional “perpetual covenant” 
harking back to Abraham. Weinfeld, “The Covenant,” 195; idem, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic; 
Sakenfeld, The Meaning of Hesed, 149, 237–39. 
534
 To be sure the nature and content (dynasty, land, etc.) of the promises vary considerably 
throughout the OT. Without attempting to conflate these promises, the overall unconditionality that a 
remnant will be the beneficiary of the fulfillment of those promises, while other potential beneficiaries may 
forfeit their place, may be recognized as a broad, overarching theme of the OT that, according to the NT, 
finds ultimate resolution in the eschatological kingdom that will be brought about by Jesus Christ; cf. 
Walton, Covenant, 94–107. 
535
 This points toward the universality and particularity of divine love, which will be briefly taken 
up in the next section of this chapter. 
536
 The grant type of covenant basically consists of gifts from a sovereign to an individual and his 
descendants who had loyally served him, with the assurance that the gifts will not be taken away from him 
or his progeny. Weinfeld, “The Covenant.” It is important to note that Knoppers has compellingly argued 
that a covenant of grant genre, as Weinfeld posits, is inadequate to the complexity of covenants in the ANE 
as well as to the Davidic covenant in the OT, and misleading with regard to the nature of ANE covenants. 




complexity of both ANE covenants and biblical covenants defies one-to-one correlation with the 
so-called covenant of grant, the many ANE instances of a promise of blessings that will extend to 
future generations, independent of lapses in, and therefore punishment of, a particular generation, 
provide a striking parallel to the interlaced elements of unconditionality and conditionality with 
regard to the divine-human relationship of the OT.
537
  
Scholars have long made a connection between the supposedly promissory and 
unconditional Abrahamic and Davidic covenants as a “covenant of grant” in stark contrast to the 
obligatory (upon the vassal) and conditional Mosaic covenant, akin to the so-called suzerain-
vassal treaty type in the ANE.
538
 However, some scholars have recognized that there is apparent 
                                                     
 
are, in fact, conditional and, further, do not conform to a standard pattern. Likewise, the instances related to 
the Davidic covenant are not altogether unconditional; they are not legal texts and represent divergent 
depictions of the covenant, in both form and content. Knoppers, “Ancient Near Eastern,” 670–97. Further 
discussion of the technical nature of the disagreements regarding the extent of the correspondence between 
biblical covenants and so-called covenants of grant (or royal grant treaties) in the ANE goes far beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. However, this study simply recognizes a broad-based, three-fold typology of 
covenants: (1) parity or kinship where “obligations of the covenant are more or less equally distributed 
between the two parties”; (2) treaty covenant where obligations are primarily imposed upon an inferior by a 
superior; (3) grant covenant where the “obligations rest predominantly with the superior party.” Hahn, 
Kinship by Covenant, 29. The explanatory value of the evident parallels does not hinge upon the particular 
outcome of the form-critical debates regarding the level of correspondence to covenant genres since 
whether there is dependency of one on the other or not the elements of bilateral relationship are clearly 
apparent in the canonical text itself. 
537
 For the examples of such partially unconditional, intergenerational ANE grants/promises see 
especially Knoppers, “Ancient Near Eastern,” 670–97. Importantly, parallels can be found across many 
genres—“vassal treaties, grants, wills, and adoption documents.” Knoppers, “Ancient Near Eastern,” 684. 
As such, “rather than seeing biblical authors as modeling the Davidic promises after either vassal treaties or 
land grants, it would be more accurate to say that biblical authors draw upon a variety of genres in their 
presentations of YHWH's provisions for David's descendants.” “Ancient Near Eastern,” 674. 
538
 For the distinction between the suzerain-vassal treaty as obligatory, meaning the vassal took on 
the obligations of the covenant in contrast to the view of the covenant of grant as promissory, where the 
grantor promises to bestow blessings (dynasty, land) upon the grantee in light of past faithfulness, see 
Weinfeld, “The Covenant,” 184–85. This view is partially dependent on Weinfeld’s assumption that a 
covenant is a largely one-sided, rather than bilateral, promise of obligation. Such sharp contrast between 
the supposed unconditionality of the Abrahamic and Davidic Covenants versus the emphatic conditionality 
of the Mosaic has been widely held. See, for instance, George E. Mendenhall, “Covenant Forms in Israelite 
Tradition,” BA 17 (1954): 50–76. 
Importantly, Weinfeld does recognize expectation of ongoing faithfulness, but not such that the 
fulfillment of the promises is conditional upon such faithfulness. In order for the Davidic covenant to 
qualify as an unconditional covenant, however, the statements of conditionality that pertain to reception of 
the promises with regard to the Davidic covenant (1 Kgs 2:4; 8:25; 9:4–9) are presumed by Weinfeld to be 




conditionality evidenced in texts with regard to both the Abrahamic and Davidic covenants, 
neither of which is altogether promissory or obligatory.
539
 In fact, since the covenants are 
integrally related to one another intertextually in the OT, there is significant overlap between the 
so-called suzerain-vassal type, the grant type, as well as the kinship type of covenant throughout 
the OT. As such, while these covenants are asymmetrical they are not depicted in the OT as 
altogether unilateral and one-sided, but are actually bilateral covenants that presume a form of 
mutuality (though not equality) between God and humans.
540
 Such a position asserts itself within 
a final-form canonical interpretation of the text that takes seriously the consistent presentation of 
the endurance of God’s beneficence contrasted with the similarly consistent predication of the 
continuance of such blessings on appropriate human response.
541
 Importantly, the language of 
love itself consistently contains conditionality that presumes a bilateral relationship of give and 
take, in which God loves human beings and desires to be loved in return. Further implications of 
                                                     
 
Deuteronomic. A final-form canonical approach is not at liberty to adopt such a selective reading of the 
texts that is based on circular reasoning. 
539
 A case can certainly be made that the emphasis of the Mosaic covenant (at least in many 
passages) is on the obligations of Israel toward God while the emphasis of the Abrahamic and Davidic 
covenants are on the promises, but neither excludes promises or obligations. In fact, Cross maintains that 
“there are no ‘unilateral’ covenants in a kinship-based society” and missing this point has led to the “gross 
distortion” of viewing covenant as unilateral. From Epic, 14–15. Cross further points out the dependence of 
such a view on extra-biblical presuppositions, commenting on Wellhausen’s view that “the relationship 
between God and Israel in premonarchical times and in early prophecy was ‘natural,’ spontaneous, free, 
interior (individualistic). Such language is his inheritance from a philosophical milieu created by idealism 
and romanticism, borrowed immediately from Vatke, and congruent with Protestant antinomianism.” Ibid., 
15. 
540
 Knoppers has pointed out the insoluble problems with positing a stark contrast between 
promissory and obligatory covenants. By extensive reference to ANE parallels, he contends that most 
covenants are bilateral. This is the case even where the covenant is asymmetrical. The conditions and/or 
responsibilities may fall more heavily on one party or the other, but this does not amount to an entirely 
unilateral or one-sided covenant. Rather, “even in the most one-sided arrangements (e.g., Ulmi-Tesup; 2 
Samuel 7, Psalm 89) there may be an element of reciprocity. The clearly bilateral dimension of such special 
relationships is but one more illustration of the complexity of covenant within ancient Israel and the ancient 
Near East.” “Ancient Near Eastern,” 696. 
541
 Davies points out that the Davidic covenant has “an inbuilt expectation of obedience (1 Sam 
7:14; Ps 132:12). The tensions which result may not be the result of careless redaction, but the necessary 
tensions in an account of a relationship with attempts to grapple with the conundrum of a persistent divine 




this approach with regard to divine love and the God-world relationship will be explored in 
chapter 6. 
In all this, there is no actual dichotomy between divine love and justice; dsx is shown 
toward those who respond to God, and yet, God repeatedly provides occasions for human 
response according to his compassion, graciousness, and longsuffering.
542
 Thus, although God’s 
love is grounded in his goodness, and prior to any external motivation, it does not appear to be 
manifested as uninterrupted or unilateral beneficence but, rather, appears within the context of 
real give-and-take relationship. In all this, God is clearly affected, loving and delighting in 
goodness, justice, and righteousness, reserving the ultimate reward for the upright. 
The Relational and Multilateral Aspect of Divine Love 
This section focuses on data that support the view that divine love is multilaterally 
relational.
543
 God universally seeks a relationship of reciprocal love but enters into a particular, 
intimate relationship only with those who respond appropriately. First, God seeks and enters into 
reciprocally responsive love relationships with his creatures, which amount to multilateral divine-
human love relationships. Second, though God’s foreconditional love is universal, God does not 
love all equally and uniformly. God desires a reciprocal love relationship of give and take with all 
his creatures and initiates the possibility of such a relationship through his universal offer of 
foreconditional love that enables and calls for a reciprocal response of love. However, not all 
respond positively. Accordingly, the reader is encouraged to keep the following questions in mind 
                                                     
 
Love,” 38–39, 62–65, 73–76, 78. 
542
 Recall the striking association between divine lovingkindness and justice as well as truth, 
righteousness, faithfulness, etc. Divine lovingkindness is unquestionably connected to moral categories 
and, as such, it only makes sense that God’s love would not be antithetical to evaluation or conditionality. 
543
 I use the term multilateral here and elsewhere because love not only is to flow reciprocally 
from God to humans and vice versa but also from humans to others, which is indirectly love toward God as 
well. Further, in the NT, intra-trinitarian love is also added to the mix (see chapter 5). Thus, the relations of 




while reading this section. Is divine love unilateral? Is God the only proper agent of love or may 
there be a reciprocal divine-human love relationship? Is divine love universal or particular? 
Following on this, might some be loved more than others? What of the concept of eschatological 
reward and the “remnant”? This section of the study will proceed with a survey of reciprocal love 
in the OT. 
Reciprocal Love in the Torah 
In the Torah, there is both particularity and universality to God’s love. The covenant 
relationship clearly depicts a particular love relationship (cf. Deut 4:37; 7:7–13; 10:15). God’s 
special love for his people is evident in numerous places. For example, God “loves [bbx] the 
people,” all the “holy ones” are in his “hand” (Deut 33:3).
544
 However, divine love extends 
beyond the elect, Israel, to outsiders. God himself showed “His love for the alien” and 
commanded the Israelites to do likewise (Deut 10:18–19). In this way, the universality of divine 
love, which is explicit elsewhere, is implied.
545
 Thus, there is a contrast between what may be 
called “insider love” and “outsider love.” Throughout the OT, it becomes clear that God’s 
intention is to call all peoples to a particular, reciprocal love relationship with himself. Those who 
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 bbx is a hapax legomenon and may be derived or adopted from an Aramaic term meaning 
“bosom,” which would signify “Yahweh’s intense love” for the people. Good, “Love in the OT,” IDB 
3:165. However, bbx is interpreted in other ways, most notably as “pure,” which Craigie reads as “Yea, the 
pure ones of the peoples.” Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy, 392. Tigay thinks the text may be damaged 
and its meaning indeterminate. Deuteronomy, 320. The MT represents the object as plural, “the peoples” 
(~yMi[;). Thus, as Tigay notes, if the statement does indeed refer to God “it is a surprisingly universalistic 
statement for a poem about His protection of Israel.” Ibid., 320–21. LXX, here, represents people as 
singular. Christensen follows MT, “peoples.” Deuteronomy 21:10–34:12, 836. However, Merrill interprets 
it as love but restricts its object to Israel. Deuteronomy, 435. Notably, later in this chapter Benjamin is 
referred to as the “beloved [dydIy”] of the LORD” (Deut 33:12), “a term of endearment” Ibid., 440. 
545
 Consider also the universal intent of the covenant promises to Abraham; they were to bless all 
nations (Gen 12:3; 22:18; 26:4). Further, the Abrahamic covenant extends even to the slave who becomes 
circumcised as a condition of entrance into the covenant (Gen 17:14). “The reason for this choice must not 
be sought in Israel’s importance as a people, but in the unmerited love of God and in his fidelity to the 
promises (7:6–7). Yet, this choice does not limit God’s rule on earth to this small people, but comes within 
the framework of God’s plan for the whole world (10:14–15) and is the basis of the obedience and holiness 
required of Israel (10:15–16; 14:1–2). Israel’s choice is for the purpose of mission (note also Gen 12:1–3; 




have entered into such a relationship will be “insiders” while those who reject God’s overtures 
will remain outsiders and, eventually, forfeit God’s universal, foreconditional love.
546
 In 
microcosm, the covenant people are treated as objects of God’s insider love though the 
individuals within the covenant themselves may forfeit God’s love. 
God desires that his creatures reciprocate his love and thus enter into an intimate, 
particular love relationship with him. It should be remembered here and throughout the OT that, 
as shall be further explained in the coming chapters, human love toward God is itself predicated 
on God’s prior action. This is apparent in God’s proclamation to his people that he will 
“circumcise” their “heart . . . to love the LORD your God with all” their “heart” and “soul, so that 
[they] may live” (Deut 30:6).
547
 With this in mind, throughout the Torah, humans are repeatedly 
commanded to love God. In response to what God has done, the people should “love” him, 
“always keep His charge, His statutes, His ordinances, and His commandments” (Deut 11:1). 
That is, humans are to love God with all their “heart,” “soul,” and “might” (Deut 6:5). Elsewhere, 
the command to love God is similarly repeated: Humans are to love God with all their “heart” and 
“soul” (Deut 10:12; 11:13; 13:3 [4]; 30:6; Josh 22:5), “to fear” him” (Deut 10:12, 20; 13:3–4 [4–
5]), “walk in His ways” (Deut 10:12; 11:22; 19:9; 30:16; Josh 22:5), “serve” him (Deut 10:12; 
11:13; 13:3–4 [4–5]; Josh 22:5), and “hold fast” or “cling” (qbd) to him (Deut 10:20; 11:22; 13:4 
[5]; Josh 22:5; 30:20), to “keep” (Exod 20:6; Deut 5:10; 7:9; 11:1; 19:9; 30:16; Josh 22:5) and/or 
obey (Deut 11:13; 30:20) variously his voice, commandments, statutes, commandments, 
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 Notice the stark contrast between the lovers and haters of God (Exod 20:5–6; Deut 5:9–10; 
7:9–10). 
547
 That God does not do this unilaterally is implicit in the abundance of commands to love God 
throughout Deuteronomy and elsewhere. God makes love toward himself possible but does not unilaterally 
effect it. On the other hand, if God did unilaterally cause humans to love him, why not do so from the 
beginning and universally? Such a conception would run counter to the OT narrative where God 
consistently calls human beings to respond to him in love. Clements comments, “There is to be a strong 
reciprocal bond of affection and commitment between Israel and the LORD as God.” “The Book of 
Deuteronomy,” in Numbers–Samuel, 2:343. Though Weinfeld sees loyalty and obedience as the primary 
meaning of the love command, he notes that “love between God and Israel involves also affection and 




ordinances, and judgments. Likewise, the people are to “take diligent heed to [themselves] to 
love” God (Josh 23:11; cf. Deut 4:15).
548
 The people are similarly exhorted to “love the LORD” 
for he “preserves the faithful and fully recompenses the proud doer” (Ps 31:23 [24]). Importantly, 
God expects his people to love their fellow human beings: both neighbors (Lev 19:18) and aliens 
(Lev 19:34; Deut 10:18–19). 
Beyond the many commands of love toward God, evidencing God’s desire for a 
reciprocal love relationship, there are instances in which humans actually do love God. For 
example, those who love God and keep his commandments are those who are shown divine 
lovingkindness (Exod 20:6; Deut 5:10; cf. Deut 7:9). Conversely, God is “the faithful God, who 
keeps His covenant and His lovingkindness [dsx] to a thousandth generation with those who love 




The operation of this reciprocality is evidenced in a seminal statement regarding divine 
lovingkindness. The first is situated within the third commandment of the Decalogue, which 
prohibits idolatry. In his passion (anq) for this exclusive relationship, God will visit iniquity to the 
third and fourth generation of those who hate him, but divine dsx will be shown to the thousandth 
generations of those who love (bha) him and keep his commandments (Exod 20:5–6 = Deut 5:10; 
cf. Exod 34:7; Deut 7:9; Jer 32:18).
550
 Thus, God’s dsx far exceeds divine judgment; the 
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 Literally, they are to be “exceedingly watchful of their souls [inner person] to love” (Josh 
23:11). The mention of “soul” implies that this is to be a passionate love, since “soul” is often the seat of 
emotions. 
549
 God is faithful (!ma) and expects faithfulness. It might be said that divine love is thus faithfully 
seeking reciprocal faithfulness. Keown, Scalise, and Smothers point out that “God’s love . . . motivated the 
election of the people and their deliverance . . . and lovingkindness ‘for a thousand generations’ measures 
the LORD’s commitment to the covenant.” Jeremiah 26–52, 108. 
550
 This is not necessarily in contradiction to statements elsewhere that sons are not to be punished 
for the sins of their fathers (Deut 24:16; 2 Kgs 14:6; Ezek 18:20). Here, the consequences of iniquity 
appear to consist of those that are naturally passed down from generation to generation. It is a fact of life 
that the quality of a father’s life has significant impact, for good or for ill, on the lives of his progeny. 




consequences of the latter may extend to the fourth generation but dsx continues even unto the 
thousandth generation, though conditionally predicated on the human response of love for God.
551
 
Here lovingkindness is thus set within the context of a reciprocal relationship predicated partially 
on human love for God. In this, the importance of the divine-human relationship qua relationship 
is highlighted. God’s passion for this relationship may result in temporary chastening when 
appropriate, but ultimately divine blessings will overflow upon those who respond to God in love, 
in accordance with God’s character of steadfast love (dsx).  
Reciprocal Love in the Prophets 
Once again, in the Prophets, God does not love all equally. There is a universal divine 
love but also a love that is particular and intimate. As has been mentioned already, God wants to 
include all humans in an intimate love relationship with himself but this requires that humans 
freely reciprocate God’s love. A number of examples of “insider” love, that is, love that is 
specially directed toward an individual or a group (going beyond universal love), occur in the 
Prophets. As in the Torah, the special love that God has for his elect, covenant people is one 
                                                     
 
making it even easier to see how the consequences of a patriarch’s evils may severely affect his family. For 
a similar view, see Gowan, Theology in Exodus, 238. Likewise, Craigie further points out the 
intergenerational affects that would stem from children and grandchildren lacking the proper Torah 
instruction that “was essential to their life and well-being.” The Book of Deuteronomy, 154. Compare, the 
similar, but nuanced view of Sarna, Exodus, 110. Others think the verse actually refers to the subsequent 
generations that continue to practice the same sins of the fathers, who will thus face similar consequences. 
Thus, the phrase “of those who hate me.” Tigay, Deuteronomy, 66; Stuart, Exodus, 454. In any case, this is 
in striking contrast to the practically everlasting dsx promised to those who love God, the “thousands,” 
which Durham proposes, “might better be read ‘innumerable descendancy.’” Exodus, 287.  
551
 That is, “the Lord will faithfully reciprocate the devotion and obedience of the people.” Tigay, 
Deuteronomy, 67. There are a number of ANE parallels to this language. For instance, the first Ketef 
Hinnom silver plaque speaks of “the covenant-lover and fidelity to his lovers, and among those who keep.” 
See Propp, Exodus 19–40, 173. It also resembles language from the Sinuhe narrative, “God exalts the one 
who loves him.” See ibid., 19–40, 173. Based on these parallels, some have reduced love in Deuteronomy 
to legal obedience devoid of any tender emotion and many others have followed in viewing such language 
merely as technical treaty language. The seminal studies are Moran, “The Ancient,” 77–87; McCarthy, 
“Notes,” 145–46. However, this position is not compelling in light of the wider evidence throughout the 
Torah (and the rest of the canon) where tender emotion is apparent on both sides of the divine-human 
relationship. Numerous other reasons also suggest that the covenant background of bha in the Torah and 
elsewhere is not mutually exclusive to the concurrent presence of emotional affection. For a further 




example of “insider” love (cf. Mal 1:2). Further, God “loved” Solomon as an infant as well as 
later in his life (2 Sam 12:24; Neh 13:26; cf. 1 Kgs 10:9). Since elsewhere it is apparent that God 
loves all, this statement must refer to a particular kind of love, otherwise it would be superfluous. 
In another instance, the “LORD loves him” may refer to Cyrus, or to Israel in a collective 
singular (Isa 48:14). Either way it manifests God’s particular “insider” love. Abraham is also 
likely singled out, referred to as God’s friend (Isa 41:8; 2 Chr 20:7; cf. Deut 4:37).
552
 The benefits 
of such “insider” love appear when David describes his “reward” and “recompense” as a 
consequence of his own fidelity to God (2 Sam 22:21–25; cf. 1 Kgs 3:6), culminating in the 
refrain, “with the kind You show yourself kind, with the blameless You show Yourself 
blameless” (2 Sam 22:26; cf. 22:27).
553
 The ideal nature of bilaterality is also apparent when, at 
the dedication of the temple, Solomon refers to God’s “keeping covenant” and “lovingkindness” 
with those “servants who walk before [him] with all their heart” (1 Kgs 8:23).
554
 
As in the Torah, God consistently seeks a reciprocal love relationship with his people.
555
 
Those who are privy to an ongoing, particular, and intimate love relationship with God (thus 
                                                     
 
552
 Though the qal participle in both of these instances may only denote Abraham’s love toward 
God, it is clear elsewhere that God loved Abraham, not least of which in the numerous references to God’s 
love of the “fathers” (cf. Deut 4:37; 7:7–8; 10:15). Other potential instances of love for individuals also 
appear. 
553
 This “asserts the importance of righteousness and obedience to God’s covenant as moral 
qualities that God takes seriously. . . . The Lord does regard such qualities, and we are reassured that such 
values matter in the eyes of God.” Birch, “First and Second Samuel,” in Numbers–Samuel, 2:1367. 
However, it must be remembered that David himself was surely not perfect. Thus, significantly, “The Lord 
does not treat all people alike—to do so would demonstrate a moral indifference that is not found in the 
biblical view of God.” Bergen, 1, 2 Samuel, 458. Similarly, the promises to Solomon are themselves 
predicated on God’s “great lovingkindness” to David, which are themselves “according as he walked 
before [God]” faithfully (1 Kgs 3:6). As such, this special relationship with Solomon is grounded in both 
the great dsx of God and the prior faithfulness of David. Importantly, this relationship is not unilateral but 
Solomon is specifically said to have “loved” God, albeit imperfectly (1 Kgs 3:3).  
554
 Elsewhere, the explicit reciprocality of the divine-human relationship is apparent absent 
language of divine love when God states, “Those who honor Me I will honor, and those who despise Me 
will be lightly esteemed” (1 Sam 2:30). 
555
 Love is to be reciprocated. Notice, for instance, the assumption that bha ought to be 
reciprocated when David is chastised by Joab for “loving those who hate you” and “hating those who love 




“insiders”) are those who respond appropriately to God in love. Importantly, this particular and 
intimate love relationship is offered to all humans. Despite the revelatory emphasis on the 
particular covenant relationship of God with Israel, it is important to recognize that God’s love 
and care extends beyond the bounds of covenant unto all peoples, though not in an 
undifferentiated manner. For example, God’s grace, dsx, and compassion extend beyond the 
covenant people to Nineveh, much to the dismay of the reluctant prophet, Jonah (Jonah 4:2, 
11).
556
 Further, the prophets refer to the universal purpose of the Abrahamic covenant, blessing to 
the nations, in a number of instances (Isa 42:1; Jer 4:2). Moreover, the covenant blessings are 
available to foreigners who join themselves to God and keep it (Isa 56:4–8).
557
 According to Jer 
12:15–17, even the foreign lands may receive compassion in the wake of judgment, if they will 
respond to God appropriately.
558
 In a real, but limited, sense divine fatherhood is universal since 
he is the creator of all (Mal 2:10). Indeed, God ultimately looks toward a gathering of the nations 
                                                     
 
“blessed of the LORD because” of the dsx they showed in burying Saul (2 Sam 2:5–6). 
556
 God even has compassion [swx] for the animals (Jonah 4:10–11). Blank comments, “Man’s 
troubles are matched and dwarfed by God’s own hurt.” Blank, “‘Doest Thou,’” 36. Other instances show 
that God was interested in other nations as well (cf. Jer 32:19; 33:9; Amos 9:7, 12). Divine dsx to foreigners 
also appears in Ruth 1:8; 2 Sam 15:20. 
557
 Although some have sought to relegate such universal implications to a minority opinion of 
“Second Isaiah, the passages that are usually quoted as examples of narrow Jewish exclusivism (Ezek. 
44:6–9; Ezra 4:1–3) are not aimed at the kind of people being talked about here. What Ezekiel and Ezra 
were alarmed about is the same thing Isaiah is alarmed about in 57:3–13 and later: pagans . . . who are 
either open in their unbelief or are masquerading as believers. . . . Isa. 56:1–8 says nothing against that kind 
of exclusivism, and 57:3–13 and 65:1–7 actively support it.” Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66, 
457.  
558
 God promises to “have compassion on” the peoples and “bring them back” each to their land 
and then “if they will really” learn the ways of his people they will be built up, but the alternative is 
destruction (Jer 12:15–17). Here, compassion appears prior to conditions but along with conditions for its 
continuance, providing a probationary opportunity for the nations to turn toward God. “The text betrays a 
powerful universalistic impulse. The Lord invites and welcomes all the ‘neighbors’ into the community of 
faith that is constituted by Israel. The invitation is real.” Miller, “The Book of Jeremiah,” in Isaiah–Ezekiel, 
6:680. “This is an extraordinary statement, nothing less than a conditional, Sinai-type covenant offered to 
the Gentiles. Yahweh’s compassion is not conditional upon them learning his peoples’ ways, but conditions 
will come afterward. Verse 17 tells us what will happen if these conditions are not met.” Lundbom, 
Jeremiah 1–20, 663; cf. Thompson, The Book of Jeremiah, 362. Huey adds, “The verses teach the freedom 
of choice with which God has endowed the human race. We are free to accept his lordship and be blessed 




to himself (Isa 66:18–22; Hos 14:5–7 [6–8]; Zeph 3:8–9; Zech 2:11).
559
 However, only those who 
appropriately respond to God actually enjoy the intimate, particular divine-human love 
relationship.  
The reality of reciprocal human love toward God, in response to his love, also appears in 
the Prophets. A particularly clear, indicative example is God’s love for Solomon (2 Sam 12:24; 
cf. Neh 13:26) and the fact that “Solomon loved the LORD, walking in the statutes of his father” 
(1 Kgs 3:3).
560
 Elsewhere, Abraham is the “friend,” literally the “lover” (ybih]a), of God (Isa 41:8; 2 
Chr 20:7). Further, Judges differentiates between the “lovers” (bha) and “haters” (bya) of God; the 
former will be blessed, the latter cursed (Judg 5:31). Elsewhere, God remembers the “love of” 
Israel’s “betrothals,” in parallel to “the devotion [dsx] of [her] youth” and her “following after 
[God] in the wilderness” (Jer 2:2).
561
 In another context, God is entreated to “let those who love 
Him be like the rising of the sun in its might” (Judg 5:31). In a number of instances, love for God 
is indirectly stated, via love for a hypostatization of God. For instance, covenant blessings are 
prescribed to those, even foreigners, who “love the name of the LORD” (Isa 56:6).
562
 As such, 
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 Notably, in Zech 2:11 God even declares that “many nations will be joined with” him and 
“become my people” and he “will dwell in [their] midst.” This is just after a statement of re-election (Zech 
2:12 [16]) and is also strikingly reminiscent of divine language of covenant-making, “I will take you for 
My people, and I will be your God” (Exod 6:7; cf. Lev 26:12; Jer 7:23; 11:4 24:7; 30:22; 32:38; Ezek 
11:20; 37:23; Zech 8:8; 13:9). 
560
 Notably, Solomon is still sacrificing at the high places, which makes his love for God 
imperfect. As such, love does not assume perfection. In the following verse, God declares that Solomon is 
to be called “Jedidiah” (Hy”d>ydIy>), meaning beloved of the Lord (2 Sam 12:25). 
561
 Stoebe mentions that as in Jer 2:2, “Deut 7:8 also presupposes God’s love; indeed, in 
distinction from Hos, ‘hb “to love” seems to have become an equivalent for ḥesed, even in reference to 
human love for God. One could ask whether the formula “to love with all your heart, etc.” (e.g., Deut 6:5; 
10:12; 11:13; 13:4; 30:6) means to express the unreserved devotion implied by ḥesed.” Stoebe, TLOT 
1:634. It is perhaps significant that human love toward God is quite prominent in Deuteronomy but 
altogether absent in Hosea, whereas human dsx toward God is well-represented in Hosea but altogether 
absent in Deuteronomy. 
562
 Further, a psalmist loves the divine “name” (Ps 5:11 [12]). The inheritance is for “all those who 
love His name” (Ps 69:36 [37]). God is gracious to “those who love Your name” (Ps 119:132). Love is also 
variously directed at God’s house (Ps 26:8), his salvation (Pss 40:16 [17]; 70:4 [5]), his commandments (Ps 
119:47–48, 127), law (Ps 119:97, 113, 163, 165), testimonies (Ps 119:119, 167), word (Ps 119:140), 




humans may reciprocate God’s love and thus enter into and/or maintain an intimate and particular 
love relationship with him.
563
 
However, God’s people may also forfeit God’s love by scorning his overtures. This 
repeatedly took place in the history of Israel and Judah. Hosea the prophet was called to act out 
this relationship in his life, by marrying an adulterous woman as a metaphor of the “love” God 
has for apostate Israel (Hos 3:1).
564
 God is here presented as a wounded lover, a scorned God of 
compassion, the victim of unrequited love.
565
 Throughout Hosea there seems to be both 
permanent and transient elements to divine love. God “finds” Israel in the wilderness, yet they 
                                                     
 
the avoidance of pointing human bha toward God due to its prevalent (perhaps original) function in human 
sexuality. Els, NIDOTTE 1:289; cf. Jenni, TLOT 1:45–54. 
563
 On the other hand, human bha is commonly misdirected, often describing Israel and/or Judah’s 
infidelity and spiritual harlotry (Isa 57:8; Jer 2:25, 33; 5:31; 8:2; 14:10). It is thus used in reference to 
Judah’s many “lovers” (Jer 22:20, 22; 30:14; Ezek 16:33, 36–37; 23:22; Lam 1:19). Thompson suggests 
this language has significant connotations of a suzerain-vassal relationship between the people and her 
“lovers” based on ANE parallels and that in such instance “lover” may mean ally. “Israel’s ‘Lovers.’” 
However, Ackerman points out that the simultaneous usage of the marriage metaphor and Judah’s adultery 
requires this passage to also be seen “as dependent upon an understanding of love rooted in the language of 
interpersonal relationship.” “The Personal,” 448. Cf. Jer 2:33–3:5. Hosea also makes reference to the 
abundance of spiritual adultery and Israel’s “lovers” (Hos 2:5 [H 2:7]; 2:7 [2:9]; 2:10 [2:12]; 2:12–13 
[2:14–15]; 3:1; 8:9; 10:11). Such misdirected love causes non-acceptance with God and remembrance of 
the people’s sin.  
564
 It is not certain whether “again” refers to God’s statement, thus “the LORD said to me again,” 
or to the command, thus go “again love.” Scholars disagree regarding the identity of the adulteress “woman 
[hV'ai].” Three main views appear: (1) it is another woman, distinct from the one in chapter 1, so Stuart, 
Hosea-Jonah, 64. (2) It is the same woman, whom Hosea had since divorced. (3) It is the same woman to 
whom Hosea remains married, though she is unfaithful, so Andersen and Freedman, Hosea, 295. It does not 
appear that the reference could be to a different married woman, lest Hosea himself be commanded here to 
commit adultery; cf. Garrett, Hosea, Joel, 99. Thus, the reference must be to the same woman of chapter 1, 
whom Hosea appears to have divorced yet with whom he is to seek reconciliation. See the earlier 
discussion regarding Hos 1:6–7. Regardless of the particular historical reference, however, the texts clearly 
point to God’s continued seeking of a mutual relationship with his people. Notice the wide range of “love” 
in this passage. It characterizes the emotion of God, symbolized by that Hosea is to display toward his wife, 
yet the people are “loved” by another, a reference to her adultery, and “loves” raisin cakes, apparently a 
reference to idolatry. Stuart notes the contrast between God’s virtuous love and that of Israel. Hosea-Jonah, 
65. Here again, it must be remembered that the term bha itself does not shed light on the kind, or quality, of 
love. 
565
 “Yahweh loves Israel—to whom he is married—in spite of the fact that Israel loves other gods. 
Hosea is to love his wife the way Yahweh loves Israel. This close comparison between God’s love for his 
people and a man’s love for his wife sums up the story of Hosea’s marriage.” Andersen and Freedman, 
Hosea, 297. This is a passionate love, as Yee states: Love here “characterizes both the profound emotion of 




come to love Baal (Hos 9:10) and become so evil that God “came to hate [anEf'] them there” and 
declares, “I will love them no more” (~t'êb'h]a; ‘@seAa al{) (Hos 9:15).566 Nevertheless, the interruption 
of divine love does not amount to a total rejection. Rather, God continues to work with his 
people, and he promises chastising (rsy) when it is his desire (hW"a;) (Hos 10:10). A similar pattern 
is recapitulated in Hos 11, even more poignantly. God declares his profound “love” (bha) for 
youthful Israel, whom he called “My child” (Hos 11:1). Such love was manifested in that he 
“taught” them to “walk” and “took them in [his] arms” though they did not recognize him (Hos 
11:3). God goes on to depict Israel as a beast whom he “led . . . with the cords of a man, with 
bonds of love” (Hos 11:4), but they “refused to return” and for this reason they are to be given 
over to Assyrian rule (cf. Hos 11:7).
567
 But this divine judgment deeply grieves God, who 
expresses his anguish: “How can I give you up, O Ephraim? How can I surrender you, O Israel? 
How can I make you like Admah? How can I treat you like Zeboiim?” My heart is turned over 
within Me, All My compassions are kindled” (Hos 11:8).
568
 Once again, the magnitude of God’s 
unrequited love is manifested here in divine suffering when the deserved consequences of Israel’s 
action must be meted out. God then proclaims that he will “not execute My fierce anger” for “I 
                                                     
 
566
 As Wallis puts it, Israel’s adultery “provoked her husband to wrath. His love changed to 
antipathy. He divorces his wife.” TDOT 1:113–14. As Eichrodt puts it, “Love has turned into a hate that 
knows neither compassion nor mercy.” Theology, 253. Though he believes, anticipating what comes 
hereafter, that it “is still the love that woos the nation and suffers as a result of their rejection, not a cold, 
calculating requital, sealing Israel's fate. This means that it is still possible to hope for the greatest of all 
mercies, that even the rejected nation may escape the destiny of judgment, if only they can find it in them 
to say ‘Yes’ to God's proposal.” Ibid., 253–54. The animosity is apparent, despite the interpretations of 
some that this is merely language of covenant rejection. For instance, Stuart claims, “Personal emotions are 
beside the point. The wrath of the covenant God is the predominating issue.” Hosea-Jonah, 153; cf. 
Lohfink, “Hate and Love,” 417. Yet, this presumes that wrath is not an emotion and reduces hate to merely 
technical covenant language. However, the wider context of Hosea points to deep and profound divine 
emotionality. See also the discussion of divine hatred in the word study of anf earlier. 
567
 See the discussion of Hos 11 earlier in this chapter. 
568
 This is the strongest emotive language of love. See the discussion of the emotionality of love 




am God and not man, the Holy One in your midst, And I will not come in wrath” (Hos 11:9).
569
 
The possibility of the rupture of God’s relationship with his people is painful to God, even if it is 
impermanent. Israel was given over to Assyrian destruction that was complete by 722 B.C., 
showing that divine judgment is not altogether removed by divine mercy, but there is a hope for 
future (eschatological) restoration (see Hos 14:4 [5] below).
570
 
Future restoration of the divine-human covenant love relationship is partially dependent 
upon the requirement that Israel turn from idolatry and return to God, in order to receive the full 
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 Despite the language of parental imagery, God is well within his rights to destroy Israel (cf. 
Deut 21:18–21). The Hebrew, however, is once again difficult to interpret. A number of 
interpretive/translation issues arise. First, it is not clear whether God is stating that the fullness of his anger 
will not be poured out (i.e., utter destruction), or whether the idiom “again” (bwv) means it will not be 
poured out after the destruction of Samaria, or whether he looks forward to an eschatological situation 
where his anger is no longer necessary. Another option is also available: Andersen and Freedmen translate 
by viewing al{ as asseverative rather than negative. Thus God is pouring out his anger, even though it is 
agonizing for him to do so. Thus, “How can I give you up, Ephraim? How can I relinquish you, Israel? 
How can I make you like Admah? How can I deal with you like Zeboiim? My mind is turning over inside 
me. My emotions are agitated all together. I will certainly act out my burning anger. I will certainly come 
back to destroy Ephraim. For I am a god and not a human. I, the Holy One, will certainly come into the 
midst of your city.” Hosea, 574; cf. Lam 3. The meaning of the statement “I am God, and not man” is also 
unclear since it could mean that he is unlike humans in not allowing his emotions to cloud his judgment, or 
that unlike humans he is free to follow his emotions that are always righteous; cf. Andersen and Freedman, 
Hosea, 589. Even if the former position is taken it still begs the question: Which emotion is overcome, his 
love and compassion (Hos 11:8) or his anger and wrath (Hos 11:9)? Some scholars posit that the ultimate 
end of God’s love is an impossibility, though he could give them over to “terrible suffering.” Garrett, 
Hosea, Joel, 62. Perhaps it conveys that God, despite the magnitude of emotion, is not determined by that 
emotion and though extremely angry will not act as a human being would (i.e., total eradication). On the 
other hand, Andersen and Freedmen posit, with reference to Deut 1:17 and the divine self-declaration of 
holiness, that “if Yahweh were to give special consideration to Ephraim, he would be acting in a human 
way. This course he spurns.” Hosea, 589. In this view, restoration comes only after total destruction, that is, 
resurrection. Ibid., 197; cf. Num 23:19; 1 Sam 15:29; Exod 34:6–7. Garrett, on the other hand suggests that 
the entire passage is patterned after the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah but that here God will not 
carry out his full fury as he did then. Ephraim will be punished but “not suffer the total, irreversible 
annihilation that Sodom experienced.” Garrett, Hosea, Joel, 228. Further, he translates the final clause ry[iB. 
aAba' al{w>, “I shall not enter the city” rather than “I will not come in wrath” and believes this refers to God’s 
mercy. Specifically, God being holy would utterly eradicate Israel if he entered the city and “saw” their sins 
as he did Gomorrah. Ibid., 228–29. Numerous options are plausible. However, regardless of the option that 
is taken, the clear import for the divine-human relationship is that God desires to not mete out judgment 
against Israel and is here agonizing over the situation. Historically, judgment did fall on Samaria yet God 
looked forward to a time of restoration (cf. Hos 14:4 [5]). 
570
 Thus, Stuart appears to be correct when he states, “This is not a promise of mercy for those 
alive in Hosea’s day, but for their descendants, the remnant that will follow. To righteous followers of the 
covenant, those who heeded Hosea’s message, it would nevertheless be a source of great encouragement.” 




measure of divine beneficence and mercy. If they will but return, God will “heal their apostasy” 
and “love them freely,”
571
 his anger will be “turned away” and blessings will result (Hos 14:1–4 
[2–5]).
572
 Thus, God wants to bestow his love upon the people, but conditions remain for Israel to 
receive divine love within a sustainable relationship. Divine love is voluntary, yet also contingent 
upon relationship. Ultimately, God looks forward to the day when he will “exult” over a remnant 
with joy, “be quiet in His love,” and “rejoice” over them “with shouts of joy” (Zeph 3:17).
573
 
Throughout the descriptions of divine love in the prophets, God’s love is emotive, within a give-
and-take relationship, and also evaluative, delighting in justice and human faithfulness. As such, 
the particular, intimate, reciprocal love that God desires with human beings is not unilaterally 
effected by him. Rather, he initiates and makes all provisions for such a relationship but it is 
nevertheless conditional upon human response (i.e., foreconditional).  
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 “The theme of God loving this people in spite of their disloyalty reiterates the passionate, 
tender emotions that Yahweh/husband expressed to his repentant wife (2:19–20; 3:1).” Yee, “The Book of 
Hosea,” in The Twelve Prophets, 7:295. Andersen and Freedman render, “I will love them generously.” 
Hosea, 646. Stuart sees this in the sense of an unearned or “voluntary offering” or “offering made out of 
generosity” such that “Yahweh’s love will again give blessing to his people.” In his view, “Yahweh’s anger 
will be appeased (cf. 11:9) only by his own grace (cf. 2:16, 17 [14, 15]). Israel remains as undeserving of 
this merciful forgiveness as she was of her initial election. She will, in the eschaton, receive the blessing of 
being made faithful (restoration blessing type 3; cf. Deut 30:6).”
 
Stuart, Hosea-Jonah, 214–15. Perhaps the 
sense is that God will be free to love them in all his fullness once the relationship is restored and his anger 
is assuaged; cf. Garrett, Hosea, Joel, 273–74. Notably, “healing is promised for the repentant nation in the 
future, whereas no healing was possible in the past.” Hosea-Jonah, 214. Thus, Yahweh will renew their 
adoption.  
572
 Eichrodt thinks that Hosea’s depiction, which he elsewhere considered the deepest and most 
advanced, nevertheless is “utterly impossible to rationalize it into a dogmatic statement about the nature of 
God” where the “most appalling outbursts of anger and the expressions of favour toward the new Israel—‘I 
will love them no more’ (9.15) and ‘I will love them freely’ (14.4)—are allowed to stand side by side with 
no attempt at reconciliation, signifying that on the basis of the prophetic faith at any rate there is no method 
of reconciling them. The only answer is to flee from the wrathful to the loving God.” Eichrodt, Theology, 
253. Thus, he believes that “it can only be understood as the product of faith, breaking through the opus 
alienum of the divine wrath, to the vision of love as the ultimate and decisive power.” Ibid.  
573
 See the discussion of this beautiful passage above. Notice the implication that the object is a 




Reciprocal Love in the Writings 
The conception of the universality and particularity of divine love within the context of 
God’s profound desire for a reciprocal love relationship with human beings is further depicted in 
the Writings, as it was in the Torah and Prophets. Notice the many explicit examples of the ideal 
reciprocal nature of love. For example, consider the exclamation, “May they prosper who love 
you [human]” (Ps 122:6). Personified wisdom even proclaims, “I love those who love Me” (Prov 
8:17).
574
 On the other hand, those who hate God ought not to be loved (2 Chr 19:2).
575
 Further, it 
is prayed that God continue lovingkindness to those who “know” God and his righteousness to 
those who are “upright in heart” (Ps 36:10; cf. Ruth 1:8). On the other hand, it is prayed that no 
lovingkindness be extended to the evil one, “because he did not remember to show 
lovingkindness” (Ps 109:12, 16). Thus, love often assumes relationality that includes proper 
regard and the expectation of reciprocality. 
In such passages the concept of “insider” love, that preferential (and often evaluative) 
love discussed earlier, appears once again. Yet, while divine love most often appears within the 
covenant relationship, and thus within an “insider” relationship, in a number of instances it is 
clear that God’s love extends far beyond the covenant community, indeed even to all humans. 
Thus, divine lovingkindness (dsx) is said to fill the earth (Pss 33:5; 119:64; cf. 36:7 [8]; 100:5; 
                                                     
 
574
 Fox comments, “Behind the concept of mutual love of wisdom and humanity may lie the theme 
of reciprocal divine-human love. While the theme of mutually divine-human love is biblical (especially 
prominent in Deuteronomy), the formula of reciprocal love is not (though some statements come very 
close). There are, however, strong Egyptian parallels. Kayatz (1966:98–102) quotes the formulas on heart 
scarabs, such as ‘Khonsu loves him who loves him’; ‘Isis loves the one who loves her.’ Kayatz believes 
that the qualities of loving and being loved are particularly characteristic of Ma’at, the goddess of justice 
and truth (see pp. 335f). This reciprocality formula, however, is used of a variety of deities.” Fox, Proverbs 
1–9, 276. Waltke adds, “Similar statements are made about one’s relation to God (e.g., ‘those who honor 
me I will honor, but those who despise me I will disdain,’ 1 Sam. 2:30; cf. 2 Sam. 22:26 [= Ps. 
18:26(27)]).” There are also “parallels in the Egyptian wisdom literature. ‘Ptah loves all those who love 
him and who ask him.’” Waltke, The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1:1–15:29, 404. 
575
 Notice, also, in numerous texts it is assumed that bha ought to be reciprocated, since it is 
lamented when love is repaid with hatred (Ps 109:4–5), or when Job’s loved ones have turned against him 





117:1–2; 119:64; 136:4–9; Ruth 1:8).
576
 God “is good to all, His mercies [~ymix]r;] are over all His 
works” (Ps 145:9; cf. 8, 10, 17).
577
 Further, God satisfies the desires of humans, indeed “every 
living thing” (Ps 145:16). Yet, in an apparently special sense, he “will fulfill the desire of those 
who fear Him” (Ps 145:19; cf. 65:2, 4 [3, 5]).
578
 Accordingly, God desires an intimate, particular 
relationship with all his creatures.
579
 However, although such a divine love relationship is 
available to all, it is not unilaterally bestowed on everyone in an undifferentiated manner (cf. Ps 
145:20). Rather, such an intimate, particular love relationship is only effective when humans 




That there is special divine love reserved for some seems apparent from the numerous 
instances that persons or groups are specified by terms of divine endearment. For instance, God’s 
“beloved” (dydIy") is the object of his blessing (Ps 127:2). As God’s “beloved” (dydIy") humans cry out 
                                                     
 
576
 Naomi calls for God to show dsx to Ruth and Orpah, non-Israelites (Ruth 1:8; cf. 2 Sam 15:20).  
577
 While bha has been seen to go beyond the covenant in earlier sections of the OT, there is no 
explicit mention of that facet of bha specifically in the Writings. On the universality of divine dsx see 
Sakenfeld, “Love in the OT,” 4:379; ibid., 127; Larue, “Recent Studies in Hesed,” 4. On the other hand, 
Clark thinks (incorrectly, I believe) that dsx is restricted to God’s covenant people. The Word Hesed, 145. 
578
 The one who is blessed is the one whom God chooses (rxb) and “bring[s] near” (brq) (Ps 65:4 
[5]). Notably, however, just previously it is stated, “to You all men come” (Ps 65:2 [3]). Tate comments, 
“The request in v 5 seems to support the interpretation that the worshiping community is intended here; all 
those who are acceptable in the worship of Yahweh, and potentially every Israelite—and if v 3b has a 
universal expectation, every human being who comes to Yahweh.” Psalms 51–100, 141–42. 
579
 This will become even clearer by way of the NT data. 
580
 Notice again the statement toward God: “with the kind [dysix'] You show Yourself kind [dsx]” 
(Ps 18:25 [26] = 2 Sam 22:26). Elsewhere, the dysx are to love God (Ps 31:23 [24]) and, likewise, God 
loves justice and does not forsake his dysx (Ps 37:28). Again, God preserves his ~ydysx, those who love him 
and hate evil (Ps 97:10). That is, “the fervent love of the godly man God requites with confiding love, the 
entire submission of the upright with a full measure of grace. . . . God’s conduct to man is the reflection of 
the relation in which man has placed himself to God; cf. 1 Sam. 2:30; 15:23.” Keil and Delitzsch, 
Commentary, 5:163. Interestingly with regard to “insider love” dysx sometimes seems to refer to Israel as a 
whole (Pss 148:14; 149:1) but in other instances it seems to connote a more restricted group of “the faithful 




to God, seeking deliverance (Ps 108:6 [7]; cf. 60:5; 84:1–2).
581
 God is said to love (bha) “the 
gates of Zion more than all the other dwelling places of Jacob” (Ps 87:2).
582
 Daniel is told by the 
angel who has come to enlighten him that he is “greatly beloved” or “esteemed.” Further 
preference seems apparent in that God loves “Jacob” (corporate Israel) and chooses Jacob’s 
inheritance (Ps 47:4 [5]). Solomon’s kingship is predicated on God’s love for his people (2 Chr 
2:11; 9:8). Further, Solomon himself is declared to have been “loved by God” (Neh 13:26).
583
 
The bestowal of land “forever” is spoken of as predicated on “Abraham [God’s] friend” (ßb.h;ao)  (2 
Chr 20:7). God’s love thus manifests particularity and preference and, accordingly, God 
manifests special concern for those whom he loves.  
A number of other examples of “insider” love appear in this corpus as well. For example, 
God loved Solomon (Neh 13:26), God loves the righteous (Ps 146:8), the one whom he 
disciplines (Prov 3:12), and the pursuer of justice (Prov 15:9). Thus, it is apparent that God does 
not love all equally. Indeed, God reserves special love for those who respond appropriately to 
him. Thus, Daniel and Nehemiah repeat the theme that God “keeps covenant and lovingkindness 
for those who love him and keep His commandments” (Dan 9:4; Neh 1:5; cf. 13:14, 22).
584
 
                                                     
 
581
 As Tate puts it, “God is reminded that these are ‘those dear to you’ (‘beloved ones’) and ‘those 
who fear you’ (v 6). The powerful action of the divine right hand is needed for deliverance (see Pss 17:7; 
18:36; 44:5 [4]; 74:11; 138:7; etc.). God is implored to respond, ‘Answer us!’ Psalms 51–100, 106. The 
term dydIy likewise appears with divine agency in the statement, “God’s dwelling places are ‘lovely’” (dydIy”) 
(Ps 84:1–2). Elsewhere, the psalmist asks God to keep him as the “apple of the eye” (Ps 17:8). Job also 
refers to the past friendship (dAs) of God (Job 29:4). There is some disagreement, however, on the precise 
meaning of dAs in this context. 
582
 Interestingly, Tate reads this with regard to God’s universal purpose. In his view, this “is a 
declaration of God’s intention to make Zion the spiritual metropolis of the world.” Psalms 51–100, 392. 
583
 Interestingly, Nehemiah presents Solomon as peerless: “Among many nations was there no 
king like him. . . . Nevertheless, the foreign women caused even him to sin” (Neh 13:26). Clearly, God’s 
love is not reserved only for perfect people.  
584
 Of course, this hearkens back to the covenant language, especially that of Deuteronomy. 
Breneman comments, “‘with those who love him and obey his commands’ shows that covenant love or 
loyalty was to be reciprocal.” Ezra, 171–72. F. Charles Fensham adds, “Love and keeping of the law are 
thus the two pillars on which the covenant rests.” The Books of Ezra and Nehemiah (NICOT; Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1982), 154–55. “The Lord does indeed make good on his covenant promises and 




Moreover, God “keeps all who love Him” while the wicked are destroyed (Ps 145:20; cf. 70:4 
[5]). Again, he “loves justice” and does not “forsake His godly ones” (dysix') whereas others are cut 
off (Ps 37:28; cf. 99:4, 8). On the other hand, God “hates” (anf) those who do evil, destroys those 
who speak falsehood, and “abhors [b[t] the man of bloodshed and deceit” (Ps 5:4–6 [5–7]; cf. 
106:40). God’s “soul” (vp,n<) hates (anf) the one who “loves” (bha) violence (Ps 11:5).585 Thus, 
there are clear instances of particular love that does not extend to all. God does not love all 
equally. Yet, this is not due to arbitrariness on God’s part. On the contrary, God is responsive to 
human devotion toward him (or the lack thereof), specifically wholehearted devotion. He “keeps” 
the covenant and lovingkindness to those who “walk before You with all their heart” (2 Chr 6:14; 
cf. Deut 7:9). 
In such instances, God’s particular love for those responsive to him is manifest as well as 
a number of examples of human love toward God. Other examples of human love toward God 
also appear. For example, the psalmist states, “I love [~xr] You, O LORD, my strength” (Ps 18:1 
[2]). Elsewhere, the psalmist “love[s] the LORD, because” God hears him (Ps 116:1).
586
 Those 
who “love the LORD” should hate evil (Ps 97:10). Those who “love” God’s salvation are those 
who “seek” God (Ps 40:16 [17]; cf. Pss 5:11 [12]; 70:4[5]). Likewise, God states that he will 
deliver someone, “because He has loved [qvx] Me,” that is, “known My name” (Ps 91:14). 587 
                                                     
 
13:22, Nehemiah recalls, “I commanded the Levites that they should purify themselves and come as 
gatekeepers to sanctify the sabbath day. For this also remember me” (Neh 13:22). Sakenfeld comments, 
“Humanly considered, Nehemiah implies that some piety engenders a better possibility for an ongoing 
relationship with God than does none at all.” The Meaning of Hesed, 165. Fensham adds, “It is clear, 
however, that Nehemiah besought the Lord to give special attention to what he did. He wanted to receive 
through his deeds the love of God.” The Books, 265. 
585
 See the discussion of the emotive nature of these statements earlier in this chapter. 
586
 Notably, this depicts love motived by, and grounded in, God’s care. According to Els, “the 
interior depths of this love is emphasized by the use of ~xr (18:1) and qvx (91:14).” NIDOTTE 1:286.  
587
 This term qvx is used of God’s love for Israel (Deut 7:7; 10:15), but nowhere else of a human’s 
love for God. Notice similar reciprocality, absent explicit language of love, elsewhere. God declares, “You 
have forsaken Me, so I also have forsaken [bz[] you to Shishak” (2 Chr 12:2, 5). “The formula ‘you have 




Elsewhere, humans are called upon to love God (Ps 31:23 [24] and repeated reference is made to 
those who love God’s name (Pss 69:36 [37]; 119:132; cf. 119:159, 163), an indirect reference to 
loving God himself.
 
Within the Writings, then, divine love and lovingkindness once again present 
a God who is intensely interested in his creation and enters into a give-and-take relationship with 
human beings. He wants to love all intimately but, sadly, some reject God’s love.
 
Conclusion 
God’s love in the OT takes many forms and displays many aspects. It is the ground of 
divine-human relationship itself, the explicit cause of election, covenant, and blessing, and the 
basis of God’s steadfast, tender affection and concern that is manifested in God’s blessings, 
discipline, and the overall maintenance of the divine-human relationship. Such divine love is 
volitionally free and not the product of necessity; the basis of election, and consequently, of the 
covenant relationship itself. While God’s will to love is primary and original, the divine-human 
relationship assumed in the OT is one of relational responsiveness, often within covenant, but 
also depicted in complementary, kinship metaphors such as the parent-child and marriage 
metaphors, both of which connote the voluntary and affectionate nature of the divine-human love 
relationship. Divine love is also manifested in evaluation. God may be pleased with human 
dispositions and/or actions, take pleasure, and even delight in his people when appropriate or, 
conversely, be displeased and provoked by evil.  
Closely related to such evaluation, divine love is also emotive, and the plethora of God’s 
emotions that revolve around the divine-human relationship point toward divine passibility. 
Because of his profound love for his people, God is concerned, affected, grieved, vexed, and 
angered at evil, and out of his intense desire to receive the undiluted love and fidelity of his 
people God becomes impassioned (anq) at their unfaithfulness and spiritual adultery. Such passion 
                                                     
 
1 Chr 28:9; 2 Chr 15:2; 24:20.” Dillard, 100. Similarly, “the LORD is with you when you are with Him. 




may be manifest in anger toward their infidelity, or restoration when others have oppressed them. 
In response to infidelity, God disciplines his people, again out of his love for them with the hope 
of ultimate reclamation. Moreover, God responds repeatedly to heartfelt entreaty and is willing to 
relent of discipline and return in his compassion and graciousness, which far exceed his wrath. 
God’s compassion even exceeds that of a mother for her newborn; he is exceedingly 
longsuffering. However, God consistently expects appropriate responsiveness from his people, 
willing to forgive, but not to the exclusion of justice.  
Accordingly, divine love is also foreconditional—bestowed prior to, but not exclusive of, 
conditions. God’s love, as well as the frequent beneficent actions that flow therefrom, is 
unmerited, but not altogether unconditional. God is the sole initiator, and at times the sole 
preserver, of the divine-human love relationship. His love endures beyond all reasonable 
expectations. Yet, the endurance of the relationship in particular is contingent upon appropriate 
human response, itself enabled by God’s own prevenient action. 
Altogether, then, divine love for humans in the OT is voluntary and unnecessary to God 
himself, yet evaluative and not wholly arbitrary; differential and preferential, yet not altogether 
exclusive; intensely emotional (compassionate, affected, caring, joyful, even jealous), yet also 
committal, foreconditional, and unmerited, yet not unconditional, and expectant of the 
appropriate human response of reciprocal love, faithfully seeking reciprocal faithfulness but often 
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A CANONICAL SURVEY OF DIVINE 
 
LOVE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT 
Divine love in the NT builds on the facets of love discovered already in the OT. Just as 
the previous chapter, this chapter will present a canonical survey of the prominent themes that 
illuminate the many facets of divine love in the God-world relationship. Of course, due to the 
overwhelming amount of data, this survey is necessarily selective in its presentation. The 
investigative process consisted of a broad reading of the entire NT that analyzed any texts and/or 
passages that might contribute to potential answers to the systematic questions raised in chapters 
2 and 3, which revolve around the question of whether divine love is unilateral or whether God 
and humans may share a reciprocal (though unequal) relationship of love. 
Relative to this broad issue, five questions have been identified as standing at the center 
of the conflict of interpretations, seen in chapter 3. First, is God the sole giver but never the 
receiver? In other words, is divine love only arbitrarily willed, pure beneficence (thematic agape) 
or may it include desire or enjoyment (thematic eros)? Second, does God only bestow and/or 
create value or might he also appraise, appreciate, and receive value? Third, does God’s love 
include affection and/or emotionality such that God is concerned for the world, sympathetically 
or otherwise? Fourth, does God choose to fully love only some, or does he choose to love all, or 
is he essentially related to all such that he necessarily loves all? Fifth, bound up with this is the 





 With such questions in mind, the investigation of the data was conducted by way of a 
final-form canonical approach, which concentrates on interpretation of the text(s) in canonical 
context.
1
 Accordingly, the focus is upon the theological interpretation of Scripture, in accordance 
with the canonical approach to systematic theology explained in chapter 1. The inductive reading 
of the NT sought to identify all data that might provide answers to the systematic questions raised 
by the theological conflict of interpretations over the meaning of divine love.
2
 The data extracted 
from this reading were then analyzed and organized according to three sections of the NT canon 
in an ongoing spiral, which included both narrowing and expansion of the data when themes 
became more or less significant than originally thought.
3
 Within this process, a number of 
prominent terms that hold significant implications for potential answers to the systematic 
questions became apparent. These were investigated and are presented from the standpoint of a 
synchronic-canonical approach. Here the inherent limitations of semantic studies with regard to 
systematic investigation are recognized, especially the fact that meanings of words vary 
depending upon their context and usage. Accordingly, it is not the intention of these semantic 
surveys to reduce the terms to simple definitions, nor to assume that a nuance of meaning in one 
location can be extrapolated to all other occurrences of a given term. Rather, such surveys seek to 
identify and summarize the basic meaning denoted by word groups as well as the polysemy and 
the multivalency of their semantic range and usage within the canon in order to provide the 
crucial background for engaging the wider canonical themes regarding divine love. 
While the NT data were investigated inductively, this chapter will survey the data 
deductively by grouping the pertinent content under five rubrics that respond to the systematic 
                                                     
 
1
 This entails that many of the issues of historical criticism are not appropriate to this study, and 
thus do not receive significant treatment. This is especially true of source and tradition criticism. 
2
 See the summary of these issues in the five questions above. 
3
 While it is likely that, despite great care, some information has been overlooked, it is hoped that 
the data presented here will provide significant insight for ongoing inquiry and discussion with regard to a 




questions noted above: the volitional, evaluative, emotional, foreconditional, and multilaterally 
relational aspects of love. These rubrics correspond to five aspects of love that provide the outline 
of a canonical and systematic model of divine love, which will be presented in chapter 6. The five 
aspects may be summarized thusly:  
1. Divine love is volitional but not only volitional.  
2. Divine love is not indifferent or disinterested, but evaluative.  
3. God’s love is profoundly emotional though not to the exclusion of volitional and 
evaluative aspects.  
4. Divine love is foreconditional, not altogether unconditional.
4
  
5. Divine love is multilaterally relational. God universally seeks a relationship of 
reciprocal love but enters into and/or maintains particular, intimate relationship only with those 
who respond appropriately.  
It must be understood that these rubrics and thesis statements are themselves derived 
from the canonical data and not presupposed. In this chapter, the NT data that support each thesis 
are grouped under the corresponding category.
5
 Under each of the five categories the data are 
further grouped under the three categories of Gospel-Acts, Pauline Writings, and General Epistles 
and Revelation.
6
 Further, the brief semantic surveys of prominent terminology relative to the 
meaning of divine love are distributed under their corresponding rubrics.
7
 Of course, the large 
                                                     
 
4
 I have coined the term “foreconditional” to refer to the conception that divine love is freely 
bestowed prior to, but not exclusive of, conditions. See chapter 6 for a more detailed explanation of the 
foreconditionality of divine love. 
5
 Of course, this requires that the grouping of the data is somewhat artificial. The reason for 
adopting this organizational structure is to afford an efficient presentation for the reader that highlights the 
importance of the data as it points toward a wider canonical model of divine love. 
6
 Such diacanonical presentation respects the canonical groupings of the text without entering into 
the ongoing debates regarding the authorship and dating of specific passages and texts that continue to 
elude consensus. 
7
 Of course, not all terms of any significance can be treated in this chapter. Thus, terms have been 




amount of data precludes an exhaustive presentation of its analysis. As such, this thematic 
presentation is but a survey of the research conducted. The two most crucial NT terms of love, 
avgapa,w and file,w, are discussed first since their NT usage and theological significance transcend 
any one or two of the themes in the remainder of the chapter.  
The Primary Semantics of Divine Love in the NT 
The Meaning of the avgapa,w Word Group  
The avgapa,w word group is the most prominent for love in the NT and appears frequently 
with both human and divine agency.
8
 The group displays a broad range of meaning including love 
that is affectionate, warm, concerned with, and interested in its object(s),
9
 love in the sense of 
high regard, value, and appreciation for its object(s),
10
 love that includes enjoyment, pleasure, and 
fondness,
11
 preferential love (whether proper or improper),
12
 and love demonstrated in action, 
                                                     
 
Accordingly, the most prominent terms are explained at the greatest length.  
8
 It appears over 300 times in verbal (avgapa,w), nominal (avga,ph), and adjectival (avgaphto,j) forms 
combined. avgapa,w appears 143 times in 110 verses, appears 116 times in 106 verses, and avgaphto,j appears 
61 times in 60 verses. The group appears most often in the Pauline writings (over 130 times) followed 
closely by the Johannine works (over 100 times). It appears in the Synoptic Gospels less than 40 times and 
just over 40 times in the remainder of the NT. In Pauline usage the noun appears much more frequently 
than the verb whereas in Johannine usage the situation is reversed. 
9
 The verb thus may mean “to regard with affection, loving concern.” J. P. Louw and E. A. Nida, 
eds., “αγαπαω a, αγαπη,” L&N 1:292. BDAG defines one aspect of meaning as “a warm regard for and 
interest in another, cherish, have affection for, love.” F. W. Danker et al., eds., “αγαπαω,” BDAG, 5–6. For 
Ceslas Spicq, this “affection . . . is accompanied by contentment” related to the idea of being “happy, 
satisfied.” “αγαπη,” TLNT 1:12–13. John H. Elliott describes the word group as “the act of emotional 
commitment.” 1 Peter (AB 37B; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 343. Cf. William E. Phipps, “The 
Sensuousness of Agape,” ThTo 29 (1973): 370–79. 
10
 Thus, it may entail love “based on sincere appreciation and high regard.” Louw and Nida, L&N 
1:292. Both the verb and noun relate to “esteem,” “satisfaction,” and “warm regard.” F. W. Danker et al., 
eds., “αγαπαω, αγαπη,” BDAG, 5–6. Cf. Spicq, TLNT 1:11–12; idem, Agape in the New Testament (3 vols.; 
St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1963), 1:18. Kenneth S. Wuest contends that it refers to “love called out of 
one’s heart by the preciousness of the object loved. It is a love of esteem, of evaluation,” which “recognizes 
the worthiness of the object loved.” “Four Greek Words for Love,” BSac 116 (1959): 243. Cf. James 
Moffat, Love in the New Testament (New York: Harper, 1930), 49.  
11
 The verb may also mean “take pleasure in.” Danker et al., BDAG, 5–6. Similarly, Louw and 
Nida, eds., “αγαπαω c,” L&N 1:300. With regard to that which would bring pleasure but is not yet enjoyed 
it can refer to desiring or longing as in the usage of those “who have loved [avgapa,w] His appearing” (cf. 2 




often of a beneficent nature.
13
 Although the avgapa,w word group is not exclusively descriptive of 
divine love, it is often used to describe God’s wonderful, superabundant, magnificent love.
14
 
Further, though human love of a misdirected or inappropriate nature may occur, love is most 
often held up as the highest of virtues and described in the most glowing of terms throughout the 
NT.
15
 Each of these aspects may overlap with one another or may be absent from or uncertain 
with regard to the meaning intended in a particular usage of the word group. 
While avgapa,w appears relatively frequently in Greek literature from Homer onward, 
avga,ph is not very well-represented in extra-biblical Greek literature, if at all.16 However, the LXX 
usage of the word group is abundant and, considering the regard with which NT writers held the 
OT, is the most significant ground for illuminating the background of the word group familiar to 
                                                     
 
12
 Cf. Moffat, Love, 49  Ethelbert Stauffer, “αγαπ ω, αγ πη, αγαπη   ,” TDNT 1:48. 
13
 So Stauffer, TDNT 1:37. “Love leads to action  it is impossible to love someone deeply and not 
do things for him. Love is eager to serve, to give.” Leon Morris, Testaments of Love: A Study of Love in the 
Bible (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1981), 42. Cf. Spicq, TLNT 1:12. Cf. 1 John 3:18. The noun may 
also be used simply in reference to the “agape feast” (Jude 1:12). 
14 avga,ph often appears as an attribute of God, e.g., the “God of love” (2 Cor 13:11) or the “love of 
God” (2 Cor 13:14) or the most famous statement: “God is love” (1 John 4:8, 16  cf. 1 John 4:7). Such 
divine love, especially toward humans, is manifested in action, often of a salvific nature (John 3:16; Rom 
5:8; 8:39; Eph 2:4–5; 1 John 3:1; 4:9–10, 16) especially the sending of the Son (John 17:23; 1 John 4:9–10, 
14–16; John 3:16–17; 34–35). Likewise, divine love is associated with his “giving” (John 3:16  Rom 5:5  1 
John 3:1). avga,ph is likewise an attribute of Jesus. For instance, reference is made to the “love . . . in Christ 
Jesus” (1 Tim 1:14  2 Tim 1:13). This love of Jesus is also directed toward humans, again often tied to his 
sacrifice, which itself is the manifestation of greatest love (John 15:13; 1 John 3:16; cf. Rom 5:8). Just as 
the Father’s love is associated with giving so is the Son’s (Gal 2:20  Eph 5:2, 25; 2 Thess 2:16).  
15
 Thus, love is “patient,” “kind,” “not jealous,” it “does not brag,” “is not arrogant,” and “never 
fails” (1 Cor 13:4, 8). Love is also the first among the fruits of the Spirit” (Gal 5:22). Further, it “does no 
wrong to a neighbor” and as such is “the fulfillment of the law” (Rom 13:10). It is included in the triad of 
“faith, hope, love . . . but the greatest of these is love” (1 Cor 13:13). Cf. 2 Tim 1:7  1 John 4:17–18. 
16
 Whether avga,ph is attested in pre-LXX Greek remains disputed. See the discussion of this issue 
below. avgapa,w in classical Greek includes many of the aspects of meaning that become apparent in the NT. 
It can relate to “being satisfied” to “desire someone or something,” “to prefer” or “to esteem” someone 
more highly than another and may relate to friendship and even sympathy. It may also refer to God’s 
preference “for a particular man.” Stauffer, TDNT 1:36. For the primary references of the Greek literature, 
see ibid., 36–37. Further, the etymology of the root is unclear and thus does not provide much information 
regarding the NT meaning. So Spicq, TLNT 1:8, Stauffer, TDNT 1:36, W. Günther and H. G. Link, 






 In the LXX, the verb avgapa,w most frequently translates the verb bha18 and the noun 
avga,ph always translates the Hebrew hbha.19 The avgapa,w group in the LXX, then, may denote 
much the same, broad meaning as the bha root does in the Hebrew.20 In the NT, the avgapa,w word 
group is closely associated in usage with many significant word groups including: love (file,w), 
kindness/mercy/compassion (e;leoj), good pleasure (euvdoki,a), compassion (oivktirmo,j and 
spla,gcnon), and, in antithetical parallel, hatred (mise,w).21 Many of these significant LXX 
translations and collocations appear interspersed throughout the discussion below.  
                                                     
 
17
 So Günther and Link, NIDNTT 2:539. See, also William Klassen, “Love in the NT and Early 
Jewish Literature” ABD 4:395. 
18 avgapa,w translates bha over 160 times in the LXX, of human love for God (Exod 20:6) and 
divine love for humans (Deut 4:37), at times of an emotive nature (Hos 11:1; Jer 38:3), in other instances 
clearly evaluative (Ps 145:8), and also of love that may be forfeited (Hos 9:15), among many other aspects 
of bha. The verb also translates hb'h]a; once (Ps 108:4), ~ybih'a] once (Hos 8:9), ~xr 4 times (cf. Ps 17:2 [18:1]), 
dydIy” 4 times (cf. Deut 33:12) and !Wrvuy> 4 times (cf. Deut 32:15), once of dyxiy” (Prov 4:3), once of dAD (Songs 
1:4), and once of tWddIy> (Jer 12:7). It also translates a number of other terms once or twice, including a 
number of terms of delight (listed further below). The verb bha is translated by avgapa,w in the vast majority 
of its occurrences. However, in a few instances it is translated by the file,w word group: file,w (Gen 27:4, 
9, 14; 37:4; Prov 8:17; 21:17; 29:3; Isa 56:10; Hos 3:1; Eccl 3:8), fi,loj (Esth 5:10, 14; 6:13; Pss 37:12; 
78:19; Prov 14:20; 27:6; Jer 20:6; 37:14) and fili,a (Prov 5:19), and in other instances various compounds 
from the file,w word group (1 Kgs 11:1; 2 Chr 16:10; 19:2; Prov 17:19). In a few other instances bha is 
translated by terms of the evra,w word group including evra,w (Esth 2:17; Prov 4:6) and evrasth,j (Hos 2:7, 9, 
12, 14, 15; Jer 22:20, 22; Lam 1:19; Ezek 16:33, 36, 37; 23:5, 9, 22). As such, bha “covers all the wealth of 
the three Greek terms.” Stauffer, TDNT 1:38. The primary “lacking feature,” however, is “religious 
eroticism,” which distinguishes it from the ANE fertility cults and from the Greek world. Ibid. A few other 
terms translate bha once in the LXX.  
19
 avga,ph translates hbha 15 times in 14 verses in the LXX, used of human love toward God (Jer 
2:2), evil lust (2 Sam 13:15), and contrasted with hatred (Eccl 9:1, 6). Most, however, appear in Songs 
(2:4–5, 7, 3:5, 10; 5:8; 7:7; 8:4, 6–7). The noun hb'h]a; is also translated by the older Greek noun avga,phsij, 
which does not appear in the NT (2 Sam 1:26; Ps 108:5; Hos 11:4; Zeph 3:17; Jer 2:33; 38:3). It is also 
translated by fili,a (Prov 10:12; 15:17; 17:9; 27:5). avgaphto,j also appears numerous times, most often 
translating dydy or dyxy. See the discussion of avgaphto,j in the LXX in the brief semantic study of avgaphto,j 
below. 
20
 That is, it is “universally applied to the actions of God and human beings” such that “no field of 
divine or human affection is excluded.” Georg Strecker, The Johannine Letters: A Commentary on 1, 2, 
and 3 John (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 146. That this is the case is borne out by a 
comparison of OT and NT usage. See the discussion of the meaning of bha in the previous chapter. 
21
 Further, avgapa,w is associated, to a lesser extent, with crhsto,j (kindness), makroqumi,a (patience), 
para,klhsij (comfort), parade,comai (accept), and do,kimoj (tested, approved). A number of other, less 




Despite the wide and significant range of meaning of this word group in the NT some 
have incorrectly categorized avga,ph in narrow terms, with significant theological implications. A 
common error is the assertion that avga,ph is uniquely descriptive of the highest divine love distinct 
from and exclusive of other, supposedly lesser, terms of love (i.e., evra,w, file,w). Such avga,ph 
flows unilaterally, that is, from God to others but never from others to God.
22
 As such, avga,ph love 
is said to be strictly beneficent giving exclusive of receiving, disinterested, directed toward the 
unworthy and thus non-evaluative, purely altruistic generosity, unconditional, utterly 
spontaneous, and impassible.
23
 These characteristics are often explicitly set in opposition to the 
purported meanings of evra,w and file,w, respectively, especially the former; making up the oft-
repeated agape-eros distinction.
24
 However, evidence suggests that the avgapa,w word group does 
not exclusively denote pure divine love to the exclusion of all other terminology (i.e., file,w). On 
the contrary, the word group may be used of both divine and human agency and manifests many 
aspects of love, including negative aspects of love.
25
 Here, the most misleading assumptions 
                                                     
 
22
 When the existence of human love toward God is allowed it is described as nothing more than 
God’s own love flowing back to himself through a strictly passive agent. Thus, Martin Luther speaks of 
both faith and love as that which is received from God and the human is merely “like a vessel or tube 
through which the stream of the divine blessings must flow without intermission to other people.” WA 
10.1.1, quoted in Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (trans. P. S. Watson; London: S.P.C.K., 1953), 735. So, 
also, Stauffer, TDNT 1:50  Charles E. B. Cranfield, “Love,” A Theological Word Book of the Bible (ed. 
Alan Richardson; New York: Macmillan, 1950), 136. 
23
 This perspective is most prominently associated with the massively influential work of Nygren, 
himself apparently beholden to earlier philosophical-theological presuppositions. While Nygren himself 
was making a thematic, not a semantic, argument, many of his assumptions (whether dependent on his 
work or not) have spilled over into semantic discussions whether explicitly or implicitly. See Agape and 
Eros. 
24
 For Nygren, eros is acquisitive and desirous love, philia denotes reciprocal friendship and 
attendant emotionality, and agape refers to self-sacrificial beneficence towards the unworthy. Ibid. 
Cranfield adopted similar distinctions. “Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. A. Richardson), 133, 135. 
So, also, Morris, Testaments of Love, 120. Cf. to varying degrees Spicq, TLNT 1:9–13; Stauffer, TDNT 
1:35–37; Günther and Link, NIDNTT 2:540, 542; Irving Singer, The Nature of Love: Plato to Luther (3 
vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 1:266. Such distinctions appear at the level of textual 
commentaries as well. For example, see Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Luke I–IX (AB 28; Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1981), 638. Contra Phipps, “The Sensuousness of Agape,” 370–79.  
25
 Accordingly, one should not make the mistake of universally projecting any one of the potential 








First, the avgapa,w word group does not, in and of itself, depict the highest love. On the 
contrary, in numerous instances it depicts inferior kinds/aspects of love, including incestuous and 
rapacious “lust” and misdirected love.
27
 On the other hand, God’s love is depicted by both 
avgapa,w and file,w (cf. John 14:21, 23; 16:27) and is never misdirected, being unique in quality, 
purity, and degree. However, such differences between human and divine love are not due to 
semantic constraints of the terms themselves, but arise from usage within distinct contexts. 
Second, the avgapa,w word group does not describe unilateral divine love but, on the 
contrary, demonstrates that divine love is multilateral, since God may not only give, but also 
receive avgapa,w/avga,ph.28 The usage of the word group demonstrates that love may flow in many 
directions within various kinds of personal relationships, including from God to humans and vice 
versa.
29
 As such, the usage itself reflects the potential mutuality of love, which is also the divine 
ideal (cf. John 14:20–24; 15:8–12; 1 John 4:8–16). Further, the potential intimacy of avgapa,w is 
                                                     
 
contextual usage of the term sheds light on its intended meaning within its semantic range. 
26
 This will be limited to an overview; the larger force of the evidence will appear within the 
discussion of the broader categories/questions. 
27
 Thus, Amnon’s lust for his half-sister Tamar is described by both avga,ph and avgapa,w (2 Sam 
13:15). In the NT, Demas forsook Paul because he loved [avgapa,w] the evil world (2 Tim 4:10). Rather than 
loving light, men have loved [avgapa,w] darkness (John 3:19). Cf. Pss 11:5; 52:3; Amos 5:15; Hos 9:1; John 
12:43. 
28
 The verb and noun most often refer to interpersonal love, often that which takes place between 
God and humans. See Günther and Link, NIDNTT 2:543  Gerhard Schneider, “αγαπη,” EDNT 1:9. 
29
 Thus, the Father loves the Son (John 3:35) and the Son loves the Father (John 14:31), the Father 
loves humans (John 3:16; 14:21) and humans love God (1 Cor 8:3; Jas 1:12; 1 John 5:3), the Son loves 
humans (Mark 10:21; John 13:1) and humans love the Son (Luke 7:47; John 14:21; Heb 6:10), and humans 
love one another (Luke 7:5; 1 Cor 16:24; 2 Cor 11:11; 2 John 1). Importantly, human love toward God, 
Jesus, and one another is denoted both by the verb and the noun. Thus, one may not assert that merely the 
noun avga,ph is reserved for divine agency. Note also that John 14:31 is the only explicit example of love 
from the Son to the Father, though it is implied elsewhere. Finally, it is notable that the command for 
humans to love one another is often modeled after divine love for them suggesting some continuity 
amongst such loves (cf. John 13:34; 15:12). For the sake of brevity, only a few textual examples of these 




apparent when Jesus proclaims his “love” for “his own” [i;dioj] (John 13:1).30 Nevertheless, some 
maintain the unilateral agency of love and insist that all instances of mutual divine-human love 
are the result of God’s efficacious election love.
31
 However, the nature of many of the instances, 
including characteristics of exhortation and conditionality, militate against such a conception.
32
 
Such a view appears to be based more on dogmatic presupposition than the canonical text. 
Third, avgapa,w is not necessarily descriptive of strictly beneficent, disinterested, altruistic, 
non-evaluative love toward the unworthy.
33
 Although divine love is often manifested toward 
unworthy objects (cf. Rom 5:8), and frequently associated with divine grace,
34
 avgapa,w love 
nevertheless manifests evaluation (cf. 1 Thess 5:13).
35
 Moreover, the reality of misdirected love 
                                                     
 
discussed within the broader canonical discussion below.  
30
 Significantly, this also rules out the idea that love for one’s own is exclusive to the concept of 
file,w. The adjective avgaphto,j also highlights the relational nature of the word group. 
31
 Thus, Morris recognizes that “mutual love can be seen” throughout Scripture and is a 
“distinctive quality of the Israelites’ view of God and man.” Testaments of Love, 42. Nevertheless he 
subsumes mutual love under unilateral election stating, “God produces love in his elect  it is certainly not 
their own achievement.” Ibid., 182. 
32
 The examples that substantiate this claim will be analyzed in the canonical section further 
below. 
33
 Contra the contention of Morris and others that “we do not bring anything valuable to God—in 
fact, we acquire value only because we are the recipients of his love.” Testaments of Love, 142. So 
Cranfield, “Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. A. Richardson), 135. Spicq similarly believes that “the 
only adequate translation is ‘love in the sense of charity’  in Latin, caritas or dilectio.” TLNT 1:8. Such 
caritas entails that the superior’s (God’s) love is generous and the inferior’s (human’s) response is 
gratitude. 
34
 Though the two word groups should not be conflated or confused, the avgapa,w and ca,rij word 
groups collocate in a number of significant instances. For instance, divine “grace” (ca,rij) is “freely 
bestowed [carito,w] on us in the Beloved [hvgaphme,nw|]” (Eph 1:6). Further, both are associated with God’s 
redemptive action (2 Thess 2:16; cf. 1 Tim 1:14). The two also often collocate in benedictory formulas 
and/or greetings (Rom 1:7  2 Cor 13:14  Eph 6:24  2 Tim 1:2  2 John 3) and in exhortation to “gracious 
work” grounded in “love” (2 Cor 8:7). Cf. Luke 6:32, 35  7:42. 
35
 In one such instance, avga,ph is explicitly evaluative and motivated as Paul commands to esteem 
some very highly “in love because of their work” (1 Thess 5:13). Viktor Warnach states that the verb in the 
LXX refers to “love in the sense of placing a high value upon some person or thing, or of receiving them 
with favour.” “Love,” Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology 2:518. Cf. Schneider, EDNT 1:9; Robert Joly, Le 





suggests evaluation in that love ought to be directed toward appropriate objects.
36
 Even the 
Father’s love for the Son and for humans is described as grounded and evaluative (John 10:17  2 
Cor 9:7). Further, the adjective avgaphto,j highlights the evaluative nature of the word group as it 
may refer to the lover’s perception of lovableness.
37
 Those who maintain that God’s 
avgapa,w/avga,ph love is unaffected and non-evaluative contend that instances of delight are simply 
the result of God’s choice “to delight” and not prompted by the object(s) as such.
38
 However, 
examples abound to the contrary.
39
 Moreover, evaluation, and even delight, is implied by the 
collocation of some terms with the avgapa,w group, that is, when love is associated with being 
pleased, being accepted, delighted in.
40
  
Fourth, the word group is not altogether unconditional, spontaneous, or unmotivated, 
despite frequent scholarly rhetoric of this nature.
41
 The purported unconditionality of the avgapa,w 
                                                     
 
36
 For example, misdirected love is evident in Matt 6:24; Luke 11:43; John 3:19; 12:43; 2 Tim 
4:10; 2 Pet 2:15; 1 John 2:15; Rev 12:11. 
37
 H. G. Liddell-Scott views the classical use as meaning “worthy of love, loveable, dear.” 
“αγαπη ο ,” LSJ Abridged, 4. The adjective generally refers to “one who is in a very special relationship 
with another,” thus “beloved,” “one who is dearly loved” and/or “prized, valued,” “the object of one’s 
affection.” F. W. Danker et al., eds., “αγαπη ο ,” BDAG, 7  J. P. Louw and E. A. Nida, eds., “αγαπη ο ,” 
L&N 1:293. Cf. Stauffer, TDNT 1:37. 
38
 Thus Morris contends, “It might be argued that God loves the people because there is something 
in them that delights him, but there is never an indication of what brings about this delight.” Testaments of 
Love, 93. “It seems that God delights in this people simply because he chooses to do so.” Ibid. 
39
 For instance, the Son is said to love righteousness, a clear indication of appraisal (Heb 1:9). 
More appear below. 
40
 For example, Christ is often referred to as the beloved (avgaphto,j) son in whom the Father is 
well-pleased (euvdoke,w) (Matt 3:17; 12:18; 17:5; Mark 1:11; Luke 3:22; 2 Pet 1:17). See also the parallel 
usage of euvdoki,a, “good will,” and avga,ph in Phil 1:15–16. Evaluation is also explicit when Christ is praised 
for having “loved righteousness and hated lawlessness” (Heb 1:9). Moreover, “whom the Lord loves he 
disciplines, and he scourges every son whom he receives [parade,comai]” (Heb 12:6). Here and in the LXX 
of Prov 3:12 parade,comai translates hc'r', a term of evaluative pleasure. In this instance, then, avgapa,w is set 
in parallel to evaluation. Similarly, the avgapa,w word group also collocates with the evaluative term do,kimoj 
(cf. Jas 1:12).  
41
 For instance, Morris comments, “We must clearly recognize that God’s love is unconditional. 
Testaments of Love, 31. Likewise, “In respect of agapao as used of God, it expresses the deep and constant 
‘love’ and interest of a perfect Being towards entirely unworthy objects.” W. E. Vine, “Love,” Vine’s 




group is conceptually bound up with the assertion that divine love is arbitrary, unilaterally willed, 
election love.
42
 While the avgapa,w word group is closely associated with election, the two 
concepts should not be confused or conflated.
43
 They relate not as interchangeable terms/concepts 
but within a nexus of cause and effect. The conditionality of avgapa,w/avga,ph is readily apparent in 
NT usage. Thus, the Father loves (avgapa,w) humans because they love (avgapa,w) the Son (John 
14:21, 23; cf. John 10:17; 15:9–10; 2 Cor 9:7; Jude 21). Therefore, it is not true that avgapa,w is 
strictly unmotivated, ungrounded, or the product of strictly unilateral election.
44
  
Fifth, the avgapa,w word group often denotes emotionality, even divine emotionality. It is 
thus incompatible with impassibility despite assertions that avga,ph is volitional, but not emotional, 
love.
45
 Rather, the usage of avgapa,w/avga,ph includes volition but also manifests emotionality.46 
                                                     
 
42
 Thus, Stauffer associates the two concepts in his view that Paul refers to “God’s unconditional 
sovereignty in loving and hating, electing and rejecting (R. 9:13, 25).” For him, the “love of God implies 
election” and love itself is simply “the orientation of his ‘sovereign will.’” TDNT 1:49–50. Similarly, 
Morris argues that “God wills to love men and he loves according to his own purpose of election, not 
according to the actions of men.” Testaments of Love, 160. Cf. Günther and Link, NIDNTT 2:544. 
43
 The avgapa,w word group and terms of election are often closely associated in the NT. Thus Paul 
refers to “those who have been chosen [evklekto,j] of God, holy and beloved [avgapa,w]” (Col 3:12  cf. 1 
Thess 1:4; 2 John 1). Many other instances appear. See Rom 9:11–13; 11:28; Eph 1:4–5; Jas 2:5. Moreover, 
in the LXX the avgapa,w and evkle,gomai word groups appear in many contexts where love and election are 
associated (cf. Deut 4:37; 7:7; 10:15; Pss 47:4; 78:68; Isa 41:8; 44:1–2). Election, by way of ai`reti,zw, also 
associates closely with divine avgapa,w when the divine voice declares, “Behold, my servant whom I have 
chosen [ai`reti,zw]; my beloved [avgaphto,j] in whom my soul is well-pleased; I will put my spirit upon him, 
and he shall proclaim justice to the Gentiles” (Matt 12:18  cf. 2 Thess 2:13). The avgapa,w word group also 
collocates frequently with language of the divine call. Thus Paul writes to the “beloved,” those “called as 
saints” (Rom 1:7  cf. 1 John 3:1  Jude 1). See also Rom 8:28  cf. 9:11–13, 25, 29; Eph 4:1–2; 2 Thess 2:13–
14; 1 Tim 6:11–12. The relationship between love and election is complex. See the discussion of love and 
election in the OT as well as the further discussion of the divine will, election, calling and love further in 
this chapter. See also Wis 3:9; Sir 47:22. 
44
 Donald A. Carson is thus correct when he states that the very “pattern of relationships” makes it 
“clear that there is nothing in the words agapaō and agapē themselves to suggest that the love of which 
John speaks is invariably spontaneous, self-generated, without reference to the loved one.” The Gospel 
according to John (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1991), 204. However, aside from semantics, Carson 
nevertheless asserts spontaneous divine love that is “not the consequence of their loveliness but of the 
sublime truth that ‘God is love’ (1 Jn. 4:16).” Ibid., 204–5. One the other hand, texts suggest that avga,ph 
does not necessarily continue forever; it can diminish or even die out (cf. Matt 24:12; Rev 2:4). 
45
 For example, Cranfield contends that avga,ph “evidently refers to the will rather than to the 
emotion, and often conveys the idea of showing love by action.” “Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. A. 




Moreover, the collocation with other word groups in the NT strongly suggests emotionality, 
including the contrast between love and hate
47











 Likewise, in the LXX the avgapa,w word group is 
used to translate terms that, in such contexts, connote delight and compassion.
53
  
                                                     
 
Cf. idem, Agape in the New Testament, 1:11–12. G. Johnston similarly defines avga,ph as “passionless love.” 
“Love in the NT,” IDB 3:169. Cf. Denis de Rougemont, Love in the Western World (Harper Torchbooks: 
New York, 1974), 311. For Richard C. Trench, avgapa,w is “cold” rather than “passionate.” Synonyms of the 
New Testament (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1948), 42. Cf. Joseph F. Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The 
New Morality (Philadelphia, Penn.: Westminster Press, 1966), 103.  
46
 For instance, explicitly emotional avgapa,w is apparent in 1 Pet 1:22 (cf. Col 3:19; 1 Pet 4:8). 
Notably, avgapa,w appears to be emotional (even visceral) when Jesus looked at a young seeker and “felt a 
love for him” (Mark 10:21) and when Jesus is said to have loved his own to the end (John 13:1). Some 
have even suggested that avga,ph may include at least some aspects of eros. Thus, John A. T. Robinson 
contends that “agape desires response, and desires it passionately. . . . Love yearns for a loving response. In 
this sense there is a need in the very heart of God, a divine discontent which must ever burn until it be 
satisfied.” “Agape and Eros,” Theology 48 (1945): 99. Klassen further comments, “If ecstasy is at the 
center of the idea of erōs, then surely there is no true agapē without it; a God who does not care whether 
people respond is hardly the God portrayed in Hosea or in the NT image of Jesus weeping over Jerusalem.” 
Love in the NT, 385. Cf. Phipps, “The Sensuousness of Agape”; Mildred Bangs Wynkoop, A Theology of 
Love: The Dynamic of Wesleyanism (Kansas City, Mo.: Beacon Hill Press, 1972), 32; Thomas J. Oord, 
“Matching Theology and Piety: An Evangelical Process Theology of Love” (Claremont Graduate 
University, 1999), 184. 
47
 See Matt 5:43–44; 6:24; Luke 6:27; Rom 9:13; Heb 1:9; 1 John 4:20, all of which will be 
discussed below. 
48
 The strongly emotive and visceral word groups of compassion, oivktirmo,j and spla,gcnon, 
collocate relatively infrequently, but nonetheless significantly, with this word group in the NT. Of 
oivktirmo,j with avgapa,w see Luke 6:36; Rom 9:13, 15; Phil 2:1; Col 3:12. Likewise, a close association 
between spla,gcnon and avgapa,w is apparent. See Phil 2:1; Col 3:12; cf. Eph 4:32–5:2; Phlm 1:7; 1 John 
3:17).  
49
 In Eph 2:4 divine mercy and love ground divine action. Other collocations include 2 Tim 1:2; 
Jude 2, 21; 2 John 3; cf. 1 Tim 1:13–14. Terms of the avgapa,w and evlee,w (“mercy, compassion”) word 
groups also translate LXX terms in parallel usages such as when God speaks of having struck his people in 
wrath but “in My favor [!Acr' - e;leoj] I have had compassion [~x;r' - avgapa,w] on you” (Isa 60:10). See also 
Jer 2:2. Likewise the terms collocate to translate God’s dsx to those who love God, the former translated by 
e;leoj and the latter by avgapa,w (Exod 20:6; Deut 5:10; 7:9; Neh 1:5; Dan 9:4; cf. Ps 119:132). Consider also 
Ps 33:5; Mic 6:8. 
50 crhsteu,omai (“kind”) is an important characteristic of love, among many others (1 Cor 13:4). 
See also Luke 6:35; 2 Cor 6:6; Gal 5:22; Eph 4:32–5:2). 
51
 God “has loved us and given us eternal comfort [para,klhsij]” (2 Thess 2:16). See also the 
collocations in 2 Cor 13:11; Phil 2:1; Col 2:2; Phlm 1:7. 
52
 Both avga,ph and makroqumi,a (“patience”) are fruits of the spirit (Gal 5:22) and patience is an 




In all, then, God’s avgapa,w/avga,ph may be (1) multilateral (giving and receiving), (2) 
evaluative and appreciative, (3) grounded, motivated, and conditional, and (4) emotional and 
descriptive of delight and enjoyment. At this point, we will turn to a discussion of the file,w word 
group before returning to a discussion of the supposed uniqueness of avga,ph as Christian love. 
 The Meaning of the file,w Word Group 
The file,w word group is also extremely significant with regard to the meaning of divine 
love. The basic meaning of the verb file,w is to love in the sense of regarding with affection. The 
noun fi,loj signifies a loved one or friend, and the noun fili,a refers to a relationship between 
loved ones (i.e., friendship).
54
 The word group may connote affectionate love, fondness, 
attraction, concern, special interest, and/or enjoyment/pleasure in or valuing of someone or 
something.
55
 It often appears in the context of close association with the potential connotation of 
                                                     
 
3:10; 2 Pet 3:8–9, 14–15. 
53
 Thus, in the LXX, avgapa,w translates a number of terms of delight such as #px (Ps 50:8; Esth 
6:9), hcr (1 Chr 29:17), fAfm' (Jer 30:31), [[;v' (Ps . 93:19), and ~y[ivu[]v; (Isa 5:7). Moreover, avgapa,w translates 
~xr 4 times, of the Psalmist’s “love” for God (Ps 17:2  cf. Prov 28:13) and God’s compassion on his people 
to bring them back (Zech 10:6). Finally, God struck the people in his wrath, but in his favor (e;leoj) he had 
compassion (~xr – avgapa,w) on them (Isa 60:10). 
54
 The verb appears 25 times in 21, the noun fi,loj (which may be active or passive) appears 29 
times in 27 verses, and the noun fili,a appears only once in the NT. 
55
 See Günther and Link, NIDNTT 2:538; Klassen, Love in the NT, 385; F. W. Danker et al., eds., 
“φιλεω,” BDAG, 1056  J. P. Louw and E. A. Nida, eds., “φιλεω,” L&N, 300  Gustav Stählin, “φιλεω, 
κα αφιλεω, φιλημα,” TDNT 9:117. The group also has many derivatives that consist of compound terms 
such as filadelfi,a, “brotherly love,” among many others in biblical and extra-biblical Greek. For this 
reason Gunther calls it “the most general word for love or regard with affection.” Günther and Link, 
NIDNTT 2:538. filadelfi,a /fila,delfoj appears in Rom 12:10; 1 Thess 4:9; Heb 13:1; 1 Pet 1:22; 3:8; 2 
Pet 1:7. Many others appear, including love for God (filo,qeoj, 2 Tim 3:4) and love for humans 
(filanqrwpi,a, Acts 28:2; Titus 3:4). One compound, significant with regard to its usage of storgē, 
describes an intense affection, heartfelt love, combining two of the words for Greek love into filo,storgoj 
translated, “devoted” (Rom 12:10). This comes from the fi,loj word group combining with “storgē 
(stergō),” which refers to “familial affection” and often “refers either to the tender feelings that parents 
naturally feel toward their children or children toward their siblings and parents, or to the bond that unites 
husband and wife, and also takes in sympathy for friends and compatriots.” Ceslas Spicq, “φιλοσ οργο ,” 
TLNT 3:462, 10. Cf. Günther and Link, NIDNTT 2:538  “Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. A. 
Richardson), 133. Cf. Ceslas Spicq, “Philostorgos (à propos de Rom 12:10),” RB 62 (1955): 497–510. 
Also, the converse astorgos appears in Rom 1:31; 2 Tim 3:3. Other compounds abound, ranging from 








Most (if not all) of the questions regarding the meaning of file,w that pertain to the 
purposes of this dissertation are bound up with the question of the extent of similarity and/or 
dissimilarity to the avgapa,w word group. As shall be seen, the meaning of the file,w word group 
overlaps significantly with the avgapa,w word group. In many instances the terms appear to be used 
interchangeably. Robert Joly’s study has convincingly argued that the file,w word group was 
being pushed out of regular use by the avgapa,w word group by the time of the writing of the NT.57 
As such, considering the smaller sample size and the fallacy of arguments from silence, it would 
be unwise to draw conclusions regarding the semantic range of file,w based on the way the term 
is not used in the NT. Moreover, the evidence suggests that one should not presuppose a sharp 
difference between the meaning of the avgapa,w and file,w word groups a priori, contra the 
                                                     
 
refer to the love of, or lovers of, money (filarguri,a and fila,rguroj, 1 Tim 6:10; Luke 16:14; 2 Tim 3:20), 
lovers of self (fi,lautoj, 2 Tim 3:2), lovers of pleasure (filh,donoj, 2 Tim 3:4), desire to be first 
(filoprwteu,w, 3 John 1:9). Compounds also refer to “dispute” (filoneiki,a) or the characteristic of being 
“contentious” (filo,neikoj) (1 Cor 11:16) or empty “philosophy” (filosofi,a) (Col 2:8). More positively 
compounds refer to the love of that which is good (fila,gaqon, Titus 1:8), being lovely (prosfilh,j, Phil 
4:8), being courteous (filofro,nwj, Acts 28:7), consideration of others (filanqrw,pwj, Acts 27:3), and love 
for the stranger, hospitality (filo,xenon and filoxeni,a, Titus 1:8; 1 Tim 3:2; 1 Pet 4:9; Rom 12:13; Heb 
13:2). Others are more ambivalent such as aspiration or ambition, literally love of honor (filotime,omai, 
Rom 15:20; 2 Cor 5:9; 1 Thess 4:11). There are also a number of compound names of humans (Philemon, 
Philetos, Philipesis, Philipos) and of cities (Philadelphia, Philippoi, Philomelion). 
56
 Stählin suggests the basic sense relates to “belonging to” or being “proper to” thus denoting 
“natural attraction to those who belong, love for close relatives.” Stählin, TDNT 9:115. Likewise, file,w is 
“love or affection for someone or something based on association.” “φιλεω,” 292. Cf. Günther and Link, 
NIDNTT 2:542; Cranfield, “Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. A. Richardson), 133; Danker et al., 
BDAG, 1056  idem, “φιλεω,” BDAG, 292  idem, “φιλο ,” BDAG, 1059. 
57
 The file,w group became more and more associated with the sense of “kiss,” a meaning that 
appears in the NT by way of file,w (cf. Matt 26:48; Mark 14:44; Luke 22:47) with the corresponding noun 
fi,lhma, which always means kiss (Luke 7:45; 22:48; Rom 16:16; 1 Cor 16:20; 2 Cor 13:12; 1 Thess 5:26; 1 
Pet 5:14; cf. Prov 27:6; Song 1:2). However, the kiss in the NT has no sexual connotations but is an 
expression of “close relationship and the corresponding love.” Stählin, TDNT 9:120. As such, Judas’s 
action is “a basic betrayal of canons of friendship.” F. W. Danker et al., eds., “φιλημα, α ο ,” BDAG, 1057. 




relatively common assertions regarding the qualitative superiority of the avgapa,w group.58 It is the 
context that sheds light on the intended semantic range of a given term. 
The etymology of the root of file,w is uncertain, though it is commonly thought to 
originally refer to love of that which belongs to one or is one’s own.
59
 The word group is much 
more prominent in pre-LXX Greek than in biblical Greek, there often (but not exclusively) 
referring to the love of friendship, developed by some philosophers (such as Aristotle) into a 
rather technical term of reciprocity, status, and utilitarian benefit.
60
 However, considering the 
linguistic shift ca. the time of the LXX translation, it would be unwise to draw too much 
information regarding the meaning of the group from its varied, and sometimes technical, usage 
in classical Greek. Rather, this work will focus on the usage of the terminology in the LXX and 
NT, the former due to the familiarity and high esteem in which it would have been held by many 
NT authors. file,w translates bha 10 times in the LXX and qv;n”, to kiss, 14 times.61 The noun fi,loj 
appears frequently in the LXX,
62
 most often translating [;re (over 30 times) and bha (10 times).63 
                                                     
 
58
 The supposed distinction stems from the assumptions of the superiority of avga,ph, which grounds 
the agape-eros distinction referred to above. This issue will be taken up further below.  
59
 Stählin, TDNT 9:129. However, according to Stählin in extra-biblical Greek the term also may 
take on the sense of “that which is chosen.” Ibid., 115. Both aspects are apparent in Jesus’ use. He uses it of 
his own who are in fact, at the same time, the chosen. Stählin thinks that i;dioj and fi,loj are “more or less 
synonymous” in the NT (cf. John 13:1 and 15:13, 19; Acts 24:33; 27:3). TDNT 9:114. However, John 
15:19 is the only instance where file,w collocates with i;dioj, “one’s own.” Moreover, the avgapa,w group 
also is used in this manner in some NT instances. 
60
 See the discussion of Aristotle’s view of love in the historical survey above. Both verb and noun 
are used of reciprocal friendship in extra-biblical Greek as well as in reference to the “solicitous” and often 
preferential love of the gods for men. Stauffer, TDNT 1:36, 115. Accordingly, fi,loj may refer to one’s 
close relatives, or to a person or object that is “intrinsic, belonging, proper to,” “beloved,” “dear.” Gustav 
Stählin, “φιλο , φιλη, φιλια,” TDNT 9:114, 146. It may also refer to affectionate or romantic love. BDAG, 
862. 
61
 The latter translation usage supports Joly’s contention regarding the linguistic shift of the 
meaning and usage of the file,w word group. Le vocabulaire. See the further discussion of this below. 
file,w also translates [;re, of “friends,” in close proximity/parallel to “lovers” in Lam 1:2  cf. Jer 22:22.  
62 fi,loj appears 180 times in the LXX with Apocrypha but just over 70 times in the OT books. In 
the OT books it often refers to a covenantal friendship. 
63




The noun fili,a mostly translates hbha (6 times).64 In the NT, the group is closely associated with 
the avgapa,w word group (see below), functions as an antonym of hate (mise,w),65 and frequently 
collocates with language of family.
66
  
The verb file,w is used in the context of numerous relationships and signifies many 
aspects of love in the NT including self-love, interpersonal love, divine-human love, and intra-
trinitarian love.
67
 Elsewhere, the verb is used of misdirected love and, in a few instances, of non-
                                                     
 
3:1; 6:9) and ~xr (Judg 5:20). 
64 fili,a appears 36 times in 35 verses in the LXX (including the Apocrypha) but only 9 times in 8 
verses in the LXX OT books. It also translates dAD and [;r once each (Prov 7:18; 19:7). In the LXX the term 
may connote friendship love, erotic fili,a, and political fili,a. Stählin suggests that in the NT avga,ph 
replaces fili,a which, in his view, “may be seen if we compare Prv. 10:12 and Jm. 5:20  1 Pt. 4:8.” TDNT 
9:154. If Stählin is correct in this regard, avga,ph would signify true friendship love in such contexts.  
65
 See Luke 23:12; John 12:25; 15:19; Jas 4:4. In the LXX see the collocation of the two in Gen 
37:4; Eccl 3:8; Prov 14:20; cf. Prov 27:6; Lam 1:2. The word group also collocates significantly, but 
infrequently, with the evkle,gomai word group (John 15:14–15, 19) but it never collocates within a single 
verse with the klhto,j word group. 
66
 For instance, the file,w word group often collocates with suggenh,j, kinsmen, relatives (Mark 
6:4; Luke 1:58; 2:44; 14:12; 21:16; John 18:26; Acts 10:24; Rom 9:3; 16:7, 11, 21). Likewise, with avdelfo,j 
in close association with “friends” (Luke 14:12  21:16).  
67
 It is used of human love, including self-love (John 12:25) and human interpersonal love of both 
a familial (Matt 10:37) and associative (John 15:19  Titus 3:15) nature. Frequently it is used of the Father’s 
or Son’s love for humans (John 11:3, 36  16:27  20:2  Rev 3:19) and also describes the Father’s love for the 
Son (John 5:20). Conversely, the verb also describes human love for Jesus: both the expectation for (Matt 
10:37; John 21:17; cf. 1 Cor 16:22) and reality thereof (Matt 10:37; John 16:27; 21:15–17). It never refers 
to the Son’s love for the Father or human love for the Father explicitly. Human love toward “God” (other 
than Jesus) by the use of file,w also does not appear in the LXX. Yet, the noun does refer to Abraham as 
the “friend of God” (Jas 2:23  cf. 4:4). Moreover, the compound term filo,qeoj implies the expectation of 
such love toward God (2 Tim 3:4; cf. Luke 1:3; Acts 1:1; 1 Cor 16:22). Some in antiquity, such as 
Aristotle, rejected the idea of human love toward the gods as well as divine-human friendship, in stark 
contrast to the biblical Greek. See the historical survey of divine love as well as the discussion in Stählin, 
TDNT 9:115. Also, the name Qeo,filoj in Luke 1:3 and Acts 1:1 literally means lover or friend of God. 
Once again, however, considering the limited sample size it would be unwise to draw conclusions 
regarding the wider meaning of the term based on the fallacious argument from silence.  
With reference to both the love of the Father and Son for humans, all three instances refer to so-
called “insider” love. The (potential) significance of this category of love will be taken up in the wider 
canonical analysis below. Here, however, it should be noted that one should not draw broad semantic 
conclusions on such a limited sample size. At the same time, it should be noted that the verb file,w with 
regard to personal love in the NT is always used within an associative relationship of some commonality, 
i.e., “insider love,” whereas avgapa,w may signify both “insider” and “outsider” love, though it also refers 
most often to the former. Importantly, the file,w word group is not strictly limited to insider love since love 
for the other (including the stranger) is encouraged by way of the compound terms filo,xenoj and filoxeni,a 






 The noun fi,loj appears very frequently in human usage, often of “friends,” 
which itself may range from close and/or well-known friends to favorable acquaintances, guests, 
or even “political friends.”
69
 However, the concept of “friendship” in the NT does not necessarily 
refer to one of utility or benefit.
70
 fi,loj also depicts divine-human friendship.71 The substantive 
fili,a is used only once in the NT, in the reference to “friendship [fili,a] with the world,” which 
is hostility (e;cqra) toward God (Jas 4:4). Divine love toward humans is also depicted by the 
compound term, filanqrwpi,a, “affectionate concern for and interest in humanity,” itself in 
parallel to the “kindness [crhsto,thj] of God” (Titus 3:4).72  
                                                     
 
68
 Such as love of praise (Matt 6:5), status (Matt 23:6; Luke 20:46), and falsehood (Rev 22:15). Of 
non-romantic kissing see Matt 26:48; Mark 14:44; Luke 22:47. This dovetails with the linguistic shift 
explanation argued by Joly; see Le vocabulaire. 
69
 It refers to the centurion’s friends whom he sent (Luke 7:6), a friend of whom a favor is asked 
(Luke 11:5–8), one who is invited to a feast (Luke 14:10, 12), in close proximity with neighbors to 
celebrate the finding of the lost sheep or coin (Luke 15:6, 9), the prodigal son’s brother’s friends (Luke 
15:29), friends made through use of wealth (Luke 16:9), grouped with parents, brothers, and relatives who 
will betray them (Luke 21:16), grouped with relatives (Acts 10:24), Herod and Pilate (Luke 23:12), in the 
sense of “friend of Caesar” (John 19:12), officials of the province who were friends who go to urge him not 
to go into theater (Acts 19:31), other friends of Paul (Acts 27:3), and “friends” in the sense of the church (3 
John 1:15). 
70
 This is evident in that friends are to share the lot of friends (Luke 12:4) and by the fact that the 
greatest love is that which lays its life down for friends (John 15:13). 
71
 In the only instance of someone being called a “friend of God” in the NT, Abraham is “called 
the friend of God” (Jas 2:23), while a “friend” (fi,loj) of the world is an enemy (evcqro,j) of God (Jas 4:4). 
Friendship with God is also indirectly symbolized in parables (Luke 11:5–8; 15:6, 9; cf. Luke 14:10; 16:9). 
See also Stählin, TDNT 9:164. Further, Christ addresses his followers as his “friends” (Luke 12:4  John 
11:11; 15:13, 14; cf. 3:29). Elsewhere, Jesus is referred to as the friend of publicans and sinners (Matt 
11:19; Luke 7:34). The statement is an attempt to slander Jesus as one who is friends with those whom one 
should not be friends. At the same time, the statement unintentionally points to the truth that Jesus is, or 
wishes to be, the “friend” of all. For Stählin, “φίλος is both active and passive. Jesus loves sinners and is 
loved by them in return, as shown in Lk. 7:37–50 by the washing of His feet, the kiss and the anointing 
with costly ointment, which are manifestations of grateful love.” TDNT 9:161. Notably, others are spoken 
of as friends of God in extra-biblical Jewish literature. Ibid., 168. 
72
 F. W. Danker et al., eds., “φιλανθρωπια,” BDAG, 1055. It also may refer to human love for 
humankind (Acts 28:2). A similar compound refers again to love for men (filanqrw,pwj), sometimes 
translated “consideration” (Acts 27:3). In the Hellenistic period it referred to divine and human benefactors. 
Cf. Ceslas Spicq, “φιλανθρωπια, φιλανθρωπω ,” TLNT 3:442–43  E. Plümacher, “φιλανθρωπια, α , 
φιλανθρωπω ,” EDNT 3:424. Significantly, the term does not necessarily refer to disinterested benevolence 




Thus, in the NT the file,w group refers to a number of aspects of love that dovetail with 
the most important usages of avgapa,w including: the conditionality of love/friendship (John 15:13; 
16:27; Jas 4:4), reciprocality (John 16:27; cf. Prov 8:17), emotion and/or passion (John 11:36; Jas 
4:4), pleasure, enjoyment, and/or evaluative love (Matt 6:5; 23:6),
73
 preferential love (Matt 10:37; 
John 20:2),
74
 concern manifested in discipline (Rev 3:19), and misdirected love (Rev 22:15, 
among many others).
75
 There is no indication that the term indicates an inferior kind of love, and 
its usage with divine agency indicates strongly the capacity of the term to indicate the highest and 
noblest aspects of love. With this in mind, we return to the misguided assertion of the uniqueness 
of the avgapa,w word group over and against the file,w word group.  
The Association of the avgapa,w and file,w Word Groups 
In conjunction with the assertion of the uniqueness of avga,ph as descriptive of the highest 
divine love, some scholars have asserted a stark difference between the avgapa,w and file,w word 
groups, often portraying the latter as unsuitable to denote “Christian love.”
76
 For instance, some 
assert that file,w is the warmer, more affectionate term and/or specific to reciprocal friendship.77 
                                                     
 
73
 In the LXX consider the use of the term in the sense of that which is especially liked and/or 
brings pleasure (Gen 27:4, 9, 14; Hos 3:1; cf. Isa 56:10). 
74
 Cf. Gen 37:4. See also the discussion of “insider love” further below. 
75
 In the LXX consider misdirected love of slumber (Isa 56:10) as well as the love of pleasure in 
Prov 21:17, in contrast to properly directed love of wisdom in Prov 29:3. 
76
 Morris, Testaments of Love, 119, 263. Spicq, while recognizing parallel meanings in some 
contexts, contends that file,w was “hardly appropriate for expressing a love that unites God and humans 
and extends even to enemies.” TLNT 1:10–11. For him, the classical meaning “friendship or amity (philia, 
phileō) moves on an entirely different plane” including the notion of “reciprocity.” TLNT 1:10. Similarly, 
Singer, The Nature of Love, 1:160. Consider also Wuest’s contention that philein is a “love of pleasure,” 
“delight,” and “liking” that “takes pleasure in” while agapan is a “love of preciousness,” “esteem,” and 
“prizing” that “ascribes value to.” “Four Greek Words,” 243. Similarly, see Benjamin B. Warfield, 
“Terminology of Love in the New Testament,” Princeton Theological Review 16 (1918): 195–96.  
77
 Of the former see Cranfield, “Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. A. Richardson), 134. Of the 
latter see Spicq, who argues that in extra-biblical Greek avga,ph is used of superior-inferior relations whereas 
“friendship is properly used only of a relationship between equals.” TLNT 1:13, 10. Cf. Viktor Warnach, 
Agape: Die Liebe als Grundmotiv der neutestamentlichen Theologie (Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1951), 




The supposed qualitative difference between the terms has been especially emphasized in the 
narrative of John 21 when Jesus asks Peter three times, “do you love me?” using avgapa,w the first 
two times, while Peter responds affirmatively with file,w until Jesus, the third time, also uses 
file,w to which Peter responds a third time with file,w (John 21:15–17). Many commentators 
have asserted that while Jesus asks Peter twice whether he “loves” him with the highest, divine 
love of avgapa,w, Peter is unwilling to assert that he is capable of such love and thus responds with 
the lesser, file,w love.78 Others have asserted, on the contrary, that Jesus asks if Peter loves him 
with a weaker form of love (avgapa,w), and Peter is actually asserting that he loves (file,w) Jesus 
with great passion and warmth of affection, which Jesus concedes in his third response.
79
 Thus, 
even scholars who see a difference in terms disagree on the nature of the difference, even taking 
opposite positions. 
Yet, in canonical usage the two word groups overlap with regard to the major aspects of 
love, often being used interchangeably in the NT.
80
 This is true with regard to John 21, which 
                                                     
 
78
 So Brooke F. Westcott, The Gospel according to St. John (London: J. Murray, 1908), 303. For 
Spicq, Peter affirms less than Jesus is asking but here “agapan refers, not to a love that is more rational and 
voluntary than philein, but to love in the technical sense it had in the Septuagint: religious attachment and 
consecration.” Agape, 3:95–96. Wuest thinks Peter is offering by way of file,w a love of emotion while 
Jesus is asking for a higher avgapa,w love of devotion. “Four Greek Words,” 246–47. William Hendriksen 
notes the considerable semantic overlap of the terms but nevertheless sees a distinction between them here. 
New Testament Commentary: The Gospel according to John (Black’s New Testament Commentaries  
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1953), 2:487, 494–500. Gerald L. Borchert sees a distinction, but for different 
reasons. John 12–21 (NAC 25B; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2003), 178. Cf. Kenneth L. 
McKay, who argues that John’s variation is not merely stylistic but builds to a climax. “Style and 
Significance in the Language of John 21:15–17,” NovT 27 (1985): 321–23, 332. Consider also the Vulgate 
translation of diligere and amare for avgapa,w and file,w in John 21, respectively. 
79
 So “Love,” 382  Trench, Synonyms, 43.  
80
 So Moffat, Love, 46–47; Günther and Link, NIDNTT 2:543; Joly, Le vocabulaire; Oord, 
“Matching Theology,” 140; Stählin, TDNT 9:116, 124; George R. Beasley-Murray, John (Dallas: Word, 
2002), 405; Andreas J. Ko  stenberger, John (BECNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2004), 596; Barclay 
Moon Newman and Eugene Albert Nida, A Handbook on the Gospel of John (New York: United Bible 
Societies, 1993), 632  James Barr, “Words for Love in Biblical Greek,” in The Glory of Christ in the New 
Testament (ed. L. D. Hurst and N. T. Wright; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 3-18. Some nevertheless see 
minor differences in the semantic range of the terms while others consider them synonymous or nearly so. 
For the former view see Carson, The Gospel according to John, 676–77; idem, Exegetical Fallacies (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 1996), 51; Leon Morris, The Gospel according to John (Grand Rapids, 




reflects Johannine stylistic variation rather than any intended distinction in meaning.
81
 Peter’s 
consternation relates to the threefold repetition of the question, not the variation of verbs.
82
 
Beyond John 21, the usage of file,w and avgapa,w in the LXX and NT shows significant overlap. 
Thus, both terms are used of Jacob’s preferential love for Joseph (Gen 37:3–4; cf. Prov 8:17; Lam 
1:2; cf. Tob 6:19).
83
 In the NT, both terms are used to describe the Father’s love for the Son (John 
5:20  cf. John 3:35), the Father’s love for the disciples because of their love for Jesus (John 
16:27; cf. 14:21, 23),
84
 Jesus’s love for humans (Rev 3:19  cf. 3:9), Jesus’s love for individuals 
(John 11:36; cf. 11:5), human love for other humans (John 15:19; cf. 15:19), human love for their 
                                                     
 
the Greek New Testament (Lawrence, Kans.: Coronado Press, 1977)  W. Feneberg, “φιλεω,” EDNT 3:425–
26. Stählin suggests that there may have been a distinction in some classical Greek authors such that file,w 
meant “to like” and avgapa,w “to love” with “strong feeling, inwardness, devotion, and even passion” yet the 
two terms “approximate” to one another “in meaning and use” and even in Classical Greek are “often 
interchangeable.” TDNT 9:116. Spicq, on the other hand, contends that “those who make them synonymous 
either ignore the semantics of agape or minimize the importance of the scene.” Agape, 3:95. 
81
 The Johannine penchant for purely stylistic variation is evident in this same pericope where 
different words are used for the lambs/sheep as well as the commanded activity of tending/shepherding 
them and of “you know” (John 21:15–17). See Louw and Nida, L&N 2:293; Moffat, Love, 46–47; Günther 
and Link, NIDNTT 2:542–43; Carson, The Gospel according to John, 676–77; idem, Exegetical Fallacies, 
53; Beasley-Murray, John, 394; Ko  stenberger, John, 596; Morris, The Gospel according to John, 771–72. 
Cf. Edwin D. Freed, “Variations in the Language and Thought of John,” ZNW 55 (1964): 192–93. 
Moreover, the variation is almost surely John’s since Jesus would likely have been speaking in Aramaic. So 
Morris, The Gospel according to John, 769; Raymond E. Brown, The Gospel according to John XIII–XXI 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1979), 1103. 
82
 Carson, The Gospel according to John, 678. So, also, Borchert, John 12–21, 335; Beasley-
Murray, John, 405; Morris, The Gospel according to John, 771; R. E. Brown, The Gospel according to 
John XIII–XXI, 1103. As J. H. Bernard puts it, “Why should he say ‘Yes,’ if he means ‘No’? A Critical and 
Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to St. John (ICC 2; New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1929), 
704. The majority of recent commentators also support the view that the terms are used interchangeably in 
this pericope. So, among many others, Moffat, Love, 46–47; Günther and Link, NIDNTT 2:542–43; 
Klassen, Love in the NT, 389; Johnston, IDB 3:177; Bernard, A Critical, 701–4; C. K. Barrett, The Gospel 
according to St. John (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1978), 584–85; Rudolf Bultmann, The Gospel of 
John: A Commentary (trans. G. R. Beasley-Murray; Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1971), 711, n. 5; 
Marie-Joseph Lagrange, Évangile selon saint Jean (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1936), 529–30. 
83
 Indeed, both avgapa,w and file,w may translate bha, as they do in the parallel usage in Gen 37:3–
4. 
84
 Nevertheless, Spicq attempts to find a distinction even here. He claims that they are “very close 
in meaning” here but not identical. In his view, the “religious agape ascending from disciple to Master 





own life (John 12:25; cf. Rev 12:11) and both terms describe the disciple whom Jesus loves (John 
20:2; cf. 23:23).
85
 Moreover, notice that Christians are the fi,loi (3 John 15) as well as the 
avgaphto,j (3 John 2, 5, 11). Furthermore, in the NT both are used of preferential love (Matt 
10:37; John 11:5; 13:1), misdirected love (Matt 23:6; Luke 20:46; 22:15; Rev 22:15; 2 Tim 4:10; 
cf. Prov 21:17), conditional divine love (John 14:21,23; 16:27), and love that includes discipline 
(Rev 3:19; Heb 12:6).
86
 Further, the avgapa,w and file,w word groups collocate frequently with 
closely related meanings both in the NT and the LXX and both translate the bha word group in 
the LXX, as seen earlier.
87
 Such usage, especially with divine agency, demonstrates that file,w is 
not an inferior type of love but in fact may describe the very love of God. Hence, it is simply 
incorrect to assert that avgapa,w is divine love and file,w is a lesser, human love.88 
                                                     
 
85
 Therefore, the only subject-object relations of love that are not described by file,w are human 
love for the Father and Jesus’ love for the Father. However, the compound filo,qeoj does describe “lovers 
of God” (2 Tim 3:4) and Jesus’ love for the Father is only explicitly stated once, the absence of file,w for 
Jesus’ love for the Father is thus likely merely accidental due to limited usage. Butler thus writes, “For 
every occurrence of phileo there is an example of agapao expressing exactly the same idea. As a 
consequence, the only conclusion possible is that agapao and phileo in the New Testament must have the 
same meaning.” The Meaning, 70. He does recognize, however, that phileo is never used explicitly of 
human love toward the Father but he does not believe “any importance should be attached to this fact.” 
Ibid., 57. 
86
 Lam 1:2 also used both in a sensual fashion. Josephus also alternates the terms stylistically. 
Further, the file,w word group may be used to speak of positive or negative love just as the avgapa,w word 
group may signify positive or negative love. 
87
 The two collocate interchangeably in John 21:15–16 (see discussion above). In John 15:13, 
“Greater love has no one that this, that one lay down his life for his friends” (John 15:13). Elsewhere, 
human love toward one another is paralleled with brotherly love (filadelfi,a) (1 Thess 4:9; so 1 Pet 1:22; 2 
Pet 1:7). In one instance, reference is made to a greeting “kiss [fi,lhma] of love [avga,ph]” (1 Pet 5:14). 
Humans are commanded to “love [avgapa,w] one another” (John 15:17) while the world “love[s] [file,w] its 
own” (John 15:19). In the LXX, Prov 8:17 uses the terms interchangeably when “wisdom” states “I love 
[avgapa,w] those who love [file,w] me.” Likewise, they are used synonymously of the love (avgapa,w) of 
pleasure and the love (file,w) of wine, respectively (Prov 21:17). See also Hos 3:1; Lam 1:2; Esth 6:9; Tob 
(s) 10:13. 
88
 In light of this evidence, some see the file,w and avgapa,w word groups as synonymous in the NT 
while others suggest there is a slight distinction in the wider semantic range although the two terms are 
used interchangeably in a number of contexts. While one cannot conclusively rule out minor variation of 
the terms, “certainly there does not seem to be any significant difference in meaning.” Raymond E. Brown, 
The Gospel according to John I–XII (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1979), 498. So Louw and Nida, L&N 
1:293. Butler contends that the two terms are synonymous since, he argues, for every instance of file,w 




Accordingly, numerous scholars have recognized that the semantics of the avgapa,w word 
group do not posit a unique type of divine or Christian love.
89
 However, notwithstanding this 
evidence, the contention that avga,ph is uniquely descriptive of the highest divine love distinct from 
and exclusive of other, supposedly lesser, terms of love (i.e., evra,w, file,w) has remained in some 
circles and is especially prominent in “popular” theology.
90
 In this vein, the striking increase of 
the avgapa,w word group, especially the noun avga,ph, in biblical Greek when compared with extra-
biblical literature around the time of the LXX, has sometimes been referenced as evidence of the 
uniqueness of avga,ph.91 Some have asserted that avga,ph in the LXX/NT presents a new, higher 
                                                     
 
the other hand, argues that avgapa,w is pushing file,w out of use and, though the terms may be used 
interchangeably in some contexts, the semantic ranges are not identical. For example, the file,w group may 
be used of a kiss (Luke 22:47) but the avgapa,w group is never used in such manner in the NT. He also 
argues that only avgapa,w is commanded and love of the family is always file,w. New Testament 
Commentary: The Gospel according to John, 2:487, 494–500. So, also “Love,” 382. Cf. Danker et al., 
BDAG, 1056; Stählin, TDNT 9:115; Carson, Exegetical Fallacies, 52. However, it should be pointed out 
that familial love signified by avgapa,w appears in the LXX (Gen 37:3–4) and the NT (Col 3:19) and the 
expectation of love toward God/Jesus, and accountability for the lack thereof, approaches that of command 
in 1 Cor 16:22 as well as with reference to the compound filo,qeoj in 2 Tim 3:4; cf. also Matt 10:37; John 
15:14  Jas 4:4. Beyond the specialized meaning of “kiss” in the file,w group, if there is any difference in 
meaning “φιλέω and φιλία are likely to focus upon love or affection based upon interpersonal association, 
while ἀγαπάω and ἀγάπη focus upon love and affection based on deep appreciation and high regard.” 
Louw and Nida, L&N 1:293. Cf. Günther and Link, NIDNTT 2:542–43; Klassen, Love in the NT, 381. 
89
 Thus, Carson states unequivocally, “there is nothing intrinsic to the verb avgapa,w (agapao) or the 
noun avga,ph (agape) to prove its real meaning or hidden meaning refers to some special kind of love.” 
Exegetical Fallacies, 32. So Butler, The Meaning, 70–72; Victor Paul Furnish, The Love Command in the 
New Testament (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1972), 20–21. Importantly, Carson does see a special 
meaning for divine love, but finds no basis for such a view in the semantics but in the “sentences, 
paragraphs, discourses, and so forth.” Exegetical Fallacies, 53. Cf. idem, “Love,” New Dictionary of 
Biblical Theology, 646. Klassen states, “Nygren’s thesis has been all but discredited.” Love in the NT, 385. 
Similarly, J. A. T. Robinson, “Agape and Eros,” 98–104; Oord, “Matching Theology,” 139; Gerald L. 
Borchert, John 1–11 (NAC 25A; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 238; Geraint Vaughan 
Jones, “Agape and Eros: Some Notes on Dostoievsky,” ExpTim 66 (1954–1955): 3. 
90
 For instance, Morris adopts Nygren’s “basic idea of ἀγάπη is that of self-giving love for the 
unworthy” while allowing that Nygren may have been too sharp in his distinctions between agape and eros 
and “equated it too narrowly with the use of particular Greek words.” Nevertheless, Morris contends, “there 
is such a love as he describes as Agape and that it is the Christian understanding of love seems clear. God’s 
love for us is evoked by God’s own inner nature, not by anything worthy in us” and divine love “evokes a 
corresponding love within people.” The Gospel according to John, 293. Cf. C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves 
(New York: Harcourt Brace, 1988). For a recent proponent of Nygren’s view of agape see Colin Grant, 
“For the Love of God: Agape,” Journal of Religious Ethics 24 (Spring 1996): 7.  
91




form of love unheard of in previous literature.
92
 Further, some assert that the NT meaning of 
avga,ph alone presents the highest form of love while the LXX portrays an inferior conception of 
avga,ph.93 The apparent explosion of the noun avga,ph onto the scene has been explained in 
numerous ways.
94
 Robert Joly makes the most compelling argument, widely adopted by 
                                                     
 
very well represented in extra-biblical Greek literature, if at all. In fact, it remains disputed whether the 
noun avga,ph is attested at all in pre-LXX Greek, though the older noun avga,phsij is present in classical 
Greek literature. However, Spicq argues that avga,ph is derived from avgapa,w and not avga,phsij. TLNT 1:18. 
Some instances of avga,ph in pre-LXX Greek have been suggested. Cf. Stauffer, TDNT 1:37–39. See TLNT 
1:14–15, for an overview of the supposed instances of pre-LXX avga,ph and Spicq’s reasons for rejecting 
such instances. Spicq concludes that avga,ph “is proper to the koine.” Ibid., 18. Further, see the conflicting 
arguments of Stephanie West and R. E. Witt regarding the instance of “pagan” use of avga,ph with regard to 
Isis in P. Oxy. 1380. West argues that this instance is merely a copyist mistake such that avga,ph was 
originally avga,qh.  “Alleged Pagan Use of Agapē in P Oxy 1380,” JTS 18 (1967): 143. Cf. idem, “Further 
Note on Agapē in P Oxy. 1380,” JTS 20 (1969): 228–30. Witt, on the other hand, argues convincingly that 
the text should not be emended and the usage fits with the cult of Isis. “Use of Agapē in P Oxy 1380,” JTS 
19 (1968): 211. 
Further, whereas the verb file,w is more common than avgapa,w in extra-biblical literature, in the 
LXX avgapa,w appears roughly 8 times as often as file,w and almost 6 times as often as file,w in the NT. 
Feneberg rightly points out that the NT disparity is “doubtless dependent on” the LXX. EDNT 3:425. 
Moreover, the evra,w word group, also prominent in extra-biblical Greek, appears only a few times in the 
LXX and never in the NT. evra,w appears in Esth 2:17; Prov 4:6 (cf. 1 Esd 4:24) and evrasth,j in Hos 2:7, 9, 
12, 14, 15; Jer 4:30; 22:20, 22; Lam 1:19; Ezek 16:33, 36, 37; 23:5, 9, 22 (cf. Wis 8:2; 15:6). Of these LXX 
OT instances only Jer 4:30 does not translate bha. 
92
 Trench thus asserts that avga,ph was “a word born within the bosom of revealed religion.” 
Synonyms, 43. Spicq believes that the noun avga,ph finds its origin in the LXX as a translation of hbha. TLNT 
1:14. While doubting the newness of the term itself in the LXX, Stauffer contends that “the whole group of 
words associated with ἀγαπᾶν is given a new meaning by the Greek translation of the OT.” TDNT 1:39. 
Similarly, James Hope Moulton and George Milligan, “αγαπη,” in The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament: 
Illustrated from the Papyri and Other Non-literary Sources (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1949), 2. 
93
 Thus, “since the Spirit of revelation has used it to express ideas previously unknown, inquiry 
into its use, whether in Greek literature or in the Septuagint, throws but little light upon its distinctive 
meaning in the NT. Cf. however, Lev 19:18  Deut 6:5.” “Love,” 381. Similarly, Morris writes, “Clearly, the 
use of the term in the Septuagint is a far cry from that in the New Testament.” Testaments of Love, 103. 
94
 Klassen supposes that the LXX uses this word group because “the Hellenistic Jewish translators 
sought the least marked Greek term for expressions of love in their sacred texts,” a preference which the 
NT naturally continued. Love in the NT, 381. Similarly, Stauffer suggests avgapa,w was a “colourless Greek 
word” that was “best adapted to express” the intended meaning of “selection, of willed address and of 
readiness for action.” TDNT 1:39, 36. Cf. Raymond E. Brown, The Epistles of John (Garden City, N. Y.: 
Doubleday, 1982), 254–55. Others have suggested in a similar vein that avgapa,w was selected because it 
lacked the “warmth” and “affective emphasis” of other terms referring to a “will rather than to the emotion” 
and/or a “sober kind of love.” Cranfield, “Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. A. Richardson), 134; 
Schneider, EDNT 1:9. It has also been suggested that avgapa,w is favored in order to avoid any sexual 
connotations, especially in contrast to evra,w. Cranfield, “Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. A. 
Richardson), 134. Cf. Moffat, Love, 38. However, not only evra,w but also file,w and avgapa,w “denote 




contemporary scholars, that the increase in usage of avga,ph and the wider word group may be 




Nygren, on the contrary, makes much of the fact that Paul overwhelmingly favors the 
noun avga,ph over the verb avgapa,w, opposite the more frequent usage of the verb rather than the 
noun in the Johannine writings and the LXX as a whole.
96
 However, Paul’s preference for the 
noun is not suggestive of a distinctive meaning thereof. The usage of the LXX and NT 
demonstrate that a sharp distinction between the meaning of avgapa,w and avga,ph is unwarranted 
and artificial.
97
 In all, while the precise identification of the factors regarding the entrance of the 
                                                     
 
LXX. Morris thinks it was chosen to distinguish from the entire range of meaning of evra,w. However, 
recognizing that the linguistics do not “prove the point” he emphasizes that the distinctive meaning stems 
not from the “word” but the “concept.” Testaments of Love, 103, 125, 128. Others have suggested the 
preference is due to similarity in sound to bha. See a discussion of this in Stählin, TDNT 9:124. 
95
 Joly contends the preference for the avga,ph word group was present in Hellenistic times and that 
the change took place for linguistic reasons from the fourth century B.C. on; specifically, philein was 
moving from “love” to “kiss” (due to the disappearance of the older word for kiss - κυveiv) while agapan 
moved from “be content with” to “love” with some overlap with previous meanings. Le vocabulaire, 33. So 
Carson, Exegetical Fallacies, 51–52; idem, New Dictionary of Biblical Theology, 646; Moisés Silva, 
Biblical Words and Their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical Semantics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Zondervan, 1995), 96; Donald A. Carson, The Difficult Doctrine of the Love of God (Wheaton, Ill.: 
Crossway Books, 2000), 27. C. C. Tarelli suggests something similar prior to Joly. “Agapē,” JTS 1 (1950): 
64–67. Cf. Barr, “Words for Love,” in The Glory (ed. Hurst and Wright), 6, 11; idem, The Semantics of 
Biblical Language (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). Moffat suggests, “So congenial and 
comprehensive did αγαπ ν become in the Christian vocabulary indeed, that φιλεϊν practically disappeared 
during the second century.” Love, 47. Warfield had also seen avga,ph as the word that was current at the 
time, not as a deliberate choice of the authors, though he nevertheless asserts a contrast between avgapa,w 
and file,w in John 21. “Terminology,” 184, 196. Contra the claims of Spicq and others that the colorless 
avga,ph words were given a higher meaning in the LXX. TLNT 1:11. 
96
 The LXX uses the verb ten times more often than the noun whereas Paul uses the noun twice as 
much as the verb. Interestingly, Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, uses philia as a noun far more 
frequently than as a verb. See Catherine Osborne, Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1994), 24, 25. 
97
 On the contrary, Barr states, “in relation to ideas of love, this noun [avga,ph] is no more than a 
nominalization of those same relations and emotions which in verb form were expressed by ἀγαπᾶν.” 
“Words for Love,” in The Glory (ed. Hurst and Wright), 8. Cf. Vaughan Jones, “Agape and Eros,” 3. 
Accordingly, Paul’s more frequent usage of the noun may simply be due to the fact that he uses abstract, 
rather than active, language regarding virtue and qualities more frequently than some other biblical writers. 
Moreover, there are some LXX books that also use the noun more frequently such as Canticles and 




specific noun avga,ph into frequent usage as well as the increased usage of the avgapa,w word group 
in biblical Greek remains beyond certainty, their usage in the LXX connects them with the OT 
meaning of love, especially that of bha.98 It is incorrect to suggest that avga,ph in and of itself posits 
a new, higher form of divine love as this overlooks the considerable influence of the OT usage on 
the NT as well as the compelling linguistic reasons for the increase in usage of the avga,ph and the 
avgapa,w word group. With this in mind, attention will now be turned to various themes of love in 
the NT that relate to the systematic issues pertinent to this dissertation.  
The Volitional Aspect of Divine Love  
This section focuses on data that support the conclusion that divine love is volitional but 
not merely volitional. First, divine love is volitional. That is, God’s love includes a free, volitional 
aspect that is not essential, necessary, or strictly arbitrary. Second, divine love is not merely 
volitional. That is, divine love is closely associated with, but not identical to, God’s will and 
election. Third, the divine-human love relationship, then, is neither unilaterally deterministic nor 
essential or ontologically necessary but mutually (though not symmetrically) volitional and 
contingent. Accordingly, the reader is encouraged to keep the following questions in mind while 
reading this section. What is the relationship between love, the divine will, and election? Is divine 
love the result of God’s unilaterally arbitrary will? Is divine love to be equated with election? 
These questions are themselves predicated on thorny questions at the center of the free-will 
debate, particularly the complex issue of whether God’s will is unilaterally efficacious or whether 
humans possess significant freedom, that is, freedom to do otherwise than they do.  
                                                     
 
Importantly, Paul may be adopting the Hellenistic style of abstract language without thereby adopting 
Hellenistic theological/philosophical content. 
98
 R. E. Brown points toward what he calls a “real concept of avga,ph before Christianity” included 




Before turning to the NT data regarding love and election it is important to first 
understand the nature of the divine will and election as depicted in the NT. Thus, a brief survey of 
the semantics and meaning of the divine will and election will be presented prior to the specific 
association of love and election. Here and throughout this section, NT data will be presented that 
suggest that the divine will is not the only factor in the divine-human relationship and election is 
not arbitrary or unilaterally efficacious (cf. 2 Thess 2:10–14). 
A Brief Consideration of the Divine Will in the NT 
The will of God is a massive concept in the NT, a full discussion of which is far beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. The significant overlap between the terms and conception of divine 
love with that of the divine will and election has led some to define love within the context of 
deterministic election.
99
 While it is not possible to address the entire concept of determinism in 
this space, a strictly deterministic conception runs into large problems in reconciling the biblical 
data regarding divine love (both in the OT and NT).
100
 While the NT presents a robust picture of 
God’s will and intervention in human affairs, the language related to the divine will and election 
suggests in numerous places that God’s will is not unilaterally efficacious nor is it always 
fulfilled. Further, the divine will also shows evidence of being affected and evaluative, related to 
that which God desires, wants, delights in, etc. If this is so, then one should not assume a 
unilateral conception of the divine will and/or election, which is then superimposed upon divine 
love and the God-human relationship. Rather, God allows significantly free beings to 
                                                     
 
99
 For instance, Morris believes that “God wills to love men and he loves according to his own 
purpose of election, not according to the actions of men.” Testaments of Love, 160. Thus, for Morris 
unilateral “predestination and love go together.” Ibid., 191. Similarly, see Agape and Eros, 214. 
100
 Since the priority of the divine will is well-known and well-represented in the Bible and in 
numerous studies, this section will primarily draw attention to the usages of the divine will that do not 
appear to fit into a conception of unilateral determinism. Importantly, those sections that depict a robust 
will and relate directly to divine love will be taken up further below. Moreover, a hypothesis regarding how 
the perspective depicted here accords with the strong statements often used to assert unilateral determinism 




significantly affect the actual course of history. As such, the conception of the divine will in the 
NT does not support a deterministic metaphysic.
101
  
The two most significant word groups related to the divine will are qe,lw and bou,lomai.102 
The NT usage of these terms suggests that they do not necessarily refer to a unilaterally 
efficacious will.
103
 The qe,lw word group relates to that which is willed, desired, wanted, taken 
pleasure in, or even liked.
104
 It may be related to the fulfilled or unfulfilled wish of its agent. The 
bou,lomai word group similarly relates to that which is wanted, desired, willed, intended and/or 
planned, whether of volition or inclination, often with the connotation of deliberation.
105
 With 
regard to both word groups, which are used very similarly in the NT,
106
 there are instances of 
unfulfilled wishes and desires, even with divine agency (cf. Matt 23:37; Mark 7:24; Luke 7:30; 
Luke 13:34; 1 Tim 2:4; 2 Pet 3:9).
107
 Thus, while both roots often appear in strong statements 
                                                     
 
101
 This perspective has striking implications for the overall doctrine of divine love, especially 
when applied to the two main exemplars of models, Carl F. H. Henry and Charles Hartshorne. 
102
 The verb qe,lw appears 208 times in 199 verses. The noun qe,lhma meaning will, wish, desire, 
appears 62 times in 58 verses. Another noun, qe,lhsij, also meaning will, appears only once (Heb 2:4). The 
verb bou,lomai appears 37 times in 37 verses. The noun, boulh, appears 12 times in 12 verses and refers to 
that which is decided in accordance with the agent’s wishes. Another noun, bou,lhma, appears 3 times. 
103
 This is not to suggest that the terms could never refer to a unilaterally efficacious will but 
simply that they don’t require that meaning with regard to the divine will.  
104
 See D. Müller, “θελω,” NIDNTT 3:1018  M. Limbeck, “θελω,” EDNT 2:138; J. P. Louw and E. 
A. Nida, eds., “θέλω,” L&N 1:287, 300. The classical Greek of the qe,lw word group referred to inclination, 
taking pleasure in and/or liking. Gottlob Schrenk, “θελω, θελημα, θελησι ,” TDNT 3:45.  
105
 See D. Müller, “Βουλομαι,” NIDNTT 3:1015–17  Gottlob Schrenk, “Βουλομαι, Βουλη, 
Βουλημα,” TDNT 1:632. The sense of deliberation also appears in the NT with the sense of “consider 
carefully, make up one’s mind, decide” (cf. Luke 14:31). H. J. Ritz, “Βουλη,” EDNT 1:224. Cf. Müller, 
NIDNTT 3:1016. Likewise, outside the NT the word group could refer to initial stages as well as the final 
result of deliberation, resolve. Schrenk, TDNT 1:633. 
106
 The original difference in meaning is widely disputed, whether the bou,lomai root was more 
rational and the qe,lw root more impulsive desire or vice versa. See Schrenk, TDNT 1:629. Cf. also Müller, 
NIDNTT 3:1015. Both are significantly associated with terms of “desire, want, wish” and evaluation. J. P. 
Louw and E. A. Nida, eds., “θέλω, θέλημα,” 1:287, 300  idem, “βούλομαι, βούλημα,” 1:287, 300. 
107
 It would be strange for Jesus to weep over that which he ultimately willed should be the case 
when he could have just as easily unilaterally willed it to be otherwise! This is contra Schrenk’s contention 




regarding the divine will, especially as it relates to his plan of salvation (cf. Acts 2:23; 4:28; Eph 
1:5, 9, 11), neither root in and of itself denotes a unilaterally efficacious will or divine decree.
108
  
The important connotation of desire and/or delight that the qe,lw and bou,lomai word 
groups often signify is further supported by the Hebrew terms that the Greek word groups 
translate in the LXX. These most often depict the aspect of that which one desires and which will 
bring the agent delight and/or pleasure in the OT.
109
 Further, in some instances, the qe,lw group is 
                                                     
 
It is resolute and complete willing.” TDNT 3:47. Likewise the textual data directly contradict the 
overstatement that with divine agency the bou,lomai word-group “is always a case of an irrefragable 
determination.” Müller, NIDNTT 3:1017. See, for example, Luke 7:30. Schrenk recognizes “the frustration” 
of Jesus’ ‘will’ but limits the impact to his merely human will in contrast to other usages which 
characterize his “omnipotent will.” Schrenk, TDNT 3:48. However, there is no exegetically based method 
to assign the verb to Jesus’ divinity or humanity. As such, this is a purely speculative argument.  
108
 This is despite the dogmatic language that is often used such as when Schrenk asserts that 
qe,lhma defines “God’s will as His eternal decree of salvation.” Similarly, boulh, Schrenk, TDNT 3:57. Cf. 
also idem, TDNT 1:635–36; Ritz, EDNT 1:224–25. Limbeck, on the contrary, is correct that with regard to 
salvation “the human will is not insignificant.” EDNT 2:138. Importantly, Müller correctly affirms, “the NT 
church does not acknowledge a double predestination in the will of God, whereby from the beginning one 
section of humanity is excluded from salvation.” Müller, NIDNTT 3:1020. In fact, some instances of human 
qe,lw suggest the importance of the human will in the divine-human relationship. As Limbeck states, “the 
call to discipleship in the word of Jesus occurs as inquiry and invitation, not as a ‘must.’” EDNT 2:138. Cf. 
Matt 15:28; 19:17, 21; Mark 8:34; 9:35; 10:51. Yet, Limbeck mistakenly believes that in John the human 
will is totally “determined from outside.” EDNT 2:138. 
109
 In the LXX, the verb qe,lw most often translates #pex', delight in, have pleasure in, desire (40 
times in 38 verses) and hb'a', be willing, consent (32 times). Thus, it may translate #px in reference to 
explicitly evaluative delight such as God’s lack of pleasure in wickedness (Ps 5:5  cf. 50:18  56:4  Hos 6:6) 
or his delight in the Psalmist (Ps 17:20; cf. 21:9; 40;12) and the lack of pleasure when the wicked perish 
(Ezek 18:23, 32) among many others. The translations of hb'a may refer to human willful rebellion against 
God (Deut 1:26  cf. Ezek 3:7  20:8) or the Lord’s unwillingness to forgive those who have rebelled against 
him (Deut 29:19; cf. 23:5). Nineteen times it takes a negative particle to translate !aem', to refuse. The verb 
also translates the noun #p,xe and the verb hc'r' once each (1 Kgs 10:13; 1 Chr 28:4) as well as a number of 
other terms once each. Beyond its rendering as qe,lw, the verb #px is also frequently rendered by bou,lomai 
(21 times) and euvdoke,w (3 times) as well as qe,lhma and qelhth,j once. 
 The noun qe,lhma most often translates the #px word group (20 times) and !Acr' (11 times); both 
terms are significantly associated with divine delight, pleasure, and desire in the OT. For example, see Jer 
9:23; Ps 29:6. Other terms are translated by qe,lhma once. Beyond its rendering by qe,lhma, #px is also 
rendered by bou,lomai and qe,lw 5 times each, pra/gma, matter, thing, 4 times, and qelhto,j, desired, twice 
among many others two times or less. The noun qe,lhsij also most often translates #px (4 times) and !wcr 
(twice). For an example of translating #px of evaluative pleasure, see especially Ps 146:10. It also once 
translates tv,r,a], desire, request, in parallel to “heart’s desire” (Ps 20:3).  
Likewise, the verb bou,lomai most often translates #px (24 times) and hb'a (16 times). For 
translations of #px with the connotation of divine delight, or the lack thereof, see Isa 1:11; 42:21; 53:10; 
65:12; 66:4; Ezek 33:11. Significantly, it appears to refer to the fact that the people would not listen, did 




closely associated with the terminology of love, often with the connotation of liking, or having 
pleasure in, something (cf. Luke 20:46; 1 Pet 3:10).
110
 The qe,lw group also collocates frequently 
with that of euvdoke,w, such that the divine will (qe,lhma) is in accordance with God’s good pleasure 
(euvdoke,w) (Eph 1:5, 9; cf. Phil 2:13) or in reference to the lack of divine desire (qe,lw) for or 
pleasure (euvdoke,w) in sacrifices (Heb 10:8; cf. Pss 50:18; 146:10).111 
While the various theological interpretations of the meaning of the divine will are the 
subject of continuous debate, consideration of the NT usage demonstrates that there is nothing 
inherent in the terminology of will that requires or suggests unilateral efficaciousness.
112
 In fact, 
the usage of the terminology suggests otherwise. At this point, we will turn to a brief survey of 
NT instances indicating that the divine will is not always fulfilled.
113
  
                                                     
 
reference to the people’s unwillingness to obey God (Lev 26:21  Isa 30:9, 15; 42:24; Ezek 3:7). As qe,lw 
does, bou,lomai also takes a negative particle to translate !aem' 10 times. It also translates some other terms 
once or twice, including dm;x' once (Isa 1:29). The noun boulh, most often translates hc'[e, “counsel” (70 
times), which supports the sense of deliberation noted above. It also translates a number of other terms 
related to council and/or plot 4 times or less. bou,lhma never appears in the LXX, although Josephus uses it 
to refer to Pharaoh’s disobedience to the true intention of God in refusing to let Israel go. Cf. Antiquities of 
the Jews 2.304. 
110
 Thus, in Luke 20:46, the scribes “like [qe,lw] to walk in love robes” and “love [file,w] 
respectful greetings in the markets,” etc. (Luke 20:46). In 1 Pet 3:10, “the one who desires [qe,lw] life, to 
love [avgapa,w] and see good days” (1 Pet 3:10  from Ps 33:13). See also the collocations in the LXX in 1 
Sam 18:22; 1 Kgs 10:9; 2 Chr 9:8; Pss 33:13; 108:17; Isa 48:14. The larger conceptual relationship 
between love, the divine will, and election is apparent in Eph 1:4–6; see the discussion of this passage with 
regard to love and election further below. The bou,lomai word group, on the other hand, never collocates in 
a single verse with the avgapa,w word group and only once with the file,w word group (Jas 4:4). 
111
 See the discussions further below of the largely evaluative meaning of the euvdoke,w word group 
and the particular meaning of these verses. The sense of choice may also be present when these two 
collocate as in the usage in Sir 15:15. The euvdoke,w and bou,lomai word groups never collocate in a single 
verse. 
112
 This stands in direct contrast to the misleading, dogmatic statements with regard to the 
semantics such as when L. Coenen states, “If it be asked what are the principles which underlie God’s 
choice, the only positive answer that can be given is that he bestows his favour upon men and joins them to 
himself solely on the basis of his own free decision and his love which is not dependent on any temporal 
circumstances [in other words it is unmotivated by any external factor].” “εκλεγομαι,” NIDNTT 1:542.  
113
 Many of the instances below may be sidestepped by the determinist interpreter by assuming 
that those who do the will of God are actually unilaterally determined to do so by God and that those who 
don’t do God’s will are explained by reference to a distinction between God’s revealed and hidden will. 




In the Gospels, the sovereignty of God’s will is emphasized, yet, at the same time, there 
are numerous instances of the divine will not being enacted. For example, the rejection of God’s 
will is explicit when the “Pharisees and the lawyers rejected God's purpose [boulh,] for 
themselves, not having been baptized by John” (Luke 7:30).
114
 Further, God “desires [qe,lw] all 
men to be saved” (1 Tim 2:4) yet, not all will be saved.
115
 Likewise, God “is patient [makroqume,w] 
toward you, not wishing [bou,lomai] for any to perish but for all to come to repentance [meta,noia]” 
(2 Pet 3:9; cf. Ezek 18:32).
116
 Yet, it is clear elsewhere in the NT that this divine will that all be 
saved is not actualized (cf. 1 John 2:17; Heb 10:36).
117
 Moreover, the will of Jesus is often 
                                                     
 
evidence surveyed in this chapter suggests that such an interpretation amounts to special pleading. 
114
 As Fitzmyer interprets, “the Pharisees and lawyers thwarted God’s design on their behalf.” 
Luke I–IX, 670. Cf. Joel B. Green, The Gospel of Luke (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997), 301; 
Darrell L. Bock, Luke 1:1–9:50 (BECNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1994), 678; Robert H. Stein, Luke 
(NAC 24; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 231. This assumes “that the βουλή of God can be 
hindered.” Ritz, EDNT 1:224. Consider also the indirect rejection of God’s will by the people’s 
disobedience to Moses (Acts 7:39) and the object lessons, which assume human beings do not always do 
God’s will (Matt 21:31  Luke 12:47). Further, Jesus frequently refers to those who do “the will” (qe,lhma) of 
the Father with the clear implication that God’s will is not always done (Matt 7:21  12:50  18:14  Mark 
3:35; John 6:40; cf. Matt 6:10; John 7:17; 9:31). See R. T. France, The Gospel of Matthew (NICNT; Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2007), 246. Cf. John Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Eerdmans, 2005), 288; Donald A. Hagner, Matthew 1–13 (WBC 33A; Dallas: Word, 2002), 148.  
115
 Anton Vögtle contends that this verse excludes the Calvinist/Determinist perspective. Der 
Judasbrief, der 2. Petrusbrief (Bd 22; Düsseldorf: Benziger Verlag, 1994), 231–32. Cf. Müller, NIDNTT 
3:1020. On the deterministic response to such verses see the brief discussion of 2 Pet 3:9 below. Further, a 
number of exhortations to prove, understand, and do the will of God imply that humans may do otherwise 
(Rom 12:2; Eph 5:17; 6:6; cf. Col 1:9; 4:12; 1 Thess 4:3; 5:18; cf. Phlm 14). While such exhortations are 
not positive examples of God’s unfulfilled will, such exhortations would be superfluous if God’s will were 
always carried out. Other texts with such implications appear in the section dedicated to love and election 
below. 
116
 The attribute of patience itself presumes the possibility of unfulfilled desire (cf. 2 Pet 3:15). 
Moreover, prayers are to be made “according to His will” and then he will hear (1 John 5:14  cf. 1 Pet 2:15) 
with the obvious implication that prayers might be made not according to his will, which he will not hear. 
“It is as we freely yield ourselves to God that he is able to accomplish his will through us and our prayers. 
In a very real sense, therefore, the accomplishment of God’s will in the world does depend on our prayers.”
 
I. Howard Marshall, The Epistles of John (NICNT; Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, 1978), 245. Cf. Stephen S. 
Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John (WBC 51; Dallas: Word, 2002), 295. Cf. 1 John 3:22. Further, Hebrews refers to 
God’s lack of desire (qe,lw) for, and pleasure (euvdoke,w) in, sacrifices and offerings (Heb 10:8; cf. 5; Heb 
13:21). Here it is evident that God desires and/or wills that in which he takes delight. See the discussion of 
euva,restoj in the section dedicated to divine delight further below. 
117
 God wants “‘everyone’/‘all’ to come to repentance. . . . God’s will may not be done, but it will 




depicted as an unfulfilled desire. Thus, Jesus’s will is explicitly thwarted or rejected such as when 
Jesus wanted (qe,lw) no one to know of his location but “he could not escape notice” (Mark 7:24) 
and when he wished the fires of destruction were already kindled (Luke 12:49).
118
 Most 
poignantly, Jesus laments, “Jerusalem, Jerusalem, who kills the prophets and stones those who 
are sent to her! How often I wanted [qe,lw] to gather your children together, the way a hen gathers 
her chicks under her wings, and you were unwilling [qe,lw]” (Matt 23:37  cf. Luke 13:34; John 
5:40).
119
 Overall, the divine will may be unfulfilled, or thwarted (at least in its ideal sense), that 
is, a number of things that God does not want do in fact take place. 
                                                     
 
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2006), 281. Similarly, Eric Fuchs and Pierre Reymond believe this text argues 
against determinism. La deuxième Épitre de Saint Pierre. L'épitre de Saint Jude (CNT 13B; Neuchâtel, 
Switzerland: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1980), 115–16. On the other hand, it is sometimes argued that the terms 
“anyone” and “all” may simply be referring to the addressees of the letter. Cf. Richard J. Bauckham, 2 
Peter, Jude (WBC 50; Dallas: Word, 2002), 313; Douglas J. Moo, 2 Peter and Jude (NIV Application 
Commentary; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1996), 188. Thomas R. Schreiner, however, thinks such a 
restriction is unsatisfying saying, “By extension we should understand 2 Pet 3:9 in the same way as Ezek 
18:32. It refers to God’s desire that everyone without exception be saved.” 1, 2 Peter Jude (NAC 37; 
Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2007), 382. Moreover, the wider canonical theology including 
Ezek 18:32, 1 Tim 2:4 and others suggests that this indeed refers to a desire for universal salvation. 
Schreiner is representative of those who recognize the problem in this verse but nevertheless maintain the 
idea of double predestination. He recognizes that in Ezek 18:32 “God’s regret over the perishing of anyone 
is clear.” Ibid., 381. Yet, he attempts to overcome the dilemma here by distinguishing between God’s 
“decretive will” and his “desired will” that “God desires the salvation of all in one sense, but he does not 
ultimately ordain that all will be saved.” Ibid. Cf. John Calvin, Commentaries on the Catholic Epistles 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1948), 419–20. For Schreiner, “God genuinely desires in one sense that 
all will be saved, even if he has not ultimately decreed that all will be saved.” He contends that “the 
Scriptures, if accepted as a harmonious whole, compel us to make such distinctions.” 1, 2 Peter Jude, 382. 
Marshall, however, comments that assuming that God’s will is always done “in such deterministic terms is 
inconsistent with the freedom which the Bible itself assigns to God’s children, and it wreaks havoc upon 
the biblical idea of the personal relationship which exists between God and his children.” The Epistles of 
John, 245. The deterministic interpretation will be further evaluated in chapter 6. 
118
 Of the latter Stein correctly notes that this “grammatical construction for a contrary-to-fact 
condition indicates that Jesus longed for the completion of his mission, which was as yet incomplete.” 
Luke, 364. Cf. C. F. D. Moule, An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek (Cambridge: University Press, 
1959), 137, 187; I. Howard Marshall, The Gospel of Luke (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1978), 
546. Further, Jesus quotes from the OT that he desires (qe,lw) “compassion” (e;leoj) rather than sacrifice 
(Matt 9:13; cf. Matt 12:7; Hos 6:6).  
119
 Their will explicitly rejected the will of Jesus. Thus, the blame is placed on their choice. See 
France, The Gospel of Matthew, 883. Similarly, Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 951; Donald A. Hagner, 
Matthew 14–28 (WBC 33b; Dallas: Word, 2002), 680; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Luke X–XXIV (AB 28A; 
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1985), 1036. Yet, “God never imposes His love by overriding human will.” 




A Brief Consideration of the Semantics of Election 
The instances above that demonstrate that the divine will is not unilaterally efficacious 
complement the meaning and usage of the terminology of election that will be surveyed below. 
This is especially true of God’s desire that all should be saved. As will be seen, terms of election 
often connote the sense of an invitation that may be (or may have already been) accepted or 
rejected. In this way, “elect” and “called” correspond to those who have appropriately responded, 
or will do so, to God’s call. With regard to “vocation” the divine call may be particular (i.e., 
apostolicity) but with regard to a love relationship with God (resultant in salvation) this call is 
universal. Therefore, the “called” and “elect,” as they relate to the objects of divine love and/or 
salvation, do not refer to those who are such by God’s unilateral decision. God’s decision to love 
at all is a necessary but not sufficient condition for “the called” and the “elect.” 
The Meaning of the evkle,gomai 
Word Group 
The evkle,gomai word group refers to choice or selection, often with the connotation of 
evaluation and appraisal of that which is distinguished, considered the best, and/or excellent.
120
 
The word group most frequently refers to divine election, though the verb may refer to human 
choice.
121
 Jesus himself is the truly worthy objective of election, the “choice” one in the sense of 
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 Coenen, NIDNTT 1: 536  J. P. Louw and E. A. Nida, eds., “εκλεκ ο ,” L&N 1:306.  
121
 The adjective evklekto,j, of that which is “chosen,” appears 22 times in 22 verses. It is used most 
often as a description of those who are Christians, the “elect” (18 times), but also refers to Christ as elect 
(Luke 23:35; 1 Pet 2:4, 6) and once of angels (1 Tim 5:21). The noun evklogh, appears 7 times in 7 verses in 
the NT, always of divine election, which is often in the sense of vocation but many times with 
soteriological implications (Acts 9:15; Rom 9:11; 11:5, 7, 28; 1 Thess 1:4; 2 Pet 1:10). The verb evkle,gomai 
appears 22 times in 20 verses with both human and divine agency of the action of choosing. With human 
agency it may refer to the church’s appointment of someone to office (Acts 6:5  15:22, 25) or to general 
human choices of an evaluative nature (Luke 10:42; 14:7). However, by far it most often refers to divine 
election. Such election may be of Jesus (Luke 9:35), but more often, of humans via the Father or Christ to a 
particular purpose (Luke 6:13; John 6:70; 13:18; 15:16, 19; Acts 1:2, 24; 15:7; 1 Cor 1:27–28; cf. Acts 
13:17) or of a soteriological nature (Mark 13:20; Eph 1:4; Jas 2:5). In some instances, the distinction 
between election to a particular purpose and unto salvation is somewhat artificial. For example, John 15 
appears to also connote soteriological implications. However, it is clear that some who are “elect” are not 




being desirable, pleasant, highly esteemed, valuable, honorable, and excellent (cf. Matt 12:18; 
Luke 9:35; 23:35; 1 Pet 2:4).
122
 Accordingly, election in the NT may be of an evaluative nature 
and is evidently not spontaneous or ungrounded in every instance.
123
 The range of meaning of the 
NT terms of election, including the potentially evaluative and/or grounded nature of the word 
group, is further bolstered by its LXX usage where it translates various Hebrew terms that 
connote evaluative choice and/or desire.
124
 Moreover, the evkle,gomai word group frequently 
                                                     
 
soteriological implications begin. One should neither dismiss the distinction nor apply it too rigidly. 
122
 Jesus is thus “choice [evklekto,j] and precious [e;ntimoj]” from God’s perspective (1 Pet 2:4, 6). 
The adjective e;ntimoj refers to that which is valued, precious, honorable. Cf. Isa 28:16. Elsewhere evklekto,j 
is also used in reference to that which is “choice” in the sense of being, evaluatively, praiseworthy. It is 
apparently used thus of Rufus “a choice man in the Lord” (Rom 16:13) and the “chosen angels” (1 Tim 
5:21). In the LXX see Ps 17:27; Sir 24:15; Bar 3:30; Wis 3:14. Many, but not all, scholars consider this 
reference to Rufus as a “‘choice’ believer (cf. French élite).” Leon Morris, The Epistle to the Romans 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998), 536. Similarly, Robert H. Mounce, Romans (NAC 27; Nashville, 
Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 277. W. Sanday and Arthur C. Headlam suggest he is “‘eminent,’ 
‘distinguished for his special excellence’ . . . as a Christian.” A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the 
Epistle to the Romans (ICC 32; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1980), 427. Similarly, C. K. Barrett refers to him 
as “that outstanding Christian.” A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (BNTC; London: A. & C. 
Black, 1957), 284. Cf. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans (AB 33; New York: Doubleday, 1993), 741.  
123
 Importantly, “the act of choosing (and thus the words of this group) includes a judgment by the 
chooser as to which object he considers to be the most suitable for the fulfilment of his purpose. It is not of 
vital importance whether it be objective criteria, or subjective feelings and considerations which are 
paramount in making the decision.” Coenen, NIDNTT 1:536. Selection of an objective nature was often in 
view by the group in classical Greek where the verb is sometimes used of the choice of that which is most 
beautiful, of the best quality, or worthy of praise. See Gottlob Schrenk, “εκλεγομαι, εκλογη, εκλεκ ο ,” 
TDNT 4:144, 182. Similarly, “the election or recruitment of political and military leaders had to do with the 
merits and the character of the persons chosen.” Gene L. Green, The Letters to the Thessalonians (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2002), 92. This evaluative element may relate to its derivation from “legō, count, 
collect, read.” Coenen, NIDNTT 1:536. 
124
 The adjective evklekto,j most often translates the word group rxb, choose, choice (38 times) and 
rrb, pure, select (6 times). It often translates ryxiB', which may refer to Israel as a whole but often specifically 
refers to the faithful among the people (cf. Isa 65:9, 15, 22). Of rrb, consider the significant usage in the 
statement, “with the pure you show yourself pure” (Ps 17:27  2 Sam 22:27). It also translates hD'm.x, of that 
which is an object of desire, 4 times (cf. Hag 2:7) and !x;Bo twice, of that which has been tested (cf. Isa 
28:16), ayrb (of “fat” and thus “choice” livestock or produce) 8 times and a number of others once. In many 
such instances, evklekto,j “does not express the fact of being chosen, but in a wider sense factors already 
present which make choice likely.” Coenen, NIDNTT 1:537. The verb evkle,gomai most often translates rxb, 
to choose, select (34 times). Cf. Ps 77:68. Such usage “denotes the complicated rather than the simple act 
of will” but the “motive is not indicated by the word.” Gottfried Quell, “Election in the Old Testament,” 
TDNT 4:148. Moreover, Coenen adds that God’s election is not on the basis of “human qualifications” but 
“can only be meaningfully maintained” as it “leads to a response to the love of God, to obedience.” 




collocates with the avgapa,w word group, especially with avgaphto,j, the “beloved,” demonstrating 
its association with love.
125
 It is even more closely associated with the klhto,j word group, which 
will be surveyed below.
126
 





 With regard to the latter, the adjective evklekto,j consistently refers to those who are “the 
elect,” the chosen of God.
129
 This “elect” often appears to refer to those who will ultimately be 
saved, at times specifically directed toward those at the end of days.
130
 In such instances, the elect 
                                                     
 
125
 Cf. John 15:19; Rom 11:28; Eph 1:4–5; Col 3:12; 1 Thess 1:4; Jas 2:5; 1 Pet 2:9, 11. Beyond a 
single verse see John 15:16–17; Rom 8:33, 35; 9:11–13. These verses will be specifically addressed in the 
section dedicated to love and election further below. The terms also frequently collocate in the LXX (Deut 
4:37; 7:7; 10:15; Pss 46:5; 77:68; Isa 41:8; 44:1–2; cf. Wis 3:9; Sir 47:22). 
126
 Though there are fewer collocations in number, the meaning is more closely related. See Matt 
22:14; 1 Pet 2:9; 2 Pet 1:10; Rev 17:14. They also frequently overlap in the LXX.  
127
 Jesus elected some to specific vocations (Luke 6:13; John 15:16, 19; Acts 1:2, 24), which 
might be forfeited, as in the case of Judas (John 6:70; 13:18). Others are elected by God to missional 
functions (Acts 9:15; 15:7; 1 Cor 1:27–28; cf. 13:17). One might argue that Judas was elected to fulfill the 
role of betrayer (cf. John 6:70). So, to a limited extent, Schrenk, TDNT 4:173. However, the actions of 
Judas are severely condemned (Mark 14:21) and if Judas was unilaterally determined to betray Christ then 
he is also arbitrarily condemned. On the contrary, Judas chose to betray Jesus  he “was a willful devil.” 
Borchert, John 1–11, 276. For the argument that God’s election is not truly frustrated in this instance since 
“election (in a broader sense) allows for the possibility of human failure” see Ko  stenberger, John, 222. Cf. 
Adolf von Schlatter, Der Evangelist Johannes, Wie er spricht, denkt und glaubt: ein Kommentar zum 
vierten Evangelium (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1960), 184–85. Notably, in 1 Cor 1:27–28 the election is 
specifically evaluative since God purposely chooses the “foolish” and “weak” things in the eyes of the 
world. Compare the narrative of the selection of Gideon’s 300 warriors (Judg 7:2–7). As in the case of 
Gideon, if God only chose those whom the world viewed as well-suited, the world could easily overlook 
the action of God in bringing about his purpose. 
128
 Election is frequently with regard to the plan of salvation, thus God “chose us in Him before 
the foundation of the world” (Eph 1:4  cf. Rom 9:11  11:5, 7, 28  1 Thess 1:4). All of these passages, which 
some have interpreted to refer to unilateral determinism, will be discussed further below. 
129
 See Matt 24:22, 24, 31; Mark 13:20, 22, 27; Luke 18:7; Rom 8:33; Col 3:12; 2 Tim 2:10; Titus 
1:1; 1 Pet 1:1; 2:9; Rev 17:14; cf. 1 Pet 5:13; 2 John 1, 13. 
130
 It is descriptive of a remnant on whose behalf tribulation will be cut short (Matt 24:22; Mark 
13:20), whom false prophets will attempt to mislead, “if possible” (Matt 24:24  Mark 13:22), and whom 
God will ultimately gather “from the four winds” (Matt 24:31; Mark 13:27) and bring justice (Luke 18:7). 
The phrase “if possible” could be understood to mean that it is impossible for the elect to be lost. Hagner, 
Matthew 14–28, 706; Blomberg, Matthew, 361. Cf. also James A. Brooks, Mark (NAC 23; Nashville, 
Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 214. This might even be taken in the sense that they are unilaterally 
determined unto salvation. Gregory the Great commented in Homilies on Ezek 1:9, “if they are elect, it is 
not possible; and if it is possible, they are not elect.” Quoted in Thomas Aquinas, Catena Aurea: 




“must refer to those who have followed Jesus, i.e., Christians.”
131
 However, the “elect” do not 
seem to be unilaterally determined by God since “many are called, but few are chosen” (Matt 
22:14).
132
 The immediate as well as the wider Matthean context suggests that those who are 
ultimately “chosen” are those who respond to God (cf. Matt 22:1–13).
133
 Likewise, the wider NT 
data also imply that those who respond appropriately are God’s elect (cf. Jas 2:5  Rev 17:14).
134
 
                                                     
 
Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1842), 264. France, on the other hand, sees this as “an optimistic expectation 
that their faith will prove equal to the test.” The Gospel of Mark (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 
2002), 529. Though France’s view might be correct the sense might be stronger, a reference to those who 
will not be misled but not necessarily that they could not be misled. This may be an example of the “elect” 
spoken of corporately without reference to which individuals make up that group or a product of divine 
foreknowledge. Importantly, the NT is consistent that it is those who endure to the end who will be saved 
(Matt 10:22; 24:13; Mark 13:13). 
131
 Hagner, Matthew 14–28, 703. Cf. Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 977. For Joel Marcus, these 
references are to the “faithful remnant.” Mark 8–16 (AB 27A; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 897. Cf. Isa 
65:8–10. R. de Vaux describes the prophetic concept of remnant as a holy community that lives in love and 
fear of YHWH and thus receives his blessings. “Le ‘reste d’Israël’ d’après les prophètes,” RB 42 (1933): 
539. There may also be the implication of evaluation if the term translated “justice” (evkdi,khsij) in Luke 
18:7 refers to the “vindication” of the saints. Such evaluative vindication, however, could only take place 
through the mediation of Christ by his merits. 
132
 The “many” likely refers to God’s universal invitation (cf. John 3:16  1 Tim 2:4, 6  Titus 2:11) 
as “the πολλοί is probably to be taken as a universalizing Semitism, which can be translated ‘everyone.’” 
Hagner, Matthew 14–28, 632. So Blomberg, Matthew, 329  B. F. Meyer, “Many [= All] Are Called, but 
Few [= Not All] Are Chosen,” NTS 36 (1990): 89–97. Thus Jeremias comments, “materially the many 
represent the totality.” That is, “Mt. 22:14 contrasts the totality of those invited with the small number of 
the chosen.” Joachim Jeremias, “πολλοι,” TDNT 6:542. The “few” here, on the other hand, again 
corresponds to the concept of “remnant.” So Blaine Charette, “The Theme of Recompense in Matthew’s 
Gospel,” JSNTSup 79 (1992): 150. Cf. Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 891. Even Moo, who takes a 
deterministic position, recognizes this as “a ‘general’ call.” The Epistle to the Romans (NICNT; Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1996), 530. Here, the “elect” corresponds to the OT category of the “righteous or 
pious” and as such, “many Jews had received the call, but few had become ‘elect’ by accepting it.” Alan 
Hugh M’Neile, The Gospel according to St. Matthew (London: Macmillan, 1928), 317. Cf. 4 Esd 8:3. The 
same phrase is found in Matt 20:16 in some manuscripts but the usage there is most likely not original. 
133
 “Those responding properly may be said to have been chosen. The elect are the true community 
of the people God chooses to save, even as Israel had once been so chosen, but those people must freely 
respond to the Spirit’s work in their lives. . . . Election does not violate free will nor occur irrespective of 
the man’s conduct.” Blomberg, Matthew, 329. Cf. 2 Esd 8:3, 41. J. Eckert likewise comments, “A 
predestinarian misunderstanding of the belief in election is thus rejected. . . . The elect are those who have 
followed the invitation into the kingdom of God through Jesus Christ.” “εκλεκ ο ,” EDNT 4:417. Contra 
Coenen who thinks that this is attributed “to the divine choice alone.” NIDNTT 1:540. 
134
 Indeed, those who are “chosen” (evkle,gomai) are those who “love God” (Jas 2:5), the “called 
[klhto,j], chosen [evklekto,j] and faithful [pisto,j]” (Rev 17:14), and they are “chosen [evklekto,j] according to 
the foreknowledge of God” (1 Pet 1:1–2; cf. Rom 8:28–30). The implication of all this is that those who 
respond appropriately are God’s elect. Indeed, “those who believe and obey are elected.” Schrenk, TDNT 




Accordingly, numerous exhortations to the “chosen” suggest human responsibility.
135
 This all 
supports the interpretation that election is neither unilateral nor unconditional, though it may (or 




 As has been seen, in some instances the terminology of election is clearly evaluative (cf. 
1 Pet 2:4, 6). However, whether the terminology describes election of a subjective, arbitrary 
nature or of an objective evaluative nature (or a combination of the two) is not specified by the 
mere use of the evkle,gomai word group. As such, whether or not election refers to God’s unilateral 
and arbitrary selection of some and not others is not settled by the semantics alone. The words for 
election should not be considered technical terms for strictly arbitrary, non-evaluative, and/or 
timeless divine decision. When used with regard to divine election of humans the term may refer 
to those who are presently part of God’s people and/or those who will finally be among God’s 
people.
137
 Perhaps in some instances the reference is simply to a corporate group without 
                                                     
 
Eerdmans, 1997), 319; Grant R. Osborne, Revelation (BECNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2002), 624; 
Gordon D. Fee, The First and Second Epistles to the Thessalonians (NICNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 2009), 31. 
135
 For instance, “be all the more diligent to make certain about His [klh/sij] and choosing [evklogh,] 
you  for as long as you practice these things, you will never stumble” (2 Pet 1:10; cf. 3:14; Col 3:12). 
Paul’s own claim to “endure all things for the sake of those who are chosen” implies the contingency of 
that status (2 Tim 2:10; cf. Titus 1:1). See also 1 Cor 9:22–23; 1 Tim 4:16. For Schrenk, this demonstrates 
that “election is not a logical point of rest. It is the serious responsibility which confronts the community 
with the question of final decision.” TDNT 4:188. Cf. Gerhard Delling, “Merkmale der Kirche nach dem 
Neuen Testament,” NTS 13 (1967): 305. As such, the “possibility of falling away is not suppressed.” 
Schrenk, TDNT 4:188. The “elect . . . need to remain faithful from start to finish.” Philip H. Towner, The 
Letters to Timothy and Titus (NICNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2006), 505. Contra George W. 
Knight, The Pastoral Epistles (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1992), 399. Moreover, the 
“chosen” may correspond to the “faithful” and “holy” (cf. 1 Pet 2:9  Rev 17:14). 
136
 The parable just prior to this statement speaks of those who rejected the invitation to the 
wedding feast. See the discussion of this regarding the meaning of kale,w below. 
137
 Stein comments that the “‘Chosen ones’ designates those who have responded to God in 
repentance and faith and are thus the recipients of his love and grace rather than to the elect by some kind 
of predestination.” Luke, 446. However, Towner argues that the term tends to be used “to refer to those 
who are at present God’s people.” The Letters, 504. In fact, the term appears to be used of those who have 
responded and are thus presently part of God’s people in some instances as well as those who will finally 




reference to which individuals will ultimately be included in that group.
138
 When in specific 
reference to those who will be saved, however, the individual texts and the wider canonical 
context suggest that the “elect” identifies those who have responded, or will respond, 
appropriately to God’s call to salvation (cf. Matt 22:14).  
The Meaning of the kale,w Word Group 
The theological meaning of the kale,w word group generally refers to being divinely 
called and/or invited, including the possibility of having responded affirmatively to the 
call/invitation.
139
 Whether the call/invitation has been responded to is not indicated by use of the 
term itself and the root never explicitly refers to an irresistible call.
140
 Indeed, the verb often 
clearly manifests the sense of an open call in the NT
141
 and in the LXX.
142
 For instance, in one 
                                                     
 
3:5; Eph 2:5, 8), present (Phil 2:12), and future (Rom 13:11). 
138
 For the position that divine election is corporate see William W. Klein, The New Chosen 
People: A Corporate View of Election (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Academie, 1990). 
139
 F. W. Danker et al., eds., “κλη ο ,” BDAG, 549  idem, “κλησι ,” BDAG, 549. Cf. Karl L. 
Schmidt, “καλεω, κλησι , αν ικαλεω, εγκαλεω, ενκλημα, εισκαλεω, με ακαλεω, προκαλεω, συγκαλεω, 
επικαλεω, προσκαλεω, εκκλεσια,” TDNT 3:487–536  L. Coenen, “καλεω,” NIDNTT 1:271–76; J. Eckert, 
“καλεω, κλησι , κλη ο ,” EDNT 2:240–44. However, the precise meaning of the terminology depends on 
the context, since the usage varies. See Charles A. Wanamaker, The Epistles to the Thessalonians (NIGTC; 
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990), 233. The adjective klhto,j (10 times in 10 verses), meaning called 
or invited, and the noun klh/sij (11 times in 11 verses), referring to a calling or invitation, are always used 
in the NT with reference to a divine call; whether a call to a specific vocation or, more generally, the call to 
follow Christ. Schmidt thinks all instances refer to the process of salvation since “to become and be an 
apostle could not be separated for Paul.” TDNT 3:494. klh/sij is always used in reference to the divine 
calling of believers (Rom 11:29; 1 Cor 1:26; 7:20; Eph 1:18; 4:1, 4; Phil 3:14; 2 Thess 1:11; 2 Tim 1:9; 
Heb 3:1; 2 Pet 1:10). The verb kale,w appears 148 times in 140 verses, the vast majority of which refer to 
the basic sense of someone being called by a name or greeted, etc. Nevertheless, many instances of the verb 
refer to the divine calling.  
140
 On the other hand, Schreiner is representative of those who contend that the divine call is 
deterministic. Thus, in his view, “those whom God calls are powerfully and inevitably brought to faith in 
Jesus Christ” and this “call of God is extended only to some and is always successful.” 1, 2 Peter Jude, 
429. Likewise, for Moo the divine call is related to God “irresistibly” bringing about “what he chooses.” 
The Epistle to the Romans, 582. However, the NT usage and LXX background of the term suggest 
otherwise. 
141
 Thus, Jesus calls his apostles (Matt 4:21; Mark 1:20) and he calls sinners to repentance (Matt 
9:13  Mark 2:17  Luke 5:32). It is apparently a contingent privilege to be “called sons of God” as such 
blessing is ascribed to peacemakers (Matt 5:9; cf. Rom 9:26; 1 John 3:1). Elsewhere, Abraham is praised 




parable, Jesus refers to those who refuse a call/invitation (kale,w) to the wedding feast, symbolic 
of his own invitation to salvation, which might be refused (Matt 22:3–4, 8–9; cf. Luke 14:16–
24).
143
 Significantly, this parable immediately precedes Jesus’s statement: “For many are called 
[klhto,j], but few are chosen [evklekto,j]” (Matt 22:14).144 As such, the “called” cannot in every 
case be identical to the “chosen” and klhto,j does not in every case refer to those who will be 
saved. On the other hand, in many cases klhto,j appears to refer to those who have responded 
                                                     
 
Moreover, the basic action of inviting someone to a gathering appears numerous times in the NT (Luke 
7:39  John 2:2  1 Cor 10:27), taking on theological significance in some of Jesus’ parables (Luke 14:7–10, 
12–13). Further, the verb often refers to those whom God has “called” in association with the wider plan of 
salvation according to which they have been called. See Rom 8:30; 9:24–26; 1 Cor 1:9; 7:17–18, 20–22, 
24; Gal 1:15; 5:8, 13; Eph 4:4; Col 3:15; 1 Thess 5:24; 2 Tim 1:9; Heb 9:15; see others interspersed below. 
Interestingly, this cannot always (if ever) refer to an “eternal” call since in some instances it refers to a 
particular point in time when one was “called” (1 Cor 7:17–18, 20–22, 24). 
142
 In the LXX, klhto,j refers to guests who were invited, even guests already present at a 
gathering (2 Sam 15:11; 1 Kgs 1:41, 49; cf. 3 Macc 5:14). It thus renders the passive participle of arq, 
“called,” in reference to invited guests (cf. Judg 14:11). In Zeph 1:7 the term is used with reference to the 
day of the LORD and in the context of proclamation of judgment, “The LORD has prepared a sacrifice  he 
has consecrated [vdq] His guests [arq – again, passive part.]” (Zeph 1:7). In the other 13 of its 18 
appearances in the LXX, the only instances of klhto,j in the Pentateuch, it appears in the phrase klhth. a`gi,a 
where the term translates ar'q.mi. Likewise, klh/sij refers in the non-OT LXX to an “invitation” to a gathering 
(Jdt 12:10; 2 Macc 5:14). The only other instance in the LXX is without significance for the theological 
meaning of the term (Jer 38:6). The verb kale,w appears 458 times in 432 verses in the LXX, the vast 
majority of which translates arq, “call” (over 340 times), with its various meanings. 
143
 Thus, Jesus speaks of those “called” (kale,w) to the “wedding feast” who were “unwilling 
[qe,lw] to come” and, accordingly, “those who were invited [kale,w] were not worthy [a;xioj]” and others are 
therefore invited (Matt 22:3–4, 8–9; cf. Luke 14:16–24). This “invitation implies obedience. . . . Nowhere 
do we read that those invited are forced to refuse. The whole point of the parable is that one does not have 
to decline or to appear in an unsuitable garment.” Schrenk, TDNT 4:186. Similarly, France, The Gospel of 
Matthew, 827; Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 892. Notably, the parable is directed at those who were 
“chosen” but ultimately reject God’s will for them. Likewise, in Luke 14:16–24 a number of potential 
guests were invited but they make excuses and refuse to come, therefore the master brings others. Finally, 
the master proclaims, “none of those men who were invited shall taste of my dinner” (Luke 14:24). Later in 
the NT, the verb is explicitly used with reference to a salvific invitation: “Blessed are those who are invited 
[kale,w] to the marriage supper of the Lamb” (Rev 19:9). This does not necessarily refer to a limited 
invitation since elsewhere in Revelation those who are “blessed” are consistently those who responded 
appropriately (Rev 1:3; 14:13; 16:15; 22:7, 14; cf. also the context of Rev 19:8).  
144
 Schmidt contends that this is a dialectical and paradoxical saying that actually means “many 
are called and yet few are called  many are elected and yet few are elected.” TDNT 3:495. However, 
Schmidt’s interpretation misses the point of the preceding parable regarding those who rejected the 
invitation to the wedding feast. On the other hand, Coenen rightly notes that “at least from the standpoint of 





(and/or will respond) affirmatively to the invitation/call (cf. Rom 1:6–7; 8:28; 1 Cor 1:2, 24; Jude 
1; Rev 17:14).
145
 Elsewhere, the divine “call” entails the pursuit of the goal or prize (Phil 3:14). 
Further, language of the divine call to salvation often appears alongside exhortation.
146
 For 
example, Paul implores his audience to “walk in a manner worthy [avxi,wj] of the calling [klh/sij] 
with which you have been called [kale,w]” (Eph 4:1). Likewise, Paul exhorts the “brethren 
beloved by the Lord,” those who had been “chosen” (aìre,w) by God “from the beginning for 
salvation” (2 Thess 2:13) “that our God will count you worthy [avxio,w] of your calling [klh/sij]” 
(2 Thess 1:11; cf. also 2:14–15).
147
 The implication is that God may not deem them worthy and, 
as such, the call is not unilaterally efficacious.
148
 Accordingly Peter exhorts the “brethren” to be 
                                                     
 
145
 These are “those who by their loyalty ratify their calling and election” (cf. 2 Pet 1:10). Moffat, 
Love, 202. Similarly, Mounce, The Book of Revelation, 319. The “necessary response is seen in their 
remaining ‘faithful.’” Osborne, Revelation, 624. klh/sij is used in reference to those “called . . . with a holy 
calling” not according to works but according to the divine purpose (2 Tim 1:9) and God will never revoke 
his call (Rom 11:29). However, the divine call may be rejected by the human. The recipients of “His 
calling” are those “who believe” (Eph 1:18–19). 
146
 Notice especially the exhortation to “pursue righteousness, godliness, faith, love, perseverance 
and gentleness” and “take hold of [evpilamba,nomai] the eternal life to which you were called [kale,w]” (1 
Tim 6:11–12). In many other cases, the context is exhortation (Gal 1:6; 5:13; Eph 4:1; 1 Thess 2:12; 4:7; 2 
Thess 1:11; 2:13–15; 1 Tim 6:12; 1 Pet 1:15; 2:9, 21; 3:9; 5:10; 2 Pet 1:3).  
147
 The soteriological intention of this exhortation is evident in the verses just prior (cf. 2 Thess 
1:7–10). There is disagreement over whether avxio,w means to make or deem worthy. Abraham J. Malherbe 
believes it means here to “make worthy.” The Letters to the Thessalonians (AB 32B; New York: 
Doubleday, 2000), 410. Cf. Fee, The First and Second Epistles, 265. However, Wanamaker points out that 
“with the possible exception of Ep. Diog.  9:1 no other examples” of the sense “to make worthy” for avxio,w” 
are known. On account of this we should stay with the normal denotation of the word, “to consider 
worthy.” The Epistles to the Thessalonians, 233. So G. L. Green, The Letters, 296; James Everett Frame, A 
Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians (New York: C. 
Scribner's Sons, 1912), 239–40; F. F. Bruce, 1 and 2 Thessalonians (WBC 45; Dallas: Word, 2002); 156. 
This is “substantiated by” the use of kataxio,w, to deem worthy, in 2 Thess 1:5. The Epistles, 233. See I. 
Howard Marshall, “Election and Calling to Salvation in 1 and 2 Thessalonians,” in The Thessalonian 
Correspondence (BETL 87; ed. R. F. Collins; Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 1990). 
148
 This evaluation of worthiness accords with Paul’s exhortation in 1 Thess 2:12 to “walk in a 
manner worthy of the God who calls [avxi,wj] you” (cf. also Matt 22:8  Eph 4:1  Phil 1:27  Col 1:10) as well 
as the numerous other statements about the necessity of divine approval in the final judgment. For G. L. 
Green, “these citations speak to us of those who are evaluated and found worthy of some kind of honor.” 
The Letters, 296. This complements the frequent collocation with the language of holiness. For instance, 
reference is made in the NT to those “called as saints,” the klhtoi/j a`gi,oij (Rom 1:7; cf. 1 Cor 1:2). These 
terms (klhto,j and a[gioj) collocate in 13 verses in the LXX as klhth. a`gi,a, the translation of vd<qo-ar”q.mi, that 




“all the more diligent to make certain His calling and choosing you  for as long as you practice 
these things, you will never stumble” (2 Pet 1:10).
149
 
Thus, the usage of the word group in the NT (as well as the LXX background of the term) 
suggests that, contra the tendency of some interpreters to refer to the “called” as those determined 
to be saved,
150
 klhto,j may refer simply to those who are invited but have the ability to decline the 
invitation (Matt 22:14) whereas in other places it appears to refer to those who have been invited 
and responded (or will respond, cf. Rom 8:28–29) appropriately to the invitation.
151
 As such, it 
                                                     
 
terminology closely resembles language of OT Israel. Further, the “called” are often exhorted to be holy. 
For example, “God has not called us for the purpose of impurity, but in sanctification (1 Thess 4:7; cf. Heb 
2:11  3:1). See also Eph 1:18  2 Tim 1:9  1 Pet 1:15  2:9. Some scholars argue that “holiness” in such 
contexts refers to “status” rather than “behavior.” So Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 55. Similarly, 
Barclay Moon Newman and Eugene Albert Nida, A Handbook on Paul’s Letter to the Romans (New York: 
United Bible Societies, 1994), 12-13; James D. G. Dunn, Romans 1–8 (WBC 38A; Dallas: Word, 2002), 
19. However, while the word group often does refer to such status it may be a false dichotomy to separate 
the two too starkly. The status expects a corresponding behavior that should be strived for, if not fully 
attained prior to the eschaton (cf. 1 Thess 4:7; 1 Pet 1:15). 
149
 “Christ has called the Christian into his kingdom (v 3), promising him immortality (v 4), but an 
appropriate moral response is required if his final salvation is to be guaranteed. Bauckham, 2 Peter, Jude, 
190. Cf. Wisd. 6:17–20. The conditionality here is real: “Virtue will keep one from the disaster of 
stumbling and never arriving at the eschatological home.” Davids, The Letters, 188. Such diligence is not 
merely for “subjective assurance” as in the interpretation of Luther and Calvin but “objectively necessary 
for the attainment of final salvation.” Bauckham, 2 Peter, Jude, 190. So, also Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter Jude, 
305. Cf. Barn. 4:13. So, also Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter Jude, 305. Cf. Vögtle, Der Judasbrief, der 2, 154; Fuchs 
and Reymond, La deuxième Épitre, 60.  
150
 For example, Schreiner contends that klhto,j refers to an “effectual” calling that “overcomes 
human resistance” and “not merely an invitation” since he believes that “God’s unstoppable purpose in 
calling believers to salvation cannot be frustrated.” Romans (BECNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1998), 
450–51. So, also, Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 530–31, 582. Similarly, Mounce, Romans, 188; Judith 
M. Gundry Volf, Paul and Perseverance: Staying in and Falling away (WUNT 37; Tübingen: JCB Mohr, 
1990), 59–60. Cf. Bruce, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 13. Klein recognizes that the sense of “summon” could fit 
as a meaning of this term but favors “designate as” because the former “implicitly includes some response” 
whereas, in his view, the term should be seen as “strictly God’s action.” “Paul’s Use of Kalein: A 
Proposal,” JETS 27 (1984): 62–64. 
151
 Cf. Blomberg, Matthew, 329. Thus, at times Paul speaks of the klhtoi. with the “implication 
that the call is accepted.” Those who are “summoned” for a special purpose will be saved “if their career 
runs its normal course” but “evklektoi, only shows that they are in the right way to reach it. . . . If they lose 
it, they will do so by their own fault.” Sanday and Headlam, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary, 220–
21. Likewise, R. C. H. Lenski points out that while in Matthew klhtoi. may refer to those who hear the 
gospel call “irrespective of whether they accept it or not, in the epistles the term is used in the pregnant 
sense and includes the acceptance.” The Interpretation of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans (Columbus, 
Ohio: Wartburg Press, 1945), 553. Similarly, see James Morison, Exposition of the Ninth Chapter of the 




may be descriptive of the universal call of God to a loving relationship.
152
 The kale,w word group 




Overall, this understanding of the divine will, calling, and election as not unilaterally 
efficacious dovetails with the other canonical data regarding divine love. Consistently, the divine-
human love relationship is presented as one of give and take.
154
 One who wishes to maintain that 
the divine will, plan, and election are unilaterally effective, amounting to the omnicausality of the 
divine will, must show how such a presupposition can accord with the inner logic apparent in the 
rest of the data of Scripture.  
The Volitional Aspect of Divine Love in the Gospels-Acts 
The primary relationship between love and election in the Gospels consists of the overlap 
between Jesus’ status as God’s chosen and as his “beloved.” Thus, God refers to Jesus as “My 
Servant whom I have chosen [aìreti,zw]; My beloved [avgaphto,j] in whom My soul is well-




 Cf. 1 Tim 2:4, 6, which implies a universal call without the explicit language of calling or 
election. All are called to a relationship with God but not all will respond. “Never is the implication given 
that God intends to accept some and to reject others. The New Testament affirms absolutely that it is God’s 
will that all men would come to know him.” B. M. Newman and Nida, A Handbook on Paul’s Letter, 166–
67. Likewise, Frédéric Louis Godet argues emphatically that such a call is an “invitation” and “all are alike 
seriously called.” Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1883), 
323. For others who view God’s “call” as universal see Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Paul’s Epistle, 
553–54; Kenneth Grayston, The Epistle to the Romans (Epworth Commentaries; Peterborough, Eng.: 
Epworth Press, 1997), 74–75. Cf. Matt 22:14.  
153
 Thus, the “beloved” are those “called as saints” (Rom 1:7) and “those who love God” are 
paralleled with “those who are called” (Rom 8:28). See also Rom 1:7; 9:11–13, 25; 11:29; Gal 5:13; Eph 
4:1–2; Col 3:12, 14–15; 1 Thess 2:8, 12; 4:7, 9; 2 Thess 2:13–16; 1 Tim 6:11–12; 2 Tim 2:22; Jas 2:5, 7; 1 
Pet 2:9–11; 1 John 3:1; Jude 1. However, Günther goes too far when he contends, “The klētoi (“called”) are 
the agapētoi (“beloved”) (Rom. 1:7  Col. 3:12).” Günther and Link, NIDNTT 2:544. While the terms may 
refer to the same group, they are not thereby identical terms. The relation of the two concepts will be 
clarified as these texts are discussed in the section dedicated to love and election further below. 
154
 Thus, not only the internal data regarding the divine will and plan suggest the fallacy of divine 
omnicausality but also the other data related to my study would require such a view in order to be 
consistent with regard to the divine-human relationship. See the compelling argument against a 




pleased [euvdoke,w]” (Matt 12:18).155 That Jesus is God’s elect one demonstrates that such election 
is not arbitrary, since Jesus himself is the uniquely worthy object of divine pleasure and qualified 
to be God’s “Chosen [evkle,gomai] One” (Luke 9:35).156 Election is also closely associated with 
love in that the very objects of Christ’s greatest love (John 15:13) are those that “did not choose 
[evkle,gomai]” him but rather, he “chose [evkle,gomai] and appointed [ti,qhmi] them to bear fruit” 
(John 15:16; cf. John 15:19). Significantly, however, they are his “friends” only if they obey him 
(John 15:14) and, as such, this is not an unconditional election. 
The Volitional Aspect of Divine Love in the Pauline Writings 
Although unilateral election is not taught in the Pauline writings, the priority and 
importance of divine volition to the divine-human love relationship are readily apparent in the 
correspondence between love and election. The close relationship between calling, election, and 
love is seen in numerous references to those who are loved by God. Specifically, divine election 
is predicated on God’s love. Thus, Paul refers to the “brethren [avdelfoi] beloved [hvgaphme,noi] by 
God” who manifest evidence of God’s “choice [evklogh.n]” of them (1 Thess 1:4  cf. 3).157 
                                                     
 
Doubleday, 1974), 87–88, 105–9.  
155
 Moffat comments that beloved and elect are interchangeable in Matt 12:18. Love, 78. However, 
as shall be seen, the relationship of the two is more complicated, which Moffat himself recognizes. Cf. 
ibid., 202. 
156
 Evaluation is further evident in the overlap between this election of Jesus and the parallel 
statements at the Transfiguration, which refer instead to his status as “beloved” (avgaphto,j), the one who is 
pleasing (euvdoke,w) to God (Matt 17:5; Mark 9:7; cf. Matt 3:17; 12:18; Mark 1:11; Luke 3:22). The TR has 
avgaphto.j here instead of “chosen” but this is widely considered to be a scribal harmonization. Moreover, 
Jesus is ridiculed on the cross with the challenge that he should save himself if he is “the Christ of God, His 
Chosen One” (Luke 23:35). Elsewhere, Matthew records this jeer in explicitly evaluative language: let God 
rescue him “if He delights [qe,lw] in Him  for He said, ‘I am the Son of God’” (Matt 27:43). The evaluative 
nature of Jesus’ election will be taken up further below. 
157
 This complements the OT perspective on love and election (cf. Deut 4:37; 7:7–8). Malherbe 
renders, “you, whom God loved, he has chosen” and believes the participle here and in 2 Thess 2:13 
focuses on “God’s election as an act of love.” The Letters, 105, 110. So G. L. Green, The Letters, 92; D. 
Michael Martin, 1, 2 Thessalonians (NAC 33; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 57. Fee 
concurs that “election . . . is always seen as an action of God’s love.” The First and Second Epistles, 31. At 
the same time, the elect are here those who have already responded appropriately to God (cf. 1 Thess 1:3, 




Likewise, Paul refers to the “brethren beloved by the Lord” whom “God has chosen [aìre,w]158 . . . 
from the beginning
159
 for salvation through sanctification” (2 Thess 2:13) who have been “called” 
that they might “gain the glory” of Christ and are further exhorted to “stand firm” (2 Thess 2:14–
15). Importantly, such election is not depicted as unconditional and/or non-evaluative. Rather, in 
contrast to the elect, those who perish do so “because they did not receive the love of the truth so 
as to be saved” (2 Thess 2:10).
160
 Accordingly, calling and election on the basis of divine love is 
to be reflected in Christian behavior. Thus, the “chosen [evklekto,j] of God” are said to be “holy 
[a[gioj] and beloved [hvgaphme,noi]” while being exhorted to manifest love (Col 3:12).161  
Second Corinthians 5:14, absent the usual language of election, is sometimes taken to 
imply that divine love unilaterally determines the actions of its object(s).
162
 There Paul asserts, 




 This term might simply mean “prefer.” Elsewhere it refers to that which is selected or a 
decision made based on preference (cf. Phil 1:22; Heb 11:25). 
159
 The reading here is uncertain due to a textual variant with manuscript support on both sides. It 
might have originally read avpV arch/j, “from the beginning” (cf. NIV, RSV, NASB) or avparch.n, “firstfruits” 
(NAB, GNB). Cf. Rom 16:5; Rev 14:4.  
160
 This lack of love for the truth is further associated with unbelief and pleasure [euvdoki,a] in 
wickedness (2 Thess 2:12). In the end, the direction of their affections is related to their decision to neither 
believe nor love the truth, which condemns them, they have rejected the divine “calling” (2 Thess 2:14). 
“The causal clause [avnqV w-n] makes clear that they suffer their fate because they have ‘refused to love the 
truth.’” D. M. Martin, 1, 2 Thessalonians, 246. So Fee adds, “They are headed for ‘destruction’ precisely 
because they ‘were not receptive,’” that is, they rejected the truth. The First and Second Epistles, 294. So 
Wanamaker, The Epistles, 261, 263; Bruce, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 174; D. M. Martin, 1, 2 Thessalonians, 
250; George Milligan, St. Pauls Epistles to the Thessalonians: The Greek Text with Introduction and Notes 
(London: Macmillan, 1908), 105. Cf. G. L. Green, The Letters, 323–24; Malherbe, The Letters, 426. 
161
 It is highly significant that those who are “chosen” and “holy” are here exhorted to act out that 
holiness. This, along with the OT covenant context of such language, suggests that holiness is not here 
identical to election but a consequence of election, which itself must be maintained by relationship to Jesus 
Christ, who expects appropriate human response. Cf. Deut 7:6–11 and Lev 11:44. Thus, God’s “choice 
souls . . . should inevitably exhibit something of his nature.” F. F. Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, to 
Philemon, and to the Ephesians (NICNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1984), 153. See also James D. 
G. Dunn, The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans), 228. 
Similarly, the “beloved” (avgaphto,j) are “called [klhto,j] as saints” (Rom 1:7  cf. 9:25). 
162
 For instance, Murray J. Harris contends, “Christ’s love is a compulsive force in the life of 
believers, a dominating power that effectively eradicates choice in that it leaves them no option but to live 
for God.” The Second Epistle to the Corinthians (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2005), 419. 




“the love [avga,ph] of Christ controls [sune,cw] us” (2 Cor 5:14) in that one died for all and 
therefore all died.
163
 Commentators hold widely varying opinions on whether this means controls, 
restrains, embraces, lays claim to, or something else.
164
 Although certainty with regard to Paul’s 
precise meaning signified by this term seems beyond reach, the wider context of this passage (and 
the canon) demonstrates that, absent contradiction, this verse cannot be in reference to absolute 
control over human beings, that is, unilaterally efficacious, determinism (cf. 2 Cor 5:9–10). The 
wider context suggests that Paul here is referring to his feeling of being “obliged” to preach the 
gospel either because of his cognizance of the depth of Christ’s love for him or out of the zeal of 
his own love for Christ (cf. Phil 1:23).
165
  
Importantly, it is clear elsewhere that the elect are not only those loved by God but those 
who love God (and others) in return. Thus, the ones who “love God” are in parallel to “those who 
are called [klhto,j] according to His purpose [pro,qesij]” for whom “God causes all things to work 
together for good” (Rom 8:28).
166
 While the determinist may argue that love for God is here the 
                                                     
 
(Gk sunexō, 2 Cor 5:14).” Love in the NT, 392. Cf. Stauffer, TDNT 1:49. 
163
 Though many commentators believe this refers to Christ’s love, the genitive construction 
allows for the possibility that Paul is speaking of human love for Christ, which “restricts” the options 
available to him in faithfulness to that love. Some commentators even see this as both subjective and 
objective. So Spicq, Agape, 2:186; Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics (Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Zondervan, 1996), 120. Paul Barnett, himself favoring the subjective view, nevertheless suggests 
that Paul may have the objective in mind and intends to compare his former motives of zeal for the name of 
Yahweh (cf. 11:2) with his current motive of love for Christ, which might be coupled with the “fear of the 
Lord.” The Second Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT 11; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997), 288.  
164
 The precise meaning of the term sune,cw here is uncertain. It generally means to hold together, 
fast, shut, in custody, or within bounds. Cf. Helmut Köster, “συνεχω,” TDNT 7:877–86. For a discussion of 
the various meanings suggested by interpreters see Ralph P. Martin, 2 Corinthians (WBC 40; Dallas: 
Word, 2002), 128. 
165
 Consider also the usage in Phil 1:23–24 where Paul says he is “hard-pressed [sune,cw] from 
both directions, having the desire to depart and be with Christ” but chooses to remain because it is “more 
necessary” for his fellows. Here, the term does not refer to determinism but pressure on Paul toward two 
differing paths, the one less desirable to him being chosen for the sake of others, and indirectly, for the sake 
of Christ. 
166
 The precise meaning of the phrase “causes all things to work together for good” is left open due 
to the availability of numerous grammatical readings. Importantly, however, the text does not require 




efficacious consequence of God’s unilateral election,
167
 the evidence here and elsewhere suggests 
otherwise.
168
 While it is undoubtedly true that God’s love is the prior and necessary condition of 
human love in return, it is not itself the sufficient condition of human love toward God. Humans 
must choose to respond (cf. Matt 22:37; Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27).
169
  
Romans 9–11 and Eph 1 are two of the most significant and controversial passages that 
deal with the relationship of divine volition, election, and love.
170
 After describing God’s election 
(evklogh,) of Jacob over Esau prior to their birth in accordance with his “purpose” (pro,qesij), not 
“because of works but because of Him who calls [kale,w]” (Rom 9:11), Paul quotes from Mal 
                                                     
 
prompts such divine beneficence. In this way, a “vital ongoing love for God is the necessary prerequisite 
for his active intervention in the affairs of our life.” Mounce, Romans, 188. Importantly, the phrase does 
not mean that evil will be suspended or instantaneously reversed for those who love God, but that the 
ultimate outcome will be good, that is, in the eschaton. So Morris, The Epistle to the Romans, 331; 
Schreiner, Romans, 450. B. M. Newman and Nida seem to capture the intent by reading the text in a way 
that “assumes that we live in a world in which God has permitted the possibilities of good and of evil; and 
that even where evil results from the choice of wicked men, God is able to work with those who love him 
in order to bring good out of the circumstances.” A Handbook on Paul’s Letter, 166. For various options of 
translation/interpretation see Carroll D. Osburn, “The Interpretation of Romans 8:28,” WTJ 44 (1982): 99–
109.  
167
 Thus, determinists insist that this is an “effectual calling” and thus unilaterally determined. God 
is solely responsible for his elect’s love toward him. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 530; cf. ibid., 531; 
Schreiner, Romans, 450–51; Gundry Volf, Paul and Perseverance, 59–60. Cf. Peter von der Osten-Sacken, 
Römer 8 als Beispiel paulinischer Soteriologie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1975), 280. On the 
other hand, Herman N. Ridderbos argues that Paul’s grouping of God’s “purpose, predestination, calling, 
justification, and glorification in one indissoluble bond” in Rom 8:28–30 “is not an abstract pronouncement 
concerning the immutability of the number of those predestined to salvation, but a pastoral encouragement 
for the persecuted and embattled church.” Paul: An Outline of His Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1997), 350. 
168
 Godet correctly sees the phrase “to them that love God” in Rom 8:28 as “expressing the 
condition” of that which follows. Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, 322. The phraseology 
of loving God is consistently conditional in the OT and NT, often supplemented with the promise of 
reward, as in this case.  
169
 Human love is thus a response to God’s “initiative, his prevenient call to such love.” Fitzmyer, 
Romans, 524. Similarly, Dunn correctly points out, “coerced love is not love.” Romans 1-8, 481; B. M. 
Newman and Nida, A Handbook on Paul’s Letter, 166–67. Even Moo, who elsewhere contends that love 
toward God is unilaterally affected by God, recognizes that here love toward God “is therefore a 
qualification for the enjoyment of the promise of this verse” though one “met by all who belong to Christ.” 
The Epistle to the Romans, 530. So Schreiner, Romans, 450. 
170
 Though a full treatment of these passages is well beyond the scope of this work, I will briefly 




1:2–3, “Jacob I loved [avgapa,w], but Esau I hated [mise,w]” (Rom 9:13). Many have equated love 
in this context with unilateral “election love.”
171
 First, the question arises whether this passage is 
dealing with salvation or election to something else.
172
 Secondly, does the latter statement, “Jacob 
have I loved,” refer to election in itself? With regard to the first question, election does not appear 
to relate to salvation, here or elsewhere in Rom 9.
173
 Rather, the issue throughout Rom 9–11 is 
God’s justice in salvation history, specifically the prerogative of God to include believing 
Gentiles and exclude unbelieving descendants of Abraham. Thus, Paul is not “teaching double 
predestination” but that God had not failed to “maintain his covenant.”
174
 
With regard to the second question, love and election are not identical in this passage. 
The statement that God loved Jacob but hated Esau in Rom 9:13 is retrospective, quoted from 
Malachi, written long after the individuals Jacob and Esau have been dead and Edom itself has 
been ravaged.
175
 The election itself, on the other hand, appears in Rom 9:11–12, which refers to 
                                                     
 
171
 Moo contends that here “God’s love is the same as his election.” The Epistle to the Romans, 
587. Cf. Morris, Testaments of Love, 159. As was the case with regard to the same phrase in Malachi, some 
scholars contend that “hated” merely means “loved less.” So Fitzmyer, Romans, 563. Moo contends that 
“love” and “hate” are not meant at all but merely divine election and rejection. The Epistle to the Romans, 
587. So Mounce, Romans, 198–99. On the other hand, Godet correctly argues that these statements “do not 
signify merely: I have preferred the one to the other” but both are based on a “difference of feeling in God 
himself,” which consists of “moral sympathy” on the one hand and “moral antipathy” on the other. 
Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, 350. See the discussion of this issue with regard to 
Malachi in chapter 4. 
172
 A secondary question is whether Paul refers to the individuals or the nations they represent, a 
point over which scholars are divided. The flow of Paul’s wider argument suggests that Paul has both the 
individuals and their progeny in mind (notice the reference in the original context to “two nations” in Gen 
25:23). See the discussion of this issue with regard to the original context of Mal 1 in chapter 4. 
173
 So, among others Schrenk, TDNT 4:179; Eckert, EDNT 4:418–19; Morison, Exposition, 72–73; 
William S. Campbell, “The Freedom and Faithfulness of God in Relation to Israel,” JSNT 13 (1981): 39; 
James D. G. Dunn, Romans 9–16 (WBC 38B; Dallas: Word, 2002), 562. Moo himself recognizes the 
“strong case” for a “corporate and salvation-historical interpretation” but prefers a deterministic reading. 
The Epistle to the Romans, 585. Similarly, Schreiner, Romans, 500–501. 
174
 Mounce, Romans, 199. Cf. Dunn, Romans 9–16, 544–46. Since both Isaac and Jacob had older 
brothers who could have justifiably been chosen by God (Rom 9:6–14), their descendants have no right to 
complain that God is including those who are not of Abraham’s seed (the Gentiles). That theodicy is at 
issue is evident in the statements that frame this argument such as “the word of God has not failed” (Rom 
9:6) and “There is no injustice with God, is there? May it never be!” (Rom 9:14).  
175




the selection of the younger son Jacob over the older Esau in Gen 25:23 and should not be 
confused with the retrospective statement of God’s love for Jacob (Israel) and hatred of Esau 
(Edom). Here, as elsewhere, divine election is predicated on God’s love.
176
 The potential injustice 
that raises the question, “What shall we say then? There is no injustice with God, is there?” in 
Rom 9:14 is answered by the fact that neither Israel nor Edom is worthy of divine love. The latter 
receives its just judgment but the former has received abundant, undeserved mercy that surpasses 
all expectations.
177
 The very fact that Israel has received such extravagant grace when they had no 
more biological claim as children of Abraham than Edom should logically silence their 
ungrateful, misguided, and unfounded complaints against God’s justice toward them.  
Paul goes on to reinforce this point by referencing the locus classicus of Israel’s rebellion 
and God’s manifestation of his character of love: “I will have mercy [evlee,w] on whom I have 
mercy, and I will have compassion [oivkti,rw] on whom I have compassion” (Rom 9:15  cf. Exod 
33:19). Paul’s point is not that God bestows mercy on some and unilaterally withholds it from 
others independently of the presence or absence of human response to him. The context of God’s 
statement in Exod 33:19, to which Paul refers, is the aftermath of Israel’s golden calf apostasy for 
which they deserved destruction by God. Instead, God was compassionate, gracious, 
longsuffering, and abounding in lovingkindness and truth (cf. Exod 34:6), freely and of his own 
volition bestowing undeserved, extravagant mercy on a severely apostate and undeserving people. 
                                                     
 
love and election are separate concepts that interrelate in Malachi but are certainly not identical. 
Specifically, divine hatred in the OT is never arbitrary, but always consists of an appropriate response to an 
actual state of affairs. 
176
 So Gunther who comments, “As in the OT the motive for the election is God’s love.” Günther 
and Link, NIDNTT 2:544. Godet correctly points out that “God’s love toward Jacob is neither merited nor 
arbitrary.” Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, 350. The wider motivation of God’s love 
behind all election will be further examined in chapter 6. 
177
 The question of the justice of God in bestowing such mercy on Israel and not Edom will be 
taken up in chapter 6. For now it should be noted that nothing that Paul states removes human 
responsibility. So Schrenk, TDNT 4:179. Determinism should thus not be read into Paul’s argument here 





The statement of Exod 33:19 is thus not a negative statement of exclusion from mercy but a 
positive statement that God has the right to bestow mercy on even the most undeserving. By 
reminding his interlocutors of this historical mercy shown to Israel, the ridiculousness of the 
claim that others should be excluded from divine mercy becomes apparent. Or, put positively, if 
God is able to justly have mercy on Israel after the golden calf rebellion, how much more does he 
have the right to show mercy to the Gentiles?
178
 
In this way, Israel has no exclusive claim to divine mercy, nor do the people have the 
right to demand that God show more mercy to them than he has already, for it depends not on the 
will of a human being, but “on God who has mercy [evlee,w]” (Rom 9:16). This Paul further 
illustrates by reference to Pharaoh whom God used as a demonstration of his power in order that 
his name would be “proclaimed throughout the whole earth” (Rom 9:17).
179
 “So then He has 
mercy [evlee,w] on whom He desires [qe,lw], and He hardens [sklhru,nw] whom He desires” (Rom 
9:18). Once again, attention to the OT context demonstrates that Pharaoh rejected God of his own 
volition. The text states that he hardened his own heart (Exod 8:11, 28) before it says that God 
hardened his heart (Exod 9:12).
180
 Thus, God gave Pharaoh over to his own decision.
181
 God has 
                                                     
 
178
 Fitzmyer points out that Paul cites these words “in order to underscore Yahweh’s freedom of 
merciful activity  he does not act arbitrarily, as Israel itself knows.” Romans, 567. Likewise, Campbell 
contends, “These words are intended not as proof that the divine election is arbitrary but as proof to the 
contrary.” “The Freedom,” 30. Cf. F. Staudinger, “ελεο ,” EDNT 1:431  H. H. Esser, “ελεο ,” NIDNTT 
2:597. Lenski likewise argues that this phrase does not restrict God’s mercy to a select few but, rather, 
means that God’s mercy is “unrestricted by limits that men may set up. . . . There is no sovereignty which 
restricts mercy and pity in God.” Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Paul’s Epistle, 608–9. 
179
 Notice, there is a missional purpose behind God’s plan. 
180
 See Morison, Exposition, 134–47. “God’s hardening follows on what Pharaoh himself did. . . . 
God does not harden people who do not go astray first (cf. Jas. 1:13).” Morris, The Epistle to the Romans, 
361. 
181
 Godet suggests that “hardening” here is the “same idea as that of paradi,dwmi (‘God gave them 
up’), by which the apostle expressed God’s judgment on the Gentiles for their refusal” of his revelation 
(Rom 1:24, 26, 28; cf. 2 Chr 36:16). Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, 355. Likewise, 
Fitzmyer comments that this “hardening” is a “protological way of expressing divine reaction to persistent 
human obstinacy against him.” Romans, 568. Accordingly, the “sovereignty of God does not set aside 
human responsibility.” Mounce, Romans, 200. Similarly, Morris, The Epistle to the Romans, 361. On the 








Paul proceeds to further clarify his point by reference to the metaphor of the potter and 
the clay (Rom 9:20). God, as potter, has the right “to make from the same lump one vessel 
[skeu/oj] for honorable [timh,] use and another for common use [avtimi,a]” (Rom 9:21). Once again, 
the emphasis is on Paul’s defense of God’s right to operate in salvation history as he has. 
Importantly, however, the language that he uses here should not be taken to suggest determinism 
as if the vessel analogy presents humans as inanimate, impotent objects that are manipulated as 
puppets or automatons. On the contrary, Paul’s use of the same language elsewhere suggests 
conditionality and the reality of human volition.
183
 Thus, Paul writes of “vessels [skeu/oj] . . . 
some to honor [timh,] and some to dishonor [avtimi,a]” and then adds, “if anyone cleanses himself 
from these things, he will be a vessel [skeu/oj] for honor [timh,], sanctified, useful [eu;crhstoj] to 
the Master” (2 Tim 2:20–21; cf. Wis 15:7).
184
  
                                                     
 
person insensitive to God and his word and that, if not reversed, culminates in eternal damnation.” The 
Epistle to the Romans, 597. Further, it “is a sovereign act of God that is not caused by anything in those 
individuals who are hardened.” Ibid., 598. Though he also contends that God’s “hardening affects those 
who have already by their sin deserved condemnation.” Ibid., 600. 
182
 This issue is itself raised when Paul writes, “Why does He still find fault? For who resists His 
will?” (Rom 9:19). It is essential at this point to recognize that the statement is not Paul’s but one which he 
presents by way of his interlocutor(s) and thus prefaced by the statement, “You will say to me then” (Rom 
9:19). 
183
 Mounce points out that in v. 22 Paul goes on to extol God’s great patience and in chapter 10 he 
discusses “the liberty and responsibility of human beings.” Romans, 202. Godet argues that “the use God 
makes of man at a given moment (a Pharaoh, for example, as a vessel of dishonor), far from excluding his 
moral liberty, supposes and involves it” and he does not assign humans roles “merely arbitrarily.” 
Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, 358. Cf. Dunn, Romans 9–16, 545.  
184
 The reflexive force of “cleanses himself” (evkkaqa,rh| èauto.n) unequivocally stresses human 
action, an “individual decision.” Towner, The Letters, 541. This is a “general invitation to respond. . . . 
‘Anyone’ can become an ‘instrument for noble purposes’ no matter what category applied in v. 20.” Ibid. 
Cf. G. W. Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 418; Jouette M. Bassler, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus (ANTC; 




Accordingly, God endures “with much patience [makroqumi,a] vessels of wrath prepared 
for destruction” (Rom 9:22).
185
 Divine patience would be superfluous if God executes his ideal 
will unilaterally.
186
 Such patience therefore implies that God is not unilaterally controlling the 
circumstances but is longsuffering in order to “make known the riches [plou/toj] of His glory 
[do,xa] upon vessels of mercy [skeu,h evle,ouj]” (Rom 9:23).187 Such “vessels of mercy” are the 
“called” (kale,w), both Jew and Gentile (Rom 9:24), and Paul alludes to Hosea, “I will call 
[kale,w] those who were not my people, ‘my people,’ and her who was not beloved, ‘beloved 
[avgapa,w]” (Rom 9:25). Paul thus uses Hosea to demonstrate God’s right to call a people who 
were not his people, extrapolating from the situation of an apostate people who were reclaimed by 
God.
188
 However, according to the wider context of Rom 9–11, this “call” is not unilaterally 
efficacious (cf. Rom 9:32; 10:3).
189
 Rather, it refers to God’s universal invitation to all peoples, 
which God has the right to bestow (Rom 10:9, 12–13; cf. 11:22–23).
190
 
                                                     
 
185
 Here, “prepared” (kathrtisme,na) is most likely passive (the middle is possible but rare). The 
agent is not explicit, the vessels could be thus “prepared” or “fitted” for destruction of their own accord (cf. 
2 Tim 2:20–21). The deterministic view takes this as a divine passive. See, for example, Schreiner, 
Romans, 521–22. 
186
 Elsewhere, divine patience is afforded to allow opportunity for repentance (Rom 2:4; 1 Tim 
1:16). Yet, Moo argues that in this verse God’s patience is not to allow for repentance for God has prepared 
them “himself for eternal condemnation.” The Epistle to the Romans, 607. The purpose of God’s patience, 
in this view, is “to show forth his wrath and make known his power.” Schreiner, Romans, 520. Contra 
Dunn, Romans 9–16, 559.  
187
 Notice, the intention is explicitly revelatory, to make known the divine character. Staudinger 
comments that this contrast between vessels of mercy and wrath is made “in order to explain God’s 
universal (inclusive of both Jews and Gentiles) appointment to glory.” Staudinger, EDNT 1:431. 
188
 Scholars have long puzzled over Paul’s use of this verse, which is originally directed at the 
northern kingdom to refer to God’s calling of Gentiles. However, Paul may draw this shocking analogy to 
drive the point home that they had no more claim to the divine call than do the Gentiles. Cf. Dunn, Romans 
9–16, 574–75. 
189
 Israel did not attain righteousness “because they did not pursue it by faith” (Rom 9:32) and 
“they did not subject themselves to the righteousness of God” (Rom 10:3).  
190
 Those of “Israel” could be saved if they would confess and believe in Jesus as Lord (Rom 10:9) 
since, for both Jew and Greek, God is “Lord of all, abounding in riches for all who call on Him” and thus 
“whoever will call on the name of the Lord will be saved” (Rom 10:12–13). This is all in accordance with 




The call is thus open to all but not all respond. God has not rejected his people (Rom 
11:1), but some have rejected him (cf. Rom 11:22–23). Nevertheless, there is a “remnant 
according to God’s gracious choice [evklogh,]” (Rom 11:5).191 “Israel” did not obtain what she 
sought but “those who were chosen [evklogh,] obtained it” whereas the “rest were hardened” 
(pwro,w) (Rom 11:7). One might at first glance interpret this to mean that only some were 
arbitrarily selected by God and the rest were arbitrarily rejected by him. However, that this cannot 
be the case becomes clear later in this chapter. Specifically, conditionality is evident when Paul 
notes the divine “kindness” and “severity” of God, the latter to those who “fell” (pi,ptw) but the 
former “to you . . . if you continue [evpime,nw] in His kindness, otherwise you also will be cut off” 
(Rom 11:22).
192
 Furthermore, those who had fallen away may yet be granted back in “if they do 
not continue [evpime,nw] in their unbelief, will be grafted in, for God is able to graft them in again” 
(Rom 11:23).
193
 Accordingly, Paul could not be talking about unilateral predestination. Rather, 
those who are “chosen” in Rom 11:7 refers to those who have responded to God in belief and 
who are, as such, the recipients of God’s undeserved mercy and grace (cf. Rom 10:9, 12–13).  
Throughout Rom 9–11, then, Paul has demonstrated that God has bestowed wholly 
undeserved and extravagant grace and mercy to Israel. This is highlighted once more in Rom 
                                                     
 
accepted or rejected. 
191
 This does not mean God’s choice of some and not others but refers to God’s gracious decision 
to continue to be merciful and thus provide the occasion for undeserving humans to accept his loving 
overtures. Contra Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 677–78. God’s gracious choice to bestow mercy on the 
undeserving does not rule out the conditions for an individual’s reception of that mercy (cf. Rom 3:22, 25  
4:16). 
192
 Here it is apparent that “God’s election, though gratuitous, is conditioned by Christians’ 
responsible fulfillment of obligations to him.” Fitzmyer, Romans, 616. Cf. Mounce, Romans, 221–22. 
Thus, Paul again “underlines the point that perseverance is a Christian responsibility rather than an 
unconditional promise.” Dunn, Romans 9–16, 665. Even Moo recognizes that “ultimate salvation is 
dependent on continuing faith; therefore, the person who ceases to believe forfeits any hope of salvation 
(cf. also Rom. 8:13  Col. 1:23  Heb. 3:6, 14).”
 
The Epistle to the Romans, 707. Similarly, see Schreiner, 
Romans, 609, 612. 
193
 Both conditional clauses use eva,n + the subjunctive (3rd class condition) and thus suggest that 




11:28 where Paul states that those who seem to be “enemies” (evcqro,j) of the gospel are according 
to divine “choice [evklogh,] . . . beloved for the sake of their fathers” (Rom 11:28  cf. Deut 7:7).194 
Here, one aspect of divine love is contrasted with another. They are in one sense “beloved” but in 
another sense God’s “enemies” at the same time. This complexity points toward the 
foreconditionality of love, which will be discussed further below.
195
 Accordingly, God has not 
repented of his “calling” (Rom 11:29) but continued to bear long with his elect because of his 
love for their forebears, which itself grounded their election in the first place.
196
 As such, in this 
instance divine love for the Israelites defies the expectations of human evaluation in accordance 
with the salvation-historical divine decision in favor of the progeny of the fathers. However, it 
should be kept in mind that this forbearance applies particularly to a remnant by faith (cf. Rom 
9:6, 27; 11:5, 22–23).
197
 In all this, God has not acted unfairly to Israel or anyone else in his 
calling of the Gentiles to be part of God’s people (cf. Matt 20:10–16). It is worthy of note that 
immediately following this discourse Rom 12:1 begins with an exhortation for humans to present 
themselves as holy and acceptable offerings to God.
198
  
                                                     
 
194
 “Enemies” could be active or passive but it is most likely passive in parallel with “beloved.” So 
most commentators. See Dunn, Romans 9–16, 685. 
195
 Paul is “saying that in connection with the gospel the Jews are the objects of divine hostility” as 
“they have refused to believe in Christ.” Morris, The Epistle to the Romans, 422. In other words, “Israel’s 
failure to respond made them an enemy of God.” Mounce, Romans, 225. 
196
 The translation of Rom 11:29 in the NASB and elsewhere misleadingly says that “the calling of 
God” is “irrevocable” when the term, avmetame,lhtoj, literally means without repentance. In other words, 
God has not changed his mind and revoked his call. Nevertheless, such call may be accepted or rejected 
(Rom 11:22–23). 
197
 Moo, on the other hand, thinks that all Israelites are blessed as the “beloved of God” due to 
God’s promises to the patriarchs “but this status will eventuate in salvation only for those whom God 
individually chooses for salvation in this age (the remnant) and in the last days (‘all Israel’).” The Epistle to 
the Romans, 731–32. 
198
 Moo thus comments, “That God’s mercy does not automatically produce the obedience God 
expects is clear from the imperatives in this passage” but, he contends, it “does impel us toward the 




Elsewhere in the Pauline writings God is said to have “chose[n] us in Him before the 
foundation of the world, that we would be holy and blameless before Him.
199
 In love He 
predestined us to adoption . . . according to the kind intention of His will.”
200
 Moreover, his 
“grace . . . He freely bestowed . . . in the Beloved” (Eph 1:4–6).
201
 Here, God’s love is the basis of 
his plan (proori,zw) of adoption,202 itself associated with the “kind intention [euvdoki,a] of His will 
[qe,lhma].”203 In other words, because of God’s love for his creatures, he has planned to save those 
who would believe through Christ and this brings him pleasure. Accordingly, God has “lavished” 
his grace “on us” (Eph 1:7–8) and has made known the “mystery of his will [qe,lhma]” in 
accordance with his “kind intention” [euvdoki,a] that he “purposed [proti,qhmi]204 in Him [Christ]” 
                                                     
 
199
 This call to holiness suggests that election includes “responsibility.” Peter Thomas O’Brien, 
The Letter to the Ephesians (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999), 100. See the discussion of the many 
exhortations toward the beloved, called, and elect and especially the relationship to holiness above. Without 
such holiness “no one will see the Lord” (Heb 12:14  cf. 1 Pet 1:2, 15–16; Eph 5:27; Col 1:22). 
200
 The phrase “in love” could belong to that which precedes or follows it. Accordingly, it might 
be taken with what precedes and could thus describe being “holy and blameless before him in love” 
ascribing “love” to human agency. Yet, it could also refer to divine love. See ibid., 100–101; Andrew T. 
Lincoln, Ephesians (WBC 42; Dallas: Word, 2002), 24. Cf. Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, 256. On 
the other hand, if taken with what follows, it would refer to God’s election according to his love. M. Barth 
thinks both may be intended. Ephesians 1–3, 80. 
201
 Here, “election and predestination are for the state of adoption, and this takes place through the 
ἠγαπημένο , the elect. The connection here is obviously that the Elect (Christ) bears the elect.” Schrenk, 
TDNT 4:175. Lincoln, accordingly, points out the connection here to the previous language “ἐν Χρισ ῷ 
(1:3), ἐν αὐ ῷ (1:4), and διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χρισ οῦ (1:5).” Ephesians, 26. 
202
 Bruce contends that this is the case regardless of whether “in love” belongs to what precedes or 
what follows. The Epistles to the Colossians, 257. Similarly, Lincoln, Ephesians, 23. On the other hand, 
O’Brien takes it as a reference to human love. Colossians-Philemon, 101. 
203
 M. Barth points out the affective nature of euvdoki,a (see the word study below) that here 
suggests God’s “willingness and joy in doing good are indicated.” Accordingly, this is “far from any idea 
of arbitrariness.” Ephesians 1–3, 81. O’Brien similarly notes that euvdoki,a “signifies not simply the purpose 
of God but also the delight that he takes in his plans. It has warm and personal connotations, and draws 
attention to God’s willingness and joy to do good.” O’Brien, Colossians-Philemon, 104. As such, this 
might be read “the good pleasure of his desire.” 
204
 Some have asserted that the προ- prefix refers to God’s “pretemporal resolve” (cf. Eph 1:4). In 
this vein, Bruce smuggles in language of an “eternal decree.” The Epistles to the Colossians, 261. Yet, the 
use of the verb with a human subject in Rom 1:13 indicates that the verb itself, absent contextual 






 “In him” those “first to hope in Christ . . . have obtained an inheritance, having been 
predestined according to His purpose who works all things after the counsel of His will” (Eph 
1:10–12). Significantly, all this is directed toward those who “having also believed . . . were 
sealed in Him” (Eph 1:13). While some have interpreted this passage as referring to unilateral 
deterministic predestination,
206
 the passage itself suggests that God has planned all along to lavish 
his grace upon those who would believe (Eph 1:13), adopting them in Christ because of his love 
and delighting to save through the gospel, that is, the mystery of his will (cf. Eph 1:7). In all this, 
the free divine volition is emphasized, but not in such a way that God unilaterally determines the 
destiny of human beings.
207
 
                                                     
 
205
 God’s “kind intention” is manifested in Christ’s salvific action, especially the cross. Such 
language is strikingly reminiscent of Isa 53 where Yahweh is said to be “pleased [#pex'] to crush” the 
servant, that is, Christ (Isa 53:10). Such pleasure does not refer to some divine sadism but to God’s overall 
delight in the plan of salvation, of which the sacrifice of Christ was an essential part. Notice the purpose “in 
him” pointing back to the incorporation “in Christ” through adoption. “God’s choice of his people ‘in 
Christ’ is the new element in election. He is the Chosen One par excellence (Luke 9:35  23:35)” through 
whom others are included as God’s elect, adopted children. O’Brien, Colossians-Philemon, 99. Similarly, 
M. Barth, Ephesians 1–3, 86; Lincoln, Ephesians, 23. Christians are thus “chosen” and, elsewhere, 
“beloved” through Christ who is the one who is truly “choice” and worthy of love. 
206
 See, for instance, Lincoln, Ephesians, 23. Cf. Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, 257, 263–
64; O’Brien, Colossians-Philemon, 99–100. On the other hand, compelling arguments have been made that 
this should be seen as a “corporate” election. So Carey C. Newman, “Election and Predestination in 
Ephesians 1:4–6a: An Exegetical-Theological Study of the Historical, Christological Realization of God’s 
Purpose,” RevExp 93 (1996): 239. Klyne Snodgrass contends that “election is primarily a corporate term” 
and as such Ephesians focuses on those who are “in Christ.” Ephesians (NIV Application Commentary; 
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1996), 49. Consider also the arguments for corporate election in Klein, 
“Paul’s Use,” 179–80; Ernest Best, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Ephesians (ICC 36; 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 119–21. Cf. H. N. Ridderbos, Paul, 349–52.  
207
 Thus, “God’s election” is “a preordination freely given in love (modal)” for which “the 
mediating function of Jesus Christ is fundamental  through the Son we become sons of God.” However, 
there is nothing here of a “divine decree concerning the non-elect of humanity by which they have been 
predestined, without any guilt of their own, to destruction and damnation (Determinism). Such a 
speculation has no place in this eulogy of thanks and praise.” Rudolf Schnackenburg, Ephesians: A 
Commentary (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 54. As D. M. Martin puts it, “the fact that God chooses is not 
presented as an act that limits the availability of salvation. There is no direct statement in the New 
Testament to the effect that the option of salvation is unavailable to certain persons or that God has chosen 




The Volitional Aspect of Divine Love in the General Epistles-Revelation 
As earlier in the NT, the election of Jesus is again depicted as evaluative. Specifically, 
Jesus is anointed by God because he has “loved righteousness and hated lawlessness” (Heb 1:9  
cf. Ps 45:7 [LXX 44:8]). Evaluation is also sometimes apparent with regard to the election of 
humans. For example, James refers to “my beloved [avgaphto,j] brethren” and asks, “did not God 
choose [evkle,gomai] the poor of this world . . . rich in faith and heirs of the kingdom which He 
promised to those who love [avgapa,w] Him?” (Jas 2:5). Here, the “chosen” are again identified as 
“those who love” God. Significantly, the “poor” had already become a descriptor of the pious in 
OT, intertestamental, and rabbinic literature
208
 and it is thus fitting that they are here described as 
“rich in faith.”
209
 Accordingly, the “poor” correspond to those who “love” God, who are, as such, 
the elect who will enjoy the ultimate reward (cf. Jas 1:12).
210
 Elsewhere, Jude speaks of “those 
who are the called, beloved in God the Father” and “kept for Jesus Christ” (Jude 1).
211
 Once again 
it is clear that the “called” and “beloved” are not those who are irresistibly called by a 
                                                     
 
208
 Compare Jesus’ blessing of the poor (Luke 6:20). The “poor” is “virtually a name for the true 
believers.” Peter H. Davids, The Epistle of James (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1982), 112. 
Likewise, Alan Richardson contends that Jesus uses the phrase as “the technical expression in later Jewish 
literature, as denoting the class of pious, hard-working, humble folk who look to God for redemption,” that 
is, “the devout.” “Poor, Rich, Possessions, Wealth,” in A Theological Word Book of the Bible (ed. A. 
Richardson; London: SCM Press, 1950), 168. Cf. Ernst Bammel, “π ωχο , π ωχεια, π ωχευω,” TDNT 
6:895–98, 911; Ralph P. Martin, James (WBC 48; Dallas: Word, 2002), 65. Cf. Douglas J. Moo, The Letter 
of James (PNTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000), 107. 
209
 The NASB translation “to be rich in faith” inserts the words “to be” whereas the Greek text 
reads literally “the poor of this world, rich in faith.” Some see this phrase as a reference to eschatological 
wealth. R. P. Martin, James, 65. So Davids, The Epistle of James, 111–12. Here, the “poor person is the 
true pious person” and here they are those “rich within that sphere which is called here ‘faith.’” Martin 
Dibelius and Heinrich Greeven, James: A Commentary on the Epistle of James (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1975), 137, 138. In my view, the phrase is qualified by “those who love Him”  both are 
descriptors of the elect’s faithful response. 
210
 This phrase “those who love him . . . is older and obviously was already a self-designation of 
the pious among the Jews.” J. L. Houlden, A Commentary on the Johannine Epistles (HNTC; New York: 
Harper & Row, 1974), 89. See the discussion of Jas 1:12 and this construction further below. 
211
 The TR has “sanctified” (hvgi,asme,noij) instead of “beloved” (hvgaphme,noij). The former is 
widely considered a copyist error since the latter has overwhelming manuscript support. See Schreiner, 1, 2 




deterministic election, as shown by the further exhortation “keep yourselves in the love of God” 
(Jude 21).
212
 Both that divine love is not merely so-called “election love” and that election itself is 
not arbitrary are further evidenced in the relationship between love, election, and evaluative 
elements. Significantly, much of the election language in the NT, as it relates to love, overlaps 
significantly with evaluation, even divine delight. Accordingly, we now turn to the evaluative 
nature of divine love. 
The Evaluative Aspect of Divine Love 
This section focuses on data that ground the conception that divine love is not indifferent 
or disinterested, but evaluative.
213
 First, divine love is explicitly depicted as evaluative throughout 
the canon. Second, divine love includes appropriate self-interest that is not exclusive to other-
interest. Third, humans may bring value to God through the prior and ongoing action of God, 
especially the mediation of Christ. Thus, God can and does receive love and may enjoy, delight 
in, and garner pleasure from his creatures. His own delight is voluntarily bound up with bringing 
genuine pleasure, joy, and delight to those very objects of his love. Accordingly, the reader is 
encouraged to keep the following questions in mind while reading this section. Can God be the 
beneficiary of human action?
214
 What about self-interest? Is self-sacrifice and/or self-abnegation 
                                                     
 
212
 Contra Schreiner, who contends that “believers have been loved by God the Father, and his 
effective love is the reason they belong to the people of God.” Ibid. On the other hand, Jerome H. Neyrey 
correctly takes “beloved” as a term of evaluative appraisal such that “God has deemed them worthy of this 
benefaction, and so they take honor from being the worthy clients of a worthy patron” while also standing 
in debt toward “their heavenly patron.” 2 Peter, Jude (AB 37C; New York: Doubleday, 1993), 48.  
213
 The term “evaluative” refers in this context to the appraisal, appreciation, and/or reception of 
value from external agents. 
214
 Those who adopt the presupposition of impassibility contend that God cannot be affected and 
thus cannot be the beneficiary of any human action. Thus divine love is non-evaluative. The famous agape-
eros distinction further contributes to this notion that divine love is non-evaluative. Specifically, if God’s 
love (signified by avga,ph or otherwise) is altogether groundless, unconditional, unilateral, and equated with 
arbitrary election, then it could not also be evaluative and God cannot enjoy or appreciate the objects of his 
love nor their love in return. See, for example, Morris, Testaments of Love, 142. Others are mentioned in 
the general introduction to the avgapa,w word group. On the other hand, some argue that even if God were 




the ideal of love?
215
 Is divine love indifferent and/or disinterested? Does God’s love include 
delight and/or enjoyment of his creatures, including their loving response toward him? This 
section of the study will begin with a survey of the meaning of prominent terms relative to God’s 
evaluative love. 
Before turning to the positive evidence regarding the evaluative aspect of divine love, 
two brief topical summaries will demonstrate the existence and virtue of evaluative love. First, a 
survey of the numerous instances of misdirected love will show that the NT assumes that 
appropriate love includes proper evaluation. Second, the objection that true love is altruistic will 
be briefly examined according to the NT data that support the concept of proper self-regard. After 
these examinations, attention will be turned to the significant evaluative and appraisal elements 
apparent in the identification of God’s chosen people (evaluation and election). There, two main 
terms that overlap between the conceptual spheres of election and evaluative love, avgaphto,j 
(beloved) and euvdoke,w (delight or pleasure in), will be examined, thus shedding light on this and 
the previous section. Further, the even more explicitly evaluative term of pleasure, the avresto,j 
word group, will be surveyed. Then, attention will be turned to the significant NT data on God’s 
acceptance, approval, delight, and enjoyment, depicting his positive evaluative love, which itself 
betrays the divine emotionality, as well as the evaluative distinction between love and hate, 
which, together, lead in to the passionate and emotional aspect of divine love.  
Misdirected Love 
Numerous instances of love (both avgapa,w and file,w) demonstrate an evaluative aspect of 
love by clearly identifying misdirected love, that is, love that is directed toward an unworthy, 
inappropriate, or even evil object.
216
 For example, the scribes and Pharisees “love [file,w] the 
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 Some have suggested that pure love is strictly altruistic in exclusion to self-interest or self-love. 
216
 Günther contends that there are no instances of misdirected love by way of the noun avga,ph in 




place of honor at banquets and the chief seats in the synagogues” (Matt 23:6). Luke recounts the 
same example but uses avgapa,w: they “love” (avgapa,w) the chief seats in the synagogues (Luke 
11:43) but disregard “justice and the love of God” (Luke 11:42). Examples of such misdirected 
love abound throughout the NT.
217
 Such misdirected love is itself the reason that Jesus is rejected 
by those who “loved [avgapa,w] the darkness rather than the Light, for their deeds were evil” (John 
3:19).
218
 Humans are not to love the world (1 John 2:15) but Demas “loved [avgapa,w] this present 
world” and thus deserted Paul (2 Tim 4:10).
219
 Accordingly, “friendship (fili,a) with the world is 
hostility [e;cqra] toward God” and “whoever wishes to be a friend [fi,loj] of the world makes 
himself an enemy [evcqro,j] of God” (Jas 4:4). Therefore, the object of one’s love is very important 
since those who perish, perish because they did not “receive the love of the truth so as to be 
saved” (2 Thess 2:10; cf. 2 Tim 4:8). Similarly, in the eschaton, the saints who have overcome 
through Christ “did not love their life even when faced with death” (Rev 12:11). On the other 
hand, the ones “outside” the holy city are “everyone who loves [file,w] and practices lying” (Rev 
22:15).
220
 Many instances of misdirected love refer to a love of attraction and/or enjoyment of its 
                                                     
 
that the reason for this is the tendency of the file,w root to make compound words. Many of the instances 
of misdirected love utilize a compound word, philologically lessening the likelihood of the use of avga,ph. 
That the noun avga,ph can signify a negative kind of love is evident in the LXX (cf. 2 Sam 13:15). 
217
 Later, Luke similarly describes: the scribes “like [qe,lw] to walk around in long robes, and love 
[file,w] respectful greetings . . . chief seats” and “places of honor” (Luke 20:46  Similarly, Matt 6:5). 
Balaam “loved [avgapa,w] the wages of unrighteousness” (2 Pet 2:15) and Diotrephes “loves to be the first 
[filoprwteu,wn]” (3 John 1:9). Many compound terms further signify misdirected love including the “love 
of money” (filarguri,a) (1 Tim 6:10; cf. Luke 16:14; 1 Tim 3:3; Heb 13:5). See also 2 Tim 3:2–4; Titus 
1:8. 
218
 Similarly, some chief rulers who believed in Jesus did not confess him because they “love” 
(avgapa,w) the approval of men rather than “the approval of God” (John 12:43). In contrast, humans are to 
love (file,w) Jesus above all and such love toward Jesus involves sacrifice such that the one “who does not 
take his cross and follow” Jesus is not worthy of him (Matt 10:38). 
219
 Such misdirected love amounts to hatred for the followers of Jesus since the world “love[s] 
[file,w] its own” but “hates” those “chosen” by Jesus (John 15:19). 
220
 The proper direction and quality of love is further explained in various ways. See Rom 12:9; 




object, often with the connotation of strongly liking something. Such love is evil in these cases 
not because of the preferential nature of the love itself as attraction and/or enjoyment (as some 
have contended),
221
 but, because of its inappropriate direction(s).
222
 Misdirected love is integrally 
related to a lack of love for God and/or the things of God. Overall, the very fact that objects of 
love may be appropriate or inappropriate suggests that proper love itself includes appropriate 
evaluation.  
Pure Altruism versus Proper Self-love 
The objection to the evaluative nature of love, that true (or pure) love should be strictly 
altruistic and thus include self-abnegation and self-sacrifice, contradicts the NT data, which 
recognize an appropriate kind of self-love. For instance, while the NT surely emphasizes the self-
sacrificial love of Christ (John 15:13) it also presumes proper self-love.
223
 Thus, the second of the 
greatest commandments tells humans to love their neighbor as themselves (Matt 22:37–39; cf. 
Mark 12:31, 33; Luke 10:27; cf. Matt 19:19). Accordingly, at least some kind of self-love is 
appropriate, contra the notion of “pure love” as wholly altruistic and self-abnegating, exclusive of 
all self-interest and self-regard.
224
 At the same time, self-regard is not to be the ultimate object of 
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 For example, consider Nygren’s condemnation of acquisitive or appetitive love in Agape and 
Eros, 128, 210. 
222
 Smalley correctly cautions, “Perhaps we should not distinguish too sharply between these two 
connotations of ‘love,’ as ‘love’ and ‘desire.’ ‘Attraction’ is a fundamentally human emotion  the question 
is whether that attraction is properly motivated, and directed to the right object.” 1, 2, 3 John, 82. Daniel L. 
Akin adds, “In a sense love is neutral. The object of one’s love or affection is decisive.” 1, 2, 3, John (NAC 
38; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 108. 
223
 Notably, in John 15:13 such love is in the context of friendship; it assumes an existing 
relationship and is thus not altogether unilateral or “disinterested.” See the discussion of friendship and 
reciprocal love later in this chapter. 
224
 Nolland rightly contends that far from utter self-disregard the “text assumes positive self-regard 
and the care for oneself that goes with this. . . . Even love for God . . . should not be seen, despite all the 
rigours of discipleship, as extinguishing the significance of our own well-being (cf. Mt. 7:12  Eph 5:29).” 
The Gospel of Matthew, 912. Blomberg also recognizes that while this is “not a call to self-love” it “does 
presuppose it.” Matthew, 335. Cf. also Klassen, Love in the NT, 389; France, The Gospel of Mark, 480; 
Marcus, Mark 8–16, 839. This is in direct contrast to Nygren’s avga,ph, which is exclusive of all self-love. 




one’s love. Thus, Jesus also states, “He who loves [file,w] his life loses it, and he who hates 
[mise,w] his life in this world will keep it to life eternal” (John 12:25). Importantly, the text does 
not command one to hate oneself but specifically to hate one’s “life in this world.” As such, the 
emphasis is on that selfishness that values one’s own human existence above the things of God, 
thus loving the world (through self) rather than God (cf. 2 Tim 3:2–4).
225
  
Moreover, proper self-love is apparent elsewhere in the NT. Thus, NT writers quote 
Jesus’s love command as the fulfillment of the whole law: “You shall love your neighbor as 
yourself” (Rom 13:9  Gal 5:14  Jas 2:8). Paul, in the same vein, contends that the husband is to 
love his wife as he loves himself (Eph 5:28). Again, each one is “to love his own wife even as 
himself” (Eph 5:33).
226
 Significantly, this is modeled after the way Christ has loved humans who 
corporately are referred to as his body (Eph 5:25, 29–30).
227
 Amazingly, then, Christ’s interest in 
the church is metaphorically compared to one’s love for their own body, their own self. 
Accordingly, this manifests the principle that God’s love includes self-interest but such self-
interest itself includes the interests of all other beings. In other words, other-love becomes 
identified with self-love. In this way, divine love is truly sympathetic.
228
 The divine life is 
intimately affected by the lives of his children because he has made their interests his own. This is 
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 Stählin, on the other hand, thinks this “demands an uncompromising renunciation of self-love.” 
Stählin, TDNT 9:130. However, the point Jesus is making is not against proper self-regard but against the 
kind of love that asserts one’s temporal life as the highest value. As such, this does not necessarily amount 
to utter self-abnegation but to a call of preference for God and the things of God above even one’s own life. 
226
 “Accordingly, the husband’s obligation to love his wife as his own body is not simply a matter 
of loving someone else just like he loves himself. It is, in fact, to love himself.” O’Brien, Colossians-
Philemon, 426–27. So Markus Barth, Ephesians 4–6 (AB 34A; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), 636; 
Gregory W. Dawes, The Body in Question: Metaphor and Meaning in the Interpretation of Ephesians 
5:21–33 (Leiden: Boston Brill, 1998), 153–54. As such, other-love in no way replaces self-love here but 
becomes inseparably connected with it for the Christian. See on Eph 5:25. See also John Nolland, Luke 
9:21–18:34 (WBC 35B; Dallas: Word, 2002), 584. 
227
 This body language is metaphorical (not ontological) since the combination here of two 
metaphors (marriage and one’s body), if taken literally, would be mutually exclusive (cf. Gen 2:24  1 Cor 
6:16). 
228




not “selfish” (1 Cor 13:5) but “recognizes the effect of love upon the lover.” As such, the self-
sacrificial love of Jesus in dying for the church that she might be his bride is bound up with his 
“self-love,” that is, love for his body, the church. 
In all this, though divine love is outgoing and (when appropriate) self-sacrificial, it is not 
therefore self-abnegating.
229
 Rather, there is appropriate self-love that is to be contrasted with 
selfishness. At the same time, there is appropriate sacrificial love, but not all proper love is 
sacrificial. While self-sacrifice is virtuous in the appropriate circumstances, total and utter self-
abnegation is not ideal. Both self-sacrificial love and proper self-love are modeled in Christ who 
laid down his life for sinners because of his love, but Christ will nevertheless be exalted in the 
eschaton as is appropriate to him (cf. Phil 2). The exaltation of Christ is not opposed to his love. 
Divine evaluation in the sense that God is brought pleasure by receiving the love of human beings 
in no way lessens the quality of divine love. God actually enjoys human beings, delights in them, 
and is joyous in their joy. His creatures’ best interest is his interest  this is true love.  
A Brief Look at Some Terms of Evaluative Divine Love 
The Meaning of avgaphto,j230 
The term avgaphto,j generally denotes “one who is in a very special relationship with 
another,” thus “beloved,” “one who is dearly loved” and/or “prized, valued,” “the object of one’s 
affection” and, even one who is worthy of love.
231
 Accordingly, the term may entail evaluation, 
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 Donald A. Carson likewise contends that love is more than altruism. He points to Paul’s 
contention in 1 Cor 13 that even the greatest kinds of giving are possible without love: “This surely 
demonstrates that the love he has in mind is more sweeping than mere altruism, than mere commitment to 
the good of the other, however self-denying.” “Love,” New Dictionary of Biblical Theology, 646.  
230
 While the wider avgapa,w word group to which avgaphto,j belongs has already been discussed, the 
importance of the term as it relates to the identification of divine love as evaluative, rather than 
deterministically elective, warrants a brief survey of the meaning of this prominent NT adjective. This will 
both clarify the evaluative nature of divine love and support the position presented above that divine 
election itself is often inclusive of evaluation.  
231
 Danker et al., BDAG, 7; ibid., 293. “It is used above all of an only and precious child.” 




the lover’s perception of lovableness, and affection, delight, and/or pleasure in someone.
232
 In the 
NT, avgaphto,j refers to Jesus as God’s beloved son in nine instances, and in such cases the 
“beloved” status is certainly evaluative since Jesus is the worthy object of divine love.
233
 In six of 
those instances, the evaluative connotation of avgaphto,j is unequivocally evident when it 
collocates with euvdoke,w in describing Christ as the beloved and well-pleasing son of God.234  
In almost every other NT instance, avgaphto,j refers to Christians, whether of those 
beloved by God (i.e., Rom 1:7) or by other humans (i.e., 1 Cor 4:14), in reference to both 
individuals and groups.
235
 The term is thus one of “insider love,” that is, love for special objects 
of endearment, favor, and affection within the context of a particular, rather than universal, 
relationship.
236
 As such, it naturally relates conceptually to other descriptors of those who are in a 






 and explicitly 
                                                     
 
and Nida, A Handbook on Paul’s Letter, 12. It appears 61 times in 60 verses in the NT.  
232
 See Robert A. Guelich, Mark 1–8:26 (WBC 34A; Dallas: Word, 2002), 34. Liddell-Scott views 
the classical use as meaning “worthy of love, loveable, dear.” LSJ Abridged, 4. 
233
 Matt 3:17; 12:18; 17:5; Mark 1:11; 9:7; 12:6; Luke 3:22; 20:13; 2 Pet 1:17. While semantically, 
both non-evaluative election and evaluative and emotive disposition are possible connotations of avgaphto,j 
(at least according to some scholars), theologically, only the latter is available as a coherent option when 
the referent is the son of God. On the explicitly evaluative delight connoted in many such instances see 
Spicq, Agape, 1:49–50, 53  idem, “ευδοκέω, ευδοκία,” TLNT 2:102. See also the further discussion of these 
below. All 8 instances of avgaphto,j in the Gospels refer to Jesus. Cf. also the use of the perfect passive 
participle of avgapa,w with reference to Christ (Eph 1:6). For Bruce these designate Christ as “the supreme 
object of the Father’s love.” The Epistles to the Colossians, 258. Similarly, Fitzmyer, Luke I–IX, 485–86. 
234
 Matt 3:17; 12:18; 17:5; Mark 1:11; Luke 3:22; 2 Pet 1:17. The only other instance describes 
that Paul and his associates were “well-pleased” to share the gospel with those who had become “very 
dear” to them (1 Thess 2:8). 
235
 The only exception is Rom 11:28 where “Israel” is referred to as “beloved for the sake of the 
fathers.” As such, it often stands in as a description of the “Christian community,” which itself consists of 
those “beloved of God” who “reciprocate that love.” Strecker, The Johannine Letters, 148. 
236
 For Stauffer, this is “the preferential love which includes separation and special calling.” TDNT 
1:48. But notice, with regard to avgaphto,j, “preferential” does not mean arbitrary, non-evaluative, or strictly 
unconditional. See the discussion of insider love further below. 
237
 Interestingly, avgaphto,j never collocates with evklekto,j in a single verse but does collocate with 
the wider evkle,gomai word group 3 times (Acts 15:25; Rom 11:28; Jas 2:5). The close association is also 




contrasts with “enemies” (Rom 11:28). Similarly, the perfect passive participle of avgapa,w often 
functions in the same manner as avgaphto,j, referring to those “beloved,” often in the context of 
election.
240
 Importantly, however, while the mere use of the term avgaphto,j does not itself specify 
how one becomes “beloved,” the usage of the term demonstrates that the status of “beloved” is 
not unconditionally bestowed, though it may be granted foreconditionally.
241
 Despite 
interpretations to the contrary, then, avgaphto,j should not be conflated with election.242 
                                                     
 
Rufus is “a choice (evklekto,j) man in the Lord” (Rom 16:12–13). Both are apparently evaluative 
descriptions of Paul’s dear brethren. In 1 Pet 2:9, 11 those who were “chosen” (evklekto,j) are also referred 
to as “beloved” (avgaphto,j). See also the collocation with ai`reti,zw, “choose, appoint,” in reference to Christ 
who is also the object of God’s pleasure (euvdoke,w) (Matt 12:18). 
238
 The two collocate only once in a single verse of the “beloved” who are “called [klhto,j] as 
saints” (Rom 1:7). Interestingly, avgaphto,j, the evkle,gomai word group, and the kale,w word group collocate 
within 2 verses in Rom 11:28–29, of those who are “from the standpoint of God’s choice . . . beloved for 
the sake of the fathers” since God’s “calling” is without repentance. Similarly, those who are referred to as 
“chosen” and “beloved” were “called” by God (1 Pet 2:9, 11). See also 1 Thess 2:8, 12  Jude 1, 3. 
239
 In many instances the two collocate, often in the phrase “beloved brethren” (1 Cor 15:58; Phil 
4:1  Jas 1:16, 19  2:5) or with reference to a “beloved brother” (Eph 6:21  Col 4:7, 9  Phlm 1:1, 16  2 Pet 
3:15). Elsewhere, the “brethren” are closely associated with the “beloved” (1 Tim 6:2  3 John 5). 
Elsewhere, familial association is evident when Paul refers to the “beloved” just after applying God’s 
covenant promise to be a father to them (2 Cor 6:18–7:1). Similarly, there are numerous references to 
beloved children (1 Cor 4:14; Eph 5:1; 1 John 3:20; cf. 1 Cor 4:17; 2 Tim 1:2). As such, there is an 
association with the concept of being adopted into the family of God. Accordingly, Neyrey sees the status 
of “beloved” (in Jude 1:1) as being “fictive members of God’s family.” 2 Peter, Jude, 48. 
240
 The perfect passive participle of avgapa,w appears 7 times in 7 verses in the NT. There it often 
appears within the context of calling and/or election. See Rom 9:25; Eph 1:6; Col 3:12; 1 Thess 1:4; 2 
Thess 2:13  Jude 1. The only other instance is with reference to the “beloved city” in Rev 20:9. The passive 
participle of avgapa,w also translates !Wrvuy> four times in the LXX (cf. Deut 32:15). 
241
 Rather, the “beloved” often applies to those who have responded, or will respond, to God’s 
loving overtures and thus become a part of the people of God (with the possible, but not certain, exception 
of Rom 11:28). As such, it often is used in reference to those who are “faithful” whether of groups (1 Tim 
6:2; 3 John 5; cf. Jas 2:5; Jude 20; Rom 1:7–8; Phlm 1, 5) or individuals (1 Cor 4:17; Eph 6:21; Col 1:7; 
4:7, 9). The “beloved” are thus in Christ  he is who is truly the “beloved” one. 
242
 While Christians are both “elect” and “beloved” the terms are not thereby synonymous. Contra 
Günther and Link’s contention that “agapē is for him [Paul] electing love, as is indicated by his use of 
agapētos, ‘the chosen one.’” NIDNTT 2:544. The same error appears when Günther and Link contend that 
the “klētoi (‘called’) are the agapētoi (‘beloved’) (Rom. 1:7  Col. 3:12).” NIDNTT 2:544. Christians may be 
both “elect” and “beloved” in Christ, both of which relate to being adopted into God’s family. In this way 





Furthermore, various usages of avgaphto,j in the NT militate against deterministic election while 
suggesting evaluation and/or emotionality (cf. 2 Pet 3:17; Jude 20–21).
243
 
This range of meaning of avgaphto,j, especially its often evaluative and emotive 
connotations, is further illumined by a consideration of the Hebrew terms that it translates in the 
LXX. For instance, out of 17 instances avgaphto,j translates dyxy 6 times, always in reference to 
one’s offspring and thus connoting that which is uniquely and specially treasured with the 
significant emotional attachment that belongs to the parental bond and affection.
244
 This sense of 
emotional attachment to a precious and dear one is also present when avgaphto,j once renders ryQiy 
in the emotionally charged description of God’s affection for, and delight in, his people as his 
“dear son [ryQiy:]” and “delightful child” for whom his heart yearns (Jer 38:20 [ET 31:20]). A 
strong sense of endearment is likewise apparent in the 5 instances where avgaphto,j translates dydy, 
                                                     
 
243
 For example, those who are referred to as avgaphto,j are often exhorted towards the 
manifestation of proper Christian behavior, especially holiness (cf. Eph 5:1, 3; 2 Cor 7:1; Jude 10). In many 
such exhortations it is clear that the avgaphto,j could fall (see especially 2 Pet 3:17; Jude 20–21; cf. Phil 
2:12  4:1  1 Pet 2:11  2 Pet 3:1, 8, 14  1 John 2:7  4:7, 11  3 John 1:11  Jude 1:3, 17). As such, “beloved” is 
certainly not a unilaterally constant designation (cf. 1 John 3:21). 
244
 Three of these instances refer to Abraham’s beloved (but not only) son Isaac (Gen 22:2, 12, 
16). The other three instances evoke the emotion of sorrow that will be felt in a time of judgment akin to 
that felt in mourning for one’s dyxiy, only child (Amos 8:10; Zech 12:10; Jer 6:26). dyxy itself appears 12 
times in the OT, 6 of which are rendered by avgaphto,j, 1 by the present passive participle of avgapa,w, 4 by 
monogenh,j, and once by monotro,pouj. Eight of the instances of dyxy refer to one’s offspring while the other 
four refer to one’s own life and to the “lonely,” there translated by monogenh,j three times and monotro,pouj 
once. Because of this association between avgaphto,j and dyxy one frequently finds the equating, or nearly 
equating, of “beloved” and “only.” So C. H. Turner who argued that o` ui`o,j mou ò avgaphto,j is rightly 
translated “only son.” “ho huios mou ho agapetos,” JTS 27 (1926): 129. Many others have agreed, at least 
to some extent, with this conclusion. See Louw and Nida, L&N 1:293; Marshall, The Gospel of Luke, 730; 
William L. Lane, The Gospel of Mark (NICNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1974), 58; John Nolland, 
Luke 1:1–9:20 (WBC 35A; Dallas: Word, 2002), 158, 164. Cf. Günther and Link, NIDNTT 2:539. 
However, the meaning of “only” child for avgaphto,j is “highly unlikely.” Fitzmyer, Luke I–IX, 486. As seen 
above, dyxy itself does not always refer to an only child or even a child at all. Isaac was not Abraham’s 
“only” child, Ishmael was his older brother. Likewise monogenh,j does not necessarily refer to one’s only 
child, or offspring at all, in the LXX or the OT. The terms, rather, denote that which is specially treasured 
in some special fashion, one that is favored. As such, it is a mistake to identify avgaphto,j with only child, its 
connotation is of affectionate love for one specially favored and dear. Indeed there is a significant 
association between monogenh,j and avgaphto,j, which appears in the LXX and NT and appears often in the 
church fathers, but the association has monogenh,j taking on the connotation of special and treasured in order 






 Finally, avgaphto,j once translates the piel participle of bha (Zech 13:6) and once dAD, 
“beloved” (Isa 5:1).
246
 In all this, the term clearly indicates affection in the LXX and often (if not 
always) does so in the NT as well.
247
 
The Meaning of the euvdoke,w 
Word Group 
  The euvdoke,w word group also overlaps with the categories of election and evaluative love. 
The word group generally denotes desire, pleasure, delight, satisfaction, approval, preference, 
and/or enjoyment of an object or course of action.
248
 The group often connotes evaluation such 
that the object of preference or desire is considered to be good, something that might bring 
pleasure, satisfaction, or benefit and/or is worthy of selection.
249
 Importantly, neither the verb nor 
                                                     
 
245
 Four of these instances refer to divine love toward his “beloved” and in the fifth the reference is 
to a song of love. In one other instance, the LXX translators apparently mistook !WdDoyI !WdDoyI from the verb ddn 
for dydy and translated it by avgaphto,j (Ps 67:13). dydy itself appears only 9 times in 8 verses in the OT. The 
other four instances not translated by avgaphto,j are all used of God’s love and rendered by the perfect 
passive participle of avgapa,w. It has been suggested that the “originally distinct meanings of dyxy and dydy 
became conflated” in the LXX, “perhaps due to textual variants in the MSS” or “misreadings” or 
“idiomatic interpretation.” M. Barth, Ephesians 1–3, 82.  
246
 In two other instances avgaphto,j appears in the LXX without Hebrew equivalent. It also appears 
8 times in 8 verses in the LXX Apocrypha. Cf. the use of avgaphto,j instead of monogenh,j in Judg (A) 11:34. 
avgaphto,j never translates ryxb in the LXX as it appears to do in the likely allusion to Isa 42:1 in Matt 12:18. 
247
 Strongly emotive affection is evident with regard to Jesus in Matt 12:18 where Jesus is the 
“beloved” in whom God’s “soul is well-pleased.” Elsewhere, in human usage emotional affection is 
likewise explicit. See 1 Thess 2:7, 8. The affective connotation is also apparent in classical Greek. Guelich, 
Mark 1–8:26, 34.  
248
 See Spicq, TLNT 2:99  H. Bietenhard, “ευδοκεω,” NIDNTT 2:817; F. W. Danker et al., eds., 
“ευδοκεω,” BDAG, 404  J. P. Louw and E. A. Nida, eds., “ευδοκεω,” L&N 1:289, 361. In classical Greek 
the term also “means to be well pleased or content, to consent, to approve.” Bietenhard, NIDNTT 2:817. Cf. 
Spicq, TLNT 2:99. At Qumran the term is primarily one of election, which is not surprising regarding the 
election theology of that community. However, even there some evaluative usages appear (cf. 1 QS 4.1). 
249
 See Danker et al., BDAG, 404  idem, “ευδοκεω,” BDAG, 289, 361  idem, “ευδοκια,” BDAG, 
404. Cf. also Gottlob Schrenk, “ευδοκέω, ευδοκία,” TDNT 2:741. Thus, euvdoki,a may refer to “that which is 
desired on the basis of its appearing to be beneficial—‘desire, what is wished for.’” Danker et al., BDAG, 
289. The etymology is uncertain  the group may derive from “the hypothetical eudokos, formed from eu, 
good, and dechomai, to accept.” See Bietenhard, NIDNTT 2:817. This would imply evaluation as the usage 
of the term also suggests. Schrenk, however, thinks that it is “developed from the impersonal εὖ δοκεῖ  ινί 
 ι.” TDNT 2:738. The noun “εὐδοκία is almost completely restricted to Jewish and Christian literature.” 




the noun refers to arbitrary decision or election. Rather, as one might expect, there is a connection 
between that in which one takes pleasure and that which one desires, wants, wishes for, and thus 
wills. 
The euvdoke,w word group appears frequently with human and divine agency.250 With 
human agency, the word group may refer to: being “pleased” to do something,
251
 the evaluative 
preference of something desirable,
252
 or taking pleasure in, or enjoying, doing something (cf. 2 
Thess 2:12). With divine agency the word group often refers to that which God is pleased to do, 
often in reference to the plan of salvation,
253
 and also frequently in reference to personal objects 




 The evaluative connotation of the 
                                                     
 
250
 The verb euvdoke,w appears 21 times in 21 verses and the noun euvdoki,a appears 9 times in 9 
verses. 
251
 Of the verb, see Rom 15:26, 27; 1 Thess 2:8; 2 Thess 2:12). Likewise, the noun euvdoki,a is used 
to refer to one’s heartfelt desire (Rom 10:1  cf. 2 Thess 1:11) or good will as motivation to action (Phil 
1:15). Rom 10:1 is descriptive of the combination of strong emotion and will in describing Paul’s “heart’s 
desire” (euvdoki,a th/j evmh/j kardi,aj) or “what I wish for with all my heart.” “ευδοκεω,” 289. Cf. Spicq, 
TLNT 2:106. 2 Thess 1:11 is here taken as referring to human desire but the genitive may refer to the divine 
good pleasure. Cf. Bietenhard, NIDNTT 2:819–20; Schrenk, TDNT 2:746. 
252
 Elsewhere the verb connotes evaluative preference of something more desirable such as Paul’s 
preference to be with the Lord (2 Cor 5:8; cf. 1 Thess 3:1; 2 Cor 12:10).  
253
 Of the verb see Luke 12:32; 1 Cor 1:21; Gal 1:15; Col 1:19. The noun likewise is used in 
reference to God’s good will or pleasure in the plan of salvation (Matt 11:26; Luke 10:21; Eph 1:5, 9; Phil 
2:13). 
254
 Thus, Jesus himself is often the worthy object of divine affection and pleasure, the “beloved” 
(avgaphto,j) in whom the Father is “well-pleased” (Matt 3:17  12:18  17:5  Mark 1:11  Luke 3:22  2 Pet 
1:17). Guelich correctly points out that this collocation with avgaphto,j “underscores the primary motif of 
affection, delight and pleasure inherent in εὐδοκεῖν.” Mark 1–8:26, 34. Similarly, Spicq emphasizes the 
“affective meaning” such that the “Father’s ‘pleasure’ is the joy of the love that he bears for the Son” and 
as such “eudokeō . . . exegete[s] the divine agapē.” TLNT 2:102. This positive, affectionate evaluation is 
not unconditional but may be forfeited for “if He shrinks back, My soul [yuch,] has no pleasure [euvdoke,w] in 
Him” (Heb 10:38  cf. Hab 2:4). That this is emotive is clear by the idiomatic use of “soul” or “inner 
person,” which, by way of the Hebrew idiom, refers to the seat of emotions. Likewise, divine emotionality 
is evident in this way in Matt 12:18. Consider also the idiomatic usage of the soul, of human agency, in Sir 
18:31. 
255
 Thus “God was not well-pleased” (euvdoke,w) with most of those who came out of the Exodus (1 
Cor 10:5) and took no pleasure (euvdoke,w) in sacrifices which he did not desire (qe,lw) (Heb 10:6, 8). Even 
those who elsewhere stress the divine will must here speak in terms of evaluation. For example, S. Légasse 
comments on this verse that “because of their own sin” the “mass of Israelites . . . did not obtain what God 




euvdoke,w word group is further apparent by reference to the terms that the euvdoke,w word group 
translates in the LXX, most often the hcr and #pex' word groups.256 
The primary dispute with regard to the meaning of the euvdoke,w word group is whether the 
term is one of will or evaluation. Some scholars have considered the group with divine usage to 
refer to God’s eternal, unilateral, and efficacious decree, especially those instances relative to the 
plan of salvation.
257
 However, the question is not whether the euvdoke,w word group is connected to 
will; it clearly is, as is evidenced by its close association with the theme and semantics of divine 
volition and election.
258
 Rather, the question is with regard to the nature of the association. There 
                                                     
 
Finally, in a difficult-to-interpret verse, the angelic proclamation of Christ’s birth may be translated “peace 
among men with whom He is pleased” (Luke 2:14) but some may translate “good will toward men.” The 
former would be contingent and evaluative while the latter could be a general, non-evaluative, arbitrary 
disposition/will. There is a great deal of dispute about the meaning of this phraseology. See the discussion 
of this verse in the discussion of the canonical data below. 
256
 The verb euvdoke,w appears 38 times in 37 verses in the LXX OT (many more times in the OT 
Apocrypha) most often translating hcr (23 times in 22 verses) often of delight, enjoyment. For instance, it 
refers to God’s lack of delight (qe,lw) and pleasure (euvdoke,w) in a horse’s strength and the legs of a man, 
respectively. Rather, God “favors [euvdoke,w] those who fear Him, those who wait for His lovingkindness” 
(Ps 146:10–11; cf. 50:18; 149:4). See also Lev 26:34; Eccl 9:7; Jer 14:10. Beyond its translation by euvdoke,w 
in the LXX it is rendered by prosde,comai, “accept,” 13 times in 12 verses and by de,comai in 5 verses all in 
the sense of accepting or, on the other hand, not being pleased with rituals/offerings. It is also rendered 5 
times by dekto,j in the sense of acceptance, favor. Numerous other terms render it once. euvdoke,w also 
translates the related verb #pex' in 3 instances, all in reference to divine delight (2 Sam 22:20; Ps 50:21; Mal 
2:17). It also translates dd'q', to bow down, twice (Gen 24:26, 48) and a number of other terms once, notably 
including dm;x', desire, once (Ps 67:17). The noun euvdoki,a appears 10 times in 10 verses in the LXX OT and 
most often translates !wcr (7 times). These are all in the Psalms (5:13; 18:15; 50:20; 68:14; 88:18; 105:4; 
144:16) often in the sense of “favor” or that which is “acceptable” (Pss 5:13 and 18:15 respectively). Cf. 
also its translation of hc'r>Ti in Song 6:4. It appears many more times in the OT Apocrypha, 16 times in 
Sirach alone where it has the connotation of one’s will in the sense of that which is pleasing. Cf. Spicq, 
TLNT 2:104. Thus, “what pleases the Lord is faithfulness and mercy” or “turning away from evil” (Sir 
1:26; 35;16  cf. 32:14  33:13  39:18  41:4) as opposed to the “gifts of wicked men,” which are not 
“acceptable” to him (Sir 35:3). Beyond its translation by euvdoki,a in the LXX, !wcr is rendered by dekto,j, 
acceptable, favorable, in 23 verses; avresto,j, pleasing, in 3; and prosdekto,j, acceptable, satisfactory, and 
qe,lhsij, will, in 2 instances; and a few others once, notably, evpiqumi,a in Gen 49:6. 
257
 For example, David E. Garland contends that “when God is said to be ‘well pleased’ 
(εὐδόκησεν, eudokēsen), it refers to God’s inscrutable decree, what is otherwise unaccountable, the 
sovereignty and mystery of God’s choice.” 1 Corinthians (BECNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2003), 
68. Likewise, Simon J. Kistemaker, New Testament Commentary: 1 Corinthians (BNTC; Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Baker, 1993), 58. Cf. Bietenhard, NIDNTT 2:818; Légasse, EDNT 2:75. Nolland, on the other hand, 
thinks Schrenk “exaggerates the election element” in the term. Luke 1:1–9:20, 164. 
258




is strong volition involved in many usages but, likewise, clear evaluation and emotion appears.
259
 
In this way, the dispute appears to be based on something of a false dichotomy between will, 
emotion, and evaluation. The three are depicted in the use of this term (and elsewhere) as closely 
interrelated, such that what one wills is, in fact, that which is evaluated as preferable and/or 
brings one pleasure.
260
 The divine will is thus itself in accord with that which pleases God, often 
explicitly with a view toward appraisal of objective reality. Thus, the explicitly evaluative 
instances of divine euvdoke,w (cf. Heb 10:38; 1 Cor 10:5) do not conflict with, but complement the 
instances where the divine desire and will seem to be highlighted.
261
 Accordingly, those instances 
that speak of God’s purpose in the plan of salvation may simply mean that God is pleased to work 
out the plan of salvation because of his love for his creatures.
262
 As such, the evidence from NT 
and LXX usage suggests that the term includes the connotation of evaluative preference such that 
the element of volitional choice is bound up with the direction toward something that is viewed as 
worthy or bringing satisfaction or pleasure.  
                                                     
 
in the brief word study of the latter earlier in this chapter. Interestingly, the group never collocates in a 
single verse with the bou,lomai or evkle,gomai word groups and rarely with the kale,w word group, with little 
significance (2 Thess 1:11; cf. Gal 1:15–16). Importantly, as has been seen above, the major terms of 
election themselves are not clearly descriptive of determinism. Consider, for example, the meaning of 
evaluative “desire” and “delight” by way of qe,lw and euvdoke,w in Heb 10:8. 
259
 For example, Schrenk notes the connection of the term to the theme of election but also notes 
that of all such terms “εὐδοκεῖν brings out most strongly the emotional side of the love of Him who elects.” 
TDNT 2:740–41. 
260
 One selects some thing or course of action because it is “preferred as better” as is explicit in the 
phrase εὐδοκοῦμεν μᾶλλον in 2 Cor 5:8. Ibid., 741. So, also “ευδοκεω,” 361. Thus, the term “implies 
strong volition, as well as taking pleasure in.” Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; 
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1987), 73. 
261
 In other words, the assertion of determinism does not fit the usage as found in instances such as 
Heb 10:38 but the usages that appear to strongly assert divine volition are in accord with a view that sees 
the will, evaluation, and emotion as complementary. 
262
 Thus, M. Barth states, “Far from any idea of arbitrariness, [euvdoke,w] has warm and personal 
connotations. When God’s good pleasure is mentioned, his willingness and joy in doing good are indicated. 
The happiness that accompanies a radiant good will is implied.” Ephesians 1–3, 81. Similarly, O’Brien 
affirms that “pleasure . . . signifies not simply the purpose of God but also the delight that he takes in his 




Other Significant Terms of  
Evaluative Pleasure 
The avre,skw word group refers to that which is pleasing or acceptable.263 The verb 
avre,skw264 and the noun avresto,j265 are often used with both human and divine agency, consistently 
in reference to grounded, evaluative pleasure.
266
 euva,restoj267 and euvareste,w268 likewise refer to 
that which is well-pleasing, acceptable, even delightful, almost always of pleasure and/or 
acceptability in the sight of God or Christ, often of an explicitly evaluative nature.
269
 Such 
                                                     
 
263
 See Werner Foerster, “αρεσκω, ανθρωπαρεσκο , αρεσκεία, αρεσ ο , ευαρεσ ο , ευαρεσ εω,” 
TDNT 1:456  H. Bietenhard, “αρέσκω,” NIDNTT 2:814–15.  
264
 The verb avre,skw appears 17 times in 16 verses, consistently referring to grounded, evaluative 
pleasure. For appearances referring to human pleasure see Matt 14:6; Mark 6:22; Acts 6:4–5; Rom 15:1–3; 
1 Cor 7:33–34; 10:33; Gal 1:10; 2 Tim 2:4. For instances of divine pleasure see Rom 8:8; 1 Cor 7:32; Gal 
1:10; 1 Thess 2:4, 15; 4:1; possibly also Rom 15:3; 2 Tim 2:4. The related term avnqrwpa,reskoj refers to 
“men pleasers” (Eph 6:6  Col 3:22). In the LXX, avre,skw most often translates bAj (21 times), rv'y”, right (6 
times), and a number of others 3 times or less. 
265
 The noun avresto,j appears 4 times in 4 verses with both human (Acts 6:2; 12:3) and divine 
agency (John 8:29; 1 John 3:22). Acts 12:3 may also refer to that which is desirable from a divine 
perspective. So Bietenhard, NIDNTT 2:816. In the LXX it often refers to divine evaluation and translates 
rv'y”, right (7 times), !Acr' (3 times), bAj (2 times), and others 3 times or less. Often, the Hebrew includes the 
idiom “in the eyes of,” a clear pointer to explicit appraisal and evaluation. Cf. ibid., 815. 
266
 In many cases the verb clearly refers to evaluative divine pleasure (cf. 1 Thess 4:1; 1 John 
3:22). The related noun avreskei,a appears only once in the NT, also of divine pleasure in human conduct 
(Col 1:10). It thus generally refers to pleasure or the “desire to please.” Bietenhard, NIDNTT 2:814. Cf. 
Prov 31:30. Its evaluative sense is also present in classical Greek where it “denotes the pleasure which men 
or the gods derive from something.” Bietenhard, NIDNTT 2:815. Cf. Malherbe, The Letters, 220.  
267
 The adjective euva,restoj appears 9 times in 9 verses, all but one of which refers to that which is 
pleasing and/or acceptable to God. Humans might be exhorted to be “acceptable to God” (Rom 12:1–2; 
14:18) or aspire to please him (2 Cor 5:9; cf. Eph 5:10; Heb 13:21) or are, in fact, “well-pleasing to God” 
(Phil 4:18; cf. Col 3:20). The one exception that refers to human agency is Titus 2:9. The evaluative sense 
is also explicit outside the NT as there it refers to “the experience of being pleased because of what another 
does.” F. W. Danker et al., eds., “ευαρεσ εω, εαυρεσ ησι , ευαρεσ ο ,” BDAG, 403. Cf. Foerster, TDNT 
1:456; Bietenhard, NIDNTT 2:814. It appears in the LXX only in Wis 4:10; 9:10, both of pleasing God. 
268
 The verb euvareste,w appears only 3 times in the NT, all with reference to pleasing God (Heb 
11:5, 6; 13:16). 
269
 See Foerster, TDNT 1:456–57; Bietenhard, NIDNTT 2:814–15; Danker et al., BDAG, 403. In 
the LXX, the verb often translates $lh in the sense of walking with God (Gen 5:22, 24; 6:9; 17:1; 24:40; 
48:15; Pss 25:3; 34:14; 55:14; 114:9; cf. Sir 44:16). Interestingly, the only instance where the avgapa,w word 
group collocates with the avre,skw word group is in the LXX Apocrypha where it is said of Enoch: “There 




terminology is closely akin to the dekto,j and euvdoke,w word groups in the sense of evaluative 
pleasure and/or acceptance.
270
 There is also significant overlap with the do,kimoj word group, 
which points to the evaluative nature of both, since the do,kimoj word group generally refers to 
that which comes out of examination, inspection, and is found pleasing, acceptable, approved.
271
 
Finally, there is some overlap with the will of God. Specifically, collocations further demonstrate 
that the divine will itself refers to that which is pleasing to God.
272
 In all, the entire avre,skw word 
group is frequently used in ways that demonstrate the fact of evaluative divine pleasure.  
The Evaluative Aspect of Divine Love in Gospels-Acts 
In this corpus, the evaluative aspect of divine love is highlighted in God’s evaluative 
pleasure and affection for Jesus in the divine declarations at Jesus’ baptism and the 
Transfiguration where Jesus is referred to as the “beloved” (avgaphto,j) Son in whom the Father is 
“well-pleased” (Matt 3:17  17:5  Mark 1:11  Luke 3:22  cf. Mark 9:7  Luke 9:35).
273
 The various 
                                                     
 
270
 See Louw and Nida, L&N 1:299. The association is not due to collocation but with regard to 
meaning and usage. Of these groups there are no theologically significant collocations. 
271 do,kimoj basically refers to that which has been tested and found worthy, reliable. See Walter 
Grundmann, “δ κιμο , αδ κιμο , δοκιμή, δοκίμιον, δοκιμ ζω, αποδοκιμ ζω, δοκιμασία,” TDNT 2: 255–
60. The two word groups overlap in 4 instances, all with theological significance (Rom 12:2; 14:18; Eph 
5:10; 1 Thess 2:4). See the further discussion of these verses below. 
272
 Thus, Heb 13:21 refers to God’s “equipping you in every good thing to do His will [qe,lhma], 
working in us that which is pleasing [euva,restoj] in His sight.” Likewise, Paul exhorts Christians to “prove 
what the will [qe,lhma] of God is, that which is good and acceptable [euva,restoj] and perfect” (Rom 12:2  cf. 
Eph 6:6). Not surprisingly, that which is good is also often referred to as pleasing (Rom 12:2; cf. Rom 15:2; 
Col 1:10; Heb 13:21).  
273
 While there is some variance between these declarations, their striking similarity points toward 
a common understanding of the nature of Christ’s incarnate status before the Father. In a number of 
passages, Jesus is called the “beloved” (avgaphto,j) Son in whom the Father is “well-pleased” with minor 
variances (Matt 3:17; 17:5; Mark 1:11; Luke 3:22). Two other verses have more significant variations, 
“This is My beloved [avgaphto,j] Son, listen to Him!” (Mark 9:7). “This is My Son, My Chosen [evkle,gomai] 
One  listen to Him!” (Luke 9:35). In Luke 9 the TR has avgaphto.j instead of evklelegme,noj but this is widely 
considered to be scribal smoothing of the variant. The origin of the variance between these synoptic 
statements is impossible to determine with certainty. Moreover, the nature of the interdependence between 
these statements as well as their usage of the OT is widely disputed. The most commonly suggested OT 
backgrounds include Gen 22:2, 12, 16; Ps 2:7; Isa 42:1; cf. Exod 4:22–23; Isa 41:8; 44:2. For a detailed 




statements highlight the strong association between avgaphto,j, euvdoke,w, and (to a lesser extent) 
evkle,gomai. Specifically, the parallel between Christ’s status as “beloved” (avgaphto,j) and the one 
in whom the Father is “well-pleased” (euvdoke,w) points toward the fact that Jesus is the worthy 
object of the Father’s loving affection and evaluative pleasure. The potentially evaluative 
connotation of election language is further apparent in the substitution of “chosen one” 
(evkle,gomai) in place of “beloved” in Luke 9:35.274 This association is emphatically presented in 
the similar statement of Matt 12:18: “Behold, My Servant [pai/j]275 whom I have chosen 
[aìreti,zw]; My beloved [avgaphto,j] in whom My soul is well-pleased [euvdoke,w]” (Matt 12:18  cf. 
Isa 42:1).
276
 On the surface, it is possible to view these statements from the standpoint of an 
arbitrary divine decree, such that all such related concepts are seen as descriptions of the 
unilateral divine will. However, evidence suggests that the terms in these passages convey 
evaluation rather than arbitrary, deterministic election. First, this is suggested by what has been 
seen already in this chapter with regard to the often evaluative connotations of election language. 
Second, Jesus is explicitly referred to as bringing pleasure to God elsewhere. Third, and perhaps 
most striking, the wider theological context requires that this language is evaluative since Christ 
is evaluatively beloved.  
                                                     
 
274
 Cf. ibid., 874; Nolland, Luke 9:21–18:34, 501. This special Father-Son relationship of lover-
beloved is further highlighted in the parable of the vineyard owner (Mark 12:6; Luke 20:13). For Marcus, 
“the repetition of the last word (‘beloved son . . . they will respect my son’) highlights the pathos of the 
father’s dispatch of his offspring.” Mark 8–16, 812. Cf. Isa 5:1–2. 
275
 This term may relate to a child or youth and thus may correspond to “Son” (ui`o,j) in the parallel 
passages. Cf. Joachim Jeremias, “παι  θεου,” TDNT 5:701–2. However, I. Howard Marshall rejects this 
view. “Son of God or Servant of Yahweh: A Reconsideration of Mark 1:11,” NTS 15 (1969): 326–336. 
276
 The verse is likely dependent on Isa 42:1 but some favor a separate Greek text other than the 
LXX. So Fitzmyer, Luke I–IX, 486; France, The Gospel of Matthew, 471–72. Others have suggested 2 Sam 
22:20. See Eduard Schweizer, “ui`o,j,” TDNT 8:368. Christ as “beloved son” is the true representative of 
Israel. So Paul G. Bretscher, “Exodus 4:22–23 and the Voice from Heaven,” JBL 87 (1968): 305–6; 
William Foxwell Albright and C. S. Mann, Matthew (AB 26; Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1971), 
31. For a detailed discussion of this text see Krister Stendahl, The School of St. Matthew, and Its Use of the 




Specifically, Jesus is not arbitrarily elected as if he is selected out of a number of 
potential christs or sons of God. He is the “beloved” Son, the “chosen,” not by selection but by 
his very nature.
277
 Christ is both ontologically and behaviorally beloved and pleasing; he always 
does the things that are “pleasing” (avresto,j) to the Father (John 8:29; cf. Matt 27:43; Heb 
10:38).
278
 Accordingly, the NT data show that the status of Jesus declared by the Father in these 
instances is a genuine, accurate, appraisal of him. He is the “choice” (best) one, the worthy; none 
other could be chosen in his place as the incarnate Messiah. He is well-pleasing, for in all his 
actions he elicits delight  he is “beloved,” that is, the Father loves the Son and in such a way that 
recognizes that the Son is worthy to be loved (cf. John 1:1  Rev 5:2, 4, 9, 12). Such “election” is 
neither arbitrary nor spontaneous but evaluative; a descriptive rather than prescriptive election.
279
 
In the Gospels, language of divine pleasure also appears closely associated with the 
divine will in the sense that God’s will is toward that which pleases him. Thus, it is the “Father’s 
                                                     
 
277
 On the other hand, if Christ’s status as God’s beloved, well-pleasing, and elect one is taken to 
derive from arbitrary and non-evaluative election, it calls into question Christ’s intrinsic status as pre-
existent, altogether worthy, and very God and may leave the door open for some form of adoptionism. 
However, adoptionism of the type that sees Christ elevated to sonship at his baptism (or at any other point) 
is itself ruled out in the Gospels as Jesus’ sonship is previously affirmed in Matt 2:15  Luke 1:32–35; 2:49; 
cf. John 1:1–3, etc. Cf. Hagner, Matthew 1–13, 59; Blomberg, Matthew, 82. France correctly sees the 
declarations of “God’s pleasure” in “obedience” and also “more fundamentally” Jesus’ “own relationship 
with God.” The Gospel of Matthew, 122–23; cf. ibid., 82. Similarly, Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 158; 
Hagner, Matthew 1–13, 59. Some, however, see the emphasis on God’s past evaluative choice (so W. L. 
Lane, The Gospel of Mark, 57–58, 320; Joel Marcus, Mark 1–8 [AB 27; New York: Doubleday, 2000], 
163), while others view the statement as one of present, evaluative approval. See discussion in Robert G. 
Bratcher and Eugene Albert Nida, A Handbook on the Gospel of Mark (New York: United Bible Societies, 
1993), 31. That the approval refers to Jesus’s obedience on earth would complement the following narrative 
of the wilderness testing in Matthew and Mark. 
278
 Thus, God “has not left” Christ since he always does “what pleases him.” R. E. Brown, The 
Gospel according to John I–XII, 347. Similarly, Ko  stenberger, John, 260; Morris, The Gospel according to 
John, 402. Cf. Matt 27:43; Ps 21:9 LXX. 
279
 As such, avgaphto,j here describes the Father’s great affection for the Son  euvdoke,w derives from 
the pleasure he evokes, and he is the truly “choice,” worthy, one. avgaphto,j here expresses the “special love-
relationship between the heavenly Father and the Son.” Fitzmyer, Luke I–IX, 485–86. Cf. France, The 
Gospel of Matthew, 471–72. Such “love is deep-seated . . . as great as the heart of God itself . . . tender, 
vast, infinite.” William Hendriksen, New Testament Commentary: Exposition of the Gospel according to 
Matthew (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1973), 215. It is further without any “suggestion of election or 
adoption to sonship.” Marshall, The Gospel of Luke, 156. For Guelich, the collocation with avgaphto,j 




good pleasure” (euvdoke,w) to bestow the kingdom (Luke 12:32).280 In one striking instance, Jesus 
refers to that which was “well-pleasing [euvdoki,a] in [the Father’s] sight in close proximity to 
God’s hiding things from the wise and revealing them to infants [nh,pioj]” (Matt 11:25–26; cf. 
Luke 10:21). While one might wonder why God would “hide” divine revelation from anyone it 
should be remembered that it is God’s modus operandi to eventually give people over to their 
own desires (cf. Rom 1:24, 26, 28). Here, the nh,pioj, the “infant” or “simple-minded,” likely 
refers to that class of people who have not spurned, but received, God’s gracious revelation 
instead of their own “wisdom.”
281
 That is, God reveals these things to those who will be 
receptive, not the haughty who do not wish to receive God’s light, preferring their own darkness 
(cf. John 7:17). Moreover, the wider context of this passage suggests that this statement of Jesus 
does not refer to the exercise of a unilateral divine will in the sense of deterministic 
predestination. For example, in the immediate context of Matt 11, Jesus denounces the cities for 
not repenting, which makes little sense if they could not have repented (cf. Matt 11:20–24, 28).
282
 
                                                     
 
280
 Thus, “God’s pleasure (or will) is manifest in his gift of the kingdom.” J. B. Green, The Gospel 
of Luke, 495. 
281
 This relates to the background in Jewish literature where the “the ‘simple’ are the pious or 
those who in their weakness can be helped by God (1QpHab 12.4; 1QH 2.9; 4Q169 [= 4QpNah] fragments 
3–4 3.5; 11QPs
a
 18.2, 4).” Darrell L. Bock, Luke 9:51–24:53 (BECNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1996), 
1010. Thus, “for Jesus the childlike and poor are not the meticulous performers of law and ritual but the 
needy and downtrodden who accept the gospel.” Marshall, The Gospel of Luke, 434. Consider Eccl 9:11; 
Sir 3:19; Wis 10:21; Luke 1:51–54; Rom 1:22; 1 Cor 1:26–31; 2 Cor 4:3–4; Jas 2:5; 4:6. Nolland thinks the 
term refers simply to those who are in need of, and open, to help. Luke 9:21–18:34, 572. This group 
appears to mirror the “poor” of Jas 2:5. Bock, Luke 9:51–24:53, 1010. Cf. Heinz Schürmann, Das 
Lukasevangelium: zweiter teil (Bd 3; Freiburg: Herder, 1990), 106. See the discussion of that verse above. 
Cf. Luke 6:20.  
282
 Thus, France correctly notes that Matt 11:25–26 does not mean that God “pre-selected 
individuals to be placed in each category; vv. 20–24 have already made it clear that people have a 
responsibility and a choice as to whether or not they receive his revelation. It is also important to note that 
this declaration is followed by Jesus’ open invitation to any who are in need (not only the ‘chosen’) to 
‘come to me’ (v. 28).” The Gospel of Matthew, 445. Contra those who see this as “the sovereign divine 
decree.” So Schrenk, TDNT 2:747  R. Mahoney, “ευδοκια,” EDNT 2:76. Cf. Bietenhard, NIDNTT 2:819. 
Compare the view of Morris who thinks that the “note of predestination here cannot be missed but is to be 
held in tension with the culpability of those who refuse to believe (cf. vv 20–24).” Leon Morris, The Gospel 
according to Matthew (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1992), 319. Similarly, Hagner, Matthew 1–13, 




It thus seems that the divine pleasure here is not directed specifically toward the hiding of such 
things from the wise in and of itself but with regard to the wider plan of salvation within which 
God ultimately gives those who reject him over to their own desires but delights to bestow his 
blessings on those who respond appropriately to him.
283
  
Moreover, God’s evaluative delight in humans is also conveyed in the Gospels. Thus, if 
anyone follows Jesus, “the Father will honor [tima,w] him” (John 12:26).284 Elsewhere, Moses is 
said to have been “lovely in the sight of God” (avstei/oj tw/| qew/|) (Acts 7:20). This sense of 
evaluative acceptance also appears when it is said, “In every nation the man who fears Him and 
does what is right is welcome [dekto,j] to Him” (Acts 10:35). Further, Jesus refers to “those who 
are considered worthy [kataxio,w] to attain to that age and the resurrection from the dead” (Luke 
20:35; cf. Acts 5:41; 2 Thess 1:5).
285
 On the other hand, the one who loves (file,w) parents or 
children more than Christ is not “worthy” (a;xioj) of him (Matt 10:37; cf. 38). Thus it appears that 
although God does not owe human beings anything (cf. Luke 17:9), he freely bestows rewards 
evaluatively and not altogether arbitrarily (cf. Acts 13:46). He freely wills to resurrect those who 
respond to God and are, thus, accounted worthy (through Christ’s mediation).  
                                                     
 
283
 “It is comforting to note that throughout the New Testament the good pleasure or delight of the 
Father, when positively expressed, everywhere else has as its object Christ and/or the work of salvation in 
connection with him. It seems logical, therefore, to believe that also here (in Matt. 11:26 and in its parallel 
Luke 10:21) the positive thought of revealing to babes the things pertaining to salvation is uppermost in 
Christ’s mind when he mentions the Father’s good pleasure.” Hendriksen, New Testament Commentary: 
Exposition of the Gospel According to Matthew, 500. So Marshall, The Gospel of Luke, 434; Hans 
Conzelmann, “συνίημι, σύνεσι , συνε   , σύνε ο ,” TDNT 7:893. In the Lucan parallel Christ himself 
“rejoiced greatly” just before he makes the declaration and in the previous verse had counseled his hearers 
to “rejoice that your names are recorded in heaven.” As such, his joy seems to be grounded in the positive 
divine revelation (Luke 10:20–21). It is therefore likely that God’s “pleasure” is intended in reference to his 
positive action in salvation since God does not delight in punishment. Cf. Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11. 
284
 Notice, this word generally means “to estimate, fix the value” and is thus an evaluative term. 
285
 This is almost surely a divine passive; God is the agent of evaluation. Stein, Luke, 502; 




Another potential instance of divine, evaluative pleasure of humans is found in Luke 2:14 
where God is said to have “men with whom He is pleased” upon whom peace is wished.
286
 Some 
have seen this as a reference to divine election, in the sense that God has unilaterally elected some 
to receive peace.
287
 However, grammatically euvdoki,aj appears to be used here to express divine 
delight.
288
 It is likely, then, that those of his good pleasure correspond to those who respond 
appropriately to him (cf. Luke 1:50).
289
 As such, the avnqrw,poij euvdoki,aj may very well 
correspond to “elect” insofar as that group is understood as those who respond to the divine call 
(cf. Matt 20:16; 22:14). 
                                                     
 
286
 Much of the meaning hinges upon a matter of textual criticism. The TR has the nominative 
euvdoki,a but other texts have the genitive euvdoki,aj. The latter is the preferred reading amongst textual critics 
as the “lectio difficilior” and is thus the reading adopted here. Cf. Schrenk, TDNT 2:747–50; Bruce M. 
Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament (London: United Bible Societies, 1971), 
133. 
287
 Schrenk views this as “the sovereign good-pleasure of God in the sense of His decree” toward 
his “elect” with “no place for reflection on the will of man.” TDNT 2:750. Schrenk’s view is based on his 
dogmatic assumption that euvdoki,a refers to God’s unilateral decree. Similarly, see Bietenhard, NIDNTT 
2:819. In this view, much is made of the parallel “sons of good pleasure” from Qumran (1 QH 4:32–33; 
11:9) on the basis of which avnqrw,poij euvdoki,aj is believed to reflect “a semitechnical Semitic expression 
referring to God’s people and having overtones of election.” Nolland, Luke 1:1–9:20, 109. So, also, Bock, 
Luke 1:1–9:50, 220. However, it is, first, not certain that this designation itself does not refer to those who 
are deserving of good pleasure and, second, one need not assume that Luke used the phraseology in the 
same way as the Qumran community, considering the divergences in their wider theological outlook. 
Mahoney recognizes the possibility that it refers to human good will but favors that it “points to God’s free 
decision.” EDNT 2:76.  
288
 While NASB translates “peace among men with whom he is pleased” peace for those with 
whom he is pleased is more likely and preferred by many commentators. See Fitzmyer, Luke I–IX, 411. Cf. 
J. B. Green, The Gospel of Luke, 136  Ross S. Kilpatrick, “The Greek Syntax of Luke 2:14,” NTS 34 
(1988). Paul Richard Berger, “Lk 2:14: anthrōpoi eudokias - Die auf Gottes Weisung mit Wohlgefallen 
beschenkten Menschen,” ZNW 74 (1983): 129–44. Although the text could conceivably be translated with 
humans as the agent of euvdoki,aj, thus “men of goodwill” the reading “men of his pleasure” i.e., those with 
whom God is pleased, is to be preferred, with God as the agent of euvdoki,aj as in Luke 10:21. Cf. J. B. 
Green, The Gospel of Luke, 137; Stein, Luke, 110; Nolland, Luke 1:1–9:20, 109; Joachim Jeremias, 
“ανθρωποι ευδοκια  (Lc 2 14),” ZNW 1 (1928): 19. 
289
 As Blomberg puts it, “To those who welcome him, he offers” peace. Matthew, 180. Thus, here 
the elect are the God-fearers in 1:50–53, that is, those who respond to Jesus’ coming. While Jesus came for 
all people (Luke 2:10), only some are among “those who benefit from his coming” Bock, Luke 1:1–9:50, 
221. Cf. Nolland, Luke 1:1–9:20, 109. Spicq, however, thinks Luke 2:14 refers to God’s granting of peace 
to all universally. TLNT 2:105–6. Cf. J. B. Green, The Gospel of Luke, 137. However, this runs counter to 




Elsewhere, the shepherd (representative of Christ) “rejoices” (cai,rw) even more over the 
one that is found than the 99 sheep that remained (Matt 18:13; cf. Ezek 34:10–11, 13).
290
 In the 
Lucan parallel, the joy at this event corresponds to joy (cara,) in heaven (a likely circumlocution 
for divine joy) where there is “more joy” over one repentant sinner than over 99 righteous who 
need no repentance (Luke 15:7; cf. 5–6).
291
 Likewise, just as the woman rejoices with (sugcai,rw) 
her friends upon finding her lost coin so there is “joy [cara./] in the presence of the angels of God” 
(another likely circumlocution for divine joy) over one sinner who repents (Luke 15:10; cf. 24).
292
 
That God values humans is likewise explicit in Jesus’ reference to the small value of two 
sparrows whom God still cares for, conveying that God cares much more for humans who are 
“more valuable [diafe,rw]293 than many sparrows” (Matt 10:31  cf. 12:12  Luke 12:6–7).294 Here, 
divine evaluation is differentiated based on its object, demonstrating that God values human 
                                                     
 
290
 Nolland comments that “more than” here displays profound “pathos” and refers to the “specific 
value of the particular sheep” as lost but now found. The Gospel of Matthew, 743. There is no hint here, 
however, that the sheep is loved more because it is “the biggest” as in the Gospel of Thomas, 107. Rather, 
“the joy at the restoration of one who had strayed points to the importance of each sheep in the shepherd’s 
eye.” Hagner, Matthew 14–28, 528. 
291
 “Heaven” here is likely a substitute for the divine name, describing the emotion of God and 
other inhabitants collectively. Cf. Fitzmyer, Luke X–XXIV, 1077. Similarly, Stein, Luke, 404. God takes 
“particular delight in restoration” in accordance with “the value he sets upon the individual.” Nolland, Luke 
9:21–18:34, 773. 
292
 Again, this is again a likely circumlocution for God himself. Fitzmyer, Luke X–XXIV, 1082. Cf. 
v. 7. Many commentators agree that this refers to divine joy. So Stein, Luke, 404; Marshall, The Gospel of 
Luke, 604; Nolland, Luke 9:21–18:34, 776; Bock, Luke 9:51–24:53, 1304  Andrew F. Walls, “‘In the 
Presence of the Angels’ (Luke 15:10),” NT 3 (1959): 316. Similarly joy is apparent in the celebration 
(euvfrai,nw) after the prodigal son returns (Luke 15:24). 
293
 The term diafe,rw means to be superior or worth more. Cf. Albright and Mann, Matthew, 127. 
Here, there is “intimacy and endearment.” Hagner, Matthew 1–13, 286. Blomberg sees this as reassurance 
to the disciples “of God’s fatherly love” through the contrast between “their great worth with the 
comparatively insignificant value of sparrows.” Matthew, 178. 
294
 Likewise, not one sparrow is “forgotten before God” (evpilanqa,nomai) (Luke 12:6). Yet humans 
are “more valuable” (diafe,rw) than many sparrows (Luke 12:7; cf. 12:24). With regard to God’s “care” for 
the sparrows see Dorothy J. Weaver’s compelling interpretation that in these verses the focus is not on 
God’s will but on “the presence of God, which supports and sustains the disciples throughout their 
sufferings.” “Matthew’s Missionary Discourse: A Literary Critical Analysis,” JSNTSup 38 (1990): 206–7. 
Cf. Hagner, Matthew 1–13, 286. In my view, the point of this object lesson is not so much about the nature 




beings and is concerned for them in a very specific manner.
295
 In all these, divine delight is 
response to events and thus affected and evaluative. 
The Evaluative Aspect of Divine Love in the Pauline Writings 
As in the Gospels, reference is often made in this corpus to God’s pleasure in close 
association with his will, often in relation to the plan of salvation. As has been argued above, this 
may be understood in the sense that God wills or desires that which brings him pleasure rather 
than assuming that the divine will is unilaterally efficacious but inclusive of evaluation and/or 
divine pleasure.
296
 The evaluative aspect of divine love is further explicit in the striking statement 
of evaluative divine love found in 2 Cor 9:7: “God loves [avgapa,w] a cheerful giver.” This points 
to an evaluative divine love that goes beyond the sense in which God loves the world generally 
(cf. John 3:16).
297
 Throughout this corpus, the status of “beloved” also points toward divine 
                                                     
 
295
 However, divine concern does not guarantee temporal safety just as sparrows still fall to the 
ground. Cf. J. B. Green, The Gospel of Luke, 483. 
296
 Thus, it was “the Father’s good pleasure [euvdoke,w] for all the fullness to dwell in Him” (Col 
1:19). God is most likely the intended agent of euvdoke,w though it is grammatically possible to take Christ or 
the “fullness” as the subject. For a discussion of these possibilities, see Bruce, The Epistles to the 
Colossians, 72–73; Markus Barth and Helmut Blanke, Colossians (AB 34B; New York: Doubleday, 1994), 
210–12  Peter T. O’Brien, Colossians-Philemon (WBC 4; Dallas: Word, 2002), 51–53. Thus, “God was 
pleased to take human form in Jesus” and “God the Father delighted in the fact that Jesus” was fully God. 
Richard R. Melick, Philippians, Colossians, Philemon (NAC 32; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 
2001), 224. Similarly, God “was pleased” (euvdoke,w) to reveal His son (Gal 1:15–16) and is “well-pleased” 
(euvdoke,w) to save through the gospel (1 Cor 1:21; cf. 1:27). Moreover, Paul speaks of the divine plan 
(proori,zw) to adopt humans “as sons through Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the kind intention 
[euvdoki,a] of His will [qe,lhma]” (Eph 1:5). Likewise, “He made known to us the mystery [qe,lhma] of His 
will, according to His kind intention [euvdoki,a] which He purposed [proti,qhmi] in Him” (Eph 1:9  cf. Phil 
2:13). O’Brien correctly comments that the reference here is not merely to “purpose” but to God’s “delight” 
in his plans. The Letter to the Ephesians, 104. However, many scholars interpret such texts 
deterministically and assert that as the meaning of the euvdoke,w word group. Cf. Bietenhard, NIDNTT 2:819; 
Schrenk, TDNT 2:747. However, it should be noted that the texts say nothing of the unilateral nature, or 
otherwise, of the divine intention. Moreover, see the textual evidence referred to above suggesting that the 
divine will is not unilaterally efficacious, as well as the brief word study of euvdoke,w, which demonstrates 
that the term does not refer to a unilaterally, efficacious divine will (cf. 1 Cor 10:5). 
297
 God “responds lovingly to generosity willed and carried out from the heart. His love is poured 
out on those who pour out their love on others. Charity is the virtue the Lord loves above all others.” Spicq, 
Agape, 2:31.Yet, this does not necessarily mean that God loves only the cheerful giver and not others but 
that God loves the giver in a special way; he delights and approves of that one. Thus, “Paul is affirming that 




evaluation. It is frequently applied to human beings and often associated with election (cf. Rom 
9:25; 11:28; 1 Thess 1:4; 2 Thess 2:13). However, the nature of many of the references to the 
“beloved” suggests that the category includes evaluation (cf. 1 Thess 1:3–4).
298
 For instance, 
exhortation is frequently directed toward the “beloved” with the expectation of appropriate 
response and the implication of negative evaluation in its absence.
299
 The “beloved” are also 
frequently referred to in terms of holiness. For instance, the “beloved” (avgaphto,j) are to cleanse 
themselves from defilement thus “perfecting holiness in the fear of God” (2 Cor 7:1).
300
 Further, 
the implication that the “beloved” include those who have responded in faith is presented in the 
many references to the “beloved” in terms of having faith (pi,stij) (Rom 1:7–8; Phlm 1, 5) or 
being faithful (pisto,j) (1 Cor 4:17; Eph 6:21; Col 1:7; 4:7, 9; 1 Tim 6:2).301 In all this, the 
implication is that being “beloved” is not an automatic or unconditional status.
302
  
                                                     
 
giving—cheerful giving—that reflects his own manner of giving (cf. Heb. 13:16).” Harris, The Second 
Epistle, 636. So, also, David E. Garland, 2 Corinthians (BECNT; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 
2001), 407. 
298
 Just before referring to “the brethren beloved [avgapa,w] by God” and God’s “choice” (evklogh,) 
of them (1 Thess 1:4) Paul spoke of “their work of faith and labor of love [avga,ph] and steadfastness of hope 
in our Lord Jesus Christ,” which appears to be an evaluation of them (1 Thess 1:3  cf. 2:4, 8, 10–13). 
299
 Thus, Paul exhorts the “beloved” to leave vengeance with God (Rom 12:19), “flee from 
idolatry” (1 Cor 10:14), “be steadfast, immovable” (1 Cor 15:58), “stand firm in the Lord” (Phil 4:1), and 
exhibit all the characteristics of true love (Col 3:12). It is not always clear whether “beloved” speaks of 
God’s love for them or Paul’s own love for the recipients of his letter. It may be that a sharp distinction 
between these two is inappropriate since those beloved by God should also be beloved by Paul as part of 
the divine family, and thus his “brethren.” Notably, the exhortation in 1 Cor 10:14 comes on the heels of a 
description of the failure of the initial generation in the wilderness. Thus, the possibility of the forfeiture of 
election due to divine displeasure is in view (cf. 1 Cor 10:1–6). Evaluation is further apparent when Paul 
commands, “Therefore be imitators of God, as beloved children” (Eph 5:1). Here being like God is 
expected of God’s children. Indeed, their status as God’s children both “requires” and “enables imitation to 
take place.” Lincoln, Ephesians, 310. Here, the reference is to “the love his children owe God which 
answers to and befits his own love.” Schnackenburg, Ephesians, 212. Cf. Bruce, The Epistles to the 
Colossians, 367  O’Brien, The Letter to the Ephesians, 353. Compare the conditionality of sonship in Luke 
6:35–36. 
300
 Further, they are “called as saints” (Rom 1:7). Likewise, they are the “chosen of God, holy and 
beloved [avgapa,w]” who are nevertheless exhorted to exhibit Christian love (Col 3:12).  
301
 Bruce states that such statements connote both “affection and commendation.” The Epistles to 
the Colossians, 43. 
302




The conditionality with regard to the status of “beloved” is explicit in a somewhat 
controversial passage that points toward some degree of synergism. Paul writes, “Beloved . . . 
work [katerga,zomai] out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who is at work 
[evnerge,w] in you, both to will [qe,lw] and to work [evnerge,w] for His good pleasure [euvdoki,a]” (Phil 
2:12–13; cf. 15). First, the divine action of God in willing and working is directed toward his own 
“good pleasure.”
303
 As such, the divine will is qualified by “kind intention” not identical to it. 
While some commentators appear to be uncomfortable with the idea that God acts for his own 
pleasure’s sake,
304
 this phrasing points toward God’s intention of delighting in his creatures.
305
 
Some commentators, however, avoid any conception that humans are contributing to their 
salvation by denying that the verse bears on soteriology, whether by interpreting it in a purely 
sociological sense,
306
 or applying it merely to the ethical outworking of salvation.
307
 However, it 
                                                     
 
Corinth is for their “upbuilding” (2 Cor 12:19).  
303
 So Melick, Philippians, 111; Gordon D. Fee, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians (NICNT; Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995), 239  Peter Thomas O’Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1991), 288; Moisés Silva, Philippians (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 
2005), 131. Some, however, think that God is working toward “goodwill” in the community. So Jean-
François Collange, L'épître de Saint Paul aux Philippiens (CNT 10A; Neuchâtel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 
1973), 97–99; John Hugh Michael, The Epistle of Paul to the Philippians (MNTC 10; Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1929), 104. Cf. Gerald F. Hawthorne, Philippians (WBC 43; Dallas: Word, 2004), 142–43. 
304
 Some scholars appear to find the idea that God does something “for the sake of his own good 
pleasure” as “awkward” or even “theologically offensive.” Some therefore contend that ùpe.r equals kata, or 
attach ùpe.r th/j euvdoki,aj to the following sentence. But this is to be rejected since such usage 
“grammatically . . . has no analogies.” Fee, Paul’s Letter, 239. So, also O’Brien, The Epistle to the 
Philippians, 288–89. Fee refers to these as “a number of unlikely ploys to get around the ordinary sense of 
the preposition.” Paul’s Letter, 239.  
305
 The preposition ùpe,r means “for the sake of” in the sense that God “does this for his people 
precisely because it pleases him to do so.” Fee, Paul’s Letter, 239. Cf. Moule, An Idiom Book, 65. God’s 
“doing what pleases him is not capricious, but what is wholly good for those he loves.” Fee, Paul’s Letter, 
239–40. Similarly O’Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians, 289. Cf. Schrenk, TDNT 2:747. 
306
 This view asserts that the verse is dealing with strictly sociological concerns such that swthri,a 
refers to the “health” or “well-being” of the community. Cf. Michael, The Epistle of Paul, 101–2. However, 
this interpretation is untenable since “out of nearly twenty occurrences of this noun in the Pauline corpus, 
not one instance requires the translation ‘well-being’  the vast majority require—and all of them admit—





seems much more likely that this text refers explicitly to “human responsibility in [personal] 
salvation” within the context of community.
308
 Importantly, this affirmation of the integral nature 
of human responsibility need not amount to any suggestion of salvation by works with the 
recognition that the divine activity is both prior to, and itself the necessary foundation of, human 
action.
309
 If this view is correct, human action is required of the “beloved,” which bears on their 
personal salvation while the primacy of divine action is upheld.
310
 
This controversial passage points to questions that underlie the issue with regard to the 
status of the “beloved.” That is, are believers beloved because they are elect or vice versa? Are 
they beloved because they are holy or vice versa? Are they beloved because they believe or vice 
versa? Such questions actually present a false dichotomy. Humans are “beloved” and “elect” 
                                                     
 
307
 This perspective views the verses as “ethical” (having to do with “how saved people live out 
their salvation”) rather than “soteriological” (having to do with how people are saved). Fee, Paul’s Letter, 
234–35. Cf. also O’Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians, 280. 
308
 Silva, Philippians, 122. That is, the “engagement of human and divine activity in the total work 
of salvation.” Ibid., 120–22; cf. 119. Cf. 2 Pet 1:10; Phil 1:6; 3:7–14. This is supported by the likelihood 
that evn ùmi/n does not mean “among you” as in corporate approaches to this verse, but must mean “in you” 
as it does with evnerge,w in 2 Cor 4:12; cf. Rom 7:5; 1 Cor 12:6; Eph 1:20; Col 1:29. Silva, Philippians, 122. 
Further, the “motivational” phrase “fear and trembling” is strongly suggestive of true human agency. Cf. 
W. Mundle, “φοβο ,” NIDNTT 1:623. On the other hand, see Fee’s seemingly reluctant recognition of this 
point. Paul’s Letter, 237. As such, “sanctification requires conscious effort and concentration.” Silva, 
Philippians, 123. Cf. Bietenhard, NIDNTT 2:819; Melick, Philippians, 110. 
309
 Thus, Silva is correct in stressing that human works neither initiate nor contribute to 
justification, which flows not from human righteousness but from the divine initiative (cf. Rom 4:5). 
Moreover, with regard to salvation, “our activity is possible only because of divine grace.” Philippians, 
122. Yet, at the same time, “because salvation in its entire scope necessarily includes the manifestation of 
righteousness in our lives, it follows that our activity is integral to the process of salvation.” Ibid. Cf. Rom 
13:11; Eph 2:9–10. Cf. Melick, Philippians, 111. Many other commentators speak of necessary human co-
operation here (even if differing on what the goal of the co-operation is) while stressing the overarching 
“effective working” of God, which itself enables, supports, or even creates such co-operation. Hawthorne, 
Philippians, 140, 142. Cf. Melick, Philippians, 111; Collange, L'épître, 99; Michael, The Epistle of Paul, 
103. Many of the commentators above view such works from a compatibilist perspective so that God is 
nevertheless the unilaterally efficacious agent behind human action, contrary to the view taken in this 
dissertation. Thus, O’Brien emphasizes “the effectiveness of the divine energy” to the exclusion of 
“synergism.” The Epistle to the Philippians, 285–86, 289. Cf. H. N. Ridderbos, Paul, 253–58, 349–52. 
310
 Thus, “our salvation, which we confess to be God’s from beginning to end, is here described as 
something that we must bring about.” Silva, Philippians, 122. Cf. John Eadie and William Young, A 





ultimately because of God’s decision to bestow love and choose to adopt those who believe in 
him. However, the divine initiative is the necessary but not sufficient condition of such statuses. 
Humans are also expected to respond in love, a response which itself is only possible because of 
God’s foreconditional, prevenient love.
311
 It is only because of divine grace that humans may be 
the recipients of the full force of God’s love. Such grace is itself only available through him who 
is the truly worthy “beloved,” for God freely bestows grace on Christians “in the Beloved” 
(avgapa,w) (Eph 1:6). Jesus is depicted as the ultimate object of divine delight, the legitimate 
“Beloved.” 
Since Jesus is the object of divine delight, through Christ humans may also offer 
acceptable sacrifice, even “fragrant aroma” (cf. Phil 4:18  Rom 12:1  Heb 13:15–16).
312
 
Accordingly, Jesus is referred to as “an offering and sacrifice to God as a fragrant aroma [ovsmh.n 
euvwdi,aj]” (Eph 5:2).313 This hearkens back to God’s delight in the OT, often connected with 
language of the sacrificial system as pleasing to God.
314
 In these cases, Jesus is the worthy 
recipient of divine delight as the truly “acceptable sacrifice to God.”
315
 Thus, things sent to Paul 
                                                     
 
311
 To say that humans are “beloved” unilaterally because they are elect would require overlooking 
or sterilizing the force of the exhortations to the beloved and the warning of future evaluative judgment. To 
say that humans are “beloved” merely due to their response to God would miss the essential divine 
initiative that makes such response possible. 
312
 Through Christ, Christians are a new priesthood (1 Pet 2:9; Rev 1:5–6) who may offer spiritual 
sacrifices (1 Pet 2:5; cf. Heb 13:16). Cf. M. Barth, Ephesians 4–6, 559. As Silva puts it, despite the utter, 
qualitative uniqueness of Jesus’ sacrifice it “does indeed provide a pattern for our behavior.” Philippians, 
208.  
313
 The phrase ovsmh.n euvwdi,aj, “fragrant aroma,” is found only here and in Phil 4:18 in the NT. 
There it refers to gifts sent to Paul, which are “an acceptable sacrifice” and “pleasing to God” (Phil 4:18). 
Cf. 2 Cor 2:14–15. 
314
 The corresponding OT phrase, :xoyNIh; x:yrE, soothing aroma, is found some 37 times in the LXX 
(including twice in the OT Apocrypha). The OT idiom refers to God enjoying the smell of the offering, 
what M. Barth refers to as a “crude anthropomorphism.” Ephesians 4–6, 559. Similarly, John Reumann, 
Philippians (Anchor Yale Bible 33B; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 669. See the discussion of 
anthropomorphisms and idioms in the methodology section as well as the reality of divine pleasure 
signified by this language discussed in chapter 4. 
315
 Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, 368. Cf. Heb 10:5–10. “Christ’s sacrifice of love was 




for his sustenance are “a fragrant aroma [ovsmh.n euvwdi,aj], an acceptable [dekto,j]316 sacrifice, well-
pleasing [euva,restoj] to God” (Phil 4:18).317 Similarly, Paul exhorts his hearers, “by the mercies of 
God, to present your bodies a living and holy sacrifice, acceptable [euva,restoj] to God, which is 
your spiritual service of worship” (Rom 12:1  cf. 12:2). Further, Paul exhorts Timothy to “be 
diligent to present [pari,sthmi] yourself approved [do,kimoj]318 to God” (2 Tim 2:15).319 Again, 
Paul speaks of the purpose of his function as a minister, which is “so that my offering of the 
Gentiles
320
 may become acceptable [euvpro,sdektoj],321 sanctified by the Holy Spirit” (Rom 15:16  
                                                     
 
Ephesians, 355. 
316 dekto,j refers to that which is acceptable. Four out of the 5 instances of this term in the NT refer 
to divine acceptance (cf. Luke 4:19; Acts 10:35; 2 Cor 6:2). The exception is Luke 4:24. See Grundmann, 
TDNT 2:58–59. 
317
 Notice the same OT imagery of “a fragrant aroma” as that of Christ’s sacrifice in Eph 5:2. Here 
God is pictured “as literally taking pleasure in the smell of the sacrifices offered by his people.” 
Hawthorne, Philippians, 272. “The picture is that of the ‘aroma’ of the sacrificial fire wafting 
heavenward—into God’s ‘nostrils,’ as it were. Properly offered, it becomes ‘an acceptable sacrifice, 
pleasing to him.’”
 
Fee, Paul’s Letter, 451. Cf. O’Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians. Amazingly, Paul 
could “speak of the Philippians’ sacrificial love for him in the same terms that this writer uses for Christ’s 
sacrifice.” Lincoln, Ephesians, 312. Importantly, the symbolism points to “the quality an offering must 
possess in order for it to be pleasing and acceptable to God (Exod 29:18, 25, 41; Lev 1:9, 13; Ezek 20:41; 
cf. Eph 5:2).” Hawthorne, Philippians, 272. As such, the imagery points “to the immense value of the 
Philippians’ gifts in the sight of God.” O’Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians, 540. On the sacrificial 
imagery see Michael Newton, The Concept of Purity at Qumran and in the Letters of Paul (SNTSMS 53; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 62–68. 
318 do,kimoj means “‘approved by testing’ and indicates that the person in question, being pleasing 
to God, has survived the test.” Morris, The Epistle to the Romans, 489. Cf. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 
858; G. W. Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 411; Grundmann, TDNT 2:255–60. Thus, it refers to careful 
assessment. Towner, The Letters, 519–20. Cf. 1 Cor 11:19. 
319
 To present (pari,sthmi) oneself may correspond to the sacrificial metaphor of becoming a 
pleasing sacrifice to God as well as the legal metaphor of standing before God the judge. It sometimes 
appears in the sense of “offering oneself as a sacrifice” (Rom 12:1; Col 1:22), sometimes in the sense of 
“presenting someone before a judge” (Col 1:28  Rom 6:13  2 Cor 4:14). Towner, The Letters, 520. Cf. also 
Rom 14:10. In either metaphor, divine evaluation and appraisal are explicit; this is the scrutiny of divine 
judgment.  
320
 The clause “offering of the Gentiles” may be a subjective genitive, the Gentiles’ offering, or an 
objective genitive, where Paul functions as a priest offering the Gentiles to God. Cf. Isa 66:20. The 
majority of commentators favor the latter option, which is also utilized here. See, for example, Fitzmyer, 
Romans, 712; Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 890; Schreiner, Romans, 767. The evaluative meaning, 
however, does not hinge on the outcome of this decision. 






 Thus, through Christ, humans may be the object(s) of divine delight, even 
pleasing sacrifices. 
God is, accordingly, often spoken of as the examiner, the judge, and humans are likewise 
often the object(s) or potential object(s) of God’s pleasure.
323
 Such approval is not unconditional, 
for even Paul disciplines himself “so that” he himself “will not be disqualified [avdo,kimoj]” (1 Cor 
9:27; cf. Titus 1:16).
324
 Further, “entreaties and prayers, petitions and thanksgivings” are to be 
“made on behalf of all men” for these are “good [kalo,j] and acceptable [avpo,dektoj] in the sight 
[evnw,pioj] of God” whose “desire” (qe,lw) is that all men be saved (1 Tim 2:1, 3–4; cf. Heb 
13:21).
325
 Paul further proclaims, “We have been approved [dokima,zw]326 by God to be entrusted 
                                                     
 
appears four other times in the NT of Paul’s service being “accepted of the saints” (Rom 15:31), of the 
“accepted time,” that is, the day of salvation (2 Cor 6:2  cf. Isa 49:8), of the fact that where “readiness is 
present, it is acceptable according to what a person has, not according to what he does not have” (2 Cor 
8:12), and perhaps most significantly in the call to Christians as “a holy priesthood to offer up spiritual 
sacrifices acceptable to God through Jesus Christ” (1 Pet 2:5). It is, of course, related to dekto,j but connotes 
“an intensive force, ‘fully/very acceptable.’” Harris, The Second Epistle, 585. 
322
 Notably, the acceptability of the offering is associated with being “sanctified by the Holy 
Spirit.” Thus, Moo comments that while “animal sacrifices are replaced by obedient Christians” (cf. Rom 
12:1) and “the priest by Christians” (cf. 1 Pet 2:5, 9) “to be ‘pleasing to God,’ sacrifices must still be 
‘sanctified.’” The Epistle to the Romans, 891. Cf. Ezek 36:22–28.  
323
 Thus, the Lord is the one who “commends” (suni,sthmi) and “it is not he who commends 
[suni,sthmi] himself that is approved [do,kimoj]” (2 Cor 10:18). Apelles is spoken of as “the approved 
[do,kimoj] in Christ” (Rom 16:10). Thus, Apelles is “a man of tested excellence.” Morris, The Epistle to the 
Romans, 535. Similarly, Schreiner, Romans, 791. Paul speaks of another’s “proven worth [dokimh,]” (Phil 
2:22).  
324
 Just as do,kimoj refers to having been approved after a test or close examination, its antonym 
avdo,kimoj refers to having failed a test and thus being unqualified or, even, worthless. In some instances it 
refers to the “dross in the silver refining process.” Towner, The Letters, 711. Cf. Prov 25:4; Isa 1:22. Some 
scholars limit this potential disqualification to the status of apostle rather than to salvation or eschatological 
reward. So Gundry Volf, Paul and Perseverance, 237. On the contrary, however, Fee points out that in 
light of the wider context (cf. 1 Cor 10) this parenesis is “that the Corinthians exercise self-control lest they 
fail to obtain the eschatological prize.” The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 440. Those who argue 
otherwise usually do so “because of a prior theological commitment, not because of what the text itself 
says.” Ibid. Garland further comments that though the “implication that one may forfeit one’s salvation 
may cause theological dyspepsia for some . . . the immortal crown to be worn (9:25) is not a good job-
approval rating as an apostle, but salvation. It can be won only if one exercises self-control.” 1 Corinthians, 
444. Cf. Kistemaker, New Testament Commentary, 316. See also Heb 6:8. 
325
 The language here suggests that these prayers may function like OT sacrifices (cf. Lev 1:3). 
Further, notice the qualification of evnw,pioj, language of being in the sight of, or coming before one for 




with the gospel, so we speak, not as pleasing [avre,skw] men, but God who examines [dokima,zw] 
our hearts” (1 Thess 2:4).
327
  
Elsewhere it is likewise evident that humans may indeed bring pleasure, or displeasure, to 
God (cf. 1 Thess 4:1).
328
 Thus, God may be “please[d] [avreski,a] in all respects” when one walks 
in a manner “worthy [avxi,wj] of the Lord” (Col 1:10  cf. 1 Thess 2:12  2 Thess 1:5).329 Further, the 
one who serves Christ by faith “is acceptable [euva,restoj] to God and approved [do,kimoj] by men” 
(Rom 14:18  cf. Phil 4:18  Rom 12:1). Likewise, children obeying their parents is “well-pleasing 
[euva,restoj] to the Lord” (Col 3:20).330 Accordingly, Paul calls for prayer “that our God will count 
                                                     
 
4:2; 7:12; 8:21; Gal 1:20. In the LXX, this divine evaluation is rendered by the term evnanti,on, “in the 
judgment of, before” (cf. Gen 6:8, 11  7:1  Exod 5:21  15:26  Lev 1:3  Deut 6:18 among many others). See 
H. Krämer, EDNT 1:462; Towner, The Letters, 176. Notice also the divine desire that all will be saved, 
which, short of universalism, is not carried out. See the discussion of the non-unilaterally efficacious nature 
of the divine will earlier in this chapter. 
326
 This verb, like the corresponding noun do,kimoj, refers to proving the quality, acceptability, or 
worth of something by examination and/or testing. Cf. 1 Cor 3:13; 11:28; 2 Cor 13:5; Gal 6:4; 1 Thess 
5.21; 1 Tim 3:10. 
327
 Notice this clearly evaluative pleasure of God, evidenced by the heart examination by God, 
which itself qualifies one to carry the gospel. Such divine examination of the human “heart” is prominent 
throughout the canon. Cf. 1 Sam 16:7; Jer 11:20; 12:3; 17:9; Pss 7:9; 17:3; 139:23; Prov 17:3; 1 Chr 28:9; 
Rom 8:27  Acts 1:24  15:8  Rom 8:27  Rev 2:23. “Despite the fact that [Paul] was chosen by God to be an 
apostle even before his birth (Gal. 1.1, 15), there was a period during which he was tested and after which 
God set his seal upon him as one approved for the ministry.” G. L. Green, The Letters, 120. Cf. ibid., 121; 
Wanamaker, The Epistles, 95; Malherbe, The Letters, 141. Such evaluative election to an office or task fits 
with the counsel to the churches to examine those who may serve as leaders (cf. Rom 14:18; 1 Cor 16:3; 2 
Cor 8:22; 13:7; 1 Tim 3:10). 
328
 “Pleasing God means living in a manner consistent with his commands (1 Thess 4:1).” D. M. 
Martin, 1, 2 Thessalonians, 92. Cf. 1 Cor 7:32–33  Gal 1:10  cf. Rom 15:3. Importantly, “those who are in 
the flesh cannot please [avre,skw] God” (Rom 8:8  cf. 1 Thess 2:15  2 Tim 2:3–4). This does not mean that 
human beings can never please God in any way but that humans cannot please God insofar as they remain 
in the control of their inherited carnal nature (cf. Rom 8:9–10). Humans must therefore be adopted in Christ 
to become pleasing to God (Rom 8:15–17).  
329
 Here, divine pleasure is explicitly evaluative by collocation with the term avxi,wj, worthy. That 
God is the one pleased is implied (Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, 47  O’Brien, Colossians-
Philemon, 22), though it is possible that the intention is that both God and humans are to be pleased. So 
Barth and Blanke, Colossians, 178.  
330
 Similar evaluation is apparent in the expectations that offspring care for their progenitors “for 
this is acceptable [avpo,dektoj] in the sight [evnw,pioj] of God” (1 Tim 5:4). Again, notice the element of 




you worthy [avxio,w] of your calling [klh/sij], and fulfill every desire [euvdoki,a] for goodness” (2 
Thess 1:11).
331
 On the other hand, those who killed the Lord and the prophets “are not pleasing 
[mh. avresko,ntwn] to God, but hostile to all men” (1 Thess 2:15). Likewise, God was not “well-
pleased” [euvdoke,w] with those who rebelled in the wilderness (1 Cor 10:5).332 Importantly, in 
these last verses those who are “not pleasing” are among God’s OT elect of Israel. Thus, the 
distinction between those who are pleasing or approved by God and those who are displeasing to 
him as well as the status of elect is not the result of arbitrary election but is grounded in the actual 




The importance of this divine evaluation of humans is evident in the frequent 
exhortations of Paul to “test” or “examine” (dokima,zw) themselves to see where they stand (2 Cor 
13:5–6) and to be “approved” rather than “unapproved [avdo,kimoj]” (2 Cor 13:7  cf. Rom 12:2  1 
Cor 11:28  Gal 6:4). Ultimately, the “quality of each man’s work” will be tested (dokima,zw) by 
fire (1 Cor 3:13) and God is himself the examiner (cf. 1 Thess 2:4).
334
 Accordingly, Paul 
                                                     
 
331
 Interestingly, if such desire is to be fulfilled automatically the wish becomes nonsensical. In 
this way, such a “wish” would demonstrate that the election is not unconditional or unilaterally efficacious.  
332
 Notably, it says that “with most of them” he was not “well-pleased,” implying also that there 
were some (a remnant) with which he was pleased. Of the others, Schrenk contends that this “can only 
imply rejection.” TDNT 2:741. Similarly, see Bietenhard, NIDNTT 2:819.  
333
 As such, divine pleasure and, apparently, election itself may be forfeited by those who 
displease God. Fee recognizes their “forfeiture of election—despite their privileges. . . . The vast majority 
of them experienced God’s judgment and failed of the prize.” The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 450. 
However, Garland nevertheless sees this as a reference to the “sovereignty and mystery of God’s choice of 
persons, which is inscrutable to humans.” Nevertheless, he confusingly recognizes that they failed to reach 
Canaan “because their ‘postbaptismal’ sins were so great” thus resulting in their “forfeiture of election.” 1 
Corinthians, 458–59. Accordingly, “God’s choice is not irrevocable.” John S. Ruef, Paul’s First Letter to 
Corinth (WPC; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), 92.  
334
 Such statements serve a “parenetic function” of calling others to examine themselves to see if 
they are pleasing God, “since the judgment would provide the final testing not only of unbelievers but also 
of Christians (cf. 1 Cor 3:10–15).” Wanamaker, The Epistles, 94. “Since they will be ‘examined’ by God at 
the End . . . they should test themselves now.”
 
Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 562. This test 
“discloses definitive approval (or otherwise) in the sense of a disclosure of all the factors which contribute 
to God’s definitive verdict. This may, indeed will, include whether the person concerned shares the 




proclaims it the Christian ambition “to be pleasing” (euva,restoj) to God for “we must all appear 
before the judgment seat of Christ so that each one may be recompensed for his deeds in the 
body, according to what he has done, whether good or bad” (2 Cor 5:9–10; cf. Eph 5:2). 
Evidently, behavior is a factor in who is “acceptable” or pleasing to God, with eschatological 
consequences.
335
 Accordingly, in light of such abundant evidence, it is manifestly certain that 
divine pleasure includes divine evaluation of human beings, which itself relates to careful 
inspection and judgment. At the same time, one must remember the mediatorial role of Christ as 
the truly acceptable sacrifice through whom humans may offer acceptable sacrifice. 
The Evaluative Aspect of Divine Love in the General Epistles-Revelation 
 In this corpus, Christ is again referred to as the “truly” beloved, the one who is actually 
worthy of divine love by way of a quotation of the divine declaration of evaluative approval at the 
transfiguration: “This is my beloved son with whom I am well-pleased” (2 Pet 1:17  cf. Matt 
17:5). That Jesus’s election was evaluative is likewise apparent in that Jesus was anointed by God 
because he has “loved righteousness and hated lawlessness” (Heb 1:9).
336
 Christ is himself “a 
living stone which has been rejected by men, but is choice [evklekto,j] and precious [e;ntimoj] in the 
sight of God” (1 Pet 2:4  cf. 2:6–8; Isa 28:16; Ps 117:22 LXX).
337
 Moreover, Christ’s status was 
itself evaluative and conditional since “if he shrinks back, my soul [yuch,] has no pleasure 
                                                     
 
work has produced some lasting effect in God’s sight.” Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000), 313.  
335
 “To be pleasing to God means that they will be vindicated and saved at the final judgment.” 
Schreiner, Romans, 741. Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 697. 
336
 Schreiner calls this “God’s imprimatur of approval upon his Son. . . . God was pleased with his 
Son, Jesus.” 1, 2 Peter Jude, 314–15. 
337
 Here, there is not only evaluation and appraisal of Christ as the worthy recipient of praise but 




[euvdoke,w] in him” (Heb 10:38  cf. Hab 2:4).338 In all this, Jesus is truly “worthy [a;xioj]” (Rev 
5:9). 
Human beings are also frequently the objects of divine evaluation, also frequently 
referred to as “beloved” in this corpus,
339
 often corresponding to the “called” or “elect” (cf. Jude 
1). Human responsibility and evaluation appear in a number of such references to the “beloved” 
(avgaphto,j).340 Accordingly, the “beloved” are to “be diligent to be found by Him in peace, 
spotless and blameless” (2 Pet 3:14  cf. 3:1, 8).
341
 As such, even the “beloved” must “be on their 
guard” so as not to “fall” (evkpi,ptw) from their “own steadfastness” (2 Pet 3:17  cf. 1 Pet 2:11).342 
This appears to exclude the concept of a unilaterally determined salvation for the “beloved.” First 
John 3:21–22 also suggests conditionality relative to human responsibility: “Beloved, if our heart 
does not condemn us, we have confidence before God; and whatever we ask we receive from 
                                                     
 
338
 Notice the emotional connotation signified by the OT idiom of “soul” as the seat of emotions. 
339
 The term is directed to groups (Jas 2:5; 2 Pet 3:1, 8; 1 John 3:2; 3 John 1:2, 5; Jude 1:3, 17) and 
individuals such as “our beloved brother Paul” (2 Pet 3:15) or “the beloved Gaius, whom I love in truth” (3 
John 1:1). Sometimes these imply beloved by God and, at other times, they seem to be a general term of the 
fellow brethren. 
340
 The “beloved” are often spoken of as having faith and/or acting faithfully (3 John 5  Jas 2:5  
Jude 20). Moreover, the author of Hebrews addresses the “beloved” saying, “we are convinced of better 
things concerning you, and things that accompany salvation” (Heb 6:9) and goes on to point out that God 
will not unjustly forget their “work” and their “love” and encouraging them to “diligence so as to realize 
the full assurance of hope until the end” (Heb 6:10–11  cf. Jude 3, 17). Elsewhere, the “beloved” face great 
adversity that is for their “testing [peirasmo,j]” (1 Pet 4:12). Such testing of the “beloved” demonstrates 
conditionality and the evaluation of the beloved. Peter Davids refers to this as “a refining process that will 
reveal the genuineness of their faith.” The First Epistle of Peter (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990), 
164–65. Cf. Prov 27:21. Notice the language of Wis 3:1–6, “God tested them and found them worthy of 
himself. As gold in the furnace he proved them, and as a whole burnt offering he accepted them.” Cf. Sir 
2:1–6.  
341
 The phrase “found by Him” is an explicit indication of divine evaluation. Further, the 
exhortation assumes that a state of purity is neither automatic nor determined for the “beloved” but requires 
their diligence. 
342
 The term evkpi,ptw “refers to apostasy,” that is, “departing from the Christian faith.” Schreiner, 
1, 2 Peter Jude, 399. So, also Davids, The Letters, 311–12. Cf. Rom 11:11, 22; 14:4; 1 Cor 10:12; Heb 
4:11  Rev 2:5. They can thus fall, they might “lose their eschatological reward,” that is, “those who fall 
away . . . are destined for eternal destruction. Believers maintain their secure position, in other words, by 
heeding warnings, not by ignoring them.” Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter Jude, 399. Cf. 2 Pet 1:10. Schreiner, 




Him, because we keep His commandments and do the things that are pleasing [avresto,j] in His 
sight” (1 John 3:21–22; cf. 4:7, 11).
343
 The reception of that which is asked for is explicitly 
contingent upon obedience and being pleasing to God, and is also likely related to the basis of 
“confidence before God.”
344
 Likewise, the “beloved are to be careful and “keep” themselves “in 
the love of God . . . waiting anxiously for the mercy” of Jesus “to eternal life” (Jude 1:20–21). It 
is highly significant that the “beloved” have to keep themselves in the love of God.
345
 The 
“beloved,” then, cannot be a group that is such on the basis of unilateral, unconditional election 
nor is the status as “beloved” an immutable, invariable, one. 
Evaluative divine pleasure is further emphasized in this corpus when it is stated that 
Enoch “was pleasing [euvareste,w] to God” before he was “taken up” (Heb 11:5  cf. Wis 4:10–15). 
Reference is also made to the “imperishable quality of a gentle and quiet spirit,” which is 
“precious [polutelh,j]346 in the sight [evnw,pioj] of God” (1 Pet 3:4).347 Peter also refers to the 
                                                     
 
343
 Here, again, the language of “in his sight” makes explicit the action of divine scrutiny, 
evidencing that God’s pleasure here is not merely arbitrary but is grounded in appraisal of the human 
response.  
344
 Cf. 1 John 5:14–15; John 14:14–15; 15:14, 17; 16:23. The conditionality of maintaining this 
relationship with God is also apparent in the broader context of the verse (1 John 3:10; cf. 3 John 11). John 
R. W. Stott comments that “there is an objective, moral reason” that God hears and answers prayers, 
“namely because we obey his commands, and, more generally, do what pleases him. Obedience is the 
indispensable condition, not the meritorious cause, of answered prayer.” The Letters of John: An 
Introduction and Commentary (Tyndale New Testament Commentaries 19; Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1988), 152. So Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 205; cf. 204–6; Robert Law, The Tests of Life: A Study of 
the First Epistle of St. John (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1909), 299–300. Cf. R. E. Brown, The Epistles of 
John, 462; Akin, 1, 2, 3, John, 166; Bietenhard, NIDNTT 2:816; Colin G. Kruse, The Letters of John 
(PNTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000), 142. Marshall, on the other hand, attempts to exclude the 
possibility that “answered prayer” is a “quid pro quo—God repays us in accordance with what we give 
him” pointing to this context of a Father-child love relationship “in which all thoughts of our doing good 
simply in order to win advantages or of God granting favors merely to those who please him are excluded.” 
The Epistles of John, 199. Yet, Marshall’s position (1) does not do justice to what the text actually states 
and (2) appears to include a false dichotomy. With regard to the former, the text explicitly and unavoidably 
predicates these benefits on obedience and pleasing God. Secondly, God could bestow blessings in 
response to obedience without requiring either that humans only serve him in order to receive such benefits 
(i.e., the claim of Satan in Job 1:10–11) or that God only gives good things to those who please him. 
345
 Carson recognizes that this is “clearly implying that it is possible for Christians not to keep 
themselves in the love of God.” New Dictionary of Biblical Theology, 648. 
346




“proof” (doki,mion) of “faith, being more precious [polu,timoj] than gold which is perishable, even 
though tested [dokima,zw] by fire” (1 Pet 1:7  cf. 4:12).348  
In many instances, the OT language of acceptable or pleasing sacrifice is applied to 
human actions toward pleasing God. Thus, Hebrews exhorts to “show gratitude, by which we 
may offer to God an acceptable [euvare,stwj] service with reverence and awe” (Heb 12:28). 
Through Christ, Christians are a “holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices acceptable 
[euvpro,sdektoj] to God through Jesus Christ” (1 Pet 2:5  cf. Heb 9:14).349 Likewise, humans are 
exhorted to “through Him [Jesus] . . . continually offer up a sacrifice of praise to God . . . for with 
such sacrifices God is pleased [euvareste,w]” (Heb 13:15–16; cf. Rom 12:1–2).350 In all this, the 
human is able to offer pleasing sacrifices only through the mediation of Christ who sanctifies 
them “through His own blood” (Heb 13:12).
351
 The human life as service to God from the heart 
                                                     
 
perfume (Mark 14:3), clothing (1 Tim 2:9), and signs of status; note also polytimoteros (1:7), timios (1:19), 
time (2:7), entimos (2:4, 6), all terms related to the semantic field of honor and worth.” Elliott, 1 Peter, 568.  
347
 Notice the evaluative language of “in the sight of.” “Such virtue” is “valuable to God.” 
Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter Jude, 154. So Davids, The First Epistle, 119. 
348
 “The focus here is on the value of genuine faith in God’s sight on the day of judgment,” which 
is said to be “of greater worth than gold.” Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter Jude, 68. “The eschatological reward will 
be given to them because of the genuineness of their faith, which is proved by the sufferings they endure.” 
Ibid. 
349
 Notably, this verse is couched between the identification of Jesus as the elect and precious 
stone in 1 Pet 2:4, 6–7. Such “spiritual sacrifices . . . may be understood as all behavior that flows from a 
transformation of the human spirit by the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit (1:2).” Karen H. Jobes, 1 
Peter (BECNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2005), 151. Of metaphorical sacrifices in the OT, see Pss 
50:13–14, 23; 51:17; 141:2. In the NT, such offerings refer to “an all-out personal commitment to do the 
will of God” (Rom 12:1).” J. Ramsey Michaels, 1 Peter (WBC 49; Dallas: Word, 2002), 101. Though some 
have suggested that Paul has the Eucharist specifically in mind here, David Hill argues convincingly that it 
is the “totality of Christian living” that is in view here and not specifically the Eucharist or any other 
liturgical element. “‘To Offer Spiritual Sacrifices’ (1 Pet 2:5): Liturgical Formulations and Christian 
Paraenesis in 1 Peter,” JSNT 16 (1982): 61. 
350
 Such sacrifices are not external ritual offerings but the human life itself lived in Christ.  
351
 “The effective, creative blessing of God will be mediated to the community through the agency 
of Jesus Christ, enabling them to bring to God through Jesus the sacrifices that please him.” William L. 
Lane, Hebrews 9–13 (WBC 47B; Dallas: Word, 2002), 565. Thus, “even the worship and praise of the 
Christian is dependent on the work of Christ for its acceptability.”
 
Davids, The First Epistle, 88. So, also 




thus fulfills the OT sacrifices, which in and of themselves (that is, apart from the heart 
motivation) never pleased (euvdoke,w) God (Heb 10:6, 8; cf. Ps 40:6).   
In all this, then, God’s initiative is primary but not unilaterally efficacious: Humans may 
be pleasing to God only through divine action. God is thus working to “equip” Christians “in 
every good thing to do His will [qe,lhma], working in” them “that which is pleasing [euva,restoj] in 
His sight [evnw,pioj]” (Heb 13:21  cf. 1 John 3:21–22; Jas 1:27).352 At the same time, pleasing God 
is only possible through faith because “without faith it is impossible to please [euvareste,w] Him” 
and such faith includes recognizing that God “is a rewarder [misqapodo,thj] of those who seek 
[evkzhte,w] Him” (Heb 11:6). Thus, pleasing God is not something earned by the believer but it is 
nevertheless conditional upon faith, which is rewarded.
353
 
The conditionality regarding such divine evaluation extends even to salvation, for 
“blessed is a man who perseveres under trial; for once he has been approved [do,kimoj], he will 
receive the crown of life which the Lord has promised to those who love [avgapa,w] Him” (Jas 
1:12; cf. Jas 2:5; 1 John 5:2; Rom 8:28; 1 Cor 2:9; 8:3).
354
 Significantly, the one who is approved 
is the one who loves God.
355
 Moreover, the reward, the “crown of life,” is eternal life itself.
356
 
                                                     
 
352
 Importantly, that this does not refer to a unilaterally efficacious divine will is evident in that 
Paul goes on to “urge” them in Heb 13:22. Note also the evaluative language “in His sight,” which again 
points back to such OT language of the evaluative scrutiny of sacrifices and judgment. 
353
 The precise nature of the reward is uncertain, but it is likely that it refers to the ultimate 
eschatological reward in light of Heb 12:23. Cf. W. L. Lane, Hebrews 9–13, 337; Paul Ellingsworth, The 
Epistle to the Hebrews (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1993), 577  Herbert Preisker, “μισθ  , 
μισθ ω, μίσθιο , μισθω   , μισθαποδ  η , μισθαποδοσία, αν ιμισθία,” TDNT 4:701. The human response 
to the divine initiative, faith, cannot be separated from faithfulness, which God appreciates. 
354
 The one who “endures to the end, then at last, winning final approval, he will receive the final 
reward, the crown of life.” James B. Adamson, The Epistle of James (NICNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1976), 67. Cf. Spicq, Agape, 2:4, Luke T. Johnson, James (AB 37A; New York: Doubleday, 
1995), 190. Thus, “those who endure are counted pious.” Davids, The Epistle of James, 79. Cf. 1 Pet 5:4; 
Dan 12:12. For a number of parallels in Jewish literature where endurance is “the sign of the pious 
character which will receive the reward” see Davids, The Epistle of James, 79–80. Ultimately, humans may 
have confidence in the judgment by abiding in Christ by which “love is perfected with us” since “perfect 
love casts out fear” (1 John 4:17–18).  
355




Throughout this corpus, that God clearly evaluates human beings, with significant consequences, 
is firmly asserted while positive evaluation of humans is emphatically located only in Christ.  
Love and Hate in the NT 
At the junction of emotionality and evaluation is the contrast between the antonyms love 
and hate, which frequently connote evaluation and emotionality. It has frequently been suggested 
that in many cases the contrast is idiomatic, amounting to choose and not choose or accept and 
reject. For instance, Jesus states that one cannot “serve two masters  for either he will hate 
[mise,w] the one and love [avgapa,w] the other” or “he will be devoted [avnte,cw] to one and despise 
[katafrone,w] the other” (Matt 6:24  Luke 16:13  cf. 6:26–27). In this instance, some have 
suggested that it would be unusual for a slave to actually love his master in any affectionate 
sense; thus the cool and detached meanings of accept and reject are more appropriate.
357
 
However, it is in fact not unusual to find affectionate love of a slave for their master in antiquity 
and thus this assumption is invalid (cf. Exod 21:5).
358
 Further, the greatest devotion in any 
                                                     
 
5:30; Ps 5:11; Jas 2:5; 1 John 5:2; Rom 8:28; 1 Cor 2:9; 8:3; 2 Tim 4:8. Cf. Deut 6:4. The ones who love 
God are thus those “in proper covenant relationship with” him who “also ‘love his commandments.’” L. T. 
Johnson, James, 188–89. See Ps 118:47–48. Cf. Kurt A. Richardson, James (NAC 36; Nashville, Tenn.: 
Broadman & Holman, 2001), 77. In rabbinic literature, “‘those that love him’ frequently stands for the 
pious, being at times an exegesis of Dt. 6:5.” Davids, The Epistle of James, 80. So Dibelius and Greeven, 
James, 89. 
356
 Cf. 1 Cor 9:25; 1 Pet 5:4; 2 Tim 4:8 and especially Rev 4:8 where those “faithful unto death” 
will be given “the crown of life [ste,fanon th/j zwh/j].” The ste,fanoj was “the wreath or chaplet” awarded 
to “victors in games” (cf. 1 Cor 9:25  2 Tim 2:5) or “to honor public service” or “signify rank” (cf. 2 Sam 
12:30  Isa 22:21) but “can also be used generally for any sort of reward.” L. T. Johnson, James, 188. Here, 
however, the term is qualified by “of life” pointing to the ultimate, eschatological reward of salvation, an 
“epexegetic genitive.” Moo, The Letter of James, 70. So Davids, The Epistle of James, 80; Dibelius and 
Greeven, James, 88–89. Cf. K. A. Richardson, James, 77. Cf. Wis 5:15–16. 
357
 Thus, Hagner suggests that in “the Jewish idiom” of love and hate the latter does not refer to 
“hatred as we understand the word but is only an emphatic way of referring to the absolute commitment 
required in discipleship. ‘Hate’ thus equals love less than.’” Matthew 1–13, 159. Similarly, Blomberg, 
Matthew, 124. The contention is based on the supposed “idiom” in Gen 29:31, 33; Deut 21:15. However, 
see the treatment of the relationship of love and hate in the OT in the previous chapter where it is argued 
that both often (if not always) refer to evaluation and emotion. 
358
 Rather, “in the Greco-Roman world the lot of slaves was extremely varied and in many cases 




relationship stems from a truly affectionate disposition.
359
 Here, not only is there a stark 
evaluative contrast at hand, but the point is that humans are to love God above all else and 
exclude love for anything that is less than good.
360
  
Accordingly, human zeal for God is supposed to be so intense that one would “hate” 
(mise,w) his father, mother, wife, children, brothers, or sisters and even one’s own life (Luke 
14:26; cf. Deut 33:9; Exod 32:27–29). Similarly, in John the one who “loves” (file,w) his own 
life loses it but Christians are to “hate” (mise,w) their own life in this world (John 12:25). Matthew 
refers to the one who “loves [file,w] father or mother more than Me” rather than using the term 
hate (Matt 10:37). However, he previously refers to enmity (evcqro,j) among family members that 
Jesus brings, thus also referring to animosity akin to the Lucan parallel (Matt 10:34–36).
361
 
Again, many have suggested that love and hate in such contexts are merely stand-ins for 
accepting and rejecting, respectively, divested of emotive content.
362
 The assumption is that this 
                                                     
 
303–4. Moreover, “Greco-Roman texts recognize the importance of affection and loyalty to the master in 
the appointment of a slave as steward.” Idem, Luke 9:21–18:34, 807. “The slave owner who engendered 
affection was likely to get more than his fair share of the efforts of the shared slave.” The Gospel of 
Matthew, 304. See also the apparent affection of Abraham’s servant for him (Gen 24:14, 26–27). 
359
 Indeed, absolute loyalty and commitment must include feeling and/or emotion. The greatest 
loyalty stems, at least in part, from inward, heartfelt motivation. Here, Jesus is using a qal vahomer 
argument that such loyal love should extend to God much more than it does in natural kinship relationships. 
The force of the point would be significantly lessened by removing the actual familial affection involved. 
360
 Here, the issue is “feelings” for both parties. Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 303. 
361
 Such “enmity” points toward the real animosity and conflict that the gospel may elicit from 
family members. Thus, even though Matthew does not use the term hate, the very closely associated 
“enmity” implies the same meaning as Luke’s version. Hagner refers to the “hostility now in view—that 
between otherwise close family members—is described with the metaphor of a “sword.” Matthew 1–13, 
291. 
362
 Stein appeals to the Matthean parallel as well as the usual OT passages (see further above) 
contending that this merely means “love [one’s family] less.” Luke, 397. So Beasley-Murray, John, 211. 
Similarly, among many others, Ko  stenberger, John, 379; R. E. Brown, The Gospel according to John I–XII, 
129; Bock, Luke 9:51–24:53, 1284. With regard to John 12:25, J. B. Green comments, “‘Hating’ one’s self 
should not be taken as a reference to an affective self-abhorrence.” The Gospel of Luke, 565. Cf. Otto 




call would make “no sense” as a “summation of what God desires.”
363
 However, the collocation 
of mise,w with other emotive terminology (such as katafrone,w, “despise,” in Matt 6:24 and Luke 
16:13, the contrast with evktre,fw, “nourish,” and qa,lpw “cherish,” in Eph 5:29  the collocation 
with evpiqumi,a “lust, desire,” h`donh,  “pleasure,” kaki,a, “malice, evil,” fqo,noj, “envy,” and 
stughto,j, “hateful,” in Titus 3:3  cf. Gen 37:4) suggests that the term as here used includes 
emotion, though not “hatred on some absolute scale.”
364
 Importantly, in these instances (Luke 14 
and Matt 10) the “hatred” is situational. The point is not that one should hate family members 
absolutely; quite the opposite is true (cf. Eph 6:1–4; 1 Tim 5:8). The assumption is that other 
loved ones, or love of oneself, may get in the way of commitment to Jesus (cf. Mic 7:6–7; 4 Ezra 
6:24).
365
 In this regard, there is a pro tanto obligation to hate the obstruction insofar as it obstructs 
undiluted love for Christ.
366
 Importantly, as in the OT, hatred need not function as the superlative 
term of animosity, as it often connotes in English, but may refer to animosity of varying 
degrees.
367
 Jesus’s call is intended to be radical and startling and should not be downplayed to 
accommodate contemporary sensibilities. True devotion, allegiance, and loyalty cannot be 
separated from the inner disposition (i.e., love/affection or hate/animosity; cf. Eccl 3:8). The one 
who does not have such undiluted love for Jesus is not “worthy [a;xioj] of him” (Matt 10:37–38). 
                                                     
 
363
 Bock, Luke 9:51–24:53, 1284. 
364
 For Carson, “the love/hate contrast reflects a semitic idiom that articulates fundamental 
preference, not hatred on some absolute scale.” The Gospel according to John, 439. Carson is correct in 
excluding the “absolute” connotation of the terms, but the terms nevertheless convey more than a tepid 
preference. Nolland believes the language is “typical Semitic hyperbole” but does not believe that it means 
“love less than.” Luke 9:21–18:34, 762.  
365
 This is because “there could be no casual devotion to Jesus in the first century. A decision for 
Christ marked a person and automatically came with a cost. . . . If one chose to be associated with Jesus, 
one received a negative reaction, often from within the home.” Bock, Luke 9:51–24:53, 1285.  
366
 Blomberg points out that “in each case Jesus implies that an unbeliever is initiating the hostility 
against a believing family member.” Matthew, 180. Fitzmyer thus correctly comments that “one is called to 
such ‘hatred’ to the extent that such persons would be opposed to Jesus  the choice that the disciple has to 
make is between natural affection for kin and allegiance to Jesus.” Luke X–XXIV, 1063. Cf. France, The 




The NT thus consistently points to a stark division between those who love God and/or 
the things of God and those who hate God and/or the things of God. Some are “haters [qeostugh,j] 
of God” (Rom 1:30).
368
 The controversy is real.
369
 The strong, emotive contrast between love and 
hate is apparent when James states that “friendship [fili,a] with the world is hostility [e;cqra] 
toward God” and thus “whoever wishes [bou,lomai] to be a friend [fi,loj] of the world makes 
himself an enemy [evcqro,j] of God” (Jas 4:4). Rejection of friendship with God (cf. John 15:14  
Jas 2:23) thus includes both volition (bou,lomai) and hostile emotion (i.e., e;cqra).370  
That hatred ought to be evaluative is evident in that Jesus has been “hated . . . without 
cause” (John 15:25  cf. Pss 35:19; 69:4). It is here implicit that it is unjust to hate someone 
“without cause.” Would it not then be unjust of God to hate some humans without cause? The 
logical conclusion is that, as is evidenced in the OT, divine hatred is never groundless but always 
                                                     
 
367
 See the word study of anf in chapter 4. 
368
 It is not clear whether this refers to those who hate God or are hated by God. In classical Greek 
this term is “used only in the passive sense, ‘hated by God, abandoned by God,’ but later in Hellenistic 
Greek it developed an active sense, ‘one who hates God.’” Fitzmyer, Romans, 289. Moo favors an active 
sense. The Epistle to the Romans, 120. Similarly, Mounce, Romans, 85; B. M. Newman and Nida, A 
Handbook on Paul’s Letter, 29; Dunn, Romans 1–8, 68; Schreiner, Romans, 98. Others take it in the 
passive sense, hated by God. For example, Barrett, A Commentary, 40. Moffat renders, “loathed by God” 
(James Moffat Translation); cf. NEB. TDNT renders, “despisers hated by God.” TDNT 8:306.  
369
 This “strife between good and evil is no tepid affair, but one that elicits the bitter hatred of the 
forces of evil.” Morris, The Gospel according to John, 207. Cf. Borchert, John 1–11; 186. John 3:19–20 
thus speaks of those who “loved [avgapa,w] the darkness rather than the Light, for their deeds were evil” and 
those who do evil “hate” (mise,w) the Light, fearing exposure (John 3:19–20). While Jesus commands 
Christians to “love [avgapa,w] one another” the world will hate (mise,w) them just as it hated Jesus since the 
world “loves [file,w] its own” (John 15:17–19). R. E. Brown contends that, unlike Matt 6:24, here “‘hate’ 
has its literal sense.” The Gospel according to John XIII–XXI, 686. But this raises the question, how does 
one know when it has its “literal sense” and when it is “Semitic exaggeration?” The lack of an objective 
hermeneutic implies that the interpretation is simply beholden to human opinion or presupposition. On the 
other hand one cannot “love God” and hate his brother (1 John 4:20). Similarly, hating (mise,w) Jesus 
ultimately amounts to hating the Father (John 15:23). “The two are so closely connected that to hate the one 
is to hate the other.”
 
Morris, The Gospel according to John, 604. Cf. Carson, The Gospel according to 
John, 526–27. 
370
 Moo sees this against the background of the OT marriage analogy. Here, then, God is the 
scorned lover by those who choose “friendship with the world.” As such, “‘Enemy,’ especially in light of 
the OT background . . . must involve hostility of God toward the believer as well as that of the believer 




appropriate to the actual state of affairs. Thus, Jesus “hates [mise,w]” the deeds of the Nicolaitans 
(Rev 2:6) and commends the church of Ephesus for also hating them. Further, the strong 
emotionality and evaluative nature of God’s displeasure is further noted in that the behavior of 
self-justifying lovers of money is “detestable” (bde,lugma) to God (Luke 16:15).371 Importantly, 
such animosity is explicitly based on the fact that “God knows” their “hearts” (Luke 16:15  cf. 
Prov 16:5). Once again, divine animosity corresponds to an accurate appraisal of its object(s), as 
it always does elsewhere.
372
 As such, God may hate passionately but never arbitrarily. The 
antithetical parallel to divine love itself implies the emotional nature of divine love, to which we 
now turn. 
The Emotional Aspect of Divine Love 
This section focuses on data that ground the conclusion that God’s love is profoundly 
emotional though not to the exclusion of volitional and evaluative aspects.
373
 First, love may be, 
at once, emotional and responsive to command. Second, God’s love is consistently depicted as 
intensely affective and emotive. Accordingly, the reader is encouraged to keep the following 
questions in mind while reading this section. Is divine love emotionally responsive to human 
disposition and/or action?
374
 If so, what kind of emotions are exhibited and on what occasions? Is 
                                                     
 
371 bde,lugma is strong language that often refers to that which is an abomination and “idiomatically 
. . . indicates something that stinks.” Bock, Luke 9:51–24:53, 1350. Cf. Werner Foerster, “βδελύσσομαι, 
βδέλυγμα, βδελυκ   ,” TDNT 1:600. In the LXX, its emotive force is explicit as it often is used to refer to 
“what God finds utterly revolting.” Nolland, Luke 9:21–18:34, 810. Cf. 1 Kgs 11:5; Prov 11:1. Cf. 
Foerster, TDNT 1:600.  
372
 “God’s wrath” is never “arbitrary or whimsical. In Scripture  God’s wrath, however affective, 
is the willed and righteous response of his holiness to sin, God’s holiness, like God’s love, is intrinsic to the 
very being of God  his wrath is not.” Carson, New Dictionary of Biblical Theology, 647. 
373
 In this dissertation, an emotion is loosely defined as any feeling(s) that may be affected by 
external stimulation. At the same time, emotions are not necessarily determined by external stimulus to the 
exclusion of other mental factors including volition, evaluation, etc. 
374
 It is often supposed that divine love is impassible. The implications of this presupposition are 
evident in the view that divine avga,ph is non-emotive but purely volitional, election love. For example, 
Cranfield contends that avga,ph “evidently refers to the will rather than to the emotion, and often conveys the 




God concerned about/affected by the world? Do the lives of creatures make a difference to God’s 
own life? Are emotions mutually exclusive to volition, that is, can emotional love be 
commanded? This section of the study will begin with the brief introduction of the primary terms 
related to the emotionality of divine love followed by a canonical survey of the NT data. 
A Brief Look at Some Terms of Emotional Divine Love 
The Meaning of the evlee,w Word Group 
The basic meaning of the evlee,w word group may include mercy, lovingkindness, heartfelt 
concern, compassion and/or sympathy of a strongly emotive character, which is often explicitly 
manifested in action.
375
 The verb evlee,w is often used of divine agency toward individuals (cf. Phil 
2:27) or groups of people (cf. 1 Pet 2:10).
376
 The noun e;leoj is also often used of God’s 
wonderful, abundant, and enduring, but not thereby unconditional, lovingkindness, compassion, 
and/or mercy (cf. Luke 1:50, 58; Ps 102:17).
377
 The adjective evleh,mwn appears twice, once of 
                                                     
 
Morris contends that “God’s love is not an emotion conditioned by the kind of people we are.” Morris, 
Testaments of Love, 151. As such, “passion” does not constitute “Christian love.” Ibid., 276. Cf. Stauffer, 
TDNT 1:38; Schneider, EDNT 1:9. For William G. Cole, “love in the Hebrew . . . was not ephemeral 
emotion but steadfast concern, involving the will rather than the feelings.” Sex and Love in the Bible (New 
York: Association Press, 1959), 67. See also de Rougemont, Love. 
375
 See Esser, NIDNTT 2:594  F. W. Danker et al., eds., “ελεεω,” BDAG, 315  idem, “ελεο ,” 
BDAG, 316  Ceslas Spicq, “ελεεω, ελεο ,” TLNT 1:471, 475  Rudolf Bultmann, “ελεο , ελεεω, ελεημων, 
ελεημοσυνη, ανελεο , ανελεημων,” TDNT 2:483, 485  F. W. Danker et al., eds., “ελεημων,” BDAG, 316. 
In the wider, secular Greek usage ἔλεο  is a term signifying strong emotion, often prompted by the 
affliction of another for which one feels mercy and/or sympathy. As such, it was often looked down upon 
by Greek thinkers as inferior πάθος, emotion, which is not proper, a weakness. Cf. Spicq, TLNT 1:471–72; 
Bultmann, TDNT 2:477–78. In contrast to the negative views of compassion in Greek thought, in the LXX 
e;leoj is “exalted” and “becomes a religious virtue and especially a divine attribute.” Spicq, TLNT 1:473. 
376
 In all, the verb appears 29 times in 26 verses and 3 more times (Rom 9:16; Jude 22, 23) with 
the varying inflectional type as evlea,w. Divine evlee,w further appears in Rom 9:15–16, 18; 11:30, 31, 32 and 
is implied in Matt 5:7; 18:33, 35; cf. 2 Cor 4:1; 1 Tim 1:13, 16. The verb also refers to human 
mercy/compassion, often with the expectation that Christians should exhibit it (cf. Rom 12:8; Jude 22, 23).  
377
 In all, the noun appears 29 times in 26 verses in the NT. Elsewhere divine e;leoj is manifest in 
Luke 1:54, 72, 78; Rom 9:23; 11:31; 15:9; Gal 6:16; Eph 2:4; 1 Tim 1:2; Titus 3:5; 1 Pet 1:3; Heb 4:16; Jas 
2:13; 2 John 3; Jude 21; cf. 2 Tim 1:16, 18; Jude 2. The noun e;leoj also may depict human mercy, 
compassion, and/or lovingkindness and is clearly depicted as virtuous conduct becoming a Christian (cf. 
Luke 10:37; Jas 2:13) and desired by God of human beings (Matt 9:13; 12:7). Another noun (evlehmosu,nh) 




humans (Matt 5:7) and once of Christ (Heb 2:17).
378
 Divine mercy/compassion is consistently 
active
379
 and often manifests emotionality
380
 as well as conditionality.
381
 
The range of this word group thus corresponds with that of lovingkindness (dsx) and 
compassion (~xr) in the OT.382 The overlap of the range of meaning with dsx is evident in the 
frequency with which the word group translates dsx in the LXX.383 The aspects of heartfelt 
                                                     
 
6:2–4; Luke 11:41; 12:33; Acts 3:2–3, 10; 9:36; 10:2, 4, 31; 24:17). In such a form the indissoluble 
connection between the disposition of mercy/pity and action is clearly manifest. 
378
 Another adjective, evleeino,j (pitiable), appears only with regard to humans, twice in 2 verses, of 
those who are pitiable or “to be pitied” (1 Cor 15:19  Rev 3:17). 
379
 e;leoj is often a grounding (as are other terms of love) of divine beneficence (Eph 2:4; Titus 3:5; 
1 Pet 1:3; cf. Luke 1:54, 78).  
380
 For example, it is used of “the tender [spla,gcnon] mercy [e;leoj] of our God” (Luke 1:78  cf. 
Luke 10:33, 37). Likewise, that “mercy” is assumed to be emotive is implied in the story of the one who 
received mercy but failed to bestow it (Matt 18:33) in the explanation of Jesus that God requires humans to 
“forgive his brother from your heart” (18:35). 
381
 In a number of instances, the reception of divine mercy is conditional upon humans bestowing 
mercy to one another (Matt 5:7; 18:33, 35; cf. Jas 2:13) or otherwise contingent (Luke 1:50; 1 Tim 1:13; 
Gal 6:16; Jude 21). At the same time, such mercy is undeserved and unmerited (Titus 3:5). Consider also 
the correspondence to the notion of dsx, which not only included dsx from two parties to one another but 
also dsx shown in response to another’s previous positive action (cf. 2 Tim 1:16, 18). Spicq refers to dsx as 
“fundamentally a species of love” noting correctly that “most of its occurrences have to do with God’s 
mercy or lovingkindness.” TLNT 1:475. 
382
 Similar to dsx in the OT, in the NT the group never explicitly refers to evlee,w/e;leoj from a 
situationally inferior toward a situationally superior but, in all cases where the subject and object are 
apparent, depicts mercy flowing from a superior to an inferior. There are instances of dsx from a situational 
inferior toward a situational superior in the OT, including human dsx toward God, but such instances are a 
small minority of the total occurrences. There are no direct instances of human mercy toward God in the 
NT, though God desires mercy (Matt 9:13; 12:7 in OT allusions translating dsx). Moreover, as in the OT, 
some instances of expectation of human to human e;leoj are likely to be understood as indirect e;leoj toward 
God. For example, the scribes and Pharisees are rebuked for neglecting “justice and mercy and 
faithfulness,” which could be toward humans and/or toward God (cf. Matt 5:7; Jas 2:13). Further, there is 
some association with grace (ca,rij) as both might refer to beneficent action toward (or received by) 
someone in need. The two word groups collocate closely in 1 Tim 1:2; 2 Tim 1:2; Heb 4:16; 2 John 3. In 
the LXX see Gen 39:21; 47:29; Prov 3:3. The two also collocate a number of times in the LXX Apocrypha.  
383
 The noun e;leoj translates dsx over 200 times (cf. Exod 20:6; 34:7; Deut 7:9). evleh,mwn also 
translates dsx twice (Prov 11:17; 20:6; cf. Prov 28:22) and dysix' once with God as the subject (Jer 3:12). 
Even evlehmosu,nh, often used of alms or sympathy, translates dsx 8 times, second to hqdc, which it translates 
10 times. Accordingly, there is significant overlap between the semantic range of dsx and e;leoj. Spicq 
points to significant continuity between the terms, contending that the NT takes up “God’s mercy in exactly 
the same form and continues it.” TLNT 1:476. Beyond dsx, e;leoj also translates ~xr (6 times), hN”xiT. , favor, 




concern, sympathy, compassion of the evlee,w word group are likewise apparent in the frequent 
association with OT terms of compassion such as ~xr384 as well as significant collocations with 
terms such as oivktirmo,j,385 “compassion, pity,” and spla,gcnon, “tender mercies, compassion.”386 
Thus, there is a significant correspondence to the meaning of compassion and/or pity.
387
 As seen 
                                                     
 
other terms once. Conversely, beyond its rendering by e;leoj, dsx is translated 9 times by the closely related 
polue,leoj, “abundant mercy,” and 9 times by dikaiosu,nh (cf. Gen 19:19), among a number of others once.  
Further, in the LXX, the verb evlee,w most often translates !nx (38 times), often of divine 
graciousness as in Exod 33:19. In many such instances where it translates !nx in the LXX it collocates with 
oivktirmo,j, which itself therein translates ~xr. See the discussion of these collocations below. evlee,w also 
translates ~xr, lmx, ~xn numerous times (see regarding these in the main text) and a number of other terms 
once. Moreover, the adjective evleh,mwn, which is most often used of God in the LXX, most often translates 
!wnx (12 times) especially in the statements that God is “merciful and gracious” (oivkti,rmwn kai. evleh,mwn) 
(Exod 34:6; 2 Chr 30:9; Neh 9:17, 31; Pss 85:15; 102:8; 110:4; 111:4; 114:5; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2). Cf. also 
Ps 144:8. It also translates dsx twice and a number of other terms once. 
384
 In the LXX, the verb evlee,w translates ~xr, compassion, 25 times, often of God’s profoundly 
emotive compassion as in Isa 38:20 (ET 31:20). Cf. Deut 13:17; 30:3; Isa 30:18; 49:15; 54:8; Ezek 39:25. It 
also translates hm'x'rU in Hos 2:3. The verb also translates lm;x' 7 times, often in the idiomatic expression “my 
eye will have no pity [sWx] and I will not spare” (lm;x' - evlee,w) (Ezek 5:11; 7:6, 8; 8:18; 9:5, 10) and ~xn 5 
times, often in the sense of God comforting his people (Zech 1:17; Isa 12:1; 49:13; 52:9). The other 
translation of lmx refers to the lack of human sparing in Isa 9:18. The other instance of ~xn is of God’s 
declaration that he will not “relent” and not “pity” and not “be sorry” (Ezek 24:14). The noun renders ~ymxr 
5 times (Deut 13:18; Isa 47:6; 54:7; 63:7; Jer 49:12) and ~xr once (Hab 3:2). Conversely, beyond its 
rendering by the evlee,w word group, the verb ~xr is translated 12 times by oivkti,rw, 4 times by avgapa,w, and 
once by parakale,w (Isa 49:13). Beyond its translation by e;leoj, ~ymxr is most often translated by the noun 
oivktirmo,j (20 times) and the adjective oivkti,rmwn (7 times) as well as a number of others once.  
385
 In the NT the two word groups collocate once in Paul’s quotation of Exod 33:19 in Rom 9:15. 
In the LXX the two collocate in many significant instances including Exod 33:19, of God’s mercy (evlee,w) 
and compassion (oivkti,rw), and 34:6 of God’s compassionate (oivkti,rmwn) and gracious (evleh,mwn) nature 
(cf. also the collocation in many allusions to Exod 34:6 including 2 Chr 20:9; Neh 9:17, 31; Pss 85:15; 
102:8; 144:8; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2). Likewise, the two collocate in the many other descriptions of God as 
gracious (evleh,mwn) and compassionate (oivkti,rmwn) (Ps 110:4; cf. 111:4; 144:8; Isa 27:11; 30:18). The 
terms also collocate in many instances where ~xr and dsx collocate, e;leoj translating dsx (Pss 39:12; 50:3; 
68:17; 102:4; 102:8; Hos 2:21; Zech 7:9; Lam 3:32). See also 2 Kgs 13:23; Isa 63:15; 1 Macc 3:44; Sir 
2:11; 5:6. 
386
 The two collocate once in the reference to the “tender [spla,gcnon] mercy [e;leoj] of our God” 
(Luke 1:78). In more than a single verse see the association in Luke 10:33, 37. Since the spla,gcnon word 
group is relatively rare in the LXX the two do not collocate often therein (cf. Odes 9:18; Prov 12:10). 
387
 In fact, the association is so significant that the NIDNTT groups the three together in its 
dictionary article. Esser points to the close association of the terms in their original meanings: “In their 
original use eleos refers to the feeling of pity, oiktirmos, and especially its root oiktos, to the exclamation of 
pity at the sight of another’s ill-fortune, and splanchna to the seat of the emotions, the inward parts or what 
today would be called the heart. The corresponding verbs in the active express these feelings shown in the 
sense of to help, feel pity, show mercy; where they are used in the passive, they express the experience of 




earlier in this chapter, the word group also associates significantly with the avgapa,w word 
group.
388
 As such, the NT meaning is sometimes akin to the English conception of mercy though 
the concept of mercy does not exhaust the meaning of the term, which likely corresponds to the 
much richer meaning of dsx in some usages. While one should not read the entire meaning of dsx 
into this term in the NT one should also not be too hasty to exclude the possibility that the rich 
concept of dsx may be in the background of many NT usages.389 
The Meaning of the oivkti,rw and 
splagcni,zomai Word Groups 
The oivkti,rw word group appears infrequently in the NT390 but with considerable 
significance, denoting the basic meaning of a highly emotive response to someone’s hardship  
compassion, sympathy, mercy, tender feeling, and/or pity.
391
 The splagcni,zomai word group is 
closely related to the oivkti,rw word group. It similarly refers to the feeling (or the seat of the 
feeling) of warm sympathy, pity, and/or compassion at someone’s misfortune, such emotion itself 
                                                     
 
388
 Significantly, they collocate frequently in the LXX in those verses that speak of God’s dsx 
toward those who love God translated by e;leoj and avgapa,w (cf. Exod 20:6 among many others). See also 
Deut 5:10; 7:9; Neh 1:5; Dan 9:4. In the NT, both are associated in grounding divine action (Eph 2:4). See 
also 2 Tim 1:2; Jude 2, 21; 2 John 3; cf. 1 Tim 1:13–14 and the discussion of the collocation of these word 
groups in the discussion of the meaning of the avgapa,w word group above. 
389
 Esser suggests the secular Greek background does not relate to the meaning of the term in the 
NT but, rather, one must “interpret the LXX translation from the standpoint of the Heb. original, and not 
the other way round.” NIDNTT 2:594. 
390
 The noun oivktirmo,j appears 5 times, twice of human agency as virtuous feeling/disposition 
(Col 3:12; Phil 2:1) and 3 times of divine agency, once describing God as “the Father of mercies” 
(oivktirmo,j) (2 Cor 1:3; cf. Rom 12:1) though such mercy is not unconditional (Heb 10:28). The adjective 
oivkti,rmwn appears 3 times in 2 verses referring to the characteristic of being merciful and/or 
compassionate, often descriptive of God as “merciful” (Luke 6:36  Jas 5:11; cf. Ps 102:8), but once of 
humans who are to be merciful even as God is (Luke 6:36). This likely echoes the OT description of God as 
“compassionate and gracious” (Ps 102:8 among many others). So Rudolf Bultmann, “οικ ιρω, οικ ιρμο , 
οικ ιρμων,” TDNT 5:161. The verb oivkti,rw appears 2 times in 1 verse, itself a quotation of Exod 33:19 
where it translates ~xr in parallel to !nx, which is translated by evlee,w (Rom 9:15). 
391
 F. W. Danker et al., eds., “οικ ιρμο ,” BDAG, 700  J. P. Louw and E. A. Nida, eds., “οικ ιρω, 
οικ ιρμο ,” L&N 1:750  H. H. Esser, “οικ ιρμο ,” NIDNTT 2:598. As was the case for the evlee,w word 
group, this emotion was also seen as a “sign of weakness” amongst many Greek philosophers, even a 
“reprehensible πάθος.” Bultmann, TDNT 5:160. Nevertheless, in classical Greek “mercy is invoked from 




bound up with affectionate love.
392
 The noun spla,gcnon may refer to the “inward parts” of the 
body as the “seat of emotions” akin to the functioning of ~ymxr in the OT.393 As such, it often 
depicts the “seat and source of love, sympathy, and mercy” or to the “feeling itself” of great 
“love” and “affection.”
394
 It is most often used of human agency (2 Cor 6:12; 7:15; Phil 2:1; Col 
3:12  Phlm 7, 12, 20  1 John 3:17) but once of divine agency of the “tender [spla,gcnon] mercy 
[e;leoj] of our God” (Luke 1:78; cf. Phil 1:8).395 The verb splagcni,zomai appears only in the 
Synoptics and refers to highly emotive compassion, always with divine agency (often Jesus) and 
often prompted by sight and spoken of explicitly as “felt.”
396
 Significantly, it may be forfeited (cf. 
                                                     
 
392
 F. W. Danker et al., eds., “σπλαγχνιζομαι,” BDAG, 938. “Compassion involves so identifying 
with the situation of others that one is prepared to act for their benefit.” Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 
407. The Semitic background of the term suggests the meaning “tender mercy.” E. Colin B. MacLaurin, 
“Semitic Background of Use of ‘en splanchnois,’” 103(1971): 45. Barclay Moon Newman and Philip C. 
Stine explain the meaning as “to be stirred up with feeling,” a “feeling of pity and love.” A Handbook on 
the Gospel of Matthew (New York: United Bible Societies, 1992), 279. It is descriptive of a “gut response.” 
France, The Gospel of Matthew, 373. Silva contends that σπλάγχνα may be used “by metonymy of the 
affection itself.” Philippians, 48. Cf. Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament (2 vols.; London: 
SCM Press, 1952), 2:222. 
393
 See Louw and Nida, L&N 1:323  F. W. Danker et al., eds., “σπλαγχνον,” BDAG, 938  Ceslas 
Spicq, “σπλαγχνα, σπλαγχνιζομαι,” TLNT 3:274–75  J. P. Louw and E. A. Nida, eds., “σπλαγχνιζομαι  
σπλαγχνα, ων,” L&N 1:294  Helmut Köster, “σπλαγχνον, σπλαγχνιζομαι, ευσπλαγχνο , πολυσπλαγχνο , 
ασπλαγχνο ,” TDNT 7:548–49  H. H. Esser, “σπλαγχνα, σπλαγχνον,” NIDNTT 2:599. Cf. Isa 49:15. See 
also E. Dhorme, L’emploi métaphorique des noms de parties du corps en hébreu et en akkadien (Paris: 
Librairie orientaliste P.Geuthner, 1963), 111–12, 134–35. The noun appears 11 times in the OT. “Older 
Greek literature viewed the σπλάγχνα particularly as the seat of violent, aggressive feelings. Only in the 
Hellenistic period were the σπλ γχνα considered the place where one “becomes weak, soft.” N. Walter, 
“σπλαγχνον,” EDNT 3:266. Cf. Sir 30:7; Wis 10:5c; Jos. Asen. 6:1; Pss. Sol. 2:14. The middle form of the 
verb, always used in the NT, is nearly absent in ancient Greek literature. Esser thus explains that “the 
metaphorical meaning [of this verb] have mercy on, feel pity, is found only in the writings of Judaism and 
the NT.” NIDNTT 2:599. 
394
 Danker et al., BDAG, 938. So, also “σπλαγχνιζομαι  σπλαγχνα, ων,” 294  Esser, NIDNTT 
2:599; Walter, EDNT 3:266. 
395
 In one instance it literally refers to “intestines” (Acts 1:18). 
396
 It is “literally a movement of the entrails at the sight” to “have a visceral feeling of 
compassion.” Spicq, TLNT 3:274–75. In 10 of its 12 instances it is passive, the other two are middle (Matt 
15:32; Mark 8:2). It most often describes Jesus’ compassionate feelings (Matt 15:32; 20:34; Mark 1:41; 
8:2; cf. Mark 9:22), very often prompted by the sight of some affliction (Matt 9:36; 14:14; Mark 6:34; Luke 
7:13). The only other occurrences are in the symbolic narratives of Jesus, which themselves are themselves 
descriptive of divine compassion (Matt 18:27; Luke 10:33; 15:20). Only in these symbolic narratives are 
humans the subject of the verb (the good Samaritan in Luke 10:33, the debt holder in Matt 18:27, and the 




Matt 18:27). Two semantically related adjectives also appear: the adjective polu,splagcnoj 
describes God’s abundant compassion (Jas 5:11)
397
 and the adjective eu;splagcnoj “tenderhearted, 
compassionate” of the disposition Christians ought to have (Eph 4:32  1 Pet 3:8). 
While the splagcni,zomai word group appears more frequently in the NT than the oivkti,rw 
word group, only the noun appears (only 3 times) in the LXX.
398
 The splagcni,zomai word group 
appears to have come into common use in post-LXX Jewish literature.
399
 On the other hand, 
though the oivkti,rw word group is relatively infrequent in the NT, the oivkti,rw word group 
appears many times in the LXX, where it is clearly situated amongst the major descriptors of 
God’s love, mercy, compassion, grace, kindness, and patience.
400
  
                                                     
 
divine dealings.” Köster, TDNT 7:553. 
397
 For Spicq this depicts the “innate love and compassion and tenderness” of God by way of the 
metaphor of “having long or abundant entrails . . . the equivalent of polyeleos.” TLNT 3:275.  
398
 The three instances are Prov 12:10 wherein it translates ~xr, Prov 26:22 where it translates !j,B,  
body, and Jer 28:13 [51:13] where it translates [c;B,  gain made by violence. The noun appears 14 times in 
the LXX Apocrypha as “the seat of natural maternal love (4 Macc 14:13; 15:23, 29), as well as of affection 
in the larger sense.”
 
Walter, EDNT 3:266. The others are 2 Mac 9:5, 6; 4 Ma 5:30; 10:8; 11:19; Ode 9:78; 
Wis 10:5; Sir 30:7; 33:5; Pss. Sol. 2:14; Bar 2:17. The verb appears once in the LXX Apocrypha in 2 Macc 
6:8 and eu;splagcnoj also appears once in the LXX Apocrypha (Ode 12:7). The closely related verb 
evpisplagcni,zomai appears in Prov 17:15 but without Hebrew original. 
399
 Thus Test. XII demonstrates the predominant use of this word group with the sense of “mercy” 
and “to be merciful,” replacing the oivkti,rw word group. Köster, TDNT 7:552. Cf. also Esser, NIDNTT 
2:599. Significantly, it is therein predicated of God and thus may point to the background of the NT’s usage 
of spla,gcnon. Köster argues that this “translation of ַרֲחִמים by σπλ γχνα” introduced “in later Jewish 
writings . . . is undoubtedly the direct presupposition of the NT usage.” Köster, TDNT 7:552. On the other 
hand, however, it is disputed whether Test. XII is actually a Jewish work at all; some have seen it as a 
Christian forgery and it is unclear whether there is a Jewish predecessor (Vorlage).  
400
 Therein, the verb oivkti,rw translates ~xr 11 times in 10 verses including depictions of God’s 
fatherly compassion (Ps 102:13) and “compassion according to his abundant lovingkindness” (Lam 3:32  
cf. Exod 33:19). The others include 1 Kgs 8:50; 2 Kgs 13:23; Ps 101:14; Mic 7:19; Isa 27:11; Jer 13:14; 
21:7. It also translates !nx in 10 verses, often of divine compassion (cf. Isa 30:18; Ps 101:14). See also Pss 
4:2; 36:21; 58:6; 66:2; 76:10; 101:14, 15; 111:5; 122:2. It also translates a number of other terms once. The 
noun oivktirmo,j most often translates ~xr/~ymxr in 28 verses, also often of God’s compassion. See 2 Sam 
24:14; 1 Kgs 8:50; 1 Chr 21:13; 2 Chr 30:9; Neh 1:11; 9:19, 27, 28, 31; Pss 24:6; 39:12; 50:3; 68:17; 
76:10; 78:8; 102:4; 105:46; 118:77, 156; 144:9; Hos 2:21; Zech 1:16; 7:9; Isa 63:15; Dan 1:9; 2:18; 9:9, 18. 
It also translates !Wnx]T; twice (Zech 12:10; Dan 9:18) and !n”x] once (Dan 4:27). The related noun oivkti,rhma, 
which never appears in the NT, translates ds,x, in Jer 38:13. The adjective oivkti,rmwn most often translates 
~wxr (12 times), usually of God being “compassionate [oivkti,rmwn] and gracious [evleh,mwn]” (Exod 34:6). 




The overlapping, emotive nature of both word groups is further evident by their 
collocations since both are closely related to the OT concept of ~xr/~ymxr.401 The oivkti,rw word 
group also overlaps significantly with the evlee,w word group, especially as it relates to the notion 
of sympathy for someone else’s hardship.
402
 The splagcni,zomai word group collocates with the 
evlee,w word group only once, in the reference to the “tender [spla,gcnon] mercy [e;leoj] of our 
God” (Luke 1:78).
403
 The oivkti,rw group also significantly collocates with the avgapa,w word group 
in the admonition “love your enemies . . . Be merciful [oivkti,rmwn], just as your Father is 
merciful” (Luke 6:36) as does the splagcni,zomai word group elsewhere.404 Both groups also 





 and “patience/longsuffering” among others.
407
 
                                                     
 
times (2 Chr 30:9; Neh 9:17, 31; Pss 85:15; 102:8; 110:4; 111:4; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2) and translates ~wxr in 
two others (Deut 4:31; Ps 77:38). oivkti,rmwn also translates !nx and !wnx once (Pss 10:12; 144:8) and ynIm'x]r; 
once (Lam 4:10). Cf. Ps 144:8.  
401
 They appear in Paul’s exhortations of Christians to “put on a heart [spla,gcnon] of compassion 
[oivktirmo,j]” (Col 3:12) and reference is made to “affection [spla,gcnon] and compassion [oivktirmo,j],” 
likely of the Philippians (Phil 2:1). Both also refer to God’s character, he is “full of compassion 
[polu,splagcnoj] and merciful” (Jas 5:11). The two word groups only collocate once in a single verse in the 
LXX (Prov 12:10) but that is insignificant considering the scarcity of the splagcni,zomai word group in the 
LXX.  
402
 Bultmann, TDNT 5:159. Bultmann goes so far as to say, “There is no palpable distinction 
between οἰκ ίρειν and ἐλεεῖν or οἰκ ιρμοί and ἔλεο ” in the LXX. Ibid., 160. See the discussion in the 
evlee,w word study just above this one. 
403
 In more than one verse the two are closely related, in Matt 18:27, 33 and Luke 10:33, 37. In the 
LXX the groups collocate in Prov 12:10 and Odes 9:18. 
404
 Some scholars have also suggested that both word groups function much like avgapa,w in the 
Gospels where avgapa,w is relatively infrequently used. Cf. Köster, TDNT 7:555–56. Both word groups 
collocate with the avgapa,w word group in Phil 2:1 and Col 3:12 and the avgapa,w word group collocates with 
the oivkti,rw word group alone in Rom 9:13, 15 and the splagcni,zomai word group alone in Phlm 7; 1 John 
3:17. They also collocate within two verses in Eph 4:32–5:1. In the LXX with oivkti,rw see Pss. Sol. 9:8; 
Zech 12:10. Neither group ever collocates with the file,w word group. 
405
 That is, the crhsto,j word group, which collocates with both in Col 3:12. See the parallel 
between the crhsto,j and oivkti,rmwn of God’s character as kind and merciful (Luke 6:34–36). In the LXX it 
collocates with the oivkti,rw group in Pss 68:17; 111:5; 144:9. 
406
 That is, para,klhsij, which collocates with both in Phil 2:1 and spla,gcnon in Eph 4:32. It 




The Meaning of the zhlo,w Word Group 
The zhlo,w word group refers to passion for someone or something, which may take the 
form of negative jealousy or positive zeal.
408
 Thus, the group may refer to “holy zeal” (John 2:17  
Rom 10:2; 2 Cor 11:2; Phil 3:6; Heb 10:27),
409
 negative hostility and anger, ill will (Acts 5:17; 
7:9; 13:45; 17:5), jealousy as a vice (Rom 13:13; 1 Cor 3:3; 13:4; 2 Cor 12:20; Gal 5:20; Jas 3:14, 
16; 4:2), or desire toward goals or devotion toward someone (1 Cor 12:31; 14:1, 39; 2 Cor 7:7, 
11; 9:2; Gal 4:17, 18; cf. Rev 3:19).
410
 In all these the emotive, passionate sense is clear whether 
it is misdirected or positively directed.
411
 Accordingly, the statement “love is not jealous” (1 Cor 
13:4) refers to the negative, misdirected, hostile sense of the term but does not rule out the 
positive passionate commitment,
412
 whether manifested by Christians, or that which is 
                                                     
 
of all comfort” (2 Cor 1:3).  
407
 That is, the makroqumi,a word group, which collocates with both in Col 3:12. In Matt 18:26 the 
debtor pleads for patience and receives compassion (splagcni,zomai) (Matt 18:27). In the LXX, this group 
collocates with oivkti,rw, often in the locus classicus of God’s character (Exod 34:6) and allusions thereto 
(Neh 9:17; Pss 85:15; 102:8; 144:8; Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2). See also Dat 4:27. Therein it collocates with 
splagcni,zomai only in Ode 12:7. 
408
 Albrecht Stumpff, “ζηλο , ζηλοω, ζηλω η , παραζηλοω,” TDNT 2:886. The verb appears 11 
times in 10 verses. The noun zh/loj appears 16 times in 16 verses and refers to passionate commitment. 
That is, “the capacity or state of passionate committal to a person or cause.” Ibid., 877. Thus, the related 
noun, zhlwth,j, “zealot,” which appears 8 times in 8 verses, and frequently in the LXX. For W. Popkes, 
both “designate a passionate commitment to a person or cause.” “ζελευω, ζηλο , ζηλοω,” EDNT 2:100. In 
classical Greek the noun may also have positive or negative connotations from “eager striving,” 
“enthusiasm,” “admiration,” to “jealousy,” “envy,” “ill-will.” H. C. Hahn, “ζηλο ,” NIDNTT 3:1166. 
Another verb, parazhlo,w, provoking to jealousy, appears 4 times in 4 verses, once of divine passion (1 Cor 
10:22). The closely related verb, zhleu,w, of intense interest and/or eagerness, appears once, exhorted by the 
resurrected Christ himself (Rev 3:19). 
409
 Such zeal toward God may itself be misguided “not in accordance with knowledge” (Rom 
10:2). This is the case with Paul’s zeal as Christian persecutor (Phil 3:6). On the other hand, some is 
positive, “godly jealousy” (2 Cor 11:2). It refers to Jesus’ zeal (John 2:17) and once to God’s own zeal 
(Heb 10:27). 
410
 This summary adapts the very helpful outline of these four distinctive usages in Popkes, EDNT 
2:100. 
411
 Likewise with the 8 instances of the noun zhlwth,j, which might be misguided or proper (Luke 
6:15; Acts 1:13; 21:20; 22:3; Gal 1:14; 1 Cor 14:12; Titus 2:14; 1 Pet 3:13). Since the term may be positive 





exemplified in divine zeal for his people (cf. Heb 10:27), which itself corresponds to his profound 
love (cf. 1 Cor 14:1; Rev 3:19; Eccl 9:6).
413
 While the word group is used relatively infrequently 
of divine passion in the NT, it corresponds to the very important anq in the OT, which is often 
used therein to describe God’s passionate love.
414
 
Divine Mercy, Compassion, and Passion in Gospels-Acts 
For obvious reasons, Jesus is the most frequent (but not sole) agent of divine emotion in 
the Gospels.
415
 Christ is depicted as the good shepherd who knows his sheep and they know him. 
His concern (me,lei) for them is so great that he is even willing to die for his sheep (John 10:11, 
                                                     
 
412
 That zeal is not always negative is evident in that Paul exhorts them to “pursue love, yet desire 
earnestly [zhlo,w] spiritual gifts” (1 Cor 14:1). Likewise, Christ exhorts those he loves to “be zealous and 
repent” (Rev 3:19). 
413
 Significantly, although it is a positive divine attribute in the LXX, Philo, who only uses the 
term in its positive sense, rules out the concept as inappropriate to God. He criticizes those who speak of 
God “as they would of men, they add jealousy, anger, passion, and other feelings like these.” However, 
those who “are initiated in the true mysteries relating to the living God . . . never attribute any of the 
properties of created beings to him.” Lectures on St. John 113.60–61 (The Works of Philo: Complete and 
Unabridged; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson), 163. Further, due to “fear of any kind of anthropomorphising” 
the idea of passion or jealousy came to be considered inappropriate to God among some Jewish scholars. 
See Stumpff, TDNT 2:879–80. While it was not avoided altogether the passionate force of the term is 
evaded, according to Stumpff.  
414
 See the word study of anq in chapter 4. With God as agent, the word group in the LXX refers to 
the “the intensity, the uncompromising involvement with which God deals with men.” Stumpff, TDNT 
2:882; Hahn, NIDNTT 3:1166. Stumpff believes the usage in the LXX classifies it as belonging “to the very 
essence of God.” TDNT 2:884. The anq word group is almost always translated by the zhlo,w word group in 
the LXX. Therein the noun zh/loj always translates the word group anq; 28 times it translates the noun hanq 
and twice it renders the verb anq. There it often depicts divine passion (Deut 29:19; Ps 78:5). A different 
noun zhlwth,j appears 8 times in 8 verses in the LXX always translating anq (5 times, Exod 20:5; 34:14; 
Deut 4:24; 5:9; 6:15) or aANq; (once, Nah 1:2). In every instance it refers to God’s jealousy  he is a “jealous 
God” (Deut 4:24). The verb zhlo,w almost always translates anq (20 times) and also is often used of God’s 
jealous love (cf. Num 25:13). It also translates aANq; (Josh 24:19) and ha'n>qi (2 Kgs 10:16) once. It renders a 
few other terms once as well. zhleu,w never appears in the LXX. The verb zhlwth,j translates anq 3 times 
(Deut 32:21; 1 Kgs 14:22; Ps 77:58) and hr'x' 3 times (Ps 36:1, 7, 8). The latter is always of human fretting 
while the former always refers to God being provoked to jealousy.  
415
 In this dissertation, such emotionality is taken as evidence of divine emotionality. The most 
powerful evidence for this position is the correspondence between the emotions of Jesus and the emotions 
exhibited by YHWH in the OT. See the methodology in chapter 1 for a discussion of the wider theological 






 This loving concern of Christ for his creatures is further evident in the angst he 
expresses over the unwillingness of Jerusalem to allow him to save her: “Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 
who kills the prophets and stones those who are sent to her! How often I wanted [qe,lw] to gather 
your children together, the way a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were unwilling 
[ouv + qe,lw]” (Matt 23:37  par. Luke 13:34).417 Later, Jesus “saw the city and wept [e;klausen] 
over it” (Luke 19:41).
418
 Elsewhere, Jesus manifests anger (ovrgh,) and is “grieved [sullupe,w] at 
their hardness of heart” (Mark 3:5  cf. John 2:17) thus manifesting sympathetic grief (sullupe,w) 
elicited by their callous disposition against God.
419
 At Lazarus’s death Jesus is said to be “deeply 
moved [evmbrima,omai]420 in spirit and troubled [tara,ssw]”421 (John 11:33), so much so that he 
                                                     
 
416
 Notice the “reciprocal knowledge” here, which “is not superficial but intimate,” implying love, 
which is even compared to that between the Father and the Son (cf. John 10:15). Morris, The Gospel 
according to John, 455. Christ is “deeply concerned for the sheep” with “passions” that are “aroused.” 
Ibid., 454. Similar concern is demonstrated in action in the parables of the lost sheep, coin, and son (Luke 
15:5, 10, 19–20). 
417
 Here, “ Jesus’ words betray great tenderness and employ maternal imagery.” Blomberg, 
Matthew, 350. 
418
 The term here for weeping is strong, referring to “full sobbing or wailing.” Cf. Danker et al., 
eds., “e;klausen,” BAGD, 433; Bock, Luke 9:51–24:53, 1560. Hagner refers to this as “agony.” Matthew 
14–28, 680. Jesus weeping and lamenting over the rebellion of God’s people is reminiscent of the OT 
prophets (cf. 2 Kgs 8:11; Jer 9:1; 13:17; 14:17). 
419
 The verb sullupe,w in passive as here means “‘to share in grief, sympathise, console,’ never ‘to 
be grieved with.’” Though Marcus thinks the latter seems to be the meaning required by the context here.” 
Mark 1–8, 248. So Vincent Taylor, The Gospel according to St. Mark (London: Macmillan, 1959), 223. 
420
 The term for “deeply moved,” evmbrima,omai, ““signifies a loud inarticulate noise, and its proper 
use appears to be for the snorting of horses.” Morris, The Gospel according to John, 493. Cf. F. W. Danker 
et al., eds., “εμβριμ ομαι,” BDAG, 253. Of humans it usually denotes anger, emotional indignation. 
Carson, The Gospel according to John, 415; Morris, The Gospel according to John, 1375. Cf. Dan 12 
[11]:30; Lam 2:6; Sir 13:3. For primary Greek references, see Barnabas Lindars and C. M. Tuckett, Essays 
on John (SNTA 17; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992), 92–96. Elsewhere in the NT it appears in vs. 
38; Matt 9:30; Mark 1:43; 14:5; cf. also the textual variant to Matt 12:18. This is the same verb used of 
Jesus’s reaction to the distressed in Mark 1:43; Matt 9:30.  
421
 This term is used here of inner “anguish.” Ko  stenberger, John, 339. Cf. John 12:27; 13:21; Esth 
4:4. The verb is immediately followed by the reflexive pronoun eàuto.n, “himself.” Some suggest this 
rendering means that Jesus was master over his emotions. So Morris, The Gospel according to John, 494. 
B. M. Newman and Nida recognize this possibility but also note it may be a “kind of substitute passive.” A 
Handbook on the Gospel of John, 371–72. Yet, this seems to read too much into the reflexive, which likely 
simply connotes the intensity of the emotions. Certainly, no theological case can be made to the effect that 




“wept” (dakru,w)422 (John 11:35).423 The Jews interpreted this as a signal of the degree of Jesus’ 
love for Lazarus: “See how much He loved [file,w] him” (John 11:36).424 This emotion two 
verses later refers to Jesus as “deeply moved [evmbrima,omai] within” (John 11:38). The language 




Elsewhere, Jesus displayed the “zeal” (zh/loj) spoken of by the prophet when he cleansed 
the temple of those who were using it as a place of business, reminiscent of divine zeal in the OT 
                                                     
 
422
 The verb may mean “burst into tears” considering the force of the aorist, here taken as 
ingressive. Ko  stenberger, John, 341. Cf. Morris, The Gospel according to John, 495. 
423
 Jesus is possibly both grieved and angered at the situation of death, suffering, and lack of faith. 
Carson believes that Jesus may be both grieved at their unbelief and at the same time “moved by their 
grief” and “consequently angry with the sin, sickness and death” itself. Here, Jesus is both “angry” and 
“loving and empathetic” toward the people at once. The Gospel according to John, 416. However, there is 
considerable disagreement among scholars over the nature and cause of Jesus’s emotion in this verse. It is 
unclear whether Jesus wept for Lazarus or because of the broader misguided feelings and dispositions of 
the people, or simply was grieved at the situation of death and suffering. The first is rejected by most on the 
premise that Jesus would have known that he was about to raise Lazarus from the dead and thus there was 
no cause for weeping. The debate is generally between forms of the second and third options. The 
interpretation of such emotion is further complicated by the fact that the precise emotion described by 
evmbrima,omai here and in v. 38 is further debated. The term would normally denote anger but the 
appropriateness of such emotion in this context has been questioned in favor of an emotion akin to 
compassion or pity. Cf. Lagrange, Évangile selon saint Jean, 304–5. Some manuscripts even soften the 
meaning of “anger” by reading “as if” before it. See R. E. Brown, The Gospel according to John I–XII, 
426. However, the lexical evidence strongly points toward the meaning of “anger” despite the tendency 
toward softening the meaning. If this view is correct, what was Jesus angry at? Many contend that Jesus is 
angered by the lack of faith by those present. For example, see Beasley-Murray, John, 192–93; Barrett, The 
Gospel according to St. John, 400. Or, perhaps Jesus is angered by the pain that sin and evil have caused or 
even angry toward the agencies of evil themselves. So, among others, Ko  stenberger, John, 339; R. E. 
Brown, The Gospel according to John I–XII, 435. For a more comprehensive summary of positions taken 
on this issue and the arguments behind them see Beasley-Murray, John, 192–93; Ko stenberger, John, 339–
40. 
424
 Many commentators argue that those present misunderstand Jesus’ tears, which were not 
because of his love for Lazarus but because of his sadness at the disposition of the others present. So, 
among many others, Carson, The Gospel according to John, 416; Morris, The Gospel according to John, 
496; Borchert, John 1–11, 360. Ko  stenberger, on the other hand allows that the Jews are “partially correct 
when they interpret Jesus’ tears as an expression of his love for Lazarus” but “err when they imagine his 
grief to be in despair.” John, 341–42. Similarly, Barrett contends that the Jews here “express the truth 
without perceiving it” though his “affection” and “love . . . for his own is” far greater than that felt by the 
mourners. The Gospel according to St. John, 400. 
425
 R. E. Brown, The Gospel according to John I–XII, 421. This is “no light emotion.” Morris, The 




(John 2:17; cf. Ps 69:9).
426
 The passion narrative also exhibits the strong emotions of Jesus. Jesus 
greatly desires (evpiqume,w) to eat the Passover with the disciples (Luke 22:15). As the cross nears, 
Jesus is “grieved [lupe,w] and distressed [avdhmone,w]” and states, “My soul is deeply grieved 
[peri,lupoj], to the point of death” (Matt 26:37–38; cf. Mark 14:33–34).427 Yet, even in the midst 
of his suffering on the cross, Christ’s love yet remains, exhibited in his prayer of forgiveness for 
those who are crucifying him (Luke 23:34).
428
 
In a number of instances the love (avgapa,w or file,w) of Jesus also exhibits emotionality, 
often responsive to human disposition and/or action. For example, when a man approaches Jesus 
asking him how to inherit eternal life, Jesus, “looking [evmble,pw] at him, felt a love [avgapa,w] for 
him” (Mark 10:21).
429
 Such love is here depicted as prompted by sight; it is thus a passible 
reaction, corresponding to the frequent instances where Jesus’ compassion is prompted by sight. 
Importantly, Jesus loves the man before calling him to decision, but response is required for the 
                                                     
 
426
 This is similar to God’s zeal for his name (cf. Isa 59:17  Ezek 39:25). Borchert comments, “The 
way Jesus reacted to the Jewish merchandising in the temple troubles some who cannot conceive of a 
loving Jesus being angry. But spineless love is hardly love. . . . Any theology that is monofocal and fails to 
encompass both love and judgment ultimately ends up in heresy.” John 1–11, 164. 
427
 The intensity and depth of this emotion is widely recognized by commentators. For example, 
Blomberg renders this as “overwhelmed with sorrow.” Matthew, 394. Similarly, Mark 14:33 reads, “very 
distressed [evkqambe,w] and troubled [avdhmone,w].” Note once again the idiom of the “soul” as the “seat of 
emotions,” depicting “deeply-felt emotion, not an outward show.” France, The Gospel of Matthew, 1004.  
428
 Jesus here puts “into practice his own instruction regarding love for one’s enemies: “Pray for 
those who abuse you” (6:27–28).” J. B. Green, The Gospel of Luke, 819–20. Though the phrase is absent in 
a number of manuscripts and the “internal” textual arguments are inconclusive, the similar saying in Acts 
7:60 points toward authenticity. See Stein, Luke, 588–89. Ultimately, the passibility of Jesus is clear in his 
“suffering” (Matt 16:21  17:12  Mark 8:31  9:12  Luke 9:22  17:25  22:15  24:26, 46  Acts 1:3  3:18  17:3  
26:23). 
429
 Marcus sees this as “fatherly affection (‘moved with love for him’).” Mark 8–16, 727. France 
sees an evaluative element noting that “ἐμβλέπω denotes a searching look (see 14:67): so far he has passed 
Jesus’ careful scrutiny, and Jesus is duly impressed.” That Jesus loves him, then, “eliminates any 
suggestion that that man’s profession is insincere.” The Gospel of Mark, 403. Spicq comments, “Jesus was 









Likewise, emotions appear to be associated with Jesus’ love for Lazarus who is referred 
to as “he whom You love [file,w]” (John 11:3  cf.36) and Lazarus, Martha, and Mary are all 
designated as objects of Jesus’s love (avgapa,w) (John 11:5). Elsewhere, Jesus “loved [avgapa,w] His 
own [i;dioj] who were in the world, He loved [avgapa,w] them to the end [te,loj]” (John 13:1). 
There seems to be a great depth of love connoted by the expression “to the end,” likely connoting 
both intensity and endurance.
431
 Further, Jesus’ love is specifically “for his own,” itself a “term of 
endearment in some ANE literature.
432
 
Divine beneficence toward humans is itself predicated on “the tender [spla,gcnon] mercy 
[e;leoj] of our God” (Luke 1:78). This terminology suggests that God’s mercy is intensely 
emotive and profoundly heartfelt.
433
 In numerous instances the divine mercy is on display. Jesus 
speaks of the “Lord” having “mercy” (evlee,w) on a man who has received a miracle (Mark 5:19). 
Further, God has given “help . . . in remembrance of His mercy [e;leoj]” and has “displayed His 
great mercy [e;leoj]” and has shown “mercy” (e;leoj) in remembrance of the covenant (Luke 1:54, 
                                                     
 
430
 The foreconditionality of divine love will be further discussed below. Stauffer sees this as an 
example of the responsibilities that come with election. “Jesus loves the rich young ruler with the love of 
God which summons men to the very highest. But the one who is called starts back.” TDNT 1:48. Thus, the 
man forfeits the conditional reward. 
431
 H. N. Ridderbos renders it “love to the last breath” and “love in its highest intensity.” The 
Gospel according to John: A Theological Commentary (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997), 452. Thus, 
it likely means “utterly, completely” as well as “to the end of life,” perhaps implying Jesus’ own 
willingness to lay down his life as the “supreme expression of love.” R. E. Brown, The Gospel according to 
John XIII–XXI, 550. So John 12–21, 77; Ko stenberger, John, 402; Morris, The Gospel according to John, 
546. 
432
 James Moulton notes that “ὁ ἴδιος without a noun expressed” appears in the papyri “as a term 
of endearment to near relations.” A Grammar of New Testament Greek (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1906), 
90. See the further discussion of love for one’s own as well as the notion of insider and outsider love 
further below. 





58, 72). Divine compassion is depicted as prompted by human need or distress in a number of 
Jesus’ object lessons.
434
 For example, in the parable of the prodigal son, the father saw (or̀a,w) his 
returning son “still a long way off . . . and felt compassion [splagcni,zomai] for him, and ran and 
embraced him and kissed [katafile,w] him” (Luke 15:20). Though the son is, by his own 
admission, unworthy (a;xioj), the sight of his return causes compassion to well up in the heart of 
the father, turning to joy and celebration (euvfrai,nw) (Luke 15:19, 24). The emotive nature of the 
father’s response is emphasized in that he ran to greet him, an undignified response according to 
the customs and norms of the day.
435
 The amazing endurance of the father’s compassion 
illustrates God’s enduring compassion, which surpasses all expectations.
436
  
Jesus is again the most frequent agent of mercy and compassion in this corpus, both 
descriptive of his divine character of love.
437
 Such compassion leads to appropriate action (cf. 
Matt 14:14; 15:32; 18:27; 20:34). Significantly, such compassion is often prompted by the sight 
of someone in distress, describing an emotive response toward its object(s).
438
 For example, 
Jesus, “seeing [or̀a,w] the people, . . . felt compassion [splagcni,zomai] for them, because they 
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 In one example, compassion is prompted by sight as is often the case of Christ’s compassion. 
The Samaritan, “when he saw [or̀a,w]” a man badly beaten and robbed, “he felt compassion 
[splagcni,zomai]” and “took care” (evpimele,omai) of the fallen Jew and, in this way, “showed mercy [e;leoj] 
toward him” (Luke 10:33–34, 37). Thus, “compassion is that which causes us so to identify with another’s 
situation such that we are prepared to act for his or her benefit (cf. 7:13; 15:20). Moreover, the content of 
the term is not significantly different from that of ‘love’ in v 27.” Nolland, Luke 9:21–18:34, 594. So, also 
Bock, Luke 9:51–24:53, 1032.  
435
 “All of these details are designed to picture the basic emotion expressed. The scene reminds 
one of the common picture of soldiers returning from a long separation from their families. The emotion is 
basic to the love that exists within a family and powerfully portrays the love of God.” Bock, Luke 9:51–
24:53, 1314. 
436
 This conception of fatherly mercy and/or compassion is a significant theme in Luke (cf. 6:36; 
8:51; 9:42; 11:2, 11, 13; 12:30, 32). 
437
 The mercy and compassion shown by Jesus “reveals the mercy and love of God.” Günther and 
Link, NIDNTT 2:543. So Köster, TDNT 7:554  N. Walter, “σπλαγχνιζομαι,” EDNT 3:265. 
438
 In such instances, the compassion is deeply emotive. Literally it could be rendered “his heart 
contracted convulsively.” Esser, NIDNTT 2:599. Such compassion of Jesus was “no condescending pity but 




were distressed and dispirited like sheep without a shepherd” (Matt 9:36).
439
 In other instances, 
compassion and/or mercy is prompted by need or distress, without the mention of sight, often in 
direct response to a request
440
 and/or the exercise of faith.
441
 In a striking example, a man comes 
to Jesus seeking healing and Jesus is either “moved with compassion” (splagcni,zomai) or 
becomes angry (ὀργισθείj) and “sternly” (evmbrima,omai) warns the man to keep quiet about his 
healing (Mark 1:41, 43–44).
442
 It is notable that in this passage Jesus’ action is explicitly 
                                                     
 
439
 Cf. Mark 6:34. Elsewhere, Jesus “saw a large crowd, and felt compassion [splagcni,zomai] for 
them and healed their sick” (Matt 14:14). Yet again, “when the Lord saw [or̀a,w] a widow of Nain, He felt 
compassion [splagcni,zomai] for her, and said to her, ‘Do not weep’” and proceeded to raise her son from 
the dead (Luke 7:13). 
440
 For instance, a man pleads with Jesus to “have mercy [evlee,w]” on his son who is a “lunatic” 
and “very ill” and “often falls into the fire and into the open water” (Matt 17:15). In Mark’s account the 
father cries for “pity” (splagcni,zomai) and “help” (bohqe,w) from Jesus for his son who is often thrown into 
fire and water by a demon (Mark 9:22). Notice the close relationship of evlee,w and splagcni,zomai in the 
parallel accounts. The affirmative response of Jesus in healing the boy indicates that Jesus indeed had 
mercy/compassion in this instance. Later in Matthew, Jesus heals two blind men in response to their call for 
“mercy” (evlee,w) being “moved with compassion” (splagcni,zomai) (Matt 20:30–31, 34). Further, a 
Canaanite woman pleads for and receives mercy saying, “Have mercy on me, Lord, Son of David  my 
daughter is cruelly demon-possessed” (Matt 15:32). Later, lepers call to Jesus for “mercy” (evlee,w) and are 
not disappointed (Luke 17:13; cf. 18:13). Elsewhere, without any recorded request, Jesus responds to the 
hunger of a large group of people, declaring to his disciples, “I feel compassion [splagcni,zomai] for the 
people” because they had not eaten for three days (Matt 15:32  cf. Mark 8:2). France renders this emotion, 
“Jesus’ heart went out to them.” The Gospel of Matthew, 763. The OT is replete with examples of human 
entreaty to God for mercy and/or compassion (cf. Ps 132:2–3). Such instances “frequently invoke God’s 
love as a motive for such assistance.” Marcus, Mark 8–16, 661. 
441
 Elsewhere, Jesus responds to the calls of two blind men for “mercy” (evlee,w) (Matt 9:27; cf. 
Mark 10:47–48; Luke 18:38–39). Significantly, in all three Synoptic accounts the mercy is explicitly stated 
as a response to faith, though in Mark and Luke’s accounts only one blind man is explicitly mentioned 
(Matt 9:29  Mark 10:52  Luke 18:42). Lane comments, “Jesus did not exercise his power arbitrarily or 
impersonally but in the context of a genuine involvement which established the existence of faith sufficient 
to receive the gift of healing from God.” The Gospel of Mark, 388. See also Stein, Luke, 464; Brooks, 
Mark, 174. Cf. Luke 5:20; 8:48; 17:19. 
442
 In this verse there is “a genuine textual dilemma” as to whether splagcni,zomai is original or the 
term ὀργισθείj, which would signify anger, should be read here. Both verbs are used numerous times in 
Jesus’ ministry. Only a few texts support ὀργισθείj but it is the lectio difficilior and preferred by some for 
that reason, as well as its correspondence to ἐμβριμᾶσθαι in 1:43 and the fact that it does not appear in the 
parallel passages in the Synoptics. See, among others, Brooks, Mark, 55; France, The Gospel of Mark, 115; 
Mark 1–8:26, 72; W. L. Lane, The Gospel of Mark, 84. Metzger, on the other hand, argues for 
splagcni,zomai. A Textual Commentary, 76. So, also, Ernst Haenchen, Der Weg Jesu. Eine Erklärung des 
Markus-Evangeliums und der kanonischen Parallelen (Bd 6; Berlin: Töpelmann, 1966), 94–96. If the 
reading “anger” is correct, Jesus may be angered not by the man’s request but perhaps at the suffering 
itself, or perhaps at his sorrow at the lack of faith around him in contrast to this faith-filled request stirs his 




voluntary: He states, “I am willing [qe,lw]  be cleansed” (Mark 1:41). As such, his will appears to 




However, while divine compassion is unmerited, it is not depicted as unconditional, 
rather it presumes appropriate response, including showing compassion to others, and can even be 
forfeited. Jesus quotes from the OT that he desires (qe,lw) “compassion” (e;leoj) rather than 
sacrifice (Matt 9:13; similarly, Matt 12:7). Accordingly humans are expected to reflect God’s 
character and “be merciful [oivkti,rmwn], just as your Father is merciful [oivkti,rmwn]” (Luke 6:36  
cf. Matt 5:44–48).
444
 Jesus further states, “Blessed are the merciful [evleh,mwn], for they shall 
receive mercy [evlee,w]” (Matt 5:7  cf. 5:7; 7:2; 1 John 4:11; Jas 2:13).445 The reception of divine 
mercy, then, is conditional upon being merciful. Similarly, Luke quotes from the OT that God’s 
“mercy [e;leoj] is upon generation after generation toward those who fear [fobe,omai] him” thus 
continuing the emphasis on the contingent reception of divine mercy (Luke 1:50; cf. Exod 20:6; 
Ps 103:17 [LXX 102:17]).
446
  
                                                     
 
Gospel of Mark, 117–18; W. L. Lane, The Gospel of Mark, 84. Brooks points out that “even if ‘with 
compassion’ is not the original reading, the compassion of Jesus comes out clearly in the fact that he 
touched the leper. Such a thing was unheard of and made Jesus ceremonially unclean.” Ibid. 
443
 France, The Gospel of Mark, 265. Hendriksen adds, “The sorrows of the people are Christ’s 
own sorrows, for he dearly loves these burdened ones. He feels deeply for them, and is eager to help them. 
On the subject of the Lord’s sympathy see also 8:17  14:14  15:32  18:27  20:34  Mark 1:41  5:19  6:34  
Luke 7:13.” New Testament Commentary: Exposition of the Gospel According to Matthew, 439. 
444
 A similar statement appears in the Targum on Lev 22:28 and the concept is frequent in 
Judaism. See Bock, Luke 1:1–9:50, 604. 
445
 This recalls the expectation of appropriate response within mutual relationship included in the 
meaning of dsx in the OT. Cf. Bultmann, TDNT 2:482. Interestingly, in one instance, the mercies given by a 
human being are recognized by God, when an angel appears to Cornelius and proclaims, “Your prayers and 
alms [evlehmosu,nh] have ascended as a memorial before God” (Acts 10:4). 
446
 For Marshall, the reciprocality of this verse is evident even in the terminology as a translation 
of dsx in which it “takes on the nuance of an attitude arising from a mutual relationship, ‘faithfulness.’” The 




The necessity of appropriate response is highlighted in the parable of the unforgiving 
servant. The debt holder “felt compassion” (splagcni,zomai) for his servant and released him from 
a massive debt (Matt 18:27).
447
 Yet, because of the lack of that servant’s mercy toward his own 
debtor, the penalty was reinstated (Matt 18:33). This displays conditionality regarding the 
retention of compassion. The reception of compassion created a moral obligation to likewise 
show compassion and, thus, the servant should “have had mercy [evlee,w]” on his fellow slave “in 
the same way that [the master] had mercy [evlee,w] on” him (Matt 18:33).448 As such, divine 
compassion and mercy are here depicted as foreconditional, that is, they are given to the 
undeserving servant freely but then forfeited by the failure to show mercy to others (cf. Matt 6:12, 
14–15).
449
 The foreconditional nature of mercy and compassion complements the foreconditional 
nature of love, the NT textual evidence for which will be taken up just after this section on divine 
mercy and compassion. 
Divine Mercy, Compassion, and Passion in the Pauline Writings 
Divine concern is also evident in the Pauline writings.
450
 While God is concerned to 
prescribe merciful treatment of oxen, he is even more concerned about the merciful treatment and 
just compensation of human laborers (1 Cor 9:9–10).
451
 Further concern is evident in the language 
                                                     
 
447
 The clause “felt compassion” signifies a decision that is not derived merely from “calculation” 
but responsive to need. “The king is moved by a visceral compassion (splanchnistheis, Matt 18:27) when 
he hears his debtor’s supplications and forgives the whole debt  but the latter shuts out all feelings of pity.” 
Spicq, TLNT 1:476. 
448
 See Hagner, Matthew 1–13, 540. Nolland, similarly, refers to it in the category of “moral 
necessities.” The Gospel of Matthew, 760. 
449
 In all this, “God will treat us according to the way we treat our brethren. The motivation for 
brotherly compassion is imitation of God; which puts the emphasis on the interiority and sincerity of the 
forgiveness.” Spicq, TLNT 1:477. 
450
 Perhaps the greatest evidence of divine concern and passibility is the oft-mentioned suffering 
(“passion”) of Jesus (Rom 8:17  2 Cor 1:5  Phil 3:10  Col 1:24).  
451
 Paul here applies the law against muzzling an ox while threshing paradigmatically to human 





of reciprocal knowledge between God and humans. Some “have come to know God, or rather to 
be known by God” and thus should not be turning back to “worthless elemental things” (Gal 4:9  
cf. 1 John 4:10). Here, the swift transition from knowing God to being known by him by use of 
the construction “or rather” (ma/llon de.) emphasizes the priority of the divine initiative without 
nullifying the human response in such reciprocal, relational knowledge.
452
 Elsewhere, Paul speaks 
of being “jealous [zhlo,w] for you with a godly jealousy [qeou/ zh,lw|]; for I betrothed you to one 
husband, so that to Christ I might present you as a pure virgin” (2 Cor 11:2).
453
 Apparently, Paul 
is vicariously manifesting God’s zeal for his people who are to be presented to Christ as a pure 
bride, mirroring the theme of God’s passionate commitment to an exclusive relationship with his 
people, found frequently in the context of the marriage metaphor in the OT. Further, divine 
jealousy, responsive to human action, is apparent in that it is possible to “provoke the Lord to 
jealousy [parazhlo,w]” (1 Cor 10:21–22).454  
Mercy and compassion are also primary characteristics of God as grounds of his actions 
in the Pauline writings. He is “rich [plou,sioj] in mercy [e;leoj]” and acts for his people “because 
                                                     
 
452
 Thus, “our knowing God is conditioned upon his prior knowledge of us.” Timothy George, 
Galatians (NAC 30; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 314. Cf. F. F. Bruce, The Epistle to the 
Galatians (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1982), 202; Ronald Y. K. Fung, The Epistle to the 
Galatians (NICNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1988), 189. Some may view the phrase ma/llon de as a 
retraction of the first statement. However, the same construction elsewhere may be rendered “all the more” 
(Acts 5:14) or “yes, rather” in the sense of moreso (Rom 8:34) and “but especially” and “but even more” (1 
Cor 14:1, 5). It may also have a contrasting sense as rather or instead (Eph 4:28; 5:11). The point is not that 
humans may not know God. That would contradict Jesus’ statement of reciprocal knowledge of his own in 
John 10:14. Rather, the point is that any conception that human beings come to know God through their 
own initiative is utterly false. Such language of reciprocal knowledge is closely associated with love. 
453
 The genitive here might be subjective or objective. If the former, it represents God’s own 
jealousy for his people, parallel to that in the OT. So Stumpff, TDNT 2:881; Hahn, NIDNTT 3:1167. 
However, it might be a genitive of quality or of origin. See Popkes, EDNT 2:100. 
454
 While someone might argue that the following clause, “we are not stronger than He, are we” (1 
Cor 10:22), means that we are not strong enough to provoke God to jealousy; this would contradict the 
clear OT teaching that God was often provoked by his people. Rather, the reference to God’s strength 
seems to refer to foolishness of provoking God since we are weak and unable to withstand divine wrath. 




of His great love with which He loved” humans (Eph 2:4  cf. Phil 1:8  Eph 4:32).
455
 Again, God’s 
“kindness” (crhsto,thj) and “love [filanqrwpi,a] for mankind appeared” and “He saved us, not 
on the basis of deeds which we have done in righteousness, but according to His mercy [e;leoj], 
by the washing of regeneration and renewing by the Holy Spirit” (Titus 3:4–5).
456
 There is, then, 
a close association between divine mercy and love and both function, among other elements 




However, as in the Gospels, the reception and/or retention of divine mercy is not strictly 
ungrounded or unconditional. For example, Paul is called by divine mercy to apostleship, an 
undeserved yet not wholly arbitrary or non-evaluative call. The evaluative aspect of the call is 
apparent in that Paul is thankful that God “considered [him] faithful” and used him despite his 
former antagonism to Christianity. He was “shown mercy because” he “acted ignorantly in 
unbelief” and “for this reason” he “found mercy” in accordance with the “more than abundant . . . 
grace of our Lord” and “the faith and love [avga,ph] that are in Christ Jesus,”458 in order that the 
                                                     
 
455
 Here, the motivation of God’s action is described. It is an emotive motivation: “διά plus the 
accusative of words for emotion indicates motivation.” Lincoln, Ephesians, 100. Also, O’Brien, The Letter 
to the Ephesians, 166. Cf. Exod 34:6; Deut 7:7–9. Elsewhere, the Christians are exhorted to “Be kind 
[crhsto,j] to one another, tender-hearted [eu;splagcnoj], forgiving each other, just as God in Christ also has 
forgiven you” (Eph 4:32). Further, Paul himself “longs” (evpipoqe,w) “with the affection [spla,gcnon] of 
Jesus Christ” (Phil 1:8). It is not clear in this latter instance whether the genitive is one of source such that 
the affection Paul feels comes from Jesus or one of quality, that Paul feels affection akin to that felt by 
Jesus. Perhaps Paul does not intend a fine distinction between these two. “Paul loves them as Christ loves 
them and because Christ loves them through him.” Hawthorne, Philippians, 29. See Fee, Paul’s Letter, 95. 
456
 This is likely related to the frequent basis of God’s actions in his abundant lovingkindness (cf. 
Num 14:19; Neh 13:22; Pss 25:7 [24:7]; 51:1 [50:3]; 106:45 [105:45]; 109:26 [108:26]; 119:88, 124, 149, 
159 [all Ps 188]; Lam 3:32, all of which translate dsx with e;leoj). Such mercy further amounts to the divine 
healing of Epaphroditus, upon whom God had mercy (evlee,w) (Phil 2:27; cf. 2 Cor 4:1–2; 1 Tim 1:2).  
457
 Such “salvation was totally unmerited, since we were dead in our trespasses.” O’Brien, The 
Letter to the Ephesians, 164. Cf. Lincoln, Ephesians, 100. 
458
 It is not clear who the agent of such love is, whether Christ or Paul. For a discussion of this see 




“perfect patience” (makroqumi,a) of Christ459 might be demonstrated as an “example” in Paul (1 
Tim 1:12–14, 16; cf. 1 Cor 15:9–10). Accordingly, Paul is “by the mercy of the Lord trustworthy” 
(1 Cor 7:25; cf. Rom 12:1). It is especially striking that the reception of mercy was predicated on 
Paul’s ignorance. As such, divine mercy is here manifested as both unmerited and evaluatively 
responsive.
460
 Similarly, it is interesting that Paul calls for God’s “mercy” (e;leoj) to be granted to 
Onesiphorus and his house, “for [o[ti] he often refreshed me and was not ashamed of my chain; 
but when he was in Rome, he eagerly searched for me and found me—the Lord grant to him to 
find mercy from the Lord” (2 Tim 1:16–18; cf. Col 3:12).
461
 Elsewhere, Paul states, “those who 
will walk by this rule, peace [eivrh,nh] and mercy [e;leoj] be upon them, and upon the Israel of 
God” (Gal 6:16  cf. Heb 10:28).
462
 At the same time, while divine mercy is neither arbitrary nor 
                                                     
 
459
 Importantly, this phrase is intensive referring to the immensity of God’s patience but does not 
denote that it is “unlimited.” So Towner, The Letters, 149. That God’s mercy is not unlimited is apparent in 
the OT and NT. 
460
 That is, though Paul had acted in ways that made him undeserving of mercy, he does not depict 
divine mercy as arbitrary or non-evaluative. Rather, he speaks of being considered faithful and notes that 
his ignorance was taken into account as a rationale for mercy. Accordingly, divine mercy is not merely 
unilateral or arbitrary but may take into account its object. G. W. Knight contends that “because” (o[ti) does 
not describe “the reason that Paul was shown mercy, as if his ignorance made him worthy and therefore 
elicited the mercy” but explains why such sins were not the “defiant or high-handed sin mentioned in the 
OT” (cf. Num 15:30, 31). The Pastoral Epistles, 96. Cf. Towner, The Letters, 140. Thomas D. Lea and 
Hayne P. Griffin Jr., on the other hand, speak of this as a “negative cause of the divine mercy. God 
demonstrated mercy to Paul because Paul was ignorant of the true nature of Jesus as Lord and Savior. . . . 
Paul did not sin against better knowledge and commit a willful sin (Heb 10:26).” 1, 2 Timothy, Titus (NAC 
34; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 73–74. Accordingly, Paul’s ignorance can be a basis 
(not the basis) of mercy without thereby meaning that Paul was in any way worthy. The ultimate priority of 
God’s graciousness is not lessened by such evaluation. 
461
 This seems to correspond to the reciprocal nature of dsx in the OT rather than a purely 
unmotivated mercy. Accordingly, the “elect” are expected to manifest such compassion (cf. Col 3:12). 
462
 It is probable that “Israel of God” is epexegetic, in apposition with those who walk by the rule. 
Many interpreters read it this way. For example, J. Louis Martyn interprets, “As to all those who follow this 
standard in their lives, let peace and mercy be upon them, that is to say upon the Israel of God.” Galatians 
(AB 33A; New York: Doubleday, 1997), 559. So, Richard N. Longenecker, Galatians (WBC 41; Dallas: 
Word, 2002), 298. Cf. Ps 125:4–5. On the other hand, some scholars insist that the term “Israel” is never 
applied to Gentile Christians elsewhere in the NT. So Ernest De Witt Burton, A Critical and Exegetical 
Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians (ICC 35; New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1920), 358. But this 
is not compelling (cf. Rom 9:6 for example). Longenecker correctly argues that it is not impossible that 
Paul refers to the Gentile converts of Galatia throughout this verse thereby focusing on the essential 
question of the book: “Who really are the children of Abraham? (cf. esp. 3:6–9, 14, 16, 26–29; 4:21–31),” 




altogether unmotivated, it is undeserved and merited and available to all (cf. Rom 9:15–18; 
11:30–32).
463
 Everyone is undeserving of God’s mercy but God has the right to bear longer with 
some than others (cf. Rom 9:23) in accordance with his wider plan of salvation. In all this, God is 
the “Father of mercies [oivktirmw/n] and God of all comfort [para,klhsij]” (2 Cor 1:3).464  
Divine Mercy, Compassion, and Passion in the General Epistles-Revelation 
Divine emotion is further evident in that God “remember[s]” and has “concern” 
(evpiske,ptomai) for humankind (Heb 2:6). Accordingly, God “took them by the hand to lead them” 
but “they did not continue in” his “covenant, and” therefore he “did not care [avmele,w] for them” 
(Heb 8:9). Here, then, divine concern is conditional and may be forfeited. Yet, later, God 
declares, “I will be merciful [i[lewj] to their iniquities, and I will remember their sins no more” 
(Heb 8:12). Elsewhere God’s care is the basis of putting trust in him as Peter exhorts, cast “your 
                                                     
 
463
 For instance, consider the oft-misunderstood proclamation of Exod 33:19, quoted by Paul, “I 
will have mercy [evlee,w] on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion [oivkti,rw] on whom I will 
have compassion” (Rom 9:15). In Exodus, the quoted statement of Rom 9:15 denotes that God is able to 
have mercy on the Israelites even though they have sinned with the golden calf. How much more is God 
able to have mercy upon the Gentiles in NT times? Such compassion and mercy are undeserved but God 
has the right to bestow it on the undeserving. See also Rom 9:16–18 and the discussion of these verses as 
well as the wider meaning of Rom 9–11 under the volitional nature of divine love above. In that same vein, 
Paul argues that many Gentiles have received “mercy because of [Israel’s] disobedience” (Rom 11:30) 
“that because of the mercy shown to you they also may now be shown mercy” (Rom 11:31). Thus, “God 
has shut up all in disobedience so that He may show mercy to all” (Rom 11:32  cf. 15:9). The deterministic 
view restricts the second “all” to mean all people in the sense of “both Jews and Gentiles.” Schreiner, 
Romans, 629. Others have interpreted this to point toward universalism. However, the parallel meaning of 
the two uses of “all” is preserved without the contradiction of universalism by understanding that such 
mercy is not unilaterally efficacious unto salvation. As such, all receive mercy but not all will respond to 
that mercy (cf. Rom 11:22–23). 
464
 For similar Pauline descriptions of God’s amazing, loving character, see 2 Cor 13:11; Rom 
15:5, 13; 16:20; 1 Thess 5:23; 2 Thess 3:16. The merciful and compassionate God is thus also the great 
comforter. God “comforts [parakale,w]” humans who can in turn comfort others as they “are comforted by 
God” (2 Cor 1:4). Humans may share in the “sufferings” of Christ but likewise the abundant “comfort” 
(para,klhsij) through Christ (2 Cor 1:5). God also “comforts” (parakale,w) the depressed (2 Cor 7:6). 
However, divine comfort does not take away suffering as such; the situation is much more complex than 
that. The emphasis on God as comforter corresponds to the OT depiction of the prophets, especially Isaiah. 




anxiety on Him, because He cares [me,lw] for you” (1 Pet 5:7).465 Similarly, Jesus is able to 
“sympathize [sumpaqe,w] with our weaknesses” (Heb 4:15  cf. 2:18  5:8).466  
Elsewhere, divine passion of God appears as a “consuming fire [katanali,skw]” (Heb 
12:29). His passionate love for his people is accordingly the basis of “a terrifying expectation of 
judgment and the fury [zh/loj] of a fire which will consume the adversaries” (Heb 10:27  cf. Isa 
26:11).
467
 God’s wrath is provoked by Israel, for God was repeatedly “tried,” “tested” 
(dokimasi,a), and “grieved” by his people (Heb 3:8–10; cf. 3:15; Pss 94:4; 95:9–11). The 
relationship of concern and love to discipline appears when Jesus states, “Those whom I love 
[file,w], I reprove [evle,gcw] and discipline [paideu,w]; therefore be zealous and repent” (Rev 
3:19).
468
 Discipline itself is a manifestation of God’s love, which looks for the ultimate well-
being of its objects. 
In this corpus it is likewise clear that mercy, along with other elements, is a central 
characteristic of God’s love (cf. 2 John 3  Jude 2) and a basis of salvation. Thus, God’s “great 
mercy [e;leoj] has caused us to be born again” (1 Pet 1:3  cf. 2:10). This central characteristic of 
mercy is also exemplified in Jesus who became a “merciful [evleh,mwn] and faithful [pisto,j] high 
priest” (Heb 2:17).
469
 Accordingly, Jesus can “sympathize [sumpaqe,w] with our weaknesses 
[avsqe,neia],” having been tempted (Heb 4:15).  
                                                     
 
465
 God is thus “concerned with the affairs of man.” Davids, The First Epistle, 188. “He has 
compassion on his children and will sustain them in every distress.” Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter Jude, 241. 
466
 The word, from which the English “sympathy” is derived, literally means to feel something 
with someone. “In its fullest sense sympathy is a bond similar to a mother’s feeling for her children (4 
Macc 13:13–14  15:4, 7, 11) or one brother’s feeling for another (4 Macc 13:23).” Craig R. Koester, 
Hebrews (AB 36; New York: Doubleday, 2001), 283. As in the rest of the NT, the sufferings of Jesus are 
frequently mentioned (Heb 2:9–10; 9:26; 13:12; 1 Pet 1:11; 2:21, 23; 4:1; 5:1).  
467
 In the LXX parallel of Isa 26:11 this divine passion is in favor of his people. It is his passionate 
love, which manifests itself in fury against those who hurt his children. 
468
 William Barclay takes file,w here as “the warmest and most tender affection.” The Revelation 
of John (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), 1:182. 
469




Divine mercy, which itself motivates God’s salvific action, is available only through 
Jesus; because of him humans can draw close to the throne of grace and “receive mercy and find 
grace” (Heb 4:16).
470
 Accordingly, the “beloved” are to be careful and “keep” themselves “in the 
love [avga,ph] of God” in a state of “waiting anxiously for the mercy [e;leoj]” of Jesus “to eternal 
life” (Jude 1:21  cf. Heb 4:6). In another instance, it is implied that endurance is rewarded out of 
God’s abundant compassion and mercy. God “is full of compassion [polu,splagcnoj] and is 
merciful [oivkti,rmwn]” and, therefore, those who endure can be sure of their reward (Jas 5:11; cf. 
Exod 34:6; Sir 2:11).
471
 Likewise, conditionality is apparent in the statement that “judgment will 
be merciless [avne,leoj] to one who has shown no mercy [e;leoj]; mercy [e;leoj] triumphs over 
judgment” (Jas 2:13). The condition, then, of receiving mercy is bestowing mercy. The key is 
one’s heart disposition.
472
 Conversely, “anyone who has set aside the Law of Moses dies without 
mercy on the testimony of two or three witnesses” (Heb 10:28).
473
  
Accordingly, divine mercy may be forfeited. Thus, while God “took them [Israel] by the 
hand to lead them . . . they did not continue in” his “covenant” and he “did not care [avmele,w] for 
them” (Heb 8:9). However, later, in the new covenant, he “will be merciful [i[lewj] to their 
iniquities” and “will remember [mimnh,|skomai] their sins no more” (Heb 8:12). Importantly, 
                                                     
 
of the OT. Cf. Deut 7:9; cf. Exod 34:6; Deut 26:16–19. See also the likely allusion to Ps 145:8 [144:8 in 
LXX]. 
470
 Here, again, there is a significant association between mercy and grace, which W. L. Lane 
refers to here as “closely allied and essential aspects of God’s love.” Hebrews 1–8 (WBC 47A; Dallas: 
Word, 2002), 116. 
471
 Notably, earlier in the verse the “endurance of Job” is mentioned and the pericope of Jas 5:7–
11 is about the reward of the patient and enduring. 
472
 For L. T. Johnson, the “law of freedom” is “identified as essentially about love and mercy. 
Failure to live by it . . . means one will be judged on that basis.” James, 234. Cf. Matt 18:23–25; 25:34–46. 
R. P. Martin notes the contrast between the “lovers of the world” in Jas 4:4 and “Abraham, the friend of 
God” in 2:23. “At the final judgment Abraham’s life of faith will be pronounced righteous because he 
demonstrated it through deeds pleasing to God; but at the same judgment those who fail to honor God by 
their works will find no mercy (cf. 2:13).” James, 148. 
473




however, while there is continuity with regard to the corporate object (Israel) of the mercy that is 
bestowed in Heb 8:12, the individual agents are different. In other words, those who forfeited the 
mercy in the wilderness are not the beneficiaries of God’s extended mercy in the covenant he 
makes “with the house of Israel after those days” (Heb 8:10).  
Kinship Metaphors 
The relational responsiveness that provides the context for divine-human relationships 
including election, covenant, and blessing/discipline, as well as aspects of conditionality and 
unconditionality, is conveyed quite powerfully in kinship metaphors including those of parent-
child and marriage. These stand at the junction of the emotional nature of divine love and the 
foreconditional and reciprocal aspects of God’s love, depicting the strong affection as well as the 
reciprocity expected of the divine-human relationship that God seeks with his creatures.  
Kinship Metaphors in the Gospels-Acts 
The marriage analogy frequently depicts the God-human love relationship in this corpus. 
Just as God is depicted as the husband of his people in the OT, Jesus takes on the role of the 
bridegroom who will metaphorically wed his bride, the church (Matt 9:15; 25:1, 5–6, 10; Mark 
2:19–20; Luke 5:34–35; John 3:29). This marriage metaphor forms the background of Jesus’ 
identification of the “adulterous” (moicali,j) generation, which heeds not his words (Matt 12:39; 
16:4; Mark 8:38). The contingency of this special divine-human relationship is apparent when the 
conditionality of being part of the wedding party is depicted in the parable of the ten virgins (cf. 
Matt 25:10).  
The parental analogy is likewise prominent in the Gospels. First and foremost it depicts 
the intra-trinitarian relationship of the Father and the Son. Thus, Christ is the true Son of God, 
often spoken of as his “beloved” son (cf. Matt 3:17).
474
 Christ is thus the fulfillment of the OT 
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sonship and, as such, the divine promises are appropriated to and through him (cf. Matt 2:15). 
Moreover, God is the “Father” of Christ whom he loves (John 3:35  5:20  10:17) and of his 
human creatures whom he loves (John 14:21, 23; 16:27).
475
 Indeed, the Father loves his human 
children even as he has loved the Son (John 17:23). This Fatherhood of God depicts his personal 
and intimate relationship to his creatures, a relationship that is dynamic and full of affectionate 
concern and appropriate emotion. Moreover, the Son loves the father (John 14:31) and the human 
children love the Father (Matt 22:37; cf. John 5:42; 8:42; 1 John 5:1), the Son (John 14:21, 23), 
and are to love one another in the same way (John 13:34).  
Accordingly, humans are repeatedly referred to as children (cf. Mark 10:24; John 13:33) 
even “children [te,knon] of God” (John 11:5).476 Yet, this relationship requires appropriate 
response. Thus, it is those who respond to God that may be “sons [uìo,j] of God” (Matt 5:9, 45  
Luke 6:35; 20:36).
477
 Although God is the “father of all” (cf. Eph 4:6) as their Creator, status as 
born-again children of God is neither natural nor automatic (cf. Matt 8:12).
478
 Those who become 
God’s children are adopted  “as many as received Him, to them He gave the right to become 
children of God” (John 1:12).
479
 Accordingly, those “who were born, not of blood nor of the will 
                                                     
 
elsewhere in this section only a few examples are given out of many. 
475
 God is also identified as “Father” to his human creatures in Matt 5:16, 45, 48  6:1, 4, 6, 8–9, 
14–15, 18, 26, 32; 7:11; 10:20, 29; 13:43; 18:14; 23:9; Luke 6:36; 11:2, 13; 12:30, 32; John 20:17; cf. Luke 
15:12, 17–18, 20–22, 27–29. Of course, the identification of God as “Father” in general or to Christ as Son 
is extremely frequent throughout the NT. 
476
 In continuity with the OT parental metaphor, Christ came to the “daughter of Zion” as her king 
(Matt 21:5; John 12:15). Moreover, this NT concept of Christians as children of God clearly picks up on 
the OT emphasis on Israel as God’s chosen/adopted son (cf. Exod 4:22–23; Hos 11:1; Deut 32:18; Jer 
31:9). 
477
 John, however, reserves this term for Christ; humans may be children but not ui`o,j of God, 
though “sons of light” comes close (John 12:36). This is likely to distinguish the nature of his sonship from 
all others. 
478
 Even the “sons of the kingdom” may ultimately be lost for their rejection of Christ (Matt 8:12). 
479
 Similar response is apparent in that “unless one is born [genna,w] of water and the Spirit he 
cannot enter into the kingdom of God” (John 3:5). R. E. Brown sees a distinction between Paul’s language 




[qe,lhma] of the flesh nor of the will [qe,lhma] of man, but of God” (John 1:13).480 This adoption is 
thus predicated on the divine will, but is neither unilateral nor unconditional but requires 
appropriate response.
481
 Accordingly, Jesus described such status conditionally: “Blessed are the 
peacemakers, for they shall be called sons [uìo,j] of God” (Matt 5:9  cf. Matt 13:43). Similarly, 
Jesus exhorts humans to love their enemies “so that you may be sons [uìo,j] of your Father 
[path,r] who is in heaven” (Matt 5:44–45; cf. Luke 6:35). 
As such, humans become children of God through Christ, the true Son, as adoptees. The 
fullness of this transfer of status is apparent when Jesus states, “I ascend to My Father and your 
Father, and My God and your God” (John 20:17). As God’s adopted children, believers are 
brothers and sisters to Christ and to one another.
482
 But once again, this applies in a particular 
manner to those who respond appropriately to God as Jesus states, “Whoever does the will of My 




                                                     
 
of John’s Prologue,” NTS 27 (1980): 1–31. In contrast are those who are of their “father the devil” and the 
“sons of the devil” (John 8:44  Acts 13:10). 
480
 “John 1:12–13 strikes the balance between human responsibility (‘to receive,’ ‘to believe’) and 
divine sovereignty (‘born of God’).” Ko stenberger, John, 38. Similarly, Kruse, The Letters of John, 115. 
481
 “All are his [the Father’s] sons in the sense that he made them and that he provides for them. 
But people are his sons in the full sense only as they respond to what he does for them in Christ.” Morris, 
The Gospel according to John, 87. “The ‘children,’ then, are those who believe.” Ibid. So Smalley, 1, 2, 3 
John, 141. Cf. Matt 5:9. 
482
 Christ refers to the followers as “brothers” to one another (Luke 22:32  cf. 15:27, 32) and they 
themselves refer to one another as “brethren” (John 21:23  Acts 6:3; 9:30). In many instances the term 
seems to refer to a Jew speaking to other Jews (cf. Rom 9:3; this is especially the case in many instances in 
Acts) but the language also refers to Christians, including Gentile Christians. Significantly, Jesus even 
refers to his “brothers” in a seemingly universal sense (Matt 25:40) but the term is also specifically applied 
to his followers (Matt 12:49–50; 28:10; Mark 3:34–35; Luke 8:21; John 20:17). 
483
 Thus, “the disciples of Jesus are his true family because they follow his teaching.” Hagner, 
Matthew 1–13, 360. Cf. similarly Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 519. “It is the performance of the will 




Kinship Metaphors in the Pauline Writings 
Similarly, in the Pauline writings, Christ is compared to the husband and the church to his 
bride whom he “loved” and for whom he “gave Himself up” (Eph 5:23–27) and to whom the 
church is “betrothed . . . as a pure virgin” (2 Cor 11:2).
484
 The parental analogy is also integral in 
the Pauline writings where Christ is the Father’s true Son, “His beloved [avga,ph] Son” (Col 1:13). 
Likewise, God is the “Father” to his human children, “the beloved of God” (Rom 1:7).
485
 
Accordingly, humans are repeatedly referred to as the “children of God” (Rom 8:16–17, 21; 9:7–
8; Phil 2:15; cf. Gal 4:28; Eph 5:1, 8). Importantly, however, this relationship is conditional. 
Though the Israelites were God’s elect and, as such, his children, Paul proclaims they are not all 
“children because they are Abraham’s descendants” for “it is not the children of the flesh who are 
children of God, but the children of the promise are regarded as descendants” (Rom 9:7–8; cf. 
Rom 9:26–27  1 Pet 3:6). Rather, “all who are being led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of 
God” (Rom 8:14).
486
 Moreover, Christians are to “prove” themselves “blameless and innocent, 
children of God above reproach” (Phil 2:15  cf. Eph 5:8). Thus, those who respond to the divine 
overture may be “sons [uìo,j] of God” (Rom 8:14, 19  9:26  2 Cor 6:18  Gal 3:26  4:6–7).  
Therefore, although there is universality to divine love evident in the NT, the Father’s 
love is directed in a particular way toward those who have entered into a “kinship” relationship 
with him and are thus “beloved” (Rom 1:7).
487
 This status is only possible in and through Christ: 
“For you are all sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus” (Gal 3:26). In this same vein, the OT 
                                                     
 
484
 Interestingly, Paul is here “jealous with a godly jealousy” that they be pure to present to Christ. 
This relates to the significant meaning of divine passion in the OT, specifically God’s passion for exclusive 
relationship with his bride. 
485
 Elsewhere the fatherhood of God toward humans appears in Rom 8:15; 1 Cor 1:3; 2 Cor 1:2; 
Gal 1:3–4; 4:6; Eph 1:2; 4:6; Phil 1:2; 4:20; Col 1:2; 1 Thess 1:3; 3:11, 13; 2 Thess 1:1; 2:16; Phlm 1:3. 
486
 In contrast are the “sons of disobedience” (Eph 2:2  5:6  Col 3:6). 
487
 As has been seen, the “beloved” are specifically those who have responded to God’s loving 




covenant language is explicitly appropriated in language kingship when Paul exhorts them to 
separate from any hint of idolatry and quotes God’s proclamation: “I will be a father to you, and 
you shall be sons and daughters to Me” (2 Cor 6:18). Such father-child relationality is here 
specifically contingent upon the forsaking of idolatry and, accordingly, entering into an exclusive 
relationship. 
Accordingly, this status as God’s children is neither natural nor automatic, for Christians 
were previously “children of wrath” (Eph 2:3). Yet, humans might receive “adoption as sons” 
only through Christ, that is, “in the Beloved” (Eph 1:5–6; similarly, Rom 8:23; Gal 4:5–6; cf. 
Rom 9:4).
488
 Christians, then, have “received a spirit of adoption as sons” by which they “cry out, 
‘Abba! Father!’” and are “fellow heirs with Christ” (Rom 8:15, 17).
489
 Christians are therefore 
“brethren” of one another and of Christ, through Christ, and, as such, should love one another (cf. 
1 Thess 4:9).
490
 Indeed, the plan of salvation was instituted so that Christ “would be the firstborn 
among many brethren” (Rom 8:29  cf. 1 Cor 8:12). 
                                                     
 
488
 This terminology of “adoption as sons” is akin to that in Greco-Roman law of those who were 
not sons by birth. See Lincoln, Ephesians, 25. There is some continuity to this metaphor with respect to the 
OT covenants and Israel “to whom belongs the adoption as sons . . . and the covenants” (Rom 9:4). “It is 
only through the work of God’s Son, the Beloved, that believers can be adopted as sons (cf. Eph 4:13; Rom. 
8:29  Gal. 3:26  4:4, 5).” O’Brien, The Letter to the Ephesians, 103. Cf. M. Barth, Ephesians 1–3, 83, 86; 
Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, 254  O’Brien, The Letter to the Ephesians, 103; Lincoln, Ephesians, 
27. Thus, “the term ‘Beloved’” used of Christians “shows that God’s election of believers to be his sons 
and daughters is intimately related to their being in Christ the Chosen One (cf. v. 5), and that the bounty 
which he lavishes on them ‘consists in their being caught up into the love which subsists between the 
Father and the Son’ (cf. John 3:35  5:20  17:23, 26).” O’Brien, The Letter to the Ephesians, 104–5. 
Similarly, Lincoln, Ephesians, 27. 
489
 Consider Francis Lyall’s contention that Paul uses the concept of adoption from Roman law 
intentionally to illustrate that the “believer” is adopted and “made part of God’s family forever, with 
reciprocal duties and rights.” “Roman Law in the Writings of Paul: Adoption,” JBL 88 (1969): 466. On the 
other hand, James M. Scott argues convincingly that the OT covenants form the background of this Pauline 
language. Adoption as Sons of God: An Exegetical Investigation into the Background of Huiothesia in the 
Pauline Corpus (WUNT; Tübingen: JCB Mohr, 1992). 
490
 Thus, Christians repeatedly refer to one another as “brethren” (John 21:23  Acts 6:3  9:30  Rom 
1:13; 1 Cor 1:10; 2 Cor 1:8; Gal 1:2, 11; Eph 6:23; Phil 1:12; Col 1:2; 4:7; 1 Thess 1:4; 2 Thess 1:3; 1 Tim 
4:6  2 Tim 4:21  cf. 2 John 1:13). Note also the language used of individuals, for instance “our sister 
Phoebe” (Rom 16:1) or “Sosthenes our brother” (1 Cor 1:1). That the category of brethren is not automatic 
is implied when Paul refers to some who are immoral, etc., as a “so-called brother” (1 Cor 5:11). Likewise, 




Kinship Metaphors in the General  
Epistles-Revelation 
In this corpus the marriage and parental metaphors again appear with great significance. 
In Revelation, the church is depicted as Christ’s bride made ready for her wedding (Rev 19:7  cf. 
Rev 21:2, 9; 22:17). The marriage metaphor of the OT is also the background to the concept that 
friendship (fili,a) with the world is hostility to God in Jas 4:4. In other words, those who love the 
world are guilty of “spiritual adultery” and thus James begins the verse with the address: “You 
adulteresses” (moicali,j).491 The parental metaphor also appears when Jesus is again identified as 
the true Son of the Father, his “beloved Son” (2 Pet 1:17). Through his sonship, others may be 
children of God. Thus, God is the “Father” of his human children upon whom he has bestowed 
great love “that we should be called children of God” (1 John 3:1). Accordingly, reference is 
made to those who are “beloved in God the Father” (Jude 1).
492
 Moreover, as in the previous 
sections of the NT, human beings are even referred to as God’s sons (uìo,j) (Heb 12:5–8; Rev 
21:7) and “children [te,knon] of God” (1 John 3:1–2, 10; 5:2; cf. 2 John 1:1, 4, 13). But not all 
humans are God’s children in this manner. Rather, those who become God’s children are adopted  
according to the “great love” that the “Father has bestowed” Christians might be “called children 
of God” (1 John 3:1).
493
 In order to become such a child of God, appropriate response is required. 
                                                     
 
Christians as “beloved brethren” (1 Cor 15:58  Phil 4:1  Jas 1:16, 19  2:5) or to individuals as “beloved 
brother” (Eph 6:21  1 Cor 4:7, 9  Phlm 1:16  2 Pet 3:15  cf. 1 Tim 6:2  Phlm 1:1  3 John 5). See further the 
connection between being “beloved” and “brethren” further below. 
491
 So Moo, The Letter of James, 186; L. T. Johnson, James, 279; K. A. Richardson, James, 178. 
492
 Elsewhere, God is depicted as the “Father” of humans in Heb 12:7  Jas 1:27  3:9. 
493
 “To them he gave authority to become God’s children  they were not so by nature (contrary to 
the Gnostics!), but became such by authorization of the Logos. This implies a concept of adoption, which 
in v 13 gives way to that of regeneration (the theme is developed in 3:1–21).” Beasley-Murray, John, 13. 
Moreover, “being a child of God is neither a quality possessed by all nor an exclusive prerogative for 
Israelites; it is an entitlement for those who believe in the Word. . . . This assumes that, in one sense, sinful 
people are not God’s children, even though they are created by God, unless and until they believe in Jesus 
Christ (cf. 1 John 3:1–2).” Ko stenberger, John, 39. So, also R. E. Brown, The Gospel according to John I–
XII, 3. Notice, the two verses immediately previous, therein John exhorts the “children” to “abide in Him” 




Thus, “He who overcomes will inherit these things, and I will be his God and he will be My son 
[uìo,j]” (Rev 21:7). Further, the contingency of this status is evident in the exhortation “brethren, 
be all the more diligent to make certain about His calling and choosing you; for as long as you 
practice these things, you will never stumble” (2 Pet 1:10; cf. 1 Pet 3:6). Likewise, such familial 
status is not guaranteed for “Christ was faithful as a Son over His house—whose house we are, if 
we hold fast our confidence and the boast of our hope firm until the end” (Heb 3:6). Because such 
status might be forfeited, the Father’s loving concern for such sons may be manifested in 
discipline when necessary without which they are “illegitimate children and not sons” (Heb 12:6–
8; cf. Rev 3:19).
494
 Further, once again this section of the NT follows through with the analogy 
such that those who are children of God are the “brethren” of Christ and of one another.
495
 As 
brethren, the children of God are to love one another (cf. 1 Pet 1:22; 2:17).
496
 
The Foreconditional Aspect of Divine Love 
This section focuses on data that lead to the conclusion that divine love is 
foreconditional, not altogether unconditional.
497
 First, divine love is prior to all other love and 
                                                     
 
practice righteousness as having been “born [genna,w] of him” (1 John 2:29). Accordingly, such status as 
children requires appropriate response and perseverance. 
494
 Importantly, this loving discipline is aimed at eliciting a zealous repentant response. Such love 
is explicitly a love of concern, which expects a response. The discipline, as in the OT, is for their good (cf. 
1 Cor 11:32). Accordingly, “God’s stern hatred of evil is a necessary part of his love for people.” Mounce, 
The Book of Revelation, 112. 
495
 Thus, Christians refer to one another as “brethren” (Heb 3:1  Jas 1:2  1 Pet 5:9  2 Pet 1:10  1 
John 3:13  3 John 1:3  Rev 19:10  cf. Rev 12:10) and are Christ’s “brethren” (Heb 2:17). Moreover, “both 
He who sanctifies and those who are sanctified are from one Father; for which reason He is not ashamed to 
call them brethren” (Heb 2:11  cf. 2:12). 
496
 The one who does not love his brother is not a child of God but a child of the devil (cf. 1 John 
2:9–11; 3:10, 14–17; 4:20–21; 5:1–2; cf. 3 John 1). Accordingly, the status as child of God is conditional 
upon, and manifest by, love. Cf. Akin, 1, 2, 3, John, 150; Kruse, The Letters of John, 126.  
497
 By the term “foreconditional” I mean that God’s love is offered prior to any conditions but not 
exclusive to conditions. Accordingly, that God’s love is foreconditional affirms that: (1) divine love is prior 
to any human initiative or response – it holds sole primacy regarding the divine-human love relationship. 
(2) God chooses to bestow his love prior to and independent of human desert or merit. (3) God’s love 




conditions though it is not thereby altogether unconditional. Second, divine love is unmerited but 
not altogether unconditional. Third, divine love, as evaluative, is also conditional and may be 
forfeited. Therefore, it is not strictly unmotivated, spontaneous, disinterested, indifferent, or 
unconditional. Fourth, divine love is unconditional with respect to God’s volition, but conditional 
with respect to divine evaluation. Accordingly, the reader is encouraged to keep the following 
questions in mind while reading this section. Is divine love altogether unconditional, spontaneous, 
or ungrounded?
498
 Is divine love mere beneficence? Is divine love altogether unmerited? Can 
divine love be forfeited, lost, discontinued and, if so, how and why?  
Before we survey the NT evidence regarding these questions, the major theme of whether 
God’s beneficent actions are altogether gratuitous, “disinterested generous love,” or can be 
conditional upon human response must be answered.
499
 Thus, this section will begin with an 
excursus regarding the (fore)conditional nature of divine blessing and thereafter attention will be 
turned to a survey of the NT evidence with regard to the questions that circle around the 
conditionality vs. the unconditionality of love. 
                                                     
 
of responding to God in love. 
498
 It is frequently asserted that divine love is altogether unconditional. Thus, Morris comments, 
“we must clearly recognize that God’s love is unconditional.” Morris, Testaments of Love, 31. Likewise, 
Stauffer contends that Paul refers to “God’s unconditional sovereignty in loving and hating, electing and 
rejecting (R. 9:13, 25).” TDNT 1:49. This claim is often (but not always) connected to the popular view that 
avga,ph signifies a uniquely divine and unilateral gift love. Importantly, as has been seen, the term avga,ph is 
“often used by biblical writers to mean something other than unmotivated or spontaneous love.” Oord, 
“Matching Theology,” 139. See the word study of the avgapa,w word group above. 
499
 For instance, consider Spicq’s claim that divine avga,ph is identical to “charity” (think caritas) 
such that God’s love is always giving love and amounts to “disinterested generous love.” TLNT 1:8, 13. 
This is in keeping with his view that avga,ph love takes place within a benefactor-benefactee relationship 
where the superior’s avga,ph is gift love and the inferior’s love is “first of all consent, welcome, acceptance” 
and “gratitude . . . the love inspired in turn by generous love.” Ibid., 13. Thus, he refers to it as “the 
voluntary, purely gratuitous love which is authentic charity.” Idem, Agape, 1:85. Nygren and others who 
follow his view agree with the first part, that divine love is always gratuitous and disinterested, but contend 
that real human love toward God is impossible. Love from humans to God is really God’s own love 




The Conditional Aspect of Divine Beneficence 
Divine love is not to be conflated with beneficence, though the latter is an aspect and 
outgrowth of the former. For instance, love does not always refer to something akin to blessing. 
For example, Jesus tells the story of a moneylender who “graciously forgave” (cari,zomai) the 
debts of two individuals. Importantly, the one whose debt was greater “will love him more 
[plei/on avgaph,sei]” (Luke 7:42–43; cf. 47). Notably, love is here proportionate to the greatness of 
forgiveness. Moreover, such “love” of the forgiven toward their benefactor cannot itself refer to 
active blessing since they have nothing tangible to give him. It is in this case a feeling or 
disposition of love. Love and blessing are therefore not identical. 
Without confusing the two concepts, however, their close association should be 
recognized. This close relationship between divine love and blessing is apparent in numerous 
instances such as the many references to God’s love as the basis of his salvific action and 
adoption of human beings (cf. among many others Titus 3:4–5; 1 John 3:1). According to such 
love, God always does what is in the best interest of those he loves, even if that is not immediate 
blessing but, instead, discipline. Thus, “whom the Lord loves He disciplines, and He scourges 
every son whom He receives” (Heb 12:6) just as fathers discipline their sons (Heb 12:5, 7). God 
always disciplines humans for their good (Heb 12:10). Likewise Jesus proclaims, “Those whom I 
love [file,w], I reprove and discipline, therefore be zealous and repent” (Rev 3:19). Love is thus 
not exclusive to judgment. On the other hand, God pours out his gifts and blessings abundantly 
upon human beings (cf. Eph 1:3; Heb 6:14; Jas 1:17). As such, divine blessing is often described 
in terms akin to grace, that is, as benefits to the undeserving. Thus, in accordance with his 
“kindness” (crhsto,thj) and “love for mankind” (filanqrwpi,a) God has saved humans “not on 
the basis of [our righteous] deeds” but “according to His mercy [e;leoj]” (Titus 3:4–5).500  
                                                     
 
500
 Moreover, his “grace . . . He freely bestowed” and his grace he has “lavished on us” and has 




Yet, while the divine decision is the necessary condition of blessing and grace, it is not 
always a sufficient condition. Indeed, the reception of divine grace is often contingent upon 
appropriate response.
501
 Thus, divine blessings, even eschatological rewards, are often 
conditioned upon appropriate human disposition and/or response to God, including love and/or 
associated loving action.
502
 Thus, “God is not unjust so as to forget your work and the love which 
you have shown toward His name” in ministering (Heb 6:10).
503
 Elsewhere, Paul interprets the 
fact that all nations will be blessed in Abraham to mean “those who of faith are blessed,” thus 
making the reception of blessing contingent on faith (Gal 3:8–9).
504
 Likewise, he states, “grace 
[ca,rij] be with all those who love [avgapa,w] our Lord Jesus Christ with incorruptible [avfqarsi,a] 
love” (Eph 6:24).
505
 Elsewhere, the reception of blessing appears to be on the basis of obedience: 
We receive what we ask “because we keep His commandments and do the things that are pleasing 
[avresto,j] in his sight” (1 John 3:22).506 Again, the one “abides by” the law and is an “effectual 
doer,” the same “will be blessed in what he does” (Jas 1:25  cf. Luke 11:28).
507
 Thus, humans 
                                                     
 
501
 This is in close connection with the OT conception of conditional blessing, itself most 
prominently featured within the framework of covenant. 
502
 On this idea of blessings attached to love for God, see Deut 11:13–14, 22–23; 19:9.  
503
 “Toward his name” almost surely refers to love toward God himself. So Koester, Hebrews, 
312. Notice here the evaluative judgment. In this way, God is a “rewarder [misqapodo,thj]” of “those who 
seek him” (Heb 11:6  cf. Jas 1:5–7). The phrase, “those who seek him” likely corresponds to “those who 
love him” elsewhere. Loving God and seeking God are frequently associated in the OT, especially in 
Deuteronomy. Importantly, here the reward is likewise predicated on faith, which is itself the only way one 
might please God. Similarly, Luke quotes from the OT that God’s “mercy [e;leoj] is upon generation after 
generation toward those who fear [fobe,omai] him” (Luke 1:50  cf. Acts 10:35).  
504
 “So then, it is those whose identity is derived from faith who are blessed with faithful 
Abraham.” Martyn, Galatians, 294. 
505
 The referent and meaning of “incorruptible” here are the subject of much debate. See Bruce, 
The Epistles to the Colossians, 415–16. However, whatever the precise function of that construction, the 
emphasis of the verse is on the reward associated with human love toward God. 
506
 Likewise, the ground that produces useful vegetation “receives a blessing [euvlogi,a] from God,” 
a metaphor for the blessings contingent upon covenant faithfulness (Heb 6:7).  
507
 Interestingly, Moo sees the blessing as most likely salvific. The Letter of James, 95. Cf. Davids, 




who “love” their “enemies” will receive a great reward (misqo,j)508 and be “sons of the Most 
High” (Luke 6:35  cf. 27) but those who “love” the praise of men have received their reward 
already (Matt 6:5; cf. Luke 14:14).
509
  
Ultimately, things wonderful beyond imagining are “prepared for those who love” God (1 
Cor 2:9; cf. Isa 64:4).
510
 There is a “crown of righteousness”
511
 laid up for “all who have loved 
[avgapa,w] His appearing” (2 Tim 4:8).512 Similarly, the contingency of eschatological reward is 
apparent when Paul speaks of women being “preserved . . . if they continue in faith and love 
[avga,ph] and sanctity with self-restraint” (1 Tim 2:15  cf. Rom 11:22–23).513 Once again, “Blessed 
                                                     
 
doing the will of God according to his Word. Those who are blessed by God live in the union of truth and 
action, which is their joy.” K. A. Richardson, James, 98.  
508
 This term refers literally to dues paid for labor, that is, wages or the natural reward for work. 
Cf. Fitzmyer, Luke I–IX, 635. 
509
 Likewise, Jesus advocates that one should invite to one’s banquet those who cannot repay but 
promises that the one who does so “will be repaid [avntapodi,dwmi] at the resurrection of the righteous” 
(Luke 14:14). Of course, God himself is implied as the one who will repay them. This is a divine passive. 
Interestingly, this beneficence is not wholly disinterested since the one doing so will be rewarded. See the 
discussion of the appropriate reciprocal nature of love below and in the following chapter. Notice also the 
language of Luke 6:27 that merely loving those who love you is not a “credit” (ca,rij) to you, which itself 
implies the evaluation and reward of human love by use of the language of grace. Likewise in Luke 6:33.  
510
 This “evokes an image of end-time salvation, confirms that God is behind it, and affirms that it 
can be appropriated only by those who love God.” Garland, 1 Corinthians, 97. 
511
 The meaning of this phrase is much-debated. Does it refer to “righteousness” itself that will be 
received in full at the eschaton or does it refer to a crown that is the reward of holy living? For a 
representative of the former view see G. W. Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 461. For a representative of the 
latter view see Lea and Griffin Jr., 1, 2 Timothy, Titus, 249. Towner wisely contends that we need not 
“distinguish too rigidly between” these. The Letters, 615. Perhaps Paul is thinking of righteousness that is 
“yet to be fully received,” as well as “the need for the believer to ‘cooperate’ in this process by means of 
his/her faithful response to God in godly living” while at the same time including a “note of ‘vindication’” 
in accordance with God as “the righteous judge.” Ibid., 616.  
512
 The description of “those who have loved his appearing” thus “characterizes those believers 
who will, like Paul, qualify to receive the reward as people whose lives have been marked by a determined 
and expectant forward look to the parousia and the consummation of the victory of God (Titus 2:13; Rom 
8:23–25  Phil 3:20).”
 
Towner, The Letters, 616. Cf. 1 Cor 9:27. 
513
 The use of eva,n + the subjunctive (3rd class condition) suggests that this condition is “uncertain 
of fulfillment.” Wallace, Greek Grammar, 696. Some have attempted to remove the soteriological 
significance by claiming that this refers to some blessing(s) other than personal salvation, claiming that 
otherwise salvation would be “conditional on a work.” See for a discussion of this issue in G. W. Knight, 




is a man who perseveres under trial; for once he has been approved, he will receive the crown of 
life which the Lord has promised to those who love Him” (Jas 1:12  cf. 5:11) and God promised 
the kingdom to “those who love him” (Jas 2:5). In all this, “God causes all things to work 
together for good to those who love God” (Rom 8:28).
514
 On the other hand, the ones “outside” 
the holy city in the end are “everyone who loves and practices lying” (Rev 22:15). Likewise, the 
ones who perish, perish “because they did not receive the love [avga,ph] of the truth so as to be 
saved” (2 Thess 2:10). Similarly, the one who “does not love [file,w] the Lord, he is to be 
accursed [avna,qema]” (1 Cor 16:22).515  
Thus, eschatological blessing, even salvation, is repeatedly tied to proper human love. 
Though such love does not thereby earn salvation it is the appropriate response to God’s call and 
love, a necessary corollary of faith, which is itself a conduit of salvation (cf. Gal 5:6).
516
 Such 
                                                     
 
perseverance necessary for personal salvation in this instance. So ibid., 147–48; Lea and Griffin Jr., 1, 2 
Timothy, Titus, 102. See the discussion of a similar issue with regard to 2 Pet 3:9.  
514
 On the supposition that those who love God are thus merely those whom God has unilaterally 
predestined to salvation, see the discussion of election and love previously. There it is argued that “called” 
refers to an invitation that is still open or has already been accepted; i.e., an invitation open to rejection 
(either at present or in the past). 
515
 Spicq rejects the idea that this is a liturgical formula, arguing that it deals with a person who is 
excluded from the church as well as from eternal life because they have refused membership in Christ. 
“Comment Comprendre philein dans 1 Cor 16:22,” NT 1 (1956): 204. Cf. idem, Agape, 3:81–85. 
516
 Likewise, passing from death to life assumes that one loves other humans while failing to love 
one’s brother amounts to abiding (me,nw) in death (1 John 3:14). John states that one knows they have 
passed from death to life “because we love the brethren [o[ti avgapw/men tou.j avdelfou,j]” but the one who 
does not “love [avgapa,w]” abides in death (1 John 3:14). Most commentators argue that love is the basis of 
one’s knowledge of having passed from death to life rather than a reason for passing from death to life. It is 
thus supposed that the “conjunction ‘because’ (hoti) modifies the verb ‘we know’ (oidamen) rather than 
‘we have passed’ (metabebekamen).” Akin, 1, 2, 3, John, 157. So Marshall, The Epistles of John, 191. 
Similarly, Kruse, The Letters of John, 135–36. It is further supposed that to assert otherwise would be 
“tantamount to a doctrine of salvation by works.” Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 189. Yet, Smalley comments that 
“the evidence, as well as the test, of having crossed over from spiritual death into the dimension of eternal 
life is both practical and objective  it is fraternal love.” Ibid. First, it is not true that if love is necessary for 
the reception of God’s gift of eternal life that such love is thereby meritorious. Second, it is grammatically 
possible that “because” does correspond to “we have passed.” Further, the statement that the one who does 
not “love abides in death” suggests that “love is more than a sign of life.” R. E. Brown, The Epistles of 
John, 446. In fact, love may be the basis of knowing that one has passed into eternal life and at the same 
time a condition of eternal life. Edward Malatesta contends one remains spiritually dead “until he has 




soteriological conditionality is not opposed to grace and salvation as a gift once one understands 
that the very possibility and ability to respond stems from God’s prevenient action (grace and 
love). In all, divine blessings are repeatedly predicated on appropriate human response, most 
often faith and/or love. Accordingly, divine love is not merely gratuitous benevolence or 
generosity, and divine blessing is itself conditional, though unmerited. Importantly, since God 
does reward appropriate response one should not equate worthiness or merit with “reward.” With 
such conditionality in mind we now turn to the conditionality of divine love specifically. 
The Foreconditionality of Love in the Gospels-Acts 
The ultimate priority of divine love is evident in the statement of God’s love for the 
world, which makes it possible for anyone who believes to be saved. Specifically, God loves the 
world so much that he gave his son for it (John 3:16).
517
 The clause “whoever believes,” if taken 
seriously, means that divine love is universal, not arbitrarily excluding anyone, but subject to 
conditionality (John 3:16, 18).
518
 As such, the foreconditionality of divine love is explicit in this 
context. Though conditional, divine love toward humans is also unmerited. That is, God loves 
undeserving humans not because humans are worthy but of his own volition. Thus, God “Himself 
is kind [crhsto,j] to ungrateful and evil men” (Luke 6:35).519 In the Matthean parallel he “causes 
                                                     
 
Interiority and Covenant: A Study of [einai en] and [menein en] in the First Letter of Saint John (AnBib 
69; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1978), 260. That love for God (and others) is conditional in this way is 
implied in many verses (see above). See the discussion of this in the following chapter.
 
517
 “The Greek construction behind so loved that he gave his one and only Son (houtōs plus hōste 
plus the indicative instead of the infinitive) emphasizes the intensity of the love.” Carson, The Gospel 
according to John, 204. Cf. Ceslas Spicq, “Notes d’exegese johannique: La charite est amour manifeste,” 
RB 65 (1958): 358. God’s love is thus intense, active, and costly. 
518
 “Undoubtedly God’s desire is that all might be saved (e.g., Acts 17:30–31; 22:15–16; 1 Tim 
2:6), but because of human freedom or choice (“whosoever,” 3:16), all of humanity does not respond in 
believing acceptance of the Son (e.g., John 1:11–13; Rom 1:5; 10:16; 1 Tim 4:10). As a result, the rejection 
of God’s love brings judgment or condemnation (John 3:17).” Borchert, John 1–11, 184. Morris similarly 
comments, the “love of God is limitless  it embraces all mankind.” Morris, The Gospel according to John, 
203. 
519
 The crhsto,thj word group refers to goodness, kindness, often used in description of God’s 




His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous” 
(Matt 5:45).
520
 On this basis, such unmerited love is also to be shown by Christians: They are to 
be “merciful [oivkti,rmwn], just as [their] Father is merciful” (Luke 6:36  cf. Matt 5:48). Thus, 
Christ commands to “love” (avgapa,w) one’s enemies (Matt 5:44  Luke 6:35).521  
Some might interpret Jesus’ command as suggesting that love is to be strictly 
unconditional, altruistic, and disinterested.
522
 However, the notion that one might love another 
                                                     
 
χρησ ο , χρησ ο η ,” TLNT 3:511  Konrad Weiss, “χρησ ο , χρησ ο η , χρησ ευομαι, χρησ ολογια,” 
TDNT 9:487–88. In classical Greek it refers to that which is “excellent,” “serviceable,” “useful,” “good” 
and broadened to include “moral excellence . . . linked with genuine goodness of heart,” rarely used of the 
gods. Beyreuther, NIDNTT 2:105. Cf. Spicq, TLNT 3:512; K. Weiss, TDNT 9:483–84. The noun crhsto,thj 
appears 10 times in 8 verses, all in the Pauline writings. In the LXX, the noun translates bAj in almost all 
instances (15 times). bAj is often translated by avgaqo,j and kalo,j as well. In many instances it describes the 
disposition a Christian ought to have, that is, kindness, closely related to other virtues such as love, 
compassion, patience, etc. (2 Cor 6:6; Gal 5:22; Col 3:12; cf. Rom 3:12). However, the noun most often 
describes the kindness and goodness of God, in close association with other terms of divine love (Rom 2:4; 
Rom 11:22; Eph 2:7; Titus 3:4). The adjective crhsto,j appears 7 times in 7 verses depicting that which is 
good or kind of humans (Luke 5:39; 1 Cor 15:33  cf. Eph 4:32) but also of God’s kindness (Luke 6:35  1 
Pet 2:3; cf. Matt 11:30). In the LXX it most often translates bAj (22 times). It translates a few other terms 
twice or less. It is most often used in worship and praise toward God. Interestingly, God’s very name is 
crhsto,j – Ps 51:11. The group is closely associated with the avgapa,w group of love (cf. Luke 35; 1 Cor 
13:4; 2 Cor 6:6; Gal 5:22; Col 3:12; cf. Eph 4:32–5:1) and also once with filanqrwpi,a (Titus 3:4). In all, 
“kindness is an unmistakable and essential characteristic of love.” Beyreuther, NIDNTT 2:106. So Spicq, 
TLNT 3:515. Cf. 1 Cor 13:4. 
520
 Blomberg sees this as God’s “common grace for all humanity in his good provisions in nature” 
showing that “God loves them too.” Matthew, 115. Cf. Ps 145:9. For similar statements in antiquity see 
Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 265. 
521
 Such love is manifested in beneficent action, even toward “those who hate you” (Luke 6:27). 
They are not merely to love (avgapa,w) only those who love (avgapa,w) them (Matt 5:46; Luke 6:32). For 
examples of similar conceptions of enemy love in the ancient world see Fitzmyer, Luke I–IX, 637–38; 
Nolland, Luke 1:1–9:20, 294–95; John Piper, “Love Your Enemies”: Jesus’ Love Command in the Synoptic 
Gospels and in the Early Christian Paraenesis: A History of the Tradition and Interpretation of Its Uses 
(SNTSMS 38; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 19–65. On the other hand, the fact that 
there were others who advocated this principle (or something quite similar) does not detract from the fact 
that it was by no means the normal human philosophy or conduct of the age. Rather, it flew “in the face of 
conventional wisdom.” J. B. Green, The Gospel of Luke, 272. 
522
 Bock states that the “love in view here is unconditional,” in contrast to any “utilitarian position 
that says, ‘Do this to them so they will do it to you.” Luke 1:1–9:50, 596. It is “love for love’s sake.” Ibid., 
598. Beyreuther comments that “because it [God’s kindness] is without limit, it calls for unconditional love 
for their enemies on the part of Jesus’ disciples.” NIDNTT 2:106. Cf. Cranfield, “Love,” A Theological 
Word Book (ed. A. Richardson), 134. Such statements confuse unconditional with unmerited. Further, 
Klassen thinks, “Lacking is any utilitarian motive. This ethical guidance is fully and exclusively rooted in 
the nature and behavior of God. The only reward which is in sight is a relationship with God.” Love in the 




without expecting benefit from the one loved does not mean that love ultimately nullifies 
conditions, just deserts, reciprocity, or proper self-regard.
523
 Indeed, Jesus repeatedly points to 
future reward (misqo,j) (cf. Matt 5:46; Luke 6:32–35).524 Ultimately, those who love their enemies 
“without expecting any return” will receive a “rich reward [misqo,j]” from God and thus become 
sons of God (Luke 6:35; cf. Matt 5:45).
525
 Thus, even in the call for Christians to bestow love on 
                                                     
 
523
 It is true that human “love is not [to be] dependent on others’ behavior.” Stein, Luke, 208. So, 
also Bock, Luke 1:1–9:50, 596. However, this cannot be extended to rule out the evaluative aspects of love 
altogether. Christ is asking for the Christian to suspend the consequences of such evaluation since he 
himself is the judge. Christians are to manifest love toward all in this time between the times but that does 
not mean that love, by definition, is non-evaluative and/or unconditional. See the further discussion of this 
below and in chapter 6. Notice also the prominent conception of “insider love,” which is discussed 
elsewhere in this chapter (cf. John 13:1).  
524
 Thus, Jesus asks, “if you love those who love you, what reward [misqo,j] do you have?” (Matt 
5:46). Luke phrases it just a bit differently but with a similar concept of reward: “If you love [avgapa,w] 
those who love [avgapa,w] you, what credit [ca,rij] is that to you? (Luke 6:32; cf. 33–34). Here, ca,rij 
“denotes an effort to pay off a debt by returning benefit for benefit.” J. B. Green, The Gospel of Luke, 273. 
Cf. Ceslas Spicq, “χ ρι ,” TLNT 3:500–506. Bock refers to it as divine favor “in response to having done 
something more,” specifically, in response to human love that “goes beyond the sinner’s love.” Luke 1:1–
9:50, 603. “There is no favor from God for such limited love.” Ibid., 600. Of course, this implies that 
loving like God loves may curry favor. It thus has “the overtone of ‘reward,’ as the use of misthos in v. 35b 
shows.” Fitzmyer, Luke I–IX, 640. See the similar usage of !x in the sense of evaluation of the person or 
relationship in the chapter 4. Divine reward is common elsewhere as well. See Matt 5:12; 6:1–16; 10:41–
42. 
525
 In Matthew they are to love as such “so that” (o[pwj) they “may be sons of” their “Father who is 
in heaven” (Matt 5:45). Thus, “there is a reward for a life lived by this higher standard of love. . . . The 
reward of the children of God is for those who live as the children of God.” France, The Gospel of 
Matthew, 227. Likewise, Johnston points out, “Love is rewarded. This does not involve any diminution of 
the quality of love, for the supreme compensation is membership in the new family of the kingdom (Matt. 
23:8–9; Mark 3:34–35  10:30).” IDB 3:170. Some have suggested that such sonship is not here conditional 
but, rather, this love is merely the outworking, or necessary result, of already being God’s children. So 
Stein, Luke, 209. Cf. Green, The Gospel of Luke, 274; Bock, Luke 1:1–9:50, 603. However, the future 
middle indicative e;stai in the phrase “and you will be [e;stai] sons of the Most High” (Luke 6:35) suggests 
that being a child of God follows as a result of the loving behavior (though this need not entail that such 
behavior is the sole or ultimate ground). Contra Stein who contends that the verb “‘will be’ should not be 
understood as ‘will become’ but rather ‘will show yourselves to be.’” Luke, 209. Even Piper notes the 
reality that “Jesus’ love command” is “a condition for entrance into the Kingdom of God.” “Love your 
enemies,” 76–77. However, it must be understood that for Piper something can be conditional and at the 
same time rendered certain by God. In other words, in his view this “condition” is fulfilled solely in 
accordance with the efficacious divine will. Moreover, the “so that” (o[pwj) in Matt 5:45 depicts sonship as 
a consequence of love. Albright and Mann thus reads, “In this way you will become sons of your heavenly 
Father.” Matthew, 71. As Charette puts it, “Those who accept the offer of salvation experience the blessing 
which God designed for the nations when he first called Abraham. But those who decline the offer are the 
truly cursed who have defeated their proper destiny by cutting themselves off for ever from the inheritance 
first promised to Abraham.” “The Theme,” 159. Importantly, this need not mean that one was not a child of 




the undeserving they themselves are evaluated and will be rewarded for such beneficence.
526
 The 
very ones who are to love their enemies, are themselves judged on the basis of their love, 




That reciprocity and the principle of appropriate response are not nullified in this 
command is further evident since, in the Lucan account, Jesus declared the golden rule: “Treat 
others the same way you want them to treat you,” just four verses before the command to love 
one’s enemies (Luke 6:31).
528
 Importantly, this guideline does not assume self-abnegation but 
rather a form of sympathy (cf. oivkti,rmwn in Luke 6:36) and a kind of reciprocity, though not the 
kind of quid quo pro reciprocity of conventional wisdom.
529
 Specifically, the ideal of reciprocal 
                                                     
 
from God’s prior initiative. It is possible that this condition refers to the continuation rather than the 
beginning of sonship but the condition is real nonetheless. In any case, the texts strongly imply that Jesus’ 
intention is to speak of a special status of sonship that is reserved for those who imitate God, specifically, 
his love. This view is supported by the fact that these passages are clearly exhortative, culminating in 
command. Cf. Sir 4:10.  
526
 On the other hand, negative reward awaits those who reject God, that is, those who remain 
ungrateful. Bock even refers to this as “meritorious love,” seeing such reward as “God’s acknowledgment 
that he has seen this meritorious love and the faithfulness it reflects. . . . It is not merit for salvation; but 
recognition of being a faithful son or daughter (Luke 6:23  Matt. 5:9).” Luke 1:1–9:50, 603. On the other 
hand, Stein comments, “There is no idea of merit in this statement, for even after perfect obedience and 
service to God, believers will only be able to say, ‘We are unworthy servants  we have only done our duty’ 
(Luke 17:10). It is pure grace that causes God to reward his servants; but reward there will be, and this is 
not an uncommon theme in the NT.” Luke, 203. Importantly, however, the idea that humans do not deserve 
such a gracious reward should not nullify the fact that such reward is itself conditional upon appropriate 
(albeit imperfect) human response. See chapter 6 on the important difference between merit and conditional 
reward. 
527
 Similarly, elsewhere beneficence is to be given not just to friends (fi,loj), brothers, relatives, 
and rich neighbors but to those who cannot repay. However, the one who shows such beneficence to the 
one who cannot repay “will be repaid [avntapodi,dwmi] at the resurrection of the righteous” (Luke 14:14  cf. 
14:10; 16:9). 
528
 Many similar commands are known in antiquity, especially prominent in the negative form in 
Jewish literature. For an impressive list of ancient parallels see Bock, Luke 1:1–9:50, 596.  
529
 Thus, J. B. Green states, “In the ethics of the larger Lukan world, a patron solidifies his or her 
position in the community by ‘giving,’ by placing others in his or her debt, and receiving from them 
obliged acts of service and reverence. In this new economy, however, the patron gives without strings 
attached, yet is still repaid, now by a third party, God, the great benefactor, the protector and the benefactor 
of those in need.” The Gospel of Luke, 274. Klassen also notes that this is “a guideline which is based on 




love is not removed but God himself stands in as the one who reciprocates such love; he himself 
will repay such love that is granted to the undeserving (cf. Matt 25:40).
530
 The consequences of 
evaluative judgment are suspended but not thereby nullified. As such, God’s “impartiality” 
should not be seen to “obviate” divine evaluative judgment.
531
 Indeed, Jesus affirms in the same 




                                                     
 
loving the enemy (Dihle 1962).”
 
Love in the NT, 387. On the contrary, the statements of Luke 6:31 and 
6:35 are no contradiction but qualify and clarify one another. Cf. Furnish, The Love Command, 58–59. 
530
 He mediates for the unworthy recipient of love in the here and now. Thus, J. B. Green is correct 
when he notes, “What motives does Jesus offer for these new practices? First, he vouches for the 
continuance of the notion of reciprocity, albeit in a radicalized form. Those who act without expectation of 
return, even on behalf of their enemies, will be rewarded. Now, however, their reward does not consist of 
acts of gratitude from the recipients of their benefaction  rather, God rewards them (cf. 12:33  14:14).” The 
Gospel of Luke, 273–74. Cf. Stein, Luke, 209. Further, “the reciprocity denied in vv 32–35a has been 
restored, with one telling exception. Jesus’ followers give freely, without dragging others and especially 
those in need into the quagmire of never-ending cycles of repayment and liability. And God will lavishly 
repay them.” Ibid., 275. Cf. Johnston, IDB 3:170. Spicq, who elsewhere points to the purely gratuitous 
nature of avga,ph, here notes that “even the purest Christian love hopes for return and fruition . . . but never 
from men. God alone rewards the love of charity, and superabundantly.” Further, “Christian beneficence 
must be disinterested in its deepest inspiration, and yet God considers whatever is done for neighbor as 
done for himself. He promises to repay those who love their enemies, if only their generosity is motivated 
by love for him.” Agape, 1:86. 
531
 See France, The Gospel of Matthew, 226. Thus, God is not removing the principles of law and 
justice: “Such action would not in fact be an imitation of the character of God who upholds the moral law 
and judges transgressors.” Marshall, The Gospel of Luke, 266. “This does not imply flabby indifference to 
the moral condition of others nor the blind renunciation of attempts at a true and serious appraisal of those 
with whom we have to live. What is unconditionally demanded is that such evaluations should be subject to 
the certainty that God’s judgment falls also on those who judge, so that superiority, hardness and blindness 
to one’s own faults are excluded, and a readiness to forgive and to intercede is safeguarded.” Friedrich 
Büchsel, “κρίνω,” TDNT 5:939. So Bock, Luke 1:1–9:50, 606; Stein, Luke, 212; Marshall, The Gospel of 
Luke, 266. In other words, it is not that such evaluation is removed but that such evaluation ultimately 
belongs to and will be carried out by God himself. 
532
 The idea that rewards are conditioned upon appropriate human response is supported in the 
foreground where Jesus emphasizes reciprocality: “Do not judge, and you will not be judged; and do not 
condemn, and you will not be condemned; pardon, and you will be pardoned. Give, and it will be given to 
you. . . . For by your standard of measure it will be measured to you in return” (Luke 6:37–38). Thus, “the 
believer’s behavior toward others will determine God’s behavior toward him or her.” Stein, Luke, 212. On 
the other hand, “those who treat others harshly can expect their prayers to be hindered (1 Pet. 3:7–12). To 
the generous, God is generous.” Bock, Luke 1:1–9:50, 607. Bock, however, insists that such evaluative 





Thus, conditionality and divine appraisal are present and God himself operates with a 
principle of reciprocity, but the divine principle of reciprocity operates in a complex way that has 
room for grace and the temporary suspension of the consequences of judgment. In the future, the 
execution of divine judgment will finally separate between those who will receive their reward 
according to the merits of Christ through atonement and those who reject divine mediation and 
suffer destruction. Importantly, Jesus’ command of love toward our enemies here does not 
therefore conflict with his advocacy and practice of “insider love” elsewhere. 
That God’s love is bestowed on the undeserving prior to conditions does not mean that 
divine love is in every respect groundless, spontaneous, or unconditional. First, divine love qua 
divine love is not always unmerited, though it is unmerited toward humans. Thus, God loves his 
unique (monogenh,j) Son, the one who was and is truly worthy of love (John 3:16).533 Elsewhere, 
divine love for the Son is explicitly grounded in Jesus’s action(s) as evident in his proclamation 
“for this reason [Dia. tou/to,] the Father loves [avgapa,w] Me, because I lay down My life” (John 
10:17).
534
 Here, divine love for the Son is grounded in the Son’s voluntary obedience and is itself 
associated with the love of God for human beings.
535
 As such, divine love is not, in and of itself, 
                                                     
 
533
 God gave what was most dear to him.” Morris, The Gospel according to John, 203–4. “The 
pathos of those words ‘only Son’ should remind the interpreter of the pathos in the story of Abraham” and 
Isaac. Borchert, John 1–11, 183. R. L. Roberts argues that since dyxy and monogenh,j are “used as hyperboles 
of affection” in the LXX the best rendering of this phrase is “only beloved.” “The Rendering ‘Only 
Begotten’ in John 3:16,” ResQ 16 (1973): 15. 
534
 He lays down his life of his own volition, and will yet take up life again in accordance with the 
commandment of the Father (John 10:17–18). 
535
 The action of Jesus “is given as the reason for the Father’s loving the Son.” Morris, The Gospel 
according to John, 456. Cf. Klassen, Love in the NT, 389. Some, however, seek to avoid this notion by 
reversing the idea. Thus Borchert, considering it “highly unlikely that either Jesus or John would have 
based the love of the Father for Jesus on the Son’s causal willingness to die,” states, “I would reverse the 
idea and read the text of 10:17 as, ‘Because [dia touto] the Father loves me, that is the reason [hoti, 
therefore] I lay down my life.’” John 1–11, 336. Cf. Ko  stenberger, John, 307–8. However, “the first part of 
this verse reads literally ‘because of this the Father loves me because I give up my life.’” B. M. Newman 
and Nida, A Handbook on the Gospel of John, 332. Thus, against such special pleading, the text does point 
to grounded divine love, not unlike that which is seen elsewhere in John (cf. John 16:27). Therefore Edwyn 
C. Hoskyns correctly states, “The love of the Father for the Son is set in the context neither of the original 
creation nor of a relationship which existed before the world was made” but the “love of the Father is 




altogether unmotivated since the Son actually merits love.
536
 Thus, while love for humans is not 
meritorious, it is not because God is incapable of appreciating merit but because human beings 
are sinful and incapable of deserving God’s love. This requires, then, a both/and explanation of 
divine love. It is primarily grounded in divine agency but also, in some respects, may be 
evaluative and grounded in the disposition and/or action(s) of its object, to a greater or lesser 
degree.  
The reality of grounded love is further evident in Jesus’ tale of the moneylender who 
“graciously forgave” (cari,zomai) two debts of unequal size. Therein, Jesus asks which “will love 
him more? [plei/on avgaph,sei]” with the answer, the “one whom he forgave more” (Luke 7:42–
43). The grace of the moneylender is completely undeserved. However, those forgiven love the 
moneylender proportionately to the greatness of his forgiveness.
537
 This is love that is explicitly 
grounded in, and responsive to, prior beneficence. Notably, however, those who love the 
benefactor are in no position to benefit him: Their love therefore apparently describes an 
affectionate disposition that would (or ought to) be manifested in beneficence toward the 
moneylender if such occasion obtained (cf. Matt 18:33–35). This object lesson is itself used to 
illustrate the virtuous love shown for Jesus by the woman of ill repute who anointed Jesus with 
                                                     
 
of men depends has been accomplished. The Resurrection is the inevitable consequence of the obedience of 
Jesus.” The Fourth Gospel (London: Faber, 1947), 379. 
536
 Importantly, the text does not say that this is the only reason the Father loves him, but it does 
portray divine love as at least partially caused and clearly evaluative. Beasley-Murray comments, “The 
Father’s love for the Son is linked with the Son’s death for the world. This event is naturally not 
represented as the origin of that love but its supreme manifestation and enactment.” John, 171. Cf. 
Ko  stenberger, John, 307. However, while it is apparent that God loved the Son even before Jesus gave his 
life for sinful humans, one should not be too quick to rule out that some aspect of the Father’s love for the 
Son is prompted and/or heightened by the Son’s self-sacrifice. Carson puts it well when he states, Jesus “is 
now at pains to elucidate why the Father loves him. It is not that the Father withholds his love until Jesus 
agrees to give up his life on the cross and rise again. Rather, the love of the Father for the Son is eternally 
linked with the unqualified obedience of the Son to the Father, his utter dependence upon him, culminating 
in this greatest act of obedience now just before him.” The Gospel according to John, 388. 
537
 Bock comments, “The larger the debt that is forgiven, the larger the gratitude and love that 
emerge in the response.” Luke 1:1–9:50, 699. This love is thus not bestowal but includes aspects of 




perfume (Luke 7:37). After telling the parable, and comparing her loving actions to the lack of 
action by his host, Jesus goes on to declare, “For this reason I say to you, her sins, which are 
many, have been forgiven, for [o[ti] she loved [avgapa,w] much; but he who is forgiven little, loves 
little. Then He said to her, ‘Your sins have been forgiven” (Luke 7:47–48). It is unclear whether 
she loves more because she is forgiven more, as the parable implies, or whether her love is a (not 
necessarily the) basis for the forgiveness as the statement of Jesus seems to imply.
538
 The former 
is favored by many commentators
539
 while some argue the latter.
540
 Both are possible readings 
based on the grammar. Perhaps Luke does not intend to separate the two but depicts here again 
the foreconditionality of love. She receives forgiveness and, appropriately, loves Christ and her 
forgiveness is ratified by her loving response (cf. 1 Pet 4:8).
541
 The lack of such response would 
                                                     
 
G. Wood, “The Use of αγαπαω in Luke 8:42, 47,” ExpTim 66 (1955): 319–20. 
538
 This tension has led some to conclude that the accounts do not belong together. For example, 
see Josef Ernst, Das Evangelium nach Lukas (RNT 3; Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1977), 258–59. 
However, such tension is not necessarily a contradiction in light of the wider foreconditionality of love 
evidenced in the NT. 
539
 Those who think she loves because she is forgiven take the causal ὄτι clause as “evidentiary” 
and thus interpret Jesus’ statement to mean something like, “Because of what she had done, I can now 
conclude that her sins had in fact been forgiven.” Stein, Luke, 237. So, among others, Fitzmyer, Luke I–IX, 
691; J. B. Green, The Gospel of Luke, 313; Bock, Luke 1:1–9:50, 703; Marshall, The Gospel of Luke, 313; 
Nolland, Luke 1:1–9:20, 537–38; J. Reiling and J. L. Swellengrebel, A Handbook on the Gospel of Luke 
(New York: United Bible Societies, 1993), 324. In this vein, some argue that the forgiveness must be in the 
past in light of the perfect tense. So Bock, Luke 1:1–9:50, 703, 705. So, also Stein, Luke, 237; Frédéric 
Louis Godet, Commentary on Luke (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1893), 1:362. Yet, elsewhere the same form 
is used by Jesus of present forgiveness (cf. Luke 5:20, 23).  
540
 For one example, among many others, Spicq comments that Jesus “responded” to “her love . . . 
by pardoning her. The lesson here is not only that love can obtain the remission of sins but also that great 
sinners are usually the most sincere in their contrition and charity.” Agape, 1:105. Cf. 106–7. Cf. Heinz 
Schürmann, Das Lukasevangelium, 436–38.  
541
 Interestingly, Jesus directly contrasts the loving actions of the woman to the lack thereof by 
Simon, suggesting an evaluative distinction between them, likely with the purpose of prompting Simon to 
notice the state of his own heart, which appears to be closed to the forgiveness that he himself needs. Thus, 
one implication of Jesus’ statement is that Simon ought to love Jesus more. This could not be the case, 
however, if love amounts to an automatic response to forgiveness. One ought to love in response to 
forgiveness, but such is not always the case (cf. Matt 18:23–35). The woman is thus indirectly praised for 
her love of Jesus. Cf. the praise of the Roman because “he loves [avgapa,w] our nation” (Luke 7:5). In this 
later case “Jesus’ reaction is emotional” and “one of commendation” for “he is amazed at the soldier.” 




result in forfeiture of the forgiveness as was the case for the unforgiving debtor (cf. Matt 18:33–
35).
542
 Accordingly, her loving response is a necessary corollary, as well as evidence of her faith 
and, as such, truly conditional.
543
 In this way, the forgiveness is foreconditional but not 
unconditional.  
Such groundedness and conditionality of divine love are also likely in view in the 
encouragement to “abide” in divine love. For example, the father “has loved [avgapa,w]” the Son 
and Jesus loves his followers in the same way. In turn, they are exhorted to “abide in My love” 
(John 15:9; cf. Jude 1:21). Notably, this command is imperative, manifesting the apparent 
conditionality of remaining in divine love (cf. John 15:4, 7). Abiding in his “love” (avga,ph) is 
accomplished if one keeps Jesus’ commandments just as Christ has modeled in relation to the 
Father and, thus, “abide[s] [me,nw] in His love” (John 15:10). The implication is that one may not 
abide in God’s love but such privilege may be forfeited such that the one who does not “abide” 
through obedience and fidelity to Jesus might thereby remove themselves as objects of such 
love.
544
 Significantly, in v. 10 Jesus’ own abiding in the Father’s love is implied to fall under this 
                                                     
 
542
 This idea that the one who does not forgive will not be forgiven is explicitly emphasized in the 
NT not only in the story of the unforgiving debtor but elsewhere (cf. Matt 6:12, 14–15, Jas 2:13).  
543
 This would make sense of two of Jesus’ statements at the end of the narrative. First, after 
describing that she “loved much” he declares to the woman “your sins have been forgiven” (Luke 7:48). 
But, this might seem to be superfluous if she was already altogether forgiven. J. B. Green, however, 
suggests that the woman needed no such assurance of forgiveness but that Jesus made the statement to 
manifest it to the others present. The Gospel of Luke, 314. This is possible, but uncertain. Nolland suggests 
this “cannot be read as a fresh forgiveness of the woman, but it can and should be read as a confirmation of 
the woman’s forgiveness.” Luke 1:1–9:20, 359. Perhaps more striking, however, is Jesus’s further 
statement, “your faith has saved you,” which explicitly grounds her forgiveness in the necessary faith 
response that she has manifested in love (Luke 7:50). Cf. Fitzmyer, Luke I–IX, 692; Bock, Luke 1:1–9:50, 
704. Such “saving” faith is also prominent in Luke, cf. 8:48  17:19  18:42. Thus, perhaps the woman acted 
out of love having received forgiveness and, at the same time, such acts of love are the necessary evidence 
and even the seal of her forgiveness. If this is correct one must nevertheless be careful to remember that 
this does not amount to earning or deserving forgiveness. As elsewhere, a gift may be unmerited without 
being unconditional. 
544
 Carson correctly states, “The injunction to remain in Jesus’ love . . . presupposes that, however 
much God’s love for us is gracious and undeserved, continued enjoyment of that love turns, at least in part, 
on our response to it.” The Gospel according to John, 520. He qualifies, “Such texts do not tell us how 
people become Christians; rather, assuming that followers of Jesus are in view, they tell us that Christians 




same conditionality (cf. John 10:17).
545
 Similarly, the disciples are Jesus’ “friends” (fi,loj) if they 
do his commands (John 15:14; cf. John 15:15).
546
 So the friendship relationship of love is 
conditional upon obedience, which earlier in the chapter is connected to reciprocal love.
547
  
More explicit examples of conditional and grounded divine love also appear in the 
Gospels. Thus, Jesus proclaims, “He who loves Me will be loved
548
 by My Father, and I will love 
him and will disclose Myself to him” (John 14:21—all avgapa,w).549 Again, the one who “loves” 
(avgapa,w) Jesus will “keep” his word “and My Father will love [avgapa,w] him” and they will make 
their abode with him (John 14:23). The clear implication is that obedience and love toward Jesus 
evokes the love of the Father and that of the Son. Likewise, divine love toward humans is 
explicitly predicated on human love when Jesus later states, the “Father Himself loves [file,w] 
you, because [o[ti] you have loved [file,w] Me and have believed [pisteu,w]”550 (John 16:27).551 
                                                     
 
their parents’ love by obedience.” New Dictionary of Biblical Theology, 648. 
545
 Thus, “not even Jesus is exempt from responding to the Father’s love for him in obedience.” 
Ko  stenberger, John, 456. Similarly, Carson, The Gospel according to John, 509. Here, then, “the 
relationship of the disciple to Jesus in terms of obedience and love is modeled on the relationship of the 
Son to the Father.” Borchert, John 12–21, 146. So Carson, The Gospel according to John, 520.  
546
 This notion of friendship with God is common elsewhere (2 Chr 20:7; Isa 41:8; John 11:11; Jas 
2:23; cf. also Exod 33:11; John 3:29). See the discussion of friendship below in this chapter.  
547
 Here, while God initiates the relationship (cf. John 6:70  15:16), “the ongoing relationship 
between Jesus and his disciples is characterized by obedience on their part, and thus is logically 
conditioned by it.” Carson, The Gospel according to John, 503. Cf. Köstenberger, John, 458; Morris, The 
Gospel according to John, 599. Borchert points out that these “basic requirements” of “friendship . . . are 
exactly the same obedience requirements as those (15:10) for abiding in his love.” John 12–21, 149. As 
such, abiding relates closely to friendship and both are conditional. 
548
 P75 reads, “kept safe.” However, the parallel in 16:27 suggests that “love” is the correct 
reading here. 
549
 B. M. Newman and Nida suggest that this clause, like the first clause of v. 21, may “also be 
treated as conditional  for example, ‘if anyone loves me, my Father will love him.” A Handbook on the 
Gospel of John, 471. 
550
 Note the close association between love and faith. Bultmann states, “‘Love is often used with 
‘faith’ as if to denote the essence of Christianity.” Theology, 2:222. This further supports the necessity of a 
love response in accordance with true faith. 
551
 Importantly, “He loves you because is literally “because.” . . . In 14.21, 23 the disciples are 




Such examples depict reciprocal, conditional, motivated, and evaluative love such that divine 
love may be contingent upon and responsive to human action.
552
  
At the same time, three potential qualifications should be noted here. First, these texts do 
not state that human love is prior to divine love and therefore do not contradict the Johannine 
perspective elsewhere regarding the ultimate priority of God’s love (cf. 1 John 4:10, 19). Second, 
love that is conditioned upon appropriate human response is not thereby merited. Something may 
be conditional and still undeserved.
553
 Third, the texts do not mean that those who love Jesus 
move from a category of not being loved by the Father at all to a category of being loved by him. 
That would not accord with earlier statements in John as well as the wider canon (cf. John 3:16). 
                                                     
 
Jesus and to believe in him if they are to experience the Father’s love.” B. M. Newman and Nida, A 
Handbook on the Gospel of John, 518. Hendriksen, accordingly, renders it, “The reason why he loves you 
is this, that you have loved me, with a love which still continues, and have believed, with a faith that never 
ceases.” New Testament Commentary: The Gospel according to John, 2:338. As such, the “Father’s love is 
extended to believers on the basis of their confirmed love and settled faith in Jesus.” Ko  stenberger, John, 
478–79. As such, “this love of the Father is presented as being contingent upon belief in his Son.” Fernando 
F. Segovia, Love Relationships in the Johannine Tradition: Agape/Agapan in I John and the Fourth Gospel 
(SBLDS 58; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1982), 155. He further sees this in terms of the relationship of “a 
promise to a condition. Whoever loves Jesus . . . can rest assured that the Father himself will love him in 
return  on the other hand, he who does not so believe is not loved by the Father.” Segovia, Love 
Relationships, 154. Thus, “God’s love is promised as a reward for Christian devotion.” There is “an 
experience of the Father’s love in return for obedience.” Moffat, Love, 265. Cf. Spicq, Agape, 87–88. 
552
 This is in direct contrast to the deterministic conception of divine love. Thus, Calvin contends 
that this amounts merely to “a testimony of” God’s “love to them.” John (Calvin’s Commentaries  Albany, 
Oreg.: Ages Software, 1998); John 14:21. Similarly, Augustine posits this human love as the unilateral 
work of God himself such that “He Himself loved that which He had made.” Lectures on St. John 7.102.5 
(NPNF 7:391). Similarly, Matthew Henry, Matthew Henry’s Commentary on the Whole Bible (Peabody, 
Mass.: Hendrickson, 1996), John 16:23–27. Cf. Stählin, TDNT 9:133. However, R. E. Brown correctly 
points out that “one must recognize that in Johannine dualism, since God’s spontaneous love is expressed 
in the gift of His Son, if one turns away from the Son, one forfeits God’s love.” The Gospel according to 
John XIII–XXI, 641. While R. E. Brown correctly points that divine love might be forfeited it should also 
be noted that a love that might be forfeited is not altogether spontaneous, though its origin may be 
spontaneous. 
553
 Thus, Morris is right to comment, “This does not mean that the Father’s love is merited by this 
obedience” but “he is saying that the Father is not indifferent to the attitude people take toward the Son.”
 
Morris, The Gospel according to John, 580. Similarly, see Borchert who points out this does not “imply 
that a believer ‘earns’ God’s love through obedience.” John 12–21, 128. However, Charles Simeon goes 
too far in suggesting that this merely refers to the “particular occasion in which” God’s “love may be 
manifested.” John XIII to Acts (Horae Homileticae 14; London: Holdsworth and Ball, 1833), 105. Although 
such human love does not create an obligation (morally or otherwise) regarding God’s loving response 





However, such statements do require that the particular aspect of divine love referred to here is 
responsive to and conditioned upon human love. Accordingly, they likely refer to a special, 
intimate, relational love that moves beyond God’s universal, unilateral decision to bestow love on 
all to the intimate, relational love without which the first is not sustained indefinitely. That is, 
God loves those who respond to his son in love in a way that is not afforded to “the world.”
554
 In 
such instances, God’s love is both prior to human love and also, in another way, responsive to and 




The Foreconditionality of Love in the Pauline Writings 
The priority of God’s love is shown in many statements in the Pauline writings. God is 
characteristically loving, the “God of love and peace” (2 Cor 13:11  cf. 14).
556
 He is “rich in 
mercy” and acts “because of His great love [avga,ph] with which He loved [avgapa,w] us” (Eph 
2:4).
557
 Thus, God’s love itself is the initiating force that makes human response to God, such as 
                                                     
 
554
 Carson goes on, “With the connection between obedience and love so explicit, it should be self-
evident that the circle of love in view embraces all of Jesus’ true disciples, but not the ‘world’, which falls 
within a rather different and more extended circle of love (cf. notes on 13:1, 34–35).” The Gospel 
according to John, 503. Morris adds correctly, “It is true that from one point of view the Father loves all 
people. But it is also true that he has a special regard for those who believe.”
 
Morris, The Gospel according 
to John, 630. See the further discussion of “insider love” in the final section of this chapter and in chapter 
6. 
555
 Hendriksen rightly states, “Why cannot God’s love both precede and follow ours? That is 
exactly what it does, and that is the beauty of it: first, by preceding our love, it creates in us the eager desire 
to keep Christ’s precepts  then, by following our love, it rewards us for keeping them! Nothing could ever 
be more glorious than such an arrangement!” New Testament Commentary: The Gospel according to John, 
2:281–82. 
556
 Klassen thinks this is probably Paul’s “way of saying that God is love.” Love in the NT, 392. 
“God of love” never appears elsewhere, whether in NT or LXX. 
557
 Similarly, Christ, the “Son of God,” is the one “who loved [avgaph,santo,j] me and gave Himself 
up for me” (Gal 2:20  similarly, Eph 5:2, 25). That Christ actively “gave” himself implies volition. See 
George, Galatians, 201. Likewise, the Father “has loved [avgapa,w] us and given us eternal comfort 
[para,klhsij]” (2 Thess 2:16). The singular verb and dual antecedent here may mean that both the Father 
and the Son are intended as the subject of this love. So, among many others, Frame, 286. Even if that is not 
the precise intention of this verse, the love of the Father and the Son are clearly operative in such instances. 






 Therefore, Paul cautions his audience not to “think lightly of the riches of 
His [God’s] kindness [crhsto,thj] and tolerance [avnoch,] and patience [makroqumi,a]” since it is the 
“kindness [crhsto,j] of God” that leads to repentance (Rom 2:4).559 Human response to divine 
love, then, is never primary but always secondary, impossible apart from God’s initiative. 




On the other hand, the endurance of such divine love is astounding. Paul states 
emphatically that nothing can “separate us from the love of Christ” (Rom 8:35  cf. 39).
561
 But we 
are conquerors “through Him who loved us” (Rom 8:37). Does this mean divine love is 
unconditional?
562
 Some have interpreted these verses to mean that even believers cannot remove 
themselves from God’s love.
563
 Such an interpretation would contradict the assertion elsewhere 
                                                     
 
558
 The priority and volitional nature of love is further emphasized when it is stated that “He chose 
us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we would be holy and blameless before Him. In love He 
predestined us to adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the kind intention of His 
will” (Eph 1:4–5). See the discussion of this verse above. Note also that it is disputed whether “in love” 
belongs with what precedes or what follows. Whether God “chose us . . . in love” or “in love He 
predestined us” it is clear that divine love includes a volitional and purposeful aspect that holds primacy as 
foundational to the divine-human relationship. 
559
 Some commentators see this as a response to a false security and complacency of some Jews 
regarding their status in the judgment as God’s elect. Cf. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 133; Dunn, 
Romans 1–8, 83. 
560 avnoch, refers to God’s patient forbearance and appears only here and in 3:26. In the LXX it 
appears only in 1 Macc 12:25. In Greek usage it refers to the holding back of “final judgment,” which 
provides “the sinner an interval in which” to repent. But this is “temporary. It implies a limit. If the sinner 
does nothing but sin . . . then in due course he must face God with all his sin.” Morris, The Epistle to the 
Romans, 112. Likewise, God’s longsuffering provides time to repent, but it does not amount to the 
nullification of judgment; human response is required. 
561
 This is clearly a subjective genitive, Christ’s love for us. So ibid., 338, Fitzmyer, Romans, 533; 
Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 543; Schreiner, Romans, 463. Four verses later Paul reiterates that 
basically nothing “will be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord” 
(Rom 8:39). 
562
 For example, “No created being or force can unsettle that foundation . . . Christ’s love and 
God’s election. These are unshakable.” Fitzmyer, Romans, 536. Stauffer speaks of the elect’s “indissoluble 
fellowship with God.” TDNT 1:49. Mounce contends, “We are forever united with the one who is perfect 
love.” Romans, 192. 
563




that the believer can remove oneself from being an object of divine love (cf. John 15:9–10; Jude 
21). Therefore, in light of the wider information regarding the conditionality of divine love, Paul 
is likely referring to the fact that there is no external force or power that can impede God’s love 
for us, though humans retain the responsibility to abide in relationship with God.
564
  
Such love toward human beings is undeserved and unmerited (but not altogether 
unconditional). Thus, God “demonstrates His own [avga,phn] toward us, in that while we were yet 
sinners, Christ died for us” (Rom 5:8).
565
 Likewise, the “kindness [crhsto,thj] of God our Savior 
and His love for mankind [filanqrwpi,a] appeared” and God acted salvifically “not on the basis 
of [our righteous] deeds” but “according to His mercy” (Titus 3:5  cf. Eph 1:4  1 Tim 1:13–14).
566
 
Yet, while unmerited, it is evident that God’s kindness may be forfeited since the divine 
“severity” will be upon those who fell but the divine kindness (crhsto,thj) “to you . . . if you 
continue in His kindness, otherwise you also will be cut off” (Rom 11:22  cf. 23). As such, God’s 
“kindness” is not the product of either unconditional election or essential relation. The general 
sense of grounded love is also apparent when Paul proclaims that God “loves” a cheerful giver (2 




 That is, nothing can separate us from God’s love “so long as we shall not refuse to abide” in it. 
Godet, Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, 333. Similarly, Philipp Melanchthon, 
Commentary on Romans (trans. F. Kramer; St. Louis: Concordia, 1992), 183–84. Cf. Sanday and Headlam, 
A Critical and Exegetical Commentary, 220–21. 
565
 Such love for the “helpless” is greater than the greatest human love (cf. Rom 5:6–8). Indeed, v. 
6 describes the human as “helpless.” Cf. Lone Fatum, “Die menschliche Schwäche im Römerbrief,” ST 29 
(1975): 31–52. Notice that God “demonstrates” his love  the action is not the love itself but demonstrates 
the underlying disposition. On the basis of this passage, some commentators assert that “divine love is 
spontaneously demonstrated toward sinners without a hint that it is repaying a love already shown.” 
Fitzmyer, Romans, 400. Cf. Morris, The Epistle to the Romans, 224. However, while this is unmerited love 
and prior to conditions, that does not necessarily exclude conditionality and expected reciprocation. 
566
 Wuest interprets filanqrwpi,a here as “affection called out of God’s heart by something in 
fallen man that is like God.” “Four Greek Words,” 244. Such unmerited love was shown directly to Paul 
when the Lord’s abundant “grace” (ca,rij) and “faith and love” (pi,stewj kai. avga,phj) were manifested to 
him and he was shown mercy (evlee,w) “because” he “acted ignorantly in unbelief” (1 Tim 1:13–14). 
Importantly, here the divine mercy is undeserved and unmerited being grounded in Christ’s “faith and 
love.” Moreover, Paul ascribes some ground also to his ignorance with the implication that such mercy 
would not have been shown had he been fully cognizant of, and intentional about, his wrongdoing. See the 




Cor 9:7). Though this does not mean that God doesn’t love others, it does correlate divine love to 
a positive human attribute. In this way, divine love cannot be wholly arbitrary or ungrounded.  
Similarly, 1 Cor 8 may teach that being known by God is predicated on human love 
toward God. Thus, “if anyone loves God, he is known by Him” (1 Cor 8:3).
567
 Accordingly, love 
for God corresponds to being known by God. But what is the nature of the correspondence? Does 
one love God because one is known by him or is one known by God because one loves God? 
Many commentators favor the former, that God’s prior action of knowing the individual results in 
the human loving God, often in the sense of unilateral election.
568
 The perfect passive is often 
appealed to in support of this position that God’s knowledge is in the past.
569
 However, the 
perfect passive does not necessarily refer to something in the past. Indeed, it is used in other 
contexts where the referent is contingent and grounded (cf. Luke 5:20, 23). To be sure, God 
“knows” humans prior to any human love toward God (cf. Gal 4:9  1 Cor 13:12  Phil 3:12). 
However, it is also possible that loving God is the condition of being known intimately by God.
570
 
In other words, though God knows everyone in a general way, he knows those who love him in a 
special way, keeping in mind that humans can only love God because God has already loved 
them (1 John 4:19).
571
 This would be in accord with the Johannine emphasis on mutual and 
conditional love in all of its spheres.
572
  
                                                     
 
567
 On textual variants that omit  ὸν θε ν and ὑπʼ αὐ οῦ and would thus significantly alter the 
meaning of this verse, see Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 367. However, this “longer” reading is 
given an “A” grading in UBS
4
. Consider also the arguments in favor of the inclusion of these clauses in 
Metzger, A Textual Commentary, 490–91. 
568
 For instance, 1 Corinthians, 370–71.  
569
 This may be a middle or a passive, but most take it as a passive. See Thiselton, The First 
Epistle, 625. 
570
 Cf. the relational connotations of [dy in the OT.  
571
 Bruce states, “Both the knowledge and the love are mutual, and in both it is God in Christ who 
takes the initiative.” The Epistles to the Colossians, 329. Cf. Frédéric Louis Godet, Commentary on First 
Corinthians (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1957), 1:410.  
572




The Foreconditionality of Love in the General Epistles-Revelation 
The priority of divine love is again evident in this corpus. Indeed, God has “bestowed” on 
humans such a great love to be called “children of God” (1 John 3:1).
573
 God’s love manifests 
itself consistently in beneficial action toward others, including the ultimate sacrifice of Christ.
574
 
No human is worthy of such love but Christ showed “true love [avga,phn]” in dying for sinful 
humans (1 John 3:16). Further, 1 John states explicitly, “God is love” (1 John 4:8, 16). This broad 
and highly significant statement raises a number of questions. First, is love the very essence of 
God? Many contend so, with varying implications.
575
 Others contend that the statement does not 
require the view that love is God’s essence any more than the statement “God is light” means that 
God’s essence is “light” (1 John 1:5  cf. John 4:24). In this way, the question of whether love is 
God’s essence cannot be settled by this singular statement in 1 John 4.
576
  
The text is explicit, however, that God is the source of love, for “love is from God” (1 
John 4:7).
577
 As such, God’s love is logically and ontologically prior to any other love, it holds 
                                                     
 
wider canonical theology best. However, one cannot be sure since there are numerous grammatical 
possibilities and the immediate context provides little help in making Paul’s meaning in this verse clear. 
573
 The clause “how great” (potapo,j) likely refers to the degree of God’s love and not that divine 
love is wholly other. So Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 140; Akin, 1, 2, 3, John, 132–33. On the other hand, based 
on the original meaning of the term “of what country,” Stott comments, “The Father’s love is so unearthly, 
so foreign to this world, that [John] wonders from what country it may come.” The Letters of John, 122. 
574
 Thus, “we know love by this, that He laid down His life for us  and we ought to lay down our 
lives for the brethren” (1 John 3:16  cf. John 15:13). Likewise, Jesus is he “who loves us and released us 
from our sins by His blood” (Rev 1:5). Some variants have avgapa,w as an aorist participle, instead of the 
present participle. However, beneficent action and/or self-sacrifice should not be confused with the nature 
of love itself, contrary to Marshall’s supposition that “the two factors which determine the nature of love: 
on the one hand, self-sacrifice, and, on the other hand, action done for the benefit of others.” Marshall, The 
Epistles of John, 214. Cf. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 543; Akin, 1, 2, 3, John, 158. As has been seen 
there are many other aspects of love including beneficent action and, when appropriate, self-sacrifice. 
Neither, however, suffices to describe the entire nature of divine love. See the discussion of altruism 
earlier. 
575
 Thus Akin, like many others, states, “His very nature is love.” 1, 2, 3, John, 178–79. Others 
contend that the statement is not “ontological” but in reference to “the loving nature of God.” Kruse, The 
Letters of John, 157. Similarly, Marshall, The Epistles of John, 212–13; Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 239.  
576
 The question of the relationship of love to God’s essence will be taken up in chapter 6. 
577




sole primacy. Further, “everyone who loves is born of God and knows God” (1 John 4:7). On the 
other hand, “the one who does not love does not know God” (1 John 4:8). Indeed, the “command 
to love is directly linked to the demand for faith” (cf. Gal 5:6) and the one who loves has fulfilled 
the law (Rom 13:8–10; cf. Matt 22:37–40; John 14:15; 15:10).
578
 These divine expectations 
(human faith and love) are themselves grounded in God’s prior love (cf. 1 John 4:9).
579
 Humans 
are to believe and accept God’s love as well as respond in love toward him and others (cf. 1 John 
4:15–21). Accordingly, this is “love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us” and sent Jesus 
to save us (1 John 4:10).
580
 Importantly, John does not mean that humans do not love God, lest he 
contradict himself elsewhere. Rather, he is emphasizing that God loved humans first and thereby 
stressing the ontological priority of divine love as the necessary condition and basis of human 
love.
581
 Yet, the text goes on to say that “if God so loved us, we also ought to love one another” 
                                                     
 
The Epistles of John, 514. Cf. Marshall, The Epistles of John, 211; Kruse, The Letters of John, 157; Stott, 
The Letters of John, 168. This is true insofar as one does not overstate the case such that divine love flows 
from God in a unilaterally efficacious manner such that human response is not required. That this is the 
case is clear from the many exhortations of Christians to love. Nevertheless, God’s prior love is the 
necessary condition of any human love. As such, “inasmuch as anyone has even the smallest capacity to 
love, this comes by the grace of God.” Akin, 1, 2, 3, John, 177. 
578
 Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 238. B. F. Westcott notes that the “clause appears at first sight to be 
inverted in form. . . . But as it is, the words bring out the blessing as well as the implied necessity of love.” 
The Epistles of St. John (London: Macmillan, 1902), 147–48. So Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 238. As such, love 
appears to be at once a real condition of relationship with God and at the same time only comes about as a 
consequence of being born of God. This is the cyclical nature of the foreconditionality of God’s love, 
which seeks relationship. 
579
 Indeed, the amazing “love of God” toward humans was shown in the sending of Christ so we 
might live (1 John 4:9). Verse 10 makes it clear that the genitive in v. 9 is subjective, referring to God’s 
love. NASB translates h` avga,ph tou/ qeou/ evn h`mi/n, “the love of God was manifested in us.” It could mean 
for/to us or, more literally, in us or in our midst. However, the wider theology seems to entail both: “The 
sense of ἐν ἡμῖν , in part, is thus that the love of God disclosed by Jesus indwells the Church, and creates 
the basis for a mutual and ongoing relationship of love between the Godhead and the Christian (cf. 
ζήσωμεν in v 9b; note also John 14:21, 23; 16:27).” Kruse, The Letters of John, 157.  
580
 Here and elsewhere some scholars point to the aorist “loved” and suggest it thereby refers 
specifically to Christ’s sacrifice on the cross. So Marshall, The Epistles of John, 214. Others suggest it 
refers to “God’s eternal love.” Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 243. The former is more likely than the latter but 
considering the variable usage of Greek tenses one should probably not put too much weight on the aorist 
here or elsewhere.  
581
 In other words, without divine initiative humans would never love God. See R. E. Brown, The 




(1 John 4:11). Notably, then, God’s love for humans places a moral obligation upon humans to 
love one another (cf. 1 John 3:16; John 15:12).
582
 Moreover, “if we love one another, God abides 
in us, and His love is perfected in us” (1 John 4:12).
583
 As such, divine love is prior to any 
conditions while expectant of appropriate response, that is, foreconditional.  
Accordingly, that God is love entails that those who would be in relationship with God 
must abide in love.
584
 Thus, John adds that Christians “have come to know and have believed the 
love which God has for us. God is love, and the one who abides in love abides in God, and God 
abides in him” (1 John 4:16  cf. 17–18).
585
 What, then, does it mean to abide in love and thus 
abide in God? Does it refer to continuing as recipients of God’s love, as agents of love to God, or 
                                                     
 
582
 In the OT section, I have called such obligations “soft obligations” where the agent is free to do 
otherwise ontologically, but morally obligated to respond. Marshall, on the other hand, is incorrect in 
asserting that the “recipients of such love have no choice as to their response. Their sins have been taken 
away by this gracious act of God. He has loved them in such a way as to arouse adoring wonder at the 
magnitude of his sacrificial giving. They cannot do anything else but show love to one another.”
 
Marshall, 
The Epistles of John, 215. This completely overlooks the exhortative function of “we also ought [ovfei,lw] 
to love one another” in 1 John 4:11. This term never refers to an ontological obligation in the NT but 
always to that which one owes or ought to do. It refers to such moral “oughts” consistently in this letter (1 
John 2:6  3:16  cf. 3 John 8). Marshall himself later refers to this as a “command.” The Epistles of John, 
215. The moral, rather than ontological, obligation is further evident in the explicit conditionality of such 
human response in this epistle and elsewhere, which is itself evident in the survey of evidence in this 
chapter.  
583
 The conditional clause suggests genuine uncertainty (eva,n + subjunctive). It is once again 
unclear whether the genitive is subjective, referring to God’s love in us  objective, referring to human love 
toward God  or qualitative, referring to a love that is qualitatively akin to God’s. Commentators are divided 
between these options. See the discussion in R. E. Brown, The Epistles of John, 521. Smalley contends that 
this “does not mean that God’s indwelling . . . depend[s] on the love of Christians. . . . We love because 
God dwells in us, and not the reverse.” 1, 2, 3 John, 247–48. On the other hand, while it is true that divine 
love is always prior to human love, the Johannine writings also suggest that the human response of love 
conditions the ongoing divine-human relationship. Thus, here and elsewhere, God’s abiding is contingent 
upon a loving response (cf. John 15:10; 1 John 3:24). This interpretation is supported not only by the reality 
of the condition but by the Johannine usage of me,nw, “abide” (cf. v. 13,15  John 15:9–10). Thus, just three 
verses later such conditionality is evident in the statement, “Whoever (again, an uncertain condition, eva,n + 
subjunctive) confesses that Jesus is the Son of God, God abides in him, and he in God.” On the reciprocal 
nature of divine-human fellowship, see Westcott, The Epistles of St. John, 174–75. Cf. Malatesta, 
Interiority and Covenant, 301. 
584
 “A person cannot come into a real relationship with a loving God without being transformed 
into a loving person.”
 
Marshall, The Epistles of John, 212. Cf. Akin, 1, 2, 3, John, 178. 
585 evn h`mi/n translated “for us,” above, could again mean for us or in us. Further, while some have 
taken the latter part of v. 16 to start a new paragraph, Smalley rightly recognizes that the “ideas of God’s 




as agents of love to fellow humans? The text admits each of these options and the wider theology 
of the Johannine writings suggests that all three are intended here.
586
 First, the one who loves his 
fellow Christian, in so doing, loves God (cf. 1 John 4:20–21).
587
 Second, remaining in God’s love 
entails appropriate responsive love to God and others and, as such, abiding in God and his love is 
conditional (cf. John 15:9–10  1 John 4:13, 15). This all amounts to “reciprocal indwelling” (i.e., 
abiding in God and vice versa), which is a prominent Johannine theme (cf. 1 John 4:13, 15; John 
15:1–10). In all this, “We love, because He first loved us” (1 John 4:19).
588
 The pericope thus 
comes full circle to the priority of divine love (cf. 1 John 4:7, 10). To be sure, then, human love is 
impossible without God’s prior love, yet it does not bypass the human agency. God’s prevenient 
love is a necessary but not sufficient condition of human love for him and others (cf. 1 Pet 2:3).
589
 
In this way, God’s love is prior to all other love, and that which enables other beings to love, but 
it is not simply unilateral (see the reciprocal nature of divine love below).  
                                                     
 
586
 See Marshall, The Epistles of John, 222; Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 255. 
587
 Smalley sees the latter part of v. 16 with reference to human love for God, which complements 
God’s love for humans. 1, 2, 3 John, 255. 
588
 The implied object of this human love is God. So some manuscripts add αὐ  ν or  ὸν Θε ν. 
Houlden argues that the “balance of the sentence suggests” this refers to love for God  “our love for God 
returns his for us.” A Commentary, 120. So also, on the basis of vv. 19–21. Kruse, The Letters of John, 169. 
Others think humans are the object, or both God and humans. See the discussion in Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 
262. Cf. Rudolf Bultmann, The Johannine Epistles: A Commentary on the Johannine Epistles 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), 75. Whoever the object, the priority of divine love is evident. Further, 
the human love here is usually taken in the indicative, though it might also be subjunctive and imply 
exhortation. So Law, The Tests of Life, 402. Cf. 1 John 4:7. A great deal of commentators, however, favor 
the indicative. So Marshall, The Epistles of John, 225; Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 262; Kruse, The Letters of 
John, 169. Notice, however, that the command to love arises from this (cf. 1 John 4:21–5:4). 
589
 Accordingly, by the use of different terminology, Peter suggests that God’s love is the impetus 
for appropriate human action toward God. Thus, evil should be put aside “if you have tasted the kindness 
[crhsto.j] of the Lord” (1 Pet 2:3  cf. Ps 34:8). That is, having tasted God’s kindness humans will 
themselves act accordingly toward God, even perhaps being able to “offer up spiritual sacrifices acceptable 
to God through Jesus Christ” (1 Pet 2:5). Importantly, the statement is exhortative, not merely descriptive. 
It is not that Christians will automatically act appropriately, but that Christians should do so in response to 
God’s kindness, and, according to other NT statements, are able to do so for that reason. To this extent I 
agree with Marshall that “the source of all love is God” and “whether we love God or our neighbor, it is 
God’s love that is at work in us.” The Epistles of John, 222. However, this does not mean that humans are 
merely passive agents through whom divine love flows. The Johannine, and wider biblical, theology will 




That divine love is not altogether unconditional but is often contingent and grounded is 
further apparent when Jesus proclaims to the Philadelphian church, in direct contrast to those who 
belong to Satan: “I have loved you. Because you have kept the Word of My perseverance, I will 
also keep you from the hour of testing” (Rev 3:9–10; cf. 1 John 3:21–22).
590
 The objects of 
Christ’s love are therefore those who have responded appropriately to God.
591
 Accordingly, Jude 
exhorts the “beloved” to be careful to “keep” themselves “in the love of God” and to be “waiting 
anxiously for the mercy” of Jesus “to eternal life” (Jude 20–21).
592
 The implication is that 
remaining in God’s love is conditional and grounded in human response, which itself makes the 
difference between the “beloved” and the “ungodly” (cf. Jude 4 ff.).
593
 This is in accord with the 
significant exhortations that Christians should “abide” in divine love (cf. John 15:9  1 John 2:10  
4:16).
594
 Thus, although God’s love is explicitly prior to human love (cf. 1 John 4:10, 16), 
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 Further, in v. 8 Jesus has placed before them an open door that cannot be shut “because you 
have a little power, and have kept My word, and have not denied My name” (Rev 3:8). 
591
 G. R. Osborne thus comments, “The Jews will finally be aware that God’s true love is for those 
who have believed in his Messiah (cf. John 13:1; Rom. 8:35–39).” Revelation, 191. “Christ will show his 
faithfulness to the Christians in Philadelphia . . . because they have been faithful witnesses to him in the 
past.” G. K. Beale, The Book of Revelation (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999), 289. 
592
 While it is grammatically possible that the “love of God” is an objective genitive referring to 
human love for God it is most likely a subjective genitive corresponding to “the mercy of our Lord Jesus 
Christ.” As such, it is thus exhorting Christians to keep themselves in God’s love, that is, to remain as 
recipients of divine love. The term might also have subjective and objective connotations as a 
comprehensive or plenary genitive. Cf. Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter Jude, 483. 
593
 Notably, the same ones who are told to keep (imperative) themselves in the love of God here 
are those who are “the called, beloved in God the Father, and kept for Jesus Christ” (Jude 1:1  cf. Jude 
1:24). God’s prior and continuing action is thus presupposed here but does not nullify the potential failure 
to keep oneself in God’s love and thus not remain among the “beloved.” This possibility is exemplified in 
the ungodly, those of the Exodus “who did not believe,” those “angels who did not keep their own 
domain,” Sodom and Gomorrah, Cain, Balaam, and Korah (Jude 1:4–7, 11). Accordingly, Davids rightly 
notices “human responsibility” here and comments, “God is love and loves believers, but they also need to 
‘remain’ in love. . . . They have experienced God’s love, but it is possible to depart from that love, as one 
sees in the case of the teachers he opposes.” Davids, The Letters, 96. Notice further the soteriological 
implications of “to eternal life” (Jude 1:21).  
594
 Carson recognizes that this is “clearly implying that it is possible for Christians not to keep 
themselves in the love of God.” New Dictionary of Biblical Theology, 648. Notably, Schreiner adopts a 
determinist-compatibilist perspective he notes that “being preserved in God’s love will only be a reality if 
believers continue to grow in their understanding of the Christian faith and if they regularly pray.” 1, 2 




remaining as a recipient of divine love is exhorted. Since “God is love” then “the one who abides 
in love abides in God, and God abides in him” (1 John 4:16  cf. 1 John 2:15; 4:12).
595
 In all, 
God’s loving initiative is prior to human love and its necessary but not sufficient condition.
596
 
Divine love is both prevenient and foreconditional, but not strictly unconditional and unilateral.  
The Relational and Multilateral Aspect of Divine Love 
This section focuses on data that ground the view that divine love is multilaterally 
relational.
597
 God universally seeks a relationship of reciprocal love but enters into particular, 
intimate relationship only with those who respond appropriately. First, God seeks and enters into 
reciprocally responsive love relationships with his creatures, which amount to multilateral divine-
human love relationships.
598
 Second, though God’s foreconditional love is universal, God does 
not love all equally and uniformly. God desires a reciprocal love relationship of give and take 
with all his creatures and initiates the possibility of such a relationship through his universal offer 
of foreconditional love, which enables and calls for a reciprocal response of love, but not all 
                                                     
 
trust in Christ remain in the faith because of the preserving work of God the Father. Nevertheless, the 
promise that God will keep his own does not nullify the responsibility of believers to persevere in the faith. 
God keeps his own, and yet believers must keep themselves in God’s love. . . . On the one hand, believers 
only avoid apostasy because of the grace of God. On the other hand, the grace of God does not cancel out 
the need for believers to exert all their energy to remain in God’s love.” Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter Jude, 483–84.  
595
 See the further discussion of this highly significant chapter further below with regard to 
reciprocal love. 
596
 As Davids puts it, in John 15 and Jude “we have a situation in which the believers are already 
loved but still need to remain in that love.” The Letters, 96. Bauckham likewise appeals to John 15:9–10 
and contends that Jude in a similar fashion “probably means that God’s love for Christians requires an 
appropriate response. Without obedience to God’s will, fellowship with God can be forfeited, and this is the 
danger with which the antinomian doctrine of the false teachers threatens the church.” 2 Peter, Jude, 113–
14. 
597
 I use the term multilateral here and elsewhere because love not only is to flow reciprocally 
from God to humans and vice versa but also from humans to others, which is indirectly love toward God as 
well. Further, in the NT, intra-trinitarian love is also added to the mix. Thus, the relations of divine love are 
more than bilateral, they are multilateral. 
598
 By reciprocal here I do not mean that love is always returned for love, but that is the ideal of 
divine love. Moreover, my use of the term reciprocal does not entail equality of relationship or equal 




respond positively. Accordingly, the reader is encouraged to keep the following questions in mind 
while reading this section. Is divine love unilateral? Is God the only proper agent of love or may 
there be a reciprocal divine-human love relationship?
599
 Is divine love universal or particular? 
Following on this, might some be loved more than others? What of the concept of eschatological 
reward and the “remnant”? This section of the study will proceed with a survey of reciprocal love 
in the NT canon. 
Reciprocal Love in the Gospels-Acts 
The multi-relationality of love is evident by way of many different texts in this corpus. 
First, it is important to clarify the nature and importance of “insider love.” Friendship is an 
example of such love that assumes a particular, as opposed to universal, relationship and is thus a 
form of preferential (but not necessarily arbitrary) love.
600
 The concept of friendship is especially 
                                                     
 
599
 It has been suggested in some circles that divine love is the only true love. In this view, human 
love is either non-existent, of a lesser kind, or the result of a unilateral divine miracle. 
600
 Jesus highlights the quality of God’s friendship in the story of the man who goes to his “friend” 
(fi,loj) at midnight requesting food for another “friend” (fi,loj) who has come on a journey (Luke 11:5–6). 
Though the initial “friend” may not “get up and give him anything because he is his friend, yet because of 
his persistence he will get up and give him as much as he needs” (Luke 11:8). Thus, if even an unwilling 
friend will respond with assistance after persistent pleading how much more will God respond to the 
requests of his children? (cf. Luke 11:12–13). Similarly Bock, Luke 9:51–24:53, 1059–60. Cf. Ernst, Das 
Evangelium nach Lukas, 366–67. Interestingly, J. B. Green interprets this within the context of honor and 
shame. Just as the “friend” would be dishonored by rejecting the pleas of his friend, J. B. Green 
extrapolates from this that “God engages in eschatological redemption in order that he might restore honor 
to his name (see above on v 2).”
 
The Gospel of Luke, 449. See J. B. Green on the “conventions of 
hospitality” that form the background here. Ibid., 447–48. Cf. Prov 3:27–28.  
The category of friendship, then, appears to imply an expectation of response, which when unmet, 
is supplemented by pleading. Many have taken this to mean that one should pray toward God with 
persistence or boldness, though this is disputed. The meaning “persistence” is questioned because the word 
used (avnai,deia) generally means “shamelessness” rather than persistence. For a discussion of the possible 
explanation of the meaning of this term here see Nolland, Luke 9:21–18:34, 625–26. For the argument 
against the meaning “persistence” see J. B. Green, The Gospel of Luke, 445. He contends that the emphasis 
is not on how to pray but on the graciousness of the Father who is willing to respond to prayer. Ibid., 446. 
Bock claims that “it refers to a combination of boldness and shamelessness.” Luke 9:51–24:53, 1059. Some 
have applied it to the householder meaning that he will respond rather than act shamelessly by refusing to 
help. So Nolland, Luke 9:21–18:34, 624, J. Duncan M. Derrett, “The Friend at Midnight: Asian Ideas in the 
Gospel of St Luke,” in Donum Gentilicium (ed. Ernst Bammel et al.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 77–
87. If this interpretation is correct, the point would be that one may approach God with confidence. In 
either case, the abundantly good friendship of God is exemplified by contrast. God is the “best friend” who 




significant as it relates to the friendship between Jesus and humans.
601
 Humans are often referred 
to as Jesus’ friends, including individuals such as John the Baptist (John 3:29), Lazarus (John 
11:11), and more general statements referring to groups of humans (cf. Matt 11:19; Luke 7:34; 
12:4; John 15:13).
602
 Other friendships, by different language, also appear. For example, Lazarus 
is the one whom Jesus loves (file,w) (John 11:3) and Jesus loves Lazarus, Martha, and Mary 
(John 11:5).
603
 There are also frequent references to the disciple “whom Jesus loved” (John 13:23  
cf. 19:26; 20:2; 21:7, 20). All of these instances point to particular, rather than universal, 
relationships of friendship love. Such friendships between Jesus and humans are consistently 
bilateral yet unequal such as when John the Baptist describes himself as the “friend [fi,loj] of the 
bridegroom,” referring to the intimate friend who takes care of wedding arrangements (John 
3:29). 
Elsewhere, the beneficiaries of Christ’s sacrificial love are referred to as his friends: 
“Greater love [avga,ph] has no one than this, that one lay down his life for his friends [fi,loj]” 
(John 15:13). This relationship includes intimacy, which Jesus highlights in his proclamation that 
he no longer calls them “slaves” but has called them “friends” having revealed himself and God 
to them (John 15:15). Notably, however, such friendship is conditional upon appropriate human 
response.
604
 Therefore, the beneficiaries of this sacrificial love are those who obey him; they are 
                                                     
 
grants the requests of His friend and who indeed wants to be asked. Hence we have the corresponding 
thought that the disciples are God’s friends.” Stählin, TDNT 9:164. 
601
 Importantly, there is no dichotomy between friendship and that love signified by avgapa,w. For 
example, Lazarus, whom Jesus loved (John 11:5), is referred to as a friend (fi,loj) of Jesus and his 
followers (John 11:11). 
602
 Interestingly, Jesus calls Judas “friend” when Judas comes to betray him but by use of the term 
et̀ai/roj (Matt 26:50). 
603
 Carson sees this as a “hint” at deeper relationships implying that “some at least felt particularly 
loved by him.” The Gospel according to John, 406. It is worthy of notice here that there is no discernible 
difference between avgapa,w and file,w in John 11:3, 5. Contra Joseph N. Sanders, “‘Those Whom Jesus 
Loved’ (John 11:5),” NTS 1 (1954): 33. See the discussion of this issue earlier in this chapter. 
604




his “friends” (fi,loj) if they do his commands (John 15:14; cf. John 15:15).605 Here, again, there 
is reciprocal action; Jesus will give himself for them but they are expected to keep his commands. 
The friendship is a mutual (though unequal) one. Further, by different language a similar 
relationship is exemplified when Christ is said to have “loved [avgapa,w] His own [i;dioj] who were 
in the world, He loved them to the end” (John 13:1  cf. John 10:14). The use of i;dioj, which 
implies belonging or membership in a close-knit group, makes clear that such love is particular 
rather than universal.
606
 Such love does not require merit but rather assumes a close relationship 
(cf. Matt 11:19; Luke 7:34) within which humans are to love one another just as God has loved 
them (cf. John 15:12).
607
  
The intimate love relations that make up such “insider love” constitute a multirelational 
circle of love: from Father to Son and vice versa, from Father and Son to humans and vice versa, 
and from believers to one another, which itself indirectly amounts to human love toward the 
Father and Son (cf. 1 John 5:1).
608
 This intimate circle of love begins with the reciprocal love 
between the Father and the Son, which itself models the ideal nature of all divine love 
relationships. The Father’s great love for the Son is exhibited in many forms. The Father loves the 
Son, rendered in different passages by avgapa,w and file,w (John 3:35; 5:20 respectively). The Son 
                                                     
 
their obedience is a necessary condition for such friendship. Such friendship is not unilateral. 
605
 He died for his “friends,” that is, those whom he loves. So Ko  stenberger, John, 458. 
Conversely, some have taken the proclamations of Peter and Thomas to lay down their lives as professions 
of their love for him as his friends. Stählin, TDNT 9:166. 
606
 “It is of the nature of this love for one’s own, for what belongs, to be reciprocal.” Stählin, 
TDNT 9:130. The “world,” on the other hand, hates (mise,w) them but “would love [file,w] its own” (John 
15:19). 
607
 Such love for one another is akin to the command to love one’s neighbor (Matt 19:19  22:39  
Mark 12:31, 33; Luke 10:27). 
608
 See Carson who also refers to this as a “circle of love.” The Gospel according to John, 547. Cf. 
Beasley-Murray, John, 287. Others refer to a “chain of love.” Ko  stenberger, John, 457. Gunther thinks that 





is the Father’s “beloved” (avgaphto,j) (cf. Matt 3:17 among many others). Such love pre-dates the 
creation itself for the Father loved (avgapa,w) the Son “before the foundation of the world” (John 
17:24). As such, divine love is not dependent upon creatures but was existent even before 
creation.  
At the same time, the Father’s love for the Son is also evaluatively grounded: “For this 
reason [Dia. tou/to,] the Father loves [avgapa,w] Me,” that is, because he will die, of his own 
volition, in accordance with the commandment of the Father (John 10:17–18). Reciprocally, 
Christ loves (avgapa,w) the Father and does exactly what the Father commands (John 14:31).609 In 
this way, Jesus models the appropriate human response to God, love manifest in obedience.  
Further, the Father’s love for the Son also manifests that love relationship that may obtain 
between God and humans. Thus, the Father’s love for the Son is the model of the Son’s love for 
his followers: “Just as [kaqw,j] the Father has loved Me, I have also loved you  abide in My love” 
(John 15:9). Likewise, the Father himself “loved” (avgapa,w) Christ’s followers “even as” (kaqw,j) 
the Father loved (avgapa,w) Christ (John 17:23).610  
The divine-human love relationship described in these passages is not universal but 
particular and intimate.
611
 The “insiders” who are privy to this special, intimate love relationship 
are those who have appropriately responded or will do so (John 17:20, 25).
612
 Accordingly, 
membership in this intimate divine-human love relationship is not automatic but contingent. 
                                                     
 
609
 Notably, this verse is the only instance in the NT that states Jesus’ love for the Father though it 
is “implied everywhere.” Morris, The Gospel according to John, 586. 
610
 Apparently, the objects of such love are the original followers of Christ as well as “those also 
who believe in Me through their word” (John 17:20).  
611
 The intimacy of this love relationship is evident in the repeated phraseology of reciprocal 
knowledge and reciprocal indwelling, i.e., “I in them and you in Me” (John 17:23  cf. 17:26). 
612
 Carson states correctly, “With the connection between obedience and love so explicit, it should 
be self-evident that the circle of love in view embraces all of Jesus’ true disciples, but not the ‘world’, 
which falls within a rather different and more extended circle of love (cf. notes on 13:1, 34–35).” The 




Specifically, humans are expected to reciprocate God’s love (both Father and Son) and not 
merely by external action but wholeheartedly (cf. Matt 10:37–38; 22:37; Mark 12:30; Luke 
10:27; John 14:15, 21, 23–24, 28).
613
 Thus, the objects of divine love are exhorted to “abide 
[me,nw] in My love” (John 15:9). Abiding in his “love” (avga,ph) is conditional and is accomplished 
if you “keep My commandments” just as Jesus has modeled in relation to the Father and Jesus 
“abide[s] [me,nw] in His love” (John 15:10).614 Significantly, then, humans may abide (me,nw) in 
divine love in the same way that Christ abides (me,nw) in the Father’s love: By the appropriate love 
response of obedience (John 15:10).
615
 As such, the exhortation to “abide” in God’s love is itself 
indicative of the divine desire and expectation that the objects of his love will love him 
reciprocally. This reciprocal love, which itself entails obedience, results in intimate friendship 
with Jesus (cf. John 15:14). The famous example of Jesus’s three-fold question to Peter, “Do you 
love me?” followed by Peter’s affirmation three times that he does love Jesus is instructive 
                                                     
 
613
 The wholehearted love that is required is evident in the greatest commandment: “love [avgapa,w] 
the LORD your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind” along with the 
second to “love [avgapa,w] your neighbor as yourself” (Matt 22:37–39; cf. Mark 12:30–31; Luke 10:27). 
Mark and Luke have four elements: heart, soul, mind, and strength (strength and mind in reverse order in 
Luke) while Matthew has only three: heart, soul, and mind. On the textual difference between these and the 
LXX see Charles A. Kimball, Jesus’ Exposition of the Old Testament in Luke’s Gospel, JSNTSup (1994): 
123–25. The various descriptors amount to a call to wholehearted love of God, “for total allegiance: one 
should love God with every globule of one’s being.” W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, A Critical and 
Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew (ICC 3; London: T&T Clark 
International, 1997), 241. The reference is to “refer to wholehearted devotion to God with every aspect of 
one’s being, from whatever angle one chooses to consider it—emotionally, volitionally, or cognitively.” 
Blomberg, Matthew, 335. Such wholehearted love is much more than all burnt offerings and sacrifices” 
(Mark 12:33). This statement seems to parallel the statements of the OT of God’s desire for dsx rather than 
sacrifice (cf. Hos 6:6 et al.). Such love must amount to undivided devotion (cf. Matt 6:24; Luke 16:13). 
Notice further that love toward God and love toward others are inseparably linked. 
614
 The conditionality of language of abiding (me,nw) is prominent throughout its NT usage. The 
implication of such language is that the love relationship must be maintained by appropriate human 
response in order to continue intact. See John 14:23; 15:7, 9–10; 1 Tim 2:15; 1 John 2:5–6, 10, 17, 28; 3:1, 
9–11, 14–15, 17; 23–24, 35–36; 4:12, 16. 
615
 Carson comments, “the love for which we were created” is “a mutual love that issues in 
obedience without reserve.” The Gospel according to John, 521. Thus, “Jesus remains in his Father’s love 
by being obedient to him (8:29  15:10)” and “believers remain in Jesus’ love by being obedient to him 
(15:9–11).” Ibid., 547. This is also indicative of the conditionality of divine love. See the more extensive 
treatment of this concept further above. Further, such “intimate relationship . . . reflects the fellowship of 




regarding the nature of such love.
616
 In particular, it points to the reality of human love toward 
God that is not automatically determined by God nor merely divine love flowing through a 
passive human agent (otherwise the questions would be superfluous) but the result of a heartfelt 
response to God’s initiating love (John 21:15–17; cf. Luke 7:47). 
Keeping God’s commandments is itself a manifestation of one’s love for him (John 
14:15, 21; cf. 1 John 5:3)
617
 and divine love is also reciprocally responsive to such manifestations 
of human love. Thus, both God and Jesus respond with love toward those who love Jesus. “He 
who loves [avgapa,w] Me will be loved [avgapa,w] by My Father, and I will love [avgapa,w] him and 
will disclose Myself to him” (John 14:21). Further, the one who “loves” (avgapa,w) Jesus will 
“keep” his word “and My Father will love [avgapa,w] him” and both Father and Son will make 
their abode (monh) with that one (John 14:23). Likewise, the “Father Himself loves [file,w] you, 
because [o[ti] you have loved [file,w] Me and have believed [pisteu,w]” (John 16:27). While God 
already loved these humans in the limited sense that he foreconditionally loves all humans 
universally, here intimate relational love is described, that aspect of reciprocal divine love that 
flows evaluatively and conditionally upon the appropriate human response of love (or 
equivalent).
618
 Significantly, such reciprocal and contingent love is described in the same terms as 
                                                     
 
616
 There is no discernible theological significance to alternating use of avgapa,w and file,w in these 
verses. For a discussion of this issue see the word studies of the avgapa,w and file,w word groups above. 
617
 Carson rightly notes that the “linkage” between love and obedience toward God “approaches 
the level of definition.” The Gospel according to John, 498. Cf. 1 John 5:3. However, Morris poses a false 
dichotomy when he states, “Love is not regarded in this Gospel as an abstract emotion but as something 
intensely practical. It involves obedience.” Morris, The Gospel according to John, 581. On the contrary, the 
NT speaks of love as both intensely emotional and volitionally active without contradiction, as does the 
OT. Significantly, “If you love [avgapa,w] Me, you will keep My commandments” (John 14:15) is a third 
class condition ( eva,n + the subjunctive) which suggests that this condition is “uncertain of fulfillment.” 
Wallace, Greek Grammar, 696. In the manuscripts favored by most textual critics the verb is present active 
subjunctive, but both aorist imperative and aorist subjunctive forms are attested in some manuscripts. 
618
 “To this love of the disciples for Jesus corresponds the reciprocal love of God for the disciples  
. . . which is obviously different from His love for the world, cf. 3:16.” Stählin, TDNT 9:133. As such, “the 
ongoing relationship between Jesus and his disciples is characterized by obedience on their part, and thus is 




that modeled by Jesus since his love for the Father is demonstrated by doing his commands and 
the Father, in response, loves him (John 10:17; 14:31; cf. 15:10).
619
 In this way, the love of Jesus 
is truly the model of human love toward God and of divine love toward humans.  
This multirelational circle of love further includes love between believers, which is 
patterned after divine-human love and is accepted as indirect love toward God. Thus, Jesus 
commands, “love one another, even as [kaqw,j] I have loved you, that you also love one another” 
(John 13:34; so, also John 15:12; cf. 15:17).
620
 This completes the multirelational circle of love 
described above.
621
 Here, attention should be drawn to the fact that the loves in the various 
relationships of this circle are depicted as alike in nature. Thus, both the Father and the Son love 
humans in the same way (kaqw,j) that the Father has loved the Son (John 15:9; 17:23; cf. Eph 5:2, 
25). In like manner, believers are to love one another “even as” (kaqw,j) Christ has loved them 
(John 13:34; 15:12). In this way, believers are to obey Christ just as (kaqw,j) he has obeyed the 
Father and thus abide (me,nw) in his love even as Christ thereby abides (me,nw) in the Father’s love 
(John 15:9–10). In all this, Christ’s revelation of the Father is itself directed toward the goal of 
divine-human love, that is, “so that the love [avga,ph] with which” the Father loved (avgapa,w) 
                                                     
 
619
 Humans “love and obey Jesus, and he loves them, in exactly the same way that he loves and 
obeys his Father, and the Father loves him (cf. 3:35  5:20  8:29  14:31).” Carson, The Gospel according to 
John, 503. That divine-human love is modeled after the love between the Father and Son points toward the 
ideal reciprocality that God desires for the God-human relationship. 
620
 This “one another” apparently refers to those who are fellow believers. Cf. Morris, The Gospel 
according to John, 562, Gerhard Lohfink, Jesus and Community: The Social Dimension of Christian Faith 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 109–14. Some, however, think that restriction is invalid. Cf. Borchert, 
John 12–21, 99. Carson contends, “It is not so much that Christians are to love the world less, as that they 
are to love one another more.” The Gospel according to John, 485. In other words, this love toward one 
another does not exclude the fact that they should love all humans in a universal sense (cf. Matt 5:43) but is 
specifically with regard to that kind of love that is intimate and takes place within a reciprocal love 
relationship. As such, love for the community does not exclude universal love, but is special, relational love 
of a different kind. God’s love is likewise differentiated as seen in John 14:21 and 16:27. 
621
 “Jesus’ point [in John 15:12] is not that love for fellow believers exempts one from the call to 
love God with heart and soul and mind and strength, but that genuine love for God ensures genuine love for 
his Son, who is the focal point of divine revelation; that genuine love for the Son ensures obedience to him 
(14:15); that obedience to him is especially tested by obedience to the new commandment, the command to 




Christ “may be in them, and [Christ] in them” (John 17:26).
622
 Indeed, the very love of God is to 
be “in them.”
623
 As such, in precisely the same way that the Father loves the Son and vice versa, 
humans are to love God and love one another (cf. John 14:31; 15:9–10, 12). In this way the 
textual evidence in no way supports the case that human love is an inferior kind of love.  
In light of such particular and intimate love, the question may arise in one’s mind about 
those who might be excluded from such love. In one sense, Christ’s death was for the “world” 
(John 3:16  cf. Rom 5:8, 10) and love is not to be restricted only to one’s friends or those who can 
benefit oneself but also is to be extended to enemies (cf. Matt 5:44, 46; 6:27, 32, 35). At the same 
time only those who believe will be his “friends” or “his own,” that is, his beloved, and thus 
receive the full benefit of God’s love unto salvation (cf. John 14:21, 23  15:9–10, 14; 16:7).
624
 
This is illustrated in microcosm in Christ’s encounter with the man who asked regarding entering 
into eternal life. Christ looked at him and “felt a love for him” and proceeded to call him to 
follow, but the man refused (Mark 10:21–22). Christ loved this man (an outsider at the time) 
foreconditionally and beckoned the man into intimate association with himself, but the man 
turned away. As such, the “insider love” referenced above is not exclusive but offered to “many” 
who refuse it (cf. Matt 22:14). The cultural boundaries of insider and outsider are not in play here, 
                                                     
 
622
 Morris takes “in them” to mean both “in them” and “among them.” Morris, The Gospel 
according to John, 653. So, also, Carson, The Gospel according to John, 570. This would point to the 
further relationality that is to obtain from Christians to other Christians. 
623
 Ultimately, the objects of God’s love “will be so transformed, as God is continually made 
known to them, that God’s own love for his Son will become their love. The love with which they learn to 
love is nothing less than the love amongst the persons of the Godhead (cf. notes on 15:12–17).” Carson, 
The Gospel according to John, 570.  
624
 Although later in John God’s love is directed toward a specific circle, his prior love for the 
world as in John 3:16 is foundational. “All believers have been chosen out of the world (15:19); they are 
not something other than ‘world’ when the gospel first comes to them. They would not have become true 
disciples apart from the love of God for the world.” For this reason, they are to continue to witness to that 
world. Ibid., 205. It should also be noted that “his own” (i;dioj) may be used in other contexts to refer to a 




but, rather, the true insider is the one who loves as God does (cf. Luke 10:36–37).
625
 Love is thus 
not restricted to an existing relationship, whether covenant or otherwise, but does pursue and 
expect a reciprocal relationship to ensue. In the absence of appropriate response, one will not be 
an insider and eventually will forfeit the benefits of God’s love.  
In all this, there is an important differentiation between God’s universal love and that 
particular, special, intimate love that is between Christ and those who respond to him. This 
friendship relationship is predicated on obedience (John 15:14), which is itself connected to 
reciprocal love and the result of entering into a love relationship with God (John 14:15).
626
 This is 
a relational, contingent, and conditional friendship though the ultimate provisions and sacrifices 
have been made by God himself. In other words, though God requires a response, he is not 
demanding an equivalent response. Such “insider love” is by no means a contradiction with 
Christ’s command to love one’s enemies (cf. Matt 5:43–37). The fact that love for the 
undeserving is commanded does not mean that such love (in all of its aspects) will continue 
indefinitely. Specifically, God himself does not “love” his enemies forever but, eventually, those 
who persist as enemies will be destroyed. The interim is the opportunity for those who are 
enemies (cf. Rom 5:10) to be reconciled to him, but without such reconciliation the love 
relationship cannot and will not continue. God is not equivalently related to all nor does he 
unilaterally exclude some. He invites and enables all to intimate relationship by his prevenient 
and foreconditional love, but not all are willing to respond. 
Reciprocal Love in the Pauline Writings 
This multirelational circle of love is also evident in the Pauline writings, though not with 
the same frequency or detail as in the Gospels. Thus, Christ is again the object of God’s love, 
                                                     
 
625
 In this story of the good Samaritan, then, enemy and neighbor love meet.  
626
 God wants such reciprocal avga,ph, i.e., friendship, with all humans, but he does not actually 




referred to as “His beloved son,” literally the son of his love (avga,ph) (Col 1:13) and as simply the 
“beloved” (avgapa,w - pass. part.) (Eph 1:6).627 Divine love for humans is seemingly ubiquitous in 
the Pauline corpus. Thus, God loves humans abundantly and has demonstrated his love toward 
humans in the plan of salvation (Eph 2:4; Rom 5:8; 8:39) and likewise Christ “loved” and gave 
himself for humans (cf. Gal 2:20; Eph 5:2). Further, divine love for humans is evident by the term 
avgaphto,j (see, among many others, Rom 1:7).628 Conversely, humans are often said to manifest 
love toward God. Thus, “God causes all things to work together for good to those who love God” 
(Rom 8:28). Moreover, the wonderful things of heaven, beyond human description, are “prepared 
for those who love” God (1 Cor 2:9). On the other hand, the one who “does not love [file,w] the 
Lord . . . is to be accursed [avna,qema]” (1 Cor 16:22).629 Likewise, God is the implied object of 
human love when it is proclaimed that a “crown of righteousness” is laid up for “all who have 
loved [avgapa,w] His appearing” (2 Tim 4:8  cf. 2 Thess 2:10). Likewise, human love toward Jesus 
is present. To take one example, Paul also proclaims, “Grace [ca,rij] be with all those who love 
our Lord Jesus Christ with incorruptible [avfqarsi,a] love” (Eph 6:24  cf. Phlm 1:5). Further, a 
reciprocal love relationship between God and humans is implied in the statement “if anyone loves 
God, he is known by Him” (1 Cor 8:3).
630
  
                                                     
 
627
 For Bruce, Col 1:13 “designation marks Christ out as the supreme object of the Father’s love” 
(cf. Col 1:13). The Epistles to the Colossians, 258. Cf. James D. G. Dunn, The Epistles to the Colossians, 
79–80. 
628
 Many other examples of divine love appear earlier in this chapter. 
629
 The referent of “Lord” may be Jesus or the Father. The term most often refers to Jesus in the 
NT. 
630
 Here the statement is a first-class condition, suggesting the veracity of the protasis and thus the 
reality of human love toward God. Cf. Wallace, Greek Grammar, 690–94. Of course, the forms of such 
conditional clauses do not always follow such rules. See the discussion of potential interpretations of this 




A number of other verses potentially depict human love toward God but there is 
uncertainty regarding the agency of love due to the ambiguous use of the genitive.
631
 One of 
these, Rom 5:5, is used by Nygren to support the view that human love toward God is nothing 
more than God’s own love returning to him through a passive agent.
632
 It reads, “The love 
[avga,ph] of God has been poured out within our hearts through the Holy Spirit” (Rom 5:5). Here it 
is not clear whether this is love for God or God’s love though the majority of commentators favor 
the latter.
633
 However, regardless of whether the genitive is subjective or objective the text does 
not assert that the human agent is a passive agent of such love. It does assert the ultimate priority 
of the divine initiative as the necessary (but not sufficient) condition of all creaturely love (cf. 1 
John 4:7, 19). Elsewhere, Paul urges believers to strive in prayer “by [dia.] our Lord Jesus Christ” 
and “by [dia.] the love of the Spirit” (Rom 15:30). Here, “of the Spirit” appears to be subjective, 
referring to Christ as the agent of prayer and the Spirit as the agent of love.
634
 Finally, there is 
ambiguity even in the absence of a genitive construction when Paul praises the Colossians for 
having “love [avga,ph] in the Spirit” (Col 1:8). Paul probably intends the Colossians as the agents 
                                                     
 
631
 Only a few significant examples will be mentioned here. See chapter 1 for a discussion of 
ambiguous genitives and how they would be utilized in this dissertation.  
632
 Thus, for Nygren the “Christian’s love for his neighbour is a manifestation of God’s Agape, 
which in this case uses the Christian, the ‘spiritual’ man, as its instrument.” Agape and Eros, 130. Thus, 
“the acting subject is not man himself  it is—as Paul expresses it—God” and thus “God’s Agape can be 
described by Paul quite realistically as a ‘pneumatic fluid’, which is ‘shed abroad in our hearts.” Ibid., 129. 
Augustine writes, “‘The love of God’ is said to be shed abroad in our hearts, not because He loves us, but 
because He makes us lovers of Himself.” On the Spirit and the Letter 5.56 (NPNF 5:108). Cf. Martin 
Luther, Luther’s Works (ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehmann; 55 vols.; 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1999), 25:44–45. 
633
 So Morris, The Epistle to the Romans, 221; Mounce, Romans, 135; Fitzmyer, Romans, 393; 
Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 304; Dunn, Romans 1–8, 252; Schreiner, Romans, 257. For the traditional 
dispute on the significance of the verse, see Ulrich Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer (EKKNT Bd 6; 
Zürich Benziger, 1978), 1:300–305.  
634
 For Fitzmyer, the Spirit is here the “source and inspiration.” Romans, 725. Others similarly 
take it as a genitive of source in the sense of the love that the Spirit pours out (cf. Rom 5:5). See Morris, 
The Epistle to the Romans, 523; Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 909; Dunn, Romans 9–16, 878. Of course 








Moreover, just as in the Gospels, humans are repeatedly exhorted to love one another 
(Rom 12:10; Eph 4:2; 1 Thess 4:9; 2 Thess 1:3), which is itself closely related to neighbor love 
(cf. Gal 5:13–14; Rom 13:8–9). At the same time, such insider love for one’s neighbor does not 
exclude universal love. Rather, Christians are exhorted to have “love for one another, and for all 
people” (1 Thess 3:12). 
Further, the importance of insider (as opposed to outsider) love is also evident in the 
frequent reference to the special relational status before God of the chosen and called who, as 
argued earlier in this chapter, are those who love God (cf. Rom 8:28).
636
 Importantly, it is evident 
that people who were once outsiders may become insiders. Thus, God calls those “who were not 
[his] people, ‘My people’ and “her who was not beloved, ‘beloved’” [avgapa,w—pass. part.] (Rom 
9:25; cf. 1 Thess 1:4). The very fact that some were not then called shows the dynamic nature of 
God’s call and election, which is not unilaterally efficacious but demands appropriate human 
response.
637
 Thus, some who were “elect” and thus insiders may become outsiders, and such 
status is contingent upon appropriate response to God (cf. Rom 11:22–23; 2 Thess 2:10–15).
638
 
On the other hand, those who become insiders were loved foreconditionally, that is, even before 
their response, when they were yet sinners “dead in” their “transgressions” (Eph 2:4–5; Rom 5:8). 
Therefore, such intimate, particular, reciprocal love is not exclusive of some humans due to a 
unilateral divine will. It is universally available but not universally consummated. 
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 Bruce takes this also as “God’s love,” which is poured out “in the Spirit” (cf. Rom 5:5). The 
Epistles to the Colossians, 44. The object of this love is undetermined. 
636
 See the many verses depicting such categories further above. 
637
 See the discussion of this issue further above. 
638




Reciprocal Love in the General Epistles-Revelation 
The multirelational circle of love is likewise apparent in this corpus. The Father’s love 
for the Son is evident by his status as his “beloved [avgaphto,j] Son” (2 Pet 1:17  cf. 1 Pet 2:4  1 
John 4:9). Likewise the Father and Son profoundly love their children (1 John 3:1; cf. 1 John 4:9; 
Rev 1:5  3:9). Numerous other instances exemplify God’s love toward his people by use of 
avgaphto,j (for example, see 1 John 3:2). Humans also love God and other humans and both kinds 
of love are preceded by divine love (1 John 4:7, 10, 19).
639
 Thus, God has the “crown of life” and 
“the kingdom,” “to those who love him” (Jas 1:12  2:5  cf. Heb 6:10  Rev 2:4, 19).
640
 Peter refers 
to those who love Christ, “though you have not seen Him, you love [avgapa,w] Him” (1 Pet 1:8).641 
In another example, “this is the love of God, that we keep His commandments” (cf. 1 John 5:1–
3). Indeed, the one who keeps God’s word “in him the love of God has truly been perfected” but 
“if anyone loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him” (1 John 2:5, 15).
642
 Moreover, 
“love is from God  and everyone who loves is born of God and knows God” (1 John 4:7). On the 
other hand, “the one who does not love does not know God, for God is love” (1 John 4:8). As 
such, a relationship with God will manifest itself in love toward other humans. Specifically, “if 
God so loved us, we also ought to love one another” (1 John 4:11). In other words, God loved us, 
therefore we should reciprocate by loving those whom he loves.  
                                                     
 
639
 Hence, this is “love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us” and sent Jesus (1 John 4:10). 
This does not mean that humans do not love God (lest it contradict the rest of the NT) but that God’s love is 
prior and holds primacy. 
640
 “Love for the Lord God is the identifying mark of his people whether in the OT or the NT 
(Deut 6:4–5  Mark 12:30), and thus virtually the equivalent of trust or faith.” Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter Jude, 69. 
Cf. Stauffer, TDNT 1:52. 
641
 Technically, this might be interpreted as imperative or indicative. But, the indicative seems to 
be Paul’s clear intent since he “was not exhorting the churches but commending them here.” Schreiner, 1, 2 
Peter Jude, 69. Here faith and love are once again connected as later in the verse it states, “though you do 
not see Him now, you believe in Him.” 
642
 By reference to the parallel concept in v. 15 it is evident that the genitive in v. 5 is objective 




Importantly, such love toward others is indirectly love toward God himself for “whoever 
loves the Father loves the child born of Him” (1 John 5:1).
643
 Further, “By this we know that we 
love the children of God, when we love God and observe His commandments” (1 John 5:2).
644
 
Likewise, “this is the love of God, that we keep His commandments” (1 John 5:3).
645
 Similarly, 
the one who loves God must also love his brother and if he does not, he cannot love God (1 John 
4:20–21; cf. 2:5–11; 3:7).
646
 Vertical and horizontal love are thus inseparable and relate closely to 
the language of mutual abiding and mutual indwelling, which depict this circle of love. Moreover, 
if we do love one another, God abides (me,nw) in us and “His love is perfected in us” (1 John 
4:12).
647
 Further, since “God is love” then “the one who abides in love abides in God, and God 
abides in him” (1 John 4:16  cf. 1 John 2:15). Indeed, one knows they have “passed out of death 
into life, because we love the brethren” but the one “who does not love abides in death” (1 John 
3:14). Accordingly, frequent reference is made to the love of the brethren and/or love of one 
another (cf. 1 Pet 1:22 among others), which is itself associated with the love of one’s neighbor 
(Jas 2:8). As such, the circle of love described elsewhere is here again apparent: God loves us, we 
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 The one “born of Him” is the one who “believes that Jesus is the Christ” (1 John 5:1). 
Accordingly, “love for God must involve love for his children.” Marshall, The Epistles of John, 227. 
644
 Thus, John is pointing out the fact that love for God entails loving others and vice versa. It is 
another way of saying that the two things are inseparably linked. “Just as it is impossible to love God 
without loving God’s children, it is impossible to love God’s children without loving God (cf. 4:21).” Akin, 
1, 2, 3, John, 191. Similarly, Kruse, The Letters of John, 172. Some commentators interpret evn tou,tw| as 
referring back to v. 1 but “when” (o[tan) in the middle of v. 2 suggests that the clause points forward. For a 
discussion of this see Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 268; Akin, 1, 2, 3, John, 191. 
645
 This is almost certainly an objective genitive referring to human love for God in accordance 
with v. 1. Most scholars are agreed. So Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 269; Akin, 1, 2, 3, John, 191; Kruse, The 
Letters of John, 172. Cf. R. E. Brown who also thinks the subjective meaning is always in the background 
in Johannine thought. The Epistles of John, 539. Cf. also John 14:15, 21, 23. 
646
 Thus, “the circuit of God’s love is completed when we love one another.” Kruse, The Letters of 
John, 162. Cf. Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 249. 
647
 “His love” (avga,ph auvtou/) might be translated the “love of him” and thus it is not certain 
whether this refers to God’s love or human love toward God of love of a divine quality, though the first is 




should love one another and, in doing so, we manifest love toward God and he abides in us and 
perfects his love in us.
648
 
The particularity of this divine love relationship is negatively shown by the fact that the 
“love [avga,ph] of the Father is not in” those who “love the world [avgapa/te]” (1 John 2:15).649 
Similarly, “friendship [fili,a] with the world is hostility toward God” thus “whoever wishes to be 
a friend [fi,loj] of the world makes himself an enemy of God” (Jas 4:4).650 These verses indicate 
that friendship signifies a mutual relationship that is grounded in reciprocality and loyalty; it is 
not indifferent or strictly universal (though it is available universally). Abraham is also said to 
have been the “friend [fi,loj] of God” and this friendship is itself predicated on Abraham’s belief 
(pisteu,w) (Jas 2:23).651 Specifically, Abraham’s faith is reckoned as righteousness and thus the 
mutuality (but not equality) of this relationship is evident in that both human faith and divine 
grace are operative as bases of this divine-human friendship.
652
 The particularity of the divine 
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 As Schneider summarizes, in the letters of John “God’s love (1 John 3:1; 4:7–21; 2 John 3) and 
love for God (1 John 2:5, 15; 3:17; 4:10, 12, 20f.; 5:1–3) and for Jesus (5:1), as well as love for one another 
(3:11, 23; 4:7, 11f.; 2 John 5) and love for the brother (1 John 2:10; 3:10; 4:20f.; pl. 3:14; cf. 5:1f.) are 
placed in relationship to each other.” EDNT 1:12. 
649
 Here, “world” is used in a negative sense of evil whereas in John 3:16 it refers to the totality of 
human persons. Cf. Akin, 1, 2, 3, John, 108. 
650
 Adamson comments that this friendship with the world “is a result of deliberate choice” as the 
Greek βουληθῇ means “‘not mere will, but will with premeditation.’” The Epistle of James, 170. So, also, 
R. P. Martin, James, 148. 
651
 Rarely are individuals referred to as a friend of God. Twice in the OT Abraham is referred to as 
such (2 Chr 20:7  Isa 41:8). Abraham’s friendship is clearly conditioned upon his appropriate response to 
God (cf. Gen 15:6; 22:9). 
652
 As Adamson puts it, in light of Gen 15:6, righteousness refers to a “right Covenant 
relationship,” which Abraham has “because his faith led him to cooperate with God.” The Epistle of James, 
132. Similarly, Davids thinks it is “likely” that this friendship is “a reward for his previous righteous deeds 
of charity.” The Epistle of James, 130. Likewise, Stählin contends, “According to the context the works of 
faith done by Abraham are the reason why God conferred this title on him.” TDNT 9:169. Cf. Jas 2:21. 
Moo, on the other hand, takes it in a forensic sense, faith credited for righteousness. The Letter of James, 
138–39. However, he also refers to this description as “an indication of the privileged status Abraham was 
given on account of his deep faith and practical obedience.” Moo, The Letter of James, 139. “Abraham, for 
James as for Paul, illustrates faith working in a life of love (Gal 5:6  1 Cor 13:2, 7).” R. P. Martin, James, 




love relationship is also apparent in the numerous references to the special group of the “called” 
and/or “elect” who are those who love God (cf. Jas 2:5  Jude 1  Rev 17:14). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter it has been seen that divine love is volitional but not merely volitional. 
That is, divine love is not unilateral but multilateral, inclusive of giving and receiving within a 
reciprocal circle of relational love. Such love often exhibits intense divine emotions akin to the 
most profound compassion and corresponds to the most intimate kinds of affectionate relationship 
(parent-child, marriage). Further, divine love is not strictly spontaneous, ungrounded, or 
unmotivated but often portrays evaluation and appraisal. At the same time, divine love is not 
merited, nor is it initiated by its object(s) but God’s decision to bestow his love is the primary and 
necessary, but not sufficient, ground of the divine-human love relationship.  
Since the divine-human love relationship is explicitly predicated on the priority of God’s 
decision to create and, in turn, bestow love on his creatures, divine love toward creatures is 
neither necessary nor essential to his being, though it is integral to his character. That is, while 
God’s love is integral to his character he did not need to even create humans, much less bestow 
his love on us. Not only is the divine volition significant in the divine-human relationship but 
human volition appears in the necessity of appropriate human response to God’s foreconditional 
love. In accordance with the evaluative nature of God’s love, it is bestowed foreconditionally. 
That is, God has decided to love prior to conditions but such prevenient love includes conditions 
for the maintenance of the divine-human relationship. Such conditions themselves may be 
fulfilled by humans only because of God’s prior love and the way made in and through Christ. 
Those who respond appropriately to God’s loving invitation are privy to an intimate and 
everlasting love relationship with him. These aspects of divine love among others will be further 
unpacked as they relate to a systematic model of divine love within the context of the God-human 




Altogether, then, divine love in the NT is voluntary and unnecessary, yet evaluative and 
not wholly arbitrary, differential and preferential, yet not altogether exclusive, intensely 
emotional (compassionate, affected, caring, joyful, even jealous), yet also committal, 
foreconditional and unmerited, yet not unconditional, and expectant of the appropriate human 













A CANONICAL AND SYSTEMATIC MODEL OF DIVINE 
  
LOVE IN RELATION TO THE WORLD 
This chapter presents and explains a canonical and systematic model of divine love in the 
context of the God-world relationship. First, this chapter will proceed with a brief overview of the 
canonical model that has been inductively derived from Scripture, synthesizing the conclusions of 
chapters 4 and 5. Next, each of the primary aspects of the model of divine love in relation to the 
world that proceed from the biblical data is further explained. The chapter will then turn to a 
comparison of the canonical model with the primary features of the transcendent-voluntarist and 
immanent experientialist models in order to address the conflict of interpretations introduced in 
chapter 3. Finally, implications of this model for a wider divine ontology are surveyed. 
Overview of the Canonical Model of Divine 
Love in Relation to the World 
Divine love in the context of the God-world relationship consists of many parts that 
interrelate with considerable complexity yet striking harmony.
1
 When Scripture speaks of God’s 
love, it does so by means of various terms that point to its various features and components. 
                                                     
 
1
 For the sake of brevity, this overview of the canonical model will forego documentation of the 
canonical grounding of the various components of the model. Such documentation and pointers to chapters 
4 and 5 will be interspersed throughout the further explanation of the model that follows the introductory 
overview. Therein texts will be referred to in order to provide the reader a canonical example of the point 
being made with regard to divine love. Yet, for the sake of brevity, clarity, and in order to avoid a tedious 
reading experience, no attempt is made to list the supporting data in any comprehensive fashion. The data 
are laid out in much more detail in chapters 4 and 5 to which the reader is referred for further examination 




Likewise, when the term “love” is used in the canonical model described here it must be kept in 
mind that the term is complex, including a great deal of polysemy.  
At the risk of oversimplification, God’s love is virtuous, kind, generous, unmerited, 
voluntary, faithfully devoted, evaluative, profoundly affectionate and compassionate, intensely 
passionate, patient and longsuffering, merciful, gracious, just, steadfast, amazingly reliable and 
enduring but not unalterably constant, preferential but not arbitrarily exclusive, relationally 
responsive, desirous of reciprocation, and active. God loves qualities like goodness, justice, 
righteousness, and indeed his love is bound up with such qualities. His love is most often directed 
toward humans and his disposition of love continually manifests itself in actions, which ground 
the divine-human relationship itself. God’s love is the basis of, and manifest in, loving acts such 
as creation, calling and election, covenant, beneficence, deliverance, redemption, restoration, 
corrective discipline, wrath toward oppressors and evil of all kinds, and many others.
2
 Through 
such providential actions, God’s everlasting love persistently draws people to himself, calling 
humans to respond freely to God’s love and thus enter into a reciprocal love relationship in which 
he will delight.
3
 God takes pleasure in those who respond positively to him (his beloved) and 
enjoys the most profound, intimate, friendship with them. In all this, God’s love is intensely 
emotional, akin to, but exponentially greater than, the compassion of the mother for her infant and 
the passion of the husband for his wife. While God desires and expects appropriate human 
response and thus faithfully seeks reciprocal love, he is often the victim of unrequited love. 
                                                     
 
2
 Indeed, a case could be made that all God’s actions are loving but the presentation and defense of 
such a case would require consideration of all of the divine actions and that far exceeds the scope of this 
work. For this reason, I make no attempt below to explain in detail the specific actions of God that 
constitute the various types and aspects of love. Suffice it to say that, according to Scripture, God always 
does that which is best, righteous, and just, always and without fail (cf. Rev 15:3). 
3
 Here and elsewhere the term reciprocal refers to love that flows bilaterally. However, reciprocal 
should not be taken to mean symmetrical or equal. The love relationship between God and humans is 




The characteristics of divine love in the context of the God-world relationship briefly 
described here may be grouped according to five primary and coprimordial aspects: Divine love 
is (1) volitional, (2) evaluative, (3) emotional, (4) foreconditional, and (5) multilaterally 
relational. These five aspects are each basic to the biblical understanding of God’s love 
relationship with the world and they interrelate and support one another while each contributes to 
the wider view of divine love, which is complex and multi-faceted. To a description of each 
aspect and their interrelationship we now turn. Throughout the subsequent explanation of the five 
aspects of love, the different qualifiers of God’s love (i.e., universally relational vs. particularly 
relational) that are introduced must be remembered in order to clearly recognize and understand 
the distinctions between the use of the term “love,” which refers to various different aspects in 
different contexts.  
All five aspects of divine love fit together within the context of reciprocal relationality. 
Scripture consistently depicts God as a personal and relational being who desires a reciprocal love 
relationship of give-and-take with his creatures. While the persons of the Trinity loved one 
another before the world was created, God’s love relationship with creatures had a beginning. 
Indeed, the God-human love relationship is contingent upon God’s free decision to create the 
world and is thus non-essential to his being. God’s decision to create the world, and thus 
voluntarily bestow his love on creatures, does not by itself effect the reciprocal love relationship 
that God desires. That is, God’s love relationship with the world is not unilaterally willed by God. 
Rather, God desires a reciprocal love relationship with human beings wherein humans freely love 
God in response to his prior love. 
The fact that God voluntarily created the world and bestowed his love on humans, 
coupled with the fact that the reciprocal love relationship desired by God does not come to 
fruition without human response, amounts to the distinction between God’s universally relational 
love and his particularly relational love. God’s universally relational love is the undeserved and 




God’s particularly relational love, on the other hand, refers to God’s special and intimate kind of 
love for those who respond to him and enter into a reciprocal relationship of love with him. God’s 
universally relational love, which flows unilaterally and prior to human response, initiates the 
possibility of a reciprocal love relationship between God and humans. That is, God draws humans 
into a reciprocal love relationship by unilaterally bestowing love on each one prior to any 
conditions with the goal of eliciting a human response of love. However, God will neither coerce 
nor unilaterally determine human beings to love him in return. With those who respond positively 
to God’s loving overtures, God enters into particular and intimate love relationship that amounts 
to a reciprocal love relationship. 
In all this, God’s love in relation to the world is foreconditional. God’s love for everyone 
(his universally relational love) is bestowed on each human prior to their response and thus before 
any conditions have been met. However, God desires and expects that humans will respond to his 
love appropriately. In this way, God’s love in relation to the world is foreconditional. That is, it is 
bestowed on everyone prior to, but not exclusive of, conditions.
4
 God’s universally bestowed, 
foreconditional love enables and calls for a response of love from humans. As such, God’s love is 
ontologically, logically, and chronologically prior to human love and itself the grounding of all 
love. Yet, the divine-human love relationship is contingent upon reciprocal human response. 
Importantly, though God’s love in relation to the world is conditional in many ways, it is never 
merited. 
God’s love is foreconditional rather than altogether unconditional or conditional. The 
canon displays both conditional and unconditional aspects of God’s love in relation to the world. 
While Scripture frequently describes God’s love as everlasting, numerous other examples present 
God’s love as conditional and subject to forfeit. Thus, God’s love is unconditional in some 
                                                     
 
4
 In other words, the foreconditionality of divine love means that God’s love is the initiator, prior 
to any human action, love, merit, or worth while, at the same time, God implements conditions for the 




respects and conditional in others. The unconditionality of God’s love refers to his subjective, 
non-evaluative, and unilateral love for all of his creatures whereas the conditionality of God’s 
love amounts to his objective, evaluative, and emotionally responsive love for humans. That is, 
God’s subjective love is that which is grounded in himself as subject, independent from the 
response, or lack of response, from human beings. God’s objective love refers to that love which 
corresponds to, and is affected by, the disposition and/or actions of its object.  
God’s subjective love thus refers to God’s unchanging disposition of unilateral and non-
evaluative love that is grounded wholly in himself but aims outward toward the goal of reciprocal 
love relationship with all humans. This subjective disposition of love prompts God’s loving 
actions that are bestowed initially on all creatures (God’s universally relational love), which is 
aimed toward, but does not unilaterally effect, reciprocal love relationship (God’s particularly 
relational love).
5
 That is, God’s subjective love is not itself relational but it is the ground of God’s 
universally relational love that reaches out toward all humans foreconditionally. In this way, 
God’s subjective love is the ground of God’s universally relational love that reaches creatures. 
While God’s subjective love is itself everlasting and unconditional, it does not eternally benefit 
creatures since humans may finally reject God entirely, thus forfeiting the love relationship 
beyond repair. While God’s subjective love remains in God’s disposition even after such 
forfeiture it does not reach its objects (via his relational love) who have finally rejected loving 
relationship with God and, accordingly, no longer receive God’s love.
6
 God always loves 
everyone subjectively in the sense that he remains desirous of a love relationship with them. He 
never removes his love from anyone who wishes to receive his love. However, the object(s) of 
                                                     
 
5
 God’s subjective love is thus the basis of, but not identical with, God’s universally relational 
love, which is bestowed on all human beings foreconditionally. 
6
 That humans who have made such a final decision no longer receive God’s love does not mean 
that God’s subjective love has ceased. Rather, it means that God’s subjective love does not reach them (via 




God’s love may reject intimate relationship with God and, if persistent in such rejection, forfeit 
the reception of divine love altogether. 
Both the reciprocally relational and foreconditional aspects of God’s love assume the 
volitional aspect of God’s love. That is, the reciprocal love relationship that God desires with all, 
and achieves with those who respond to him, assumes bilateral significant freedom. Bilateral 
significant freedom means that both God and humans possess the freedom to do otherwise than 
they do. For his part, God need not have created human beings at all and thus his love toward 
humans is voluntary, not necessary. Conversely, humans also possess significant freedom, 
bestowed by God their creator, which they might use to reciprocate or reject God’s love. 
Importantly, God’s love is not arbitrarily willed toward only some but God voluntarily loves all 
humans and bestows his universally relational love on them accordingly. Thus, according to the 
canon, the divine-human love relationship is neither unilaterally deterministic nor necessary to 
God’s nature but mutually (though not symmetrically) voluntary and contingent. 
God’s love is not only volitional but also includes evaluative and emotional aspects. The 
evaluative aspect of God’s love refers to the appraisal, appreciation, and/or reception of value 
from external agents. God loves goodness and hates evil. He delights in, takes pleasure in, and 
enjoys his people who belong to him but is displeased, pained, and grieved by those who turn 
their backs on him.
7
 God’s joy is, accordingly, increased or decreased by the actual state of affairs 
in the world because God has bound his own interests to the best interests of all of his creatures. 
While sinful humans cannot by themselves bring value to God, they may bring value and joy to 
him because of God’s enabling and drawing action, especially the mediation of Christ through 
whom even meager human offerings elicit divine delight. As such, God’s love for individuals 
may, in fact, be increased and/or decreased according to their disposition and/or actions. 
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 That is, God derives pleasure from the positive disposition and actions of humans, as well as 




Finally, God’s love is also profoundly emotional. God is consistently presented as 
affectionate, loving, and devotedly interested in and intimately concerned with human beings. 
God feels sorrow, passion, and intense anger at human evil but also compassion and the desire to 
bring wayward humans back into proper relationship with himself. Conversely, God delights in 
goodness and is joyous over every person who responds to his loving overtures. In all, God’s love 
for humans is ardent and passionate. The emotionality of God’s love does not exclude its 




Altogether, divine love is relational. God persistently seeks a reciprocal love relationship 
of give-and-take with his creatures. Further, his love is foreconditional and unmerited, voluntary 
and unnecessary, yet not arbitrary, differential and preferential, yet available to those who are 
willing to respond positively, intensely emotional, yet also committal, evaluative and expectant of 
appropriate human response. 
The Canonical Model of Divine Love 
in Relation to the World Unpacked 
We now turn to an explanation of each of the five aspects of divine love that have been 
featured in the overview above and the relationship between them, along with pointers to the 
biblical data from which these aspects are derived and, when necessary, cross references to the 
sections in chapters 4 and 5 that elaborate on the biblical basis of these aspects. For the purposes 
of clarity in unfolding these aspects I will begin by explaining the volitional, evaluative, and 
emotional aspects of God’s love. These three characteristics of love must be understood in order 
to build toward the larger picture of God’s foreconditional and multilaterally relational love. 
These characteristics, however, are coprimordial. That is, they are equally basic to God’s love for 
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 The evaluative and emotional aspects of divine love are especially closely related since both of 
them assume divine passibility and point to the fact that God can enter into a mutually beneficial (though 




the world. The order in which they are presented here corresponds to the canonical investigation, 
depicting a phenomenological description of God’s love in relation to the world. Therefore, the 
order of elements does not signify the order of importance or a progression from basis to 
consequence but, rather, is chosen for the purpose of explanation and in correspondence to 
chapters 4 and 5. The volitional, evaluative, and emotional aspects closely interrelate with one 
another and all contribute to the understanding of the foreconditionality of love while all of the 
four preceding aspects lead to the wider conception of God’s multilaterally relational love. While 
these five aspects may be distinguished, they are not altogether distinct since they overlap 
considerably as evidenced by both the semantic and thematic data of the canon.
9
 
The Volitional Aspect of Divine Love 
God’s Love for Creatures Is Voluntary 
In the beginning, since no other persons existed (cf. John 1:1–3), God’s love flowed only 
between the persons of the Trinity (cf. John 17:24). However, God decided to create and, 
accordingly, bestow his love on creatures.
10
 The divine-human love relationship that God desired 
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 The overlaps between the five aspects are readily apparent by reference to the semantics alone. 
The primary words for love in the OT and NT collocate with and closely relate to terminology that points to 
the five aspects. For a demonstration of the semantic overlaps that also support the various aspects 
described in this chapter, see the word studies interspersed throughout chapters 4 and 5, especially the 
studies of bha, dsx, ~xr, #px, avgapa,w, and file,w. Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that, among other things, 
divine love toward the world is volitional, as evidenced by both the semantics and divine actions. For 
instance, the language of election and divine will relate closely to the language of God’s love (see the 
various word studies in chapters 4 and 5 in this regard). This interrelationship points to the association 
between God’s will and his loving actions. Indeed, God’s will to create is the prerequisite for his relational 
love with the world. God’s decision to create, election, and commitment to the covenant relationship 
initiated, but not unilaterally maintained, by that election exemplify the volitional aspect of God’s love. 
Moreover, this volitional aspect complements both the emotional and evaluative aspects of divine love 
toward the world, which are also coprimordial. Indeed, evaluation, volition, and emotion are all bound up 
in the language of God’s election, good pleasure, delight, etc., by way of both OT and NT terminology, all 
of which closely corresponds to and collocates with the most important words descriptive of divine love. 
God’s evaluation is further seen in various languages and descriptions of his delight and joy over his people 
and, conversely, his displeasure and righteous indignation against evil, all of which are closely associated 
with the major terminology of love. Closely connected to God’s evaluative love is his emotional love 
evidenced in various depictions of his compassion and passion. These volitional, evaluative, and emotional 
aspects are assumed by, and necessary for, the foreconditional and multilaterally relational aspects of love.  
10




(and continues to desire) could not take place without God’s logically, ontologically, and 
chronologically prior decision to create other beings. God is thus the relational starting point, 
causal origin, and prime agent of all relationship. God did not need to create and love the world 
but voluntarily opened himself up to relationship with creatures and, as such, God’s love 
relationship with creatures is also voluntary rather than necessary. 
 This volitional aspect of God’s love in the context of the God-world relationship extends 
beyond the act of creation. God’s amazing commitment to his creatures is demonstrated as he 
continues to voluntarily love creatures even after the fall. While human sin merits death, God has 
made a way to repair the ruptured relationship and continues to bestow his universally relational 
love even on sinful and undeserving human beings, though he is under no obligation to do so.
11
 In 
response to the Fall and subsequent disordering of the world, God chose a people through whom 
he would reach out to all peoples and committed himself to them in covenant relationship for the 
benefit of all (cf. Gen 12:3; 18:18). The covenant relationship thus further highlights the 
volitional elements involved in the divine-human love relationship. God’s love for humans itself 
prompted the initiation of covenant relationship through election and God’s people were expected 
to reciprocate God’s love through commitment and obedience to him (cf. Deut 7:7–13).
12
 
Likewise, the oft-used kinship metaphors of marriage and parent-child point toward the bilateral, 
voluntary commitment expected within the divine-human love relationship.
13
 
                                                     
 
time, created by God. This is the explicit canonical view and is among the most basic of biblical 
metaphysical assumptions. See William L. Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (Eugene, Oreg.: 
Wipf & Stock, 2000). 
11
 Both the unmerited nature of divine love and the divine decision as an example of the partial 
and temporary suspension of the consequences of evaluative judgment will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
12
 Since the covenant relationship can be broken it cannot be descriptive of a necessary 
relationship. Rather, it clearly describes a voluntary relationship. On the real possibility that love 
relationship with God, including covenant, could be forfeited as well as its bilateral nature, see the 
discussions of the foreconditional and multilaterally relational aspects of love later in this chapter.  
13




Though God’s people repeatedly rebelled against him and rejected his loving overtures, 
God persisted in his love for them far beyond any obligations and reasonable expectations. Over 
and over again, God renewed his commitment to continue bestowing his love on them actively 
with the intention of ultimately reclaiming them and restoring them to the harmonious, reciprocal 
divine-human love relationship that was his goal all along (cf. Exod 32–34; Neh 9; Ps 78). 
Though they did not deserve it and though God had every right to remove his love from reaching 
them, God voluntarily continued his love relationship with them. In this vein, the canon 
consistently speaks of divine love in relation to the world as both initiated and freely bestowed by 
God. 
Numerous other examples of God’s volitional love appear throughout Scripture, perhaps 
the most explicit of which is found in his declaration: “I will love them freely” (Hos 14:4 [5]).
14
 
On the basis of his love, God chose Israel above all peoples, though they did not merit such 
election (cf. Deut 7:6–7, 14; 10:15). Likewise, that God’s love for creatures is not necessary is 
evident in the strong language that presents God’s love as contingent upon his will in Exod 
33:19.
15
 There, in the aftermath of Israel’s rebellion with the golden calf, God states, “I will be 
                                                     
 
charge of infidelity by his “bride” (cf. Jer 3  Hosea). Moreover, the parental metaphor is depicted as one of 
“adoption,” which is also a relationship entered into by decision, at least on the part of the parent, but also 
at some point that of the child as well (cf. Deut 32:10; Ezek 16:1–6; Hos 11:1). A child might remove 
him/herself from such a relationship and have nothing to do with his/her parents (at least when adulthood is 
reached). The parent may continue to have loving feelings toward the absent child but, to the extent that the 
parent’s love is unrequited, the parent-child love relationship is non-existent. For a further discussion of 
kinship metaphors see chapter 4, pages 341–52, and chapter 5, pages 534–40. 
14
 The adjective translated freely (hb'd'n) connotes the “determinative . . . element of freewill” 
referring to that which is offered “totally voluntarily.” J. Conrad, “נדב,” TLOT 9:200, 222. See also the 
fundamentally free and voluntary nature of divine dsx in the discussion of that term in the OT chapter, 
pages 354–75, where is it demonstrated that God need not manifest dsx, but dsx is predicated upon God’s 
voluntary association. Cf. Katharine Doob Sakenfeld, The Meaning of Hesed in the Hebrew Bible: A New 
Inquiry (Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1978), 45, 176, 234. 
15
 In other cases, the removal of God’s lovingkindness or compassion, in response to the people’s 
apostasy, suggests the volitional aspect of God’s love (Jer 16:5). Thus, God can clearly remove his love. 
However, the context shows that the people’s actions warranted the removal of lovingkindness and/or 
compassion long before God actually removed it. Therefore, it appears that such removal is not automatic 
but voluntary, while at the same time never arbitrary. The freedom of God is also evident in his 




gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show compassion on whom I will show 
compassion” (Exod 33:19  cf. Rom 9:15–18).
16
 God’s commitment to love humans reaches its 
apex in Christ himself who manifested the depth and height of God’s love by willingly giving 
himself up for humans (Rom 5:8; Gal 2:20; Eph 5:25).  
Thus, God both voluntarily created and bestowed love on humans and continued to 
bestow that love in the face of evil which, absent God’s mercy, would amount to the forfeiture of 
the benefits of God’s love. As such, humans never merit or deserve God’s love. God’s love is 
freely given without compulsion.
17
 
God’s Love for Creatures  
Is Not Solely Voluntary 
While God’s love includes a volitional aspect, it is not strictly volitional or unilaterally 
willed. That is, God’s love is not identical to his will or merely a product of his will. God’s love 
is also evaluative, emotional, foreconditional, and relationally responsive.
18
 God voluntarily loves 
all humans and bestows his universally relational love on them accordingly.
19
 This requires an 
understanding of the relationship and distinction between God’s love and his will and election. 
                                                     
 
entreating God in prayer assume that he has the power to act or not act and will himself make a decision. 
16
 Here God bestows his compassion and grace without compulsion. The people have forfeited his 
favor but he continues it toward them nevertheless. In this case, God is not stating that he will arbitrarily be 
gracious and compassionate to some and not others. Rather, he is stating that though none deserve God’s 
mercy or compassion and he is under no obligation to be merciful toward them, he has the right to bestow 
it. That God is not merely selecting some to receive his grace and not others is apparent by the construction 
of the phrase itself, which might be better translated “I will proclaim before you the name LORD, and the 
grace that I grant and the compassion that I show” (JPS). See the further discussion of this in chapter 4, 
pages 251–2. See also the discussion of the relation of God’s will and love in Rom 9:15–18 in chapter 5, 
pages 462–4. 
17
 However, while this volitionally free aspect of divine love is recognized, one should be careful 
not to assume a false dichotomy between the divine will and essence. This issue will be revisited later in 
this chapter. 
18
 These aspects will each be discussed in succession after this one. 
19
 God’s universal bestowal of love and the content of his universally relational love in particular 




God’s love is closely connected to his will and the divine action of election throughout 
the canon. However, Scripture clearly distinguishes between God’s love and God’s will and 
election. Specifically, divine love is itself the basis of election.
20
 That is, election is a 
manifestation of divine love. At this point, two kinds of election must also be distinguished from 
one another, though they may overlap: (1) vocational election within the plan of salvation and (2) 
salvific election. Both kinds of election are the result of a divine call to which humans freely 
respond. That is, both kinds of election are not unilaterally determined by God but require 
appropriate human response for their continuance. Further, both calls result from and are a 
manifestation of God’s love as will be explained further below. 
Vocational election on the basis of divine love 
Vocational election refers to God’s call to specific individuals and/or groups to a role in 
the plan of salvation, often of a revelatory nature.
21
 This kind of election does not refer to the 
salvation of the elect but to their special function in salvation history.
22
 For example, Israel was 
                                                     
 
20
 See Deut 4:37; 7:7–8; 10:15; Pss 47:4 [5]; 78:68; Isa 41:8; 42:1; Matt 12:18; Rom 11:28; cf. Isa 
42:1; Eph 1:4; Col 3:12; 1 Thess 1:4; 2 Thess 2:13. See the discussion of these passages in chapters 4 and 5 
especially on pages 265–9, 274–5, 460–62, 468–9. One should also refer to the discussion of the 
relationship between love and election in Mal 1 and Rom 9 in chapters 4 and 5 on pages 271–5, 460–7. 
Further, that love is the basis of election is widely recognized. See, for instance, William A. Dyrness, 
Themes in Old Testament Theology (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1979), 59; Gordon R. Clark, 
The Word Hesed in the Hebrew Bible (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 263  Gerhard Wallis, “אהב,” TDOT 
1:104; Klyne Snodgrass, Ephesians (NIV Application Commentary; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 
1996), 49; Gene L. Green, The Letters to the Thessalonians (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2002), 92; 
Peter Thomas O’Brien, The Letter to the Ephesians (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999), 99; Daniel 
Day Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 19; Peter C. Craigie, 
The Book of Deuteronomy (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1976), 179–80  E. M. Good, “Love in the OT” 
(IDB 3; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1962), 166; Ralph L. Smith, Micah-Malachi (WBC 32; Dallas: 
Word, 1984), 305; Carl F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority (6 vols.; Waco, Tex.: Word Books, 
1976), 6:347. 
21
 For example, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, the people of Israel, Saul, David, the Twelve, Paul, etc., 
were vocationally elected to specific tasks and/or functions. On the revelatory purpose of “covenant” see 
further John H. Walton, Covenant: God’s Purpose, God’s Plan (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1994). 
22
 Of course, there is some overlap between vocational and salvific election. One who is 
vocationally elected may also be elect unto salvation but the two are not the same. The latter is universally 
available but predicated on appropriate response. As such, the appropriate response, or lack thereof, to 




chosen because of God’s love for the patriarchs (cf. Deut 4:37).
23
 Importantly, while their election 
was unmerited and prior to conditions (cf. Deut 7:7–8; 9:4–5), its attendant privileges were 
neither unconditional nor impervious to forfeiture. Likewise, in other instances, while God 
chooses particular individuals, such election is conditional upon human response and thus may be 
rejected initially and/or forfeited as it was by King Saul and Judas.
24
 Accordingly, humans must 
maintain their status as “elect” within the divine-human relationship through appropriate response 
to God (cf. Deut 7:7–13; 10:15–16; John 15:14, 16).
25
 
Significantly, God’s vocational election of Israel is not intended for the benefit of Israel 
alone. Rather, God intends, through Israel, to enter into a reciprocal love relationship with 
peoples of all nations and ethnicities (cf. Gen 12:3; Deut 10:18; Acts 10:34–35).
26
 His vocational 
election is thus a manifestation of his love not only toward Israel but toward all peoples whom he 
desires to draw into reciprocal love relationship with himself.
27
 The revelation of God’s love, 
compassion, mercy, and grace to Israel is, in microcosm, that which he will bestow upon all 
                                                     
 
23
 Scripture does not reveal “why” God loved the patriarchs in a special manner though it is 
apparent that God had a special relational love with Abraham (cf. Isa 41:8; 2 Chr 20:7; Jas 2:23). 
24
 Cf. Heb 11:8 with reference to Abraham’s response to the divine call. Throughout Scripture, 
“election by Yahweh must find response in the proper behavior of the elect.” H. Wildberger, “בחר,” TLOT 
1:214. 
25
 For example, though God chose his disciples they are his “friends” only if they obey him (John 
15:14) and, as such, this is not an unconditional election. In this way, the ongoing status of an individual or 
nation as “chosen” is conditional  it is not presented as a unilateral, irresistible, permanent election. “Israel 
has been chosen by God and must therefore maintain its obligations toward the divine covenant that was 
the consequence of this choice.” Ronald E. Clements, “The Book of Deuteronomy,” in Numbers–Samuel 
(vol. 2 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1998), 350. Cf. Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy, 179; 
Jeffrey H. Tigay, Deuteronomy (JPS Torah Commentary; Philadelphia: JPS, 1996), 87.  
26
 Thus, “God’s election does not mean groundless and unmerited favoritism. Were that the case, 
God would have been shown to flout the very righteousness the covenant declared and upheld.” Clements, 
“The Book of Deuteronomy,” in Numbers–Samuel, 2:359. Rather, “God’s plan for the salvation of the 
nations was his motive for the election of Israel. This responsible role of the elect was a dominant theme in 
the preaching of the prophets.” Lamar Eugene Cooper Sr., Ezekiel (NAC 17; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman 
& Holman, 1994), 105. Cf. Dyrness, Themes, 59.  
27
 That is, God’s purpose in vocationally electing a particular nation stems from his love for all 
peoples and his desire to reveal that love to everyone such that all who are willing might enter into a 




sinners who will respond to his action and come to him (John 3:16; Rom 10:13; 1 John 1:9).
28
 
God vocationally elects humans because of his love and that love not only motivates God to enter 
into covenant relationship in the first place but also to remain in that relationship as long as 
possible in order to enact the plan of salvation, reveal himself, and provide every opportunity for 
as many as possible to respond to him and enter into his particularly relational love.
29
 
Salvific election on the basis of divine love 
Salvific election describes those instances in Scripture where those who will ultimately 
receive salvation are referred to as the “elect” (cf. Matt 24:24  Mark 13:22). The language of 
divine calling and election often functions as technical language with reference to becoming, or 
being, part of the people of God, which itself requires entrance into, and the maintenance of, a 
loving relationship with God.
30
 Salvific election then, like vocational election, stems from God’s 
                                                     
 
among many other instances, Exod 32:12–13; Pss 109:21; 143:11; Ezek 18:25; 20:9, 14, 22, 44. 
28
 That is, through the vocational election of Israel and others, God aims at revealing his universal 
love and his desire for that love to be returned. For this reason God bears longer with Israel in order to 
manifest his character; that is, not because they are deserving of such longsuffering nor because God is 
partial (he is not, cf. Acts 10:34–35) but because they are the conduit of the revelation of God’s universal 
love, which is intended toward relational love with all peoples. One may surmise that if God had not made 
a particular choice of his people all the divine actions could have been viewed as merely natural, the normal 
course of events. In this case, there would be no way to highlight the way God deals with his people 
supernaturally and specially. In order for God to reveal his character, and the modus operandi of the divine-
human relationship, he used a microcosm to set in contrast with the wider world structure which, 
temporarily, lies outside of God’s ideal will as a consequence of creaturely evil. 
29
 Within this framework, consider the case of God’s love for “Jacob” rather than “Esau” in Mal 1 
and Rom 9. Neither Israel nor Edom deserved divine love (cf. Mal 2:11; 3:6) but God bore long with Israel 
due to their vocational election in the plan of salvation (Deut 4:37; 7:7; Rom 11:28). Israel is privileged not 
merely for its own sake but God’s persevering love toward them is directed toward revealing his love to all. 
Despite their special election, however, judgment could and did fall upon them, even though God was 
abundantly longsuffering until there “was no remedy” (2 Chr 36:16). See the further discussion of these 
instances in chapters 4 and 5, especially on pages 271–80, 460–7, as well as the discussion of evaluative 
love in the following section in this chapter. 
30
 A few examples and explanation of this will be given in the discussion that follows. However, 
for a further explanation of the meaning of God’s calling and election with regard to salvation, see the word 
studies of rxb, eκλεγομαι, and kale,w along with the discussion of these issues in chapters 4 and 5, pages 
242–5, 447–56. See also, among others, Robert H. Stein, Luke (NAC 24; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & 
Holman, 2001), 446  Gottlob Schrenk, “eκλεγομαι, eκλογη, eκλεκ ο ,” TDNT 4:187; Craig Blomberg, 




love. God calls everyone to salvation because he loves every human (his universally relational 




God’s call in such contexts is an invitation to a reciprocal love relationship, which may 
be accepted or rejected.
32
 Those who accept the invitation are the “elect” who will enjoy 
relationship with God forever (cf. Matt 22:14).
33
 This same group is also often referred to as 
God’s “beloved” (cf. Rom 1:7  Col 3:12  1 Thess 1:4  2 Thess 2:13).
34
 On the other hand, not all 
who are called, or “invited,” respond and become “elect” (cf. Matt 22:3–4, 8–9, 14; Luke 14:16–
24). The divine-human love relationship enjoyed by the elect, then, is contingent upon 
appropriate response (cf. Rom 10:9, 12–13; 11:22–23).
35
 That is, the final status of “elect” 
requires the ongoing, free, positive response of human beings (cf. 2 Pet 1:10).
36
 In this way, God 
                                                     
 
31
 See further the discussion of God’s universally relational love later in this chapter. 
32
 The terminology of the divine call is used in a complex fashion. At times, the called are those 
who have received an invitation to which they must respond (cf. Matt 22:14) while at other times the 
“called” are those who have responded to the invitation (or will respond). In either case, the invitation is 
one that must be voluntarily accepted (cf. Matt 22:2–6). For further evidence of this see the discussion of 
the kale,w word group in chapter 5, pages 452–6. 
33
 For example, Jesus stated, “many are called, but few are chosen” (Matt 22:14). Here, the 
“called” are those who may accept or reject God’s invitation while the “chosen” are those who do accept 
the invitation.  
34
 However, though they correspond to the same objects, the terminology of the elect and those 
who love God are not themselves equivalent in meaning. The elect are those who have been called and 
responded to that call (or will do so). The beloved are also elect but the term beloved also connotes that 
they are the recipients of God’s particularly relational love and thus the objects of God’s special affection. 
The latter is not connoted by the term elect itself, although it is true that the elect are also beloved. For a 
further demonstration of this view of the statuses of called, elect, and beloved see chapter 5, pages 447–71. 
35
 For example, “Whoever will call on the name of the Lord will be saved” (Rom 10:13  cf. 10:9, 
12). Likewise, Rom 11:22–23 shows that the “elect” are not unilaterally so. Rather, they may forfeit God’s 
kindness. Thus, Paul writes, “Behold then the kindness and severity of God; to those who fell, severity, but 
to you, God’s kindness, if you continue in His kindness  otherwise you also will be cut off. And they also, 
if they do not continue in their unbelief, will be grafted in, for God is able to graft them in again.” See the 
further discussion of Rom 9–11 with regard to these issues in chapter 5, pages 460–7. 
36
 This status is, accordingly, conditional and not unilaterally determined. Thus, Peter writes, 
“brethren, be all the more diligent to make certain about His calling and choosing you; for as long as you 




freely loves all human beings and makes the reception of his love available to every human but 
also imposes real conditions upon the potential ongoing recipients of his love.
37
 
In all this, those who are salvifically “elect” are those who have responded (or will 
respond) to the divine invitation by loving God (albeit imperfectly) and are thus “beloved,” that 
is, party to God’s particularly relational love, forevermore. Therefore, the “elect” and “beloved” 
who receive the final reward are not merely those loved by God but “those who love” God in 
return (Rom 8:28; 1 Cor 2:9; 8:3; 1 Thess 1:4; cf. Eph 6:24; Jas 1:12; 2:5).
38
 This exemplifies the 
crucial distinction between God’s universally relational love, which God voluntarily bestows on 
everyone, and his particularly relational love, which is received and enjoyed only by those who 
appropriately respond to God’s universally relational love.
39
 God’s universally relational love is 
manifest, among other ways, in the universal call (invitation) to the divine-human love 
relationship (cf. John 3:16; 1 Tim 2:4; 2 Pet 3:9).
40
 The nature of God’s vocational and salvific 
election as the result of God’s call to which humans freely respond points to the fact that God has 
granted human beings significant freedom, a point to which we now turn. 
                                                     
 
2:13–15  2 Pet 3:14, 17  Jude 1). Paul prays “that your God will count you worthy of your calling” (2 Thess 
1:11). If the faith response of the elect were irresistibly determined by God these numerous exhortations to 
those elect would be superfluous. For further evidence of the conditionality of election see William G. 
MacDonald, “The Biblical Doctrine of Election,” in The Grace of God, the Will of Man: A Case for 
Arminianism (ed. C. H. Pinnock; Minneapolis, Minn.: Bethany House, 1995); William W. Klein, The New 
Chosen People: A Corporate View of Election (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Academie, 1990). See also the further 
discussion of these and other passages with regard to this issue in chapter 5, pages 447–71. 
37
 This is descriptive of the foreconditionality of love, which will be discussed further below in 
this chapter. This expected human response is not meritorious. Rather, human response to God’s invitation 
is itself offered and made possible by his prior grace and love (John 6:44; 12:32). Election is thus 
conditional and yet unmerited. God’s calling is not according to works (2 Tim 1:9) and God will not revoke 
the call (Rom 11:29). The recipients of “His calling” are those “who believe” (Eph 1:18–19). 
38
 To take but one of these examples, the one “who perseveres under trial” when “approved, he 
will receive the crown of life which the Lord has promised to those who love Him” (Jas 1:12  similarly, see 
Rom 8:28; 1 Cor 2:9; Jas 2:5; cf. 1 Cor 8:3; Eph 6:24).  
39
God’s universally relational and particularly relational love will be discussed in detail later in 
this chapter. 
40
 The call is not itself God’s love but is one of the actions that is prompted by God’s love and that 




God’s Love Relationship with Creatures 
Assumes Bilateral Significant Freedom 
As has been briefly seen, the volitional aspect of God’s love includes God’s desire and 
will toward a reciprocal relationship with all humans, a relationship that is achieved with those 
who respond to him. That God desires a reciprocal relationship with all but only enjoys it with 
some, assumes the notion of bilateral significant freedom. Bilateral significant freedom means 
that both God and humans possess the freedom to do otherwise than they do. As mentioned 
earlier, for his part, God need not have created human beings at all. He did not need to create 
other beings. He could have enjoyed the Trinitarian love relationship for all eternity. God’s love 
toward humans is therefore voluntary, not necessary.
41
  
Conversely, God has bestowed significant freedom on humans, including the freedom to 
reciprocate, or not reciprocate, God’s love (cf. Deut 6:5).
42
 The volitional aspect of God’s love 
therefore has a counterpart in the divinely bestowed free will of humans. God never irresistibly 
determines human love. Indeed, the biblical data suggest that determined love is an oxymoron.
43
 
Love must be freely given as supported both by the numerous commands of humans to love (see 
                                                     
 
41
 God’s significant freedom has been demonstrated by many of the passages referenced already in 
this chapter regarding the volitional nature of divine love. For a further discussion of the biblical theology 
of this issue see chapters 4 and 5, pages 447–71. The significant freedom of God and other creatures is also 
briefly revisited below in the section on theo-ontological implications. 
42
 Thus, human beings are not unilaterally determined to act as they do. The significant freedom of 
human beings is apparent in numerous instances where what God wants to happen does not occur. For 
instance, “the Pharisees and the lawyers rejected God’s purpose for themselves” (Luke 7:30  cf. Mark 
7:24). Elsewhere, God desired to save his people. He even “longs to be gracious” to them and “waits on 
high to have compassion,” but they were “unwilling” (Isa 30:15, 18). Likewise, God “called, but no one 
answers,” he “spoke, but they did not listen. And they did evil in [His] sight and chose that in which [He] 
did not delight” (Isa 66:4  cf. 65:12). In many other instances God’s will is not unilaterally effective since 
that which takes place is not always what God desires. See Lam 3:33; Ezek 33:11; cf. 18:23, 32; Matt 
23:37; Luke 13:34; 2 Pet 3:9; cf. 1 Tim 2:4. See also the discussion of these and other passages in chapters 
4 and 5. 
43
 Some evidence for this conclusion is presented in this section and much more may be found in 
chapters 4 and 5, pages 241–301 and 447–71. Moreover, the evidence for this conclusion becomes stronger 
and stronger as one considers the many other aspects of love and how they interrelate. As we turn to each 
of those aspects we will see that the voluntary nature of love, both human and divine, is not only implied in 
many passages but required to make sense of the broader conception of God’s love and the divine-human 




further below) and implied by the fact that God’s love as well as the love of humans is 
consistently depicted as voluntary throughout Scripture (cf. Hos 14:4; Deut 30;15–16, 19–20). 
Indeed, there are no instances of forced love in the Scripture. Rather, throughout Scripture, love, 
whether human or divine, assumes freedom.
44
 
This means that human response is required to establish and maintain the particular, 
divine-human love relationship. The requisite human response is apparent in the frequent divine 
command of humans to love God and others (cf. Deut 6:5; Lev 19:18; Matt 22:37–39), among 
many other places. Such commands make little sense if the human’s will is not involved. Rather, 
such commands suggest that humans might volitionally respond to God’s love with reciprocal 
love. Conversely, divine love may be forfeited by the lack of appropriate human response.
45
 If 
humans are free to respond or not respond to God’s love, as suggested in these texts, the God-
human love relationship cannot be the result of God’s will alone. God’s will, therefore, is 
necessary to a divine-human love relationship but does not bring such relationship to fruition by 
itself.
46
 Though God will never arbitrarily remove his love, humans may reject his love and 
disown him (cf. Jer 31:3; Hos 9:15). The divine-human love relationship, then, is neither 
unilaterally deterministic nor essential or ontologically necessary but mutually (though not 
symmetrically) volitional and contingent. 
In all this, God’s love in relation to the world is voluntary but not arbitrary. That is, 
God’s love for creatures is not the product of his will alone but also includes evaluative and 
                                                     
 
44
 Stephen G. Post correctly comments that “God refuses to eliminate human freedom, because a 
divine determinism would preclude the realization of communion, of which freedom is a constitutive 
principle.” A Theory of Agape: On the Meaning of Christian Love (Lewisburg, Penn.: Bucknell University 
Press, 1990), 26. Similarly, David Fergusson writes, “The necessary condition of freedom bestowed by the 
love of God, therefore, is the possibility of our rejecting him.” “Will the Love of God Finally Triumph?” in 
Nothing Greater, Nothing Better (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 200.  
45
 This will be explained and further elaborated upon in the section on the foreconditional nature 
of divine love below. 
46
 That is, God’s will to love is thus a necessary basis of the divine-human love relationship but 




emotional aspects that complement its volitional aspect. Further, the love relationship that God 
desires with human beings is not unilaterally willed but requires the free response of human 
beings to God’s freely given love. Neither God nor humans love one another by necessity. God 
freely loves humans and beseeches humans to freely love him in return. God’s love for the world, 
then, takes place within the context of a free, volitional relationship. 
The Evaluative Aspect of Divine Love 
Throughout Scripture, God’s Love  
Is Consistently Evaluative 
God’s love is not only volitional but also includes evaluative and emotional aspects. The 
evaluative aspect of God’s love refers to the appraisal, appreciation, and/or reception of value 
from external agents. Throughout Scripture, God often delights in, takes pleasure in, and enjoys 
his creatures. Indeed, “the Lord takes pleasure in His people” (Ps 149:4) who are precious and 
valuable in his sight (Exod 19:5–6; Deut 26:18; Isa 43:4; Matt 10:31; 12:12; Luke 12:27, 24).
47
 
On the other hand, God may also be displeased, vexed, and grieved by humans.
48
 God’s 
evaluative love is further evident in that he loves the righteous (Ps 146:8; cf. Prov 11:20; 12:2, 
22) and the “cheerful giver” (2 Cor 9:7  cf. Heb 13:16) but hates those who do iniquity (Ps 5:5 
[6]; cf. 11:5; Prov 11:20; Rev 2:6).
49
 Indeed, the “way of the wicked is an abomination to the 
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 Elsewhere it is abundantly clear that God’s people may be “delightful” and/or pleasing to him (2 
Sam 22:21–28; 1 Kgs 10:9; Jer 31:20; Pss 147:10–11; 149:4; Prov 16:7; Dan 9:23; 2 Chr 9:8; Rom 14:18; 
Col 1:10; 3:20; 1 Thess 4:1; Heb 11:5; 1 John 3:22). Likewise, human beings are precious and valuable to 
God (cf. Isa 43:4; Matt 10:31; 12:12; Luke 12:6–7, 24) and his special treasure (Exod 19:5–6; Deut 7:6; 
14:2; 26:18; cf. Mal 3:17–18). God thus enjoys his creatures and this is an aspect of his love. Furthermore, 
God “will exult over you with joy, He will be quiet in His love, He will rejoice over you with shouts of 
joy” (Zeph 3:17). One may “walk in a manner worthy of the Lord, to please him in all respects” (Col 1:10  
cf. 1 Thess 4:1  Heb 11:5  1 John 3:22) as children who are obedient to their parents are “well-pleasing to 
the Lord” (Col 3:20). 
48
 In many instances, the canon clearly asserts that humans may displease God. See, for example, 
Isa 9:17 [16]; 65:12; 66:4; Eccl 5:4 [3]; 1 Cor 10:5; 1 Thess 2:15. 
49
 Importantly, this contrast between divine love and hate (cf. Isa 61:8; Ps 45:7 [8]) is depicted as 
explicitly evaluative and often emotive. It is evident here and elsewhere that divine love and hatred should 
not be conflated with choosing and rejecting, respectively. They both may connote volition, evaluation, and 




Lord, but He loves one who pursues righteousness” (Prov 15:8–9). That God loves the righteous 
and the “cheerful giver” does not necessarily mean that God only loves them and not others. 
Rather, God loves everyone in some respects as evidenced elsewhere (cf. John 3:16).
50
 These 
passages, then, suggest that God loves the righteous and the cheerful giver in a special, evaluative 
sense. He delights in and approves of those who do good while being displeased by evil.
51
 
Significantly, even those among God’s “elect” may be the object of divine displeasure (Hos 8:13; 
Mal 1:10  1 Cor 10:5) while the “outsider” may be accepted by God (Acts 10:35).  
Accordingly, divine pleasure or displeasure in human beings is (partially) predicated on 
human disposition and/or action and may be manifest along with intense and profound divine 
emotions.
52
 As such, God’s love for individuals may, in fact, be increased and/or decreased 
according to their disposition and/or actions. Thus, the evaluative aspect of God’s love assumes 
divine responsiveness to human beings, including appraisal of their disposition and/or actions. As 
such, both God’s positive and negative responses to human beings are not arbitrary, but 
responsive to human actions. 
                                                     
 
301 and 506–10. 
50
 On God’s love for everyone, see the discussion of God’s universally relational love under the 
discussion of the relationally multilateral aspect of God’s love later in this chapter. 
51
 God hates evil because, among other reasons, it affects everyone negatively. In other words, his 
love for all must logically result in the response of hatred toward certain states of affairs and, even, specific 
persons who perpetrate evil. In this regard Leon Morris correctly points out that “we often confuse love 
with sentimentality. . . . There is a stern side to real love.” Testaments of Love: A Study of Love in the Bible 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1981), 25. Cf. Donald A. Carson, “Love,” New Dictionary of Biblical 
Theology, 647. 
52
 For example, God delights in righteousness, goodness, obedience, and lovingkindness (Jer 9:24; 
Mic 7:18; Ps 11:7; cf. 1 Pet 1:7; 3:4) but takes no pleasure in wickedness (Ps 5:4 [5]; cf. Deut 12:31; 28:63; 
Luke 16:15) nor in merely external sacrifice (1 Sam 15:22; Isa 1:11, 14; Hos 6:6; 9:4; Amos 5:21–22; Mic 
6:7–8; Ps 40:6 [7]; Heb 10:8  cf. Prov 15:8). The emotional intensity of God’s evaluative displeasure is 
evident when God himself declares, “I hate [literally, My soul (vp,n<) hates] your new moon festivals and 
your appointed feasts, they have become a burden to Me, I am weary of bearing them” (Isa 1:14  cf. Jer 
12:8; Hos 9:15; Amos 6:8; Ps 106:40). Thus, divine hatred is depicted in strongly emotional terms that 
point toward the passionate nature of God as well as the passionate nature of love. See the further 




Indeed, God’s displeasure is never described as arbitrary in Scripture but is always 
prompted by evil (cf. Hos 9:15).
53
 God never hates that which is good but justly hates evil.
54
 Yet, 
even his righteous indignation is tempered, due to his amazing mercy and grace.
55
 In the 
meantime, God longs for the day when his people will be his delight (Isa 62:4 [5]; cf. Isa 65:19; 
Jer 32:41; Ezek 20:39–42; Mal 3:12). The pinnacle of God’s joy is reserved for the day of 
ultimate restoration when reality will be in perfect accord with the divine will and pleasure and he 
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 “God’s wrath is [not] arbitrary or whimsical” but is the “righteous response of his holiness to 
sin.” Carson, New Dictionary of Biblical Theology, 647. 
54
 Not only is this apparent by reference to the canonical instances of divine hatred but it also 
follows from other Scriptural data. For example, Scripture laments that Jesus was “hated . . . without cause” 
(John 15:25  cf. Pss 35:19  69:4). It is here implicit that it is unjust to hate someone “without cause.” 
Would it not then be unjust of God to hate some humans without cause? The logical conclusion is that, as is 
evidenced in the canon, divine hatred is never groundless but always appropriate to the actual state of 
affairs. This corresponds to the frequent canonical conception of misdirected love, which assumes that love 
ought to be directed toward that which is good rather than that which is evil. Such a conception itself 
assumes the appropriateness of evaluative love. Thus, humans should love that which is good and hate that 
which is evil (cf. Amos 5:15; Titus 1:8). Misdirected love is frequently rebuked throughout the canon (see, 
among many others, Isa 1:23; 56:10; Hos 3:1; 9:10; 10:1; Amos 4:5; Prov 20:13; 2 Chr 19:2; Matt 6:5; 
23:6; Luke 11:42–43; 16:14; 20:46; 1 Tim 3:3; 6:10; 2 Tim 3:2–4; 4:10; Heb 13:5; 2 Pet 2:15; 3 John 9; 
Rev 22:15). Importantly, misdirected love is evil not because it includes desire, attraction, and enjoyment 
but because it is directed at that which should not be loved. This is contra Anders Nygren’s condemnation 
of what he called acquisitive or appetitive love. Agape and Eros (trans. P. S. Watson; London: SPCK, 
1953), 128, 210. Thus, Daniel L. Akin correctly states that it is “not the emotion that is felt by the 
individual” that is evil but “the question is whether that attraction is properly motivated, and directed to the 
right object.” 1, 2, 3, John (NAC 38; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 108. 
55
 Further, divine hatred does not necessarily refer to maximal negative emotion as the term “hate” 
in English generally connotes. The intensity of the divine feelings of hatred and/or displeasure depends on 
the context and can vary from the most intense loathing to mild aversion. Moreover, God may 
(temporarily) love and hate the same object(s) simultaneously. For example, God may come to hate his 
people evaluatively but still continue to long for a particular, love relationship with them and accordingly 
work to draw them to himself in the meantime. This corresponds to the subjective, universally relational, 
and foreconditional aspects of his love, which itself relates to the temporary and partial suspension of 
evaluative judgment. Eventually, however, without appropriate human response, such evaluative hatred 
will become permanent and God’s universally relational love will be forfeited. Nevertheless, in the 
meantime there is considerable complexity due to the sinfulness of the human objects of God’s love such 
that God might truly love and hate the same object, in different ways, at the same time. Tony Lane 
comments, “God loves sinners, not in the sense that he does not hate them along with their sin, but in the 
sense that he seeks their salvation in Christ.” “The Wrath of God as an Aspect of the Love of God,” in 
Nothing Greater, Nothing Better (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 155. He further suggests that it is 
possible to view God’s “wrath against a particular sinner [a]s demanded by his love for that particular 




will rejoice over his people even as the father rejoiced over his prodigal son who returned home 
(Luke 15:20–24; cf. Zeph 3:17).
56
 
The Partial and Temporary Suspension  
of the Effects of Divine Evaluation 
 However, what about the apparent tension between the concept of evaluative love and the 
reality that the objects of divine love are not worthy of love? For example, what is to be made of 
God’s love for the “righteous” in light of the fact that elsewhere the canon states that in God’s 
sight no one is righteous (cf. Ps 143:2; Rom 3:10) and all human righteousness is like filthy rags 
(Isa 64:6)? God is able to take pleasure in unworthy human beings because, due to his loving 
mercy and grace, he has temporarily and partially suspended the consequences of evaluative 
judgment in response to the entrance of evil into the world through the Fall (cf. Acts 17:3).
57
 
Without this there would not only be an absence of evaluative love toward creatures but humans 
themselves would be non-existent. Yet, while humans have ruptured the divine-human love 
relationship and deserve to die, God mercifully and graciously grants ongoing life and love (cf. 
Exod 33:18–34:10). That is, because of God’s voluntary and undeserved, steadfast love, 
manifested in the bestowal of mercy and grace, the eradication of evil, which would otherwise be 
immediate, is temporarily suspended so that all who will respond to God’s loving overtures might 
be reconciled to him (cf. 2 Pet 3:9; Ezek 18:32; 33:11).
58
 However, the temporary and partial 
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 God delights when even one lost person is found. See Luke 15:7, 10, 24; Matt 18; Ezek 34:10–
11, 13. 
57
 I qualify this suspension of the consequences of judgment as “partial” since God still does 
execute some judgment at all times but, presently, his positive judgments do not correspond to perfect 
judgment (other than the evaluation of Christ), since no creaturely objects are themselves worthy of 
positive appraisal, and his negative judgments are significantly tempered (but not nullified) by his 
longsuffering mercy and grace. Such “partial” judgment is especially prominent in the divine appraisal of 
his OT covenant people, who apparently function as a microcosm and type of the way the divine-human 
evaluation operates in accord with God’s mercy and grace.  
58
 Therefore, the word “righteous” is used in such instances in a qualified sense, a partial 
righteousness corresponding to the partial suspension of the effects of judgment. Of course, the very 




suspension of divine evaluation does not amount to its nullification. There will be future 
judgment, including the eradication of the impediment to the perfect divine-human love 
relationship, that is, evil (cf. Rev 20–21). In the meantime, God bestows his universally relational 
love on undeserving, sinful humans based on his own mediating work and, accordingly, actively 
draws humans to himself toward his ultimate goal of reciprocal divine-human love relationship. 
That divine evaluation is partially suspended requires that God’s positive appraisal of 
creatures is now only partially evaluative. No creaturely objects are presently worthy of positive 
evaluation. Indeed, absent divine intervention human beings are incapable by themselves of 
bringing anything valuable to God and are therefore unworthy objects of divine love (cf. Isa 
64:6).
59
 However, humans may bring value, such as pleasing “sacrifices,” to God only through: 
(1) the divine initiative of grace and love, which are bestowed prior to conditions (his 
foreconditional love), and (2) the mediation of Christ (and the Holy Spirit).  
First, prior to any human action, God has loved humans and, accordingly, draws them to 
himself (Jer 31:3) such that human love is predicated on, and responsive to, prior divine love (1 
John 4:19).
60
 This prior action dovetails with the volitional aspect of God’s love discussed earlier, 
since God not only decided to create beings whom he would love but also continued his 
universally relational love toward humans even after the Fall. Accordingly, God’s negative 
judgments are significantly tempered (but not nullified) by his longsuffering mercy and grace. 
                                                     
 
judgment as their occasion. 
59
 At the same time, it should not be forgotten that humans are all creatures of God and thus 
possess intrinsic value, not because they deserve it but because God has invested value in his humans 
whom he “fearfully and wonderfully made” (Ps 139:14) in his own image. As such, unworthy and sinful 
humans are not thereby valueless in the eyes of God. Humans thus always possess intrinsic value as 
divinely created but cannot generate value in and of themselves in their fallen state. 
60
 Thus, God declares, “I have loved you with an everlasting love; Therefore I have drawn you 
with lovingkindness” (Jer 31:3). Moreover, “We love, because He first loved us” (1 John 4:19). This aspect 
of God’s love will be discussed in more detail under the discussion of the foreconditional aspect of God’s 




Second, Christ’s mediation suffices for the deficiency of human righteousness for those 
who are “in Christ” by faith (which itself entails love as its indispensable corollary).
61
 That is, 
God values the human intention and motivation (itself impossible without God’s prior, loving 
action and continuing mediation) and adds to that intention and motivation the ongoing mediation 
of Christ that makes up for the human deficiencies (cf. 1 Pet 2:5). Thus, statements of God’s 
delight in the “righteous” do not mean that those humans merit or deserve God’s evaluative love. 
Rather, during this partial and temporary suspension of the effects of evaluative judgment Christ 
functions as mediator such that meager human offerings, themselves only possible because of 
God’s previous loving action toward humans, may be received as pleasing and acceptable to 
God.
62
 Thus, God truly loves the “righteous,” those who conscientiously respond to God’s loving 
overtures in good faith, while there is no one who is, in fact, wholly righteous since all strictly 
human righteousness is soiled (cf. Isa 64:6).
63
 As such, it must never be forgotten that such 
“righteousness” is conditional but is not itself meritorious  it could not be evaluated as “lovely” 
without divine mercy and mediation. God’s love toward his creatures is always undeserved but 
that does not rule out divine evaluation or conditionality. Through Christ, God’s attention is 
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 See the discussion of this in chapter 5, pages 492–506. 
62
 Whereas, in the OT human acceptability before God was mediated through the sanctuary system 
(typologically), the NT reveals Christ as the true mediator (antitype) through whom Christians might bring 
genuine value to God. “Through Christ,” humans may “offer up spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God” (1 
Pet 2:5) and be “pleasing in His sight” (Heb 13:21). Under this umbrella of divine mercy and mediation, 
God takes pleasure in even the smallest appropriate response to his love (cf. Mark 9:24; 2 Cor 8:12). That 
is, even though creatures are unworthy objects of divine delight, God takes pleasure in whatever 
“goodness” is exhibited in them. Accordingly, through Christ, God can look upon even meager offerings as 
valuable and pleasing to him. Christ’s mediation makes humble offerings acceptable by the superaddition 
of himself (cf. 1 Pet 2:5; Eph 5:2, 10). See also Ezek 20:39–42; Rom 12:1–2; Eph 5:1–2, 10; Phil 4:18; Heb 
13:12, 15–16. See also the mediatorial work of the Holy Spirit in Rom 8:26. 
63
 Perhaps some have overlooked the evaluative elements of divine love due to the fear of 
approaching the idea of merits or the fallacy that one might earn salvation. The key to understanding the 
apparent tension between the idea that God evaluates, appreciates, and may be pleased with human beings, 
resulting in blessings, with the idea that human righteousness is mere filthy rags is understanding the reality 




directed not only at what humans are in the present but what they might become in Christ.
64
 In 
this way, the partial and temporary suspension of the effects of evaluation allows for the 
mercifully positive divine appraisal of undeserving humans.  
Jesus Christ is the worthy and effective mediator since he himself is loved as the 
supremely worthy, excellent, valuable, precious, objectively and evaluatively choice and lovable 
Son of God. Thus, the Father declared, “This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well-pleased” 
(Matt 3:17).
65
 The Father’s love for the Son is itself evaluative, grounded in the reality of who 
Jesus is and what he does. Significantly, the Father’s evaluative love toward the Son depicts 
choice, evaluation, and emotion as complementary.
66
 Christ is thus the truly worthy object of 
God’s evaluative love while others may be the objects of God’s delight prior to the eschaton only 
to the extent that they are “in Christ,” receiving such privileges as God’s adopted children. In 
other words, Christ stands in as the proper object of divine love though whom humans may be 
beloved (cf. Eph 1:6; 5:2).
67
  
                                                     
 
64
 As Edward Collins Vacek suggests, “Agape is directed to the good of the beloved, whether this 
good is actual or only potential.” Love, Human and Divine: The Heart of Christian Ethics (Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994), 163. 
65
 That the Son is the worthy object of God’s love as “beloved” as well as the one who is truly 
pleasing to God, is abundantly attested in the canonical data. See Isa 42:1; Matt 3:17; 12:18; 17:5; Mark 
1:11; Luke 3:22; 9:35; Mark 9:7; Luke 9:35; John 8:29; Heb 1:9; 10:38; 1 Pet 2:4, 6; 2 Pet 1:17; Rev 5:9, 
12. 
66
 On the close association between divine choice, evaluation, and emotion consider the word 
studies in chapters 4 and 5 of avgaphto,j, euvdoke,w, qe,lw, bou,lomai, evkle,gomai, #px, hcr, and rxb on pages 
242–5, 277–84, 441–56, and 476–83. The use of such terms shows considerable overlap between that 
which God wills and his evaluative desires, that which brings him satisfaction, pleasure and/or delight, and 
even that which he loves or has affection toward. As such, there is a strong association in the canon 
between divine volition, evaluation, and emotion such that the divine will is not to the exclusion of, but 
includes, evaluation and emotion. Consider also the brief word studies of the many other terms used of 
divine evaluation and/or delight such as the avre,skw and do,kimoj word groups on pages 484–5. Further, see 
also the discussion of qvx on pages 266–7. 
67
 Christ is himself the eminently “elect” and “beloved” one through whom humans who respond 
with love to God’s loving overtures might be “elect” and “beloved” (cf. Eph 1:4–6). Thus, “Christ is the 
primary and exemplary elect” through whom others may be elected. Markus Barth, Ephesians 1–3 (AB 34; 
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), 86. In this way, “the Elect (Christ) bears the elect.” Schrenk, TDNT 
4:175. Cf. O’Brien, The Letter to the Ephesians, 99, 104–5; Andrew T. Lincoln, Ephesians (WBC 42; 




However, the temporary and partial suspension of the consequences of evaluation does 
not amount to nullification. Evil will finally be punished.
68
 Though divine mercy and grace 
endure beyond reasonable expectations, they do not nullify divine justice, especially 
eschatological judgment. In the future, there will be evaluative judgment that corresponds to the 
actual state of affairs. Indeed, the canon consistently points toward the reality of evaluative 
scrutiny and testing in judgment (cf. 1 Chr 29:17; Jer 11:20; Ps 7:9; Prov 27:21; Rom 8:27; 2 Cor 
10:18; 13:5–7; 1 Thess 2:4; 1 Pet 1:7; 4:12), especially eschatological judgment (1 Cor 3:13; 2 
Cor 5:9–10). Therein, God freely wills to resurrect those who respond to God and are thus 
accounted worthy (through Christ’s mediation, see Luke 20:35  cf. 2 Thess 1:5  2 Pet 1:10–11) 
and finally transformed into his likeness (cf. 1 Cor 15:51–56; 1 John 3:2).
69
 In all this, such 
positive divine appraisal is predicated on “faith” without which “it is impossible to please Him” 
(Heb 11:6). In this way, pleasing God is not something earned by the believer but it is 
nevertheless conditional upon true faith, which is finally rewarded.
70
 In the eschaton, the divine 
postponement of the consequences of evaluation will be over and the partial and mediated divine 
evaluation will turn to fully objective evaluation. Then, however, willing humans will have been 
transformed into perfectly loveable objects, having been changed by God. On the other hand, 
those who reject God’s love will also be judged accordingly. Thus, mediatorial justification prior 
                                                     
 
68
 C. F. H. Henry is correct in stating, “It is the God who regards sin solemnly who is the God of 
holy love—and none other.” Notes on the Doctrine of God (Boston: Wilde, 1948), 110. Thus, divine “love 
does not intercept God’s final punishment of evil.” Idem, God, Revelation, and Authority, 6:353. The 
alternative, “self-cancelling justice is not only unbiblical, it also implies amoral love.” Ibid., 6:354. 
69
 Evidently, being pleasing or acceptable to God entails eschatological consequences. “To be 
pleasing to God means that they will be vindicated and saved at the final judgment.” Thomas R. Schreiner, 
Romans (BECNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1998), 741. 
70
 As Douglas J. Moo puts it, “Some Christians have a difficulty with rewards, objecting that our 
obedience to Christ should be pure and disinterested, unmotivated by any such crass consideration as future 
reward. . . . But the contemplation of heaven’s rewards is found throughout the NT as a spur to our 
faithfulness in difficult circumstances here on earth.” The Letter of James (PNTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: 




to the final execution of judgment is not mere legal fiction but points to the fact that God will 
accomplish the perfection of those who love him (cf. Jas 1:12; 1 John 3:2).
71
  
God Has Bound His Own Interests to  
the Best Interests of His Creatures 
As has been seen, God’s evaluative love includes the fact that God derives pleasure from 
the positive disposition and actions of humans but is displeased at sin and evil of every kind. In 
this way, God himself is the model of both proper self-love and profound other-love. On the one 
hand, God rightly commands and receives worship and glory and enjoys and delights in 
relationship with his people. On the other hand, divine self-interest does not exclude other-
interest. Rather, by God’s free decision to create, sustain, and invest his love in the world, God’s 
self-interest includes the best interests of all others. In this way, God’s own enjoyment is 
voluntarily tied to the joy of his creatures, akin to a loving mother’s joy in her child’s happiness. 
For example, in Eph 5 the church is presented as analogous to Christ’s bride and his own 
body when Paul states, “Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ also loved the church and gave 
Himself up for her. . . . So husbands ought also to love their own wives as their own bodies. He 
who loves his own wife loves himself; for no one ever hated his own flesh, but nourishes and 
cherishes it, just as Christ also does the church, because we are members of his body” (Eph 5:25, 
28–30).
72 In these parallel metaphors of love, the giver (Christ) receives by giving. This is far 
from the selfishness that 1 Cor 13:5 excludes by stating that love “does not seek its own.” It is 
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 They will manifest the ultimate result of gold refined in the fire (cf. 1 Pet 1:7; 4, 12). In other 
words, divine love, which is undeserved, will then be warranted as a result of the completed process of 
mediation, redemption, and reconciliation. Even then, however, divine love will not be merited since divine 
favor could never be deserved by creatures; existence itself is a gift. 
72
 While process thinkers might see in this passage an example of panentheism, the fact that the 
two metaphors of wife and body are mutually exclusive, if applied literally, rules this notion out. Such 
language should not be taken to refer to an essential relation between Jesus and human beings any more 
than a man and a woman form an essential relation when they are married and “become one” (Gen 2:24  1 





appropriate self-interest that includes other-interest. Here, the self-sacrificial love of Christ in 
dying for the church that she might be redeemed as his bride is bound up with his self-love, that 
is, his love for his metaphorical body, the church. 
Thus, that God may be the beneficiary of creaturely action, enjoying, delighting, and 
taking pleasure in human love toward him and others (which itself is indirectly love toward him) 
in no way depreciates his love. God enjoys human beings, delights in them, and is joyous in their 
joy. His creatures’ best interest is his interest and this is genuine, compassionate love.
73
 This is 
also true of God’s zeal for his name (cf. Joel 2:18), which is not exclusive to other-interest since 
the proper revelation of God’s love encourages human love response.
74
  
In all this, God’s love is consistently evaluative. While sinful humans cannot by 
themselves bring value to God, they may bring value and joy to him because of God’s enabling 
and drawing action, especially the mediation of Christ. Yet, while God has proper self-interest, he 
is never selfish. God’s life is intimately affected by the lives of humans because he has made their 
best interests his own  the joy of others is integral to God’s own joy.
75
 In this manner, God 
models, affirms, and prescribes an unselfish self-interest, most clearly manifest in the 
demonstration of God’s love at the cross (cf. Rom 5:8). 
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 While humans, being selfish, often place their own interests above those of others, God 
experiences no such conflict of interests because his will is perfectly directed toward the best good of all 
which, in its fullness, will bring him and them joy. 
74
 This interrelation of God’s self and other-interest is itself tied to God’s compassion and 
sympathy as well as his zeal and passion. On these elements see the discussion of the emotive nature of 
divine love in the next section.  
75
 Indeed, when one sinner is saved, heaven rejoices (Luke 15:7, 10). As such, God’s joy is 
increased or decreased by the actual state of affairs in the world because God has bound his own interests to 




The Emotional Aspect of Divine Love 
God’s Love Is Deeply Emotional and Affected 
Scripture consistently displays God’s intensely passionate and profoundly emotional love 
for his people.
76
 God is deeply concerned about the goings on of history, makes commitments and 
keeps them, and is consistently concerned about and emotionally invested in the world, which 
spurs him to appropriate action (cf. Exod 2:23–25).
77
 God is thus presented as ever-involved and 
invested in the world that he created, being affectionate, loving, devotedly interested in and 
intimately concerned with human beings.
78
 Indeed, God delights in goodness, takes pleasure in 
righteousness, and is joyous over every person who responds to his loving overtures (cf. Zeph 
3:17).
79
 God is, then, intensely interested in and affected by humans, and may be pleased and 
enjoy them. On the other hand, God feels sorrow, passion, and intense anger at human evil, while 
                                                     
 
76
 Here, “emotion” refers to any feeling(s) that may be affected by external stimulation. Yet, 
emotions are not necessarily determined by external stimulus to the exclusion of other mental factors, 
including volition, evaluation, etc. With this in mind, the term emotion is used in this dissertation to refer to 
that which manifests a passible, affective response to the state of affairs. No attempt is made here to broach 
the ongoing conflict of interpretations in the field of psychology regarding the definition and nature of 
emotion. However, this model does appear to complement the aspects of some cognitive (but not 
exclusively cognitive) theories of emotions that give weight to an evaluative component wherein emotion is 
a response to an agent’s evaluation of the state of affairs. See the brief discussion in Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
“Suffering Love,” in Augustine’s Confessions: Critical Essays (ed. W. E. Mann; Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2006), 123.  
77
 This is evident in the intimacy of the creation and fall accounts, the divine initiative, watch care, 
and grief displayed in the flood, patriarchal, Exodus, conquest, kingdoms, exile and restoration narratives in 
the OT as well as by the intense divine concern and interest manifested through the incarnation, life, death, 
and resurrection of Christ and through apostolic times and even unto the forecasted parousia. 
78
 In this presentation, the manifestation of divine emotionality in the incarnation of Christ has not 
been separated from the other manifestations of divine emotion in Scripture but they are taken to represent 
truly divine emotions. Indeed, Christ came to reveal God and proclaimed in no uncertain terms “He who 
has seen Me has seen the Father” (John 14:9). However, even if one were to exclude the emotions of 
Christ, the emotionality of divine love is readily apparent even without those instances. Moreover, the 
correspondence between the emotions of Christ and those of YHWH elsewhere themselves present a 
compelling argument that such emotions are divine rather than merely human. See the methodology section 
in chapter 1 for a further discussion of this issue and the potential theological ramifications of positing that 
Jesus’ emotions were merely human. 
79
 God “will exult” over his people “with joy, He will be quiet in His love, He will rejoice over 




also compassion and the desire to bring wayward humans back into proper relationship with 
himself (see below).  
God’s love consistently manifests strong affection for, and interest in, his creatures (cf. 
Isa 49:15; 63:9; Jer 31:20; Hos 3:1; 9:15; 11:1, 8–9; Zeph 3:17; Mark 10:21; John 13:1). His 
people are “beloved” and “dear” to him.
80
 For example, God’s love is likened to the tender 
affection of a parent who adopts and cares for a child. Thus, God “loved” Israel as “a youth” and 
called his “son” out of Egypt (Hos 11:1).
81
 Even when they rebel against him, God’s “heart 
yearns” for his people whom he calls “My dear son” and “delightful child” (Jer 31:20).
82
 God’s 
compassion and sympathy for his children is even greater than the love of any mother for her 
newborn child. Indeed, God himself proclaims, “Can a woman forget her nursing child and have 
no compassion on the son of her womb? Even these may forget, but I will not forget you” (Isa 
49:15).
83
 This depth of God’s compassion is symbolized by the passionate and joyous love of the 
father for his prodigal son who returned (Luke 15:20). Jesus likewise manifests this profoundly 
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 See, for example, the word studies of qvx and avgaphto,j, among others, in the canonical chapters, 
pages 266–7 and 476–80. avgaphto,j, for example, generally refers to that which is loved, often in the sense 
of being dearly loved, prized, and/or valued, the object of one’s affection, and may be used of emotional 
attachment to a dear one, as dydy and dyxy. 
81
 God also taught “Ephraim to walk,” took him in his arms, cared for him (Hos 11:3–4), and 
“carried” his people “just as a man carries his son” (Deut 1:31). In “God’s love and His mercy He 
redeemed them” and “lifted them and carried them all the days of old” (Isa 63:9  cf. John 13:1). 
82
 Notice the intensely emotional phraseology of God’s heart yearning. See the discussion of this 
imagery in chapter 4 on pages 327–8. See also Exod 4:22; Deut 1:31; 8:5, 16; Isa 49:15; 66:13; Jer 31:20; 
Hos 11:1, 3–4; Ps 103:13; Prov 3:11–12; cf. Luke 15:20. 
83 ~xr, the term used in Isa 49:15 to compare God’s love to that of a mother’s compassion, is 
probably denominative from ~x,r,  “womb,” and accordingly evokes the image of a “womb-like mother 
love.” See Phyllis Trible, God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality (OBT 2; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), 
31–59. See the word study of ~xr on pages 302–7. Consider also the physiological idiom associated with 
~xr and splagcni,zomai, which speaks to the depth of the divine emotions of compassion as if they are 
located in his churning “innards” (cf. Isa 63:15). See the discussion of this and other intensely emotional 
imagery of God’s love on pages 327–8. Elsewhere, God loves his people even as “one whom his mother 





emotional love. When he sees people in need he is moved with compassionate love for them (cf. 
Matt 9:36; 14:14; Mark 1:41; 6:34; 10:21; Luke 7:14). 
God’s compassionate love frequently appears in the face of sin and evil, meeting human 
apostasy with forbearance and grace. For example, though God’s people deserve to be cut off 
after the rebellious worship of the golden calf, God freely bestows compassion and mercy upon 
those who choose to repent and follow him (Exod 32:26–30; 33:19). In doing so, he reveals his 
character, which he later proclaims to Moses: “The Lord, the Lord God, compassionate and 
gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in lovingkindness and truth; who keeps lovingkindness 
for thousands, who forgives iniquity, transgression and sin” (Exod 34:6–7). Thus, God’s 
compassion, mercy, and lovingkindness are astounding in their greatness, depth, and longevity. 
God is exceedingly longsuffering and patient in his compassionate and merciful love, which 
endures beyond all reasonable expectations.
84
 
In many other instances, God responds to supplication and/or entreaty because of his 
great love, being moved to compassion, and relents from the execution of judgment in reaction to 
human entreaty and/or appropriate response (cf. Judg 2:18; Jer 18:1–10; Joel 2:13–14; Jonah 3:9–
10; 4:2; cf. Matt 18:27).
85
 Even though God’s people repeatedly betrayed and forsook him, God 
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 Likewise, see Joel 2:13; Jonah 4:2; Ps 86:15; Neh 9:17, 31, among others. Accordingly, the 
Bible frequently speaks of the greatness or abundance of God’s mercy or compassion (cf. Deut 4:31; 2 Sam 
24:14; Isa 63:7; Ps 51:1; Neh 9:19, 31; Lam 3:22; Dan 9:18; 1 Chr 21:13; Luke 1:58; Eph 2:4; Jas 5:11). 
See the further evidence of profound divine compassion, heartfelt concern, sympathy, and mercy by way of 
the discussion of the ~xr, lmx, swx, oivkti,rw, splagcni,zomai, and evlee,w word groups in the word studies in 
chapters 4 and 5, especially pages 302–7, 511–19. Likewise, God’s emotional commitment to his people is 
apparent in his dsx, lovingkindness, which is often associated with his compassion in the OT and in some 
aspects closely related to the NT concept of mercy. See the word studies on pages 354–75 and 511–19. 
Norman H. Snaith suggests that in dsx there is “inherent in the word” something of “eagerness, ardor” and 
“intense devotion” of the “love of God.” The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament (London: The Epworth 
Press, 1962), 106. Such terms as used with divine agency demonstrate consistently that God is deeply 
affected by, and interested in, the lives of his creatures. 
85
 See also Gen 18:22–32; Exod 32:1–14; 33:12–34:10; Isa 30:19; Pss 69:16 [17]; 102:17; 
119:132; Neh 9:27; Dan 9:18; 2 Chr 7:14. For even more evidence of divine responsiveness see Deut 
32:10–11; Isa 31:5; 40:11; Hos 11:8; 13:5; Ps 23:4; 1 Chr 21:15; John 10:11, 13–14; Heb 2:6; 8:9; 1 Pet 
5:7. Yet, God is never unduly swayed or unreliable as are humans (cf. 1 Sam 15:29; Jer 4:28; 15:6). Thus, 




continued to patiently bestow compassion.
86
 This compassion and mercy, which takes into 
account the distress and/or needs of humans, is itself a grounding of divine beneficence.
87
 Such 
repeated, undeserved kindness manifests the depth of God’s emotional attachment to human 
beings. Yet, God’s response to entreaty is not automatic. He may also not relent (1 Sam 15:29  Jer 
4:28; 15:6).
88
 Thus, while God experiences strong emotions, God is nevertheless volitionally free 
and evaluative (see the previous two sections). 
Accordingly, even God’s compassion and mercy have a limit. Divine compassion is 
neither constant nor immutable, but conditional within real, historically significant 
interrelationship.
89
 God’s people may so persistently reject him that he withdraws his 
“lovingkindness and compassion” from them (Jer 16:5  cf. Isa 9:17  27:11  63:15  Jer 11:15  
14:10; Ezek 5:11; Hos 9:15; Ps 89:49). God, however, never wished to do so. He did everything 
he could do to avoid this outcome (Isa 5:1–7).
90
 God thus expects appropriate response from his 
people (cf. Exod 20:6; Matt 5:7; 6:12, 14–15  Luke 6:36  2 Chr 30:9). God’s lovingkindness, 
compassion, and mercy are not unconditional (cf. Luke 1:50; Gal 6:16; Heb 10:28; Jas 2:13; Jude 
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 Thus, “God is a compassionate God” (Deut 4:31) whose “mercies are great” (2 Sam 24:14  1 
Chr 21:13) and whose “lovingkindnesses never cease” and “compassions never fail” (Lam 3:22). He is 
sympathetic (cf. Isa 63:9; Heb 4:15), deeply affected by the sorrows of his people (Judg 10:16; Luke 
19:41), and willing to hear, answer, and comfort (Isa 49:10, 15; Matt 9:36; 14:14). He is a God of “tender 
mercy” (Luke 1:78), “rich in mercy” and “great love” (Eph 2:4), “the Father of mercies and God of all 
comfort” (2 Cor 1:3). See also many other references to the greatness of God’s compassion, 
lovingkindness, and mercy in Isa 63:7; Ps 51:1; Neh 9:19, 31; Dan 9:18; Luke 1:58; Jas 5:11.  
87
 See Ps 51:1; Matt 15:32; Luke 1:54, 78; Eph 2:4; Titus 3:4–5; 1 Pet 1:3. It is a grounding but 
not the only grounding (cf. Eph 2:4). 
88
 For example, only wholehearted, heartfelt worship moves God, in conjunction with repentance 
and obedience/fidelity (cf. Mal 1:9–10). See the word study of ~xn in the OT chapter. See also John C. 
Peckham, “The Passible Potter and the Contingent Clay: A Theological Study of Jeremiah 18:1–10,” 
Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 18 (2007): 130–50. 
89
 See the discussion of the foreconditionality of divine love in the following section of this 
chapter. 
90
 Indeed, God “sent word to them again and again by His messengers, because He had 
compassion on His people” yet “they continually mocked the messengers of God, despised His words and 
scoffed at His prophets, until the wrath of the LORD arose against His people, until there was no remedy” 




21) and, thus, may be forfeited (cf. Deut 13:8 [9]; Isa 9:17 [16]; 27:11; Jer 15:1; 16:5; Ezek 5:11; 
Hos 13:5–8; Matt 18:27, 33, 35; Rom 11:22; Heb 8:9).
91
 In this way, God’s mercy and 
compassion are not automatic. God is not compelled to be gracious but freely bestows 
compassion and mercy on his creatures (Exod 33:19; Rom 9:15–16).
92
  
At the same time, divine love includes justice. Though God is exceedingly compassionate 
and gracious he “will by no means leave the guilty unpunished” (Exod 34:6–7). God is thus 
willing to forgive but not to the exclusion of justice nor in the ultimate absence of the love 
relationship with his people that he so desires. He “longs to be gracious” to his people and 
“therefore waits on high to have compassion” (Isa 30:18–19; cf. 2 Chr 30:9; Hos 2:19 [21]; Joel 
2:18–19; Heb 8:12).
93
 Though God consistently longs to bestow compassion on his people, his 
compassion is often interrupted by their rebellion (Isa 5; Matt 23:37; Luke 13:34). They 
repeatedly forsook God with other gods and thus forfeited his deliverance (Judg 10:13; 1 Sam 
8:8; 1 Kgs 11:33; 2 Kgs 22:17; Jer 1:16 cf. Hos 13:5–6). Similarly, Christ lamented while 
pondering Jerusalem’s coming hardship, “How often I wanted to gather your children together, 
the way a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were unwilling” (Matt 23:37). God 
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 For example, God’s “mercy is upon generation after generation toward those who fear him” 
(Luke 1:50) and “blessed are the merciful, for they shall receive mercy” (Matt 5:7  cf. Exod 20:6  Ps 
103:13  Gal 6:16  Jude 21) but “judgment will be merciless to the one who has shown no mercy” (Jas 
2:13). Thus, though its lasting nature stands in stark contrast to the fleetingness of divine anger, even divine 
compassion has a limit. It is not inexhaustible (cf. 2 Chr 36:15–17). In this way the efficacy and 
manifestation of divine compassion fluctuates, not because God is capricious, but in direct relationship to 
the vacillation of his wayward people. Thus, the canon does not support the contention: “Because 
compassion is inherent to Yahweh’s nature, its disappearance is conceivable only if the order of human 
nature and the universe could be overthrown.” H. Simian-Yofre, “רחם,” TDOT 13:441. Interestingly, 
elsewhere Simian-Yofre refers to God’s “absolute freedom.” How can it be both? 
92
 See also Pss 78:38; 135:14 [136:14]; Neh 9:19, 31; Rom 9:15–16, 18; Heb 8:12. The divine 
initiative is free and primary and he may reject human repentance and/or refuse compassion though he does 
not do so without good reason such as when “the people have become so corrupt and disloyal at their core 
that no hope for true and sustained repentance seems possible” and they proffer only “shallow repentance,” 
which is not “heartfelt.” Cf. Hos 5:8–6:6. Dennis T. Olson, “The Book of Judges,” in Numbers–Samuel 
(vol 2 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1998), 826. Cf. Carl F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and 
Authority, 6:410. 
93
 God thus waits to respond to human entreaty and repentance (cf. Jer 18:1–10). Here again, it is 




still feels for and longs for his people in periods of their apostasy but his compassion does not 
reach them due to their rejection of God. Such removal of divine compassion is never arbitrary 
but always responsive to human infidelity and evil (cf. Hos 5:8–6:6).  
God’s Intense but Always  
Appropriate Passion 
God’s profound love and concern for the world is further evident in his passion. Indeed, 
God describes himself as a “jealous God,” that is, the passionate lover of his people (Exod 20:5  
Deut 5:9; cf. 34:14; 4:24; 6:15; Josh 24:19; Nah 1:2).
94
 God’s jealousy, however, lacks the 
negative connotations of human jealousy. God’s jealousy is a wholly appropriate and virtuous 
aspect of his love. It is never envious. God is never jealous of other gods or idols or any kind of 
being but his jealousy is always directed at that which rightfully belongs to him. God is thus 
passionate for his name and his people.
95
 
As such, God’s “jealousy,” or passionate love, is always directed toward that which 
rightfully belongs to him. Accordingly, God’s jealousy is primarily manifest as his appropriate 
desire for exclusive relationship with his people whom he passionately loves.
96
 That is, just as 
spouses ought to be dedicated to one another in exclusive relationship, God expects and desires a 
love relationship with his people that is undiluted. 
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 However, God’s love and passion never refers to sexual desires or activity.  
95
 God’s passion for his “name” relates not only to self-interest but also God’s concern for 
creatures since an accurate picture of his character is more likely to draw people to respond to his 
passionate love. See Ezek 39:25; John 2:17. 
96
 It is thus analogous to that which spouses ought to have in a marriage relationship, though it 
never amounts to petty or inappropriate jealousy as often manifested in human relationships. Accordingly, 
Paul R. House correctly explains that jealousy “troubles many readers of Scripture who consider jealousy a 
solely negative trait. Jealous protection of what is rightly one’s own, however, is justified. For example, 
most marriage partners do not want their spouses violated sexually. They are justifiably protective of an 
exclusive sexual relationship. . . . In these examples jealousy is a good and normal trait. God’s jealousy is 
equally positive.” Divine jealousy “is no character flaw. Instead it magnifies God’s righteousness, concern, 




However, God himself is often depicted as a scorned husband, the unrequited lover of an 
unfaithful wife (see Hos 1–3; Isa 62:4; Jer 2:2; 3:1–12; Ezek 16, 23; Zech 8:2; cf. 2 Cor 11:2).
97
 
Because of God’s intense and wholly appropriate desire to receive the undiluted love and fidelity 
of his people, God becomes impassioned at their unfaithfulness and spiritual adultery.
98
 That is, 
the repeated adulterous liaisons between God’s people and false gods provoke his jealousy (Deut 
32:21; 1 Kgs 14:22; 1 Cor 10:22).
99
 On the other hand, God’s passion may also be directed 
against those who abuse and oppress his beloved people, in favor of and toward the restoration of 
his people (cf. Isa 26:11).
100
 
God’s Pain, Grief and Anger as Righteous 
and Loving Indignation and Wrath 
Thus, God’s love manifests itself not only in positive emotions but also in negative 
emotions. God is often provoked by his people, displeased, grieved, vexed, anguished, and/or 
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 Elaine Adler points out that the language utilized in the marriage metaphor, including bha, is 
affectionate and passionate. Cf. “The Background for the Metaphor of Covenant as Marriage” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of California, Berkeley, 1990), 70. “‘A wife of youth’ suggests all the passionate devotion of a 
young married couple with the bright hopes of their early married life.” J. A. Motyer, Isaiah: An 
Introduction and Commentary (TOTC 18; Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1999), 447. 
98
 See Deut 32:21; 1 Kgs 14:22; Ps 77:58; cf. 1 Cor 10:22. “Yahweh is ardent in both love and 
justice.” Francis I. Andersen and David Noel Freedman, Hosea: A New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary (AB 24; New York: Doubleday, 1980), 187. Gerald L. Borchert comments, “The way Jesus 
reacted to the Jewish merchandising in the temple [in John 2:17] troubles some who cannot conceive of a 
loving Jesus being angry. But spineless love is hardly love. Instead, characteristics that adhere to anger and 
judgment can in fact be the obverse side of the coin of love.” John 1–11 (NAC 25A; Nashville, Tenn.: 
Broadman & Holman, 2001), 164. 
99
 Thus, God’s passion is frequently manifested in anger and wrath at their infidelity. Such 
negative emotions, however, are not essential to divine passion itself but the appropriate response to the 
actual state of affairs. Absent sin and evil, manifested in infidelity, the negative aspect of passion (as well 
as other emotions) would not be. In response to infidelity, God disciplines his people but such discipline is 
itself grounded in his passionate love for them with the hope of ultimate reclamation (cf. Prov 3:12; Rev 
3:19). Moreover, as seen further above, God responds repeatedly to heartfelt entreaty and is willing to 
relent of discipline and return in his compassion and graciousness, which far exceed his wrath.  
100
 Thus, “the Lord will be zealous for His land and will have pity on His people” (Joel 2:18  cf. 
Zech 1:14–17). Moreover, “out of Jerusalem will go forth a remnant, and out of Mount Zion survivors. The 
zeal of the Lord will perform this” (2 Kgs 19:31  Isa 37:32  cf. Zech 8:2–3; Heb 10:27). See also Isa 26:11; 






 Though God worked miracles and blessed Israel abundantly they forgot him and 
continually rebelled against him. “How often they rebelled against Him in the wilderness and 
grieved Him in the desert! Again and again they tempted God, and pained the Holy One of Israel” 
(Ps 78:40–41; cf. Gen 6:5–6  Isa 63:10  1 Cor 10:5). Thus, God’s emotional response to evil 
includes displeasure, wrath, jealousy, and when pressed, even hatred, abhorrence, and loathing. 
Indeed, “they provoked Him with their high places and aroused his jealousy with their graven 
images” so that God was “filled with wrath and greatly abhorred Israel” (Ps 78:58–59; cf. Jer 
12:8; Hos 9:15; Ps 95:10–11; Heb 3:8–10).  
God’s wrath is never arbitrary but is always the appropriate response to sin and suffering, 
that is, it is the result of human provocation.
102
 As shall be seen further below, God’s love and 
mercy far surpass such negative emotions, postponing and mitigating, but not cancelling, the 
execution of divine judgment. Yet, God’s love does not nullify his justice or righteousness. True 
love requires justice and righteousness and thus God’s anger against evil also stems from his love 
for all and his desire for the ultimate good of the universe. If God did not finally execute 
judgment against evil, the world would be left in an indefinite state of degradation, much to the 
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 See Exod 20:5–6; 34:6–7; Ps 78:10–72; 2 Chr 28:25; 33:6; 34:24–25; Heb 3:8–10, 15. The 
frequent recurrence of such provocation is highly significant. “God’s anger (cf. Num 14:11, 23, 43b) was 
not aroused by a single incident but by a persistent tendency to refuse his direction.” William L. Lane, 
Hebrews 1–8 (WBC 47A; Dallas: Word, 2002), 86. See also Gen 6:5–7; Deut 32:21; 1 Kgs 14:22; Isa 
63:10; 65:3; Jer 12:8–9; Hos 9:15; Pss 78:40–41, 58–60; 95:9–11; Mark 3:5; 1 Cor 10:5. Likewise, out of 
his profound love and passion for his people, God may be grieved, vexed, and angered at evil (cf. John 
11:38). 
102
 See Deut 32:21; 1 Kgs 14:22; Isa 65:3; Pss 78:10–72; 95:9–11; 2 Chr 28:25; 33:6; 34:24–25 
among many other examples. The atrocities that elicited divine anger included child sacrifice, all kinds of 
debauchery that was even mixed in with worship, defiling and perverting the very means of the people’s 
communion with God (cf. 2 Chr 33:6). In light of this, should not Yahweh be indignant at depraved 
wickedness? Is he not righteous to respond against evil? As such, negative divine emotions are thoroughly 
evaluative, not arbitrary. As D. D. Williams puts it, “what is clear is that his wrath and punishment are 
never unmotivated.” The Spirit, 22. So, also Patrick D. Miller, “The Book of Jeremiah” in Isaiah–Ezekiel 
(vol. 6 of NIB; Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 2001), 814  K. D. Schunck, “חםה,” TDOT 13:464. 
Carson adds, “Where there is no sin, there is no wrath, but there will always be love in God.” The Difficult 




detriment of all of God’s creatures.
103
 If God loves everyone (cf. John 3:16) his concern for all 
requires that he mete out justice and finally eradicate evil. God passionately hates evil, as he 
should, and he will bring it to an utter end. Thus, the benefits of God’s love have a limit. In the 
meantime, God’s discipline of his people while there is yet time to repent and turn to him is itself 
out of his love and desire that they might be saved (cf. 2 Pet 3:9). Thus, God disciplines his 
people “just as a man disciplines his son” (Deut 8:5) “to do good” for them “in the end” (Deut 
8:16). “For whom the Lord loves He reproves, even as a father corrects the son in whom he 
delights” (Prov 3:12  cf. Heb 12:6  Rev 3:19). In all this, it is because God is love that evil 
provokes him to intense, always appropriate anger. 
God’s Wrath-Surpassing  
Compassionate Love 
 Nevertheless, God’s love and mercy far surpass his negative emotions.
104
 Indeed, God 
continually restrains his anger in longsuffering and patience, hoping to call humans back to him 
(cf. Ps 78:38) and thus, in his patience, repeatedly postpones and mitigates the execution of divine 
judgment. The striking tension between God’s profound love and justice is evident in the angst of 
God over his people who have rejected him: “How can I give you up, O Ephraim? How can I 
surrender you, O Israel? How can I make you like Admah? How can I treat you like Zeboiim? 
My heart is turned over within Me, All My compassions are kindled” (Hos 11:8  cf. Isa 30:15, 
18–19; Jer 3:1, 4, 8, 12).
105
 Nevertheless, despite the intensity of evoked emotion, God retains 
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 As D. C. K. Watson puts it, “Unless God detests sin and evil with great loathing, He cannot be 
a God of Love.” My God Is Real (London: Falcon, 1970), p. 39, quoted in T. Lane, “The Wrath of God,” in 
Nothing Greater, Nothing Better, 160. 
104
 Thus, the “Lord of Israel is not a Janus-faced God, a God of wrath and a God of love. The 
wrath of God is always subordinated to the love of God.” Miller, “The Book of Jeremiah,” in Isaiah–
Ezekiel, 6:814. 
105
 Thus, “there is a constant tension between justice and mercy. God is a righteous God and will 
not tolerate evil. Punishment is inevitable if sinful behavior persists. The world makes moral sense. God 
cannot abandon God’s own standards of justice. And yet, God is constantly pulled in the direction of 




self-control, restraining his anger, limiting his wrath, and forgiving according to his compassion. 
“But He, being compassionate, forgave their iniquity and did not destroy them  and often He 
restrained His anger and did not arouse all His wrath” (Ps 78:38). Thus, God never overreacts like 
humans are prone to do.  
God does not want to act in wrath. Even in times of judgment God “does not afflict 
willingly” but “if He causes grief, then He will have compassion” (Lam 3:32–33; cf. Judg 10:16). 
He does not want to destroy his people (cf. Isa 30:18; Luke 13:34, etc.). However, eventually, 
love requires action against evil, however unpalatable even to God himself. Yet, “God’s anger 
lasts but a moment in contrast to his favor, which lasts a lifetime (Ps 30:5).
106
 Thus, God’s 
positive emotions for his people far exceed the negative, both in intensity and duration. While the 
consequences of iniquity may reach to the fourth generation, God “keeps lovingkindness” unto 
the thousandth generation (Exod 34:7). In this way, God’s love exceeds all reasonable 
expectations and he is disposed toward positive emotions, which far exceed the negative ones in 
both intensity and duration (cf. Isa 54:7–10; Jer 33:26). The ultimate depth of divine love is 
manifested in God’s giving of his own son, his beloved, for undeserving human beings (John 
3:16).
107
 Though the magnitude of the Father’s love for the Son is beyond description, the entire 
Godhead desires the reconciliation of creatures to themselves so much that they made the ultimate 
sacrifice. There is no greater love than this (John 15:13). 
                                                     
 
awaiting them. God wants to forgive and move on to better things if people will give at least some hint of 
repentance.” Daniel J. Simundson, “The Book of Micah,” in The Twelve Prophets (vol. 7 of NIB; 
Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1996), 589. Cf. O. Palmer Robertson, The Books of Nahum, Habbakkuk, 
and Zephaniah (NICOT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990), 61. 
106
 See also Isa 12:1; 54:7–8; Jer 31:3, 13, 20, 25–26; Hos 14:4. 
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 “Surely, to see his son die in such a cruel fashion would break any father’s heart—much more 





The Emotionality of Divine Love 
Complements Its Volitional  
and Evaluative Aspects 
Though God’s love is deeply emotional it is not only emotional. The emotionality of 
God’s love complements its volitional and evaluative aspects, all three of which are mutually 
supportive and interrelated. The evaluative and emotional aspects of divine love are especially 
closely related since both of them assume divine passibility and point to the fact that God can 
enter into a mutually beneficial (though unequal) relationship of give-and-take with human 
beings. As seen in the previous section, and earlier in this one, there is some overlap between the 
evaluative aspects of God’s love and emotionality. For example, God’s delight in his people is 
both evaluative and emotive. Likewise, God’s displeasure is emotional but always evaluative.
108
 
There are some, however, who have suggested that love must not be emotional if it is 
commanded since, it is supposed, one cannot command an emotion.
109
 In this view, love must be 
volitional rather than emotional. Some have thus supposed that the love commands of Scripture 
refer merely to the legal aspects of covenant relationship, that is, purely willed and external 
obedience, devoid of emotion.
110
 However, it is not true that love that can be commanded must be 
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 Indeed, the contrast between divine love and hate, affection and animosity, throughout the 
canon strikingly portrays both the emotive and evaluative aspects of love. “Jesus himself had loved and 
hated keenly—hated because he loved, hated intensely whatever challenged, misrepresented, and thwarted 
the divine purpose on earth.” James Moffat, Love in the New Testament (New York: Harper, 1930), 54. 
Even C. F. H. Henry speaks of “God’s enmity toward sinners” as “not merely a passive attitude but one of 
active hostility.” God, Revelation, and Authority, 6:358. Here, C. F. H. Henry speaks as if divine wrath may 
be elicited but it is clear in his system that all actually stems from the omnicausal divine volition. 
109
 Stein thus states, “Emotions can be elicited but not commanded. Actions and the will can be 
commanded.” Luke, 206–7. Morris likewise contends, “While it is nonsense to be commanded to generate a 
passionate eros, it is not nonsense to be commanded to respond to God’s 1ove.” Thus, for him, “we must 
not confuse love with passion or sentimentality.” Testaments of Love, 187, 189. Similarly, W. D. Davies 
and Dale C. Allison, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to Saint Matthew 
(ICC  London: T&T Clark International, 1997), 241  Bernard J. Bamberger, “Fear and Love of God in the 
Old Testament,” HUCA 6 (1929): 39–53  J. W. McKay, “Man's Love for God in Deuteronomy and the 
Father/Teacher—Son/Pupil Relationship,” VT 22 (1972): 426; Dennis McCarthy, “Notes on the Love of 
God in Deuteronomy and the Father-Son Relationship between Yahweh and Israel,” CBQ 27 (1965): 145–
46. 
110
 For example, based on ANE parallels, it has been suggested that the primary OT term of love, 




non-emotional. Such a view posits a false dichotomy as if love is merely emotion or volition to 
the exclusion of one another.  
Certainly, love toward God is to be manifest in obedience and such love is not merely 
emotional. However, can true wholehearted loyalty not involve emotions (cf. Matt 6:24; Luke 
16:13)? Is not loyalty and commitment much stronger if it is also grounded in devoted affection, 
even zealous passion? The thoroughgoing, loving obedience God desires cannot be merely 
external. Rather, genuine loyalty involves the entire person (cf. Deut 4:29; 10:20; Josh 23:8).
111
 
Accordingly, love may be both passionate and volitional in response to command and/or entreaty. 
In fact, the divine love commands themselves require not merely external compliance, but 
internal, wholehearted response.
112
 The love that God desires from humans is to come from the 
whole person, including the emotions.
113
 
                                                     
 
contrasted with affection. So William L. Moran, “The Ancient Near Eastern Background of the Love of 
God in Deuteronomy,” CBQ 25 (1963): 78. Cf. McCarthy, “Notes,” 144–46; Susan Ackerman, “The 
Personal Is Political: Covenantal and Affectionate Love ('āhēb, 'ahâbâ) in the Hebrew Bible,” VT 52 
(2002): 440  P. J. J. S. Els, “אהב,” NIDOTTE 1:285–87  Norbert Lohfink, “Hate and Love in Osee 9, 15,” 
CBQ 25 (1963): 417; Larry R. Walker, “‘Love’ in the Old Testament: Some Lexical Observations,” in 
Current Issues in Biblical and Patristic Interpretation (ed. Gerald F. Hawthorne; Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1975), 283–84. In this vein, a distinction is often made between the emotional affection in 
intimate personal relationships (family, friendship) as opposed to the merely political “love” of treaty 
contexts. Cf. Ackerman, “The Personal,” 440  J. A. Thompson, “Israel’s ‘Lovers,’” VT 27 (1977): 475–81; 
idem, “Significance of the Verb Love in the David-Jonathan Narratives in 1 Samuel,” VT 24 (1974): 334–
38. See the further discussion of this in chapter 4, pages 233–8. 
111
 The command to love God “requires to be exercised by the whole man and demands of him an 
ultimate decision . . . one which proves itself in unreserved trust.” Viktor Warnach, “Love,” EDNT 2:528. 
So Els, NIDOTTE 1:286. As Jacqueline E. Lapsley points out, “even a modern understanding of ‘loyalty’ is 
loaded with emotional content, and there is no reason to assume that ancient loyalty did not also involve the 
emotions in a significant way.” “Feeling Our Way: Love for God in Deuteronomy,” CBQ 65 (2003): 352. 
Cf. Clements, “The Book of Deuteronomy,” in Numbers–Samuel, 2:343. 
112
 Thus, “You shall love the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with 
all your might” (Deut 6:5  cf. 10:12  11:13  13:3  30:6  Josh 22:5  Matt 22:37  Mark 12:30  Luke 10:27). 
For many more love commands see also Deut 11:1, 22; 19:9; 30:15, 16, 19–20; Josh 23:10–11; Lev 19:18; 
Mark 12:31; John 13:34; 15:12, 17; Rom 13:9; 1 John 3:23; 4:21; 2 John 1:5, 6; cf. Hos 3:1. Indeed, loving 
Jesus and/or the Father is itself related to obeying his commands (John 14:15, 21; 15:10; 1 John 5:2, 3) and 
Jesus’s love for the Father is likewise exemplified in obedience to commands (John 14:31  15:10). Further, 
see especially Evan’s discussion of the fact that “some emotions are ones that we have some control over, 
at least over time.” C. Stephen Evans, “Can Love Be Commanded? Kierkegaard’s View of Neighbor 
Love,” in Visions of Agapé: Problems and Possibilities in Human and Divine Love (ed. C. A. Boyd; 
Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008), 76. He comes to the conclusion that “Christian love for the neighbor is 




As such, the love that God calls for is to be emotional but not merely emotional; such 
love is to include decision and commitment as well as emotion and evaluation. Mere emotion is 
not enough but neither can it be excluded from the appropriate love response that God seeks. 
Those who claim that love cannot be emotional if it is commanded or volitional subscribe to a 
false opposition of volition, evaluation, and emotion.
114
 Commitment is not antithetical to 
emotional and passionate love. Likewise, the volitional nature of God’s love does not thereby 
exclude its emotion or vice versa.  
                                                     
 
the other’s good. But it is the enduring kind of emotion, the kind of emotion we can work at developing.” 
Ibid., 83. That emotional love can be commanded would seem to be required in the command, “fervently 
love one another from the heart” (1 Pet 1:22). Accordingly, as discussed in chapter 3, love cannot be 
restricted to something like purely external, “covenantal” love and, thus, it should not be conflated with the 
legalities of covenant. Rather, covenant itself, like election, is predicated on divine love and modeled after 
affectionate kinship (cf. Exod 4:31). See Scott Hahn, Kinship by Covenant: A Canonical Approach to the 
Fulfillment of God’s Saving Promises (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). Contra Moran, “The 
Ancient.” 
113
 Accordingly, merely external obedience is consistently criticized while God repeatedly calls for 
wholehearted love, mercy, and justice (cf. Mic 6:8  Luke 11:42). God laments that “this people draw near 
with their words and honor Me with their lip service, but they remove their hearts far from Me” (Isa 29:13). 
God expects and desires full allegiance, devotion, and loyalty, including one’s emotions. Thus, he delights 
in “loyalty rather than sacrifice” (Hos 6:6) and receives the offerings of “a broken spirit” and “a broken and 
contrite heart” (Ps 51:17). External manifestation of loving obedience to God must correspond to an 
internal, emotive, even passionate, devotion. Alexander To Ha Luc thus comments, “genuine inner feeling 
must go hand in hand with outward observance, loyalty to God must involve both.” “The Meaning of 'hb in 
the Hebrew Bible” (Ph.D. diss., The University of Wisconsin—Madison, 1982), 139. Cf. Bruce K. Waltke, 
The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1:1–15:29 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 203. 
114
 The biblical data simply do not present any dichotomy between volition and emotion but 
propose complementarity between divine volition, emotion, and evaluation. Cf. Matt 15:31; Mark 1:41. 
Thus, Tigay notes, “The idea of commanding a feeling is not foreign to the Torah, which assumes that 
people can cultivate proper attitudes.” Deuteronomy, 76. Cf. Marten H. Woudstra, The Book of Joshua 
(NICOT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1981), 337. Lapsley adds, “The objection that feelings cannot be 
commanded relies on the modern notions not only that feelings exist within the private world of the 
individual, but also that they are uncontrollable. In order to talk about love in Deuteronomy, on the other 
hand, we must come up with a way to talk about emotion that does not perpetuate the modern propensity to 
privatize feelings and separate them from action.” “Feeling Our Way,” 365. For a further discussion of this 
issue see the demonstration of the complementarity of emotion and volition in love presented in chapters 4 
and 5. 
 Notice, for example, that Christ in one instance is “moved with compassion,” then states, “I am 
willing  be cleansed” (Mark 1:41). Here, volition and emotion are complementary. The biblical data simply 
do not present any dichotomy between volition and emotion but propose complementarity between divine 
volition, emotion, and evaluation. “Love and behavior motivated by love are not to be separated from 
emotion, and yet they are not dependent on emotion, but require wise consideration.” Wallis, TDOT 1:110. 
D. T. Olson comments, “Obedience and passionate relationship characterize the full love of God.” 




In all, God’s love for humans is ardent, passionate, and profoundly emotional.
115
 God is 
thus intensely interested in and affected by human beings, and may be pleased or displeased by 
their response to him such that the quality of his life is directly affected by the state of affairs in 
the world. His compassion is passionate, profoundly deep and intense, the magnitude of which is 
astounding. Yet it is not to be taken for granted but requires appropriate response. Such divine 
compassion is assiduous but not constant, highly emotive but not beyond divine control. While 
God is passible, however, he is not passibly inactive. Overall, the canon demonstrates that God’s 
love is emotional but not merely emotional. Divine love includes deep affection and personal 
concern complementary to its volitional and evaluative aspects. 
The Foreconditional Aspect of Divine Love 
God’s Love Is Prior to Conditions 
God’s love is foreconditional. This means God’s love for humans is prior to, but not 
exclusive of, conditions. God’s love for everyone, his universally relational love, is bestowed on 
each human prior to their response and thus before any conditions have been met. As such, God’s 
love is prior to any human action, merit, worth, or love. God voluntarily bestows his universally 
relational love upon everyone with the goal of enjoying a particularly relational love relationship 
with each human who will respond positively and, ultimately, reciprocate God’s love.
116
 As such, 
God’s love is logically and ontologically prior to any other love and holds sole primacy (cf. John 
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 This is especially exemplified by Christ who is “above all . . . ‘the one who cares.’” R. T. 
France, The Gospel of Mark (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2002), 265. William Hendriksen 
adds, “The sorrows of the people are Christ’s own sorrows, for he dearly loves these burdened ones.” New 
Testament Commentary: Exposition of the Gospel According to Matthew (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 
1973), 439. Further, God is compassionate and sympathetic (cf. Isa 63:9; Heb 4:15), deeply affected by the 
sorrows of his people (Judg 10:16; Luke 19:41), willing to hear, answer, and comfort (Isa 49:10, 15; Matt 
9:36; 14:14). 
116
 The reciprocation of divine love itself within a multilateral relationship will be discussed in the 




3:16; 2 Cor 13:11; 1 John 4:8, 16).
117
 Indeed, “God is love” (1 John 4:8, 16) and the “God of 
love” (2 Cor 13:11) who so loved the world that he gave his beloved Son (cf. John 3:16). On the 
other hand, “love is from God” (1 John 4:7) and “we love, because He first loved us” (1 John 
4:19; cf. John 15:16; 1 John 3:1; 4:9–10). God thus draws humans toward himself in his love and 
kindness (cf. Jer 31:3; Rom 2:4). However, human response is not unilaterally effected by God’s 
initiative nor does it bypass human agency. That is, God’s love is prior to all other love, and itself 
enables other beings to freely love.
118
 
God’s Love Imposes Conditions 
While God’s love is foreconditional, God implements conditions for the reception and 
continuance of his love. Scripture repeatedly depicts God’s love as conditional upon human 
response yet not thereby deserved. For example, God promises lovingkindness to those who love 
him (Exod 20:6).
119
 Elsewhere, Deut 7:12–13 states, “Then it shall come about, because you 
listen to these judgments and keep and do them, that the Lord your God will keep with you His 
covenant and His lovingkindness which He swore to your forefathers. He will love you and bless 
you and multiply you.”
120
 Perhaps most striking are the examples in John such as when Jesus 
states, “If anyone loves Me . . . My Father will love him” (John 14:23) and later proclaims, “the 
Father Himself loves you, because you have loved Me” (John 16:27). Here, the clear implication 
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 The issues regarding the relationship of love to God’s essence will be taken up in the final 
section of this chapter. 
118
 The issue of human responsive love will be taken up in the next section of this chapter where 
the relational and multilateral nature of divine love will be explained. 
119
 See also Deut 7:9; 1 Kgs 8:23; Ps 103:11, 17–18  Dan 9:4. Elsewhere, God’s lovingkindness 
demonstrates the relational responsibility, conditionality, and expectation of appropriate response such that 
the ongoing reception of lovingkindness is tied to fidelity to God. Though God’s lovingkindness is 
predicated on his free decision, the bestowal of divine lovingkindness is not strictly unilateral. God is 
willing to be the continual benefactor of lovingkindness but requires willing beneficiaries. So Katharine 
Doob Sakenfeld, “Love in the OT,” ABD 4:379. Cf. idem, The Meaning of Hesed, 131; Nelson Glueck, 
Hesed in the Bible (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1967), 89. 
120
 See also, among many others, Hos 14:1–4 [2–5]; Joel 2:12–14; Ps 146:8; Prov 15:9; John 




is that obedience and love toward Jesus evoke the love of the Father and that of the Son.
121
 
Likewise, the friendship relationship of love with Christ is conditional upon obedience (John 
15:14).
122
 Even the Father’s love for the Son is apparently grounded and conditional as Christ 
proclaims, “For this reason the Father loves Me, because I lay down My life so that I may take it 
again” (John 10:17).
123
 Such examples, among others, depict reciprocal, conditional, motivated, 
and evaluative love. 
Indeed, the conditionality of divine love complements, and is supported by, the 
evaluative aspect of God’s love explained earlier in this chapter. For example, conditionality is 
related to evaluation since the “way of the wicked is an abomination to the Lord, but He loves 
one who pursues righteousness” (Prov 15:9). That is, God appraises, delights in, and enjoys his 
creatures and, by its very nature, such evaluation is contingent and conditional upon the particular 
state of affairs. Further, as noted in the previous section, the reception of divine mercy is 
frequently conditional upon humans bestowing mercy to one another (Matt 5:7; 18:33, 35; cf. Jas 
2:13) or otherwise contingent (Luke 1:50; 1 Tim 1:13; Gal 6:16; Jude 21). At the same time, such 
mercy is undeserved and unmerited (Titus 3:5).
124
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 See the further discussion of the conditionality in these and other passages in conversation with 
biblical scholars in the sections on the foreconditional aspect of love in chapters 4 and 5. 
122
 This points toward the reciprocal love relationship, which will be discussed in the next section. 
See also Mark 10:21–22; Matt 18:27, 33. Further, the frequent language of “abiding” in the NT suggests 
that the divine-human love relationship must be maintained by appropriate human response in order to 
continue intact. For example, “If anyone loves Me, he will keep My word  and My father will love him, and 
We will come to him and make Our abode [monh,] with him” (John 14:23). Cf. John 14:23  15:7, 9–10; 1 
Tim 2:15; Heb 8:9; 1 John 2:5–6, 10, 17; 28; 3:1, 9–11, 14–15, 17; 23–24, 35–36; 4:12, 16. Where 
“followers of Jesus are in view” such texts “tell us that Christians remain in the love of God and of Jesus by 
obedience.” Carson, New Dictionary of Biblical Theology, 648. 
123
 Thus, “not even Jesus is exempt from responding to the Father’s love for him in obedience.” 
Ko  stenberger, John, 456. This is especially striking as it manifests the risk undertaken by Christ with 
regard to the possibility of disrupting the eternal love relationship in order to include creatures in a love 
relationship for which they are undeserving. 
124
 The conditionality of divine love further complements the conditionality of divine blessings, 
which are clearly revealed in the covenant stipulations with corresponding blessings and curses. God’s 
blessings flow from God’s love and provide an explicit example of the actions that are grounded in divine 




Texts such as John 14:21; 16:27 and others refer to a special, intimate, relational love that 
moves beyond God’s universally relational love that he freely bestows on all prior to response 
and the intimate, relational love without which God’s universally relational love is not sustained 
indefinitely. That is, God loves those who respond to his son in love in a way that is not afforded 
to “the world” who freely choose not to respond.
125
 As such, God’s love is both prior to human 
love and, yet, responsive to and conditioned upon human love that is responsive to God’s prior 
love. This is the foreconditionality of divine love.
126
 
Thus, it is apparent in such passages that love for God is itself a real condition of 
receiving or maintaining God’s universal, relational love (cf. John 14:21, 23  16:27  1 John 4:8) 
                                                     
 
explicitly foreconditional; God grants blessings to his people prior to conditions but continued blessings are 
predicated on conditions that humans are expected to fulfill (cf. Deut 7; Lev 26; Pss 5:12; 111:4–5). On the 
other hand, divine love may be manifest not only by immediate blessing but also discipline, which God 
intends for the greater good of his creatures (cf. Deut 8:5; Prov 3:12; Heb 12:6, 10; Rev 3:19). Divine 
blessings are unmerited but not unconditional and may be forfeited since God expects appropriate response 
from the object(s) of his blessing(s). See the abundance of evidence of the conditionality, and potential 
forfeiture, of divine beneficence in the sections on the foreconditional aspect of love in chapters 4 and 5. 
Milgrom even contends that “all blessings and curses, even when nonexplicit are optatives.” Jacob 
Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27 (vol. 3B; New York: Doubleday, 2001), 2286. 
125
 For example, compare God’s universal love in John 3:16 with his particular love for the 
righteous in Ps 146:8 and for the cheerful giver in 2 Cor 9:7. This distinction between God’s universally 
relational and particularly relational love will be further discussed in the next section. 
126
 God deeply desires to bless the people, but his doing so is contingent upon not only their 
external obedience, but also their internal disposition. Thus, God extends benevolence universally, that is, 
he wills everyone’s best good, yet his beneficence is limited by the actual state of affairs insofar as actual 
divine blessings are contingent and conditional. Consider God’s stirring declaration: “Oh that they had such 
a heart in them, that they would fear Me and keep all My commandments always, that it may be well with 
them and with their sons forever!” (Deut 5:29  cf. 4:40  6:24  12:28). Such a love relationship is not 
unilaterally predicated on God’s will and thus cannot amount to unilateral and arbitrary divine beneficence. 
As such, the conditionality of blessing entails the reality of contingent reward. See Gen 22:16–18; 26:4–5; 
32:25–28; Exod 19:5; 23:25; Lev 26:3–17; Deut 11:26–28; Luke 6:35; 11:28; 14:14; Gal 3:9; Eph 6:24; Jas 
1:25; 1 John 3:21–22. Such rewards even include salvation as the result of the eschatological, evaluative 
judgment (cf. 2 Tim 4:8; Jas 1:12; 5:11; cf. 2 Thess 2:10). Importantly, the temporary and partial 
suspension of the consequences of judgment, spoken of previously in this chapter, is also apparent in that 
humans often do not (immediately) receive their just deserts in this disordered world (cf. Job; Eccl 3:16–17; 
8:12, 14; 9:2; Matt 5:45). That is, there is not always a one-to-one correlation between behavior and the 
reception of blessings or curses. Accordingly, one should not view the conditionality of divine beneficence 
as if it amounts to a thoroughgoing theology of (immediate) retribution. The conditionality of divine 
beneficence is much more complex. Often retribution, whether positive or negative, is deferred rather than 
immediate. Ultimately, full justice awaits the eschaton. See the sections on the foreconditional aspect of 





and, thus, of salvation itself (cf. 2 Tim 4:8; Jas 1:12). Indeed, one cannot have true faith in Christ 
without love for God and his children (cf. 1 John 3:14; 5:1).
127
 Faith is thus the human response 
to God’s prior love and itself entails a reciprocal response of love on the basis of that faith in, and 
acceptance of, God’s prior love for us. As has been seen earlier, though the human love response 
is itself imperfect, God not only provides the initiating love that enables human response but also 
mediates this loving response such that it is acceptable to God (cf. 1 Pet 2:5). As such, love is a 
real condition of relationship with God and at the same time only comes about because of God’s 
prior, foreconditional gift of love that draws the Christian to freely respond to God’s love and 
therefore be party to God’s particular, relational love (cf. Jer 31:3  1 John 4:7).
128
 God’s love is 
thus prior and posterior to human response, in different respects, but nevertheless conditional.
129
 
This is the foreconditionality of divine love.
130
 Such love is not meritorious, it does not earn 
                                                     
 
127
 Faith and love go hand in hand in the NT and one cannot even love God without the prior 
initiating love of God. But one must respond to that initiating love in faith and love. Edward Malatesta 
comments that one remains in death “until he has chosen to make love a conscious activity.” Interiority and 
Covenant: A Study of [einai en] and [menein en] in the First Letter of Saint John (AnBib 69; Rome: 
Biblical Institute Press, 1978), 259–60. Stephen S. Smalley comments on 1 John 3:14, “The evidence, as 
well as the test, of having crossed over from spiritual death into the dimension of eternal life is both 
practical and objective  it is fraternal love.” 1, 2, 3 John (WBC 51; Dallas: Word, 2002), 189. Such love for 
the brethren is itself indirectly love for God (cf. 1 John 5:1). 
128
 Thus, anyone who loves is “born of God” (1 John 4:7) but they were not “born of God” by 
God’s unilateral and unconditional decree. They had to respond to God’s prior action (1 John 5:1; cf. John 
3:16). In this way, one cannot love God without God’s prior action, while without response to God’s prior 
action there is no ongoing relationship of love. Accordingly, I believe that one who tries to remove the 
exhortative and paraenetic function of statements such as 1 John 3:14; 4:7; 1 Cor 8:3 overlooks their 
motivational intentionality. It seems, then, that God’s prevenient love prompts prevenient grace, which 
effects a partial regeneration that allows human response. I refer to such regeneration as partial because one 
does not stop sinning upon being born again. Thus, the one who is born again must “grow in respect to 
salvation” (cf. 1 Pet 2:2, 5) and the full results of generation are therefore neither instantaneous nor 
automatic. A full discussion of the complex relationship between being born again and loving God, 
however, is beyond the scope of this work. For the purposes of this work, Moffat puts it well: “The 
experience of God’s love is thus a growing experience, into which the Christian enters more and more as he 
is faithful.” Love, 265. 
129
 Hendriksen rightly states, “Why cannot God’s love both precede and follow ours? That is 
exactly what it does, and that is the beauty of it: first, by preceding our love, it creates in us the eager desire 
to keep Christ’s precepts  then, by following our love, it rewards us for keeping them! Nothing could ever 
be more glorious than such an arrangement!” New Testament Commentary: The Gospel according to John 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1953), 2:281–82. 
130




salvation, but it is the requisite, appropriate response to God’s love (cf. 2 Tim 4:8).
131
 God’s love 
is bestowed prior to conditions, it is undeserved, and, at the same time, there are conditions 
attached to it. 
The Conditionality and Unconditionality  
of Divine Love 
While divine love is never deserved or merited, it is in many ways conditional and thus 
humans may forfeit God’s love such that it does not reach them. God himself declares in response 
to the rebellion of his people: “All their evil is at Gilgal  Indeed, I came to hate them there! 
Because of the wickedness of their deeds I will drive them out of My house! I will love them no 
more” (Hos 9:15  cf. Jer 11:15  Jer 14:10). Elsewhere God states, “‘I have withdrawn My peace 
from this people,’ declares the Lord, ‘My lovingkindness and compassion’” (Jer 16:5  cf. Ps 
89:49).
132
 Likewise Romans speaks of “the kindness and severity of God  to those who fell, 
severity, but to you, God’s kindness, if you continue in His kindness  otherwise you will also be 
cut off” (Rom 11:22  cf. Matt 18:27–33). Elsewhere, Jude exhorts, “Keep yourselves in the love 
of God, waiting anxiously for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ to eternal life” (Jude 21). The 
reality of the forfeiture of divine love is further implied in the many statements that God will 
again love his people (Hos 14:1–4) and restore them (Jer 30:18; Ezek 39:25; Joel 2:12–14; Heb 
8:9, 12). Moreover, one need only look at the numerous instances of divine hatred and abhorrence 
                                                     
 
that such love is thereby meritorious. Such love does not earn salvation but it is the requisite, appropriate 
response to God’s call and love, a necessary corollary of true faith, which is the conduit of salvation. 
Salvation is no less a gift because the condition is faith (with the necessary corollary of love). 
131
 Since divine love is a gift, creatures have no claim upon it. Indeed, humans need not even exist 
but for the will of God to create and sustain them. In this way, divine love is never deserved or merited 
(though it may be warranted). 
132
 The reality of the forfeiture of divine love is further implied in the many statements that God 
will return and restore his people. Cf. Jer 30:18; Ezek 39:25; Hos 14:1–4 [2–5]; Heb 8:9, 12. Carson refers 
to “God’s conditional, covenantal love.” New Dictionary of Biblical Theology, 648. Cf. Ceslas Spicq, 




(Pss 5:5  11:5  Jer 12:8  Hos 9:15, etc.) to dismiss the sentimental notion that God’s love is 
monolithic, constant, and altogether unconditional.
133
 
Yet, though divine love may be forfeited, it is surpassingly enduring, steadfast, and 
reliable, but not thereby altogether constant or unconditional. Indeed, God’s love reaches beyond 
all responsibilities and expectations.
134
 The amazing longevity of God’s love (universal and 
particular) is especially evident in God’s enduring, but not unilaterally permanent, commitment to 
his vocationally elect people (cf. Rom 11:28).
135
 
Yet, some texts appear to depict God’s love as everlasting and thus unconditional. For 
example, God’s love is described as an “everlasting love” (Jer 31:3  cf. Rom 8:35, 39).
136
 
Elsewhere, it is repeatedly asserted that God’s “lovingkindness is everlasting” (cf. Ps 136).
137
 Yet, 
as seen above, God’s love is conditional and may be forfeited. Indeed, God may even come to 
hate the objects of his love and proclaim that he “will love them no more” (Hos 9:15). There is 
thus some apparent tension between two streams of statements regarding divine love, those that 
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 Indeed, all the divine angst proclaimed by the prophets over God’s wayward people, the 
unrequited love, abandonment, separation, and the hope of reconciliation must be overlooked or treated as 
somehow “unreal” if Jer 31:3 or other texts are asserted as defining the divine-human love relationship as 
strictly unconditional and constant. 
134
 While love and lovingkindness often take place in the context of covenant, they far surpass 
covenant obligations and expectations. See the word studies in chapter 4, pages 223–40 and 354–75. God is 
willing to forgive all those who genuinely come to him and repent in response to his prevenient grace and 
foreconditional love (cf. Jer 3). However, the opportunity to repent and turn to God is not everlasting (Heb 
3:15; 4:7; cf. Ps 95:7–8). 
135
 Throughout the canon, God continued to bear long with his elect because of his love for their 
forebears, which itself grounded their election in the first place. As such, in this instance, divine love for 
the Israelites defies the expectations of human evaluation in accordance with the salvation-historical divine 
decision. Snaith speaks of this “determined persistence” of divine love as the “over-plus of God’s love.” 
Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas, 141. 
136
 See the discussion of the meaning of the phraseology of Jer 31:3 in chapter 4, pages 387–8. 
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 Beyond the repetition of this refrain in all 26 verses in Ps 136 it occurs in Jer 33:11; Pss 100:5; 
106:1; 107:1; 118:1–4, 29; 1 Chr 16:34, 41  2 Chr 5:13  7:3, 7  20:21. Likewise, reference is made of God’s 
“everlasting lovingkindness” (Isa 54:8). See the repeated collocations of dsx and ~lA[ in the word study of 
dsx in chapter 4, pages 354–75. Elsewhere, God proclaims that his dsx will not be removed, nor his 
covenant of peace shaken (Isa 54:10; cf. Lam 3:22; Pss 103:17; 117:2). Note, however, that dsx is also 




speak of the everlasting nature of God’s love and those that depict it as conditional and subject to 
forfeiture. If both of these points are taken seriously, there is apparently both an unconditional 
and conditional aspect to divine love.
138
 
God’s Subjective and Objective Love 
This apparent tension does not amount to contradiction but may be understood by 
distinguishing between the subjective and objective aspects of divine love made apparent when 
one carefully considers the evidence of both streams. God’s subjective love is that which he wills 
independently of external factors, it is non-evaluative and grounded entirely in himself as subject. 
As such, it is unconditional and permanent. God’s objective love, on the other hand, evaluatively 
takes into account the disposition and actions of the other and is therefore conditional and 
requires reciprocal love for its permanent continuance.
139
 That is, God’s subjective love is that 
which is grounded in himself as subject independent from the response, or lack of response, from 
human beings. God’s objective love refers to that love which corresponds to, and is affected by, 
the disposition and/or actions of its object. God’s love is thus unconditional with respect to God’s 
will (subjective love) but conditional with respect to God’s evaluation (objective love).  
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 This illustrates the interpretive danger of absolutizing any one of the elements of divine love 
such that God’s love is wholly unconditional (and thus disinterested) or that God’s love is merely a direct 
response to human actions; neither can be supported by examination of all of the evidence. 
139
 Even Snaith, who asserts that God’s bha is utterly “unconditioned,” recognizes conditionality 
by asserting that dsx is a “conditional” love, always within the context of covenant. The Distinctive Ideas, 
95. However, as has been seen in this study, it is neither true that bha is unconditional nor that dsx always 
operates within covenant. See chapter 4, pages 223–40 and 354–75. Similarly, Charles E. B. Cranfield, who 
contends that divine love is “spontaneous” and “not caused by any worth or attractiveness in its object, but 
rather creates worth in its object,” nevertheless recognizes that “while all the OT agrees that God’s love for 
Israel was spontaneous in origin, there is observable a tendency to understand its continuance as 
conditional on Israel's behaviour (e.g. Deut 5:10; Exod 20:6; Deut 7:9–13), and the possibility of regarding 
it as a reward for human merit arises.” “Love,” A Theological Word Book of the Bible (ed. Alan 
Richardson; New York: Macmillan, 1950), 132. Notice also Eugene H. Merrill’s reference to divine 
lovingkindness as “unconditional” as “the basis for covenant election” but within “relationship, however, 
ḥesed is part of a reciprocal process, a disposition conditioned upon . . . love (āhăbâ) and obedience.” 
Deuteronomy (NAC 4; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 1994), 148. Post writes, “Agape may 
appear unconditional and therefore universal in its initial outreach, but eventually it requires that the 
recipient undergo a change of heart—a conversion grounded in the narratives and community that 




This dovetails in part with God’s universally relational love and his particularly relational 
love, which has been discussed earlier in this chapter and will be illuminated further in the 
following section. In many ways, God’s objective love corresponds to God’s particularly 
relational love, which includes God’s evaluative joy and delight over humans who love him and 
others and is conditional upon the free reciprocation of divine love by humans.
140
 On the other 
hand, God’s subjective love is the basis of, but not identical with, God’s universally relational 
love, which is bestowed on all human beings foreconditionally.
141
 God’s subjective love thus 
refers to God’s unchanging disposition of unilateral and non-evaluative love for everyone, that is, 
love that is independent of the disposition and/or actions of its object that God has toward all of 
his creation. This subjective disposition of love prompts God’s universally relational love, which 
bestows loving actions initially on all creatures and aims toward, but does not unilaterally effect, 
reciprocal love relationship (God’s particularly relational love). 
God’s subjective love is, therefore, the prior, unchanging, and independent ground of 
God’s universally relational love, which, in turn, is manifested in loving actions that reach 
creatures. While God’s subjective love is itself everlasting and unconditional it does not eternally 
benefit creatures since humans may finally reject God entirely, thus forfeiting the love 
relationship beyond repair. While God’s subjective love remains in God’s disposition even after 
such forfeiture, it does not reach its objects who have finally rejected loving relationship with 
God and, accordingly, no longer receive God’s love (cf. Jer 31:3  Hos 9:15). That is, those who 
finally reject God forfeit his universally relational love (as well as the opportunity to enjoy 
particularly relational love). That humans who have made such a final decision no longer receive 
God’s relational love does not mean that God’s subjective love has ceased. Rather, it means that 
                                                     
 
140
 Notice the correspondence to the volitional, evaluative, emotional, foreconditional, and 
multilaterally relational aspects of divine love. 
141
 It is also the indirect basis of God’s particularly relational love since God’s universally 




God’s subjective love no longer reaches them (via his relational love) since they have removed 
themselves from the sphere of God’s loving actions. God always loves everyone subjectively in 
the sense that he remains desirous of a love relationship with them and himself remains loving. 
He never removes his love from anyone who wishes to receive his love. However, the object(s) of 
God’s love may reject intimate relationship with God and, if persistent in such rejection, forfeit 
the reception of divine love altogether. 
Thus, while God’s universally relational love is foreconditional but not unconditional, 
God’s subjective love is unconditional  it endures even if it is finally unrequited. One may reject 
God’s desire for a love relationship, but that does not quench his desire but merely prevents 
God’s desire from coming to fruition and prevents those who reject it from receiving its benefits. 
When God’s universally relational love is persistently unrequited and thus forfeited, God’s 
subjective love remains as God’s longing, his unfulfilled wishes, aspects of his compassion and 
sympathy, and sorrow over his lost ones.
142
  
In all this, God’s love itself (that is, his subjective love) is, like him, everlasting (cf. Jer 
31:3; Rom 8:35, 39). Thus, there is no danger that he will arbitrarily remove his love from any 
creature. Humans, however, may forfeit God’s relational love (universal and particular). Then, 
only his subjective love, that desire to be in relationship with his lost one, remains. However, the 
lost one comes to non-existence and in this way God’s purely subjective love is thus finally 
objectless.
143
 It is in the subjective respect(s) that divine love and lovingkindness are described as 
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 The emotionality of love thus appears to overlap between the subjective and unconditional and 
objective and conditional aspects of divine love. In one sense, God longs for relationship with his 
unrequited lover, and this includes emotionality that continues even after the rupture of the particular, 
relational love (cf. Matt 23:37; Luke 13:34). On the other hand, the fullness of divine emotions, which 
include delight, pleasure, and enjoyment of its object(s), does not obtain once the intended object of God’s 
love finally rejects the entrance into, or continuance, of the particular, love relationship. Further, as has 
been seen, the fullness of divine compassion and mercy may be forfeited by persistent rejection of God’s 
overtures. It is not clear to what extent this includes God’s feelings of compassion since it appears that 
some aspects of these may remain as purely subjective feelings while others are evaluative and responsive 
(objective). 
143




eternal. That is, God does not will to remove love but remains benevolent toward all. In this 
regard, his love is unchanging and constant, but this is not descriptive of all aspects of divine 
love. Rather, the objective aspects of divine love, specifically predicated on human response, may 
amount to the disruption and even, eventually, total rupture of the relationship as it regards 
specific humans.
144
 There is apparent tension between God’s subjective and objective love only 
because of the existence of sin and evil followed by God’s decision to continue his love to beings 
who deserve destruction. However, God’s subjective and objective loves will, in the eschaton, be 
in perfect harmony. 
While God’s subjective love is permanent, God’s relational love (both universal and 
particular) is contingent. That is, the universally relational love that God bestows 
foreconditionally as well as the particularly relational love (objective love), which is the product 
of God’s universally relational love and human reciprocation of that love, is conditional and 
subject to forfeiture. The removal of love, however, is always in response to human disposition or 
action (cf. Isa 5:2–7). Throughout Scripture, God’s people repeatedly decide to reject God and 
not the other way around (cf. Jer 15:6; Neh 9:19). When God finally cuts off such people it is 
only in response to their decision to shut him out.
145
 God, however, never unilaterally removes his 
love (cf. Heb 13:5). On the contrary, as has been seen above, God’s love itself is everlasting. 
                                                     
 
perilous; for love that seeks the ultimate response, the surrender of the personal will, cannot but destroy 
those who resist it. Condemnation is always close at hand.” Theology of the Old Testament (trans. A. 
Baker; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961), 254. Further, Eichrodt comes close to something like this 
canonical model when he states that “though men may admittedly violate its terms and thus lose the right to 
participate in it. Such love shines forth unalterably like the sun in heaven and constitutes the inner strength 
of the eternal divine order.” Ibid., 256. However, while he recognizes both parts of the tension he overlooks 
the overall congruity between them, thinking it “impossible to rationalize” the tension between Hosea’s 
statements of the discontinuance (9:15) and continuance (14:4) of divine love. Ibid., 253.  
144
 This give-and-take of divine love will be taken up in further detail in the next section of this 
dissertation, which deals with the multilaterally relational aspect of divine love. 
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 Thus, “any breakdown in relationship between Yahweh and Israel is the responsibility of the 
latter, not the former. Yahweh is in the right, Israel is in the wrong.” John E. Goldingay, Daniel (WBC 30; 
Dallas: Word, 1989), 242. Cf. Neh 9:33. In this way, “There is a point when God abandons sinners to their 




Thus, love does not run out but humans may refuse to receive and reciprocate it. In this way, 
those who finally reject God’s loving overtures thereby forfeit the relationally responsive aspects 
of God’s love and exclude themselves from relationship with him. 
In all this, God’s subjective love and objective love differentiate between that love which 
belongs to God’s character independent of any external objects (his subjective love) and that 
which corresponds to, and is affected by, creatures (objective love). Therefore, it should not be 
thought that some of the five aspects (volitional, evaluative, emotional, foreconditional, and 
multilaterally relational) of God’s love in relation to the world correspond to his subjective love 
and others correspond to his objective love. All five aspects correspond to God’s objective love 
since they all refer to God’s love in relation to the world while God’s subjective love is prior to, 
and the ground of, God’s relationship to the world and thus prompts his universally relational 
love that reaches out toward the ideal of particularly relational love.
146
 
Corporate Unconditionality  
and Conditionality 
Beyond the important distinction between God’s subjective and objective love, God’s 
love is also unconditional in a corporate sense. That God will love and save a people, the plan of 
salvation itself is unconditional. However, the identity of the specific recipients of that saving 
divine love is conditional. As such, humans can forfeit their place as beneficiaries in the 
relationship. This corporate unconditionality is apparent in the related themes of remnant and the 
so-called grant-type covenant. God’s promises will come to fruition for God’s people, that is, 
those who respond to God as part of a faithful remnant (cf. Isa 65:8–9; Rom 9:6; 11:7, 22–23). As 
such, the remnant theme itself implies unconditionality and conditionality.
147
 In the sense that it 
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 As mentioned above, the five aspects of divine love correspond to God’s objective love in 
relation to the world. God’s subjective love on the other hand is grounded in himself and thus non-
relational, non-evaluative, and unconditional. However, like his objective love it is voluntary and includes 
emotion. 
147




affirms that God’s promises will come to fruition for God’s people it affirms corporate 
unconditionality yet it manifests conditionality on the individual level with respect to who will be 
included in that faithful remnant (cf. Isa 65:8–9; Rom 9:6; 11:7, 22–23). As such, the very 
concept of “remnant” presumes that God’s love does not endure forever unto all its intended 
objects.  
Perhaps even more striking is the parallel with the so-called grant-type covenant evident 
in the OT, especially with regard to the Davidic covenant, wherein there is a promise of blessings 
granted to a faithful vassal and his progeny that will extend to future generations independent of 
lapses in, and therefore punishment of, a particular generation or individuals (cf. Ps 103:17–
18).
148
 Further, in the NT there is a thematic overlap as well since it could be argued that Christ 
himself functions as the entirely faithful vassal who warrants (indeed merits) the bestowal of 
grant-type covenant promises such that all his offspring are privy to God’s kingdom, which will 
not be taken away from his offspring. However, particular intended recipients of the covenant 
promise(s) may forfeit their place and thus not actually receive the covenant blessings. In this 
way, Christ stands as the ultimate guarantor of God’s loving, covenant promises in this revelatory 
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 The grant type of covenant basically consists of gifts from a sovereign to an individual and his 
descendants who had loyally served him, with the assurance that the gifts will not be taken away from him 
or his progeny. M. Weinfeld, “The Covenant of Grant in the Old Testament and in the Ancient Near East,” 
JAOS 90 (1970): 184–203. See the brief discussion of this in the OT chapter. As mentioned in that OT 
chapter the complexity of both ANE covenants and biblical covenants defies one-to-one correlation with 
the so-called covenant of grant. However, the parallel is striking and may shed light on the tension between 
conditionality and unconditionality with regard to the divine-human relationship. Merrill puts it this way, 
“(1) God’s promises to the fathers were, indeed, without condition and qualification (Gen 13:14–17; 15:18; 
17:8; etc.), but (2) any individual or generation in succession to the patriarchs could appropriate their 
blessings only through faith and obedience (Gen 15:6; Exod 19:5; Deut 4:40; 5:16, 29, 33). To put it 
another way, the pledge of redemption and conquest by Israel was a settled and nonnegotiable matter (the 
unconditional side of the covenant), but their reality in the experience of individual Israelites or even a 
generation of them was contingent on covenant faithfulness (the conditional side) . . . (cf. Lev 26:27–45; 
Jer 31:31–37; 32:36–40; Ezek 36:22–31; 37:1–14).” Deuteronomy, 173. Similarly, John N. Oswalt 
comments, “On the one hand nothing could prevent God’s promises to Abraham, Moses, and David from 
being realized: the nation was elect and would be ruled over by a descendant of David. But those promises 
guarantee nothing to the individuals of any generation. If they sin, they will be punished; if they are 
righteous, they will be rewarded (Ezek. 18:1–24). Election promises made to the nation will not be 
participated in automatically by individuals.” The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66 (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 




microcosm of God’s loving relationship (intended or real) with the world. In this way, among 
others, he is the antitype of David to whom the grant-type promises were made at least partially 
because of his faithfulness (cf. 1 Kgs 15:4–5). With this in mind the concept of human beings 
being adopted in Christ becomes even more striking. When it is remembered that covenant itself 
is based on kinship (see OT metaphors), Christ stands as the progenitor (and at the same time 
“brother” and “husband” due to the canonical penchant for mixed metaphors) of the recipients of 
God’s promises: the “elect” and “beloved” in the objectively “Elect” and “Beloved” One.
149
 
Overall, the foreconditionality of divine love means that God bestows love on humans 
before any conditions have been put in place and/or met but then expects humans to respond 
appropriately to his love. Accordingly, God’s particularly relational love is conditional upon 
appropriate responsiveness to God’s universally relational love. God never unilaterally 
determines to remove his love from any object and in this limited sense God’s love may be 
thought of as, subjectively, unconditional. However, the object of God’s love may reject intimate 
relationship with God and, if finally persistent in this regard, thus forfeit the reception of divine 
love altogether. In all this, God’s love is ontologically and logically prior to human love and itself 
the grounding of all love while the divine-human love relationship is itself contingent upon 
reciprocal human response.  
The Multilaterally Relational Aspect of Divine Love 
God’s Love Is Ideally Reciprocal 
 The multilaterally relational aspect of love means that God universally seeks a 
relationship of reciprocal love but enters into particular, intimate relationship only with those who 
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 I am not here asserting univocity between the so-called grant-type covenant evident in the OT 
and these themes and concepts in the NT, but the overlap is indeed striking and may present a helpful, 
canonical model for understanding the foreconditionality of divine love, especially the complex aspects of 
subjectively unconditional and objectively conditional divine love. This requires further analysis that goes 






 All of the other aspects of divine love fit together within the context of 
this (ideally) reciprocal relationality of divine love. Scripture consistently depicts God as a 
personal and relational being who desires a reciprocal love relationship of give-and-take with his 
creatures. While the persons of the Trinity loved one another before the world was created (cf. 
John 17:24), God’s love relationship with creatures had a beginning. Likewise, the canonical 
depiction of election, covenant, and blessing, as well as aspects of conditionality and 
unconditionality, assumes relational responsiveness. 
Thus, the covenant and kinship descriptors of the divine-human relationship depict God 
as a relational and responsive being who bestows love and longs for humans to love him in 
return.
151
 For example, the marriage metaphor explicitly models the give-and-take involved in the 
divine-human love relationship (cf. Hos 1:6; 2:4 [6]; 11:8; Jas 4:4). Likewise, the parent-child 
adoption metaphor points to God’s profound love for his people as well as the expectations that 
he has for his children in return.
152
 Both metaphors depict God’s profound and lasting affection 
for his people as well as his desire for reciprocal love from his people. As such, these metaphors 
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 Here, two terms should be defined in order to avoid confusion. First, I use the term 
“multilateral” here because divine love is even more than bilateral not only in its Trinitarian nature but also 
in the tri-relationality between God as lover, a human as beloved, and that same human as one who should 
love God’s children, reciprocating God’s love back to him (cf. Matt 25:40  1 John 4:21  5:1). These 
relationships are further described below. Second, the term “reciprocal” is not used to refer to a disposition 
and/or action that expects or receives an equal or symmetrical reaction but to the expectance or reception of 
an appropriate reaction. In other words, “reciprocal” does not require a relationship of equals nor that the 
disposition and/or action flows equally. 
151
 Similarly, divine dsx, which often, but not always, functions in the context of covenant, also 
manifests the reciprocal relationality of divine love. It is free and voluntary but not altogether spontaneous, 
often taking place within the commitment of the covenant relationship, but not restricted thereby. It is a 
basic grounding characteristic of God that makes the covenant meaningful and reliable. It is unmerited but 
not altogether unconditional and assumes a relation that will be reciprocated when/if occasion arises (even 
if dsx itself is not, or cannot be). See the further discussion of dsx in chapter 4, pages 354–75. 
152
 For example as God’s children, certain behavior is expected  they “are the sons of the LORD” 
(Deut 14:1), “a holy people” whom the LORD has “chosen” as “His own possession” (Deut 14:2). The 
reality of the requisite response for the maintenance of such relationship is evident in that Israel “acted 
corruptly toward” God and are “not His children, because of their defect” (Deut 32:5  cf. 32:18–21). As 
adoptees, believers will share in Christ’s victory and through him they may be transformed, and will finally 
be at glorification, into his image, being presented holy and blameless to him, and as such, perfectly 




depict the ideal of reciprocal and loyal love by both parties, which assumes bilateral freedom and 
volition.
153
 However, both metaphors depict Israel’s repeated and persistent unfaithfulness toward 
God wherein God is a devoted parent and faithfully loving husband, unjustly dishonored, scorned, 
wounded, and pained, whose overtures are rejected in a repetitive cycle of unrequited love.
154
 
God, in his amazing longsuffering love, repeatedly works to draw his people back to him but will 
not irresistibly determine their return and, eventually, gives his people over to their choice.
155
 
In all this, the God-human love relationship depends upon God’s free decision to create 
and sustain the world and his ongoing willingness to entertain a love relationship with human 
beings even after the Fall. God’s relationship with the world is thus non-essential to his being. It 
is freely initiated by God but also contingent upon the free response of human beings. That is, 
God’s decision to create the world and thus voluntarily bestow his love on creatures does not by 
itself effect the reciprocal love relationship that God desires. As such, God’s love relationship 
with the world is not unilaterally willed by God. God desires a reciprocal love relationship with 
human beings wherein humans freely love God in response to his prior love. 
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 This conception fits the basic definition of covenant according to Gary N. Knoppers as not 
merely a unilateral or one-sided oath but a “formal agreement involving two or more parties” and that 
consequently, “affects those parties.” Such agreements are “inevitably bilateral.” “Ancient Near Eastern 
Royal Grants and the Davidic Covenant: A Parallel?” JAOS 116 (1996): 696. Importantly, marriage and 
adoption are both voluntary, rather than merely natural, relationships. This implies that the divine-human 
relationship is voluntary rather than necessary. Yet, at the same time, deep and intense affection is evident 
both in such metaphors and elsewhere throughout the prophets, which suggests relationship that is not only 
volitional but also profoundly emotional. The divine-human relationship is thus depicted as both more than 
voluntary (i.e., pathos, compassion) but also not less than voluntary. 
154
 God is recurrently represented as a disrespected and unloved father or a scorned, cuckolded 
husband, the victim of unrequited love (cf. Isa 1:2, 4; 30:9; 56:7–8; Jer 2:24–25; 3:1, 4, 20; Ezek 16:15, 25–
26; Hos 11:2; Mal 1:6; Matt 23:37; Luke 13:34). Such rebellion brings divine discipline (Isa 63:10; Ezek 
16:42–43) and the rupture of the special relationship between God and his people. They have no rightful 
claim to the continuance of the special relationship as “wife” (Jer 3:1) or as God’s children (Hos 1:6, 9; 2:4; 
cf. Jer 4:22). Nevertheless, despite their unfaithfulness and apostasy, God maintains a heartfelt call for their 
repentance and return in his graciousness and love (Jer 3:12–14, 22) upon which the restoration depends 
(Jer 4:1; cf. 31:21–22; Hos 2:2 [4]; 10:12; 14:1–3 [2–4]). Cf. Hos 2:14; 3:1; Jer 3:19, 22. Those who return 
God “will love freely” (Hos 14:3–4 [4–5]) and with them he promises to make a new covenant (cf. Jer 
31:31–36; Ezek 16:60–62; Hos 2:19–20 [21–22]; Heb 9:15). 
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 See the discussion of significant bilateral freedom above in the section on the volitional aspect 




This is evident not only in kinship metaphors (see above) but also elsewhere throughout 
the canon. Scripture is consistent that God strongly desires that human beings reciprocate his 
love. As such, the love relationship intended by God is one of give-and-take, which presumes the 
volitional freedom of both God and creatures. As has been seen, God can and does take delight in 
his creatures and values human love. Accordingly, he is disappointed, displeased, and frequently 
pained when his love is unrequited (Hos 9:15; 11:8; Matt 23:37; Luke 13:34). Nevertheless, God 
goes out of his way to seek reciprocal love relationship with his creatures, overcoming all 
obstacles save one. He will not irresistibly determine the will of the one who rejects him. Thus, 
God’s actions of creation and providence aim at the goal of the reciprocation of divine love 
though appropriate response. That is, God desires and works toward mutually responsive, though 
not symmetrical, love relationship with human beings. Accordingly, God bestows love 
universally and foreconditionally and seeks reciprocal love.
156
 The ideal divine-human 
relationship is thus reciprocal but it is not thereby symmetrical. God and humans relate mutually, 
but not equally. 
The Multilateral Circle of Love 
The reciprocation of divine love amounts to a particular relationship of divine love. These 
relationships are universally available but not universal; they are particular and intimate. The 
various particular divine love relationships constitute a multirelational circle of love including: 
(1) love between the members of the Trinity, (2) love from God to humans, (3) love from humans 
to God, and (4) love from believers to one another, which itself amounts indirectly to human love 
toward God. 
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 Thus, W. Günther comments, “God’s activity is love, which looks for men’s reciprocal love (1 
Jn. 4:8, 16).” W.
 




Love between the members of the Trinity consists of a reciprocal love relationship that 
pre-dates creation itself and models the ideal nature of all love relationships (cf. John 17:24).
157
 
The Father loves the Son (Matt 3:17; John 3:35; 5:20; 10:17; 15:9–10; 17:23–24, 26) and Christ 
loves the Father and does exactly what the Father commands (John 14:31). In this way, Jesus 
models the appropriate human response to God: love manifest in obedience. 
The Father and Son not only love one another but also love human beings. Thus, the Son 
loves his followers intimately (John 13:1; cf. 11:5; 13:34; 14:21; 15:12; 21:7, 20). Indeed, the 
Father’s love for the Son is the model of the Son’s love for his followers: “Just as the Father has 
loved Me, I have also loved you  abide in My love” (John 15:9). Likewise, the Father intimately 
loves those who belong to Christ. He “loved” Christ’s followers “even as” he loved Christ (John 
17:23; cf. 14:21, 23). Importantly, God’s love is itself reciprocally responsive to human love 
toward God and/or Christ (cf. Exod 20:6; Deut 5:10; 7:9; Neh 1:5; Dan 9:4; John 14:21, 23; 
16:27), which implies the validity and value of human love toward God.
158
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 Here and elsewhere one might wonder what the role of the Holy Spirit is in such love. Though 
theologians have made various suggestions, there is little information in this regard compared to that 
regarding the love of the Father and Son. One should remember that the canon reveals the Trinity 
progressively such that the Father-Son love relationship is itself not explicitly revealed until the NT and, 
even then, the most explicit statements about Father-Son love come in John, which is widely considered to 
be written later than many (if not all) other books of the NT. Since the Spirit is revealed most explicitly in 
the NT, specifically with regard to the Spirit’s role in the post-resurrection church, it should not be 
surprising that there is a lack of data regarding the Spirit’s role in the multilateral love relationship. 
However, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.  
The evidence that exists in this regard is somewhat vague. Paul speaks of the “love of the Spirit” 
(Rom 5:30), an ambiguous genitive, as well as the Colossians’ “love in the Spirit” (Col 1:8). The “love of 
God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost” (Rom 5:5, KJV) and love is itself a fruit of the Spirit 
(Gal 5:22). The “fellowship of the Holy Spirit” is placed in parallel with “the grace of the Lord Jesus 
Christ” and “the love of God” in a Trinitarian formula (2 Cor 13:14  cf. Phil 2:1). It is further implied that 
the Spirit loves humans since the Spirit manifests love toward humans in action (not leastwise in Rom 
8:26). Likewise, the Spirit comes as the “comforter,” thus replacing Christ on earth. As such, it is implied 
that the Spirit should likewise be seen as a partner in such love relationship, both intra-trinitarian and 
divine-human. In this way, the information about the love and activity of the Spirit strongly suggests that 
the Spirit loves humans even as the Father and the Son and also enters into the intra-trinitarian love 
relationship. However, there is little canonical information on either of these points. 
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Conversely, humans love the Father and the Son reciprocally. First, consider the frequent 
exhortations for humans to love God and Christ, which manifest God’s desire to have an intimate 
relationship with his creatures. For example, “You shall love the LORD your God with all your 
heart and with all your soul and with all your might” (Deut 6:5).
159
 The frequent exhortations to 
love God demonstrate the potential of real, human love toward God and that such love is neither 
necessary nor automatic. Indeed, such exhortations assume that humans are free to respond to or 
reject God’s love and that such responses are not unilaterally determined.
160
 The reality of human 
love toward God is also evident in many instances. Humans are repeatedly said to love Jesus 
(Luke 7:47; John 14:21, 23; 21:15–17; Eph 6:24; 1 Pet 1:8; cf. 2 Tim 4:8; Phlm 5; Jas 1:12).
161
 
Likewise, humans are also frequently said to love God (Exod 20:6; Deut 5:10; 7:9; 1 Kgs 3:3; Ps 
91:14; Neh 1:5; Dan 9:4; Rom 8:28; 1 Cor 2:9; 8:3; Jas 2:5; 1 John 5:1–3; cf. Jer 2:2; Hos 6:6; 
Neh 13:14; Heb 6:10).  
Finally, believers are to love one another.
162
 God’s love for humans places a moral 
obligation upon humans to love one another (cf. 1 John 3:16; John 15:12).
163
 As such, the 
recipients of divine love as “beloved” are to bestow it to others. This is the multilateral circle of 
                                                     
 
159
 See also Deut 10:12; 11:1, 13; 13:3 [4]; 30:6; Josh 22:5; 23:11; Ps 31:23 [34]; Matt 22:37; 
Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27; John 14:15, 28; cf. Jer 2:2; 1 Cor 16:22. Nothing short of wholehearted devotion 
is expected, which requires more than external action but also internal disposition (cf. Deut 6:5; Mark 
12:30). 
160
 On the other hand, if such responses are unilaterally determined, the exhortations appear to be 
superfluous. In this regard, see the discussion of bilateral significant freedom earlier in this chapter. 
161
 Notice especially Peter’s three-fold affirmation of love for Jesus in John 21:15–17. If such love 
were automatic or merely divine love flowing through a passive human agent it is difficult to make sense of 
Jesus’ repeated question. 
162
 The expectation that believers love one another is well-represented (John 13:34–35; 15:12, 17; 
1 Thess 4:9; 1 Pet 1:22; 1 John 3:11, 23; 4:7–8, 11–12, 20–21; 5:2; 2 John 5). Such love for one another is 
akin to the command to love one’s neighbor (Matt 19:19; 22:39; Mark 12:31, 33; Luke 10:27; Rom 13:8–9; 
Gal 5:14; Jas 2:8). Likewise, one should love his brother (1 John 2:10; 3:10, 14). 
163
 In 1 John 4:11 the phrase “we also ought [ovfei,lw] to love one another” presumes that such love 
is not merely the automatic outcome of love for God or election by God. Indeed, ovfei,lw never refers to an 
ontological obligation in the NT but always to a moral obligation, that which one owes or ought to do. Cf. 1 




divine love. This love toward fellow humans indirectly amounts to love toward God (1 John 4:7–
8, 11–12, 20–21; 5:1–2; cf. also Matt 25:40).
164
 When believers love God and one another, the 
circuit of love between God and his children is complete. In other words, love reaches 
“perfection” (cf. 1 John 4:17–18).
165
 
Notably, the canon depicts strong correspondence between divine and human love. The 
various love relationships above are depicted as alike in nature. For example, both the Father and 
the Son love humans in the same way (kaqw,j) that the Father has loved the Son (John 15:9; 
17:23; cf. Eph 5:2, 25). Just as (kaqw,j) the Father loves humans because of their love for the Son, 
so the Father loves the Son because of his obedience (John 10:17; cf. 14:31; 15:10). Conversely, 
believers are to obey Christ just as (kaqw,j) he has obeyed the Father and thus abide (me,nw) in his 
love even as Christ thereby abides (me,nw) in the Father’s love (John 15:9–10).166 Finally, just as 
(kaqw,j) the Son loves his followers they are to love one another (John 13:34; 15:12).167 As such, 
in the same way that the Son loves the Father, humans are to love God and love one another. 
God’s Universally Relational Love 
God loves everyone with foreconditional, universally relational love. God’s universally 
relational love is the undeserved and unprompted initiating love that God bestows on each human 
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 Hence the love that is ready to help even the least of brethren is equivalent to readiness to help 
the Son of Man, whereas lovelessness is the same as contempt for him. Both will be judged by the Son of 
Man in his day (Mt 10:40 ff.  25:31 ff.).” Ethelbert Stauffer, “αγαπ ω, αγ πη, αγαπη   ,” TDNT 1:48. 
Interestingly, 1 John 3:23 connects loving one another with believing in Jesus. Cf. Moffat, Love, 298. Note 
also the vertical-horizontal connection of 1 John 4:10–12, 19; cf. Heb 6:10. 
165
 As such, the divine-human love relationship is to be reciprocal and is not complete, or perfect, 
until then. Cf. Smalley, 1, 2, 3 John, 257; Raymond E. Brown, The Epistles of John (AB 30; Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982), 527. 
166
 In this way, the love of Jesus is truly the model of human love toward God and of divine love 
toward humans (cf. John 17:26). Thus, “Jesus remains in his Father’s love by being obedient to him (8:29  
15:10)” and “believers remain in Jesus’ love by being obedient to him (15:9–11).” Donald A. Carson, The 
Gospel according to John (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1991), 547. This is also indicative of the 
conditionality of divine love. See the more extensive treatment of this concept further above. 
167
 Likewise, in Ephesians Christians are to “walk in love, just as Christ also loved” them (Eph 




being prior to any human response. God’s universally relational love, which flows unilaterally 
and prior to human response, initiates the possibility of a reciprocal love relationship between 
God and humans. That is, God works toward drawing (but does not determine) humans into a 
reciprocal love relationship by unilaterally bestowing love on each one prior to any conditions, 
with the goal of eliciting a human response of love. This universal aspect of divine love is 
apparent in numerous ways throughout the canon. For example, God loved the world so much 
that he made the ultimate sacrifice (John 3:16; cf. Rom 5:8, 10).
168
 Accordingly, God desires the 
salvation of all and does not want anyone to perish (cf. Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11; John 3:16; 12:32; 
Acts 17:30–31; 1 Tim 2:4–6; Titus 2:11; 2 Pet 3:9; cf. Acts 10:34–35; Rom 1:5; 1 Tim 4:10).
169
  
As mentioned earlier, God’s universally relational love is manifest in all of his actions 
that pertain to the initiation of relationship with people. That is, God’s universally relational love 
works through various divine actions (including creation, election, maintenance of the covenant, 
and other manifestations of divine providence) to draw all human beings into a particularly 
relational, intimate, reciprocal love relationship with God. As such, God’s universally relational 
love makes available to all human beings the opportunity to be friends of God unto redemption as 
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 Further, he “shows love for the alien” and commands his people to do the same (Deut 10:18–
19) and elsewhere Christians are exhorted to have “love for one another, and for all people” (1 Thess 3:12). 
Likewise, divine lovingkindness extends beyond the elect, covenant people in numerous examples (cf. Ruth 
1:8; 2 Sam 15:20; Jonah 4:2). Indeed the entire “earth is full of the lovingkindness of the LORD” (Ps 33:5  
cf. Pss 36:7 [8]; 117:1–2; 119:64; 145:8–9). Since dsx is characteristically responsive to or initiative of a 
reciprocal relation such texts complement the concept of reciprocal love in this section. Similarly, the 
universality of divine love is implied in that God is “good to all, And His mercies are over all His works” 
(Ps 145:9  cf. 100:1, 5) and he satisfies “the desire of every living thing” (Ps 145:16). Likewise, God is not 
“partial” (Deut 10:17–18; Acts 10:34–35; cf. Deut 1:17; Jonah 4:2, 11; Gal 2:6) and he bestows blessings 
on all his creatures, though not always equivalently (cf. Matt 5:44–45; Luke 6:35–36; Acts 14:17). John B. 
Polhill correctly comments, “Peter saw that God does not discriminate on the basis of race or ethnic 
background, looking up to some and down on others. But God does discriminate between those whose 
behavior is acceptable and those whose attitude is not acceptable. Those who reverence God and practice 
what is right are acceptable to him (v. 35  cf. Luke 8:21).” Acts (NAC 26; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & 
Holman, 2001), 260. 
169
 “Undoubtedly God’s desire is that all might be saved (e.g., Acts 17:30–31; 22:15–16; 1 Tim 
2:6), but because of human freedom of choice (“whosoever,” 3:16), all of humanity does not respond in 
believing acceptance of the Son (e.g., John 1:11–13; Rom 1:5; 10:16; 1 Tim 4:10). As a result, the rejection 




part of the unfolding of God’s marvelous plan of salvation, that is, God invites and draws them 
toward receiving and enjoying his particularly relational love, to which we now turn. 
God’s Particularly Relational Love  
for Those Who Respond 
Beyond God’s foreconditional, universally relational love is his particularly relational or 
“insider” love, which amounts to an intimate, reciprocal divine-human love relationship toward 
which God’s universally relational love aims. While God’s universally relational love is the 
undeserved and unprompted initiating love that God bestows on each human being prior to any 
human response, God’s particularly relational love refers to God’s special and intimate kind of 
love for those who respond to him and enter into a reciprocal relationship of love with him. God’s 
particularly relational love is thus the result of God’s initiating and enabling love as well as the 
appropriate human response. Thus, God’s particularly relational love does not apply to everyone 
but to those with whom God is involved in special relationship, that is, those who reciprocate 
God’s love (cf. 1 Cor 16:22).  
Thus, in a sense divine fatherhood is also universal, he is the creator and father of all 
(Mal 2:10; Eph 4:6; cf. Pss 68:5 [6]; 10:14).
170
 At the same time, the intimate fatherhood of God 
(corresponding to his particularly, relational love) is reserved for those who respond to his 
overtures (Matt 5:9; Luke 6:35–36; 20:6; John 1:12; Gal 3:26; Rev 21:7; cf. Ps 103:17; Matt 
12:50; par Mark 3:35; Luke 8:21; Ro 9:7–8), that is, those who have been adopted (cf. Rom 8:14–
15, 23  Eph 1:5). As such, God’s adoption of his people is predicated on the divine will, but is 
neither unilateral nor unconditional but requires appropriate response. God will neither coerce nor 
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 Indeed, God’s reference to Israel as his “firstborn” implies that he has, or intends to have, other 
children (Exod 4:22; cf. Gen 12:3, 22:18; 26:4; Deut 2:5, 9, 19; 32:8; Isa 19:19–25; 42:1–6; 49:6; 56:4–7; 
66:18–22; Jer 4:2; 12:15–17; Zech 2:11; Amos 9:7, 12; Luke 14:23; Acts 13:17; Rom 1:5; Gal 3:28). 
Accordingly, from attention to the larger intention of the divine-human covenant relationship one may infer 
that God’s intention was to adopt other peoples through Israel, his firstborn. Christ, the true “firstborn” and 
antitype of Israel, takes over this function as the one through whom believers may be adopted into the 
family of God. However, the kinship metaphor of parent-child as well as that of marriage is usually in 




unilaterally determine human beings to love him in return. With those who respond positively to 
God’s loving overture, God enters into particular and intimate love relationship, which amounts 
to a reciprocal love relationship.  
Thus, in accord with the foreconditionality of love discussed earlier, the divine-human 
love relationship must be entered into and maintained by appropriate human response (cf. John 
14:21, 23; 15:9–10; 16:27; 1 John 2:17; 3:24; 4:12, 16; Jude 21).
171
 Though this reciprocal love 
relationship is universally available, not all accept and respond to God’s foreconditional, 
universally relational love. As such, God’s love is universal in some respects, but also particular 
and appropriate to specific groups and persons who respond to his love. Those who enter into the 




Such “insider love” relationships appear frequently in Scripture including repeated 
references to God’s preferential love, friendship love, love for his “elect” (salvific rather than 
vocational), love for his “beloved,” kinship love, etc.
173
 To take one example, in more than one 
instance humans are spoken of as friends of God and/or Christ (Isa 41:8; 2 Chr 20:7; John 3:29; 
11:11; John 15:13–14; Jas 2:23; cf. Exod 33:11; Matt 11:19; Luke 7:34; 12:4; Jas 4:4). Such 
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 This particularity and universality of divine love thus logically follows from what has already 
been seen with regard to the volitional, evaluative, emotional, and foreconditional natures of love. 
172
 While God already loved these humans in the limited sense that he foreconditionally loves all 
humans, those who respond enter into a more intimate love relationship. 
173
 Beyond friendship, which is discussed in the main text, the numerous examples of insider love 
include the disciple “whom Jesus loved” (John 13:23  cf. 19:26  20:2  21:7, 20). Such instances point to 
relationships of particular, intimate, relational love. Likewise, Christ’s “own” whom he loved to the end 
likely corresponds to this category as well (John 13:1), in distinction from the world who “would love its 
own” (John 15:19). See also the many descriptions of the special status of the “beloved” and “elect” 
throughout the NT and to a certain extent those chosen of God in the OT (see, among many others, Deut 
7:7–8, 12–13; Jas 2:5; Jude 1; Rev 17:14). Moreover, the concept of a faithful remnant itself dovetails 
considerably with the canonical notion of “insider love.” Cf. Isa 65:8–12; Zeph 3:17. See the brief 
discussion in the previous section of this chapter. See also Gerhard F. Hasel, “The Remnant: The History 
and Theology of the Remnant Idea from Genesis to Isaiah” (Revised version of the author's thesis, 
Vanderbilt University, 1970, which was presented under title The Origin and Early History of the Remnant 
Motif in Ancient Israel, Andrews University Press, 1972). Cf. Isa 10:20–22; 37:32; 65:9, 15; Hos 11:1; 




friendship assumes a particular, as opposed to universal, relationship and is thus a form of 
preferential but not arbitrary love. Moreover, a friendship relationship with God is predicated on 
obedience, which is itself connected to reciprocal love (John 15:14).
174
 This is a relational, 
contingent, and conditional, though not symmetrical or equal, friendship; the greatest provisions 
and sacrifices have been made by God himself.
175
 Accordingly, membership in such a particularly 
relational, intimate, and reciprocal, divine-human love relationship is not automatic but 
contingent (cf. John 15:14  Jas 2:23). Specifically, humans are expected to reciprocate God’s love 
(both Father and Son) and not merely by external action but wholeheartedly (cf. Matt 10:37–38; 
22:37; Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27; John 14:15, 21, 23–24, 28; 15:9–10; 16:27).  
While God’s universally relational love works toward a reciprocal love relationship with 
everyone, it is not unilaterally efficacious but initiatory and foreconditional while his particularly 
relational love is the product of God’s free decision to love coupled with the human response to 
that love.
176
 In this way, the fullness of the divine-human love relationship is reserved for the 
reconciliation, which can only be effectuated in the eschaton. In the meantime, God’s universal 
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 Notice Jas 4:4: “Friendship [fili,a] with the world is hostility toward God” thus “whoever 
wishes to be a friend [fi,loj] of the world makes himself an enemy of God” (Jas 4:4). Here, friendship 
signifies a mutual relationship that is grounded in reciprocality and loyalty; it is not indifferent or strictly 
universal (though it is available universally). Notably, the “basic requirements” of “friendship . . . are 
exactly the same obedience requirements as those (15:10) for abiding in his love.” Gerald L. Borchert, John 
12–21 (NAC 25B; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2003), 149. Importantly, however, this is in no 
wise a merely utilitarian friendship (cf. John 15:15). 
175
 Carson is careful to make certain that it is understood that humans don’t deserve Jesus’ 
friendship saying, “This obedience is not what makes them friends; it is what characterizes his friends. 
Clearly, then, this ‘friendship’ is not strictly reciprocal: these friends of Jesus cannot turn around and say 
that Jesus will be their friend if he does what they say.” The Gospel according to John, 522. Carson’s point 
that friendship is unmerited is well-taken though it should be noted that in this dissertation the term 
“reciprocal” is not meant to imply an equal relationship. 
176
 To say that humans are “beloved” unilaterally because they are elect would require overlooking 
or sterilizing the force of the exhortations to the beloved and the warning of future evaluative judgment. To 
say that humans are “beloved” merely due to their response to God would miss the essential divine 
initiative that makes such response possible. Cf. Phil 2:12–13; Jude 1, 21. As Thomas J. Oord states, 
“Creaturely love is not the work of God alone.” “A Relational God and Unlimited Love,” in Visions of 
Agapé: Problems and Possibilities in Human and Divine Love (ed. C. A. Boyd; Aldershot, England: 




love is more than the sun shining its rays on all, it includes affectionate concern, which may turn 
to abhorrence and hatred, but compassion endures long. God is grieved by those who do not love 
him back. However, in the end the divine-human love relationship is reserved for those who 
respond to God’s universal invitation  a response that is itself enabled by God’s prior action and 
foreconditional love toward initiating a reciprocal love relationship. In all this, the reason why 
some do not enter into the multirelational circle of divine love is simply because they fail to 
respond positively to, and thus reject, God’s prevenient and foreconditional love, much to the 
chagrin of God. 
Accordingly, Scripture clearly distinguishes between those whom God loves with 
universally relational love and those whom God will love forever. The former reaches every 
human being foreconditionally whereas the latter only reaches those who respond and thus 
participate in God’s particularly relational love. The difference, then, is that those privy to God’s 
particularly relational love allow God to love them forever while the others reject him and thus 
forfeit their status. They could have been “insiders” but they were not willing (cf. Matt 22:14  
Luke 13:34). In this way, God’s particularly relational, intimate, preferential love is not arbitrary 
or groundless but conditional and evaluative. Consequently, some are loved by God more 
intimately than others.
177
 Yet, it must be emphasized that the exclusion of those who do not enjoy 
God’s particularly relational love is not due to any arbitrary decision by God but is based only 
upon the human decision to reject God’s foreconditional love.  
Importantly, God’s particularly relational, intimate love is not restricted to an existing 
relationship, whether covenant or otherwise. The invitation is to all. God’s universal love beckons 
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 “The Lord does not treat all people alike—to do so would demonstrate a moral indifference that 
is not found in the biblical view of God.” Robert D. Bergen, 1, 2 Samuel (NAC 7; Nashville, Tenn.: 
Broadman & Holman, 1996), 458. Indeed, “with the connection between obedience and love so explicit, it 
should be self-evident that the circle of love in view embraces all of Jesus’ true disciples, but not the 
‘world,’ which falls within a rather different and more extended circle of love (cf. notes on 13:1, 34–35).” 
Carson, The Gospel according to John, 503. Cf. Shawn Floyd, “Preferential Divine Love: Or, Why God 






 Those who are outsiders may become part of God’s insider love.
179
 Likewise, some 
who were “elect” and thus insiders may become outsiders  such status is contingent upon 
appropriate response to God (cf. Rom 11:22–23; 2 Thess 2:10–15). In the absence of appropriate 
response, one will not be an “insider” and eventually will forfeit the benefits of God’s love 
altogether. That is, eventually the one who rejects God will neither enjoy God’s particularly 
relational nor his universally relational love. 
God Continues to Love Each  
One Temporarily 
Yet, God continues to love each human being with his universally relational love until 
they finally reject him. Thus, importantly, God’s love for “insiders” does not conflict with the 
commands to love one’s enemy. Rather, “enemy love,” as well as love for those who are unable 
to repay, is part of God’s universally relational love, which his children are also to model (cf. 
Matt 5:44–46  Luke 6:36). Thus, believers are not to restrict their love only to “those who love 
you” (Matt 5:46  cf. Luke 6:32).
180
 At the same time, this does not rule out particular, intimate, 
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 This is clear from the clause “whoever believes” in John 3:16  cf. Acts 10:34–35; 1 Tim 4:10; 2 
Tim 4:8; 1 John 2:2. See Jerry L. Walls and Joseph Dongell, Why I Am Not a Calvinist (Downers Grove, 
Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 50–55. Cf. I. Howard Marshall, “Universal Grace and Atonement in the 
Pastoral Epistles,” in The Grace of God, the Will of Man: A Case for Arminianism (ed. C. H. Pinnock; 
Minneapolis, Minn.: Bethany House, 1995), 57–62; David L. Allen and Steve Lemke, eds., Whosoever 
Will: A Biblical-Theological Critique of Five-Point Calvinism (Nashville, Tenn.: B & H Academic, 2010). 
179
 Indeed, the canon frequently refers to the actuality or possibility of “outsiders” becoming part 
of “insider” love (Mark 10:21–22; John 3:16; Rom 5:8–10; 9:25–26; 2 Cor 5:19; Eph 2:3–5; cf. Isa 66:18–
22; Jer 12:15–17; Zech 2:11; Ruth; Acts 10:34–35; 17:30–31; Isa 56:4–7). 
180
 Notably, however, that this is in reference to the suspension rather than the nullification of 
evaluation is evident in that they themselves will receive eschatological reward for such love (cf. Luke 
6:37–38  14:14). Significantly, the promise of future reward for love toward one’s enemy evidences the fact 
that evaluative love is merely suspended but not nullified (cf. Matt 5:45–6:6; Luke 6:31–37). Indeed, such 
human love toward the undeserving objects of God’s love is itself indirectly love toward God since he 
(Christ) stands in as the proper object of love (as mediator) as well as the guarantor of appropriate future 
reward (as judge) (cf. Matt 5:45–6:6; Luke 6:31–37). Thus, the idea of loving the undeserving does not 
remove the proper, biblical idea of justice and reciprocality, but it subverts any merely self-serving quid 
quo pro motivation without suspending the overall ideal that all loving actions should be, and in the 





evaluative, and preferential love relationship with God and one another (John 14:21, 23; 15:13–
15; 16:27).
181
 The two are not mutually exclusive. In this way, God is “kind” even to “ungrateful 
and evil men” (Luke 6:35  cf. Matt 5:45) and exhorts his children to therefore love their enemies 
(cf. Matt 5:44–46; Luke 6:27, 32, 35–36; Rom 12:14, 17, 19–21). This is descriptive of his 
universally relational love but it is not God’s intention that they remain enemies since, if they 
remain so, they will ultimately face destruction. Rather, God desires that none would perish (2 Pet 
3:9). Accordingly, so-called “enemy love” is aimed at overcoming relational obstacles such that 
the “enemy” will enter into a reciprocal love relationship with God and humans.
182
 As such, 
divine love not only looks at the present state of things but looks toward the future, what might 
be. In this way, such “enemy love” is not intended to nullify evaluation, nor does it rule out 
intimate, reciprocal friendship with those who are willing, but is part of the partial and temporary 
suspension of the consequences of evaluative judgment.
183
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 See Post’s rejection of the assertion of love for all in contrast to particular, intimate 
relationships. While affirming a proper love for all he states that “nothing is more harmful to agape than a 
premature and superficial universalism that separates it from its communal grounding.” A Theory of Agape, 
116. Cf. ibid., 97–105. Cf. the distinction between the “inclusive” and “special” covenant relationships in 
the Bible posited by Joseph Allen, Love & Conflict: A Covenantal Model of Christian Ethics (Lanham, 
Md.: University Press of America, 1995), 39–45. 
182
 Thus, the call for the “beloved” to bestow love on all others, including the “evil,” makes sense 
when it is recognized that all humans are indeed “evil” and undeserving objects of love (to varying 
degrees). Since the possibility remains open prior to the eschaton that the unrighteous will accept God and, 
finally, be transformed into a proper object of love, all such potential objects should be shown the kind of 
love that temporarily suspends judgment just as all humans have been the beneficiaries of this temporary 
suspension of the effects of judgment (cf. Deut 10:18–19; Matt 7:1–2; 18:26–33; Luke 6:37). Enemy love 
is thus impermanent, corresponding to the partial and temporary suspension of the effects of evaluative 
judgment, after which the redeemed will all be perfectly loveable. In the meantime, however, the Christian 
should not pre-judge who will ultimately “become” loveable (cf. 1 Cor 4:5).  
183
 Indeed, there is a place for preferential and intimate love of one’s circle of family or friends but 
not exclusively. The Christian intention should be to widen that circle of multilateral love such that all who 
will may be involved in the divine-human reciprocal and multilateral love relationship. Christians are to 
manifest love toward all in this time between the times but that does not mean that love, by definition, is 




God’s impartiality does not obviate divine judgment.
184
 Therefore, God himself does not 
love his enemies unconditionally but, eventually, those who persist as enemies will be destroyed. 
The interim is the opportunity for those who are enemies (cf. Rom 5:10) to be reconciled to him, 
but without such reconciliation the love relationship cannot and will not continue.
185
 On the other 
hand, God enters into an intimate and reciprocal relationship with those who respond to his love 
(his particularly relational love), which brings him great joy (cf. Luke 15:7; Zeph 3:17).
186
 The 
intimate love relations that make up such “insider love” constitute the multirelational circle of 
love discussed above: between the members of the Trinity, from God to humans and vice versa, 
and from believers to one another, which is indirectly human love toward God. 
Altogether, divine love is multilaterally relational. God persistently seeks a reciprocal 
love relationship of give-and-take with his creatures. He initiates the possibility of such a 
relationship with everyone through his foreconditional, universally relational love that enables 
and calls for a reciprocal response of love. With those who respond to this loving overture, God 
enters into particular and intimate love relationship that amounts to a multilateral divine-human 
love relationship from God to humans and vice versa and humans to one another, themselves 
modeled after the intra-trinitarian love relationship. Rightly understood, this requires that God’s 
love is foreconditional and unmerited, voluntary and unnecessary, yet not arbitrary; differential 
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 God is not removing the principles of law and justice: “Such action would not in fact be an 
imitation of the character of God who upholds the moral law and judges transgressors.” I. Howard 
Marshall, The Gospel of Luke (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1978), 266. Thus, “what is unconditionally 
demanded is that such evaluations should be subject to the certainty that God’s judgment falls also on those 
who judge, so that superiority, hardness and blindness to one’s own faults are excluded, and a readiness to 
forgive and to intercede is safeguarded.” Büchsel, “κρίνω,” TDNT 5:939. In other words, it is not that such 
evaluation is removed but that such evaluation is partially and temporarily suspended and ultimately 
belongs to and will be carried out by God himself. 
185
 Many in the world love darkness and reject the will of God (cf. John 3:19; 14:24) and, as such, 
reject God’s love (cf. John 5:42  8:42). Indeed, many hate God (Exod 20:5; Deut 5:9; Ps 68:1; Rom 1:30) 
and make themselves his enemy (Jas 4:4) and eventually face destruction. 
186
 See the section on the evaluative nature of divine love earlier in this chapter for a rebuttal of the 
fallacy that love grounded in a mutually beneficial relationship is lesser than purely altruistic love and thus 




and preferential, yet not altogether exclusive; intensely emotional, yet also committal, evaluative 
and expectant of appropriate human response rather than unilaterality. For the remainder of this 
chapter I will refer to this canonical model of divine love as the foreconditional-reciprocal model 
of divine love. 
A Critical Comparison of the Foreconditional- 
Reciprocal, Transcendent-Voluntarist, and  
Immanent-Experientialist Models 
This chapter now returns to the questions raised by the conflict of interpretations between 
the transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-experientialist models, as well as the corresponding 
dissatisfaction in recent theology with regard to the meaning of divine love. This chapter will now 
address the implications of this foreconditional-reciprocal model of divine love with regard to 
such issues in dialogue with the perspectives on divine love that have been surveyed already. 
Attention will be drawn especially to where this foreconditional-reciprocal model of divine love 
complements and/or departs from the positions of the exemplars by specific discussion of the 
systematic issues raised in the analysis of the transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-
experientialist models (see chapter 3). 
The systematic issues raised by the conflict of interpretations between the transcendent-
voluntarist and immanent-experientialist models with regard to the meaning of divine love in 
relation to the world revolve around the question of the nature of the divine-human relationship 
with regard to two primary themes of give-and-take, that is, God’s affecting and being affected. 
Foremost among these issues is whether God’s love is unilateral or whether God and humans may 
share a reciprocal (though unequal) relationship of love. The answer to this primary question is 
heavily influenced by the answers to a number of closely related ones. First, is God the sole giver 
but never the receiver? In other words, is divine love only arbitrarily willed, pure beneficence 
                                                     
 




(thematic agape) or may it include desire or enjoyment (thematic eros)? Second, does God only 
bestow and/or create value or might he also appraise, appreciate, and receive value? Third, does 
God’s love include affection and/or emotionality such that God is concerned for the world, 
sympathetically or otherwise? Fourth, does God choose to fully love only some, or does he 
choose to love all, or is he essentially related to all such that he necessarily loves all? Fifth, bound 
up with this is the question of whether divine love is unconditional or conditional, ungrounded or 
grounded, and so on. The volitional, evaluative, emotional, foreconditional, and multilaterally 
relational aspects of divine love for the world respond to these questions. We now turn to each of 
the aspects in comparison to the transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-experientialist models, as 
well as with reference to the dissatisfaction in recent theology. 
The Volitional Aspect of God’s Love 
The primary issue of the God-world relationship is whether it is unilateral or includes 
some level of reciprocity. This issue is bound up with answers to many ontological issues, 
including the sovereignty of the divine will, especially as it relates to the issue of determinism or 
indeterminism. It is no coincidence, then, that the conflict of interpretations regarding the 
meaning and nature of love hinges upon its relationship to the divine will.  
The immanent-experientialist model proposes that love is not volitional but descriptive of 
an essential, and thus ontologically necessary, relation between God and creatures. God’s love, 
then, is not voluntary but essential to his very being.
187
 A divine will that chooses between objects 
of love is absent; there is no election love of any kind. As such, divine love is descriptive of God 
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 God does not need this world but he does need some world in Charles Hartshorne’s system. See 
Man’s Vision of God and the Logic of Theism (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1964), 108. Most panentheists 
agree with this perspective. “Divine freedom is an oxymoron in almost all panentheism.” John W. Cooper, 
Panentheism, the Other God of the Philosophers: From Plato to the Present (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker 
Academic, 2006), 326. However, Phillip Clayton is a notable exception in his assertion of God’s libertarian 
freedom. He states, “A free creation remains free  any effect the world subsequently has on God is a 
consequence of the initial free decision rather than a sign of eternal necessity.” God and Contemporary 




as the feeler of all feelings, the self-surpassing surpasser of all. Whereas the immanent-
experientialist model posits that God’s relationship to the world is essential to his being, 
according to the foreconditional-reciprocal model, divine love for the world does not take place 
within an essential relation, but within the context of a free, volitional relationship.
188
 In other 
words, since divine love is predicated (partially) on the divine will, it is non-essential to God’s 
being. God possesses the freedom to bestow love or not bestow love on his creatures.
189
 Since 
                                                     
 
188
 This is, of course, in direct contrast to the claims of the immanent-experientialist model. Oord 
has also argued for a form of panentheism, which he calls “Essential Kenosis Theology,” such that divine 
love for creatures is necessary and essential to God  “God loves necessarily” and “cannot not love.” The 
Nature of Love: A Theology (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2010), 129. Cf. Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and 
the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 54–55. This also entails, 
among other things, that God necessarily relates with creatures and essentially lacks the power to 
unilaterally coerce creatures. Oord, The Nature, 124–26, 131, 133, 139, 147. At the same time, he claims 
that in a different way “God’s love is free,” by which he means God is free to choose among various loving 
actions. This is predicated on him lacking the foreknowledge to know which action would be the most 
loving, leaving him thus free to choose, but only between loving options. Ibid., 139–40. In his dissertation 
he describes this as essential free-will theism. Cf. idem, “Matching Theology and Piety: An Evangelical 
Process Theology of Love” (Ph.D. diss., Claremont Graduate University, 1999), 308, 320. Michael S. 
Horton on the other hand argues from the determinist perspective that “God is not free to decide whether he 
will be merciful and gracious, but he is free to decide whether he will have mercy on some rather than 
others.” The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Zondervan, 2011), 267. Thomas B. Talbott contends that if the statement “God is love . . . expresses a truth 
about the essence of God, then it is logically impossible that the person who is God should fail to love 
someone.” The Inescapable Love of God (Parkland, Fla.: Universal, 1999), 113. From this premise he 
argues for universalism.  
189
 Many scholars agree that divine love is volitional, only a few examples of which will be noted 
here. Trevor Hart refers to divine love as “something contingent upon God’s willing to enter into such a 
relationship in the first place, to place himself under certain relational constraints, to be limited in his 
freedom by the existence of a genuinely free other.” “How Do We Define the Nature of God’s Love?” in 
Nothing Greater, Nothing Better (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 109. Richard Rice “insists that 
love is a voluntary commitment.” “Process Theism and the Open View of God: The Crucial Difference,” in 
Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue between Process and Free Will Theists (ed. David R. Griffin, 
John B. Cobb, and Clark H. Pinnock; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000), 185. So Cooper, 
Panentheism, 328; Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and 
Authorship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 102, 151. Accordingly, “the world owes its 
existence to God’s free choice, not to metaphysical necessity.” “Process Theism,” in Searching for an 
Adequate God (ed. Griffin, Cobb, and Pinnock), 185. Spicq accordingly states, “Certainly God is free to 
grant or deny his favors.” “ελεεω, ελεο ,” TLNT 1:478. Cf. Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas, 109; Eichrodt, 
Theology, 252. Consider also the case K. Barth makes for God as the One who Loves in Freedom. He 
contends that “God’s loving is necessary” as “the essence and nature of God” yet “it is also free from every 
necessity in respect of its object.” That is, “He would still be One who loves without us and without the 
world” and thus “needs no other” to be “the One who loves.” Further, “It is not part of God’s being and 
action that as love it must have an object in another who is different from Him.” Thus, “In the fact that He 
determines to love such another, His love overflows.” Church Dogmatics (trans. G. T. Thomson; 5 vols.; 




God’s love is contingent upon his volition (but not only his volition, cf. Exod 33:19  34:6–7; Rom 
9:15–18), God’s love for creatures cannot be necessary nor can it be the result of an internal 
relation as is suggested by the immanent-experientialist model.
190
 God is free to do otherwise than 
he does and has freely decided to enter into (and remain in) relationship with creatures while he is 
(and remains) ontically discrete—distinct from the world he has created.
191
 Thus, divine love in 
relation to the world is volitional. That is, God’s love for creatures includes a free, volitional 
aspect that is not necessary to his being. 
On the other hand, the transcendent-voluntarist model overemphasizes the volitional 
aspect of God’s love. Specifically, the transcendent-voluntarist model proposes that God is the 
sole giver but never the receiver of love. Divine love is purely volitional and unilateral, arbitrarily 
willed, pure beneficence (thematic agape) to the utter exclusion of desire and/or enjoyment 
(thematic eros).
192
 The transcendent-voluntarist model thus complements the popular supposition 
of so-called “election love,” which conflates love and election into a single concept such that 
                                                     
 
being His love.” Ibid., 281. Cf. ibid., 2/2:166. 
190
As seen above, the very language used with regard to the divine-human relationship as 
covenant, as well as the closely related kinship metaphors, presumes the lack of ontological, or essential, 
relation and points toward a voluntary and particular (though not necessarily exclusive) love relationship. 
Indeed, if the possibility of the forfeiture of the covenant relationship is taken seriously, covenant cannot be 
descriptive of a necessary, internal relation. Further, since divine love can be removed, as explained below 
when the foreconditional aspect of God’s love is discussed, such love cannot be necessary to God. 
191
 Cf. Hart, “How Do We Define,” 109. This is evident in the canonical narrative of creation (as 
well as the depiction of divine creation throughout the rest of the canon), which excludes the notion of 
panentheism. This is also apparent in the metaphor of the potter and the clay. See Peckham, “The Passible 
Potter.” Indeed, “No biblical text suggests or implies that the world is part of God, either of his eternal 
nature or of his actual existence.” Cooper, Panentheism, 323. Cooper argues further in favor of classic 
theism and against panentheism in saying that God’s “creation of the world” is “a genuinely free choice 
from a number of possibilities” including “creating the actual world and/or creating another possible world, 
or creating nothing at all.” Ibid., 325. If, on the other hand, one says God’s love toward creatures is 
ontologically necessary then the creation and/or existence of some world is also ontologically necessary, as 
the immanent-experientialist model proposes. Nevertheless, some classical theists consider creation 
inevitable though not essential to God’s being. 
192
 Thus, divine love is a sovereign, volitional love, not the result of any “inner divine necessity” 
or emanation, but rather purely based on the totally free divine volition.
 
C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 
and Authority, 5:116. See also ibid., 6:349. This conception of divine love follows from the aseity and 




God’s love refers to his election and amounts to determinism.
193
 In this view, God’s love is purely 
the result of the immutable, timeless, divine decree and is irresistible to its object(s) while utterly 
unattainable for the divinely determined reprobate.
194
  
However, according to the foreconditional-reciprocal model, divine love is volitional but 
not only volitional. The volitional aspect of divine love does not exclude passibility and is thereby 
not mutually exclusive to the affective-emotional and evaluative aspects of divine love. Further, 
divine love is closely associated with, but not identical to, God’s will and election. God’s 
foreconditional love is the basis of election.
195
 It is thus incorrect to conflate God’s love with 
                                                     
 
for humankind. See the discussion of this model in chapter 2. 
193
 So Morris, Testaments of Love, 159–60, C. F. H. Henry, Notes on the Doctrine of God, 111; 
idem, God, Revelation, and Authority, 6:106–7; Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas, 133, 139; Merrill, 
Deuteronomy, 76–77, 132; Andrew E. Hill, Malachi (AB 25D; New York: Doubleday, 1998), 147, 165; 
Pieter A. Verhoef, The Books of Haggai and Malachi (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1987), 196; 
Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans (NICNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1996), 587; Robert 
H. Mounce, Romans (NAC 27; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 198–99  J. I. Packer, “The 
Love of God: Universal and Particular,” in Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, 
Foreknowledge & Grace (ed. T. R. Schreiner and B. A. Ware; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books, 2000), 
280  John Piper, “How Does a Sovereign God Love?: A Reply to Thomas Talbott,” The Reformed Journal 
33 (1983): 10. See chapters 4 and 5 for numerous other examples of this view that divine love is 
synonymous with choice as well as numerous scholars who reject this view. Lapsley, for one, correctly 
points out that such conflation “effectively eliminates emotions as significant in covenant love, despite the 
biblical evidence to the contrary.” “Feeling Our Way,” 360. 
194
 Nygren refers to this as “purely theocentric love, in which all choice on man’s part is 
excluded.” Agape and Eros, 213. Similarly, Morris comments, “Predestination and love go together.” 
Testaments of Love, 191. For K. Barth, “God’s love is not merely not conditioned by any reciprocity of 
love. It is also not conditioned by any worthiness to be loved on the part of the loved.” Church Dogmatics 
2/1:278. Cf. John B. Webster’s contention that “God’s holy will is accomplished in love.” It is an act of 
God’s will “requiring no creaturely element as a cooperating cause.” As such, there is “no possibility that  
. . . opposition on the part of the creature will somehow constitute a genuine threat to the consecrating will 
of God.” “The Holiness and Love of God,” SJT 57 (2004): 264, 266.  
195
 Determinists suppose that the status of the “elect” is unilaterally decreed by God as an 
irresistible, effectual calling, which is “unstoppable” and “cannot be frustrated.” So Schreiner, Romans, 
450–51. Similarly, Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 530; cf. ibid., 531. However, the canonical statements 
that refer to God’s elect as those who will ultimately be saved should be understood non-deterministically 
in light of the wider canonical evidence and may be understood, as such, in at least two ways. In either non-
deterministic view of election, the statuses of “called” and/or “elect” do not mean that the individuals qua 
individuals could not be lost. Indeed, if the proper response of the elect were irresistibly determined by God 
the numerous exhortations to those elect would be superfluous (see Deut 7:11–13; 2 Pet 1:10; cf. 3:14, 17; 
Eph 4:1; Col 3:12; 2 Thess 1:11 and 2:13–15; Jude 1, 20–21). Rather, both approaches preserve the 
conditionality of the divine-human love relationship, which is apparent throughout Scripture without doing 




                                                     
 
see pages 441–71. See also MacDonald, “The Biblical Doctrine,” in The Grace of God (ed. Pinnock), 207–
29; Klein, The New Chosen People. 
First, corporate election suggests that Scripture is speaking of the groups as groups but not 
referring specifically to the individuals who (will) make up those groups since inclusion is contingent upon 
response to the divine invitation. In other words, the reference is simply to a corporate group without 
reference to which individuals will ultimately be included in that group. The common criticism of this 
position is that groups are always made up of individuals. Of course, this is true. However, one may refer to 
a group without thereby assuming which individuals are included in the group. For instance, one might 
speak of next year’s Indianapolis Colts or next term’s United States Congress. In both cases, some 
individuals who will make up those groups are not even known by the speaker; the terms refer to a 
corporate group without identifying the individuals and without implying that the individuals that make up 
the group necessarily make up that group. See ibid. 
Second, many (if not all) of the statements that speak of the “called” and “elect” assume divine 
foreknowledge such that from the standpoint of inspiration those who will respond are foreknown by God 
while the place of those finally included remains open to the free decisions of the individuals to accept or 
reject God’s prevenient grace and foreconditional love. This view is supported by the priority of divine 
foreknowledge to divine “predestination” as described in Rom 8:28–30 and strongly implied elsewhere (cf. 
1 Pet 1:1–2). See Fernando Canale, “Doctrine of God,” in Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology 
(ed. R. Dederen; Hagerstown, Md.: Review and Herald, 2000), 113–15. Cf. MacDonald, “The Biblical 
Doctrine,” in The Grace of God (ed. Pinnock), 226. In this view, God knows they will be “elect” not 
because they are necessarily such and could not be or do otherwise but because he has infallible knowledge 
of their future free decisions. Of course, this assumes the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and 
libertarian free will. Cf. Richard Land’s suggestion of congruent election. “Congruent Election: 
Understanding Salvation from an ‘Eternal Now’ Perspective,” in Whosoever Will: A Biblical-Theological 
Critique of Five-Point Calvinism (ed. David L. Allen and S. Lemke; Nashville, Tenn.: B & H Academic, 
2010). Compatibilism (including the transcendent-voluntarist model), process theism (including the 
immanent-experientialist model), and open theism reject this view based on the belief that exhaustive 
foreknowledge and libertarian free will are incompatible. However, open theism and process theism resolve 
the supposed incompatibility by denying exhaustive foreknowledge whereas deterministic compatibilists 
remove “libertarian” free will in favor of “free will” in the sense that the “will” is not externally 
“compelled” but is nevertheless controlled by the unilaterally efficacious divine will. On the former see 
Hartshorne, Man’s Vision, 98; William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1989). On the latter see C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, 5:282; Millard J. Erickson, 
What Does God Know and When Does He Know It? (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2003). 
However, more than one model of how divine foreknowledge and libertarian freedom might be 
compatible has been proposed. To take just a couple of examples, Land has utilized Boethius’s view that 
God is eternally present and posits that election is timeless, taking into account God’s universal experience 
of all that “will” happen. This he calls “congruent election.” Land, “Congruent Election,” in Whosoever 
Will (ed. Allen and Lemke). However, this view may be criticized for qualifying (or even denying) the 
strong language that depicts God as experiencing history in a linear fashion (at least to some degree). See 
Fernando Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial 
Presuppositions (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1987). William L. Craig has made a 
strong case for a view that utilizes middle knowledge (Molinism) to show that divine foreknowledge and 
libertarian free will are compatible. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of 
Freedom (New York: Leiden, 1991). It is also possible that God’s knowledge of future free events 
transcends time in a way that we do not understand such that God’s knowledge is caused by the future free 
decisions themselves without positing God as a timeless being. This bumps up against the supposed 
impossibility of retroactive causation.  
In either view, those who respond to the divine invitation and are thus “elect” do not thereby merit 
salvation. Election, like divine love, is conditional and yet unmerited. God’s calling is not according to 
works (2 Tim 1:9) and God will not revoke the call (Rom 11:29). The recipients of “His calling” are those 
“who believe” (Eph 1:18–19). See the further discussion of this issue in the section on the foreconditional 




election since love and election relate not as interchangeable terms/concepts but within a nexus of 
cause and effect. 
Further, the divine-human love relationship is not purely the result of God’s will but 
human response is required to establish and maintain the particular, divine-human love 
relationship. According to Scripture, as seen earlier, human beings possess significant freedom, 
granted by God, to do otherwise than they do, including the freedom to reject God’s love and 
forfeit love relationship with him. Indeed, the canonical data suggest that irresistibly determined 
love is an oxymoron.
196
 While God’s love is bestowed on everyone manifested in (among other 
things) the universal invitation and drawing of human beings to respond to God’s love in kind 
(universally relational love), humans are free to refuse God’s love and thus not enjoy love 
relationship with God (particularly relational love).
197
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 Many scholars agree that “coerced love is not love.” So James D. G. Dunn, Romans 1–8 (WBC 
38A; Dallas: Word, 2002), 481; Barclay Moon Newman and Eugene Albert Nida, A Handbook on Paul’s 
Letter to the Romans (UBS; New York: United Bible Societies, 1994), 166–67. Vincent Brümmer adds, 
“love is necessarily free.” The Model of Love: A Study in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 177. Likewise, Fergusson states, “Coerced love . . . would not truly be 
love.” “Will the Love,” in Nothing Greater, Nothing Better, 199. So Sakenfeld, The Meaning of Hesed, 
176; Post, A Theory of Agape, 13, 108–11; John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (London: Collins, 1966), 
266. Likewise, Pinnock explains, “To the invitation of love, one may respond gladly or refuse. Forced love 
is a contradiction in terms, and God does not force his love on us.” Clark H. Pinnock, Flame of Love: A 
Theology of the Holy Spirit (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1996), 74. Cf. Oord, The Nature, 153; 
idem, “Matching Theology,” 308, 320. Further, Post suggests that “God refuses to eliminate human 
freedom, because a divine determinism would preclude the realization of communion, of which freedom is 
a constitutive principle.” A Theory of Agape, 26. Similarly, Fergusson writes, “The necessary condition of 
freedom bestowed by the love of God, therefore, is the possibility of our rejecting him.” “Will the Love,” in 
Nothing Greater, Nothing Better, 200. In all this, if freedom is included in the very conception of love; love 
cannot be irresistibly determined.  
197
 This distinction between God’s universally relational and particularly relational love in the 
foreconditional-reciprocal model differs substantially from the determinist conception that God loves all 
with a “common love” but with regard to salvation loves only those whom he has chosen with “efficacious 
love.” The nature of this difference will be taken up and described later in this chapter in the section 
regarding ontological implications. For now, the difference boils down to the fact that “never is the 
implication given that God intends to accept some and to reject others. The New Testament affirms 
absolutely that it is God’s will that all men would come to know him.” B. M. Newman and Nida, A 
Handbook on Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 166–67. Schrenk adds, “It is certainly not said that from all 
eternity the world has been divided into the predestined and the reprobate. What is said is that everything 
depends upon whether one is willing or not to believe in Christ and to obey Him.” TDNT 4:191. Cf. 




Many scholars, from widely differing theological backgrounds, also reject the 
deterministic perspective on love.
198
 Thus, while there is a strong element of volition in the God-
human relationship, which is also closely associated with divine love, God’s love is not to be 
identified with volition nor is divine love in all of its aspects merely a product of the divine 
will.
199
 This free, volitional element of the divine-human love relationship, applied bilaterally, 
amounts to a rejection of determinism, process theology, and universalism.
200
 In all this, 
according to the foreconditional-reciprocal model, the divine-human love relationship is neither 
unilaterally deterministic nor essential or ontologically necessary but mutually (though not 
symmetrically) volitional and contingent.  
                                                     
 
198
 Oord voices the concerns of many in the “Arminian, Wesley, Holiness and other traditions” 
that “this doctrine sacrifices divine love.” “Matching Theology,” 54. Cf. ibid., 308, 320; idem, The Nature, 
155. Brümmer believes the notion that God unilaterally chooses whom he loves and “causes us to love him 
. . . seems to turn God into a kind of Heavenly Conquistador.” The Model of Love, 159–60. Cf. ibid., 54; 
Irving Singer, The Nature of Love: Plato to Luther (3 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 
1:293. Clark H. Pinnock believes that God “could control everything” but “chooses not to do so . . . for the 
sake of the freedom that love requires.” “Constrained by Love: Divine Self-Restraint According to Open 
Theism,” PRSt 34 (2007): 149. Similarly, Thomas C. Oden, The Living God (San Francisco: Harper & 
Row, 1987), 75; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology (trans. G. W. Bromiley; 3 vols.; Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Eerdmans, 1991), 1:438. Contra Oord, who contends that God, by nature, cannot coerce. “Matching 
Theology,” 314. Cf. idem, The Nature, 126; Geddes MacGregor, He Who Lets Us Be: A Theology of Love 
(New York: Seabury Press, 1975). Talbott severely criticizes the theory of predestination as “blasphemy” 
that must “inevitably attribute Satanic qualities to God” and presents divine love as severely deficient. “On 
Predestination, Reprobation, and the Love of God: A Polemic,” The Reformed Journal 33 (1983): 11–13.  
199
 Thus, Carson correctly cautions that “Christian love cannot be reduced to willed altruism.” The 
Difficult Doctrine, 28. Thomas F. Torrance suggests that God has elected all in Christ but some say no to 
God. “Universalism or Election,” SJT 2 (1949): 316–18. In this way, God’s logically and ontologically 
primary decision to create other beings is the necessary (but not sufficient) condition of the divine-human 
love relationship. 
200
 That is, if this is taken seriously, both the transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-experientialist 
models as well as universalism are excluded since in these views the human agent cannot forfeit divine love 
since it is either the product of a unilateral divine decision or of an essential relation. Conversely, 
Fergusson suggests that if humans do not have significant freedom it seems there is “no way in which 
Christian theology can avoid either the Augustinian disjunction of divine love and justice on the one side, 
or the incipient universalism of K. Barth’s doctrine of universal predestination in Christ on the other. Only 
a theology that recognizes the freedom finally to rebel against God can avoid the determinism of either 




The Evaluative Aspect of God’s Love 
The evaluative aspect of divine love addresses the major question: Does God only bestow 
value or might he also appraise, appreciate, and receive value? The immanent-experientialist 
model, in direct opposition to the transcendent-voluntarist model and its supposition of divine 
impassibility, contends that God is the feeler of all feelings. As such, God’s joy and pleasure is 
bound up with the world due to the ontological relationship between them.
201
 That is, God always 
benefits or suffers along with all the joys and sorrows of the world.
202
 God’s pleasure or 




The canonical model affirms the fact that God’s own life is affected by human beings. 
God’s joy on the one hand and displeasure on the other are impacted by human events. However, 
whereas in the immanent-experientialist model God is necessarily bound to creatures since God’s 
very being includes the world, the foreconditional-reciprocal model suggests (1) God identifies 
with the interests of others willingly rather than necessarily and (2) God’s pleasure and 
displeasure are evaluative such that he identifies with the best interests of his creatures.
204
 That is, 
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 As supremely relative, God experiences all value in the world in accordance with God’s perfect 
adequacy (internal relation) to the feelings of all as universally related. Charles Hartshorne, The Divine 
Relativity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964 ), 91. Cf. idem, Man’s Vision, 23, 135, 164; Daniel 
Day Williams, “The New Theological Situation,” ThTo 24 (1968): 459; Charles Hartshorne, Reality as 
Social Process: Studies in Metaphysics and Religion (New York: Hafner, 1971), 156. Paul Fiddes adds, 
“To love is to be in a relationship where what the loved one does alters one’s own experience.” The 
Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 50.  
202
 Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany: State University of 
New York, 1984), 28. Cf. idem, Man’s Vision, 116, 203, 294; idem, The Divine Relativity, xvii; idem, 
Reality as Social Process, 160. 
203
 Hartshorne argues, “The idea that God equally and solely experiences bliss in all his relations 
[by which he means classic theism] is once for all a denial of the religiously essential doctrine that God is 
displeased by human sin and human misfortune.” Man’s Vision, 195. Cf. ibid., 16, 39, 117. In this view, 
“God needs . . . the intrinsic beauty” of creatures’ lives and “their own true happiness” not in the sense that 
he would cease to exist (though he does need some other lives) “but because the exact beauty of his own 
life varies with the amount of beauty in lives generally. Ibid., 164. 
204
 The “best” interests of others is to be distinguished from what humans might consider their 




God is affected by creatures because he willingly created them; the relation is not therefore 
essential or necessary to God. Further, God does not merely feel the joy and suffering of others as 
his own. Rather, God’s pleasure or displeasure is evaluative. That is, God does not identify with 
the evil interests that humans may value and enjoy, in contrast to Hartshorne’s process 
panentheism.
205
 Thus, while a creature may take joy in evil, God does not take pleasure in their 
pleasure in evil. God takes pleasure in the good of the world but despises evil.
206
 
 In this way, the foreconditional-reciprocal model of divine love suggests that humans 
may bring God pleasure or displeasure but God’s pleasure is not due to an ontological, essential 
relationship but takes place because God willingly created humans and has a vested (though non-
necessary) interest in creaturely well-being. An increasing number of theologians have also 
suggested that divine love is passible in some respects, without adopting the process ontology 
regarding the God-world relationship.
207
 Accordingly, the concept that God’s love does include 
evaluation, and/or that God may delight in and even enjoy his creatures, is also favored by a 
number of recent theologians.
208
  
                                                     
 
important ways from Hartshorne’s view that God is internally related to all others such that “promoting 
their welfare contributes to his own.” Hartshorne, Man’s Vision, 147. Cf. ibid., 151, 163.  
205
 See Hartshorne, Man’s Vision, 147. Cf. ibid., 151, 163. 
206
 Gary D. Badcock rightly states, “Were it true to say that God is simply indifferent to its 
goodness or its rebellion, or that his beneficence in relation to the world takes no account of the events that 
take place in it, then it would not be possible to say of him that he loves the world.” “The Concept of Love: 
Divine and Human,” in Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of God (ed. K. J. 
Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 46. T. Lane adds in this regard that the cliché “God 
hates the sin but loves the sinner” is thus self-contradictory. “It is incoherent to say that God is displeased 
with child molestation but feels no displeasure toward child molesters.” “The Wrath of God,” in Nothing 
Greater, Nothing Better, 155. 
207
 Many of these have been seen earlier in this dissertation and others will appear interspersed 
throughout this section. 
208
 Moltmann thus states: God is capable of receiving value, or “an increase of his riches and his 
bliss.” The Trinity, 121. Likewise, T. C. Oden states, “God loves all creatures in the twofold sense that God 
unapologetically enjoys them for their own sake and desires their answering, enjoying love in response to 
eternally patient, self-sacrificial love.” The Living God, 121. Importantly, both qualify that this is not out of 
divine “need,” “lack,” or “deficiency.” Cf. ibid., 121; Moltmann, The Trinity, 45, 168. Cf. Vacek, Love, 




The transcendent-voluntarist model, on the other hand, espouses the historically dominant 
view that God is only the benefactor but never the beneficiary in the divine-human relationship. 
Ontologically, God is self-sufficient in every respect and, ethically, God sacrifices his own 
interests (if he can be thought to actually have “interests”) for those of others. Therefore, God 
cannot actually enjoy, delight in, take pleasure in, or receive value from the disposition and/or 
action of creatures, including their responsive love.
209
 Accordingly, many have viewed God’s 
love as wholly gratuitous, arbitrary, and beneficent love of the unworthy.
210
 As such, this model 
views love as purely altruistic and outgoing gift love (thematic agape) such that God never 
                                                     
 
Clarendon, 1994), 65; Singer, The Nature of Love, 1:10  Badcock, “The Concept of Love,” in Nothing 
Greater (ed. Vanhoozer), 45. In a similar vein, Brümmer criticizes the view of so-called disinterested love 
claiming that “pure giving without receiving is not love but mere beneficence.” The Model of Love, 240. 
Thus, God may only be “said to care for us but not about us.” Ibid., 132. However, Brümmer is more 
comfortable with the language of “need” stating, “If God does not need us, we become infinitely 
superfluous.” Ibid., 242. Cf. Badcock, “The Concept of Love,” in Nothing Greater (ed. Vanhoozer), 45; 
Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1987), 134. 
209
 See C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, 5:306. Similarly, Nygren asserts that God 
is altogether “indifferent to value.” Agape and Eros, 210. 
210
 Love is beneficence, “bestowed not upon a worthy object and not for the personal advantage of 
the Lover but solely for the benefit of the undeserving recipient.” C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and 
Authority, 6:343. Likewise, Spicq contends that love is nevertheless “purely gratuitous” as human neighbor 
love should be. Agape, 53. Cf. Nygren, Agape and Eros, 77–78, 157  Martin Cyril D’Arcy, The Mind and 
Heart of Love (London: Faber & Faber, 1954), 245  Alan J. Torrance, “Is Love the Essence of God?” in 
Nothing Greater, Nothing Better (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 130, 132. Similarly, Morris 
contends that “we do not bring anything valuable to God—in fact, we acquire value only because we are 
the recipients of his love.” Testaments of Love, 142. Accordingly, “God delights in this people simply 
because he chooses to do so” such that there is not “something in them that delights him.” Testaments of 
Love, 93. As such, “the love of God . . . is not a love of the worthy” but “a love for the completely 
undeserving” and “entirely unworthy.” Ibid., 128, 271, 382. Similarly, C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, 
and Authority, 6:342. Snaith speaks of divine love as “wholly disinterested.” The Distinctive Ideas, 137. 
Kyung Hee Park adds, “God’s love for his people is not based on any qualities of human behavior, but in 
the personal being of God himself (Deut 7:7).” “Divine Love in Hosea 11” (Ph.D. diss., The Southern 
Baptist Theological Seminary, 2004), 36. Cf. W. E. Vine, “Love,” Vine’s Complete Expository Dictionary 
of Old and New Testament Words, 382. Cranfield contends that divine love is “spontaneous” and “not 
caused by any worth or attractiveness in its object, but rather creates worth in its object. The cause of God’s 
love for Israel lies not in any qualities or potentialities of Israel but in the personal being of God himself.” 
Cranfield, “Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. A. Richardson), 132. Even within the canon, the question 
is raised when Eliphaz, one of Job’s “friends,” contends that humans cannot be useful or valuable to God 




receives love in any way that benefits him or adds value to his life.
211
 In other words, God cannot 
appreciate or enjoy love from his creatures.
212
 
Yet, according to the foreconditional-reciprocal model, divine love is evaluative rather 
than indifferent or disinterested. God himself enjoys, delights in, takes pleasure in, and/or 
receives value from the disposition and/or action of other agents. On the other hand, God is 
displeased and may be grieved and vexed at sin and evil. Accordingly, the canonical data 
contradict the supposition of an ontological restriction on divine evaluation and enjoyment. 
Divine love is not altogether disinterested, indifferent, arbitrary, ungrounded and/or spontaneous. 
Thus, the traditional conception that God is ontologically incapable of being affected by 
externalities such that it is impossible for him to receive value or benefit, what we might call the 
theo-ontological objection, is overcome by the canonical data of the foreconditional-reciprocal 
model which present divine love as evaluative. Beyond the theo-ontological objection met above, 
two other (lesser) bases for the traditional denial that humans may bring value and/or joy to God 
often appear: the moral and hamartiological objections, respectively. 
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 Cf. C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, 6:343; Norman L. Geisler, Systematic 
Theology: God, Creation (4 vols.; Minneapolis, Minn.: Bethany House, 2002), 2:367. This is in contrast to 
the fact that the avgapa,w word group, like other terms of love in the OT and NT, frequently refers to 
evaluative love. Thus Warnach speaks of agapan in the LXX as “love in the sense of placing a high value 
upon some person or thing, or of receiving them with favour.” EDNT 2:518. So Gerhard Schneider, 
“αγαπη,” EDNT 1:9. Cf. Robert Joly, Le vocabulaire chrétien de l'amour est-il original: Philein et agapan 
dans le grec antique (Brussels: Univ de Bruxelles, 1968). See the brief study of the avgapa,w word group in 
the NT chapter for evidence that it is not necessarily descriptive of strictly beneficent, disinterested, 
altruistic, non-evaluative love toward the unworthy. 
212
 “‘God is love’ is this: it belongs to the fullness of God’s nature that he cannot be served but 
must overflow in service to his creation. The very meaning of God is a being who cannot be enriched but 
always remains the enricher.” Piper, “How Does a Sovereign,” 11. As such, “[God’s] love for us and for his 
other creatures is completely disinterested.” Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Baker, 1998), 319. Cf. C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1988), 127; H. Ray 
Dunning, Grace, Faith, and Holiness: A Wesleyan Systematic Theology (Kansas City, Mo.: Beacon Hill 
Press of Kansas City, 1988), 195, 200–201; Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God (London: 
Lutterworth Press, 1949), 186. In this way: “God loves us on the basis of that likeness of himself that he 
has placed within us. He therefore in effect loves himself in us. This likeness to him, however, is not our 




The moral objection supposes that pure love is strictly self-sacrificial and self-abnegating. 
In this view, self-interest is viewed as immoral and, thus, love that receives joy from its object(s) 
is considered to be (implicitly or explicitly) selfish.
213
 However, the Bible recognizes proper self-
love and self-interest in contrast to selfishness and self-centeredness. In other words, Scripture 
recognizes appropriate self-interest that is not to the exclusion of other-interest.
214
 For example, 
God commands humans to love their neighbor as themselves.
215
 Likewise, consider the golden 
rule, which is predicated on the assumption of appropriate self-regard though not to the exclusion 
of other-regard (Matt 7:12; Luke 6:31; cf. Phil 2:3–4).
216
 As such, the supposition that purely 
altruistic love (thematic agape) is the only true kind of “Christian” love, excluding other aspects 
such as attraction, enjoyment, pleasure, and responsive affection, is unwarranted.
217
 
God himself exhibits proper self-interest and self-regard, which is not to the exclusion of 
the interests of others but voluntarily includes the best interests of his creatures.
218
 That is, in the 
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 See, for example, Nygren, Agape and Eros, 210. 
214
 Here, I use “selfishness” to refer to improper self-interest over and against the proper regard for 
God and others. While God has proper self-interest he is never selfish. Human beings, on the other hand, 
are selfish by nature. See Post, A Theory of Agape, 17–18. 
215
 See Lev 19:18; Matt 22:39; Mark 12:31, 33; Luke 10:27; cf. Matt 19:19; Rom 13:9; Gal 5:14; 
Jas 2:8; Eph 5:25, 28–30, 33. 
216
 Accordingly, at least some kind of self-love is appropriate, contra the notion of “pure love” as 
wholly altruistic and self-abnegating, exclusive of all self-interest and self-regard. While it may be true that 
self-love is not commanded as such, it is implicitly approved in its proper place. As Wallis states, “even if 
the OT does not explicitly demand self-denial and altruism, it advocates the kind of behavior which equates 
concern for the well-being of one’s neighbor with the assertion of one’s own will.” TDOT 1:111. 
217
 Many scholars, both classical and contemporary, have recognized this. See, for example, Post, 
A Theory of Agape, 17–20; C. Osborne, Eros Unveiled, 72; Oord, The Nature, 13; Augustine, The Trinity 
15.19.37 (NPNF 3; Albany, Oreg.: New City Press), 423–24; idem, On the Morals of the Catholic Church 
26.49 (NPNF 4; Albany, Oreg.: New City Press), 92; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Books for the 
Ages 3; Albany, Oreg.: Ages Software), 326. 
218
 In contrast to sinful human nature, there is no dichotomy between self-interest and other-
interest in the divine disposition and/or actions because there is no conflict between them in the divine will. 
God’s self-interest and other-interest are in perfect harmony. The problem, in this disordered and evil 
world, is that human self-interest and other-interest often conflict because of sin and the scarcity of 
resources. Eventually, there will be no conflicts of interest. The selfishness of a zero-sum game with its 
attendant conflicts of interest is to be replaced by sympathy and solidarity in Christ and with fellow beings. 




foreconditional-reciprocal model, God’s life is intimately affected by the lives of his children 
because he has made their best interests his own  the joy of others is integral to God’s own joy.
219
 
Importantly, while God has proper self-interest, he is never selfish. The transcendent-voluntarist, 
however, might argue that any self-interest detracts from the purity of God’s love for others.
220
 
However, one could make the case that if God is impassible, as in the transcendent-voluntarist 
model, God does not seek his own interests merely because he has none. That is, if nothing can 
actually add or subtract from the divine happiness and/or the quality of the divine life, there is no 
real sacrifice to be made. However, the canon depicts God as willingly binding his happiness to 
that of others and risking the quality of the divine life (but not existence) in allowing other 
significantly free beings to exist and impact history.
221
 
God himself, then, is the model of proper self-love. Self-sacrificial love is often 
demanded by the circumstances of this sinful and disordered world.
222
 However, total and utter 
                                                     
 
219
 As such, God really does take delight in his creatures, not in the sense that he is “a self-
gratifying being after all” but rather, “all that God does he does for his pleasure  but since God is wholly 
good, his doing what pleases him is not capricious, but what is wholly good for those he loves. God’s 
pleasure is pure love, so what he does ‘for the sake of his good pleasure’ is by that very fact also on behalf 
of those he loves. After all, it delights God to delight his people.” Gordon D. Fee, Paul’s Letter to the 
Philippians (NICNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995), 239–40. Cf. Walter Brueggemann, “The 
Book of Exodus: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections,” in Genesis to Leviticus (vol. 1 of NIB; 
Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1994), 947. Indeed, “The fact that the biblical writers speak of God as 
rejoicing and suffering over the state of creation is not a superficial eliminable feature of their speech. It 
expresses themes deeply embedded in the biblical vision. God’s love for his world is a rejoicing and 
suffering love. The picture of God as Stoic sage, ever blissful and nonsuffering, is in deep conflict with the 
biblical picture.” Wolterstorff, “Suffering Love,” in Augustine’s Confessions (ed. Mann), 136. 
220
 From a vastly different standpoint, the immanent-experientialist model also arrives at this 
conclusion that “God can make no sacrifices” due to God’s essential relation to all. Hartshorne, Man’s 
Vision, 161. 
221
 Cf. Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1977). 
222
 Indeed, it is evident that outgoing love and placing the needs of the other “above” one’s own is 
virtuous and praiseworthy (cf. 1 Cor 13:5; Phil 2:3–4). Christ’s self-giving and sacrificial love in the 
incarnation and crucifixion itself exemplified the greatest love (John 15:13). However, it is crucial to 
recognize that the occasion for this self-sacrifice (as well as all others) is itself predicated on evil and sin. In 
a perfect world, absent evil and conflict, there is no need for utter self-sacrifice. There will thus come a day 
when utter self-sacrifice is no longer necessary, when all creaturely interests will be in harmony with God’s 
will, which itself is directed toward the best interests of all without any conflicts of interest. Accordingly, 




self-abnegation is not ideal and is even “self-contradictory.”
223
 For example, Christ, who modeled 
the ultimate self-sacrificial love in laying down his life, is to be exalted as is appropriate to him 
(cf. Phil 2:9–11). Hence, one who assigns pure altruism to God’s love overlooks an important 
aspect of God’s nature as the worthy recipient of praise, worship, exaltation, and creaturely 
love.
224
 Moreover, self-sacrifice cannot be the ultimate end of divine interest because it can’t 
possibly serve as an ultimate end of other-interest. If God were to sacrifice his very existence then 
no others would exist since all existence is dependent upon God. Thus the suggestion that God is 
purely altruistic is ontologically self-defeating insofar as altruism suggests the ideal of self-
sacrifice and absence of self-interest. Accordingly, God is not selfish or self-serving while, at the 
same time, God rightly desires and receives glory and exaltation.
225
 In all this, divine love is 
evaluative but is neither selfish nor self-abnegating; though divine love is other-centered and 
                                                     
 
Agape, 10–12. He argues that “the western tendency to idealize selfless love devoid of even the slightest 
iota of self-concern is an aberration from the valid ideal of unselfishness in fellowship.” Ibid., 12. This is 
contrary to the common assertions such as “to say ‘God is love’ is exactly the same as to say, ‘God has in 
His Son made atonement for the sin of the world.’” James Denney, The Death of Christ (London: Tyndale 
Press, 1951), 152. 
223
 Thus Oord correctly notes, “Defining love exclusively in terms of self-sacrifice is not biblical.  
. . . Biblical authors affirm self-love.” The Nature, 27. Indeed, “as a universal principle, self-sacrifice is 
self-contradictory. That is, if two persons each acted always self-sacrificially toward one another, neither 
could act self-sacrificially. Each would insist on holding the door open for the other, and thus neither would 
enter.” Vacek, Love, Human and Divine, 184. Likewise, “self-less, purely one-way love may be an 
understandable exaggeration of unselfishness, but its impact is essentially negative in that it undermines the 
circular flow of giving and receiving in which agape is sustained and supported.” Post, A Theory of Agape, 
12. Gene H. Outka agrees, saying, “The feature of self-sacrifice in itself would appear to provide no way of 
distinguishing between attention to another’s needs and submission to his exploitation and no warrant for 
resisting the latter.” Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 275. 
224
 Indeed, though God himself models the ultimate self-sacrificial love when appropriate, he does 
not view others as better than himself (cf. Phil 2:3). He could not do so and be accurate. Such a prescription 
for Christians to do so is directed at overcoming natural selfishness, which contributes to the usual conflicts 
of interest. Further, while God truly is better, all humans have fallen short of God’s glory (Rom 3:23). 
Significantly, Christ’s role as servant rather than the one being served, while denying immediate self-
gratification due to the evil and disordered world, contributed to Christ’s ultimate delight, the salvation of 
his beloved and the enjoyment of a bilateral love relationship with them. 
225
 The divine self-interest toward the glory of God is a proper end in itself since God is the 
appropriate object of worship and exaltation yet also a means to an other-directed end, the revelation of his 




often manifest in self-sacrifice, it is neither necessarily nor ideally self-sacrificial. In all this, the 
dichotomy between self-interest and other-interest is demonstrated to be false.
226
 
The hamartiological objection argues that humans are incapable of generating value or 
eliciting divine delight due to their inherent total sinfulness. This objection may be raised 
independently of whether God can receive value or not. It dovetails, however, with the common 
view that divine love is to be equated with love for the unworthy, that is, altogether gratuitous 
love.
227
 However, according to Scripture, God’s love is not necessarily love for the unworthy. 
The Father loves Christ, who is and was worthy of such love as the supremely excellent, valuable, 
precious, choice, and lovable Son of God.
228
 Thus, while it is true that God’s love for humans is 
unmerited, it is not true that divine love is, by nature, love for the unworthy.
229
 Further, God’s 
love for humans is mediated through the truly worthy Son. That is, humans may bring value to 
God through the prior and ongoing action of God, especially the mediation of Christ. Thus, the 
hamartiological objection is overcome by the mediation of Christ, which provides both the 
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 Indeed, the false dichotomy between altruism and egoism is itself the outgrowth of the false 
thematic agape view that is beholden to the false ontological assumption of divine impassibility. It is the 
further outgrowth of a false dichotomy between altruism and proper self-regard. 
227
 See the description of the transcendent-voluntarist model in this regard above. 
228
 Notably, even Nygren “finds in John the concept of a love that is motivated by the inherent 
worth of the Son. This at once denies his own definition of agape as a love freely outflowing and 
unmotivated.” G. Johnston, “Love in the NT,” IDB 3:177. Nygren does not allow this to defeat his view by 
claiming that the Johannine conception of love is deficient. Cf. Agape and Eros, 158. Even Morris, who 
consistently emphasizes the unilateral and unconditional nature of divine love, states that “the fact that it 
denotes a spontaneous, unmotivated love does not mean that it can be directed only toward the unworthy.” 
Testaments of Love, 138. Cf. Spicq, Agape, 53. But, then, what is the meaning of “denotes” and 
“spontaneous” and “unmotivated”? To be consistent, he must mean that God’s love is sometimes 
spontaneous and unmotivated. As such, it would be incorrect to assert that God’s love is, by nature, 
spontaneous and unmotivated, which is the impression that one gets from the broader thrust of his many 
statements in this regard. 
229
 This is contra the assertion that divine love is “the deep and constant ‘love’ and interest of a 
perfect Being towards entirely unworthy objects.” “Love,” 382. Vacek correctly points out that “agape is 




imputed and imparted righteousness as the proper object of divine delight. In the “Beloved” 
(Christ) Christians are also “beloved,” in the “Elect” Christians are also “elect.”
230
  
In light of the evidence, then, none of the three objections to divine evaluative love stand. 
God can and does receive love and may enjoy, delight in, and garner pleasure from his creatures. 
His own delight, however, is in bringing genuine pleasure, joy, and delight to those very objects 
of his love. This evaluative aspect of divine love is supported by and complements the other 
aspects of divine love. If God’s love were altogether groundless, unconditional, unilateral, and 
equated with arbitrary election then it could not also be evaluative since God could not enjoy or 
appreciate the objects of his love nor their love for him in return. Conversely, that God’s love is 
foreconditional, multilateral, and not arbitrary complements the evaluative nature of God’s 
love.
231
 Moreover, the evaluative and emotional aspects of love dovetail regarding the issue of 
divine passibility. That is, both of them require that God is actually affected by the actions of the 
world. For evaluation, God must actually appraise objects. For the emotion described in 
Scripture, God must be affected by the actions of humans. 
The Emotional Aspect of God’s Love 
This brings us to the third of five major questions around which the conflict of 
theological interpretation about divine love in relation to the world revolves: Does God’s love 
include responsive, passible, affection and/or emotionality such that God is concerned for the 
                                                     
 
230
 Since nearly all of the canon deals with a post-fall world, nearly all of the canonical 
information about divine love relates to God’s love for the unworthy as the outworking of this decision to 
continue to love sinful human beings. However, since such love for the unworthy only takes place within a 
sinful, disordered world, love for the unworthy cannot itself be essential to divine love. Indeed, God’s love 
predates the existence of evil (John 17:24). Thus, the form love takes toward unworthy objects is but one 
exemplification of love but not part of its essence. Accordingly, the operation of this relationship within a 
post-fall world should not be confused with the ideal divine-human love relation.  
231
 Further, that God can enjoy human action makes truly meaningful reciprocal love between God 




world, sympathetically or otherwise?
232
 The immanent-experientialist model views God as utterly 
passible and emotional as the ultimate subject and object of all the experiences of the world, the 
universal feeler of all other’s feelings.
233
 Love, then, is identical with sympathy that takes place 
by way of God’s essential and internal relation to the world.
234
 According to the foreconditional-
reciprocal model, however, God’s love is intensely emotive and affective yet also voluntary and 
evaluative by way of his contingent and external relation to the world. That is, God is not 
ontologically bound to the world but has willingly entered into a relationship with the world 
wherein God is affected by the lives of human beings, having attached his own interests to the 
best interests of all others. God is thus passible, but not passive.
235
 Thus, divine love for his 




On the other hand, the transcendent-voluntarist model presupposes the impassibility of 
God, that is, God cannot be affected by anything external to God; he has no passions.
237
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 As described earlier, emotion is used in this dissertation to refer to that which manifests a 
passible, affective response to the state of affairs. 
233
 Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 28. Cf. idem, Man’s Vision, 203, 294; idem, Reality as Social 
Process, 160. Accordingly, Hartshorne harshly criticizes the view that God is impassible and “passionless.” 
Man’s Vision, 115. Similarly, D. D. Williams states, “Impassibility makes love meaningless.” The Spirit, 
127.  
234
 Indeed, for Hartshorne, “love is joy in the joy (actual or expected) of another, and sorrow in the 
sorrow of another.” Man’s Vision, 116. Cf. ibid., 266; idem, Reality as Social Process, 160. Such 
“sympathy” as “love” is itself Hartshorne’s social conception of love, which is descriptive of reality. 
Omnipotence, 37.  
235
 “God is no robot” but “a personal, living God” who “is incomparably affected by, even pained 
by, the sinner’s rebellion. Acknowledging the passibility (emotions) of God does not diminish the 
immutability of his promissory purposes.” K. A. Mathews, Genesis 1–11:26 (NAC 1A; Nashville, Tenn.: 
Broadman & Holman, 1995), 344. Cf. Peter H. Davids, The First Epistle of Peter (NICNT; Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990), 188. “Something in the very heart of God is moved by suffering and hurt and 
pain.” Miller, “The Book of Jeremiah,” in Isaiah–Ezekiel, 6:814.  
236
 As has been discussed already in this chapter, divine passibility does not amount to ontological 
necessity. God is ontically discrete, distinct from the world he has created. God chose to create other beings 
and consider their interests as his own. As such, there is no internal relation, no ontological necessity that 
God be committed to his people emotionally or otherwise. 
237




Consequently, divine love is strictly volitional, to the exclusion of evaluative and passible, 
emotional aspects.
238
 This has been the dominant position in much of Christian theology.
239
 
However, according to the foreconditional-reciprocal model, while God is the omnipotent and 
self-existent Lord over all, he is nevertheless affected by the disposition, actions, and experiences 
of his creatures.
240
 As such, God is not impassible.
241
 Recently, a number of theologians, despite 
                                                     
 
could impact divinity, God’s love is unaffected by spatio-temporal reality since it “presupposes the 
exclusive voluntary initiative of the sovereign divine being whom no external power can manipulate.” God, 
Revelation, and Authority, 6:349. Cf. Norman L. Geisler, H. Wayne House, and Max Herrera, The Battle 
for God: Responding to the Challenge of Neotheism (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2001), 171; Bruce A. 
Ware, “An Evangelical Reexamination of the Doctrine of the Immutability of God” (Ph.D. diss., Fuller 
Theological Seminary, 1984). 
238
 Cf. C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, 6:341, 346, 349. Recent articulations 
regarding God’s impassibility have attempted to concurrently maintain divine impassibility and the ability 
of God to “feel,” often articulated in response to the increasing criticisms of relational theologies such as 
process and open theism. In such a view, evaluative and emotive aspects are excluded insofar as they 
assume passibility, that is, insofar as they are descriptive of a divine response to external stimulus. In this 
way, God may have fond feelings for his creatures but such emotions are themselves purely the result of the 
unaffected and impassible divine will. For example, Geisler contends that God may have emotional states 
but “His feelings are not the result of actions imposed upon Him by others.” At the same time he contends 
that “God cannot be acted upon by anything outside of Himself.” Geisler, House, and Herrera, The Battle 
for God, 170–71. Similarly, Cooper contends that “God’s pleasure and anger are not passions or emotions 
caused in him.” That is, “classical theism denies that God’s feelings are the effects of creaturely causes.” 
Panentheism, 332. In this way, it is specifically disputed by some classical theists that God’s impassibility 
means that God is uncaring or “utterly devoid of any feelings.” Millard J. Erickson, God the Father 
Almighty: A Contemporary Exploration of the Divine Attributes (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books, 
1998), 161. Cf. Morris, Testaments of Love, 276. “If God loves, it is because he chooses to love  if he 
suffers, it is because he chooses to suffer. God is impassible in the sense that he sustains no ‘passion,’ no 
emotion, that makes Him vulnerable from the outside, over which he has no control, or which he has not 
foreseen.” Carson, The Difficult Doctrine, 60. Cf. idem, “How Can We Reconcile the Love and the 
Transcendent Sovereignty of God?” in God under Fire: Modern Scholarship Reinvents God (ed. D. S. 
Huffman and Eric L. Johnson; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2002), 308, 345; C. F. H. Henry, God, 
Revelation, and Authority, 6:349; Morris, Testaments of Love, 11  Hart, “How Do We Define,” 109  K. 
Barth, Church Dogmatics, 2/1:370. Thus, God cannot be affected and any emotions he may have are not 
elicited but purely willed, unaffected emotions. In this way, all God’s “emotions” are caused purely by the 
eternal decree. 
239
 Thus, Morris contends that “God’s love is not an emotion conditioned by the kind of people we 
are.” Testaments of Love, 151. This simultaneously excludes emotionality and evaluation. As such, 
“passion” does not constitute “Christian love.” Ibid., 276. Such a view dovetails with the supposed 
supremacy of avga,ph (see the discussion in the previous chapter) in which it is supposed to refer “to the will 
rather than to the emotion.” Cranfield, “Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. A. Richardson), 134. Cf. 
Stauffer, TDNT 1:38; Schneider, EDNT 1:9. Likewise, of OT love, William G. Cole asserts that “love in the 
Hebrew . . . was not ephemeral emotion but steadfast concern, involving the will rather than the feelings.” 
Sex and Love in the Bible (New York: Association Press, 1959), 67. See also Denis de Rougemont, Love in 
the Western World (Harper Torchbooks: New York, 1974). 
240




significant variances in their wider theology, have also come to the conclusion that God’s love is 
emotional and, accordingly, the divine nature is passible.
242
  
                                                     
 
often relents. Douglas K. Stuart comments, “The idea that God would not shift direction or adjust his plans 
in response to prayer is foreign to the Bible but unfortunately at home with some forms of deterministic 
theology.” Exodus (NAC 2; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2006), 672. Brueggemann adds, “Such 
freedom on God’s part is, of course, a problem for scholastic theology, which wants an immutable God, but 
such a God stands in deep tension with the biblical presentation of God.” “The Book of Exodus,” in 
Genesis to Leviticus 1:932. Cf. Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1–17 (Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990), 275; Terence E. Fretheim, The Suffering of God: An Old Testament Perspective 
(OBT 14; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984). For more information in this regard see chapters 4 and 5, 
pages 301–52 and 510–40. 
241
 As has been seen earlier, divine passion and compassion may be elicited and explicitly 
correspond to the state of affairs. As such, they not only evidence divine passibility and intense emotion but 
also evaluation. Contra the view of Philo and others who dismiss divine jealousy and passion as 
inappropriate to God due to the presupposition of divine impassibility. See Philo, Lectures on St. John 
113.60–61 (Yonge 163). Cf. Stumpff, TDNT 2: 877–88.  
242
 Vanhoozer points out, “it is becoming increasingly difficult for classical theists to defend the 
intelligibility of the love of God as an apathetic and unilateral benevolence.” “Introduction: The Love of 
God—Its Place, Meaning, and Function in Systematic Theology,” in Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: 
Theological Essays on the Love of God (ed. K. J. Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 10. 
Further, Vacek, who wishes to exclude self-interest from thematic agape, nevertheless believes that 
“unemotional love” is not the answer. Rather, “in excluding ‘being affected’” the Agapist perspective of 
Nygren and others “excludes love.” Love, Human and Divine, 160. In his view, the Agapist perspective that 
views love as beneficence “without in any way being affected by the other” stems “from the fatal failure to 
distinguish between being affected and acting for our own sake.” Ibid. He correctly contends that “some 
affectionate love is necessary.” Ibid., 162. Also reacting against the Agapist view, G. Lloyd Carr states that 
“agape, at least in the Old Testament, is not to be limited to self-giving, non-sensual ‘love.’ It is a word 
filled with all the Hebrew concepts of passion, sexual attraction, friendship, obedience, loyalty, duty, and 
commitment to the other person.” G. Lloyd Carr, The Song of Solomon: An Introduction and Commentary 
(TOTC 17; Downers Grove, Ill.: Inter-Varsity Press, 1984), 63. Similarly, see D. D. Williams, The Spirit, 
45; Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Prophets (New York: Perennial, 2001), 286. Oord contends that love 
“necessarily involves both intention and sympathy/empathy.” The Nature, 30. Cf. ibid., 24; idem, 
“Matching Theology,” 277  Rice, “Process Theism,” in Searching for an Adequate God (ed. Griffin, Cobb, 
and Pinnock), 184. For Moltmann, a God incapable of suffering “is poorer than any human . . . he is also a 
loveless being.”
 
The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian 
Theology (trans. R. A. Wilson and J. Bowden; New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 222. “God’s being is in 
suffering and the suffering is in God’s being itself, because God is love.” The Crucified God: The Cross of 
Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology, 227. Cf. C. Osborne, Eros Unveiled, 21; 
Dunning, Grace, Faith, and Holiness, 195. Wolterstorff suggests that “to act out of love toward something 
other than oneself is to value that thing and certain states of that thing. And on this point it matters not 
whether the love be erotic or agapic.” “Suffering Love,” in Augustine’s Confessions (ed. Mann), 135. Some 
have even suggested that divine love (thematic agape) may include at least some aspects of so-called eros. 
Cf. Oord, The Nature, 121  D’Arcy, The Mind and Heart; Jürgen Moltmann, The Spirit of Life: A Universal 
Affirmation (London: SCMP, 1992), 261; L. Koehler and W. Baumgartner, eds., “חסד,” HALOT (Leiden, 
Holland: Brill, 2001). In this vein, Boyd argues for a perichoresis of agape, eros, storge, and philia, 
modeled after the Trinity. Craig A. Boyd, “The Perichoretic Nature of Love: Beyond the Perfection 
Model,” in Visions of Agapé: Problems and Possibilities in Human and Divine Love (ed. C. A. Boyd; 
Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008). William Klassen comments, “If ecstasy is at the center of the idea of 




Beyond the ontological presupposition of divine impassibility, a secondary rationale for 
the exclusion of emotionality from not only divine love, but love in general, stems from the 
frequent love commands in the Bible. Some argue that emotional love, by definition, could not be 
commanded.
243
 As such, love must be volitional rather than emotional. Closely associated with 
this is the assumption that love, especially in the OT but in some contexts in the NT as well, 
might simply be a term that refers to the legal aspects of covenant relationship, a term of purely 
volitional commitment manifested primarily in external, legal obedience.
244
  
However, the foreconditional-reciprocal model comes to the conclusion that love cannot 
be restricted to something like purely legal or external, “covenantal” love. Covenant itself is 
                                                     
 
hardly the God portrayed in Hosea or in the NT image of Jesus weeping over Jerusalem.” “Love in the NT 
and Early Jewish Literature,” ABD 4:385. Cf. Oord, “Matching Theology,” 184  John A. T. Robinson, 
“Agape and Eros,” Theology 48 (1945): 99  William E. Phipps, “The Sensuousness of Agape,” ThTo 29 
(1973); Mildred Bangs Wynkoop, A Theology of Love: The Dynamic of Wesleyanism (Kansas City, Mo.: 
Beacon Hill Press, 1972), 32; George H. Tavard, A Way of Love (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1977), 
133–34. Even Carson is adamant that an emotionless God is “profoundly unbiblical and should be 
repudiated” though he later argues for a form of impassibility. The Difficult Doctrine, 48. On the other 
hand, Carson also defends the modified view of passibility with the contention that “if the love of God is 
exclusively portrayed as an inviting, yearning, sinner-seeking, rather lovesick passion, we may strengthen 
the hands of Arminians, semi-Pelagians, Pelagians, and those more interested in God’s inner emotional life 
than in his justice and glory, but the cost will be massive. . . . Made absolute . . . it steals God’s sovereignty 
from him and our security from us.” Ibid., 22. Further, he declares, “A God who is terribly vulnerable to the 
pain caused by our rebellion is scarcely a God who is in control or a God who so perfect he does not, 
strictly speaking, need us.” Ibid., 60. 
243
 Stein thus states, “Emotions can be elicited but not commanded. Actions and the will can be 
commanded.” Luke, 206–7. Morris likewise contends, “While it is nonsense to be commanded to generate a 
passionate eros, it is not nonsense to be commanded to respond to God’s 1ove.” Thus, for him, “we must 
not confuse love with passion or sentimentality.” Morris, Testaments of Love, 187, 189. Similarly, W. D. 
Davies and Allison, A Critical, 241  Bamberger, “Fear and Love”  J. W. McKay, “Man’s Love,” 426  
McCarthy, “Notes,” 145–46.  
244
 For example, based on ANE parallels, it has been suggested that bha, at least in Deuteronomy, 
belongs to technical treaty language as a “covenantal love” that is to be contrasted with affection. So 
Moran, “The Ancient,” 78. Cf. McCarthy, “Notes,” 144–46  Ackerman, “The Personal,” 440  Els, 
NIDOTTE 1:285–87; Lohfink, “Hate and Love in Osee 9, 15”  Walker, “‘Love,’” in Current Issues (ed. 
Hawthorne), 283–84. In this vein, a distinction is often made between the emotional affection in intimate 
personal relationships (family, friendship) as opposed to the merely political “love” of treaty contexts. Cf. 
Ackerman, “The Personal,” 440  Thompson, “Israel's ‘Lovers’”  idem, “Significance of the Verb Love in 
the David-Jonathan Narratives in 1 Samuel.” See chapter 4, pages 233–8, for a more detailed discussion 




predicated on divine love and modeled after affectionate kinship.
245
 Accordingly, emotional 
aspects of love are evident within the very covenantal contexts that some have asserted refer to 
merely legal, covenant love, devoid of affection. As such, the love that God bestows and calls for 
(within covenant or without) is emotional but not only emotional. That is, love within the divine-
human relationship includes bilateral, voluntary commitment as well as emotion and 
evaluation.
246
 God loves human beings with the utmost passion and affection. Conversely, love 
toward God is not to be external obedience without affection toward him but internal obedience 
grounded in deep-seated affection, devotion, commitment, loyalty, and even passion.
247
 Love, 
then, is not merely emotion but the love God bestows and the love response he seeks are alike 
emotional yet also volitional and evaluative. In all this, the foreconditional-reciprocal model 
strongly challenges the impassibility of God proposed by the transcendent-voluntarist model 
while also departing from the undifferentiated nature of sympathy required by the essential 
relationship posited by the immanent-experientialist model.  
The Foreconditional Aspect of God’s Love 
The volitional, evaluative, and emotional natures of divine love all contribute to the view 
that God’s love involves significant give-and-take. In the discussion of the final two aspects of 
love, this give-and-take relationality of love is taken up explicitly in response to some of the most 
pressing and oft-misunderstood issues about divine love. The most pressing issue relates to 
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 See Hahn, Kinship by Covenant. Contra Moran, “The Ancient.” See also the discussion of this 
in chapter 4, pages 233–8. 
246
 Many scholars recognize both emotion and volition in divine love. For example, Rice explains 
that “love involves profound sensitivity, but it insists that love is a voluntary commitment.” “Process 
Theism,” in Searching for an Adequate God (ed. Griffin, Cobb, and Pinnock), 185. Oord also argues that 
both choice and emotion are “always present in an expression of love.” The Nature, 30. Post contends that 
“an even balance or co-primacy between emotion and reason is the fitting alternative to those who would 
diminish the importance of either capacity.” Unlimited Love: Altruism, Compassion, and Service 
(Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2003), 67. 
247
 “Love and behavior motivated by love are not to be separated from emotion, and yet they are 




whether divine love is unilateral or bilateral. Bound up with this is the question of whether divine 
love is necessary or contingent, unconditional or conditional, unmotivated or motivated, 
ungrounded or grounded, etc. 
For both the immanent-experientialist and transcendent-voluntarist models, divine love is 
unconditional and cannot be forfeited. In the immanent-experientialist model, God’s love is 
ontologically necessary. God is internally bound to the world and his love is descriptive of that 
necessary relation.
248
 In the transcendent-voluntarist model, on the other hand, God’s love is 
dependent only upon his unilateral and arbitrary will to love. In this way, it is frequently asserted, 
and popularly assumed, that divine love is unconditional.
249
 Accordingly, in this model divine 
love is thought to be spontaneous, unmotivated, and ungrounded.
250
 As such, divine love is 
                                                     
 
“Obedience and passionate relationship characterize the full love of God.” Deuteronomy and the Death, 51.  
248
 See chapter 2 for the description of Hartshorne’s ontology, which requires this conception of 
divine love. 
249
 Thus, for Snaith, divine love (bha) is “arbitrary” and “depends solely on the will of the agent” 
meaning “it is unconditioned by anything outside the Nature of God.” The Distinctive Ideas, 138. Likewise, 
Morris comments, “We must clearly recognize that God’s love is unconditional.” Morris, Testaments of 
Love, Testaments of Love, 31. Cf. Horton, The Christian Faith, 267; Vanhoozer, Remythologizing 
Theology, 174. Similar references to God’s “unconditional” love frequently appear in theological 
dictionaries and biblical commentaries. Cf. Lincoln, Ephesians, 100; Ko stenberger, John, 423; Els, 
NIDOTTE 1:280  Walker, “‘Love,’” in Current Issues (ed. Hawthorne), 287; Stauffer, TDNT 1:49; A. E. 
Hill, Malachi, 167; Verhoef, 196–97, 200–201; Park, “Divine Love in Hosea 11,” 37–38; Edmond Jacob, 
Theology of the Old Testament (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), 110. Some of these scholars appear to 
confuse the unmerited nature of divine love with the concept of unconditionality. Consider, for example, 
Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas, 137. Further imprecise usage of the term “unconditional” appears such as 
when it is stated that “God always takes the initiative in love and his people must respond to this 
unconditional love.” Park, “Divine Love in Hosea 11,” 38. Cf. Leonard J. Coppes, “רחם,” in Theological 
Wordbook of the Old Testament (ed. R. L. Harris et al.; Chicago: Moody Press, 1980), 843. If humans 
“must respond” then love is not altogether “unconditional.”  
250
 Morris contends that God’s love is “spontaneous and unmotivated.” Testaments of Love, 264. 
Cf. C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, 6:340; ibid., 5:116; Nygren, Agape and Eros, 210; 
Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas, 137. Cranfield similarly states, “The ground of God’s love for us is altogether 
in himself. He loves us, because he is love.” Therefore, divine love is “spontaneous.” “Love,” A 
Theological Word Book (ed. A. Richardson), 135, 132. Likewise, Johnston contends, “The divine love is 
sovereign, unmotivated save by the necessity to be itself, spontaneous, and redemptive.” IDB 3:169. 
Notably, Morris qualifies that God’s “spontaneous and unmotivated” love “does not mean that he may not 
also respond to the love men show to his Son.” Morris, Testaments of Love, 264. However, if taken 
seriously this would mean that divine love is not altogether “spontaneous” or “unmotivated” but evaluative 
and responsive. On the other hand, Post questions “the assumption that God’s love is ‘unmotivated, 




unilaterally constant; the object of God’s love can do nothing to inhibit, decrease, or forfeit such 
love since it is wholly independent of evaluation of its object(s).
251
 This conception dovetails with 
the assumptions that have already been challenged in this chapter, that divine love is purely 
volitional, non-evaluative, and unaffected by external agency.
252
 
However, the foreconditional-reciprocal model contends that God’s love is 
foreconditional rather than strictly unconditional. That is, God’s love is offered prior to any 
conditions but not exclusive to conditions. Thus, God’s foreconditional love affirms that:  
1. Divine love is prior to any human initiative or response and holds sole primacy 
regarding the divine-human love relationship.
253
  
2. God voluntarily bestows his love prior to and independent of human desert or merit.
254
  
                                                     
 
251
 For example, Morris states, “God’s love” is “constant” as well as “firm and sure and steadfast, 
continuing no matter what happens.” Testaments of Love, 19, 100. As God, “he will never cease to love” 
for the “constancy of his love depends on what he is rather than on what they are.” Ibid., 12, 77. Similarly, 
“Love,” 382. C. F. H. Henry contends that God “maintains eternal fidelity in love. He is the steadfast God, 
not a vacillating sovereign. God, Revelation, and Authority, 5:13. Accordingly, it is frequently asserted that 
God’s love is “permanent” and “cannot be withdrawn.” Akin, 1, 2, 3, John, 133. Cf. Snaith, The Distinctive 
Ideas, 112–13, 115, 122; Simian-Yofre, TDOT 13:441  Cranfield, “Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. 
A. Richardson), 133; E. Ray Clendenen, “Malachi,” in Haggai, Malachi (NAC 21A; Nashville, Tenn.: 
Broadman & Holman, 2004), 253  Geoffrey Grogan, “A Biblical Theology of the Love of God,” in Nothing 
Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of God (ed. K. J. Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001), 56; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans (AB 33; New York: Doubleday, 1993), 536. 
Nothing a human can do will amount to the removal of God’s love if God has elected that one. So 
Schreiner, Romans, 466; Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 546–47. 
252
 The purported unconditionality of love is conceptually bound up with the assertion that divine 
love is arbitrary, unilaterally willed, election love. 
253
 Oord states in this regard, “Creatures could not love if our relational God were not the Lover 
who initially empowers, inspires, and beckons them.” The Nature, 21. However, “God lovingly acts first in 
each moment to provide agency, freedom, values, and relationship.” Ibid., 129. However, it should be noted 
that his view differs from the one stated in this section since his “Essential Kenosis theology claims 
Prevenient grace is necessary grace” stemming from “God’s eternal nature” while the canonical evidence 
suggests that divine love is volitional, not necessary. See ibid., 129. 
254
 Some might use the term “prevenient” in association with God’s prior love and action. For 
example, T. C. Oden presents the typical Arminian view of prevenient grace, which refers to “the grace that 
begins to enable one to choose further to cooperate with saving grace. By offering the will the restored 
capacity to respond to grace, the person then may freely and increasingly become an active, willing 
participant in receiving the conditions for justification.” John Wesley's Scriptural Christianity: A Plain 
Exposition of His Teaching on Christian Doctrine (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1994), 243. Cf. Roger 




3. God’s love expects and ultimately requires an appropriate human response, even if that 
response is itself imperfect. 
Though God’s subjective love is unconditional, God’s objective love is conditional and 
may be forfeited.
255
 Thus, while God’s love for humans is surpassingly enduring, steadfast, and 
reliable, it is not thereby altogether constant or unconditional. Accordingly, divine love toward 
humans is contingent rather than necessary and God is not ontologically bound to his creatures in 
contrast to the immanent-experientialist model. Further, as conditional upon human response in 
many respects, God’s love is not strictly unmotivated, spontaneous, disinterested, indifferent, or 
unconditional. Accordingly, the conditionality of God’s love, especially its potential forfeiture, 
rejects both the transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-experientialist models as well as many 




 On the other hand, in accord 
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 See the discussion of the subjectivity and objectivity of God’s love earlier in this chapter. 
256
 For the universalist position see Talbott, The Inescapable Love. For a vastly different 
universalist conception, one that requires human freedom, see Hick, Evil and the God of Love. On the other 
hand, “The fact that God allows us as persons to retain the ability to turn away from him, excludes any 
form of universalism which holds that God’s love must triumph in the end and cause all to love him.” 
Brümmer, The Model of Love, 179. Cf. Fergusson, “Will the Love,” in Nothing Greater, Nothing Better, 
196–202; Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 1:438  T. F. Torrance, “Universalism or Election,” 312–14; 
Fritz Guy, “The Universality of God’s Love,” in The Grace of God, the Will of Man: A Case for 
Arminianism (ed. C. H. Pinnock; Minneapolis, Minn.: Bethany House, 1995), 43–45. For a compelling 
biblical argument against universalism, see I. Howard Marshall, “Does the New Testament Teach 
Universal Salvation,” in Christ in Our Place (Allison Park, Penn: Pickwick, 1989). 
257
 Here, the horns of the compatibilist dilemma are apparent. For example, Schreiner, who takes a 
determinist position, nevertheless states, “Those who trust in Christ remain in the faith because of the 
preserving work of God the Father. Nevertheless, the promise that God will keep his own does not nullify 
the responsibility of believers to persevere in the faith. God keeps his own, and yet believers must keep 
themselves in God’s love. . . . On the one hand, believers only avoid apostasy because of the grace of God. 
On the other hand, the grace of God does not cancel out the need for believers to exert all their energy to 
remain in God’s love.” 1, 2 Peter, Jude (NAC 37; Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 2007), 483–84. 
Yet, he contends that “those upon whom God set his covenantal love before creating the world are those he 
predestined to share the eschatological image of the Son” his “chosen . . . will surely persevere and attain to 
glorification.” Idem, Romans, 466. However, if Schreiner is correct, why does God not effectively draw all 
to him? If God can determine human beings to freely do whatever he wills, why not will that all are 
actually saved? See Jerry L. Walls, “Why No Classical Theist, Let Alone Orthodox Christian, Should Ever 
Be a Compatibilist,” Philosophia Christi 13 (2011): 75–104. See also the compelling arguments of 
Plantinga against compatibilism and in favor of significant freedom of creaturely agents. Cf. Plantinga, 
God, Freedom, and Evil; idem, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). Similarly, 
Morris, who stresses the groundlessness, unconditionality, and unilateral constancy of divine love makes 








Furthermore, as conditional, divine love is not identical with unilateral, divine 
beneficence.
259
 Divine love is not to be conflated with beneficence though the latter is an aspect 
and outgrowth of the former.
260
 Divine blessings are predicated on love though not unilaterally 
since divine love is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of divine blessing.
261
 
                                                     
 
themselves off from the blessing that God’s love is always offering.” Testaments of Love, 31. Cf. C. F. H. 
Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, 6:308. However, this statement of Morris undercuts his emphatic 
position elsewhere that divine love is unconditional. 
On the other hand, in criticizing all those who suggest that God’s love is voluntary rather than 
essential, Oord contends that God’s love is “unconditional” such that “God loves us no matter what we do” 
since “unconditional love refers to God’s eternal nature as necessarily including love for creatures. God 
essentially loves creation, because God’s essential nature includes love for the world. If God’s nature did 
not include love for creation, Christian appeals to God’s unconditional love would be baseless.” The 
Nature, 133. Cf. Paul R. Sponheim, Love's Availing Power: Imaging God, Imagining the World 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2011). He further contends that such a view, that God cannot not love 
us, provides assurance that is “unavailable to those who think God could stop loving us.” Oord, The Nature, 
132. However, it is not true that God’s love must be either essential or “unconditional” to provide such 
assurance. All that is required is the recognition that God never arbitrarily decides to remove his love from 
anyone, as is affirmed in this foreconditional-reciprocal model. Accordingly, one need not worry that God 
will remove his love since the only way divine love will be removed is as a consequence of one’s final 
rejection of God. As such, divine love is conditional but not capricious. 
258
 For example, Carson refers to “God’s conditional, covenantal love.” New Dictionary of Biblical 
Theology, 648. Cf. Spicq, Agape, 31. Further, Carson acknowledges, “it is possible for Christians not to 
keep themselves in the love of God.” New Dictionary of Biblical Theology, 648. Cf. Jude 21. Likewise, 
Raymond E. Brown comments, “If one turns away from the Son, one forfeits God’s love.” The Gospel 
according to John XIII–XXI (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1979), 641. Cf. Duane L. Christensen, 
Deuteronomy 1–11 (vol. 6A; Dallas: Word, 1991), 160–61. 
259
 This is contra the repeated assertion that divine love is mere beneficence, that is, it is altogether 
gratuitous, “disinterested generous love.” For instance, consider Spicq’s claim that divine avga,ph is identical 
to “charity” (think caritas) such that God’s love is always giving love and amounts to “disinterested 
generous love.” “αγαπη,” TLNT 1:8, 13. This is in keeping with his view that avga,ph love takes place within 
a benefactor-benefactee relationship where the superior’s avga,ph is gift love and the inferior’s love is “first 
of all consent, welcome, acceptance” and “gratitude . . . the love inspired in turn by generous love.” TLNT 
1:13. Thus, he refers to it as “the voluntary, purely gratuitous love which is authentic charity.” Idem, 
Agape, 1:85. Nygren and others who follow his view agree with the first part, that divine love is always 
gratuitous and disinterested, but contend that real human love toward God is impossible. Love from 
humans to God is really God’s own love flowing through humans to himself. See the historical survey of 
divine love on this view. 
260
 Love is sometimes almost conflated with grace to the extent that it is seen as election love. 
Thus, according to Morris, the bha “words appear to signify love freely given, love given when there is no 
sense of obligation. When used to refer to God they imply his grace.” Testaments of Love, 12. Cf. Grogan, 




Yet, though God’s love is conditional in many respects, it is not thereby merited. Some, 
however, have incorrectly conflated conditionality with merit.
262
 Yet, unmerited is not the same 
as unconditional or disinterested. 
263
 Something may be conditional yet unmerited; contingent 
upon response but not thereby earned, or deserved, when it is received.
264
 Though divine love is 
                                                     
 
say, “only where the love of God is discerned in terms of grace—in terms of a divinely provided 
redemption bestowed as unmerited divine favor—that the love of God is conceived aright; in every other 
religious or philosophical tradition, the divine love is misconstrued.” Notes on the Doctrine of God, 108. 
Cf. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine, 185; Donald G. Bloesch, God, the Almighty: Power, Wisdom, 
Holiness, Love (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 148. 
261
 Brueggemann comments, “Christianity has for so long represented itself as a religion of free 
grace, that we flinch from the thought that God’s gifts are conditional. Mosaic faith, however, is 
realistically grounded in a comprehensive ‘if’ (v. 22  cf. 19:5).” “The Book of Exodus,” in Genesis to 
Leviticus, 1:878. Merrill on the other hand presupposes a compatibilistic perspective and contends for “the 
absence of any conditionality” with regard to Israel’s repentance claiming that God will himself effect their 
repentance. See Deuteronomy, 128. But this begs the question, if God unilaterally effects repentance in his 
people, why does he not do so from the very beginning? The canon contends God is actually waiting on the 
people, and through trials wooing them back to the realization of their need for him (cf. Isa 30:15, 18; Matt 
23:37). 
262
 For example, Snaith comments, “Jehovah's love for Israel was unconditioned by anything in 
Israel that was good. It was wholly unmerited. It was not in the least degree because of anything in Israel 
that was good, or beautiful, or desirable. . . . Such is the story of God’s unconditioned love.” The 
Distinctive Ideas, 137. Cf. Morris, Testaments of Love, 148; Lincoln, Ephesians, 100. 
263
Accordingly, the term avga,ph is “often used by biblical writers to mean something other than 
unmotivated or spontaneous love.” Oord, “Matching Theology,” 139. See the word study of the avgapa,w 
word group in the NT chapter. 
264
 For example, someone who wins a sweepstakes who must fulfill certain minor conditions to 
actually receive the prize did not thereby earn the prize. The lottery winner must show the ticket but they 
did not thereby earn the money, though they have a rightful claim to it. Similarly, the elect are those who 
have accepted God’s invitation, responded to his prevenient love with corresponding love (itself only 
possible through divine initiative and Christ’s mediation) and therefore have a rightful claim to eternal life, 
not one that is merited or deserved but one that is ultimately predicated on the free grace and love of God. 
Thus, it is apparent throughout Hosea that God’s love for his people is unmerited and surpassingly 
enduring. Yet, it is also evident that divine love is by no means indifferent (he is grieved and deeply 
concerned for his beloved) nor unconditional as he clearly expects, and ultimately requires appropriate 
response (cf. Hos 9:15). What some interpreters deem “unconditional” may thus more accurately be 
referred to as “unmerited” or “undeserved” (Deut 7:7; 9:4–5). Since divine love is a gift, creatures have no 
claim upon it. Indeed, humans need not even exist but for the will of God to create and sustain them. In this 
way, divine love is never deserved or merited (though it may be warranted). God loves undeserving 
humans not because humans are worthy but because of his own volition, mercy, and grace (see Deut 7:7–8; 
Hos 3:1; Luke 6:35; Rom 5:8; Titus 3:4–5; 1 John 3:16; cf. Deut 9:4–5). However, as has been seen, divine 
love qua divine love is not necessarily love for the unworthy. Moreover, in the eschaton, human beings 
who have responded to God’s love will become (by divine action) perfectly loveable. At that time, they will 
“warrant” divine love. That is, they will be proper objects of love as loveable. However, even then humans 




unmerited, however, this does not rule out the fact that God can and does reward appropriate 
(albeit imperfect) human response toward him.
265
 Evaluation does not rule out divine grace or 
vice versa; God is gracious and, at the same time, not arbitrary. As such, the notion of unmerited 
love does not mean that love ultimately nullifies conditions, evaluative judgment, just deserts, or 
reciprocity. 
 In all this, divine love cannot be altogether unmotivated, ungrounded, spontaneous, 
disinterested, or unconditional. God’s love is initiatory, prior to any human action, love, merit, or 
worthwhile at the same time God implements conditions for the reception and continuance of that 
love. Such love is foreconditional, yet unmerited. Further, this foreconditional aspect of God’s 
love supports and is bound up with the aspects already discussed and points forward to the 
multilaterally relational aspect of love. The bilateral and volitional aspect of divine love is a 
necessary supposition of conditionality while the evaluative aspect by its very nature assumes that 
divine love is (at least in some ways) contingent and conditional upon actual states of affairs. In 
all this, God’s love must be responsive and thus assumes divine passibility. Since divine love is 
actually evaluative, passible, and conditional, corresponding to and being affected by its object(s) 
it must not be unilaterally constant but contingent upon its object(s). With this in mind we now 
turn to the final aspect of divine love, multilateral relationality. 
The Multilaterally Relational Aspect of God’s Love 
 In this last rubric we return even more explicitly to the primary query: Is the God-world 
relationship unilateral or does it include some degree of reciprocality? In the immanent-
experientialist model, love describes the essential relation between God and the world. All are 
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 Bock sees divine reward as “God’s acknowledgment that he has seen this meritorious love and 
the faithfulness it reflects,” though he does not mean that it merits salvation. Darrell L. Bock, Luke 1:1–
9:50 (BECNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1994), 603. I am more comfortable in ascribing language of 
“warrant” rather than “merit” to such instances since even such reward is gracious since God is under no 
obligation, moral or otherwise, to reward human beings who, overall, have fallen far short of the divine 




internally related to God and are part of God’s very nature. Therefore, divine love is universal  
there is no object outside of God’s love. In fact, the divine-human love relationship is one part of 
the necessarily reciprocal relationality that makes up reality itself.
266
 In this way, since God is 
essentially related to all, divine love is universal and applicable to all in an undifferentiated 
manner within a sympathetic, indeterministic relationship. As such, the immanent-experientialist 
model indiscriminately universalizes divine love.
267
 The foreconditional-reciprocal model, 
however, contends that while it is universal in some ways, God’s love is multilaterally relational 
in a way that does differentiate between its objects. That is, God universally seeks, but does not 
need, a relationship of reciprocal love but enters into particular, intimate relationship only with 
those who respond appropriately.
268
 God’s love, then, does not reach all of its objects equally but 
is evaluatively and conditionally responsive to the actual dispositions and/or actions of human 
beings.
269
 The foreconditional-reciprocal model, then, stands in direct contrast with the 
                                                     
 
be outweighed by the titanic amount of human demerit(s). Cf. Luke 17:10. 
266
 Indeed, the whole being of God, the entire divine ontology, is summed up in the term “love,” 
which “defined as social awareness, taken literally, is God.”
 
Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, 36. 
267
 Hartshorne is adamant that God’s love is universal and rejects the exclusive nature of divine 
love professed in classic theism. “God is held to love all, not just a few; always; not just at times; in all 
their being, not with neglect of this or that aspect; and his influence in the universal society will be 
paramount and the basis of its integrity.” Reality as Social Process, 135. However, Hartshorne’s universal 
love appears to be to the detriment of love for the individual, not in the sense that love for each individual 
is excluded but such that the number of the objects of divine love means that a given object of divine love 
is not of much importance. Hartshorne writes, “Consider now the idea that a loving God would not 
establish natural laws that make eventually dying a certainty for animals such as we are. God loves us, this 
I believe. But as what does God love us? I answer, God loves us as what we are, a certain very distinctive 
species of mortal animal, finite spatially and in careers. We are each divinely loved as rendered individual 
and definite by this finitude.” Omnipotence, 36. Cf. idem, Man’s Vision, 192–93. In this way, the 
immanent-experientialist model indiscriminately universalizes the divine love in direct contrast to the 
transcendent-voluntarist model, which limits divine love to those whom God sovereignly elects to bestow 
favor upon. 
268
 Despite the magnitude of his desire for loving relationship, God has no need of a human 
response toward his love. Intra-trinitarian love pre-exists, and would remain without divine-human love (cf. 
John 17:24). That God is love “is true quite independently of our being there to be loved. God is eternally 
love prior to, and independently of, his love for us.” Cranfield, “Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. A. 
Richardson), 135. 
269
 The concept of insider and outsider love, divine-friendship, familial imagery, and the status as 




undifferentiated universal love of the immanent-experientialist model by distinguishing between 
God’s universally relational and particularly relational love, neither of which is constant and/or 
unconditional.  
The foreconditional-reciprocal model not only contrasts with the immanent-
experientialist model but also stands in contrast to the transcendent-voluntarist model’s 
conception of God’s love unto salvation as arbitrarily and unilaterally restricted to some. In the 
transcendent-voluntarist model, God’s love is universal only in the sense of “common love” but 
love unto salvation is reserved for those who are unilaterally elected by God; the rest are 
damned.
270
 While this correctly recognizes that God does not love all equally, in contrast to the 
immanent-experientialist model’s undifferentiated divine love, it incorrectly contends that God 
does not love all equally as the result of only his timeless and unilateral divine decree such that 
those whom God loves fully are chosen arbitrarily.
271
 As such, love unto salvation is granted only 
                                                     
 
does not reach all objects equally. Thus, God clearly loves all with a kind of “common” or “universal” love. 
T. C. Oden thus correctly states, “All things are loved by God, but all things are not loved in the same way 
by God, since there are degrees of capacity, receptivity, and willingness among varied creatures to receive 
God’s love.” The Living God, 118. Likewise, Mounce adds, “God loves the entire human race (John 3:16), 
but those who respond to him in faith are loved in a special way.” Romans, 64. So, Leon Morris, The 
Gospel according to John (NICNT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995), 630. Cf. Oord, The Nature, 
121. 
270
 For example, Packer believes that particular love reaches those whom God has sovereignly 
elected to love while universal love corresponds to God’s common grace. “The Love of God,” in Still 
Sovereign (ed. Schreiner and Ware), 283. Thus God “loves all in some ways” and he loves “some in all 
ways.” Ibid. Similarly, see C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, 6:310, 345  Piper, “How Does a 
Sovereign,” 10. Cf. the debate between Hunt and White on this issue in Dave Hunt and James R. White, 
Debating Calvinism (Sisters, Oreg.: Multnomah Publishers, 2004), 255–80. In this vein, Morris can adopt 
double predestination and at the same time state without contradiction: “God being the God that he is, his 
love is for all he has made.” Testaments of Love, 80. Compare Calvin’s view that “God loves men in a 
secret way, before they are called, if they are among the elect.” John Calvin, John (Albany, Oreg.: Ages 
Software, 1998), 16:27. 
271
 Determinists generally contend that God is just in doing so since all are sinners and rightly 
deserve punishment. That God is gracious to some who are undeserving should be praised rather than 
questioned. However, Davis objects by way of a striking analogy: “Suppose I discover that my two sons are 
both equally guilty of some wrong—say they both trampled some of my wife’s beloved roses in our 
backyard. And suppose I say to one of them: ‘You are guilty and your punishment is that you will be 
confined to your room.’ And suppose I say to the other one: ‘You are equally guilty, but as a gift of love, 
I’m going to let you go without punishment.’ Surely it is obvious on the face of it that I have been unfair.” 








The foreconditional-reciprocal model, on the contrary, contends that God seeks, enters 
into, and maintains reciprocally responsive love relationships with human beings.
273
 In doing so, 
God’s universally relational love, which is bestowed on everyone foreconditionally, prompts 
God’s actions toward drawing humans into a voluntary and reciprocal relationship of love (God’s 
particularly relational love).
274
 Thus, God truly loves everyone and in such a way that he works 
toward saving all and enjoying an everlasting, reciprocal love relationship with each one of 
them.
275
 The reason why not all enjoy such a relationship is not due to any decision or lack of 
action on God’s part but the result of the human’s decision to reject God’s loving overtures.
276
 
                                                     
 
Fergusson, “Will the Love,” in Nothing Greater, Nothing Better, 190.  
272
 There is nothing the reprobate could have decided or done that could have led to their inclusion 
as objects of God’s salvific love. J. L. Walls objects, “A being who determines (manipulates) another being 
to perform evil actions is himself evil. It is even more perverse if a being determines a being to perform evil 
actions and then holds him accountable, and punishes him for those actions.” “Why No Classical Theist,” 
88. This echoes Flew’s contention: “Certainly it would be monstrous to suggest that anyone, however truly 
responsible in the eyes of men, could fairly be called to account and punished by the God who had rigged 
his every move.” Antony Flew, “Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom,” in New Essays in 
Philosophical Theology (ed. A. Flew and A. C. MacIntyre; New York: Macmillan, 1964), 163. 
273
 Numerous scholars also recognize that God desires and seeks reciprocal love from his 
creatures. As Moffat puts it, “Love seeks love.” Love, 280. Accordingly, “divine love” makes a “claim for 
reciprocal love.” Love, 278. Cf. Post, A Theory of Agape, 10, 27; Brümmer, The Model of Love, 236; T. C. 
Oden, The Living God, 119  Badcock, “The Concept of Love,” in Nothing Greater (ed. Vanhoozer), 45–46. 
For J. A. T. Robinson, “Agape desires response, and desires it passionately. . . . Love yearns for a loving 
response.” “Agape and Eros,” 99. “God’s love seeks communion, because otherwise the feelings of sadness 
and frustration explicit in Christ’s crying out over Jerusalem, ‘My heart is ready to break with grief’ 
(Matthew 26:38) would be incomprehensible.” Post, A Theory of Agape, 27. Carson comments that “the 
love for which we were created” is “a mutual love that issues in obedience without reserve.” The Gospel 
according to John, 521. 
274
 On the other hand, one is left to wonder why God “loves” the reprobate with a “common love” 
in the deterministic conception. As J. L. Walls puts it, “temporal blessings cannot begin to underwrite a 
sober claim of divine love for persons who are determined to damnation by God’s unconditional choice.” 
“Why No Classical Theist,” 98. He adds that to say that God loves the arbitrarily non-elect is to use “the 
concept of love in a deeply idiosyncratic sense.” Ibid. 
275
 The universality of God’s love is recognized by many scholars, though the particular 
understanding of such love varies. For Dunning, divine love as a “manifestation” of the divine nature “is 
universal rather than selective,” God loves “all without discrimination. None is excluded.” Grace, Faith, 




This difference bears out further with regard to the question of whether humans actually 
reciprocate God’s love. While in the foreconditional-reciprocal model the divine-human love 
relationship is contingent upon the voluntary human reciprocation of God’s love, the 
transcendent-voluntarist model sees divine love as unilateral such that God gives, but does not 
actually receive, love.
277
 In that view, human “love” toward God is nothing more than God’s own 
love flowing back to him as the result of divine determinism. This complements the suggestion of 
Luther that human love toward God is actually divine love that flows through the human “like a 
vessel or tube through which the stream of the divine blessings must flow without intermission to 
other people.”
278
 As such, human love toward God is solely the result of God’s unilaterally 
                                                     
 
20; Brümmer, The Model of Love, 175; T. C. Oden, The Living God; Klassen, Love in the NT, 386; 
Wynkoop, A Theology of Love  Guy, “The Universality,” in The Grace of God (ed. Pinnock). As seen 
above, determinists also recognize a universality to God’s love, often referred to as “common love,” which 
is not effective unto salvation. For Geisler, God is “omnibenevolent.” Systematic Theology, 367. Cf. 
Carson, The Difficult Doctrine, 22. Among these, Clendenen recognizes that “Acts 14:17  1 Tim 2:4  and 2 
Pet 3:9 teach that there is a sense in which the love of God is universal” but contrasts that with God’s “love 
for his elect,” which results from divine determinism. In his view, “divine love” that “respects human 
freedom, even to the extent of allowing humanity to be utterly irrational and perverse—that is, to reject the 
love that has created, sustained, and redeemed it” (p. 45) is a love without arms and legs, that is, not divine 
at all.” Clendenen, “Malachi,” 252. On the contrary, Guy states, “It is unthinkable that the divine love is 
restricted to a fortunate part of creation and that another (perhaps even larger) part is excluded. In regard to 
human reality, the divine love includes absolutely all, intending the ultimate good—that is, the eternal 
salvation—of every person.” “The Universality,” in The Grace of God (ed. Pinnock), 36. On the other 
hand, for an interesting discussion of whether it is even conceivable that God extend benevolence to all 
equally see Paul Helm, “Can God Love the World?” in Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: Theological 
Essays on the Love of God (ed. K. J. Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2001). 
276
 J. L. Walls puts it well in stating, “Libertarians can affirm the love of God for all persons 
without being disingenuous, even if some persons are damned. For God extends his love to such persons in 
such a way that they are truly enabled to respond. Indeed, it is my view that God gives all persons ‘optimal 
grace,’ which means they have every opportunity to accept the gospel and be saved. Despite this, some may 
resist grace decisively and be lost.” “Why No Classical Theist,” 98. See also the fascinating essay by Floyd 
wherein he tries to make sense of Aquinas’s claim that God loves some more than others. He comes to the 
conclusion that “while God’s love is intensely felt for all, not everyone will reciprocate it and, as a result, 
preclude themselves from enjoying the goods that would otherwise be available to them. . . . Even amongst 
people I love, I cannot maintain fellowship with them if they are unwilling to return my affection or behave 
in ways that promote a common life.” “Preferential Divine Love,” 371. 
277
 In this view, love is superfluous to God. It is not only not needed but neither is it desired or 
valued. See C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, 6:62. 
278
 Martin Luther, WA 10.1.1, quoted in Nygren, Agape and Eros, 735. Marshall slips toward this 
when he suggests that humans who have received divine love “have no choice as to their response” and 






 Accordingly, all true love originates unilaterally with God such that love 
toward God is, in actuality, God’s love for himself effected irresistibly through others. Therefore, 
human responsive love cannot be a condition with an uncertain outcome. Such a conception fits 
with the erroneous suppositions already discussed in this chapter including the view that divine 
love is unilaterally efficacious, unconditional, spontaneous, grounded, etc. 
Accordingly, it is often supposed that humans cannot actually reciprocate God’s love. 
This may take the form of denying that human love can truly be so-called agape love. In other 
words, it is supposed, humans are incapable of “true” love.
280
 More basically, a deterministic 
metaphysics rules out reciprocal love toward God not by denying the reality of love toward God 
itself but by defining such love as merely the result of the unilateral, divine decree. The 
foreconditional-reciprocal model, however, recognizes that human love toward God is not 
depicted in Scripture as passive but as the appropriate response that God’s prior action elicits and 
enables, but does not determine.
281
 Indeed, Scripture consistently presents humans as voluntarily 
                                                     
 
Eerdmans, 1978), 215. Cf. Morris, Testaments of Love, 182. For more examples of this perspective see the 
introduction of this issue in the general introduction to avga,ph in the NT chapter. 
279
 Thus, Nygren contends that a human loves God “because God’s unmotivated love has 
overwhelmed him and taken control of him, so that he cannot do other than love God. Therein profound 
significance of the idea of predestination: man has not selected God, but God has elected man.” Agape and 
Eros, 214. So, also, Morris, Testaments of Love, 191. Augustine posits human love as the unilateral work of 
God himself such that “He Himself loved that which He had made.” Lectures on St. John 7.102.5 (NPNF
1
 
7; Albany, Oreg.: Ages Software), 391. Similarly, Matthew Henry, Matthew Henry’s Commentary on the 
Whole Bible (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1996); John 16:23–27. Cf. Els, NIDOTTE 1: 283; Cranfield, 
“Love,” A Theological Word Book (ed. A. Richardson), 133; K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, 1/2: 410. 
280
 Although it is clear that human bha toward God is present, especially in the Psalms, a number 
of scholars have marginalized human love toward God by sometimes suggesting that all or nearly all of the 
instances are merely the result of the influence of the so-called Deuteronomic tradition. Cf. Snaith, The 
Distinctive Ideas, 133; Els, NIDOTTE 1:279, 283–84. Dovetailing with this is the all-too-common rejection 
of human dsx toward God, which does not hold up to scrutiny. Both of these appear to stem, at least for 
some scholars, from the theological supposition that humans cannot benefit God. See, for example, Hans-
Jürgen Zobel, “חסד,” TDOT (ed. G. J. Botterweck and H. Ringren; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1986), 
63. See chapter 4, pages 354–75, for a further discussion of these issues. Even Hartshorne, from a vastly 
different ontology, suggests that humans “do not ‘love’ literally, but with qualifications, and 
metaphorically.” The Divine Relativity, 36. 
281
 Johnston thus states correctly that if Nygren is right that human love is merely “through the 






 Hence, God is not the only agent of true or proper love, and it is 
manifestly false that human beings cannot reciprocate divine love.
283
 A number of theologians 
                                                     
 
really the believer's at all! This is to evacuate Christian love of any value, and it is to be rejected for the 
same reasons that one must reject the notion that faith is a moment of passivity.” IDB 3:173. 
282
 See, for instance, Rom 8:28; 1 Cor 2:9; 8:3; cf. Eph 6:24; Jas 1:12; 2:5. These passages are 
each discussed in chapter 5. 
283
 Indeed, contra Nygren and others, “agape can ascend from man to God.” Spicq, Agape, 105. So 
Warnach, EDNT 2:529. Nevertheless, the determinist contends that love for God is the efficacious 
consequence of God’s unilateral election. For the idea that God is solely responsible for his elect’s love 
toward him see Schreiner, Romans, 450–51; Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 530; cf. ibid., 531; Judith M. 
Gundry Volf, Paul and Perseverance: Staying in and Falling Away (WUNT 37; Tübingen: JCB Mohr, 
1990), 59–60. Cf. Peter von der Osten-Sacken, Römer 8 als Beispiel paulinischer Soteriologie (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1975), 280. Contra Herman N. Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1975), 350. However, the canonical evidence suggests otherwise. First, 
the frequent exhortations of humans to love strongly suggest that humans are free to do otherwise. Second, 
the reward(s) attached to love for God strongly implies the real contingency and freedom of human love 
toward God. Third, the canonical evidence does not accord with a thorough-going determinism. On the 
contrary, a determinist metaphysic has been consistently excluded by what has been seen with regard to 
divine love not only in this section but also throughout this and the previous two chapters. In all this, 
human love toward God as described in Scripture cannot be merely the result of God’s will. Indeed, the 
many exhortations of humans to love God alone, if taken seriously, assume that humans are free to respond 
to or reject God’s love and that such responses are not unilaterally determined by God. See the section on 
the volitional nature of divine love earlier in this chapter as well as the two canonical chapters for 
arguments and evidence in this regard. 
Further, as seen earlier in this chapter, Scripture does not present human love toward God as an 
inferior kind of love over and against divine love but as the love that corresponds to, and reciprocates, 
God’s love. Indeed, the canon depicts strong correspondence between divine and human love (see the 
earlier discussion of the multilaterally relational aspect of divine love). The canonical evidence, then, in no 
way supports an absolute dichotomy between human and divine love.
 
Thus, Phipps correctly comments that 
“the Greek Bible does not support the common assumption that agape should be defined in a way that 
stands in contrast to ordinary human love.” “The Sensuousness of Agape,” 371. Likewise, Carson adds a 
very important qualifier saying that “doubtless God’s love is immeasurably richer than ours, in ways still to 
be explored, but they belong to the same genus, or the parallelisms could not be drawn.” The Difficult 
Doctrine, 48.
 
To be sure, a difference in quality is implied simply by nature of the subjects of such love but 
the difference is not with regard to the terminology or description of the love itself. That is, God’s love is 
perfect just as he is perfect while human love is imperfect as humans are imperfect. However, this is no 
way removes the reality of human love. As seen earlier, while it is true that fallen, human beings are 
incapable of bringing any value to God by themselves, such as truly loving him, God’s prior, loving action 
enables a love response that grows progressively greater as one draws closer in intimate relationship with 
God. In the meantime, divine mediation makes up for the deficiency of human love but accepts human 
intentionality as pleasing through Christ. Mediation is thus a necessary condition of the divine-human love 
relationship. All humans who enter into this relationship do so through Christ (John 14:6). Accordingly, 
human love toward God is not meritorious but is contingent and conditional upon appropriate human 
response to God’s prevenient grace and foreconditional love (cf. Jer 31:3  John 12:32  1 Tim 2:4–6; Titus 
2:11; 1 John 4:19). In this way, through God’s prior action and mediation, humans can and do truly 
reciprocate divine love. The burden of proof, then, is on those who say human love is an inferior kind of 
love that is not fit to be called Christian love at all. 
In all this, to say that humans can love does not therefore imply that they can do so without Christ, 




likewise recognize that free, responsive, human love toward God is necessary to the maintenance 
of the divine-human love relationship.
284
 Thus, while it is undoubtedly true that God’s love is the 
prior and necessary condition of human love in return, it is not itself the sufficient condition of 
human love toward God. Humans must choose to respond (cf. Matt 22:37; Mark 12:30; Luke 
10:27). Those who do not love God remain “outsiders,” not privy to the intimate, particular 
divine-human love relationship that God intends for them (John 3:19; 8:42). 
In all this, God desires a reciprocal love relationship of give-and-take with his creatures. 
He initiates the possibility of such a relationship through his universal offer of foreconditional 
love, which enables and calls for a reciprocal response of love. With those who respond to this 
loving overture, God enters into particular and intimate love relationship, which amounts to a 
multilateral divine-human love relationship from God to humans and vice versa and humans to 
one another, themselves modeled after the intra-trinitarian love relationship. This multilaterally 




                                                     
 
our purposes, it is sufficient to recognize that God’s prevenient action and mediation are necessary but not 
sufficient for human love toward God. “Human love of God is, then, the result of his initiative, his 
prevenient call to such love.” Further, “Behind the love that justified human beings have for God is God’s 




 T. C. Oden thus comments, “God’s love for humanity, like all love, is reciprocal. God prizes 
the world, and values especially human creatures, who have the freedom and imagination to respond to 
God and to share with God consciousness and compassion.” The Living God, 121. Though he points out 
that love might not be reciprocated. Ibid., 120. Likewise, Brümmer contends that “love must by its very 
nature be a relationship of free mutual give-and-take, otherwise it cannot be love at all.” The Model of 
Love, 161. In his view, love always “entails a desire for reciprocation” though it may be “unrequited.” Ibid., 
155. Post also critiques such a view stating that one-directional love is “essentially negative in that it 
undermines the circular flow of giving and receiving in which agape is sustained and supported.” A Theory 
of Agape, 12. Cf. Moffat, Love, 278; Oord, The Nature, 21–22  idem, “Matching Theology,” 313  Pinnock, 
“Constrained by Love,” 149  Moltmann, The Trinity, 203; J. A. T. Robinson, “Agape and Eros,” 99; Liz 
Carmichael, Friendship: Interpreting Christian Love (New York: T & T Clark International, 2004), 4; John 
Burnaby, Amor Dei, a Study of the Religion of St. Augustine: The Hulsean Lectures for 1938 (London: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1960), 307.  
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 As T. C. Oden puts it, “God loves all creatures in the twofold sense that God unapologetically 
enjoys them for their own sake and desires their answering, enjoying love in response to eternally patient, 





This foreconditional-reciprocal model agrees with the transcendent-voluntarist model that 
divine love includes a crucial volitional element such that God voluntarily bestows his love on 
creatures and, in contrast to the immanent-experientialist model, God is not engaged in a 
relationship with creatures that is essential to his being. On the other hand, the foreconditional-
reciprocal model agrees with the immanent-experientialist model, in contrast to the transcendent-
voluntarist model, that divine love in relation to the world assumes divine experience of the world 
that profoundly affects God (passibility) as God enjoys a reciprocal love relationship with 
creatures. 
However, whereas divine volition excludes passibility in the transcendent-voluntarist 
model and divine sympathetic passibility excludes divine volition from love in the immanent-
experientialist model, the foreconditional-reciprocal model posits that the volitional and 
emotional aspects of God’s love complement, rather than exclude, one another. God desires and 
voluntarily works toward a reciprocal relationship with all humans. This is in contrast to both the 
transcendent voluntarist model, wherein God irresistibly elects only some humans as the 
recipients of his salvific love, and the immanent experientialist model, where God’s love 
relationship to the world is indiscriminately universal and necessary to his being. God’s love is 
also affected by the choices and experiences of human beings, in keeping with the immanent-
experientialist model but in contrast to the transcendent-voluntarist model. However, in contrast 
to both models, God’s experience of the world is evaluative such that God delights in those who 
respond positively to his love while those who reject God’s love finally forfeit their relationship 
with God.  
In this way, the evaluative aspect of divine love complements and bridges the volitional 
and emotional aspects of divine love while pointing toward a further aspect that is overlooked by 
both models, the foreconditionality of divine love. Whereas both models assume that divine love 




immanent-experientialist model due to the necessary and essential relationship between God and 
the world, the foreconditional-reciprocal model recognizes that God bestows love prior to, but not 
exclusive of, conditions. Those who respond positively to God’s love enjoy an everlasting 
reciprocal love relationship with him, grounded in bilateral significant freedom, within the 
multilateral circle of divine love. 
Potential Implications for a Canonical Theo-Ontology 
The issues addressed by this canonically derived foreconditional-reciprocal model of 
divine love are themselves bound up with answers to ontological issues relating to: (1) the 
sovereignty of divine will, especially as it relates to the issue of determinism or indeterminism, 
(2) the extent of the use of divine power (coercion/persuasion/other), (3) the acceptance, 
rejection, or qualification of immutability and impassibility, and (4) the nature of divine 
perfection and/or self-sufficiency (that is, dependence, independence, or other).
286
 
 As has been seen, the transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-experientialist models take 
widely different views of these issues and, accordingly, come to widely divergent and mutually 
exclusive views of divine love. The canonical investigation of divine love pursued in this 
dissertation has come to conclusions regarding the nature of divine love that differ from both 
models in many crucial respects. Such conclusions also point toward significant tension and/or 
contradiction with the underlying ontologies supposed by the transcendent-voluntarist and 
immanent-experientialist models. This section will introduce some tentative facets of a canonical 
ontology that are suggested by the foreconditional-reciprocal model of divine love, which is itself 
based on canonical data presented in the previous two chapters.  
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whether God is affected by the world (and if so, whether according to his eternal decree, his ontological 
sympathetic dependency, or free relationship with others) and whether he cares about it or only cares for it, 




It must be emphasized that these facets are tentative for at least four reasons. First, the 
foreconditional-reciprocal model of divine love presented in this work is itself tentative and open 
to revision based on further canonical investigation. Second, it could be misleading to attempt to 
derive a divine ontology from one divine characteristic, even one as major as divine love. Third, 
addressing the full scope of divine ontology is well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Fourth, 
other outlines of divine ontology may also be able to harmonize with this model of divine love 
and should continue to be sought. These ontological suggestions are thus to some extent 
speculative, relying on extrapolations from the canonical data regarding divine love. Therefore, 
this brief outline of ontological issues relative to this foreconditional-reciprocal model of divine 
love in no way attempts to provide a comprehensive or dogmatic answer to the issues of divine 
ontology. However, it is supposed that insofar as this model of divine love actually accords with 
the canonical data, a canonical ontology of God must account for the volitional, evaluative, 
emotional, foreconditional, and reciprocal facets of divine love.  
Significant Freedom of God and Creatures 
First, with regard to the sovereignty of the divine will especially as it relates to the issue 
of determinism or indeterminism: This foreconditional-reciprocal model of love suggests the 
ontological independence and significant freedom of God as well as the significant, albeit limited, 
freedom of human beings.
287
 In other words, this model of love suggests that God does not 
unilaterally determine the course of events but that agents, like God himself, possess significant 
freedom. As explained earlier in this chapter, by significant freedom I mean that agents have 
freedom to do otherwise than they do. This is assumed for God in that he is continually spoken of 
in language that suggests his freedom as it relates to love (among other things). Likewise, humans 
are depicted not only as rejecting God’s will but also as having the capacity (through prevenient 
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divine action) to accept or reject God’s love and to love him in return or reject his loving 
overtures. 
With regard to the specific facets of divine love: The volitional nature of divine love 
emphasizes the freedom of God. He is not bound to love creatures but willingly created creatures 
as objects of his love. Further, he is consistently depicted as having the ability to do otherwise 
than what he does. The evaluative, emotional, foreconditional, and reciprocal aspects of love also 
each point toward creaturely freedom. The evaluative and emotional aspects of love suggest that 
agents may act in ways that actually impact God, suggesting that he himself is not the only true 
agent.
288
 The foreconditional and reciprocal aspects each assume that humans can (due to God’s 
prevenient action) respond or refuse to respond to God’s loving overtures. The ability of humans 
to reject and/or forfeit divine love requires that the divine will is not unilaterally efficacious but 
that significantly free beings actually affect the course of history in ways that are not in 
accordance with God’s desires. That is, insofar as God’s love is conditional and contingent upon 
human response, human response must itself be contingent. Likewise, the notion of mutual, 
reciprocal, loving relationship also implies the reality of the limited freedom of human agency. 
God’s love may be unrequited and, accordingly, humans can choose to sever their relationship 
with God. 
This significant freedom of creatures is further apparent in that God’s ideal will is not 
always done. God’s ideal will refers to that which God ideally desires to take place  in other 
words, that which would take place if all agents acted in perfect accordance with God’s desires. 
This is to be distinguished from God’s effective will, which refers to God’s will that has already 
taken into account all factors including the wills of significantly free creatures.
289
 As such, it 
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 This will be discussed further under the question of divine immutability and impassibility. 
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 In other words, it is that which God wills in accordance with the wider matrix of creaturely 
freedom. This distinction is similar to the Arminian distinction between antecedent and consequent wills. I 




includes not only the active divine will but also what might be called his permissive will, that 
which he allows. In this way, God’s effective will is evaluative. 
The distinction between God’s ideal and effective will might be clarified by way of an 
example. God did not desire that Adam and Eve eat the forbidden fruit. However, while God’s 
ideal desire was that Adam and Eve not disobey him and eat the forbidden fruit, God also desired 
the kind of reciprocal divine-human love relationship that is predicated on the significant freedom 
of both parties. God could not unilaterally effect both desires and therefore permitted Adam and 
Eve to depart from his ideal will in favor of allowing significant freedom. 
To take one other example, God did not sadistically delight in, or ideally desire, the 
crucifixion of his Son (cf. Lam 3:32–33). Rather, it was his “pleasure” in the wider context of the 
plan of salvation. That is, because of his love for his creatures and because the death of his Son 
was the means of their redemption, God was “pleased to crush Him” (cf. Isa 53:10). Ideally, 
however, there would have never been sin and thus no occasion for such suffering and 
sacrifice.
290
 As such, when God is said to pleasure in things that are otherwise distasteful, it is 
likely that God’s pleasure is in the wider result rather than the things themselves (cf. Isa 53:10  
Matt 11:25–26; Luke 10:21).
291
 In this manner, such passages do not contradict the clear meaning 
of passages that state that God has no pleasure in the death of anyone (cf. Ezek. 18:23, 32; 
                                                     
 
with regard to the operation of the divine will as it relates to providence (specifically the theoretical order 
of the divine decrees). For a discussion of Arminius’s view of the antecedent and consequent wills of God 
and their implications for divine sovereignty see R. E. Olson, Arminian Theology, 123. Cf. Guy, “The 
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omnibenevolence. Cf. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, 172–73. 
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 As Post states, divine love “takes on the form of self-sacrifice out of necessity rather than 
preference due to the tolerance of human freedom.” A Theory of Agape, 33. 
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 Importantly, this view does not require meticulous providence. God’s permissive will may 
function in accordance with wide principles of the extent of freedom afforded to creaturely agents. 
However, it is well beyond the scope of this work to delve more deeply into this issue of divine providence. 
Consider, for a brief overview of these issues of divine providence, Canale, “Doctrine of God,” in 
Handbook (ed. Dederen), 118–20. Cf. Randall G. Basinger, “Exhaustive Divine Sovereignty: A Practical 






 The contrast between God’s ideal and effective wills is not the result of divine volition 
but the result of a sinful, disordered world, which is itself the result of creaturely rebellion against 
God’s ideal will. In the eschaton, God’s ideal will shall perfectly correspond to God’s effective 
will as shall all the other wills of significantly free creatures whose wills are freely put in 
subjection to, and thus harmony with, God’s perfect, omniscient, and omnibenevolent will. 
This brings us to perhaps the most crucial point regarding the validity of divine 
determinism. Specifically, that God’s ideal will is not always fulfilled is apparent in that God has 
no pleasure in the death of the wicked (cf. Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11) and desires that none would 
perish (2 Pet 3:9; cf. 1 Tim 2:4–6). However, not all will be saved since God eventually gives 
people over to their desires (cf. John 3:18; Rom 1:24, 26, 28; 2:4–12; 1 John 2:17).
293
 Some 
determinists deal with the issue of such passages by contending that “God genuinely desires in 
one sense that all will be saved” but at the same time claiming that “he has not ultimately decreed 
that all will be saved.”
294
 This is the distinction between God’s “desired will” and “decretive will” 
respectively.
295
 In this view, God in some sense desires that all be saved but nevertheless decrees 
                                                     
 
Minn.: Bethany House, 1995). 
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 In this way, strong statements of divine sovereignty may be reconciled with statements that 
assert that God’s will is unfulfilled. For example, God does “whatever he pleases” does not mean that 
everything that happens pleases God or is unilaterally determined by the divine will (Pss 115:3; 135:6; cf. 
Job 23:13). Rather, what occurs is what God allows and/or wills in the greater interest of the kind of real, 
relational love that requires creaturely freedom.  
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 Here it should be noted that the claim of universalism, whether of the deterministic variety or 
otherwise, is excluded by this foreconditional-reciprocal model of divine love due to the recognition of the 
conditionality, and potential forfeiture, of divine love. See the discussion of this earlier in this chapter and 
in the two canonical chapters. Further, there is abundant canonical data that are not specifically related to 
divine love that also rule out the idea that everyone will finally be saved. See Marshall, “Does the New 
Testament.” 
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 Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter, Jude, 381–82. For other ways in which other determinists avoid the 
conclusion that God’s will is not carried out with regard to these texts see brief discussion in the NT 
chapter. 
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 Ibid. This is akin to Martin Luther’s view of God’s “hidden” will, which created a dilemma he 
could not resolve: “If I could by any means understand how this same God, who makes such a show of 
wrath and unrighteousness, can yet be merciful and just, there would be no need for faith.” The Bondage of 




solely on the basis of his unilaterally efficacious will that some will be damned. However, this 
raises an insoluble difficulty. If God’s will is unilaterally efficacious and God wants to save 
everyone, why does He not do so?
296
  
The distinction between God’s ideal and effective will of this foreconditional-reciprocal 
model, on the other hand, requires no position that God’s revealed will is different from his 
“hidden” will while also recognizing that the divine will is neither simple nor monolithic. In this 
way, the canonical analysis presented in the previous two chapters comes to the conclusion 
shared by many scholars that the “fact that all are not saved can be attributed to the stubbornness 
of the human will rather than to the weakness of the divine intent.”
297
 God, in accordance with his 
universal love, wanted to save those who are lost but they were not willing (Isa 66:4; Matt 23:37; 
Luke 13:34). It appears that God does not override their wills though he is ontologically capable 
of doing so because to do so would undercut another element of his ideal will, that there exists a 
divine-human love relationship, which itself requires the responsive, rather than determined, love 
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of significantly free creaturely agents.
298
 God thus allows wills other than his own so that in the 
future his ideal will shall obtain and effect the most profound joy for all creatures in the universe, 
including himself.
299
 Accordingly, God does not irresistibly determine humans to love him.
300
 
Thus, insofar as humans possess the ability to reject God’s ideal will God may have unfulfilled 
desires.
301
 However, God’s unfulfilled desires do not amount to ontological need, lack, or 
deficiency.
302
 Yet, while God is himself free and sovereign, God’s will is not omnicausal. On the 
contrary, the divine will itself takes into account the wider state of affairs, including the wills of 
other agents, and it thus includes evaluation.
303
 In this way, the foreconditional-reciprocal model 
of divine love suggested here is mutually exclusive to determinism. 
That God has bestowed significant freedom on his creatures need not require the rejection 
of divine foreknowledge. Although the foreconditional-reciprocal model of divine love is not 
itself dependent on divine foreknowledge (as explained in chapter 5), I believe exhaustive divine 
foreknowledge best accounts for the data regarding divine love and election, especially in light of 
Rom 8:28–30. This model of love suggests that divine omniscience, however it functions (the 
precise nature of which is beyond the scope of this work), is not identical with or the unilateral 
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result of the divine will.
304
 At the same time, the divine will is still logically and ontologically 
prior to all other wills. Indeed, God’s will is itself the necessary condition of all other agencies. 
This is explicit in the notion of foreconditional love, especially the aspect of God’s prior loving 
action(s) that enable humans to freely respond (or not) to God’s call. Moreover, as shall be 
discussed further below with regard to divine self-sufficiency, the significant freedom of God 
entails that God is not required to love or enter into any kind of relationship with this or any 
world. He does so freely, not necessarily or essentially. Therefore, this foreconditional-reciprocal 
model of divine love rejects both the views of the transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-
experientialist models with regard to the nature and action of the divine will. 
Divine Omnipotence and Self-Limitation 
Second, with regard to the extent of the use of divine power (coercion/persuasion/other): 
This foreconditional-reciprocal model suggests that God is omnipotent but does not exercise all 
of his power; that is, he does not utilize his power to effect his will omnicausally. This conclusion 
is itself a corollary of the previous view regarding the significant freedom of God and human 
beings. For the same reasons that this model of divine love rejects determinism it likewise rejects 
omnicausality. This in no way detracts from divine omnipotence. Here, omnipotence is defined as 
possessing the power to do anything (excluding, of course, logical or semantic absurdity).
305
 The 
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possession of all power does not require the exercise of all power. God, being omnipotent, freely 
grants power to other agents whose choices he does not unilaterally determine. In this way, God 




In doing so, God has voluntarily limited himself by bestowing significant freedom on 
other beings. To take but one example of this: unless God were to break a promise, the very fact 
that he engages with the world in a way that includes promise-making limits himself. God’s oath 
or promise is binding upon himself, not because there is anything external to him that can bind 
him, but because in the very making of a promise he self-limits.
307
 This limitation is not 
ontological. It is a limitation that God voluntarily adopts and maintains.
308
 Such divine self-
limitation in no way limits his power but merely limits the avenues, applications, and uses of his 
power insofar as he voluntarily keeps his word. In this way, divine omnipotence does not amount 
to divine omnicausality. Accordingly, God may enter in truly mutual and reciprocal relationships 
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 The explanation of God’s choice to grant free will is beyond the scope of this work but it would 
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with other beings, which entail mutual expectations and moral obligations. Moreover, the divine 
self-limitation assumed by a genuine, reciprocal, give-and-take, divine-human relationship adds 
complexity such that the world as a whole does not operate in a way in which blessing/curses 
correspond universally to human disposition and/or behavior. This is a tension in Scripture not 
due to divine subjectivity, but due to the thwarting of God’s ideal will in the entrance of evil. As 
such, this foreconditional-reciprocal model of love contradicts the transcendent-voluntarist model 
in proposing that God’s power is not omnicausal
309
 and at the same time rejects the immanent-




Third, with regard to the issue of the immutability and impassibility of God: This 
foreconditional-reciprocal model of divine love suggests that God is affected by the dispositions 
and/or actions of his creatures and therefore not impassible nor, in this regard, immutable. The 
first premise of this section, that God does not unilaterally determine the course of history, itself 
entails the passibility of God. Further, the evaluative and emotional aspects of divine love assume 
that God is impacted by the actual disposition and/or action of his creatures. That is, evaluation 
consists of appraisal of the actual state of its object(s) and the emotions depicted in the canon are 
consistently depicted as prompted by the disposition and/or action of creatures. Accordingly, in 
keeping with the evidence with regard to the evaluative and emotional natures of divine love, a 
biblical ontology must recognize that God is capable of emotional affection, enjoyment, and the 
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recognition and appreciation of value in the world. This assumes that God is ontologically 
capable of being affected and, therefore, passible.
311
 
For example, this complements the frequent depiction of God’s compassion as feeling 
prompted at the sight or awareness of someone else’s malady and/or misfortune, an explicitly 
affected state. One cannot have such “compassion” without being affected and thus passible. This 
canonical depiction of divine compassion alone, if taken seriously and not dismissed as mere 
anthropopathism, rules out the conception of divine impassibility. A similar case can be made 
with regard to divine passion/jealousy and many other divine emotions depicted in the canon. The 
interpretive maneuver of dismissing the strongly emotive language with divine agency as merely 
anthropopathic does not hold up to close scrutiny. Rather, it seems to be special pleading for a 
dogmatic presupposition and lacks a consistent and compelling rationale for determining which 
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Along with this recognition of God’s passible emotion, however, one should not assume 
that divine emotion is to the exclusion of volition. Both are depicted in Scripture as 
complementary, not contradictory, aspects of divine love.
313
 Likewise, the foreconditional and 
reciprocal aspects of love assume that God may be affected. Thus, entering into an intimate, 
particular love relationship with creatures is contingent upon human response, to which God is 
sensitive and responsive. 
In contrast to the transcendent-voluntarist model, this rejection of impassibility suggests 
that God may be affected by the actual state of the affairs of the world. In other words, God is not 
immune to spatio-temporal activity. On the contrary, the foreconditional-reciprocal model of 
divine love, extracted from the canonical data, suggests that God is capable and willing of 
opening himself up to the joys and sufferings of the world while at the same time maintaining 
ontological independence. If God has bestowed significant freedom on his creatures such that 
they really affect the world, including real contributions to joy and value on the one hand or 
sorrow and degradation on the other, then it is not accurate to suggest that all value is unilaterally 
caused by God. God sometimes creates value unilaterally (such as the origin of the world itself) 
but other times value is the product of God’s creation and sustenance of significantly free beings 
along with their value-creating actions.  
However, humans could bring no value to God (or anyone else) absent God’s voluntary 
initiative since the very origin and substance of human beings is entirely dependent upon divine 
beneficence and grace (cf. 1 Cor 4:7). As such, creaturely contribution to the “value” and/or “joy” 
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of the world is not meritorious but may be divinely enjoyed nonetheless. This view not only 
differs from the transcendent-voluntarist model by asserting divine passibility and the enjoyment 
of value that God does not himself unilaterally effect, but also differs sharply from the conception 
of the immanent-experientialist model, which posits that God is ontologically bound to the joy 
and sufferings of others.
314
 With regard to the latter, this foreconditional-reciprocal model 
suggests that God is not ontologically bound to the joy and sufferings of others and will, finally, 
cut off those who persist in contributing suffering and evil to the world. In other words, the 
transcendent-voluntarist model posits that God cannot be affected by others, while the immanent-
experientialist model asserts that God cannot not be affected by others, while the foreconditional-
reciprocal model of divine love suggests that God is affected by others, but not necessarily so. 
As such, contrary to the immanent-experientialist model, God identifies with the best 
interests of others voluntarily rather than necessarily. Accordingly, the conditionality of the 
divine-human relationship extends to God’s identification with the best interests of others. 
Moreover, contrary to the immanent-experientialist model, God does not identify with the 
interests of all others in an undifferentiated manner. Rather, God will continue to identify with the 
interests of those who do not finally reject his interests. One example of the undifferentiated 
nature of divine sympathy in the immanent-experientialist model may be instructive and highlight 
the importance of this distinction. For Hartshorne, “love is taking the standpoint of the other.”
315
 
However, if this is true in an undifferentiated manner, as Hartshorne’s view implies, it would 
require that God enjoy evil to the extent that a particular creature takes pleasure therein.
316
 In this 
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way, Hartshorne’s view posits that God enjoys all value and feels all suffering but presents an 
impoverished view of divine evaluation, that is, the accurate appraisal of that which is delightful 
or abhorrent, good or evil. Thus, it appears that Hartshorne’s view focuses on awareness and 
immediate feeling to the detriment of the kind of divine evaluation that prompts pleasure and/or 
displeasure as well as acceptance and/or rejection in the canon.
317
 In this foreconditional-
reciprocal model, on the other hand, God does not view all creaturely “pleasure” equally nor does 
he delight in all that delights sinful human beings. On the contrary, God delights in righteousness 
and abhors evil and will finally eradicate evil, sin, and suffering.
318
 
Importantly, this conception of the passibility of God does not suggest that God is 
passive. On the contrary, divine volition is also operative, though the precise interrelationship of 
divine volition and emotion is not entirely clear. God possesses the power to overrule all other 
wills but has chosen not to do so. In this way, he need not be affected by creatures. Indeed, this 
view suggests that he need not have even created creatures.
319
 Such divine passibility does not 
necessarily deny divine immutability but does conflict with any conception of immutability that 
rules out the ability of God to engage the world in real give-and-take relationship (that is, one 
with bilateral, significant freedom).
320
 At the same time, divine immutability may be affirmed if 
by that one means that ontologically God is not becoming greater or lesser.
321
 Further, the divine 
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character is constant. He does not break his promises, he always acts in the most loving way 
possible and possesses the omniscience to know precisely what the most loving disposition and/or 
action is.
322
 When human beings finally reject God, the most loving option available to him is to 
give them over to their own desires.
323
 
Divine Perfection, Self-Sufficiency, and Sympathy 
Fourth, with regard to the nature of divine perfection and/or self-sufficiency (that is, 
dependence, independence, or other), this foreconditional-reciprocal model of divine love 
suggests that God is ontologically independent from the world as its Creator and self-sufficient 
with respect to existence. At the same time, God has voluntarily bound his own interests 
(including his joy and/or sorrow) with the interests of his creatures in a personal manner. As such, 
God is not an incomplete being without the world but is perfect in this respect. Further, he is 
wholly good and without moral fault and, as mentioned above, is not becoming greater or lesser 
ontologically. Nevertheless, God includes the best interests of others in his own interests. In this 
way, the quality of the divine life, as it were, is voluntarily bound by God with the course of 
creaturely history. Yet, God is by no means passive in this regard since he exerts enormous power 
in providentially guiding and affecting, but not unilaterally determining, this history toward his 
ultimate end. 
At the same time, God’s love according to the foreconditional-reciprocal model suggests 
that God is relational, interested in his creatures, can be affected by and even the beneficiary of 
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human disposition and/or action. This assumes a theo-ontology that allows for reciprocity (though 
not symmetrically or equally) between God and creatures. Further, the volitional aspect of divine 
love posits that God is not necessarily or essentially involved in a love relationship (or any other 
relationship) with creatures. Likewise, the foreconditional and reciprocal aspects of divine love 
argue that God’s love for his creatures is not the product of a necessary or essential relation. That 
is, if divine love is conditional upon human response, and may be forfeited, it cannot be necessary 
or essential to God. On the contrary, God freely enters into reciprocal relationship with those who 
willingly respond to his loving overtures, remembering that such willing response is itself made 
possible by God’s prevenient and sustaining action. Therefore, God is not ontologically and/or 
necessarily bound to the world in love.
324
 
This brings us to the difficult issue of the relationship between God’s essence and love. 
First, the essence of God includes a great deal of mystery and, as such, one should be careful with 
regard to dogmatic assertions on this topic. Many have posited and continue to posit that God’s 
essence is love.
325
 Theologians may mean many different things when they identify God’s 
essence with “love.”
326
 Of course, since the definition of “love” itself differs widely, this should 
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be no surprise. To the extent that theologians mean that all that God is and does is congruent with 
divine love there is no disagreement with this foreconditional-reciprocal model of divine love. 
However, to the extent that such identification amounts to ontological restriction of God’s 
freedom with regard to his love relationship with creatures, the canonical data raise significant 
issues. 
Before addressing such issues it is important to first recognize that, in my view, the 
canonical data simply do not provide revelation with which to assert the precise nature of the 
divine essence.
327
 As such, the data are insufficient to comment dogmatically on assertions 
regarding the nature of the divine essence and existence. Moreover, I question whether it is 
possible to make any certain pronouncement(s) that correspond to the divine essence as a whole 
as this would seem to require an understanding of God’s essence as a whole, which appears to be 
beyond not only divine revelation but also human cognizance.
328
 Therefore, I am not prepared to 
make a dogmatic assertion with regard to whether God’s essence and love may be equated. 
Nevertheless, a few things may be said here without making claim to certitude with 
regard to the relationship between divine love and divine essence. While the canonical data argue 
against an essential divine-human love relationship, that does not necessarily require that love is 
not a part (or the whole) of God’s essence. For example, intra-trinitarian love appears to be 
essential to God, a product of God’s trinitarian, essentially-related nature.
329
 Nevertheless, the 
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canonical data have demonstrated the crucial volitional aspect of divine love and points toward 
the significant freedom of God to do otherwise than he does. In this regard, the interrelationship 
between God’s will and essence as it relates to intra-trinitarian divine love is not revealed and, in 
my view, may not be deduced with certainty independent of divine revelation. Here, whatever 
else is said about the correspondence between God’s essence and love, one should not imply that 
love rules out the other divine characteristics that are prominent in the canon or vice versa, 
including the divine will. Concurrently, it is important to avoid asserting a false dichotomy 
between the divine will and essence. Here there is mystery upon which the canonical data 
investigated in this dissertation shed little light.
330
 
Importantly, however, the canonical data suggest that the essential intra-trinitarian love 
relation does not extend to creatures, who were and are not part of God’s essence. God’s essence 
and existence are independent of creatures.
331
 God is other than the world he has created and not 
ontologically bound to his creation. As such, it may be God’s essence to love (at least within the 
trinity) or be loving, but the specific objects of God’s love are not determined by his essence. In 
other words, while intra-trinitarian love may be essential to God’s nature, God does not need to 
love creatures (indeed, he does not “need” to create at all).
332
 Accordingly, the canonical data 
consistently depict God as free to do otherwise than what he does, including with regard to divine 
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love toward creatures. In this way, while God may be essentially and/or characteristically loving, 




 This chapter has contended that God’s love is volitional, evaluative, emotional, 
foreconditional, and ideally reciprocal. First, divine love is volitional but not merely volitional. It 
includes a free, volitional aspect that is neither essential nor necessary to God’s being yet also not 
arbitrary. While divine love is closely associated with the divine will and election, such concepts 
should not be conflated. The divine-human love relationship is neither unilaterally deterministic 
nor essential or ontologically necessary to God but bilaterally (though not symmetrically) 
volitional and contingent. Second, divine love is not indifferent or disinterested but evaluative. 
This means that God is capable of being affected by, and even benefitting from, the disposition 
and/or actions of his creatures. Further, despite human sinfulness, humans may bring value to 
God through the prevenient and ongoing action of God, especially the mediation of Christ. 
Moreover, God has a proper self-regard that is inclusive, rather than exclusive, to the best 
interests of his creatures.  
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Third, God’s love is profoundly emotional and affective though not to the exclusion of 
volitional and evaluative aspects. There is no dichotomy between volition and emotion and, as 
such, love may be both emotional and responsive to command. Fourth, divine love is 
foreconditional, not altogether unconditional. That is, divine love is prior to all other love and 
conditions but not exclusive to conditions. Further, divine love for the world is unmerited but not 
unconditional as the receipt of something may be contingent upon particular conditions without 
thereby being deserved. The conditionality of divine love includes evaluation and the possibility 
of forfeiture. As such, it is not strictly unmotivated, spontaneous, disinterested, indifferent, or 
unconditional. Moreover, there is a conditionality and unconditionality with respect to divine 
love. Divine love in relation to the world is unconditional with respect to God’s volition, but 
conditional with respect to divine evaluation.  
Finally, divine love is multilaterally relational. God universally seeks a relationship of 
reciprocal love but enters into particular, intimate relationship only with those who respond 
appropriately. God earnestly seeks and enters into reciprocally responsive love relationships with 
his creatures, which amount to multilateral divine-human love relationships. However, although 
God’s foreconditional love is universal, God does not love all equally and uniformly.  
God’s love according to this foreconditional-reciprocal model points to the potential 
ontological suggestions that God desires reciprocal relationship with human beings and, as such, 
decided to grant significant freedom to his creatures while also himself possessing the freedom to 
do otherwise than he does. This entails that God does not exercise all his power omnicausally but 
bestows and allows creatures to affect history. Moreover, as relationally responsive, God is 
passible (though not passive) and may be affected by the disposition and/or actions of his 
creatures. Finally, as passible, God has bound his own interests, including his joy on the one hand 
and suffering on the other, to the best interests of the world. Such a relation is not ontological, but 












SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The love of God is central to God’s relationship to the world. Accordingly, this study 
addressed the conflict of interpretations regarding divine love in the context of the God-world 
relationship and, in so doing, shed light on the wider question of God’s relation to the world. 
Chapter 1 introduced the background, purpose, problem, scope, and plan of study as well as the 
final-form canonical theological method employed in the investigation. Chapter 2 briefly 
surveyed the historical theology of love, tracing the central conceptions of divine love and the 
God-world relationship by selected, highly influential thinkers. Chapter 3 presented and analyzed 
the exemplars of the transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-experientialist models, considering 
their views of divine love in relation to the world as well as the ontologies that ground their 
conceptions. Subsequently, a sample of recent reactions to both models demonstrated the current 
dissatisfaction regarding the conflict of interpretations indicating the potential for paradigm 
change in the theological model of interpreting God's love to the world. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 shifted to the investigation of a canonical and systematic model that 
addresses the issues raised by the conflict of interpretations. Chapters 4 and 5 presented the data 
from a canonical investigation of the data regarding divine love in the OT and NT. The material 
from the biblical investigation of divine love was then utilized in the construction of the 
foreconditional-reciprocal model of divine love that addresses the conflict of interpretations seen 
in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 6 finally revealed and summarized the broad outline of the 
canonically derived, foreconditional-reciprocal model of divine love in relation to the world, with 




concludes the dissertation by summarizing the findings and conclusions of the study and making 
some recommendations for further study. 
Introduction and Methodology of the Study 
 Chapter 1 introduced the issue that mutually exclusive conceptions of love, and their 
undergirding divine ontologies, call for careful study due to the prominence of divine love in the 
God-world relationship. After an explanation of the background, the problem and purpose, the 
scope and delimitations, and the plan of study, I explained the theological method that was 
utilized in order to address the conflict of interpretations. Instead of extrapolating the meaning of 
divine love from a presupposed ontology, this study applied a final-form canonical approach to 
systematic theology that affords epistemological primacy to the biblical canon as a unified, but 
not monolithic, whole.  
 This approach employs phenomenological exegesis, which uses the data derived from the 
typical method of hermeneutical exegesis, to uncover the first principles of reality apparent in the 
inner logic of the text as canon (the canonical horizon), which themselves return to inform one’s 
hermeneutical exegesis as well as the interpreter’s horizon such that both forms of exegesis 
continually inform one another while seeking to bracket out extra-canonical suppositions and 
interpretive errors toward the isolation of exegetical interpretations that cohere with the full 
canonical context. In this way, the interpreter seeks the particular characteristics of God revealed 
in the canon by analyzing the data in their immediate and wider canonical context by way of 
hermeneutical and phenomenological exegesis, reciprocally informing one another toward a 
canonical and systematic model of divine love that rigorously corresponds to all the data of 
Scripture, to the exclusion of extra-canonical suppositions, and is internally coherent. This 
method was applied toward a potential resolution to the conflict of interpretations over the issue 
of the meaning of divine love in the God-world relationship by focusing on the biblical revelation 




love, toward exposing a model of divine love, which itself provides implications toward a biblical 
ontology.  
 Finally, the first chapter addressed a few methodological issues of the canonical 
investigation, including the interpretation of figurative language relative to God, the potential 
application of incarnational data to one’s conception of God, and the prevalence of ambiguity 
regarding genitive constructions and the agency of love in the NT. Overall, the approach argued 
that unless there are some canonical data to the contrary, the literary thrust of canonical revelation 
should not be cast aside as merely human accommodation since all human language about God is, 
to some extent, accommodative. The canonical approach maintains that canonical language, 
including language that is demonstrably figurative, conveys meaningful and accurate (albeit 
analogical) data about God as he is in himself. Therefore, non-literal and figurative language, 
such as metaphorical and idiomatic phraseology, must not be dismissed but should be treated 
carefully in accordance with the intention in the text by way of the textual and contextual clues 
regarding the intended correspondence to its referent(s), being careful not to dismiss evidence 
based on presuppositions of what God is actually like prior to and/or independent of the canonical 
data. Likewise, this chapter suggested that, as a working approach, the data relative to Christ as 
incarnate should be taken to apply to the divine nature by way of a modified view of 
communicatio idiomatum such that, absent compelling canonical reasons otherwise, the data 
regarding the incarnate Christ correspond not only to humanity but also divinity in the sense that 
the divine nature of Christ is capable of experiencing that which the incarnate Christ experienced 
since Jesus was truly God who became truly human without divesting himself of divinity. In all 
this, the degree of the correspondence between the understanding of such revelation and God as 
he actually is cannot be determined prior to the eschaton due to the epistemic distance between 




Survey of the Historical Theology of Love 
 Chapter 2 briefly surveyed the historical theology of divine love by way of a few, highly 
influential exemplars. First, the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of divine love were 
introduced. Plato’s writings depict love (eros) as desirous and thus originating from deficiency or 
need. The highest love is the rational, rather than emotional, desire for the Good (proton philon) 
but God can have no such desire because, for Plato, that would signify lack of perfection. While 
Aristotle departs from Plato in many ways, his view likewise rules out the possibility of God’s 
love toward creatures. For Aristotle, love (philia) must be toward that which is useful, beautiful, 
and/or good, while love for the good (of a rational and purposeful, rather than passionate, nature) 
is the highest, true love. Since all three types of love are directed toward something valuable to 
the lover and, for Aristotle, God is the impassible, unmoved mover who can receive no value and 
lacks nothing, God cannot love others. For both Plato and Aristotle, then, God is never the lover 
but only the loved. 
Augustine, being indirectly influenced by Plato’s conception through neoplatonism, also 
denies the reality of a dynamic love relationship between God and creatures while breaking 
significantly with Plato’s conception of love by affirming that God does indeed love human 
beings but in a different manner than humans love God. Humans may love God as the only object 
of enjoyment (frui) but God’s love for humans is different, he cannot enjoy (frui) them. In this 
way, Augustine assumes the classical ontology that God is perfect, self-sufficient, immutable, and 
impassible and thus can neither desire nor receive any value or enjoyment. God’s love is thus 
defined in accordance with impassibility such that he does not love in the sense of Plato’s eros or 
Aristotle’s philia but his love is unilateral beneficence (corresponding conceptually to agape), 
which brings no benefit or enjoyment (frui) to God. Augustine’s has been the predominant view 
in Christianity through the ages. 
Aquinas continues the basic Augustinian premise regarding divine love and the God-




For Aquinas, as Augustine, God is self-sufficient and utterly immutable. God is the first, 
unmoved, and passionless mover who possesses all perfections of being and cannot be affected or 
desire anything. While his divine ontology rules out a mutually impactful relationship between 
God and the world, Aquinas nevertheless posits friendship love (amicitia) between God and 
humans, but of such a kind that God is the unilateral initiator of friendship as the benefactor and 
never beneficiary. Human friendship love is always directed towards some good (amor 
concupiscentiae, desirous love) that is willed toward someone (amor amicitiae, friendship love). 
Humans love (caritas) God in the sense of enjoying him for his own sake while God loves 
(caritas) in the sense of beneficence. For both Augustine and Aquinas, the very essence of God is 
a love that is a unilaterally willed, unaffected beneficence such that God loves all in some manner 
but only some are loved unto eternal life. 
Martin Luther’s view of divine love remained along the lines of that of Augustine and 
Aquinas. However, Luther vehemently rejects the view of human love from Augustine 
throughout medieval theology, viewing it as a synthesis that posits a place for egocentric human 
love toward God (thematic eros), while Luther recognizes only divine love (thematic agape) as 
authentic, altruistic love. Humans cannot truly love God or any others except as passive agents of 
divine love flowing through them since God is the cause of all authentic love. God’s love, on the 
other hand, is unilateral, non-evaluative, unmotivated, and wholly gratuitous beneficence, akin to 
grace. This view of divine love, congruent with that of Augustine and Aquinas, is required by the 
conception of God as immutable and impassible. For Luther, God’s unilaterally determinative, 
irresistible, and wholly efficacious will is primary. 
All of this provides the context for Anders Nygren’s highly influential Agape and Eros in 
which he fleshes out Luther’s concept of gratuitous love (agape) directed against eros. He posits 
an absolute dichotomy between eros, which is desirous and acquisitive love (whether vulgar or 
heavenly) that is inappropriate to God’s perfect and self-sufficient nature and unfit for 




altruistic beneficence. For Nygren, God’s love (thematic agape) is spontaneous, unmotivated, 
indifferent to value, non-desirous and non-emotive, beneficent, condescending, gratuitous, and 
sovereign in relation to its object. In his view, the theme of agape love was specifically chosen by 
the NT writers to convey this indifferent, sola gratia type of love to the exclusion of all other 
types of love (eros, philia, etc.), even those in the OT. The only true agent of agape love is God. 
Humans of themselves are incapable of agape love such that love toward God (and others) is 
caused only by God’s arbitrary predestination of those upon whom he bestows unconditional 
love. While Nygren’s view has come under a great deal of criticism, it still remains very 
influential.  
 Overall, there is considerable continuity between these prominent historical conceptions 
of divine love, especially the classic conception of God as simple, timeless, perfect, self-
sufficient, immutable, and impassible, which leads to the conception of divine love as unilateral, 
unmotivated, unaffected, gratuitous beneficence that entails no passion but is rationally 
purposive. Contemporary treatments of divine love continue to be significantly influenced by this 
history, whether by accepting the conceptions of eros or agape, vehemently rejecting them, or 
even knowingly or unknowingly assimilating and mixing them. 
Conflicting Interpretations of Divine Love 
 Chapter 3 presented and analyzed the exemplars of the transcendent-voluntarist (Carl F. 
H. Henry) and immanent-experientialist models (Charles Hartshorne), which present two of the 
most prominent recent perspectives on divine love. This included an analytical description of 
each model's methodological and ontological frameworks, their conception of God’s relationship 
to the world, and their specific view of divine love in order to clearly identify the conflict of 
interpretation, which illuminated the central areas of disagreement over the nature of divine love 




 The transcendent-voluntarist model of divine love is bound up with its divine ontology of 
a transcendent, perfect, simple, immutable, impassible, and totally self-sufficient God, which 
places precise limits upon the nature of divine love. For such a God, love cannot be immanent, 
love cannot change God, and God can have no need or desire such that love can add no value or 
enrichment to the divine life. God as sovereign, rational will entails a sovereign, rational, and 
willed love of unilateral beneficence; hence unconditional election love, independent of its object, 
which corresponds to thematic agape to the exclusion of thematic eros. God is not at all affected 
by external reality or the decisions of creatures but orders all history and bestows love 
sovereignly and independently of external causes. Since God as omnicausal cannot be acted upon, 
there is no power that could impact divinity, God’s love is wholly unmotivated and unconditional, 
being unaffected by spatio-temporal reality. In keeping with the sovereignty of God’s will and 
impassibility, all divine love is predicated solely upon the eternal predestinating divine decree, 
independent of human action and/or response. Although the transcendent-voluntarist model 
insists that God has emotions, such emotions are not the result of God being affected but the 
result of his own unilateral and sovereign will. Accordingly, God’s relationship to the world is an 
external one (the relativity required by an internal relation is impossible for a timeless, immutable 
God) and there is an absolute ontological distinction between God (the supernatural) and the 
world (natural) such that God is the altogether independent and voluntary creator of the world ex 
nihilo. God’s loving action, which is manifested in time and space, thus stems only from the 
timeless providence of God according to the eternal decree (predestination). God is internally 
related only to himself as triune, and any potential need for love is fulfilled by intra-trinitarian 
love.  
Consequently, divine love for other than God is superfluous to God, not only as needed 
but even as desired or valued. Once again, this fits with the absolute perfection of God, which 
entails that God is already utterly complete, thus there could be no new experience for God; all is 




since God is absolutely simple, divine love is but one aspect of the utterly unitary essence of God. 
Love is thus qualified by all other perfections of God, which, together, are actually merely the 
simplicity of the sovereign will of God. Divine love complements divine holiness, wrath, justice, 
and eschatological judgment/damnation—all of which take place in strict accordance with the 
sovereign and efficacious will of God, which determines all history. God is thus only the loving 
father of whom he chooses (election love). As such, there can be no reciprocal divine-human love 
relationship of give-and-take. 
The immanent-experientialist model, on the other hand, categorically rejects classic 
theism and posits divine love as divine sympathy, the feeling of all others’ feelings. In this model, 
God is the supreme, all-inclusive mind and compound individual of the world, not identical or 
equivalent to the world, but more than the world (panentheism). God is essentially related to the 
world such that God needs some world (though not this particular world) to exist. However, 
God’s existence is itself necessary while his actuality is contingent and, hence, the existence of 
some world is necessary. The divine-world relationship is understood within the context of the 
indeterministic, relativistic, spatio-temporalistic panpsychism such that all reality is an 
interdependent creative synthesis of partially determined and self-determined minds interacting as 
both subjects and objects in process. Minds are related both internally and externally where the 
subject of an internal relation includes and is thus affected by its relata and the object of an 
external relation remains unaffected. God is the supreme subject, internally related to all and thus 
supremely relative and all-inclusive, as well as the supreme object, an object (but not the sole 
object) for every subject. The supreme mind as universal subject and object corresponds to the 
dual transcendence (dipolarity) of the divine nature wherein God eminently exemplifies the 
admirable characteristics of metaphysical contraries. These poles are ontologically 
distinguishable yet ontically inseparable such that God is the absolute-relative, abstract-concrete, 
potential-actual, necessary-contingent, universal-particular, supreme compound individual. Just 




universal object (abstract and absolute). He is the self-surpassing surpasser of all, the 
transcendental relativity (surrelativism). Although God is relationally all-inclusive, he cannot be 
wholly identified with (pantheism), nor wholly differentiated from (classic theism) the world. He 
includes the world yet is more than the world (panentheism).  
Since God is internally related to all minds and thus all-inclusive he has immediate (non-
mediated, direct) relations, meaning that he directly feels all the feelings of the world and changes 
accordingly. This essential relation of God to the world is God’s universal sympathy, which is 
identical to his love. As ethically immutable God always loves all others with perfect adequacy, 
yet also grows (aesthetic perfectibility) and enjoys the ever-increasing value of the world that he 
includes as the supremely relative all-inclusive compound individual of the world. God’s love for 
the world as universal subject eminently affects him, partly determining his life in joy and 
suffering. The world’s love for God as the universal object deeply affects the world and partly 
determines the course of reality as God aims at the harmonious happiness of all. While God is 
universally affected as universal subject (and thus partially determined) he may also act by 
persuasion (but never coercion) upon all others as universal object such that when God moves 
himself he thereby creates the necessary condition (but not the sufficient condition) for the effect 
of the world as the interdependent, creative synthesis of social process. God is thus the most 
moved but also possesses the greatest compossible power.  
As such, divine love, which itself constitutes the God-world relation, is dynamically 
relational, emotional, and supremely passible, in stark contrast to the conception of the 
transcendent-voluntarist model. Accordingly, for this model, love itself describes the 
panentheistic ontology of the creative synthesis of social reality. God as the supreme, all-
inclusive mind and thus the supreme lover, the compound individual of the world who is the 
eminently relative all-sympathizer, not identical or equivalent to the world, but more than the 




The transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-experientialist models of love and divine 
ontology are thus mutually exclusive of one another. There could be no resolution of the conflict 
of interpretations regarding divine love without drastic revision of one or both ontologies since 
there is an irreconcilable difference between the transcendent, sovereignly willed, unaffected and 
unenriched election love of the transcendent-voluntarist model and the all-sympathetic, 
immanent, affected and enriched, direct and adequate, desire-filled feeling love of the immanent-
experientialist model. 
Chapter 3 concluded by presenting numerous examples of other, recent reactions to both 
models, which demonstrated the current dissatisfaction in light of the conflict of interpretations 
with regard to the definition of divine love itself as well as underlying ontology. At the juncture 
of the ongoing conflict of interpretations is whether God and humans can enter into a reciprocal 
love relationship, whether divine love is purely giving or might also receive and/or enjoy value, 
whether divine love can rightly be thought of as arbitrary election love or whether it is 
undifferentiated universal love or something else, and whether God’s love is purely willed or may 
also be passive and experiential. The extent of the conflict between the models of divine love and 
the current dissatisfaction with both models served to indicate the potential for paradigm change, 
warranting investigation of the biblical data to ascertain whether progress in overcoming the 
perceived shortcomings of the models is attainable through a canonical methodology. 
The Canonical Investigation of Divine Love in Relation to the World 
 Chapters 4, 5, and 6 shifted to the investigation of a canonical and systematic model in 
order to address the conflict of interpretations. Chapters 4 and 5 presented the canonical data of 
the OT and NT that were inductively collected from a broad reading of the entire canon that 
analyzed any texts and/or passages that might provide potential answers to the systematic 
questions raised in chapter 3, which revolve around whether God’s love is unilateral or reciprocal, 




reception of value, impassible or passionate, partial and/or universal, necessary or unnecessary, 
and conditional and/or unconditional. In both chapters most of the data were grouped under five 
rubrics that were extracted from the canonical text: the volitional, evaluative, emotional, 
foreconditional, and relational natures of divine love.  
Chapter 4 first introduced and surveyed the most prominent word group of divine love in 
the OT, bha, which may be used to refer to everything from the most virtuous love of affection 
and generosity, to a “love” that is more akin to lust and fades quickly after its rapacious 
selfishness is satisfied. Positively, bha may connote intense affection and emotion, including 
delight, rejoicing, favor, et al., whether of human or divine agency. Divine bha has an apparently 
volitional aspect, often related to, but not identical with, divine choice (election) but also 
evaluative and/or emotive, conditional though unmerited, and directed toward the ideal of mutual 
love (bha) as evidenced in the abundance of commands for human love toward God as well as 
examples of actual love (bha) toward God. Further, contrary to the influential view that bha is 
often merely technical treaty language bereft of affection, divine bha i s not purely “covenantal,” 
descriptive of a merely legal, lord-vassal treaty relationship, but depicts the type of emotional and 
affectionate bha manifested in kinship relationships.  
Similarly, chapter 5 introduced and surveyed the two most prominent word groups of 
divine love in the NT, avgapa,w and file,w. The avgapa,w word group, similar to the bha word group, 
which it very frequently translates in the LXX, displays a broad range of meaning including love 
that is affectionate, warm, concerned with, and interested in its object(s), love in the sense of high 
regard, value, and appreciation for its object(s), love that includes enjoyment, pleasure, and 
fondness, preferential love (whether proper or improper), and love demonstrated in action, often 
of a beneficent nature. However, avga,ph is not exclusively unilateral, indifferent, beneficent, 
giving love toward the unworthy and thus non-evaluative, purely altruistic generosity, 




is not uniquely descriptive of the highest divine love distinct from and exclusive of other, 
supposedly lesser, terms of love (i.e., eros, file,w) but may itself describe negative love. The 
significant increase in usage of the avgapa,w word group in the LXX and NT does not posit avgapa,w 
as a qualitatively greater kind of love but is likely explained by a linguistic shift around the time 
of the LXX. While eros is absent altogether in the NT and appears very rarely in the OT LXX, 
the file,w word group may also describe the highest of love, divine love itself, and overlaps 
significantly (even interchangeably in many contexts) with the range of meaning of the avgapa,w 
word group. The file,w word group may connote affectionate love, fondness, attraction, concern, 
special interest, and/or enjoyment/pleasure in or valuing of someone or something, often 
appearing in the context of close association with the potential connotation of belonging, at times 
in the sense of friendship or family but extending to virtually any kind of association.  
The Volitional Aspect of Divine Love in the OT and NT 
With the background of the most prominent OT and NT word groups in place, both 
chapters proceeded to discuss the volitional aspect of divine love toward creatures, which is 
neither necessary nor strictly arbitrary, closely associated with the divine will and election, but 
not exclusive of evaluation and emotion. Chapters 4 and 5 first introduced the prominent 
terminology relative to the volitional aspect of divine love. Chapter 4 surveyed the rxb and !nx 
word groups, while chapter 5 surveyed the semantics of election in the NT including the qe,lw, 
bou,lomai, evkle,gomai, and kale,w word groups.  
The !nx word group is most often translated as favor or grace, and may refer to a positive, 
favorable disposition and/or action from one to another and may refer to God’s favor or grace 
toward someone whether arbitrarily bestowed or based on positive evaluation and/or 
conditionality of appropriate response. rxb is the primary term of divine election or choice in the 
OT and thus depicts strong volition, though it often also connotes evaluation and examination as 




with divine love but should not be conflated with it and sometimes refers to unfulfilled divine 
desires and overlaps with God’s desire and delight.  
The terms of God’s will and election in the NT similarly relate closely with divine love 
but are not identical thereto and evidence not only divine volition but also divine desire, delight, 
and evaluation as well as the fact that God’s will is not always carried out. The sense of God’s 
will, desire, or that which God takes pleasure in may be depicted by both the qe,lw and bou,lomai 
but both also refer, at times, to God’s unfulfilled desires. NT terms of election, the evkle,gomai and 
kale,w word groups, refer with divine agency to God’s election and calling respectively, often 
with the connotation of evaluation. Both may connote the sense of an invitation that may be (or 
may have already been) accepted or rejected. Thus, the “called” and “elect” as they relate to the 
objects of divine love and/or salvation are not thus by God’s unilateral decision. God’s decision 
to love at all is a necessary but not sufficient condition for “the called” and the “elect.”  
In both the OT and NT, election is often for a vocational purpose and never amounts to 
arbitrary election of an individual or group to salvation. While election may be undeserved and 
foreconditional, its attendant privileges are not unconditional, wholly arbitrary, or unending. 
God’s people are not automatically privy to God’s covenantal promises, which contain elements 
of conditionality and unconditionality. This relational responsiveness is often depicted by kinship 
metaphors such as the parent-child and marriage metaphors, both of which connote the voluntary 
and affectionate nature of the divine-human love relationship. Further, God has the right to 
bestow mercy and compassion even on those who are egregiously undeserving but does not 
arbitrarily elect those who will receive mercy in exclusion to others. Divine election imposes 
conditions and responds to human responsibility, and the divine will is not depicted in the OT or 
NT as unilaterally efficacious. Indeed, the divine will may be unfulfilled and shows evidence of 




Although unilateral election is not taught in the OT or NT, the priority and importance of 
divine volition to the divine-human love relationship is readily apparent in the correspondence 
(but not identity) between love and election. According to the canonical data of both testaments, 
divine love is volitionally free, not the product of necessity, and itself the basis of the divine-
human relationship including election, covenant, and blessing. Further, the relationship of love 
and election overlaps with evaluation, even delight. In this way, the volitional aspect of divine 
love is complementary to evaluation and emotion and is not arbitrarily differential. As such, 
though the status of God’s elect is unmerited, it is nevertheless conditional and must be 
maintained by appropriate human response to God. The elect are not only those loved by God but 
those who love God (and others) in return. 
The Evaluative Aspect of Divine Love in the OT and NT 
Chapters 4 and 5 moved to the evaluative aspect of divine love in the OT and NT, 
focusing on the data that support the thesis: Divine love is not indifferent or disinterested, but 
evaluative. First, the significant terms #px and hcr were surveyed in chapter 4, both of which 
associate closely with bha at times and are often used with divine agency to portray God’s often 
emotive and evaluative desire, delight, and/or evaluative will or wish. Chapter 5 surveyed two 
terms that overlap between the conceptual spheres of election and evaluative love, avgaphto,j and 
euvdoke,w, as well as the even more explicitly evaluative term of pleasure, the avre,skw word group 
among others. The euvdoke,w word group corresponds to the hcr and #pex' word groups, often 
translating them in the LXX, and generally denotes desire, pleasure, delight, satisfaction, 
approval, preference, and /or enjoyment of an object or course of action. Often, the preference, 
desire, or delight is evaluative, directed at that which brings pleasure and/or is worthy of 
selection. Neither the OT nor NT terms refer to a unilaterally effective divine will but may refer 




avgaphto,j, like the passive participle of avgapa,w, generally denotes an object of special 
relationship to the subject, thus beloved, one who is dearly loved, prized, and/or valued. 
Accordingly, the term may entail divine evaluation and affection, delight, and/or pleasure in 
someone who is party to a special relationship and thus relates conceptually to other such 
descriptors of special relationship to God such as the elect, called, and/or brethren. The avre,skw 
word group refers to that which is pleasing, acceptable, often used with both human and divine 
agency, consistently in reference to grounded, evaluative pleasure. 
After such word studies, chapter 5 presented two brief topical summaries that 
demonstrated the existence and virtue of evaluative love. First, the numerous instances of 
misdirected love were surveyed, showing that the NT assumes that appropriate love includes 
proper evaluation. Second, the objection that true love is altruistic was briefly examined 
according to the NT data that support the concept of proper self-regard. Self-sacrificial love is 
sometimes demanded by the context but is not itself ideal love. Divine love thus includes 
appropriate self-interest that is not exclusive to other-interest. 
Both chapters proceeded after such preliminaries to survey the evidence for evaluative 
love, providing clear canonical evidence that God has profound desires and is affected by the 
disposition of humans toward him such that God’s delight and enjoyment are evaluative. God can 
and does receive love and enjoy, delight in, and garner pleasure from his creatures. For example, 
divine appraisal is evident in the repeated statements of God’s delight in, or desire for, heartfelt, 
sincere devotion to him, which is contrasted with merely external sacrifices. Thus, the distinction 
between those who are pleasing or approved by God and those who are displeasing to him as well 
as the status of elect is not the result of arbitrary election but is grounded in the actual state of 
affairs. God may be displeased with his people and even come to hate them, but such displeasure 




Humans, though sinful, may bring value to God through the prevenient action of God, 
signified by the typical sacrificial system in the OT, which pointed toward the antitype, Christ, 
who mediates human offerings so that they may be acceptable to God and truly bring him 
pleasure. In all this, God’s love is such that he often manifests emotions of delight and/or joy over 
his people. In the NT, Christ himself is the object of the Father’s evaluative love. In both 
testaments, God’s people are his delight, even the apple of his eye; he often rejoices over them 
and accepts their offerings and in the future will rejoice over them with joy. 
The Emotional Aspect of Divine Love in the OT and NT 
Chapters 4 and 5 proceeded to present the canonical data regarding the emotional aspect 
of God’s love, which leads to the conclusion that God’s love is profoundly emotional though not 
to the exclusion of volitional and evaluative aspects. First, the semantics of compassion and 
passion in the OT were surveyed. Both the OT and NT utilize significant terminology to depict 
God’s profoundly emotional mother-love or compassion, which is signified by the word group of 
~xr in the OT and the evlee,w, oivkti,rw, and splagcni,zomai word groups in the NT. ~xr includes 
mercy but is more than mercy; it is an emotional love, a compassionate affection that often is 
manifested in merciful, non-obligatory action that goes beyond reasonable expectations. 
Likewise, the oivkti,rw and splagcni,zomai word groups refer to God’s intensely emotional 
compassion and correspond to the OT terminology in this regard. The basic meaning of the evlee,w 
word group, which corresponds in many respects to dsx and ~xr in the OT, may include mercy, 
lovingkindness, heartfelt concern, compassion and/or sympathy of a strongly emotive character 
that is often explicitly manifested in action.  
Throughout the OT and NT, God’s compassionate and gracious nature is manifest in 
intense affection and compassion for the plight of human beings, which results in corresponding 
action and extends far beyond any responsibility and reasonable expectations, including that of 




passionate and heartfelt than that of the mother for her suckling child. The emotional love of God 
for his people is often depicted by way of kinship metaphors in both testaments, especially the 
parental and marriage metaphors. The central themes of both kinship metaphors are God’s 
enduring and faithful affection and their continual infidelity such that God’s love is often left 
unrequited. In the NT, Christ is often moved to compassion by the plight of people in much the 
same way that YHWH’s compassionate love is manifest in the OT. 
Repeatedly throughout the canon, God’s freely-given, amazing compassion is recounted 
as the unfailing basis of his merciful, redemptive action, often responsive to human entreaty. 
However, God’s compassion is not unilaterally constant but conditional; it is sometimes bestowed 
prior to any conditions but ultimately its continuance requires true repentance as is poignantly 
displayed in the husband-bride metaphor throughout Hosea. Although compassion cannot be 
earned, it must be received  God’s call seeks to evoke response. 
Throughout the canon, divine compassion is complemented by divine passion; God is 
both anq la (Deut 4:24) and ~wxr la (Deut 4:31). That is, God is the compassionate and passionate 
lover. In the OT, the word group anq denotes the very strong emotions of ardor and intense 
passion, related to a basic sense of zeal, passion, or jealousy, for that which belongs to one, or 
envy for that which belongs to someone else. With divine agency it never refers to envy or any 
other negative connotation of jealousy but always to God’s appropriate passion and ardent love 
for that which rightfully belongs to him. Chapter 5 introduced the zhlo,w word group, which in 
the NT corresponds in meaning to the anq word group. 
God is intensely concerned for his people, yet human beings often provoke God to anger. 
God’s displeasure is never arbitrary but always a result of human action, which provokes God to 
anger and even hatred and animosity. Because of God’s passionate love, he is grieved and vexed 
and provoked to jealousy when his people are unfaithful to him—the rightful passion that God 




enough about his people to discipline them. Though God is often pained by the infidelity of his 
creatures, he is likewise greatly affected by their suffering. Indeed, the longsuffering of God’s 
love stands in stark contrast to the fleeting nature of his anger. Thus, God’s passion is balanced 
by his compassion, both of which described his wider love. Throughout Israel’s history, there is a 
recurring pattern of apostasy/loss of blessing/return/restoration of blessing/apostasy, and yet, 
divine compassion. God repeatedly wills, and longs for, a harmonious reconciliation with his 
wayward people, and his compassion and grace make such reconciliation possible, but he does 
not unilaterally effectuate relationship. 
The Foreconditional Aspect of Divine Love in the OT and NT 
This section of chapters 4 and 5 focused on data that support the thesis that God’s love is 
foreconditional and thus not altogether unconditional; bestowed prior to, but not exclusive of, 
conditions. Before the evidence of the foreconditionality of love itself was surveyed, chapter 4 
presented the meaning of dsx (“steadfast love, lovingkindness”), which overlaps not only with the 
foreconditionality of love but also with many other aspects of divine love. dsx, one of the most 
significant descriptors of God’s character in the entire Scriptures, is relational conduct and/or 
attitude in accord with the highest virtues (love, loyalty, goodness, kindness) and beneficial to 
another, which meets and exceeds all expectations (often manifested in mercy and forgiveness), 
in which the agent is ontologically free to act otherwise, and is responsive to and/or creates or 
maintains the expectation (but not hard obligation) of appropriate response from the recipient. It 
is often translated as lovingkindness, steadfast love, loyalty, goodness, faithfulness, mercy, etc., 
and may connote love, compassion, mercy, and forgiveness, yet also faithfulness, loyalty, and 
strength. 
Following the survey of dsx, chapter 4 explained the conditionality of divine beneficence, 
which overlaps in many regards with the foreconditionality of love. Though God’s commitment 




positive human response in accord with the expectations of God. Likewise, chapter 5 began with 
an excursus on the foreconditional nature of divine blessing. In many ways, the contingency of 
divine blessing parallels that of divine love. Love is not identical to beneficence but the latter is 
an outgrowth of the former, while both are foreconditional. That is, God’s love, as well as the 
frequent beneficent actions that flow from it, is unmerited, but not altogether unconditional. 
Throughout the canon, the ontological, logical, and chronological priority of divine love 
is emphasized. From the unmerited election of Israel to those who love God because he loved us 
first in the NT, God is the sole initiator of the divine-human love relationship. His love is 
amazingly enduring and he freely grants mercy and compassion to undeserving people who have 
forfeited the privileges of their special relationship with God. God’s foreconditional love for the 
world itself makes it possible for anyone who believes to be saved. 
God’s love endures beyond all reasonable expectations and is everlasting in some 
respects. Yet, the endurance of the relationship in particular is contingent upon appropriate 
human response, itself enabled by God’s own prevenient action. On the other hand, there are 
numerous instances throughout the OT that display the conditionality of love, including its 
potential forfeiture, which may even elicit divine hatred. Likewise, the NT states that obedience 
and love toward Jesus evokes the love of the Father and that of the Son. Such examples depict 
reciprocal, conditional, motivated, and evaluative love such that divine love may be contingent 
upon and responsive to human action. If both the statements that suggest God’s love is everlasting 
as well as those that refer to the forfeiture of divine love are taken seriously, it appears that divine 
love is everlasting in some respect(s), yet may nevertheless be discontinued. Thus, although the 
origination of divine love is foreconditional and unmerited, the continuance of his love and the 
attendant, promised, covenant blessings are contingent and conditional upon the human response. 
As such, despite the enduring quality of divine love, it is not unilaterally permanent. 
God’s love, lovingkindness, and compassion may be withdrawn, contingent upon the actions of 




apart from God’s initiative. However, response is necessary, divine forbearance and patience will 
not continue forever; it has a limit. That is, God bestows love freely to his creatures 
foreconditionally, but the continued reception of that love, and attendant personal love 
relationship with God, is conditional upon appropriate human response to God’s initiating love. 
Such a view is bolstered by, though not necessarily dependent on, interesting parallels between 
the biblical covenants and the grant type of covenant in the ANE. As such, God’s love is, in and 
of itself, everlasting and granted prior to conditions but its continued reception is conditional 
upon appropriate human response. This is the foreconditionality of divine love.  
The Relational and Multilateral Aspect of Divine Love in the OT and NT 
The final sections of chapters 4 and 5 present the canonical evidence regarding the 
multilaterally relational aspect of divine love. God’s desire for reciprocal relationship is evident 
in the many commands for humans to love God. Moreover, beyond the many commands of love 
toward God there are numerous instances that manifest actual human love toward God in both the 
OT and the NT. Importantly, God not only desires love toward himself but also expects his 
people to love their fellow human beings: neighbors and aliens, which, indirectly, amounts to 
love toward God. God’s passion for this relationship may result in temporary chastening when 
appropriate, but ultimately divine blessings will overflow upon those who respond to God in love, 
in accordance with God’s character of steadfast love. Keeping God’s commandments is itself a 
manifestation of one’s love for him, and divine love is also reciprocally responsive to such 
manifestations of human love throughout the canon. 
In all this, God’s love is ideally set within the context of a reciprocal relationship 
predicated partially on human love for God. Accordingly, God universally seeks a relationship of 
reciprocal love but enters into and/or maintains particular, intimate relationship only with those 
who respond appropriately. Yet, since not all respond positively to God’s loving overtures, God 




there is both a particularity and universality to God’s love. God wants to include all humans in an 
intimate love relationship with himself but this requires that humans reciprocate God’s love and 
God does not irresistibly determine that humans love him. 
That there is special divine love reserved for some seems apparent from the numerous 
instances that persons or groups are specified by terms of divine endearment including “beloved,” 
“elect,” “called,” etc., as well as the broad context of covenant relationality. Those who have 
entered into such a relationship will be “insiders” while those who reject God’s overtures will 
remain outsiders and, eventually, forfeit God’s universal, foreconditional love. In microcosm, the 
covenant people are treated as objects of God’s insider love, though the individuals within the 
covenant themselves may forfeit God’s love by scorning his overtures, as repeatedly took place in 
the history of Israel and Judah. Likewise, friendship is an example of such love that assumes a 
particular, as opposed to universal, relationship and is thus a form of preferential (but not 
arbitrary) love. Friendship with God, as all forms of “insider” love, is conditional upon 
appropriate human response.  
However, despite the revelatory emphasis on the particular covenant relationship of God 
with Israel, God’s love and care extends beyond the bounds of covenant unto all peoples, though 
not in an undifferentiated manner. Likewise, in the NT, insider status is universally offered. God 
consistently seeks a reciprocal love relationship with all people. Those who are privy to an 
ongoing, particular, and intimate love relationship with God (thus “insiders) are those who 
respond appropriately to God in love. As such, all humans may reciprocate God’s love and thus 
enter into and/or maintain an intimate and particular love relationship with him. This particular, 
intimate, reciprocal love that God desires with human beings is not unilaterally effected by him. 
God initiates and makes all provisions for such a relationship but it is nevertheless conditional 




A Canonical and Systematic Model of Divine 
Love in Relation to the World 
Chapter 6 revealed and summarized the broad outline of a canonical and systematic 
model of divine love in relation to the world, with implications for divine ontology and the nature 
of God’s relationship to the world. The five major theses, inductively derived from the canonical 
text, describe divine love as volitional, evaluative, emotional, foreconditional, and ideally 
reciprocal, and were described and explained systematically.  
First, divine love is volitional but not merely volitional. This contrasts with the 
transcendent-voluntarist model and immanent-experientialist models of divine love. The former 
proposes that God is the sole giver but never the receiver of love such that divine love is purely 
volitional and unilateral, arbitrarily willed, pure beneficence (thematic agape) to the utter 
exclusion of desire and/or enjoyment (thematic eros). The latter contends that love is not 
volitional but descriptive of an essential, and thus ontologically necessary, relation between God 
and creatures.  
That God’s love is volitional but not merely volitional means that it includes a free, 
volitional aspect that is not essential, necessary, or altogether arbitrary and is complementary to, 
not exclusive of, the other aspects of his love including evaluation and emotion. God is free to do 
otherwise than he does but has freely decided to love human beings; he is not compelled to love, 
essentially or otherwise. However, although God is ontologically free to disown his people, he 
will never arbitrarily remove his love. Yet, human beings may reject his love and disown him. 
Divine love is closely associated with God’s will and election, but the divine-human relationship 
is not unilaterally deterministic and God’s love is prior to, and the causal basis of, election. This 
volitional element of the divine-human love relationship, applied bilaterally, amounts to a 
rejection of determinism, process theology, and universalism. 
Second, divine love is not indifferent or disinterested but evaluative. The immanent-




up with the world due to the ontological relationship between them such that God benefits or 
suffers along with all the joys or sorrows of the world. The transcendent-voluntarist model, on the 
other hand, believes God is only the benefactor but never the beneficiary in the divine-human 
relationship. God as self-sufficient cannot actually enjoy, delight in, take pleasure in, or receive 
value from the disposition and/or action of creatures, including their responsive love. 
However, that divine love is not indifferent or disinterested but evaluative is evident in 
that God repeatedly enjoys, delights in, takes pleasure in, and/or receives value from the 
disposition and/or actions of creatures. On the other hand, God is displeased by evil, though his 
animosity is never arbitrary. Though some suggest that God should not enjoy or receive value 
from creatures but should be purely altruistic, God’s love includes a proper self-interest that, due 
to his free decision, includes the best interests of all others. Far from being selfish, such divine 
love is truly sympathetic, manifested in Christ’s self-sacrifice in response to evil. Further, while 
humans can bring no value to God and are unworthy of love in and of themselves, God has 
partially and temporarily suspended judgment. In the meantime, Christ functions as mediator such 
that meager human offerings, themselves only possible because of God’s prevenient grace, may 
be received as pleasing and acceptable to God. However, there will be final judgment, including 
the eradication of all evil, but until then God bestows undeserved love universally on sinful 
humans toward his ultimate end of divine-human love relationship. 
Third, God’s love is profoundly emotional and affective though not to the exclusion of 
volitional and evaluative aspects. The immanent-experientialist model views God as utterly 
passible, the universal feeler of all others’ feelings, such that love is identical with God’s 
universal sympathy, and thus indiscriminate rather than evaluative. On the other hand, the 
transcendent-voluntarist model presupposes the impassibility of God, that is, God cannot be 
affected by anything external to God; he has no passions. 
However, the canonical data demonstrate that God’s love is emotional, including deep 




and evaluative. Volition, evaluation, and emotion do not exclude one another, but God’s love 
manifests all three and expects reciprocal response of not merely external obedience without 
affection but internal obedience grounded in deep-seated affection, devotion, commitment, 
loyalty, and even passion. God is affectionate, loving, devotedly interested and intimately 
concerned, feeling sorrow, passion, and intense anger at evil, but also compassion and the desire 
to restore creatures to relationship with himself. God’s love is thus profoundly emotional but does 
not amount to undifferentiated sympathy.  
Fourth, divine love is foreconditional, not altogether unconditional. For both the 
immanent-experientialist and transcendent-voluntarist models, divine love is unconditional and 
cannot be forfeited. In the immanent-experientialist model, God’s love is ontologically necessary 
because God is internally bound to the world. In the transcendent-voluntarist model God’s love is 
dependent only upon his unilateral and arbitrary will to love and thus unconditional, spontaneous, 
unmotivated, and ungrounded, and cannot be forfeited. 
On the other hand, the foreconditionality of divine love means that God’s love is 
initiatory, prior to any human action, love, merit, or worth while at the same time God 
implements conditions for the reception and continuance of that love. Thus, divine love is not 
strictly unmotivated, spontaneous, or unconditional. God has freely decided to love human beings 
while expecting human response, which itself is only possible because of God’s prevenient love. 
In this way, divine love is foreconditional but never merited. While divine love is surpassingly 
enduring, steadfast, and reliable, it is not altogether constant or unconditional. Humans may reject 
God’s loving overtures and, eventually, forfeit his objective love. God’s purely subjective love, 
that is, his will to love his creatures, is unconditional while his objective love, including the 
benefits of divine love, is conditional and contingent upon human response. Further, the plan of 
salvation itself, that God will love a people, save them, etc., is unconditional. However, the 
specific recipients of that saving divine love are conditional. As such, humans can forfeit their 




Finally, divine love is multilaterally relational. God universally seeks a relationship of 
reciprocal love with others but enters into particular, intimate relationship only with those who 
respond appropriately. In the immanent-experientialist model, love describes the essential relation 
between God and the world. Since all are internally related to God, divine love is universal; there 
is no object outside of God’s love. In the transcendent-voluntarist model, God’s love is universal 
only in the sense of “common love” but love unto salvation is reserved for those who are 
unilaterally elected by God; the rest are damned. God gives but never receives love; all love is 
solely the result of God’s unilaterally efficacious will.  
However, according to this canonically derived, foreconditional-reciprocal model, God 
has chosen to bestow universal love with the intention of entering into a particular, love 
relationship that includes the reciprocation of divine love by its object(s). God strongly desires 
that human beings reciprocate his love and love those whom he himself loves in a multilateral 
love relationship even as the Father loves the Son and vice versa. However, although God’s 
foreconditional love is universal, God does not love all equally and uniformly. While God loves 
all with a universal and prevenient love aimed at drawing humans into relationship with him, 
God’s particular, relational love is conditional upon appropriate response, which he himself 
enables. Those who respond to God’s love become insiders as God’s beloved, elect, friends, etc. 
While God never unilaterally determines to remove his love from any object, any object of God’s 
love may reject intimate relationship with God and, if finally persistent in this regard, forfeit the 
reception of divine love altogether. On the other hand, all those who reciprocate God’s love will 
enjoy an unending love relationship with him in eternal bliss. 
This canonically derived, foreconditional-reciprocal model of divine love points to a 
number of potential ontological implications. First, God desires reciprocal relationship with 
human beings but does not effect his will unilaterally. Rather, he decided to grant significant 
freedom to his creatures while also himself possessing the freedom to do otherwise than he does. 




bestows and allows creatures to affect history. In doing so, God has voluntarily limited the 
exercise of his power. Further, God is passible (though not passive) and may be affected by the 
disposition and/or actions of his creatures including enjoying and appreciating value in the world. 
Though God is passible, he is ontologically independent from the world as its creator, and self-
sufficient with respect to existence. Yet, God has voluntarily bound his own interests (including 
his joy and/or sorrow) to the interests of his creatures while maintaining ontological 
independence from the world. 
Importantly, God is by no means passive in this regard since he exerts enormous power in 
providentially guiding and affecting, but not unilaterally determining, this history toward his 
ultimate end. In all this, God’s essence and existence are independent of creatures. God is other 
than the world he has created and not ontologically bound to his creation. As such, it may be 
God’s essence to love (at least within the trinity) or be loving, but the specific objects of God’s 
love are not determined by his essence. God does not need to love creatures (indeed, he does not 
“need” to create at all) but has voluntarily chosen to love creatures toward a reciprocal love 
relationship. 
Conclusions 
 This dissertation has addressed the irreconcilable conflict of interpretations between the 
transcendent-voluntarist and immanent-experientialist models of divine love in relation to the 
world. By using a final-form canonical approach to systematic theology, a canonical and 
systematic model of divine love has been outlined that responds to the issues at the heart of the 
conflict of interpretations over the nature of divine love in relation to the world. This canonically 
derived, foreconditional-reciprocal model agrees with the transcendent-voluntarist model that 
divine love includes a crucial volitional element such that God voluntarily bestows his love on 
creatures and, in contrast to the immanent-experientialist model, God is not engaged in a 




reciprocal model agrees with the immanent-experientialist model, in contrast to the transcendent-
voluntarist model, that divine love in relation to the world assumes divine experience of the 
world, which profoundly affects God (passibility) as God enjoys a reciprocal love relationship 
with creatures.  
However, whereas divine volition excludes passibility in the transcendent-voluntarist 
model and divine sympathetic passibility excludes divine volition from love in the immanent-
experientialist model, the foreconditional-reciprocal model posits that the volitional and 
emotional aspects of God’s love complement, rather than exclude, one another. God desires and 
voluntarily works toward a reciprocal relationship with all humans. This is in contrast to both the 
transcendent-voluntarist model, wherein God irresistibly elects only some humans as the 
recipients of his salvific love, and the immanent-experientialist model, where God’s love 
relationship to the world is indiscriminately universal and necessary to his being. God’s love is 
also affected by the choices and experiences of human beings, in keeping with the immanent-
experientialist model but in contrast to the transcendent-voluntarist model. However, in contrast 
to both models, God’s experience of the world is evaluative such that God delights in those who 
respond positively to his love while those who reject God’s love finally forfeit their relationship 
with God.  
In this way, the evaluative aspect of divine love complements and bridges the volitional 
and emotional aspects of divine love while pointing toward a further aspect that is overlooked by 
both models, the foreconditionality of divine love. Whereas both models assume that divine love 
is unconditional, the transcendent-voluntarist model due to the priority of the divine will and the 
immanent-experientialist model due to the necessary and essential relationship between God and 
the world, the foreconditional-reciprocal model recognizes that God bestows love prior to, but not 
exclusive of, conditions. Those who respond positively to God’s love enjoy an everlasting 
reciprocal love relationship with him, grounded in bilateral significant freedom, within the 




In all this, according to the foreconditional-reciprocal model, divine love in relation to the 
world is volitional, evaluative, emotional, foreconditional, and multilaterally relational and points 
toward a biblical-historical ontology. This research thus provides a path forward that is grounded 
in the canonical method, producing a model of divine love that addresses the issues raised by 
other models of divine love, is internally coherent, and rigorously corresponds to the canon of 
Scripture, while recognizing that this model is itself subject to revision and clarification in 
accordance with further canonical investigation. 
Suggestions for Further Study 
Further research may illuminate a number of areas related to the meaning of divine love 
in the context of the God-world relationship. There are abundant avenues for further research, 
including the implications this conception of divine love might hold for moral theology and other 
broad areas. However, only a few, more specific, lines of research will be suggested below. 
First, there is room for further investigation into the canonical data regarding divine love, 
which might confirm or correct the foreconditional-reciprocal model outlined here. Second, since 
this dissertation focused on the revelation regarding one overarching divine characteristic and, 
upon that limited basis, suggested some potential implications for divine ontology, there is a great 
deal of work to be done toward investigating and articulating other aspects of divine ontology on 
the basis of a final-form canonical approach to systematic theology. Third, the conception of love 
derived from this investigation may have implications for the nature of intratrinitarian relations, 
regarding which further canonical investigation is needed. 
Fourth, much work remains to be done regarding the nature of human and divine freedom 
in light of my suggestion of bilateral significant freedom derived from this foreconditional-
reciprocal model of divine love. While the debate over the nature of creaturely freedom in the 
history of theology is well-known, further attention should be given to the nature of divine 




than he does. This issue relates to the nature and extent of God’s freedom to love or not love. 
Fifth, systematic exploration of the connection between the divine-human love relationship and 
God’s law, which itself corresponds to God’s love, would shed further light on God’s character of 
love and justice, the appropriate human response of love, and divine judgment (itself closely 
related to the evaluative aspect of divine love). 
Sixth, the nature of God’s freedom is bound to the issue of the nature of God’s essence 
and existence and the manner of relationship between the two. Is God’s existence (life) 
determined by his essence (nature) or vice versa? Are they to be identified with one another or 
conceived in some other way? If God has significant freedom, as suggested in this work, it seems 
that God’s existence cannot be determined by his essence, but to what extent (if any) is God’s 
freedom limited by his nature? This relates to the question regarding the relationship of God’s 
love to his essence and his existence, regarding which the data of this study were not sufficient to 
provide a sufficient answer. 
Seventh, considerable work is needed with regard to the nature of divine personality and 
relationality. This dissertation contends that God’s love is passible and thus God is indeed 
affected by the world. How does this relate to God’s nature, immutability, personhood, etc.? The 
particularity of divine love depicted in this study requires relationally responsive personhood. 
What is the nature of divine personality and how does it relate to the age-old questions of 
ontology and metaphysics? 
Finally, this dissertation has come to the conclusion that love is manifest in action though 
not identical with action. Since one could make the case that all God’s actions are loving, this 
dissertation focused on divine actions only as they related to the specific questions of this study. 
However, further research into the loving nature of God’s actions, overlapping with theodicy, 
would further illuminate the full extent of God’s love and goodness. Such investigation might 
also shed further light on the issues of God’s action in relation to the final destiny of God’s 
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